§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHMy Lords, I rise to put a question to the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of which I have given him private notice, relative to a subject which is assuming a very grave importance. I allude to the differences which have long existed between Germany and Denmark in regard to Holstein. My Lords, even if those differences in their result were only likely to affect the Powers immediately concerned, they would have deserved a great deal more attention than they had hitherto received; for, undoubtedly, an alteration in the balance of power in the north of Europe which practically would impair the strength of Denmark, and thereby render her less independent in guarding the Sound, could not be viewed with indifference by this country. But it is not so. Those differences are calculated to be attended with a still more serious consequence. They are calculated to affect the peace of Europe, or rather perhaps—to speak more correctly—to affect the state of armed truce in which Europe now stands; and this, my, Lords, not at a distant date—not at an uncertain period, but within the next nine days. If the Diet of Germany should adhere to its expressed determination, before we meet again after Easter the fatal step may have been taken and war have been commenced in Europe. My Lords, the demands addressed to Denmark are, in the opinion of the Danes, such as, if complied with, would affect the honour of that country and impair her integrity, and Denmark has declared that with these demands she will not comply. Accordingly to the utmost of her power she has armed her people in self-defence. She has, in fact, done that which might have been expected from a noble and valiant people. My Lords, what are those demands? There are three points:—first, a denial on the part of the Diet that any financial laws passed by the authority of Denmark can affect Holstein, without the consent of Holstein; secondly, a demand on Denmark that she shall make no common laws affecting the rest of the kingdom and also affecting Holstein, without the consent of Holstein; thirdly, a declaration on the part of the Diet, that unless within six weeks from the passing of the Act passed in February—which period will expire on the 27th of March—the King of Denmark shall declare 2137 that he will not pass any law to affect Holstein, without the consent of Holstein, the Diet will proceed to the execution of the measures which, in the event of a refusal, it has announced its intention to adopt. Now Denmark in reply to those demands declares that it is beyond the competence of the Diet to make them. In that view she is supported by the King of the Netherlands in his capacity of Duke of Luxembourg, who takes the same ground. She considers that the compliance with the demand is inconsistent with the integrity of her power, and would make it impossible for her to carry on the Government. The impression entertained there evidently is that this second demand gives to Holstein a veto on the common laws of Denmark, and thereby practically establishes her as an independent Power, and impairs the action of the Danish Government. While, however, Denmark is resolved not to accede to these demands I understand she has made certain concessions. She called together the States of Holstein, which met on the 6th of March, and she submitted to them the principles of a new constitution of a most liberal character, comprising many of the best features of our own constitution—such as an Upper and Lower Chamber, entire security of person, the independence of the Judges, and various other principles consecrated by custom among ourselves. If Holstein should accept this proposal it would then be submitted to all the States of Denmark, to which this constitution was to apply; but if Holstein should not accede to it, it was proposed that there should be a Provisional Government for Holstein alone, until that happy period arrived when she could consent to form part of the general State. I believe nobody unacquainted with the former constitution of Holstein can understand the various changes introduced in this provisional constitution, but they are represented to be of a very liberal character, and grant to Holstein all that she can justly require, though they do not amount to a direct acquiescence in the demands of the Diet. I wish to look forward rather than backward. I have no wish to go back to the history of the connection between Denmark and Holstein, which has existed 400 years. During this period, whatever mutual causes of complaint may have existed, Holstein has actually acquired a great amount of prosperity, which united to her wealth and position, has attracted to her the attentions and patronage of the German States. Neither will I refer to a more 2138 recent period, when Holstein, misled by the fever of excitement prevailing in 1848, entertained projects inconsistent with her fealty to the Danish Crown. Nor will I inquire whether the German Diet has been actuated by perfectly conscientious motives, and has endeavoured simply to discharge the duty imposed on it by the constitution of the German States; nor, on the other hand, whether she is actuated by interested motives, and desires to separate Holstein from Denmark in order to acquire ports and a position in the Northern Sea which would make Germany a naval Power. But this I know, that the moving power is not the general body of the States of Germany—the moving power is Prussia, The real question is, whether Prussia, in the name of the Diet, shall detach the territory of Holstein from Denmark. I will assume that the King of Denmark remains determined to adhere to his opinion, and not to acquiesce in the demands of the Diet. Will the Diet proceed to execute its purpose—that is, will Prussia march an