§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH—My Lords, I rise in pursuance of the no- 775 tice I have given to inquire, Whether Her Majesty's Government is engaged in any Correspondence with the Object of reconciling the Spiritual Independence of the Sec of Rome with the Exercise of Temporal Sovereignty within the Roman territory by the King of Italy? and I trust your Lordships, with your usual indulgence, will permit me to offer to you some observations on the subject to which the question refers.
I shall not, my Lords, occupy your time by any retrospect. I shall not censure the Governments which have been swept away, nor praise that which has succeeded. I shall not triumph over the Sovereigns who have been exiled; as much, perhaps, for the errors of their predecessors as for their own. I accept the situation of things as I find it. I look to the present and to the future not to the past. Her Majesty has been advised to acknowledge Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy, and I do not think there has been one audible whisper of disapproval of the course which Her Majesty has been advised to take. It seems to me that all we have to do now is to consider in what manner the work already commenced can best be completed, and how the new Power which has been introduced into Europe can best be applied to the general benefit.
I know not with what mind your Lordships may contemplate this great and sudden revolution in the affairs of Italy—a revolution which has in two years united the people of that country under one sceptre, and placed among the great States of Europe a perfectly new Power, not formed by the destruction of any State that had for centuries been of the smallest use to Europe or to civilization, but formed out of the ruins of States which had existed for no apparent good purpose, a Power equal already in population to Prussia, and greatly superior to her in position and in natural wealth. I must confess that when I see the events which have led to this great revolution—how two great Emperors, at the head of vast armies, were completely baffled in their designs—how when they reserved the rights of princes whom they in tended and desired to replace, the population of the territories belonging to those princes rose for the purpose of vindicating the rights reserved to them by Nature and of placing on the throne the Sovereign they preferred—when I see a man with no advantage but that he derived from his own character, his own sword, his own en- 776 thusiasm, his own extraordinary power of leading men to victory, landing with a thousand men on the extreme coast of Sicily, and marching from victory to victory, any one of which would have made the reputation of an ordinary general, till he was at last, almost alone, carried on the shoulders of the people of Naples into the King's palace, while the forts of the city of Naples were still occupied by the royal troops—when I see further the shortcomings and the mistakes of that man so full of natural greatness, nobility, and generosity, leading indirectly to the invasion of Umbria and the Marches, the capture of Gaeta, and of Messina, and to the completion of the Italian Kingdom—when I see elements so discordant, things so contradictory, all brought to bear for the accomplishment of one great purpose, I cannot attribute the result to chance or to the ordinary operations of the work of man. I see in it the hand of Providence, and I accept its work.
But great as is this State, extending from the Alps to Cape Passaro, combining every advantage of soil, of climate, and of position, it still wants a capital, and without that capital the key-stone is wanting to the arch. I agree altogether with the Chambers of the new Italian Parliament in desiring that Rome should be the capital of the State. There is no other city in Italy worthy of that honour, or which would effect the objects to be derived from the occupation of Rome. Rome is as necessary to Italy for its capital as London is to England and Paris to France. Florence may be better situated; but neither Florence nor any other city can ever possess that prestige, that power over the minds of men, which Rome has acquired, which has been illustrious for more than 2,000 years. The Parliament sitting in any other city would still be considered in other parts of Italy as almost a foreign Parliament, and not identified with the national interests. The jealous feelings of cities which have been the residence of Sovereigns would naturally he aroused. But give them Rome as their capital and there will be no more jealousies. There will no longer be Lombards, or Tuscans, or Neapolitans. One general feeling will unite the whole people of Italy, and they will indeed become a nation.
In the midst of this great country there is one small territory now occupied by the troops of France. It is so small that I believe the whole of it, or nearly the whole of it, may be seen from the summit of St. Peter's; and yet the want of that territory prevents 777 the completion of the great work, which, when completed will, I believe so greatly tend to consolidate the peace of Europe. In the midst of that small territory stands Rome, and that illustrious city is occupied by French troops.
If I desired permanently to deprive France of the use of an army of 20,000 men—if I desired to make her become from day to day more and more the object of hatred to the Italian people, now so much disposed to view the French with gratitude—if I desired to perpetuate the hostility of the French clergy to the French Government—I could not desire anything better than that French troops should still remain at Rome. But, my Lords, I have higher objects. I think the greatest which it is possible at this moment to entertain is that of consolidating the strength of the new Kingdom of Italy. The French went to Rome for the purpose of giving the hand to the Pope, and of obstructing the progress of democracy. They remain at Rome now, not intentionally—that I believe—but practically with the effect of giving the hand to democracy and of degrading the Pope. I say with the effect of giving the hand to democracy, because until Italy is settled and consolidated under a constitutional Government, democracy, always at work, will work with more advantage and greater means for the purpose of establishing itself instead of the constitutional Government, which it is the desire of the people and the desire of the Chambers to establish. It is altogether a a false position. There is no man who has shown that he understands the inconvenience of a false position better than the Emperor of the French; and whenever he has discovered that he has got into a false position he has generally hitherto extricated himself from it with great boldness and dexterity. In this false position he has remained too long. His policy now is a half-measure, and no half-measure ever succeeds. It is inconsistent utterly with the character of a great and powerful State like France to entertain half-measures. They are suited only to weak and timid States. There is but one nation in the world which from the first period of its existence avoided half-measures, and that was the Roman Republic; and in consequence of avoiding half-measures it conquered the world. France might, in the first instance, have insisted upon declaring that the whole of the Roman States should be preserved under the dominion of the Pope; but that would have been an extreme measure. The 778 French Emperor did not adopt it in the first instance, because to do so would have been altogether inconsistent with the principle on which the French Empire is founded. The French Emperor is in a very different position from Louis XIV. He may do things Louis XIV. could not; but Louis XIV. might have done things the French Emperor cannot, their power having been derived from different sources. Louis XIV. derived his from his long hereditary succession and divine right: that of the Emperor is drawn from popular election. He cannot contradict himself—he cannot act in contravention of the principles on which his own Government is founded. He cannot in Italy contend against principles which in France have made him what he is. There are certain moral limits to the action of all monarchs. They cannot safely act in contravention of the principles by which they rule. The French Emperor, therefore, could not dept the extreme course of declaring that all the territories of the Roman States should remain under the dominion of the Pope.
