HL Deb 25 July 1861 vol 164 cc1452-67

Order of the Day for the House to be put into a Committee upon the East India (High Courts of Judicature) Bill read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into a Committee on the said Bill.


—My Lords, I will, with your Lordships' permission, take this opportunity of ex- plaining the objects of the several Amendments of which I have given notice, and the reasons which have induced me to submit them to your Lordships' consideration. Your Lordships have agreed to the second reading of this Bill as passed by the House of Commons. I shall not offer any further opposition to the principle of the measure. I understand that principle to be the amalgamation of the Sudder Court and the Supreme Court. I must observe that I cannot by any means agree in the reasoning on which that amalgamation is proposed. It appears to me that those two Courts are incongruous; that they have not what I believe, in chymical language, is called "affinity;"—that they have no liking for each other, but rather the contrary. It is not impossible that on that account, if not on any other, there may be considerable differences among the Members. No one looking at the present constitution of these two Courts can say with confidence what the result of an amalgamation will be. The Judges of the one bring with them the knowledge of the laws prevailing in the provinces; those of the Supreme Court the knowledge of the general law. I agree very much with the opinion given by one of the witnesses examined before the Committee, that probably the Judges of the Supreme Court will prove much too strong for the Judges of the Sudder, and will have everything their own way. I do not believe that that will be a desirable result. It will have an effect injurious to the administration of the law in the Provinces, and to the character of our courts generally. But if we are to establish this amalgamation, at least let us see how it will work before we introduce the system into the small courts throughout India. Let us see what will be the result as regards appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. If it shall be a well-constituted Court—if it shall administer justice well—there will be none, or very few appeals, and their decisions will be generally upheld. If that shall be the case, there may perhaps be no objection to the plan: but it is desirable to see what will be the practical working of the experiment before we determine to extend it over the whole of the Provinces. We should make the Bill of a tentative and not of an ambitious character; we should see our way clearly before we finally decide on a matter of such great importance. There is one point on which I agree with the noble Earl the Under Secretary of State for India. When the Supreme Court was first established it was established to protect the Natives of India against the Europeans, and the Natives and Europeans against the Company's Government. One of these objects is no longer necessary, because the Government from which the Supreme Court emanates and that which rules the country are one: but the other reason for the existence of the Supreme Court—that of protecting the Natives against the Europeans—exists, and exists in still greater force than formerly, in consequence of the great increase in the number of Europeans in India. More than this, since they were established there has been a great extension of our dominion. I am willing to remedy any grievance that may really exist, but I would not go further than the necessity of the case, and the object of one of my Amendments is to provide that it shall be lawful for Her Majesty to appoint to the High Court at Fort William, in Bengal, two additional Judges, and to each of the High Courts at Madras and Bombay one. I think this provision, with an arrangement of a similar character for the Court in the North-West Provinces, if one should be established there, would be amply sufficient for the purpose of trying by experience how the system will work. Your Lordships must recollect that if an English Judge has not a knowledge of the Native language as well as a knowledge of the law he is utterly helpless in the Indian provinces without the assistance of a Judge speaking the language of and acquainted with the country in which he has to perform judicial functions. The advantage of an English Judge is this, that he comes with his mind fresh from this country. On his arrival—though not, perhaps, after he has lived for some time in India—he may be supposed to be free from local prejudices. But, my Lords, there is a most important and novel principle in this Bill which I hope your Lordships will reject. By this Bill the Crown has the absolute power of appointing all the Judges of those Courts—not only the lawyers sent from England, but also those members of the Civil Service who may have belonged to the judicial staff of India. That is a principle which I think your Lordships ought not to introduce in this Bill. It is entirely contrary to every pledge given in Parliament when the Act under which India is now governed was introduced. It is contrary to the practice which has hitherto prevailed, and I believe it is inconsistent with the in- terests of this country in India; and I am sure it is altogether inconsistent with the interests of India. It is inconsistent with the maintenance of the proper position of the Governor General. It is for him who sees the working of the law and the manner in which it is administered, to reward good conduct, ability, and honour. Those engaged in the courts of India should look up to him, the head of the Government there, and not look to some party in this country as the authority who was enabled to raise them to the highest positions in their profession—they should own no "foreign allegiance." As the Bill stands now, the Crown has an indefinite power of appointing barristers from this country to judgeships in those High Courts; so that a barrister who gets into Parliament, and who, for no matter what purpose, makes himself troublesome to the Government, may have an Indian Judgeship thrust down his throat. The office seems to have been created for the express purpose of buying the silence of the Bar. The Bill creates sixty Judges to administer the law in India —yet we are about to commence a contest with the other House in respect to the appointment of a single Judge. He is to have £5,000 a year; yet both Houses seem to agree to the passing of a measure which will inflict upon India thirty-five Judges, each of whom is to have a salary of £5,000 a year. We have suffered the Natives of India to eat of the tree of knowledge, and they now know the reason of all that is done here. I entreat your Lordships not to think only of our own position in legislating for India; do not expose the more deformed parts of our practical Government, and show the Natives of India that where we are not to suffer ourselves it matters not what burdens we impose on others. To do right, and to make them feel that we do so, is now absolutely essential to the carrying on of the Government. This Bill asks more than is necessary for the object which it contemplates. The universal practice of Parliament is to refuse to give more than is absolutely necessary, reserving the power of increasing the supplies when necessary. Government may, if it can, reduce expenditure; but Parliament will never give a margin or an elasticity, as it was called by the noble Lord, to any establishment within the discretion of the Governor General to extend. No doubt pecuniary Votes of Credit are often given in the face of dangers threatening from abroad, but I never heard of a Vote of Credit for Judges to meet some possible demand for increased judicial expenditure. Of all qualities of the mind, perhaps the most rare is the judicial. The Bill proposes that thirty-five barristers shall be appointed to act as Judges in India. My Lords, there are not thirty-five, nor, perhaps, five men at the whole Bar, of whom any one could with safety predicate that they would make good Judges. Success at the Bar is no proof that a man will make a good Judge. Within my recollection, I have known more than one gentleman most successful at the Bar—good, able men, and sound lawyers—who yet made extremely indifferent Judges. The fact is that the very qualities which enable a man to attain distinction at the Bar are the very qualities which unfit him for the duties of the Bench. Do you suppose that because thirty-five barristers of five years' standing each may be represented to you as so many Lord Mansfields, you will find ten—ay, or five of that number, possessing judicial minds? A judicial mind is a gift of Providence, and most rare. These, my Lords, are the objects and reasons of the Amendments I am about to propose. I assure your Lordships that it has been very irksome to me to press myself so often during the last two or three weeks upon your attention; but, connected as I have been with India for so many years, I felt that I could not absolve myself from the performance of that duty, especially where I held a strong opinion. I deeply regret the loss which the country sustained by the deaths of Lord Dalhousie and Lord Elphinstone. Had they been living, and in your Lordships' House, they would have spoken on this question with much more recent knowledge and greater experience than I am able to do. Had they agreed with me in opinion I should have been greatly strengthened in the views which I have advanced to your Lordships, and had they disagreed with me I should at least have had the consolation of thinking that my apprehensions must of necessity be exaggerated. As it is I must only express my own sentiments; and, feeling as I do on this subject, I have opposed the Bill, and now propose these Amendments, because, as the measure now stands, I believe it to be inconsistent with the good government of India on old English constitutional principles, and incompatible with the fair administration of justice.


