Lords Sitting of 1 March 1861

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILL—1ª Bank of England Payments.
AFFAIRS OF ITALY.

  PAPERS MOVED FOR.
  THE MARQUESS OF NORMANBYsaid, that the Papers for which he intended to move at the conclusion of the remarks he was about to offer on the present position of Italian affairs were these:—
  "Copies of any Despatches which have been exchanged between Her Majesty's Government and those of France, Sardinia, or of any other European Power on the Question of the Recognition of the Blockade of Gaeta:
  "Copies of any Despatches from Her Majesty's Minister at Turin containing a Report of the Number of Persons qualified to vote, and of those who actually did vote, at the last Elections in Italy:
  "Similar Returns of the partial Re-elections in September last:
  "Copies of any Despatches transmitting the Proclamations and General Orders of Generals Cialdini di Sonnez and Pinelli as to the Struggle going on in the Abruzzi and other Parts of the Neapolitan Dominions between the Neapolitan Royalists and the Piedmontese Army:
  "Copies of any Despatches giving an Explanation of the Royal Decree arbitrarily abolishing the administrative Autonomy of Tuscany, immediately preceding the Meeting of the National Parliament which was summoned nominally to decide upon the Re-construction of the whole Country:
  "Copy of any Despatches from Mr. Eliot giving an account of the Proceedings with reference to
  the Plébiscite which extinguished the separate Existence of the Government of the Two Sicilies:
  "Copy of any Despatches explaining the extraordinary Circumstance that some of the Constitutional Ministers of The King of Naples remained without any Intermission in the same confidential Situation under General Garibaldi:
  "Copies of any Reports made to the Lords of the Admiralty from the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's Fleet in the Mediterranean as to the Part taken by that Fleet from the Landing of Garibaldi and during the Invasion of the Country by King Victor Emmanuel."
  The noble Marquess said, he moved for these despatches because he thought that they touched upon most important points—points which, according to his opinion, were quite indispensable for the fair and full consideration of the question, and they were points on which the papers now before them gave no information whatever. Every succeeding instalment of papers on Italy which had been presented by the present Government showed that a very small quantity of matter could be spread over a large surface. Certainly the papers of the present Government formed a very striking contrast with the productions of his noble Friend who was Foreign Secretary in the administration of Lord Derby, which created a great sensation, and were universally felt to give a clear, candid, and full explanation of Italian affairs. No one could fail to remark, on reading the despatches of the present Government, the very small part which Her Majesty's Minister at Turin, Sir James Hudson, seemed to have taken in these proceedings. He was convinced that that favoured diplomatist occupying a distinguished post had had many communications with Count Cavour—indeed, it was a subject of attack in the Sardinian Chambers that England had too much influence and control in the internal affairs of that country. But whatever the communications had been between Sir James Hudson and Count Cavour, their value was very much diminished when it appeared they were not of a nature that his Government could present them to the Legislature of this country. He was quite sure that if Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, or Sir Henry Bulwer, or Sir Hamilton Seymour, had been our Minister at Turin during a period full of great events they would have put forward clear and statesmanlike views on the aspect of affairs; and certainly if Sir James Hudson were now to close his career, he would be known principally for having been egregiously duped by his friend the

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  Sardinian Minister last year, when he stated, in a communication to him as the representative of this country, that the King of Sardinia had no intention of selling or exchanging or bartering any part of his dominions. While on the question of Savoy and Nice, he could not help remarking on the changed tone of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary as shown in the whispering humbleness with which in these papers he suggested that France should offer Switzerland any security "short of a cession of territory." Indeed, why last year the noble Lord declared that no proposition could be admitted short of ceding to Switzerland a military zone bordering the lake. The French Government treated his propositions rather contemptuously, and—quantum, mutatus ab illo!—the noble Lord withdrew them with as much callous indifference as if they had been merely a Reform Bill. Now, with regard to the papers produced last year—their Lordships would recollect that during last Session there was a moment when this House might have interfered if not with effect, at least, with dignity; but they were prevented by not being in possession of important information with which, it appears, the Government must have been in a position to communicate. On the 7th of February, he called attention to the subject of Savoy and Nice, and the noble Earl the President of the Council by his answer led them to believe that the French Government had no intention of proceeding to the annexation of those provinces. Yet, on the 5th of February, Lord Cowley had written a despatch, distinctly stating that he had heard, both from Count Walewski and M. Thouvenel, that such a thing was not only possible but imminent. The Government had docketed this despatch as only received on the 8th, and the noble Baron who represented the Foreign Office in their Lordships' House (Lord Wodehouse) stated in explanation that Lord Cowley frequently kept his despatches back two or three days. He had looked through more than 100 of Lord Cowley's despatches, and, except in one entirely unimportant instance, he could not find one that had not been received the day after its date at Paris. The noble Lord was bound to have had better official information before offering such an explanation. But there was another extraordinary circumstance connected with these despatches. Sir James Hudson's despatch reporting the deception
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  practised on him by Count Cavour was also docketed as received on the 8th; but the noble Earl opposite quoted the words on the 7th. He would also remind their Lordships that when Lord Cowley honoured them with his presence on one occasion last Session, he (the Marquess of Normanby) put a question to him, and neither from Lord Cowley nor from any one else had he received a satisfactory explanation why that despatch was three days in coming from Paris to London. And when he asked an explanation of this upon another occasion, the noble Earl stated that he supposed he had quoted from a telegram. But can it be supposed that Lord Cowley could not also have telegraphed an important fact connected with a subject about to be discussed in this House. Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary, with spasmodic vigour, had talked about England seeking other foreign alliances;—and what had been the effect of that declaration? The first time the noble Lord appeared in public after that declaration was at the Lord Mayor's dinner on the 9th of November; and there, so happy had he been in his search on the Continent for new alliances that the only Ambassador present was the Count de Persigny himself. Now it must be recollected that the noble Baron had attempted to prove that the warning given by Count Walewski had not been serious, because Count Persigny had known nothing about it. An ambassador is rather helpless as to contradictions of assertions whilst still at his post. But during a short absence in France Count Persigny made a speech in which he stated on this question:—
  "The Government of the Emperor received those warnings as soon as the Treaty of Villafranca was called in question, and above all it never concealed anything from the English Government. It is, therefore, contrary to repeated assertions with the perfect knowledge of all parties that the facts have been accomplished."
  So much for the attempt to make use of the name of Count Persigny as against his Government. He (the Marquess of Normanby) thought it was of the greatest importance that the Alpine frontier should not have been given up. But, as far as the lower portion of Savoy was concerned, he was perfectly aware that it had been the wish of the French nation since 1815 that their frontier should not be so close to Lyons; and there could not be a doubt that the Savoyard population preferred to belong to France rather than to Sardinia.
  Turning from the question of Savoy to