army into Holstein? If so, Prance will march an army to the Rhine. And more than that, with her great power of transporting troops by sea, she will send a corps ďarnée to the assistance of the Danes; and Prussia, having placed herself in a perfectly false position, France will have the greatest advantages in carrying on war against her. It is essential to the success of Prussia in a war with France that everything on the right of the Elbe should be friendly, or at least neutral. By the false step she meditates she would place an enemy's army there. At what a period, if she be so minded, would Prussia engage in this unfortunate contest! Where is she to look for assistance? The armies of Austria are occupied in watching the Italians, in protecting the Quadrilateral, and in repressing the excitement which prevails in Hungary. Austria is unable to move to her support, whatever her distress. Is Russia in a position to do so? Even before the intimation which we received from Warsaw, I did not believe that she had it in her power to render assistance. The Emperor of Russia has thought fit, from a generous impulse, and possibly from enlightened and politic motives, to make a great social revolution, extending throughout the whole of that country, and completely altering the relations between property and labour. This, therefore, is not a favourable opportunity to engage at the same time in a great foreign war. Further than that, these—I 2139 cannot call them insurrections, but these disturbances at Warsaw altogether change the position of Russia. However great the prudence of Prince Gortschakoff, whatever may have been the moderation and good sense of the Emperor in dealing with the difficulty which has arisen, there can be no doubt that at the present moment Russia could not move 150,000 men over the Vistula without having another 150,000 to guard her communications, and these reinforcements would have to pass through an excited territory and a disaffected population. Prussia, therefore, cannot look for assistance from Russia. Is this a moment when she ought to think of engaging in a war in which France will take part? A time may come—much as I should regret it—when France may attack Prussia; but let her not provoke hostilities, let her wait till she is attacked, and then let her rally round her the whole of Germany in defence of right. But if, unassisted, she opposes herself to a Danish army of 30,000 men, reinforced by an army of Frenchmen, she is perilling all that remains of the treaties of 1815, and perhaps even perilling her own existence. I have thought it right, in deep apprehension of the consequences which may very soon ensue, to call the attention of Her Majesty's Ministers to this subject. I have no reason to entertain any doubt that they have already foreseen the dangers which I have intimated, nor will I question that they have taken every step which to them appeared right for the purpose of averting these dangers but, under the circumstances, before we separate, I think we ought to know what they have done, and we ought to know what hopes they entertain of averting the danger which is so pregnant with ruin to Prussia and with difficulty to the rest of Europe. To enable Her Majesty's Ministers to make this statement to the House, I now ask the noble Lord the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, In what position the difficulties which have arisen between Denmark and Germany with respect to Holstein now stand?
LORD WODEHOUSEsaid, the noble Earl, in the very remarkable speech which he had just addressed to the House, had not at all exaggerated the importance of the question he had brought under their Lordship's notice. The noble Earl had stated with as much ability as clearness the considerations which rendered a settlement of the Holstein question vital to the interests of Europe. The question was 2140 one which it was very difficult to understand in all its bearings; its leading features were intelligible, but it would be very difficult to follow it through the complicated negotiations which had taken place between Germany and Denmark. The demand of the Diet, to which the noble Earl alluded, related to what was called the provisional position which Denmark wished to have established. The explanation of the demand, he believed, was that after the difficulty which led to the war between Denmark and Germany promises were made by the King of Denmark that there should be a common constitution for the whole of the States as regarded certain departments—Foreign Affairs, the Marine, War Department, the Post, and one or two others which were obviously points of common interest. These promises were given in a Proclamation by the King of Denmark in January, 1852; and in pursuance of that promise a scheme was submitted; first, to Denmark Proper, then to Schleswig, and also to Holstein. But, although this common constitution was accepted by the other portions of the kingdom, it was not accepted by the States of Holstein. Holstein demanded a larger share of power than he thought she was entitled to, and, therefore, as far as she was concerned, the constitution fell to the ground, and was formally annulled by the King in 1859. The Diet then demanded that a provisional arrangement should be made as regarded the State of Holstein, by which no law should be passed affecting that State—even with respect to the common affairs of the monarchy—without its consent being obtained. The Danish Government, although they had refused to comply with the demands of the Diet, made certain proposals to the States of Holstein, which were described by the noble Earl with great correctness. In those offers the Danish Government proposed, as he understood, that the States of Holstein should have the power of voting what was called the normal budget. The proposal