said, it was unnecessary for the noble Earl to offer the slightest apology to the House for con- tributing, as he always did upon questions of this nature, much valuable information. But, for his own part, he had never felt clearer as to the principle which should guide their Lordships in reference to the Amendments to be proposed by the noble Earl. When the noble Earl spoke of the peculiar aptitudes requisite for the administration of the law in India, it appeared to him that the very fact that two Courts, possessing different qualifications, were already in existence, afforded the strongest reason for bringing them together, and combining the judicial knowledge and the acquaintance with the habits of the people which formed their distinguishing characteristics. With regard to the question of the appointment of Judges, he thought it most objectionable that legal dignitaries should sit side by side upon the bench holding their commissions from different authorities. Such a system would not only prolong, but, in his opinion, would aggravate the evils to which the noble Earl objected. The large number of Judges for whose appointment power was taken under the Bill had, likewise, been objected to. The noble Earl was mistaken if he thought it was intended to fill up all these offices. He could assure their Lordships the Government had no intention of appointing any additional Judges; the only object which they had in view was to establish one High Court, by combining the two separate jurisdictions existing at each of the Presidencies. The question raised by the Amendments of which the noble Earl had given notice was whether it was, in the opinion of their Lordships, desirable to establish for India a High Court of judicature, upon the bench of which were to sit Judges deriving their authority from different sources and under different circumstances. Now Her Majesty's Government thought it very undesirable that these high judicial officers should exercise an authority derived as to some directly of the Crown, and as to others from an unequal and inferior power. If, therefore, the noble Earl moved his Amendments he should feel it his duty to oppose them.