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  the present condition of Italy, the first observation he had to make was that, never in any revolutionary epoch which had occurred within the last seventy years, had there been such a persevering abuse of high-sounding terms as on the present occasion. They had heard much of national independence and constitutional liberty, when, in point of fact, these two terms had been used to force the population of Italy to accept exactly the contrary of that which they desired. National independence! Why, every country of Italy that had now been subjected to Piedmont, had always considered itself for generations past within its own limits, independent. National independence! When, at Naples, the interference of Piedmont was considered as much an interference with their national independence as the interference of Austria was considered at Lombardy. But the cry now was for a unified Italy. He could only say that all the habits of his life—all his personal associations—all his feelings would lead him to wish for the prosperity of Italy; and it was monstrous to suppose that he could be actuated by any other motive than a sincere desire to maintain the true interests of Italy according to his experience and the best of his judgment. But there were two Italies. There was Italy more or less federal, and there was Italy "unified," to use the phrase of the day which was as new as the idea. Federal Italy was the Italy of all time and experience, of practice, and of authority; the Italy of Machiavelli, of Dante, and of the principal philosophic statesmen and patriots from that time down to our own time; the Italy of Cesare Balbo, of Gioberti, and the Italy of Alfieri, Alberi Ferrari, and other eminent modern Italian writers. It was the Italy, of two men, who, as he knew personally, had a profound knowledge of Italy—the Emperor Napoleon and M. Lamartine—and who, though disagreeing on almost every other point, united in saying that Italy must be federal. The noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, who delighted to identify everything relating to the present condition of Italy with the period of 1688—a sort of monomania of his—would be glad to hear that Federal Italy was the Italy of Addison. In the Tour in Italy, which most of your Lordships must have read, he distinctly stated that her geographical features, the characteristics of the people, the nature of the country, made it impossible that Italy could ever be anything but federal. Against
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  the Italy of all these combined authorities, there was the new idea set up of what was called "Unified" Italy—the word was as new as the idea—the Italy of Cavour, Buoncompagni, Liborio Romano, and, he was sorry to say, of Lord John Russell. He was convinced that the schemes of a Unified Italy would end in confusion after an interval of civil strife. The proceedings of the Piedmontese Government to carry out this plan showed a singular mixture of audacity of design and timidity of execution. If Victor Emmanuel had convinced himself, and had been able to convince those about him, in spite of the authority of foreign statesmen and the experience of his father as well as himself, of the possibility of carrying out this idea of a Unified Italy; if he thought that he had excited sufficient enthusiasm to carry his point; there could be no doubt that he ought to avail himself of that enthusiasm to drive out the foreigner who still occupied the north-east corner of Italy. But in this respect he gave Victor Emmanuel credit for being a wise man in his generation. Commanding the left wing of the army in the late war at the battle of Solferino, he must have convinced himself that he was then no match for General Benedict and the Austrians; he had shown great alacrity in gathering up the spoils which the fortune of war had thrown into his hands; but no doubt he entertained a very lively recollection of the forces opposed to him, and was aware that the great difference between this year and 1848 was the presence on this occasion of the French army, the power and courage of which handed over to him the dominions which had been ceded to them by treaty. It would have been fair if the King of Sardinia, before invading the Neapolitan territory, had said to the King of Naples—though to be sure that would have been an "interference" with the internal government of Naples—but it would have been but fair if he had said to the King of Naples that it was impossible that absolute government could long continue in the South of Italy while constitutional government was established in the North. If he had done that, could anybody doubt who had watched the conduct of the King of Naples, in all his difficulties, that he would have received such advice in good part? One reason for thinking so was that the King of Sardinia himself seemed sensible that he had made a mistake in not doing so, for

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  the revolutionary papers here were told to say that he had made such a communication, and that the King of Naples had refused to receive it. But, luckily, Francis II. had in this country an intelligent and zealous agent, who immediately wrote to the paper in which the statement appeared to deny that any such communication had ever been made. But it suited the Piedmontese Government better to proceed in an underhand manner, and that their operations in Sicily should be conducted by bands under the responsibility of Garibaldi, and that he should have all the risk, and they should have All the profit—though Garibaldi would be candid enough to acknowledge that he had received the greatest possible assistance from the King of Sardinia from the first. Though the steel and the lead were Garibaldi's, the gold all came from Sardinia, and it was by gold much more than any other metal that the King of Sardinia and Count Cavour had got all their victories. It was notorious that at different times many hundred thousand pounds were transmitted to Sicily by the Piedmontese Government; it was notorious that just before Garibaldi entered Naples 25,000,000 f. were paid into the hands of Piedmontese agents in that city, who were to corrupt the officials at Naples, civil, military, and naval. It had been stated, and never denied, upon the authority of the Neapolitan correspondent of The Morning Herald, and he had heard it from other sources, that £800,000 were borrowed at 8 per cent and 2 per cent premium from a certain Milanese banker sent to Naples, and distributed by persons who acted for the Piedmontese Government there. The officers of the fleet were bought over, which was shown by the fact that in no instance would the crews go with them. Some of the Neapolitan generals were known to have been bought. The name of the notorious Nunziante is in everybodys mouth. Another general known to have betrayed his troops was shot by them in the back as he was attempting to fly. The moment Francis II. proclaimed a Constitution he put himself in the hands of Liborio Romano, whom he made Minister of the Interior. This man was intrusted with the formation of the electoral lists, and the advancement generally of the Constitution, all of which he delayed as much as he could. He did all he possibly could, too, to prevent a change of generals, knowing the existing ones to have been bought.
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  This was the state of things in which the young King of Naples was betrayed by those who pretended to be his friends; and it was this to which he alluded in a most touching manner in one of his Proclamations. "The traitor came," he said, "paid by the foreign enemy, and seated himself in my councils among my friends. I was young, and I could not believe that such treachery could exist." How could any man believe in such treachery?
  "For neither man nor angel can discern
  Hypocrisy—the only evil that walks
  Invisible, except to God alone."
  A most strange Proclamation had been issued by King Victor Emmanuel. Where a constitutional King came forward and alluded to his own character in justification of his proceedings, he could not be surprised if others followed his example. In this Proclamation the King stated that he had never hesitated between the throne and his word. In point of fact his Majesty never had hesitated; but it was the throne that he chose to take, and not his word which he ever intended to keep. How had he kept the word he gave when he accepted the Preliminaries of Villafranca and signed the Treaty of Zurich, and to which the noble Lord, the Foreign Secretary, himself referred as binding him not to attack Venetia? Lord John Russell, in his despatch of the 31st of August, alluded to this subject, observing,
  "The King of Sardinia was free not to accept the preliminaries of Villafranca and the Treaty of Zurich, but having renounced a continuation of the war, and after having given his Royal word to live in peace and friendship with Austria, he was no longer free to cast aside his obligations and direct a wanton attack upon a neighbouring Prince."
  These remarks applied with particular force to the case of Naples, because in all these despatches Naples and Venetia were treated on precisely the same footing by the Foreign Secretary. Did King Victor Emmanuel keep his word when he assured Sir James Hudson that he would never sell, exchange, or barter any part of his dominions? Then, what was to be said of that most extraordinary and unjustifiable attack upon the forces of the Pope? The troops under Generals Cialdini and Fanti, entering the Papal territory in a hostile attitude, without any declaration of war, cruelly butchered the German, Italian, French, English, and Irish soldiers in the service of the Pope; and the whole expedition would ever remain an oppro-