My Lords, the clergy of France have expressed their sympathy with the Pope. It has been expressed also by large bodies of persons in other countries. I say nothing whatever against the feeling which has been manifested by those persons. On the contrary, I respect their feelings. I think it natural and just to feel sympathy with the misfortunes of a great Sovereign in the position in which the Pope now stands; it is not merely a feeling of sympathy with misfortune, but a fueling of sympathy hallowed by religion. But I think that the course that has been adopted by the French clergy and by many other Roman Catholics rests on views altogether erroneous. What the French clergy desires, and what many of the Roman Catholics in other parts of Europe desire, is, not that the Pope should continue in the state in which he is now, but that he should he restored to all his dominions. That is impossible. The question, therefore, now is, is it desirable for France and the rest of Europe that things should remain as they now are?
No one understands better than the Emperor of the French the disadvantages of his position; it has disadvantages of a political as well as of a military nature. If all the people of Rome were in favour of this occupation, and if the Pope were satisfied with the whole policy upon which it rests no doubt it would contribute to the prestige of the French Emperor to occupy Rome.
779 But when the French occupy Rome against the feelings of the population and in furtherance of a policy not satisfactory to the Pope, that occupation can only strengthen the hands of democracy, and all the weight of Rome is against France, not for her. Rome is the very last position which any Power ought to wish to occupy for military purposes. It is in the midst of an unproductive unhealthy district—at a distance of many marches from any valuable country. It intercepts no doubt the direct road from Tuscany to Naples, but it leaves free the communication between Northern Italy and the South by the other side of the Apennines. No one would select Rome as a base of operations either for or against Italy; and so hostile is the population that if the French were to move out in strength in three days their quarters and their magazines would be captured by a people in insurrection. I cannot, therefore, but express my hope that France will reconsider the position in which she stands, and come to some conclusion of more advantage to the general peace of Europe than that which must be the necessary consequence of things remaining as they are.
But, my Lords, what is the position of the Pope? He has no means of support from the country remaining under his nominal government, but is obliged to derive his income from the casual charity of the faithful in different parts of Europe, or from an allowance doled out by the French. He has a nominal but no real power. Such is the weight of the temporal considerations which oppress him that he cannot give his mind to the general government of the Church of which he is the head. He cannot perform the duties of his spritual rule, and his temporal rule is taken altogether out of his hands. In point of fact, my Lords, the Pope is in a position in which no clergy in France—no clergy anywhere—no Roman Catholic anywhere could desire the head of their Church to remain. It must be the desire of all the great Catholic States, and also of all States which contain a large Roman Catholic population, that the Pope should be permanently established in a state of entire spiritual independence. We have often heard here the expression of a fear of foreign influence in ecclesiastical matters. The true way of destroying foreign influence is to separate the Pope's temporal authority from his spiritual rule over the Roman Catholic populations, leaving him no other 780 duties to perform than those which appertain to the Church of which he is the head.
I think, my Lords, before the French leave Rome it is most proper that every arrangement should be made for securing the Pope's dignity and his independence in the exercise of his authority over the Roman Church and that these arrangements should be placed under the guarantee of the Catholic Powers of Europe. In making these arrangements there should be shown the greatest liberality. The personal expenditure of the Pope is very limited indeed, but he has a very large expenditure connected with the keeping up of churches, palaces, museums, and galleries. He must be surrounded by the old Swiss Guard: he must have an Italian Guard of his own; a considerable sum is necessary to enable him to grant allowances to Italian Cardinals who have not sufficient revenues from their own sees. He must also have the means of maintaining all the great establishments which have existed for centuries with a view to the propagation and maintenance of the Roman Catholic faith. All these arrangements for the future are arrangements that could be made without any great difficulty. But, my Lords, these arrangements being made in a spirit of justice and enlightened liberality, I do think the clergy of France ought to be satisfied, and that the Roman Catholics generally would be satisfied. Let the Emperor show his own clergy and his own people, who now feel so deep an interest in the Pope, that an arrangement of this kind would secure to the Pope for ever advantages which he cannot now possess; and we may hope to see the difficulties which exist under French occupation disappear.