said, he did not mean to oppose the Bill which was founded on the recommendation of Commissioners of the very highest authority and introduced a principle which he did not dispute might be of use in India. But it was impossible to exaggerate the importance of this measure. By it the system of judicature now applied to 150,000,000 of Her Majesty's subjects was at once to be subverted and changed. The judicature of India at present consisted of a Supreme Court which exercised no appellate, and a Sudder Court which exercised little or no original jurisdiction. With respect to the application of law to the enormous population of India it would be a great mistake to suppose we had to deal with only two classes of people—Europeans or British-born subjects on the one hand and Native Indians on the other. What were called Native Indians, and the laws applicable to them, were divided into innumerable classes. There were Hindoos, Mahommedans, Parsees, Armenians, each class subdivided into many others. He believed that there were in India more than thirty different languages, and as many different sets of laws, religions, and customs, to the people who had become attached to each of which it was now proposed to apply one general measure for the administration of justice. His noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack was quite justified in his statement that if this Bill proved effectual for its objects it would mark this Session with an importance beyond any other within his recollection. But how the objects were to be effected he could not discern from the Bill. It proposed to introduce changes of the most surprizing character. The distinctive clauses were sufficiently clear. From the moment when it came into operation the Supreme and the Sudder Courts would be abolished, but the Bill contained no distinct provision with respect to the Courts or what was to be substituted for them. All that he found in the Bill was that they were to be composed of a certain number of that class which Sidney Smith called the primum mobile of all human affairs, barristers of six years' standing, a certain number of covenanted servants of the East India Company, and a certain number of Native Judges. He was far from saying that it might not be possible from these materials to constitute efficient Courts, and to provide for the administration of justice throughout India; but he did say that to do so would be a task of the greatest difficulty, and one which might well task the utmost powers of the ablest administrators. The Courts to be established under this Bill were to administer civil, criminal, Admiralty, and testamentary and matrimonial law—all different branches of law, which in this country were distributed among a number of different tribunals. Now, he did think that before their Lordships abo- lished what existed they ought to have some intimation of what was to be substituted for it. It might be very useful to introduce into the Sudder Courts that knowledge of law and of the principles of general jurisprudence which belonged to regularly educated lawyers, but would it be equally advantageous to introduce into the Supreme Courts persons who were not lawyers, and who, it was admitted, could know nothing of the system the important duties of which they were called on to perform? The Supreme Courts of the different provinces discharged their duties, as far as he had heard or had learned by his experience on the Judicial Committee, with efficiency, and with the confidence of those whose affairs they had to administer. Was it quite certain that the dignity, the weight, and the confidence which now attached to those Courts would be preserved by the new ones? He entertained doubts whether such would be the case. He entirely agreed with the observations which were made by his noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough) when the Council of India Bill was introduced, as to the extreme objection which existed to altering the state of things which was established in India, and with which the Natives were satisfied. As regarded the constitution of the Supreme Courts and their mode of administering their original jurisdiction, he doubted whether any alteration was required. The extent of their jurisdiction might probably be usefully increased, and there could be no doubt that the Sudder Courts might be greatly improved by combining the legal knowledge of the Judges of the Supreme Courts with the acquaintance with the local laws, and customs, and habits and language of the Natives, which might be found amongst the Judges of the Sudder Courts. He thought that out of those materials a satisfactory Court of Appeal might be constituted, and the enormous evil of appeals to England be greatly diminished. At present an immediate appeal to Her Majesty in Council lay from decrees both of the Supreme and Sudder Courts in all cases above a certain amount in value. If their Lordships could feel compassion for lawyers of any class, he was sure that they would pity those who had to decide these appeal cases, and they must at least commiserate the unfortunate persons who were the subject of such litigations. The whole of the proceedings were in writing of great length, extending sometimes to many hundred close printed folio pages. It was necessary to translate the whole of the record-pleadings, documents, and examination of witnesses, and judgments into English, and then to print them; and when the Judges in England came to the consideration of the case they did so with the firm assurance that in all probability nearly all the instruments produced by the Natives were forgeries, and nearly all the depositions of the witnesses were falsehoods. There was no exaggeration. The very nature of truth seemed not to be understood amongst Hindoos. He had been informed by a gentleman now holding a distinguished situation in this country that he was once engaged as counsel for an Indian of good position to maintain the validity of a will, which was beyond all doubt perfectly genuine. In support of the will witnesses were called to the number of a dozen, each of whom swore that he saw the testator affix the seal to the will and that he was of perfectly sound mind at the time. The truth was that not one of the witnesses had been present on the occasion; but the client justified the course he had taken in calling them on the ground that although the evidence was false, it was in support of a genuine instrument. That was the general feeling in India on the subject. These appeals were attended with great expense and delay, and involved the utter ruin of the parties interested, unless their means were very large; and after all the expense was incurred, and the best attention of the Judicial Commissioners had been given to the subject, it was often impossible from the nature of the case that the Judges could feel confidence in their judgment. He thought that by improving the Appeal Courts in India it might be possible to raise with advantage the sum below which no appeal was now allowed to this country, and by that means, and by the greater confidence which the Court would command, greatly to diminish the number of appeals to England. There was, however, one class of appeal cases in which he did not wish any change, and that was where the Government or their officers were concerned. There were a number of cases in which the Judges of the inferior courts were suspected of partiality in their decisions towards the Government or its officers. The cases in which that was more likely to occur than any other were those connected with the collector's courts. He did not know whether the Commission which used to be the court of appeal in such cases had been abolished; but if not, he thought it would be necessary that some provision should be made on that point in the Bill. The appellate jurisdiction in Indian cases was exercised at present by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, with the assistance of two gentlemen of the highest character, ability, and weight, who had been Indian Judges, and who acted as assessors to the Committee. No one could desire to speak with greater respect than himself of the assessors, but he had never concealed his opinion that it was not right that such men as the present Vice-Chancellors, Sir William Page Wood, Sir Richard Kindersley, and Sir John Stuart, should be denied the rank of Privy Councillor, while it was conferred on the assessors. Those gentlemen were entitled to receive for their attendance some few hundred pounds a year in addition to their rank. They had no vote, but favoured the members of the Committee with their advice. The Court itself could not be formed by less than three members of the Committee who were sufficient for the decision of all other cases. There was often difficulty in procuring the attendance of sufficient numbers to constitute a Court, and this difficulty might be removed; or, at all events, diminished, if the assessors were made members of the Committee for the purpose of hearing appeals on which they now sat as assessors. He was afraid that, unless the Bill came out of Committee in a different shape from that in which it was at present it would not do any great credit to the Government, or be of any great advantage to the country. There seemed to be some difficulty of detail. One of the provisions enacted that the lawyers should not be less than one-third, and the covenanted servants not less than one-third, of the Judges constituting the Courts. Possibly they might want one or two additional covenanted or uncovenanted servants; and yet, as the Bill stood, they must appoint an equal additional number of lawyers, because the number of lawyers must not be less than one-third. In his opinion the House had a right to expect that a fuller outline of what was intended to be done under the provisions of the Bill should be contained in the Bill itself.