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  brium to Europe. This agent had told the Emperor Napoleon that his intention was to resist Garibaldi, instead of which, with forces ten times more numerous, he annihilated the Papal army. Again, did Victor Emmanuel keep his word when he told the King of Naples that he was opposed to Garibaldi's expedition, and that the use of his name by Garibaldi was a wanton and unjustifiable usurpation of his authority? And what opinion would be formed of the more recent conduct of the King of Sardinia among all men of honour? Garibaldi confiscated, and the King confirmed the confiscation, all the private property of the Royal family of Naples, amounting to 11,000,000 ducats, and including the dowry of the mother of the present King, who was a Sardinian princess. Their Lordships would also recollect how much public opinion throughout Europe was shocked when it was said that Garibaldi had conferred a pension on the wife and the sister or daughter of the Agesilao Milano who attempted the assassination of the late King of Naples. At the present moment this pension to a regicide was being paid in the name of the King of Sardinia. But His Majesty was impartial in the rewards and favours which he bestowed upon regicides. He had given the order of St. Maurice to one who confessed that he had been paid and employed to murder the King's own father, Charles Albert. This was a certain Gallenga, and in 1856 the following facts were established on the confession of Signor Gallenga himself:—That in the year 1833 Gallenga received at Genoa from Joseph Mazzini a dagger and 1,000 lire on an engagement to assassinate the King Charles Albert. Upon this being made known Gallenga was called upon by the Risorgimento, a Government paper, to resign his seat in the Chambers. He replied in terms sufficiently humble, sending at the same time 1,000 lire as a peace offering for the cannon at Alessandria,—"I declare upon my honour—upon such portion of honour which can still remain to me—that I did undertake this commission." The Opinione required the removal of Signor Gallenga from any further interference in the public affairs of the country; to which he replied, "Renouncing public life I renounce also the public press." The Opinione again returned to the charge, saying, "Can Signor Gallenga believe it possible that his quality of Deputy can be reconciled with
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  his confession?" Upon which Gallenga ended by writing:—
  "Turin, 1st of December, 1856. I do not hesitate to yield to the opinion expressed by the Risorgimento, and by almost every paper in the capital. I have this day taken the most prompt steps to resign the seat which I hold in the Elective Chambers, and I lay at the feet of the King the Cross of the Order of St. Maurice with which he was pleased to decorate me."
  This was an old story but now revived. The reason why public attention had been called to the fact was, that Count Cavour had caused Gallenga, for his own purposes, to be returned as a member of the new Italian Chambers, and again Victor Emmanuel had decorated him with the order of St. Maurice. This was a sad proof of how much the tone of public morality throughout Italy had deteriorated within the last four years; so that the man who had been guilty of what in 1856 was considered by every party an infamous act, and was deservedly driven from all society, this man was put forward by Count Cavour, and was chosen at the new elections, as one of the representatives of "regenerate Italy." He was now going to state a fact which was very generally known throughout the Continent, but which, with the happy knack common to Englishmen of shutting their eyes to everything abroad which did not square with, their own views, had only been mentioned in one of the public journals of this country, The Morning Herald. The people of England looked upon Victor Emmanuel as the representative of constitutional Government, and believed that if he were not supported everything would fall into the hands of Mazzini. Now, he had reason to believe that within the last few days a complete understanding had been arrived at between the King and the Republicans, and thereby Victor Emmanuel was to get the crown of united Italy, the almost avowed design of Mazzini being that, as soon as possible, he would take the crown off the King's head. From the year 1830 downwards it has always been the creed of the Republicans that if they could accept for a few months a united monarchy it would be so odious to the national character, so at variance with the Italian feelings, that the Republic would soon supersede it. Now there was a certain advocate named Signor Brofferio, a man of extreme opinions, but of great sincerity, and this gentleman had lately published at Genoa a journal called Roma e Venezia, in which he gave an account of an interview which, at

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  the end of 1859, he had had with Victor Emmanuel on the part of Mazzini, bearing a letter to the King from that person. This is the description of the interview:—
  "I gave the King Mazzini's letter. He read it without saying a word, merely smiling at times, as though he thought 'There is some truth in all this.' When he arrived at the passage where Mazzini recommended him to send Garibaldi to Sicily the King laughed outright, and said, 'To send him to Sicily is easy enough; the difficulty is how to maintain him there.'"
  This was in 1859, after Victor Emmanuel had ratified the Treaty of Zurich, Mazzini being then a person under sentence par contumace for treason.
  "These were the words textually made use of by the King. When he had read the letter through His Majesty said, 'Give Mazzini my compliments; tell him that I have read his letter with pleasure, and that I appreciate his good intentions. I wish to make one remark, however,'—'What is it, your Majesty?' 'Mazzini wishes to give 500,000 men on paper. I don't want so many. I should he well satisfied with an efficient force of 250,000 men. 'Sire, I can answer for the Italian people. Remove the coterie of intriguers who deceive it, and it will do wonders, Well, let it wake up, and we shall see.' 'Will you, Sire, permit me to invite Mazzini to a conference, in order to take measures to carry his proposed plan into execution?' 'What, Mazzini in Piedmont! Tell him to mind what he is about.' 'Why, your Majesty would surely not have him arrested?' 'I? By no means; but I can't answer for the procurator fiscal, if he falls into his hands.' 'Well, Sire, to prevent any possibility of danger from that quarter, if your Majesty permits me, I will ask Mazzini to proceed to La Verbanella, in the canton of Ticino, where I will meet him, and where we will both of us settle the basis of peace between the Monarchy and the Republic, to prevent one being devoured by the other.'"
  This conference produced a letter from Mazzini, promising that, if the Central Government ceased to prosecute the party and would give Garibaldi an assurance of its good wishes, it would take the initiative in raising Italy, and preserve an inviolate secrecy as to the compact. It would be seen from this letter that ever since the war a delusion was practised by the King of Sardinia for all these matters had been carefully arranged before hand. Within a few months after the time when this letter was written, Garibaldi was master of Palermo. He might state that these things happened—as far as he could make out—before the return of Count Cavour; but it was, nevertheless, quite clear that when Count Cavour was recalled, he accurately carried out the programme that originated with Mazzini. After all this he thought posterity would pronounce the name of Il Ré
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  Galantuomo in a tone of irony. But there was another name now vacant that he thought would better suit the King of Sardinia—it was the name of King Bomba; for he believed no King had ever bombarded so many cities as the King of Sardinia. As soon as he ascended the throne he bombarded his own city of Genoa; last year, under circumstances of the greatest atrocity, he bombarded the town of Ancona, on which the cannonade was continued twelve hours after the capitulation was accepted in substance. This was stated in the Sardinian Senate, and Count Cavour was called on to deny it for the honour of the Sardinian flag; but Count Cavour did not deny it; and, what was more, the correspondents of the English newspapers omitted all mention of the fact of the challenge having been given to Count Cavour. The King of Sardinia also bombarded Capua, which Garibaldi had refused to do. The fire was principally directed at the populous parts of the town, and the garrison yielded to the terror and sufferings of thousands of women and children, not to the destruction of their defences, and lastly Gaeta. He would now refer to a question which had been put a few evenings since to the Government in the House of Commons, when a question was put to the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs respecting the conduct of the Sardinian troops in the Abruzzi, that conduct impeaching the humanity of the Sardinian Government; but, when the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in answering the question, said he should be ashamed to argue in that House the humanity of the Sardinians, for that they were well known to be as humane as they were brave, could he have had any knowledge of the first proclamation of General Pinelli? It was well said in a clever book called I'Italia, published at Florence by Signor Alberi, "That sanguinary decree had in a few weeks sacrificed more victims than were ever attributed to Ferdinand H. during a reign of thirty years by his most determined adversaries." The following was the proclamation of General Pinelli, commander of the Pied-montese brigade in the Abruzzi:—
  "1. Whoever shall be found with firearms or other weapons without being able to justify the possession of thorn by a permit from the constituted authorities will be immediately shot. 2. Whoever is recognized as having by word, by money, or other means excited the peasants to revolt will be immediately shot. The same penalty will be immediately applied to those who by words