My Lords, so far I have trespassed on your Lordships with respect to Rome. I wish now, with your Lordship's permission, to say a few words with respect to Venetia. I assure your Lordships that I approach this subject with feelings of the deepest respect for Austria. I will add with feelings of gratitude to Austria. I never can forget the services performed by that Power in the great war of the Revolution. To her exertions at that time is mainly owing that present state of financial distress which I fear is at the root of many other difficulties with which she is now beset. We are more especially indebted to her for her advance in 1805, which prevented the invasion of this country; for her advance in 781 1809, which led to the withdrawal of many troops from Spain, and tended materially to the liberation of the Peninsula; and above all, for her advance in 1813, when, risking her very existence, she threw herself into the very front of the battle, and accompanied the allies to Leipsic and to Paris. I cannot forget these services, and I cannot, therefore, help sympathizing with her in her present condition.
My Lords, Austria has not been fairly treated in considering her conduct with regard to Italy. At the Congress of Vienna Austria gave up the Netherlands, and received Italy in exchange—I say "Italy," because though Austria herself received only a portion of that country, Princes of the Austrian house were established in other portions; and it was perfectly understood that it was the mission of Austria to maintain Italy against Prance. Genoa was given to Piedmont for the same purpose. The extended Kingdom of Sardinia was understood to be the advanced guard of Austria in Italy against the French. These were the designs of the Congress of Vienna. Whether they were wise or not I will not now stop to inquire; but with that intention Austria was established in Italy, and in endeavouring to maintain and extend her influence in that country, she only performed her original mission and fulfilled the obligations which she contracted at Vienna. That being the case, I regret to be obliged now to offer an opinion which may not be acceptable to her. I think it absolutely necessary to the present safety of Austria that she should reconcile herself to the Italian people. I recollect hearing at the time of the Congress the expression of an Austrian Minister, "Italy is our budget." Now, Italy is her deficit, and is the main source of her financial difficulties. It occupies her army when she wants it elsewhere much more urgently. With respect to her strategical advantages derived from the possession of Venetia let me ask whether, in point of fact, the value of the Quadrilateral fortresses is still what it was? I believe it is not. The great improvements which have been made in artillery of late years have greatly diminished the value of all fortresses; they have diminished the number of days any fortress may be expected to hold out. The great increase in the numerical strength of armies has also diminished the value of fortresses. In the war in Italy under the First Napoleon, when an army consisted of 782 30,000 or 40,000 men, under the hand of a general in the field, a fortress like that of Mantua was of great value; but when an army consists of 150,000 men, either the soldiers in those garrisons are too few to act upon the communications of an enemy, or they are so numerous as to be of much more value in the field. I will not say that they are not still of some value. So long as its communication are open, no doubt, a fortified position like Verona will form a great obstacle to the advance of an enemy; but the recent changes in Italy have much altered the stragetical position of Austria in that country. In former wars Austria held Ferrara, and all to the southward of it was neutral Papal territory. An attack upon the Austrian position must then have been made in front. Now, Ferrara and all the country behind it being in the hands of the Italians they acquire a new base of operations, and may turn the Mincio and the Adige by passing the Po at Ponte di Lagoscuso. They have already made Bologna a great fortified position. Still, whatever its success in Venetia, no Italian army would venture to advance upon Vienna if the passes of the Alps were in the possession of the Austrians with Germany at their back. But, my Lords, the people of Italy are earnestly desirous to possess Venetia, and until they do I greatly fear that their policy will be completely warped, and instead of acting as they will when formed into a great and independent kingdom, they will look to an alliance with France for the purpose of obtaining Venetia with her assistance. But when she possesses Venetia, Italy will comprise the whole Italian peninsula, and she will have no object to gratify. It is impossible she can desire to occupy one foot of ground beyond the Italian soil. Her policy, then, in conjunction with Switzerland, with which she will be most intimately allied, will be to preserve a permanent armed neutrality, to protect the balance of power in Europe, and to forbid any State, German or French, from passing the Rhine, both banks of which will then be under the command of her armies acting in strict alliance and co-operation with the Swiss. If Italy be constituted so that she may be able to adopt this, her true line of policy, observe the advantage which it will produce to Austria, Her left flank will be entirely protected in any operations which she may hereafter be required to conduct against 783 France, and, united with Germany, she would at all times be enabled to protect her dominions.
My Lords, these are the views which I entertain with respect to the Venetian question. I do earnestly hope a time will come when Austria will take a more correct view of her own real ultimate interests than perhaps she can be induced to do at present. But I must say that of all things I do deprecate any attempt on the part of any body of Italians whatever to interfere by arms in the differences which may now exist between Austria and Hungary. Austria in her strength and in her integrity is absolutely necessary to the safety of every State in Europe. It would be impossible to preserve the balance of power if her integrity were assailed; and any man who now entertains a desire of raising commotions and of creating a war against Austria in Hungary would commit a crime against Europe, and be the enemy of every man desiring to be free within its boundaries.