regretted that the noble and learned Lord, to whom he had for years been accustomed to listen with pleasure and instruction should not have applied his great knowledge and experience to embodying in Amendments the points to which he had adverted. He should have been very glad to have had some propositions, the result of the noble and learned Lord's knowledge and experience, with regard to the appellate jurisdiction. But the noble and learned Lord contented himself with general criticism, without condescending to tell their Lordships in what particular manner the evils of which he complained ought to be remedied. It was, undoubtedly, true that there was a great deal of difficulty attending the appellate jurisdiction, arising partly from the want of moral and religious principle among the Natives. The noble and learned Lord had told them that the Natives acted on the principle that the end sanctified any description of means, and, therefore, if once a man persuaded himself that he had a good cause, he would adopt any iniquitous or nefarious mode for gaining that cause in a court of justice. Her Majesty's Government had not been inattentive to that consideration; and in the first place they hoped that by the union of the Supreme with the Sudder Courts a more sifting, searching, and satisfactory tribunal would be created; and they also hoped that when a single Court was established a better mode of procedure and more correct and accurate rules would be laid down, which, to a great extent, would have the effect probably of preventing appeals, but, at all events, of sending them up in a shapeless and expensive manner, and less likely to produce further litigation. But they did not stop there. That was the intention of the Bill, and the result of the constitution of the Court would be that certain Judges under a Commission would go into the provinces, and, for the most part, act as Judges in the first instance, and there decide cases which would afterwards probably be reviewed by the Court sitting as it were in Banco—a phrase used to denote the Judges in Westminster Hall sitting to examine the decisions of the Judges on circuit—and by that mode the Government hoped the number of appeals would be greatly diminished. They were asked how could they provide one system for the administration of justice for so many distinct races as existed in India? His noble and learned Friend knew, but probably it was not generally known to their Lordships, that at present throughout all India there was a very well organized local administration of justice. There were several courts, subordinating one to another, and terminating in the Sudder Adawlut as the Su- preme Court of Appeal in civil causes. But they were confined to the administration of justice among the Natives, and European subjects scattered throughout the provinces were not amenable to their jurisdiction. In no possible way could they create a system of administration of justice applicable throughout all India except by amalgamating the two tribunals, Native and British, and sending Judges to try important cases in the first instance, which would afterwards be reviewed by the full Court, and such cases as required further review reserved for the Judicial Committee. That was the system proposed by the Bill, and with great submission he ventured to say it would not be wise to define it more explicitly. Defined it was already; but if they laid down rules in an Act of Parliament as to the particular manner in which a great jurisdiction was to be exercised, they would be bound in iron fetters, and if a mistake were made they could not meet the difficulty, for which otherwise it would be easy to provide. Therefore, he thought that with great wisdom, while the outline of the procedure and the Court was traced and the constitution of the Court accurately defined, the made of procedure was left to be filled up by particular powers, under letters patent issued by the Crown, which would be perfectly consistent with the ordinary rules which governed the administration of justice. As to the Amendments proposed by the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough), he must say, speaking with diffidence, and not presuming to set his knowledge and experience against the knowledge and experience of the noble Earl, that he could not for a moment concur in them. They had, happily, made India part of what he might call the proper dominions of Her Majesty. They had brought India under the direct rule of the Crown. Now, it was the first prerogative of the Crown, and a prerogative always assuredly to be preserved, that the Crown was the source of justice, and from the Crown proceeded the appointment of Judges to administer justice. The preservation of that great prerogative, as of right due to the Crown, was accompanied with equal right and benefit to the subject; because, if the Crown was the great source from which proceeded justice, the Ministers of the Crown were responsible for the selection and appointment of Judges. That great principle, however, would be lost if the Amendment of the noble Earl to take away one-third part of the appointments from the Crown were adopted. If the noble Earl's Amendment were agreed to there would be two sets of Judges in India — the Queen's Judges, who would be looked on as Judges of the "first chop," and the Governor General's Judges, who would be regarded as Judges of an inferior class. If one of the Queen's Judges were sent down to any part of the country, his administration of justice would be regarded as of a higher order, while that of the Governor General's Judges would be looked upon as of secondary quality. It would also tend to destroy all uniformity and unanimity among the Judges. In fact, the noble Earl wished to introduce into the administration of justice that feeling which had prevailed in the army as to the distinction between Queen's troops and Company's troops. There could not be a greater mistake, both as to the principle and expediency, and he trusted their Lordships would not assent to it. With regard to the general observations of his noble and learned Friend (Lord Kingsdown), as far as he was able to follow them they did not at all appear to impeach the principle of the Bill, and he hoped, therefore, that their Lordships would now go into Committee.