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  or acts shall insult the arms of Savoy, the portrait of the King, or the national Italian flag."
  It was stated by the Foreign Secretary that only brigands were executed; what right had he to make such an assertion? Had he never read the first order of General Cialdini, the Piedmonteae Commander-in-Chief, "Let all the peasants taken in arms be shot. I begin to-day." The name of brigand, then, is an invention of the noble Lord; he stated this on the authority of the Sardinian Minister, who, of course, only repeated what he was told by his Government—on the authorit3r, that was, of the parties most interested and concerned in the denial. But what real information had the English Government of all these things? No one supposed that the noble Lord would have said what he did had he spoken with full information. But could they wonder at these cruelties when they found that the following was one of General Pinelli's orders of the day to his troops?—
  "Officers and Soldiers,—You have done much work, but nothing is done as long as anything remains to do. A portion of this race of robbers shelter themselves in the mountains; fly to unkennel them; be inexorable as fate. Against such enemies pity is a crime; they bend their knees when you come in force, but they attack you traitorously when they see you weak, and they massacre the wounded. Greedy only for plunder, they are for the moment the paid envoys, not of Christ, but of Satan; and are ready to sell their daggers to any one when the gold paid by the stupid credulity of the faithful no longer satisfies their rapacity. We will destroy them; we will crush these sacerdotal vampires, who with impure lips suck for centuries past the blood of our mother. We will purify with blood and fire the regions infected with their impure saliva, and from the ashes liberty will spring with the more vigour in this noble province of Ascoli."
  Let him count up some of the victims. It had been stated in a paper, dated the 9th of February, that at Scurcolla fifty persons were massacred, among whom were two priests, three women, and two children; at Avezzano, twenty-eight; at Tagliacozzo, forty-eight; at Iternia, all the inhabitants who were not able to escape. These butcheries were committed by the order of General Pinclli, and these accounts, with many more, he had selected from printed papers, French and Italian. There were some cruelties related too horrible to be believed, as that in some cases cords were screwed so tightly round the heads of some victims that the eyes burst from the sockets and the brains protruded. But it might be said these were hostile accounts—statements of persons interested in making it appear that these cruel prac-
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  tices prevailed. But what did the Sardinian officers say? In a letter from a Sardinian officer, published in the Independente of Naples of the 26th of January, he stated:—
  "When we arrived before Mazzano we began our cannonade. The brigands ran away, and we occupied the place, which was immediately set fire to, burnt, and destroyed. Other columns took possession of Cassara and San Vito, which suffered the same fate as Mazzano. These villages were taken by storm; all the houses, cottages, and buildings that we came across were given as prey to the flames. It was a terrible spectacle: all the animals—oxen, pigs, sheep, &c,—fled terrified to the hills; man was chasing man, horrible to see, but nevertheless true. The flames rose to the heavens on all sides; it made me shudder. From Cassoli, in the Abruzzi, the following details are given of the murder of a priest, by name Gennaro Orsi. This noble priest was taken to the place where forty-seven of his companions had already suffered death. After enduring innumerable insults, to which his sole reply was, 'You do not frighten me, you only excite my pity,' this worthy minister of God fell to the ground, hit by eight balls. But, wounded torn and as he was, he had the strength to raise himself and say, ' I fear you not.' It was then that the champions of the 'Re Oalantuomo' were checked for a moment by the courage of this martyr; but one of them, in a transport of rage, tore the crucifix which he held to his breast from him, and exclaimed 'Ecco la causa!' They then trod on the crucifix and destroyed it, and, tying their victim to a tree, finished him with their bayonets."
  Closing this part of his case, he would next call their Lordships' attention to the real state of the facts connected with the elections. As regarded the plébiscite, he found, for the first time, that it was supposed a people could give free expression to their opinions while a revolutionary army occupied the country, and when nearly all the provinces were in a state of siege. He had been informed of various circumstances connected with that plebiscite, which, of course, he could only give upon the authority of others; but the unanimity and numbers of those who voted in many places might be judged of by what occurred in one. It was stated that in one place, in the kingdom of Naples, in the neighbourhood of Sorrento, the Mayor sat at a table with the ballot-box on one side and a heap of bulletins on the other. Having waited some time, and no one coming to vote, the mayor observed that silence gave consent, and, therefore, thrust the whole number of bulletins into the ballot-box, which he closed up and sent off to the revolutionary authorities. There was another serious matter in connection with those elections.—he meant that plébiscite which extin-

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  guished the separate existence of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. What did their Lordships think of the genuineness of those elections, when it was known that six days before the plébiscite, General Garibaldi, still acting as Dictator, published in the Official Gazette a distinct statement, that the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was indissolubly united to the constitutional kingdom of all Italy under Victor Emmanuel and his descendants? What right had a person in General Garibaldi's position to declare that, and to anticipate the result of a pretended appeal to the popular voice? No country in Europe could recognize such an election. If appeals to popular suffrage were to be allowed to override all established rights, there must, at least, be a real and honest vote taken in order to ascertain the genuine wishes of the population. Their Lordships knew that in this country particular inquiry was made into the particulars of even single elections to a seat in the House of Commons, to ascertain whether there had been fraud or corruption practised by any party, and how much more necessary were honesty and purity when the issue was of such vital importance to the continual existence or summary extinction to a whole nation. But, could there be any doubt, after all that had been disclosed, that the pretended vote by universal suffrage was a perfect sham? Little was heard in England upon this subject, but all the French journals—even those whose correspondence was friendly towards what was called the Italian cause—agreed in condemning the unfairness of the elections that had taken place. The Courrier de Dimanche, which had been arbitrarily dealt with by M. Persigny, asked "What shall we say of this pitiable parody upon universal suffrage elected under terror—the mask of arbitrary despotism?" The Presse, a journal which was sufficiently favourable to the Revolution said, "Sincere opinion in favour of annexation there is none. The unanimity of the voting is not to be wondered at. It is fear that dictates or falsehood which proclaims it." Again, it was said, "There never was a more cruel thraldom or a grosser imposition practised upon the rest of the world."
  He desired next to say a few words upon a point concerning which there was great misconception in this country—namely, as to the extent of the franchise in the late elections in Italy. It was be-
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  lieved by some persons to be manhood suffrage. He had an account, taken from the official records of Turin, of the amount of votes given at the partial re-elections in September last. In these re-elections there were thirty-three districts of 30,000 inhabitants, each returning one member a piece—the population so represented, were above 900,000; but of these, by the Statute Piedmontese, there were only about 20,000 electors, or 1 in 45 of the population; and only 4,300, or one in 170 of the population actually voted. It has been said that the West Riding of Yorkshire is not sufficiently represented; but there, at present, 1 in 19 of the population vote for two members each for the county or boroughs. In the city of Naples, with a population of 500,000, only 4,000 had any share in the election, and at Milan, with a population of 300,000 or 400,000, only 5,000 persons voted. Those facts proved how desirable it was that the Government and people, before running away with the idea that the state of things in Italy was so very satisfactory, should obtain more perfect information of the events which had lately occurred in that country. Where can be found in these returns any trace of that enthusiasm of which we have heard so much?
  He desired to say a few words upon a subject which had been mentioned on the first night of the Session. He had then called their Lordships' attention to the two contradictory despatches of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary. He thought the English people had a right to expect, when their Ministers published their opinions to all the world that at least, they should be consistent; but nothing could be more inconsistent than the two despatches of the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department. If he (the Marquess of Normanby) had time and strength enough left he would go into detail upon that matter; but, at present, he should confine himself to a single remark. He wanted to know what was the position of the Government towards the King of Naples, who, he thought, had a right to complain of the interference of the English Government. The interference of the French Government was to prevent an unnecessary effusion of blood. Their vessels prevented a blockade, which never was and never could be recognised by any European Power, as the King of Sardinia proclaimed it without any declaration of war. But what right had Lord John