was that there should be a fixed sum, which should always be paid by Holstein towards the common affairs of the monarchy; that that sum having been voted once for all, any excess should require the consent of the States of Holstein. But it seemed that the Danish Government made one reservation. They demanded that until the year 1862 the Budget, which had been fixed by decree of the King for two years, should remain in force. To that the States 2141 very strongly objected; and Her Majesty's Government had that day received intelligence from Copenhagen that the King of Denmark had conceded that point, and had consented that the whole Budget should, to adopt the expression used in the intelligence, "be submitted to the deliberative vote of the States of Holstein." This point was of the more importance because a very short time subsequent to the demand of the Diet Her Majesty's Government, acting in concert with the Governments of Prance and Russia, recommended to Denmark to submit to the States of Holstein the Budget for the common affairs of the monarchy, because they thought that at any rate those States should have the power of saying yes or no to a proposal so important to their interests. The Danish Government had replied to that desire expressed by the three Great Powers of Europe in the manner he had mentioned; and Her Majesty's Government could not but hope that the Prussian Government, which, as the noble Earl correctly says, is principally concerned, will see in this the means of arriving at a satisfactory termination of this most unfortunate dispute. They had all along given conciliatory advice to both the Danish and the Prussian Governments, and had recommended them to be conciliatory towards each other, and to seek for some pacific solution of this question. He would not any more than the noble Earl go into the various matters in discussion between Denmark and the Diet of Germany and Prussia, but he could not help saying that it seemed to him that both parties had been considerably in fault. On the one side the German Governments had undoubtedly made demands which appeared to go beyond the concessions promised by the Danish Government in 1850 and in 1851; and on the other side he did not think that the Danish Government was entirely exempt from the charge of not having treated with entire equality the Danish and German population in the duchy of Schleswig; but the fact was that other questions lay behind the questions which were immediately in discussion. The original question was the union of Holstein and Schleswig, and, although in the discussions which were now going on the duchy of Holstein alone appeared to be concerned, the question of the duchy of Schleswig lay behind that question, embittered the relations between Germany and Denmark, and had hitherto rendered 2142 ineffective all efforts at conciliation. Denmark had great reason to complain of the agitation Which had been excited throughout her provinces by the manner in which this question had been put forward; but at the same time she, in her natural anxiety to support Danish nationality, had not observed strict impartiality. At the present moment, however, he thought that Denmark had shown a spirit of conciliation, which ought to induce Germany to come to an arrangement with her; and he was quite certain that those dangers to which the noble Earl had called attention, and which embraced questions of far greater scope than that of Denmark and Holstein, ought to weigh strongly with the German Confederation and with Prussia, and ought to lead them, instead of irritating Denmark, a State which, although small in position, is of great importance to Germany and Europe, to seek means by which she might be converted into a firm and useful Ally to the Confederation.
Before sitting down he would take the opportunity of stating in reply to a question which was put to him by the noble Viscount (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe) the other evening, that his noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office was of opinion that he could not consistently with the interests of the public service produce the despatches which had been received from Her Majesty's Consul General at Warsaw with reference to the recent disturbances in that city.
§ VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEsaid, that he was not surprised at the answer which had been given by his noble Friend, but he did expect that, considering the importance of the subject, his noble Friend would have taken the opportunity of stating the circumstances as they had been reported to the Foreign Office. It would appear that the promises which had been received from the Russian Government were not by any means so satisfactory as their Lordships might have been led to imagine; because, although it would seem that there was an intention to establish a Council at Warsaw, and to allow the country to elect municipal councils throughout the kingdom, yet there was no appearance of any intention to place at the head of the Council any person upon whom the Polish nation was at all likely to rely. If that proof of sincerity were not given by the Russian Government it would not be surprising if the effect upon the Polish people, excited as they were by the loss of 2143 life which took place a few days ago, should be such as to occasion fresh riots and outbreaks, which might prove dangerous to the peace of Europe. He had heard with satisfaction the opinions which his noble Friend opposite had expressed so clearly and powerfully with reference to the differences between Denmark and the German Confederation, and he trusted that what had fallen from the noble Earl might have sufficient influence to give us another chance of preserving peace, and avoiding the settlement of these disputes by an appeal to arms.