said, that his experience in the Judical Committee of the Privy Council enabled him fully to confirm the statement of his noble and learned Friend (Lord Kingsdown) as to the character of the cases frequently brought from India. He approved of a system which would simplify the proceedings in the Indian Courts, and enable Judges more thoroughly to sift cases than they could at present.

Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly. (In the Committee.)

Clause 1 agreed to.

Clause 2 (Constitution of High Courts),


moved to omit the clause, on the ground that it would place the whole of the patronage involved in the appointment of Judges in the hands of the Crown, contrary to pledges which had been formerly given. In fact, the principle asserted by the noble and learned Lord (the Lord Chancellor) would place the appointment, not only of the Superior Courts, but of the Judges of the Small Courts, the Zillah Courts, and the Sudder Courts—that was about one-half the patronage of India—in the hands of the Crown. The noble and learned Lord had said that the Judges of the Supreme Court sent out from England would have a great deal more authority than those who were appointed by the Governor General. He must confess that he had some doubts upon that subject. The Natives of India were extremely clever in discovering the character of the individuals placed over them; and no person in India, be his rank or official position what it might, would have any other real weight than what he derived from his own personal qualities. It was the great advantage of that country that men stood or fell by their own personal abilities, and not in consequence of adventitious circumstances similar to those which existed in this country.