  1181
  Russell to regard as brigands a population rising in arms in favour of their legitimate Sovereign to whom they were attached? It was easy to talk of "brigands;" but a noble Lord who represented the foreign policy of England should exercise great care in applying that epithet to any body of men. While the garrison of Gaeta was still holding out against the Sardinians, and the sympathy of all Europe was excited by the undeserved misfortunes of King Francis II., Lord John Russell wrote a despatch to Lord Cowley stating that he wished to point out how much the generous intentions of the Emperor of the French had been perverted, and observing, "The King of Naples is free to retire; why does he not do so?" He frankly admits that he never read any despatch from any English Minister which, as a matter of feeling, he would not rather have penned than these cynical sentences. That language was addressed, too, to a people who, above all others, had the intensest commiseration for unmerited distress, and who had received the sentiments expressed on that very subject by their own Emperor in his Speech from the Throne with universal and unmixed applause. There were many persons now disappointed by the way in which that noble Lord had treated the question of Reform, and others who were astounded at his sudden advocacy of the abolition of church rates, contrary to all his former opinions. The noble Lord had also allowed himself to be overridden by that sort of sectarian influence which somehow or other unhappily beset the noble Viscount at the head of the Government. What if the noble Lord's firm supporters were to turn round and say to him, "You are free to retire; why do you not do so?" Such a result would be attended by a different amount of European sympathy than had followed the fall of the King of Naples. Let not those noble Lords flatter themselves that their foreign policy was producing any substantial effect abroad favourable to English influence in Italy. No doubt, the Italians might get up a slight demonstration of goodwill towards this country when our sympathy happened to be useful to them; but he had seen statements which had been circulated in the cities of Italy, and in Count Cavour's Papers saying that it was hoped that the Legislature in France would be as favourably disposed as the Emperor, since the interests of Italy and France were identical, their real alliance must always
  1182
  be with France. Again, there were other publications showing that the so-called national party felt how far they were from having any foreign support. In France, it was said, they had none except from the Emperor; in Germany they had none; while, from England they had only soft and honeyed words, and even those were employed out of jealousy towards France. It was also added, with respect to the feeling of the English people, so little did they know of foreign affairs, that a few articles in The Times could turn them all against the Italians. He received a letter the other day from an eminent Italian, in which he said that his countrymen all knew the origin and extent of English sympathy—that England wanted to sell, but would not fight—and they, therefore, felt that beyond words they would never get anything from her Government. In conclusion he must say that a policy which encouraged revolution and aroused what were termed nationalities could not but be most injurious to an empire like that of England, which contained millions of men of so many different creeds and races within its scattered dominions; supposing that adopting our theory and our practice some of the discontented subjects of the British Crown were to rise and throw off their allegiance, we should repress the attempt with vigour, as we always do, probably at first with success. But beware, my Lords, no nation ever permanently prospered which systematically, ostentatiously, violated that golden rule of universal application to States as to individuals, "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you." The noble Marquess then moved for the papers of which he had given notice.
  LORD WODEHOUSEsaid, the speech of the noble Marquess had almost entirely relieved him from the necessity of making any reply on the part of Her Majesty's Government; because, although the noble Marquess had, indeed, moved for certain papers on the subject of Italy, he had said next to nothing on the conduct of the Government in relation to that country. Before, however, he proceeded to remark upon what the noble Marquess had said, it would perhaps be convenient that he should state whether or not he could give the papers referred to. The noble Marquess had given a very long list of the documents which he desired to have produced—and that there might be no mistake he (Lord Wodehouse) would state how the matter

  1183
  stood with reference to these papers. The first series of them were "copies of any despatches which have been exchanged between Her Majesty's Government and those of France, Sardinia, or any other European Power on the question of the recognition of the blockade of Gaeta." Now, there were no despatches or communications of that kind. There was, indeed, a question asked of Lord Cowley by M. Thouvenel as to the course which Her Majesty's Government intended to take; but the matter was treated by Her Majesty's Government, not as one of policy, but simply as one affecting the ordinary law of blockade. The next part of the Motion asked for "copies of any despatches from Her Majesty's Minister at Turin, containing a report of the number of persons qualified to vote, and of those who actually did vote, at the last elections in Italy; and similar returns of the partial re-elections in September last." If that were a return moved for in the Sardinian Parliament probably it would be readily given. We were not specially concerned in that subject, and it would hardly be possible to supply the noble Marquess with such exact information, although, of course, the general results of the elections had been communicated to Her Majesty's Government and would be accessible to their Lordships. The Motion also asked for "copies of any despatches transmitting the proclamations and general orders of Generals Cialdini, Di Sonnaz, and Pinelli as to the struggle going on in the Abruzzi and other parts of the Neapolitan dominions between the Neapolitan Royalists and the Piedmontese army." Some of these were already contained in the papers before Parliament, though he did not find that the proclamations were among them. The noble Marquess likewise required "copies of any despatches giving an explanation of the Royal decree arbitrarily abolishing the administrative autonomy of Tuscany immediately preceding the meeting of the national Parliament." That was a matter which sufficiently explained itself. The next paper sought was a "copy of any despatches from Mr. Eliot giving an account of the proceedings with reference to the plébiscite which extinguished the separate existence of the Government of the Two Sicilies." The noble Marquess could scarcely have read the papers already presented to Parliament or he would not surely have described them as being so meagre on this subject. All the information of any interest relating to
  1184
  it which the Government possessed was, he believed, comprised in the documents on the table. The noble Marquess also wanted a "copy of any despatches explaining the extraordinary circumstance that some of the constitutional Ministers of the King of Naples remained, without any intermission, in the same confidential situation under General Garibaldi." That was, no doubt, a very extraordinary circumstance, and the noble Marquess was perfectly right in expressing his opinion upon it. But as to any explanation of it, it was rather for the Italian Ministers concerned to furnish it if they thought fit. There was a secret history of what took place at that time, no doubt; but Her Majesty's Government were unable to give that circumstantial account of it which the noble Marquess desired, because they did not happen to possess it themselves. The noble Marquess then asked for "copies of any Reports made to the Lords of the Admiralty from the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean as to the part taken by that fleet from the landing of Garibaldi and during the invasion of the country by King Victor Emmanuel." That paragraph contained an assumption as well as a Motion for papers, because it spoke of the part taken by our fleet, as if that fleet had been engaged in some manner in the insurrection of Sicily and Naples. Now, strictly speaking, our fleet took no part whatever in those transactions. The only occasions on which the British Admiral might be said to have taken any part were these. On one occasion during the bombardment of Palermo the commander of the Neapolitan troops expressed a wish that Admiral Mundy would afford some neutral spot on which the belligerents could meet. Admiral Mundy acceded to that request; a meeting accordingly took place on board of one of Her Majesty's ships, and an armistice was the consequence. Another occasion might be said to be this—Admiral Mundy had given an opportunity to Mr. Eliot, the British Minister, of meeting General Garibaldi, but of that interview the account received from Mr. Eliot had been given. There was also an offer made by the desire of Her Majesty's Government, by Admiral Mundy to the King of Naples to go on board of any one of our ships; but that offer was declined. There was also an allegation that some sailors had taken part in the insurrection; that had been inquired into, and it had been shown that it was a