I dare say that my opinions may be represented as expressing a purely English view of the subject. We are supposed to have sympathized with the Italians through some idea that the union of those countries under the rule of King Victor Emmanuel would be specially advantageous to this country. I really do not give the people of this country credit for having thought at all on the subject. They saw a great people struggling for freedom, they looked back to all that people had suffered, they knew that in former days they had been great in arms and commerce, the leaders of the civilization of mankind, and they felt in every part of the country a natural and generous sympathy with that people, and the object for which they were struggling. But other interest in the question we have none, or if any, it is more remote than that of any of the nations of Europe. Our policy seems to have been either largely mistaken, or, what is much more probable, misrepresented. We want nothing on the Continent, nor would we accept anything. We desire nothing but the permanent security of our own islands—we desire that all nations should respect each other's rights. We wish them all to be rich, prosperous, and happy; and, perhaps, we may have an interest in that respect, because we know that the richer and more prosperous they are the greater will be our own wealth and our own prosperity. Beyond this we have 784 no interest whatever. But if we could lay down a line of policy and distribute power in Europe according to our own view—no doubt what would be most desirable would be this—that power should be so divided among the different States of Europe as to enable them to defend their own independence without our intervention. But if the time should ever arise when one great predominant Power should again attempt, as was formerly done, to overcome the liberties of other nations for the purpose of founding its own grandeur on their ruin, then I trust that, as in former times, England will summon the nations of Europe to the field, will place herself in the front of the battle, and, by God's help in so just a cause, will again overwhelm the aggressor by the weight of an armed world.
My Lords, availing myself of the freedom which is attached to the seat I occupy, I have permitted myself fully and frankly to express the opinions which I hold. I certainly do feel very deeply in this matter. I am not an Italian of yesterday. It is now forty-five years since in the House of Commons, in a debate with respect to the Treaty of Paris, I expressed my deep regret that in the Congress the Allies had not availed themselves of what the French had done in the North and Centre of Italy, by breaking down the jealousies which previously existed, by the creation of an army, and by the improvement of the people—that they had not availed themselves of these circumstances to found a great State in the North of Italy. I then expressed an opinion, to which I have ever adhered, in favour of nationality as the best and most secure basis of the independence of States. That was forty-five years ago, and I have never varied in these opinions. There have been occasions, undoubtedly, when I have entertained hopes of seeing realized the change in Italy which I have so long desired. Time after time these have vanished from my view; but now I feel deeply grateful to Providence that I have been permitted to live to this time when, towards the conclusion of a very long political life, I almost hold within my grasp the earliest, the most enduring, and the most cherished visions of my youth.
LORD WODEHOUSEMy Lords, the House has listened with the attention and interest which it deserves to the eloquent speech of the noble Earl who has just resumed his seat. I myself feel at a great disadvantage in following him, not merely 785 on account of that eloquence, but also because, as the noble Earl himself has said, he occupies a seat on the Opposition side of the House, while I occupy a seat on the Ministerial bench. The question into the discussion of which the noble Earl has entered is, undoubtedly, of the highest interest and of the utmost importance; but I am sure he will not expect, and the House, I am certain, will not desire that any one speaking on behalf of Her Majesty's Government should enter freely into the various points into which he has entered. The question which the noble Earl has asked lies comparatively within a very narrow compass; and, as your Lordships, no doubt, expect, the answer to that question is that we have not engaged in any correspondence with the object of reconciling the spiritual independence of the See of Rome with the exercise of temporal sovereignty within the Roman territory by the King of Italy. The reasons, I think, must be obvious why Her Majesty's Government have not engaged in any correspondence on that subject. It is true there are a considerable number of our fellow-subjects who are co-religionists of those who dwell within those territories, and who, as the noble Earl says, must take the greatest interest in this question. But it is also true that this country is preeminently a Protestant country, and the chief Protestant Power in Europe; and it must, I think, be evident that, in dealing with matters which involve not merely the independence of one of the States of Europe, but likewise the position of the spiritual head of the Catholics throughout the world, it cannot be desirable that Her Majesty's Government should take the initiative. Not merely would such a proceeding involve us in discussions which we are not the most capable of conducting, but any proposal that we might make, even though the proposal might be good in itself, would not be likely to be received with favour by the Catholic Powers of Europe. The noble Earl pointed out the possibility, as he thinks, of some arrangement by which the temporal sovereignty of the Pope might be disconnected from his spiritual authority; but the difficulties which would besot the proposition of such an agreement between the Catholic Powers must be apparent to your Lordships; and if, in addition, the question were to be discussed by the Protestant Powers, I am sure no ingenuity of man could bring about a solution of the ques- 786 tion. For these reasons, although Her Majesty's Government certainly do not view with satisfaction the continuance of a state of things in which the independence of one of the States of Europe—I mean of those provinces which still remain nominally under the authority of the Pope—is entirely at an end, owing to the occupation of that territory by foreign troops, I must yet decline to follow the noble Earl through the different questions which he has raised. I cannot help observing that for many years the temporal authority of the Pope has altogether ceased to exist. Since the year 1849 the independence of the Pope, as a Sovereign, has not existed for a single hour. His authority, which had been destroyed by the movement in 1848, the full effects of which we are feeling at the present day, was only restored by the armies of France and Austria. As long as those troops remained in his territory, the sovereignty of the Pope was nominally sustained; but on the day on which the Austrian troops left the territory which they occupied, even the nominal authority of the Pope ceased to exist; and it is notorious that on the day on which the French troops shall be withdrawn from Rome the sovereignty of the Pope will altogether cease