Moved, To omit Clause 2.


said, that nothing was more certain than that the Supreme Court Judges viewed the Sudder Court Judges with great contempt, on account of their ignorance of English law, while the Sudder Court Judges felt an equal contempt for the Judges of the Supreme Court on account of their ignorance of Indian law and custom. To combine those two Courts in harmony seemed, therefore, a great experiment; and he must confess that, rather than see it made all at once, he should prefer that they proceeded more gradually. The alteration proposed by the noble Earl seemed to him to be one which they ought to assent to. He knew very well that the Minister for India was often overwhelmed with applications from young barristers for Judgeships, which applications were accompanied by such testimonials of fitness, so recklessly given by the leaders of the Bar, that it was a very difficult matter to resist them. The greatest caution ought to be exercised in selecting those who displayed a judicial mind, because he fully agreed that it very often happened that able advocates made indifferent Judges.


felt the objection which had been pointed out by his noble and learned Friend as to the inconvenience of some of the Judges of the Courts of India deriving their authority from the Supreme power, while others derived theirs from a power which, however high it might be, was less than the highest. He thought it would be far better that all the Judges should be appointed by the Crown upon the recommendation of the Governor General. He saw no reason why the appointment of Indian Judges should be taken out of the category of other appointments, the principle of which was that some one should be responsible for them.

On Question, Whether the said clause shall stand part of the Bill?

Their Lordships divided:—Contents 48; Not-Contents 42: Majority 6.

Westbury, L. (L. Chancellor.) Cranworth, L.
Dartrey, L. (L. Cremorne.)
Newcastle, D. De Mauley, L.
Somerset, D. De Tabley, L.
Ebury, L.
Ailesbury, M. Elgin, L. (E. Elgin and Kincardine.)
Airlie, E. Foley, L. [Teller.]
Chichester, E. Fortescue, L. (V. Ebrington.)
Clarendon, E.
DeGrey, E. [Teller.) Hamilton, L. (L. Belhaven and Stenton.)
Devon, E. Ducie, E. Harris, L.
Granville, E. Lismore, L. (V. Lismore.)Harrowby, E.
Minto, E. Manners, L.
Saint Germans, E. Methuen, L.
Spencer, E. Monteagle of Brandon, L.
Falmouth, V. Ponsonby, L. (E. Bessborough.)Stratford de Redeliffe. V.
Sydney, V. Portman, L.
Torrington, V. Rivers, L.
Rossie, L. (L. Kinnaird.)
Carlisle, Bp.
London, Bp. Sandys, L.
Saye and Sele, L.
Belper, L. Stanley of Alderley, L.
Boyle, L. (E. Cork and Orrery.) Taunton, L.
Wensleydale, L.
Clandeboye, L. (L. Dufferin and Claneboye.) Wodehouse, L.
Beaufort, D. Melville, V.
Cleveland, D. Strathallan, V.
Bath, M. [Teller.] Abinger, L.
Winchester, M. Berners, L.
Chelmsford, L.
Amherst, E. Colchester, L.
Beauchamp, E. Colville of Culross, L,
Carnarvon, E. [Teller.]
Coventry, E. Denman, L.
Derby, E. Dinevor, L.
Doncaster, E. (D. of Buccleuch & Queensberry.) Grantley, L.
Kingsdown, L.
Lovel and Holland, L.
Ellenborough, E. (E. Egmont.)
Harrington, E. Lyveden, L.
Lonsdale, E. Polwarth, L.
Lucan, E. Raglan, L.
Malmesbury, E. Ravensworth, L.
Nelson, E. Redesdale, L.
Powis, E. Silehester, L. (E. Longford.)Shrewsbury, E.
Stradbroke, E. Sondes, L.
Walsingham, L.
Dungannon, V. Wynford, L. Hardinge, V.

Resolved in the Affirmative.


intimated that after that division it was not his intention to propose any other of his Amendments.

Amendments made; the Report thereof to be received To-morrow.

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