  1185
  matter of no consequence whatever. These were the only points on which information could be wished. No doubt Admiral Mundy had mentioned matters of fact in writing to Her Majesty's Government; but, in affairs of this kind, the proper source of information was from the diplomatic agents of the Government. He could not help saying, however, that Admiral Mundy, placed in a position of great delicacy, had acted with much prudence and judgment; and, in the opinion of all who came in contact with him, his conduct reflected the greatest credit upon him. If the noble Marquess would amend his Motion by moving for copies or extracts of the various documents which he had indicated the Government would have no difficulty in assenting to the Motion. Turning from these particular papers, he would say that the first part of the speech of the noble Marquess was an elaborate attack on the King of Sardinia. That attack, he believed, lasted more than an hour. The noble Marquess read various extracts from the newspapers; he read some most secret and confidential communications he had received; he had compiled a great deal of information, and formed what he thought a connected narrative from which he concluded that there never was so shameful, so tyrannical, so detestable a character in history as the King of Sardinia. The noble Marquess drew a contrast between this most wicked King, who, he said, would henceforth be called "Bomba," from having bombarded undefended cities, and his favourite, the King of Naples, of whom he spoke in such high terms. He had not one word to say offensive to the King of Naples. Every one must respect the courage he had shown under the fate that had befallen him. He had expiated the faults of his father and those who had gone before him. But, in judging of political events, their Lordships must not fix their eyes upon the present King of Naples, who had reigned only a few months—they must look to the whole system of Neapolitan administration; they must contrast the conduct of the King of Piedmont and the late King of Naples, and they would discover the reason why the latter was called "King Bomba." The noble Marquess, going far back, told them there was an Italy of Dante, an Italy of Bocaccio. Then, coming down to the present time, the noble Marquess said there was the Italy of Lord John Russell. Now, the Italy of Lord John Russell the noble Marquess gave them to understand was
  1186
  United Italy. Now, whatever might have been the correctness or wisdom of the view with regard to Italy taken by his noble Friend, it did so happen that his idea was not that of United Italy. The noble Marquess must have read these papers with extremely little attention, or he would have seen that his noble Friend Lord John Russell, instead of advocating United Italy, said that he thought it better that Italy should be divided into two kingdoms. His noble Friend might or might not be right in the view he took, but it was rather hard to have views attributed to him contrary to those he had expressed. The view taken by Her Majesty's Government was not that they ought to decide for the Italians what should be their form of Government—not that, feeling a deep interest in Italy and wishing her people to be happy, they should tell them how they would be happy, but that they should endeavour to get fair play for the people of Italy, to enable them to decide for themselves what form of Government, what institutions, and what policy best suited them. That had been the course of Her Majesty's Government from the commencement of these events, and such it would continue to be. He would venture to say that whoever read the papers presented to Parliament would not find that the Government had deviated in a single instance from that general principle. The noble Marquess, after attributing to his noble Friend Lord John Russell political views he did not hold, went on to speak very severely of the atrocities he said had been committed by the Sardinians, and of which, he said, Her Majesty's Government should be aware. He particularly alluded to a certain proclamation of General Pinelli; but he suppressed the most material fact in regard to it. Most of their Lordships must be aware that General Pinelli was immediately thereafter recalled by the Sardinian Court. [The Marquess of NORMANBY: Two months after.] He thought the act of recall itself a sufficient proof of the view the Sardinian Government took of that proclamation. Then the noble Marquess also alluded to the proclamation of General Cialdini, and said his noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office could not have seen it. But that proclamation was to be found in the papers laid before Parliament. He was no friend of that proclamation—he condemned it—he thought it entirely wrong. But it would be found that Admiral Persano, immediately he was made

  1187
  acquainted with the proclamation of General Cialdini, sent to him to request that he would forbear to put it into execution. He (Lord Wodehouse) did not mean to say that no excesses had been committed; but it was well known that brigands had been infesting the country, and committing the greatest and most horrible atrocities, such as justified very severe retaliation. He would state a few cases gleaned from information received from our Minister at Turin in the month of December last. It was stated that bands of brigands were sent across the Papal frontier to attack the Sardinian troops; that these brigands cut off the head of a Sardinian lieutenant; in December they burned alive five Sardinian riflemen, who had been wounded and were prisoners. After the fight at Mozano a Sardinian captain, made a prisoner, was found dead and mutilated; another lieutenant was found dead, who had been taken prisoner; a Sardinian commissary, a prisoner, was murdered in cold blood. The accounts went on to say that the progress of these brigands was marked by pillage and rapine. All this occurred in the single month of December. No doubt there had been, in a great revolutionary contest, excesses committed on both sides; but he was not bound to defend every act of the Sardinian commander, or the Sardinian Government. Her Majesty's Government undertook no responsibility whatever for the acts of any foreign Government. They had sympathy for the Italians, and admired the efforts they had made; but Her Majesty's Government did not profess to defend every separate act of Sardinia. That was the general answer he had to give to the accusations of the noble Marquess against Sardinia. The noble Marquess had also referred to the plébiscite, and had asserted that the voting took place under circumstances which prevented it from being a true representation of the feelings of the people. Now, he (Lord Wodehouse) was not an advocate for universal suffrage; and certainly he did not see the necessity for resorting to universal suffrage in such a case, and inviting the great mass of the people to vote on the question whether the destinies of the country should be intrusted to this or that Sovereign. It could not be disputed that the people were subjected to influences of various kinds. But it could, at least, be said that the plébiscite, was preferable to the system which used to prevail in old times, when provinces, with
  1188
  their inhabitants, were transferred from one King or Government to another in consequence of some compact between Sovereigns without even the pretence of consulting the opinions of the people at all. Whatever value they might attribute to the voting in certain cases, there was every reason to believe that a large majority of the people did express their honest convictions. Reference was also made by the noble Marquess to the question of Savoy and Nice, and a very severe criticism was passed on his noble Friend the Foreign Secretary. Again he had to say that the noble Marquess had not shown that acquaintance with the printed papers in the possession of the House which he should have expected. Just before Parliament separated last year it was proposed by the French Government that a conference of the great Powers should be called to decide bow the Treaty of Vienna was to be reconciled with the Treaty of Turin. Her Majesty's Government offered no opposition to that proposal; but the other Powers expressed their belief that it would not lead to any satisfactory result. His noble Friend, writing on the 19th of July, stated that Her Majesty's Government, although they did not see the advantage of a Congress, were willing to acquiesce in it, and intimated the opinion of the Government that the only satisfactory solution of the question was, to provide a military frontier to Switzerland on the southern side of the Lake of Geneva." That was the view which his noble Friend expressed in the last despatch he wrote on the subject. That his noble Friend was not able to obtain that solution, he was sorry to say, was an indisputable fact. The other Powers did not support his view, and he thought it better, therefore, not to press a policy in which this country would be left almost alone. But the noble Marquess was not satisfied with condemning the Government of Sardinia. He did not, it was true, make a direct attack on Her Majesty's Government, or point out the particular acts of their policy of which he complained; but, in his extreme anxiety to find fault with everything and everybody, he directed his remarks against his own country. England, he said, would sell, but she would not fight.
  THE MAKQUESS OF NORMANBY: I said that was the view of the Italians, and a specimen of the gratitude which we received from them.
  LORD WODEHOUSEwould be sorry to

  1189
  misrepresent the noble Marquess, but certainly understood him to adduce the opinion he had referred to as showing the general course of our policy. It had never been the policy of Her Majesty's Government to seek favours from other countries in return for the sympathy or assistance which they extended towards them. The Government had always endeavoured to promote not only the particular interests of our own country but the general interests of Europe and the maintenance of peace. If Her Majesty's Government were anxious to see Italy united and independent, it was because the state of that country since 1815 had been a perpetual menace to the peace of Europe. The Government might be mistaken in that view; but he believed they were supported by a great majority of the British people. The Government had abstained from interference in Italy because they conceived they had no right to interfere. But when by the war undertaken by France a new state of things had been produced they were anxious that the Italians should be allowed to deal with the consequences of that war without being subjected to the intervention of other Powers; for they recollected that in 1821 the Great Powers sent an army to Naples to restore the King. The general principle upon which the question of the independence of the States of Europe rested was, that no State ought to interfere in the internal affairs of another. But to the application of that principle there had been and must be exceptions. Their Lordships would recollect what took place in Belgium and Greece. Notwithstanding these exceptions, however, which, under certain circumstances, were inevitable, he believed that the general principle had been recognized by every statesman and by every Government in this country, no matter to what political party they belonged. England held that there ought to be no foreign interference in the internal affairs of any State, and had discountenanced the idea of having a sort of Areopagus, which, under the plea of restoring order, would prevent the settlement of affairs according to the wishes of the people themselves. It was not for him to say whether the course they had pursued would or would not gain for them the gratitude of the Italian people; but he believed that at the present moment the Italians fully appreciated the policy which England had pursued. In conclusion he had only to express his regret at the tone of the noble Marquess's remarks,
  1190
  and to say how little he envied the sensations of any man who could look upon the course of recent events in Italy without one spark of admiration for the heroism which had been exhibited, and without any feeling of sympathy for a people who had struggled so nobly to regain their independence.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My Lords, the last words of my noble Friend's speech confirm the opinion I have long held of the risk which any Peer or Member of the Parliament of this country must incur when he speaks under the influence of such feelings as those which now pervade the public mind in England upon this subject; and, again, of the risk to which he is exposed of being charged with a want of sympathy for the Italian people in their struggle for independence if he does not approve of everything that has been said or done during the great drama that has just been played in that country. I must, in the first place, distinctly state that there is no man in this House who sympathises more honestly and more sincerely than I do with that people; and that now, after having known them for thirty years, I feel quite as much delight at hearing of their improved condition as I should have done when I was an enthusiastic youth making my first tour in Italy after I had just left school. But looking solely at what has taken place—looking at the facts as they have occurred, and not taking a poetical view of the subject, for we are not sitting here on the sunny slopes of Parnassus, but on the dingy benches of Parliament—I say, looking at the question in that way, and regarding the interests of this country as paramount even to the happiness of Italy, I think it is somewhat unfair to charge with a want of sympathy for Italy any one who takes the same general views which my noble Friend the noble Marquess near me takes of this subject. I think that his feelings upon this question, although they may not be acceptable to every one, can be easily explained, and are perfectly justifiable. He has passed many years among them, has been intimate with many of their chief statesmen while representing Her Majesty at one of the Italian Courts; and his personal predelictions for certain families, royal and otherwise, I think are natural and justifiable. I believe, moreover, that his complaint that the papers given by the Government to this House are insufficient is thoroughly well founded. I am surprised at hearing my noble Friend the Under Secretary for Fo-