in every part of his dominions. It is for this reason that the solution of the question immediately depends upon whether the French Government shall or shall not withdraw their troops from Rome; and it is clear that while the reasons which may have induced the Emperor of the French to continue that occupation are reasons which it is not desirable that we should upon this occasion discuss in this House, there are, as the noble Earl has pointed out, many arguments tending to prove that it would be far better policy to withdraw those troops. Her Majesty's Government have not disguised their opinion that it is desirable that those troops should be withdrawn; but it is clear that there are many other considerations which must have weight with Catholic Powers, and that although the mattter has been much discussed, no one has yet pointed out any means by which after the withdrawal of those troops the spiritiual authority of the Pope can be reconciled with his new position. I do not say that that problem may not be solved, but it certainly is not for Her Majesty's Government to devise the means of such a reconciliation. Before I leave this question I cannot help saying that a most erroneous idea seems to pre- 787 vail in some portions of Her Majesty's dominions, and in other parts of Europe, as to the part which Her Majesty's Government have taken, and are taking in these transactions; because it is stated, and it is believed, I suppose, by some persons, that the chief object and end of the Government, especially of my noble Friend who is at the head of the Foreign Office, has been to put an end to the authority of the Pope. It is supposed that he is the chief enemy of the head of the Catholic Church, and that his aim throughout has been to undermine the authority of the Pope, and to place him in a situation in which that authority can no longer be maintained. All I can say is that Her Majesty's Government have carefully abstained from taking a prominent part in the discussion of those questions which specially affect the Pope. They take a deep interest in everything which relates to the Italian Peninsula, and they have used their moral influence to secure for the Italian people the opportunity of carrying out their own views; but they have all along thought that it was not for a Protestant Power to take a prominent part in the discussion of questions relating to the head of the Catholic Church. As regards the other portions of the noble Earl's speech, I might be excused from entering at all upon the very important and very varied topics which he has discussed, more especially upon that most important question as to the possession of Venetia by the Emperor of Austria. My Lords, all that I can say upon that matter is that Her Majesty's Government are most anxious—as anxious as the noble Earl can be—that peace should be maintained. The advice which they have given to each of the parties is not to be the assailant; and I am confident that he who is the assailant will not only incur a most grave and weighty responsibility, but will not receive the sympathy which the party who is attacked will always command. A great work has been begun and has been carried out in Italy, and I cannot help hoping that those Italian statesmen who now sway the destinies of that peninsula will be wise enough to see that time is required for the consolidation of the fabric which they have constructed, and that if they can present to Europe the spectacle of an united people, peaceably working out their own independence, they will be doing more to promote the solution of those questions as to Rome and Venetia which they so ardently desire 788 than they could accomplish by any attempt to destroy the present territorial arrangements of Europe.
§ THE EARL OF CLARENDONMy Lords, although I was fully prepared for the answer which my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has given to the noble Earl opposite, I cannot help expressing the satisfaction I feel at learning that Her Majesty's Government have not been employed in matters where I think their interference would be prejudicial, and my confident hope and expectation that they will adhere to the same prudent policy of leaving the settlement of the Roman question, which is essentially a Catholic question, to the Catholic Powers of Europe. At the same time I must say that I entirely agree with the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough) in the speech which has been listened to with equal admiration on both sides of the House. I think that the Roman question is of vital importance to Italy, and that Rome most certainly ought to he the capital of that country. If it be not, the differences between the various States will stand in the way of the unity of Italy; whereas all the States would agree in choosing for the capital the city of Rome, which combines all the requisites, historical, religious, and local for the capital of a great country; and which, moreover, has none of those municipal recollections which would interfere with the establishment of constitutional Government. But this can be effected only with the consent of France, and in consequence of the convictions of the Catholic Powers of Europe that, Rome being the capital of Italy, the spiritual independence of the Pope can be secured, and that the civil authorities would not interfere with spiritual matters, or with the power and authority of the Church, I say that we could not interfere in such questions as these without prejudicing the results at which we desire to arrive—we could not help to settle either of those questions which must be solved before there is any chance of Rome being constituted the capital of Italy. We may address ourselves to the French Government; we may express our desire, in terms as earnest as those which have been employed by the noble Earl, that the French garrison should be withdrawn from Rome; we may appeal to the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of Italy which was voluntarily adopted by the Emperor himself; we may declare that as long as the Roman question is unsettled 789 Italy will be unsettled, and that, as the noble Earl has said, the danger of war must be constantly imminent; but, argue as we may, we shall not be able to disguise from ourselves the fact that the question of Rome is a French almost as much as it is an Italian question, and that, with the grave political and religious considerations for France which it involves, the Emperor will claim to be the sole judge of what it is expedient to do in the interests of that country. It is perfectly true, as the noble Earl has said, that the expedition of 1849 was undertaken in order to repress democracy. It was a great error. It has proved a grievous misfortune to the subjects of the Pope, and continues to be a sore embarrassment to France. The French Government were not slow in discovering the error of that expedition, because even while the Pope was still at Gaeta he positively rejected those administrative reforms which were proposed to him, and refused to return to Rome except in the plenitude of the most unrestricted power which had been enjoyed by any of his predecessors. Upon that condition he returned—with that condition he has tolerated no interference; and for the past twelve years the French Army has been the Roman police, the passive spectators of acts which they have reprobated, and the responsible protectors of the worst Government in Europe. I