LORD BROUGHAMpresented a Petition from Bezer Blundell, praying that a measure may be passed to enable defendants in prosecution for Libel to be examined on Oath. The noble and learned Lord said, that in 1851 he had the great satisfaction of effecting, with their Lordships' concurrence, the most important change and improvement which had for many years been introduced into the procedure, indeed, he might say, into the jurisprudence, of this country—the allowing parties in all civil suits whatever to be examined as witnesses, and compelling them to be examined at the instance of their adversaries. The effects of the change had proved most beneficial in all civil suits, and he had decided to extend it partially to criminal cases, by giving the option to the defendants to be examined if they chose, submitting themselves, of course, to the sifting of cross examination, which any innocent person must rather desire than wish to avoid. The objection taken to this proposal, when he had introduced a Bill on the subject, was that any person who declined the leave to be examined would be supposed to do so from consciousness of guilt. He (Lord Brougham) owned that this did not much change his opinion, because it would only serve to convict the guilty. The petition which he now had to present afforded a strong illustration of the bad state of the law in this respect. It was from Mr. Blundell, and the facts stated in it strongly supported his (Lord Brougham's) view of the subject, and showed the necessity of a change in the law. Mr. Blundell, in his endeavours to improve the administration of the County Court, became involved 1048 in a correspondence which, it was alleged, partook of a libellous tendency. Proceedings were taken against him, and Mr. Blundell offered to deposit £100, to cover the costs of his adversary, if he would allow the action to be brought in a shape which would admit of his being examined. That proposition, however, was declined, and an indictment was brought against him not only for libel, but for an attempt to extort money. The latter part of the case broke down, and an acquittal was directed; but the charge of libel was persevered in, and, as Mr. Blundell was unable to be heard in his own defence as a witness while his adversary was allowed to be favoured, he was convicted though he could have proved the truth of the statement. His only remedy, as he was advised, was to prosecute his opponent for perjury, who would, in turn, be debarred from giving evidence in his own behalf. Mr. Blundell complained of this state of the law of libel, and asked that defendants might be heard in their own behalf. For his own part, he would be prepared to go further, and to extend the principle to all criminal cases.