  1191
  reign Affairs state that the Government has given us all the papers upon the subject of the blockade of Gaeta. I have myself been always disposed to discourage that redundancy of official correspondence which acts as a great impediment to public business; but I cannot help supposing from the statement of my noble Friend that he must have put an absolute veto on the transmission to the Government of any despatches upon this subject. Is it possible that there was no discussion with respect to the coming blockade of Gaeta? Is it possible that the Sardinian Government never expressed to the English Government their wish to put an end to the war by that blockade, and that the English Government did not reply in some way or another to any communication that may have been made to them upon the subject? Is it possible that the English Government had no communication with the French Government upon that point? And was there no attempt made by the English Government to induce the French Government to forego their prevention of that blockade? It appears to me that my noble Friend must have been engaged in shearing those despatches in the reverse of the way we thin our woods—by cutting down the larger and leaving only the smaller timber standing. It is strange—very strange—that we have received no more detailed accounts from Sir James Hudson and Mr. Elliot, with respect to the elections and the general feeling which pervaded the people of Southern Italy. I speak from personal knowledge when I state that the general practice of our foreign agents is to enter into even longer details than are necessary upon occasions of this description. I am surprised, also, that Mr. Elliot should not have said one word with respect to the rôle played by M. Romano, which many of us think so little to that gentleman's credit. But I suppose the noble Lord has overlooked those despatches, or thinks them to be so uninteresting as not to be worth publishing. The noble Lord in answering the noble Marquess has made use of a term on which I cannot help adverting. He says he wishes the Italians should be left to choose for themselves their own Government. I agree with him if he means that the inhabitants of the Peninsula should be allowed to exercise their own discretion in that matter without foreign intervention. But I cannot admit that the word "Italian" means a single nationality, for I am perfectly convinced that no two nations
  1192
  can he more different in constitution, in sympathies, in tastes, and even in race and origin than the Neapolitans and the inhabitants of the North. It does not, therefore, follow that because the principle of nationality is recognised in Italy its inhabitants should all form one kingdom. It appears that Lord John Russell himself took the same view of that subject which is taken by many people—and which, on passing, I may say I take myself—namely, that it would be more desirable to have two kingdoms in Italy than one only. But although that may have been the private opinion of Lord John Russell, yet, I must say that his policy, either intentionally or otherwise, has led to a diametrically opposite result. Let me go back to the beginning of those transactions. From the very first the Sardinians showed the cloven foot—but when I say the "cloven foot," I do not mean anything uncivil to that country. I only mean that, although Sardinia appeared in the character of a patriot, not a liberator, there was below the "cloven foot" of ambition and annexation. As far back as the year 1858, when I had the honour of presiding over the Foreign Office, the views of the Sardinian Government were openly displayed. Your Lordships must still remember the case of the Cagliari steamer. That was a vessel which sailed from the port of Genoa, and which must have sailed with the knowledge of the Sardinian Government, having on board a number of men who overpowered a willing crew, and made a piratical descent on the territory of the King of Naples, an ally of the King of Sardinia, and with whom Sardinia was at peace. Those men destroyed a village, and took away the lives of those who opposed them, and we were ourselves, to some extent, involved in the transaction from the accidental circumstance that two Englishmen were on board the ship when she was seized. From the moment we became acquainted with those facts we saw—what, no doubt, my noble Friend who succeeded me at the Foreign Office saw—that the object of the originators of that movement was to begin that great Italian war which was the dream of Count Cavour and of his master. An attempt was made, but made in vain, to entangle us in that war, and in assisting in its objects. I believe, however, that if the expedition of the Cagliari had been successful, that war would have been begun at once in Southern Italy

  1193
  which was begun two years later in the North of Italy. From that moment Count Cavour assured us that he had in view no object of annexation or aggrandisement for Sardinia, and that his only desire was to expel foreigners from Italy, that being a consummation of which all impartial men would approve. You know what followed, and you know whether Count Cavour acted up to that assurance. Your Lordships will recollect how we all trembled with the imminent fear of the outbreak of a great European war. We were on the edge of a precipice. I do not mean to glorify our-selves, but the Government of that day did all it could to prevent the outbreak of war, and failing in that we succeeded in localizing the contest, by inducing Germany to forbear from interfering for the assistance of Austria; for if Germany had joined in the struggle it must have assumed European proportions, and we could not, perhaps, have avoided being dragged into it. Austria broke the peace; the war commenced, and two great battles were fought. I believe that the battle of Solferino was a most providential victory—if victory it can be called—on the part of the French. Looking at the general interests of Europe, I am persuaded that it was a most providential inspiration, as I may call it, which then induced the Emperor of the French to stay his steps at the moment when a less wise man would have indulged in a feeling of exultation at what appeared to be a victory. I believe that if his uncle had been in his place he would not have acted so himself, but would probably have involved his country in a contest which would not yet have terminated. I regard that Peace of Villafranca as a most providential circumstance. It was followed by the adoption, on the part of the Emperor of Austria and of the Emperor of the French, of certain proposals which, although they would not have done all that we in this country must have desired for the promotion of the welfare of Italy, would have gone far to secure at once the happiness of the North of Italy, and of the South of Italy at no distant period. But when I am told that Her Majesty's present Government have adopted, in reference to this question, the policy of complete non-interference, I can hardly admit the accuracy of that statement. It is true that they did not openly interfere. But we have been very much misinformed, and the French Government have been very much misinformed, if Her
  1194
  Majesty's Government did not do all they could to prevent the exact fulfilment of the arrangement adopted by Austria and France. Under that arrangement Sardinia did not obtain the advantages she had expected. She was disappointed in not gaining possession of Tuscany and the Romagna; and if we have not been much misinformed the English Government encouraged her very much in her attempts to acquire those provinces. By the course which Sardinia adopted she put everybody in Italy, not in a dilemma, but in a trilemma. If you were a foreign Sovereign you had no business in Italy, and ought to be turned out of the country. That was the first category. Then, if your Government was a bad one, your Government ought to be brought to a termination. Of course, there was not a word to be said about that. But then, there was a third category which comprehended all who escaped from the first and second, and brought the whole country into Count Cavour's net. That was, that even if you rule well and wisely, like the Duchess of Parma, against whose Government not a word was said, you must go, because there could otherwise be no unification of Italy. Although Lord John Russell may not have agreed in desiring that Sardinia should absorb the whole of Italy, the policy which he countenanced led so completely to the unification of the north that it was only necessary to watch events to see that step by step the unification of the south must follow. Lord John Russell, therefore, though he may have wished to divide Italy into two parts, followed precisely the policy which would bring about unification. As I have said, my Lords, the feeling of this country is very strong on this subject, and I do not at all wonder that a people so fond of liberty, and so independent should be entirely with the Italian race in their struggles. But, my Lords, whereas, as I said before, independence of the foreigner and resistance to misgovernment are principles always to be supported, it is perfectly fair to have an opinion with respect to Italian unification; and, I trust, the question may be fairly discussed without any man being accused of bigotry, or a leaning to despotism. Principally from a common mistake that the Italians are all of one race, I have heard persons of all kinds—moralists, politicians, and financiers—go into ecstacies of enthusiasm at the idea of unification. The newspapers of the country have all been