believe that the humiliation of the position of the French Army at Rome has long been felt by the Emperor. I believe that his desire to withdraw that army is perfectly sincere. There is abundant evidence of that in the papers which have been laid before the French Chambers, and in those despatches of M. Thouvenel, which, at the time they were written, were certainly not intended for publication. I believe that the Emperor permitted General Lamoriciè re to take service with the Pope in the expectation that he would organize a force sufficient to maintain tranquillity, and without foreign aid to secure the personal safety of the Pope, and to repress the just discontent of the Pope's subjects; I believe too that if General Garibaldi's expedition to Sicily had been delayed for another month, the French garrison would have been withdrawn from Rome. But, having reference to the events which have since occurred, particularly considering the feelings and opinions which have recently been manifested in the French Chambers, and the natural impatience of the existing state of things which notoriously exists at Rome, I think that the Emperor 790 of the French may well say that if he were now to withdraw his garrison from Rome, not alone Catholic France but Catholic Europe would hold him personally responsible for any insult or injury which the Pope might sustain. I say, therefore, that we may be sure that the Emperor will not withdraw his forces from Rome one hour sooner than he thinks that it will be safe for himself and expedient for France to do so—unless, indeed, the Pope were spontaneously to consent to Rome becoming the capital of Italy, and to the installation in that city of the Italian Government and Parliament, and were spontaneously to announce that by measures to which he had assented his own independence would be secured, and the privileges and powers of the Church would be preserved undiminished. No one can say that such an event is impossible—no one can deny that it is highly improbable—but I am certain that any interference on our part would render it still more unlikely, if not impossible. I cannot agree with the noble Earl opposite that the occupation of Rome by the French Army is unpopular in France, On the contrary I believe that the more we press for its cessation the more it will be believed that we are actuated by some selfish, political, or Protestant object, and the more difficult will it become for the Emperor to withdraw his troops. Then with respect to Rome:—We must remember that we have no regular diplomatic relations with Rome, and that the Pope would be apt to receive any irregular communication with suspicion. He might not unfairly say that on the political part of the question we are not impartial, because England was almost unanimously in favour of the unity of Italy; and that on the religious part of the question our interest as Protestants must dispose us to regard with favour whatever would weaken his power. But, my Lords, means may and I trust will be discovered for reconciling the spiritual independence of the Holy See with the exercise of the temporal power of the King of Italy in that territory. I believe that those means will be found in the operation of time and in the progress of events—in the good government, order, tranquillity, and increasing prosperity of the countries adjacent to the dominions of the Pope, and, above all, in the growing discontent of the Pope's subjects, in his straitened revenues, and in the impossibility of his continuing to resist the pressure from all sides. I think that the Pope 791 may then negotiate for the fullest and freest exercise of his spiritual Power, and the King of Italy would, indeed, be most unwise if he did not meet any such overtures from the Holy See in a spirit of the widest and most reverential liberality. Our efforts should be confined, as they have hitherto been, and as I am sure they will continue to be, to an endeavour to check the intervention of other Powers in the affairs of Italy. We must never disguise our determination that the moral influence of England will be used to prevent the restoration of Governments which must bring vengeance in their train, and which can never claim the confidence and affection of the people; and must continue our efforts, as it was expressed in the Speech from the Throne, to secure for the Italians liberty to manage their affairs for themselves. As far as they have yet had an opportunity of doing so they have shown themselves fully equal to the task. For years past they have had to endure all the evils that priests and police and foreign bayonets could inflict, and have been reduced to that state which most unfits men for free institutions; but during the last year and a half they have exhibited a patience, moderation, intelligence, and good sense which have exceeded the expectations of their most enthusiastic friends. The last general election has been conducted with so much peace and order, the people have displayed so much sound judgment in resisting the appeals made to their passions and in selecting the men whom they deemed best fitted to promote the national interests, that, though there are many and most formidable difficulties yet to be overcome, I think we cannot feel otherwise than hopeful that better days are in store for Italy, and that she may yet fulfil her destiny as an united nation. I understand and respect the desire of many of our Roman Catholic fellow-subjects, that the supreme head of their Church should exercise, in all its plenitude, his temporal and spiritual power; but I agree with my noble Friend the Under Secretary that they are not justified in saying, either with regard to Her Majesty's Government, or with regard to my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Department, that the temporal or spiritual authority of the Pope has been interfered with. We have only expressed our wishes that the Pope's subjects should be prosperous and contented, but we are not debarred from looking at the Pope as one of the Sovereigns of Eu- 792 rope, and from seeing what it is impossible we can close our eyes to—that he stands in a position different from any other Sovereign. For he has, in fact, no temporal power at all; he has delegated it to two other Powers, who, the one in his capital and the other in his provinces, have exercised it for him. There cannot be the slightest doubt of what my noble Friend the Under Secretary has said, that the moment that the pressure of foreign forces is withdrawn the nullity of the Pope's power becomes manifest. Nothing can be more certain than that when the French army quits Rome the Pope's subjects will throw off their allegiance as they did in the day that the Austrian army withdrew from the Legations. The reason, it appears to me, why the Pope can never retain his temporal authority is that his subjects can never rely on the establishment of such a Government as shall justly command their obedience and loyalty. For this I do not blame the present Pope or any of his predecessors; because, without destroying the basis on which the Papacy has always rested, and without departing altogether from the system which has prevailed for centuries, I believe it to be impossible for any Pope to grant those reforms which the spirit of the age and the just exigencies of his subjects require. Advice and warnings have for the last forty years been given to the Popes by the Catholic Powers of Europe, and