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  clapping their hands long and loudly to the same tune. But I would ask politicians and moralists, whether they think it will conduce to the happiness of mankind, or of the Italian people, if Italy is to he converted into one of those great military camps which, in my humble opinion, are the pest of the age? We have ten times more men under arms in Europe now than a century ago. I never can believe that such a consequence of unification as this, with the inevitable grinding conscription and taxation which will accompany it, can be desired by the friends of Italy. As my noble Friend has told us that he is not the advocate or the defender of the King of Sardinia and his Government for those acts which were palpable breaches of international law and honour, I shall say nothing about them, but shall refer them to the consideration of the moralists. No one feels a stronger sympathy with the Italian people than I do; hut, if I may be permitted to address one word of advice to them, I would tell them to trust to themselves, and to no other nation for their liberty; liberty is worth nothing without independence, and they will never be independent if they lean on a foreign reed. I would also advise them when this war is over to smother within their breasts their most natural, but violent feelings against Austria. If Italy is to be a great and independent nation it will be as necessary for her interests and security to have a powerful Germany on one frontier as a powerful France on the other.
  LORD LLANOVERsaid, that having been in Italy at the time, and having seen much of the people of Naples, he could deny that the Neapolitans felt that their nationality had been violated by the annexation to Piedmont. He was at Naples when Garibaldi arrived there, and for some weeks after, and he saw nothing but general rejoicing at the course of events, and at the dethronement of the Bourbon dynasty. He could assure his noble Friend that he had come to an entirely wrong conclusion on the point. In referring to the Italy of different periods his noble Friend had studiously refrained from alluding to that period of despotism which had just passed away, it was to he hoped for ever. He could not agree with his noble Friend that the King of Naples would have listened to any representations which the King of Sardinia might have addressed to him with a view of establishing constitutional government. He refused
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  to listen to the advice which our Government and that of France gave him, though if he had followed it he might have been on the throne now. He had it on the best authority that when the young King came to the throne his Ministers urged him as strongly as they could to throw aside the principles of government which his father had followed, to restore the constitution which his father had sworn to grant and maintain, which oath he had altogether violated, and, if he would not go so far, they begged and prayed of him to administer laws as they existed in Naples in their purity, and not to ignore them, as his father had done. He believed it to be a fact—indeed, he might say he knew it as much as a man could know of anything he had not been present at—that the young King promised his Ministers he would do so; but he never fulfilled his promise. If he had he would not have been where he was now. The noble Marquess talked of the apathy of the Neapolitans on the question of annexation, but if he would read Mr. Elliot's despatch he would see that 19 per cent of the population voted, which was only two per cent less than the proportion which voted in France in 1848; and of that 19 per cent 99½ per cent voted for annexation. The noble Marquess complained of our interference, and seemed to think that the interference of the French at Gaeta had prevented great effusion of blood. On the contrary, he felt perfectly certain that if Gaeta had been left alone it would have fallen long before, and that the presence of the French fleet there had not only led to great effusion of blood, but had caused the reactionary movements which had subsequently taken place. The noble Marquess dwelt strongly on the confiscation of the private property of the Royal Family of Naples. But what was the history of that? After Garibaldi entered Naples an order was issued confiscating the private as well as the public property of the Royal Family of Naples. But if the noble Marquess would look into the blue book he would see that as soon as Lord John Russell knew of the proceeding he addressed a despatch to Sir James Hudson at Turin to read to Count Cavour protesting against it, and that Count Cavour in reply, had assured our Government that at the proper time every attention should be paid to the private rights of the Neapolitan Royal Family. So that if our Government had interfered at all in this matter, if had been in favour of the ex-Royal Family. The

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  noble Marquess had stated that there existed no favourable feeling on the part of the Italians towards England. Now, when he was in Italy he never saw any feeling wore strongly manifested. From Naples to Turin there seemed but one sentiment of gratitude and good-will towards Great Britain. The fact was, that although the Italians knew very well that we were not prepared to rush into war on their account, they also knew that they possessed our entire sympathy, and that when a nation like ours spoke boldly out through its Parliament and people its opinions would exert a great moral effect throughout Europe. As to what had fallen from the noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) he wished sincerely that the Italians were left to themselves, and it was unfortunate that the noble Lord did not give that advice when he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which he seems disposed to give now. If there were now no foreign intervention in the Peninsula, Italy would settle down and be quiet. The people were thoroughly prepared to undertake the management of their own affairs if the Emperor of the French would only let them; and he hoped that, from circumstances which had occurred within the last few days, his Majesty would see the impossibility of attempting to please two parties who were so utterly opposed one to another. The Emperor must make his choice; he must either go with the Ultramontane party and the Pope, or with the Liberal party. He hoped that the policy of non-intervention in Italy, which had been urged repeatedly upon the French Government by this country would now be followed; and he was quite sure that if the Italians were left free to govern their own country they would make proper use of the benefits which God had given them, but which despotism had hitherto prevented them from enjoying.
  THE MARQUESS OF NORMANDYsaid, that even if he were not reminded by his own physical exhaustion at what length he had already trespassed on their time, he should not attempt any reply for this simple reason, that he considered his statements had received no answer whatever; with respect, however, to what had just been said, though it might be an excellent thing to leave the Italians to themselves, they were certainly not in that condition when the noble Lord (Lord Llanover) was there. Was not the English legion in Naples at that time? [Lord LLANOVER: They had not arrived!] Then the noble
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  Lord's testimony as to the present state of public feeling in Italy was not worth much. He admitted that when Garibaldi first entered Naples there was much public excitement; but the sympathy which existed in his favour might be judged of from the fact, that out of the 500,000 inhabitants of Naples only eighty joined the legion of Garibaldi. It was not just to impute to the King of Naples the faults of his father, any more than it would be just to make King Victor Emmanuel responsible for errors committed by Carlo Alberto. The King of Naples was only about twenty-four years old, he had taken, in conformity with the advice of the Western Powers the very best man in Italy (Signor Filangieri) for his Prime Minister; and as to neglecting the advice subsequently proffered to him by the English Government, that advice was given in such a way that it would have been inconsistent with the dignity of an independent Sovereign to accept it. In bringing forward this Motion, his only object had been to bring forward facts utterly unknown in this country, and to establish the authority on which they rested with respect to further official information; he could, of course, not press for it in any other shape to which objection was felt by the Government; he would, therefore, withdraw his original Motion and move for further papers in the shape suggested by the noble Baronet connected with the Foreign Office.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.
  The noble Marquess then moved—"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Copies or Extracts of any further Papers respecting Italy."
  Motion agreed to.
  House adjourned at Eight o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.