the answer which has been returned has in substance been invariably the same as that which Cardinal Antonelli lately gave to the Marquis de Gramont—Le Pape ne transigera jamais; or, in other words, the Pope will not grant those political reforms which he believes to be inconsistent with his spiritual rights. The Papacy is the purest absolutism, and in all those questions which vitally affect the social well-being of a people, such as equality of legal rights, education, liberty of conscience, liberty of the press, the Church claims to be the sole and exclusive judge, and never has consented, and never will, to the slightest compromise or division of authority. It is the custom in this country to regard the secularization of the Papal Government as the panacea for all the evils from which the subjects of the Pope are now suffering; but in the immutable and inevitable condition of the Papal Government such a process seems to me impossible. A Cardinal must be Secretary of State, for he is the President of the 793 Council of Ministers, the pivot, in fact, on which turns the whole machinery of the Papal Government. He must be Minister for Foreign Affairs, for he conducts the correspondence which all relates to ecclesiastical matters with the Pope's agents abroad, all of whom are ecclesiastics. Civil causes must be tried before ecclesiastical tribunals. The Pope is himself at the head of the Inquisition and cannot delegate his power to a layman, and education both at Rome and abroad is considered to be under the special direction of the Church. As the temporal must, in all respects, be subservient to the spiritual authority of a Sovereign, the Pope can grant no substantial reforms; and this alone would be an insurmountable obstacle to the re-establishment of his temporal power by the side of a constitutional government in the rest of Italy—the two could not coexist together. I think, therefore, that the Pope must already see or will soon become sensible that his lost provinces could only be recovered for him by a foreign army, and could only be retained under his nominal authority by a never-ceasing foreign occupation, and as that is simply impossible, I trust some means will be found of reconciling what has been called "the inexorable logic of events" with the personal independency and spiritual supremacy of the Pope. I think, however, that we Protestants have nothing to do with arrangements so delicate and difficult, which may safely be left to the operation of time and events.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, whatever falls from my noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough) is well entitled to the attention of your Lordships, and I have listened with much interest to the clear and manly statement which he has made. He has stated in the fullest and frankest manner what are his own views on this important question. In some points I entirely concur in the opinion of my noble Friend, but I am not inclined now to enter into the many important and interesting points to which the noble Earl has adverted—least of all am I inclined to enter upon that most delicate and difficult subject to which my noble Friend directed your attention—the present position of Venetia. My noble Friend has laid down the principle that the rights of Austria over her Venetian territories are as valid as the rights of any Sovereign over any portion of his dominions. I agree with him; and at the same time I concur with 794 him in thinking that the continued possession of that territory by Austria may be a source of constant difficulties and differences between Austria and the Italian kingdom, between whom, I again concur, it is most important, that if it be possible, all causes of difference should be withdrawn, and that those States should be united in the bonds of harmony and peace. I further concur with my noble Friend, and I am sure your Lordships will concur also, in thinking that, whatever may be our personal feelings—whatever we may wish, whatever may be the sentiments of the country—the Power which first resorts to the fearful alternative of war will incur an awful responsibility, and lose altogether the sympathies which, but for the means adopted, she would otherwise command. In the very few observations which I shall make I shall confine myself exclusively to the subject to which my noble Friend's question more immediately referred—the particular difficulty with which not we, but Europe has to deal, namely, the question of the Pope. And I think I may congratulate your Lordships and the country that whatever differences of opinion there may be between us as to the final settlement which is desirable with regard to this Italian question, there is on all sides of the House—I am sure there is on this side, and I rejoice to hear there is on the part of Her Majesty's Government and on the part of those who represent more or less independent opinions, like my noble Friend who has just sat down—one concurrent opinion, that with regard to the internal settlement of the Roman territory Her Majesty's Government is not only justified but required to maintain the principle of the strictest non-interference. I entirely concur in what was stated by the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and confirmed by the expression of the opinions of my noble Friend who has just sat down, that if anything were wanted to complicate the difficulties of this question it would be the fact of England—a Protestant country—taking an active part in endeavouring to settle the affairs of the Roman State. So strongly have I always felt upon this question that, at the time when the Government with which I had the honour to be connected were using all their efforts to prevent the war which unfortunately broke out between France and Austria, we were pressing both parties to endeavour to come to some terms of agreement with the very object 795 which the question has in view—namely, of reconciling the spiritual supremacy and authority of the Pope with the general peace and tranquillity of Italy. The formation of a Kingdom of Italy, indeed, was not then contemplated by any one; hut in giving our advice to France and Austria, we did not hesitate to say that the Catholic Powers were particularly, and especially those Governments, hound to deal with the Roman question, and that, while we would give every assistance to the ultimate settlement of that question, we felt that to place ourselves in the first line would not only be objectionable in point of principle, but a serious impediment to the practical success of any undertaking or any effort to bring about a settlement. Therefore, I repeat, I cordially assent to the principle laid down by the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State—that this is a question in which it is not expedient for this country to interfere either by diplomacy or by correspondence. We are less likely to do good than to do harm by such interference, and I rejoice to hear from the noble Lord that Her Majesty's Government have not engaged in any such negotiations or any such correspondence. Nevertheless, I must be permitted to say, before I sit down, that I look upon this Roman question as one which as long as it remains unsettled must keep unsettled the prospect of retaining peace. It is a question of the greatest difficulty and of the greatest delicacy. It would be a question of no difficulty whatever were we dealing with only a temporal Sovereign. But it is a question full of difficulty and embarrassment when we are dealing with one who unites in his own person the capacities of a temporal Sovereign and of the spiritual head of another Church. I must also be permitted to say that it is not a matter of indifference to this country, as regards English interests, in what position the Pope should stand. It has ever been the principle of British policy that the head of the Roman Church should be independent. It is a matter of the utmost consequence to this country that he, to whose spiritual authority and power large numbers of our fellow-countrymen, as well as so many millions of our fellow Christians in other parts of the world, give a ready and willing obedience—that he who claims at their hands that obedience and those obligations of duty should be himself in a position independent to act, free from the dictation and control of any Foreign Power; for any Foreign Power which stood in such 796 a position towards him as to obtain a command over him, would have the means of transferring into their own hands a great portion of that authority which properly belongs to him. It is very difficult to define the limits between the spiritual and temporal authority, and any Power standing in such a relation towards him might exercise through him an amount of authority extremely dangerous to the wellbeing and safety of this country. Let no man, then, suppose that it is a matter of indifference to us, whether the Pope is an independent Prince or not. The extent of his temporal power is a matter wholly and entirely distinct from his independence. Indeed, my noble Friend referred to this principle when he adverted to the possible idea that, while wishing to put an end to the present state of things, some Protestant object might be served by some weakening of the spiritual power of the Pope. I confess that, if I were desirous of destroying or injuring that spiritual power, I should think I could do nothing so effectual for the object as to promote a continuance of the present state of things. I cannot conceive a position more embarrassing to Europe, more painful to conscientious Roman Catholics, or more painful to the Pope himself, than the self-contradictory position in which he is at this moment placed. My noble Friend who has just sat down, and also the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State, have pointed out that for many years the Pope has not possessed any temporal power, in the sense in which we speak of it with regard to other Sovereigns. He is maintained in his temporal authority in opposition to the will of the vast majority of the people over whom his rule nominally extends, by the intervention and presence of foreign troops, and the power of foreign bayonets. If this were the case of a temporal Sovereign we should be justly entitled to call on France at once to cease from that intervention, which in the case of a temporal Sovereign would be absolutely indispensable to withdraw her troops and to leave Italy for the Italians and Rome for the Romans. But in the case of the Pope, where the interests of religion are supposed to be at stake, at all events, if he is to be protected from being dependent on popular will, he must be maintained in such Sovereignty and State as not to be under the domination of any Foreign Power. Until some solution can be found for the difficult question raised by my noble Friend it is impossible— 797 whatever may be the objections felt by Europe, whatever may be the objections felt by France herself, whatever may be the sense of embarrassment—and I have no doubt the Emperor himself labours under a great sense of embarrassment—it is impossible, I say, to urge France to withdraw that protection which she at present affords, and it would be useless and worse than useless—it would be idle and criminal—to urge the Emperor to adopt measures which at the present we know he cannot adopt. Only look at what took place in the Legislative Council the other day. Five deputies only, I believe, supported the withdrawal of the French troops. The whole body of public opinion in France—which I rejoice to see is becoming more freely expressed every day—is that the Pope must be maintained in independence; and so long as he can be maintained by no other Power it is the duty of the eldest son of the Church, as the Emperor is termed, to maintain the Pope in his authority. I will not express so strong an opinion as my noble Friend behind me, or even as my noble Friend opposite, with regard to the absolute necessity of Rome being the capital of the Italian kingdom. I confess I lean to the opinion, which is stated in papers laid before your Lordships as the original view of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, desiring the independence of Italy, he thought it would be infinitely better effected by the formation of two separate kingdoms. I maintain that opinion now, and I believe that, although it sounds very well to speak of the unity of Italy, the difficulty of accomplishing that object would have been infinitely less, and the prospect of ultimate success infinitely greater, if the mode adopted had been the formation of a northern and southern kingdom; in which case the Roman question would have been easy of solution, because Rome would have laid between the two, and not been, as at present, the centre of the united kingdom. My Lords, as there is one Italian kingdom, I heartily hope and earnestly desire that the union may not be a formal but a real and practical union. At the same time, notwithstanding the moderation displayed and the self-sacrifices made, I cannot but see the greatest difficulties in the consolidation of this union. I cannot look to the state of Naples at the present moment with satisfaction. I do not believe that if the people of Naples and Sicily had been left to themselves they 798 would have desired to be associated in one kingdom with Northern Italy. I do not say they would have desired a continuance of their then existing monarchy; but, if the former dynasty had been well advised and had acted in time, that Government might have been established on a satisfactory and sound basis, and I believe that the continuance of that monarchy in amity and friendship with the constitutional monarchy of the North of Italy, not interfering with the exceptional jurisdiction of the Pope in whatever remained of the Roman territory, would have been a more probable and a more practical solution of the question, and would have avoided many of the difficulties which must be encountered in the present state of things. Nothing can be more natural, if there is to be an united Italy, than that the Italians should desire to have Rome for their capital. There are a thousand considerations which lead to that. But they very fact of that necessity enhances to an infinite degree the difficulty of coming to any solution with regard to the independence of the Pope; because, diminish his territory as you will, if he is to be independent at all, he must exercise absolute authority, and he must have uncontrolled dominion over that territory; he must have a provision made for him sufficient to maintain not only the dignity and splendour, but the practical utility of his office. He may have the guarantee of the Catholic Powers of Europe—and that is an arrangement which I should prefer—but he must obviously within his own limits be uncontrolled master of his own movements; he must be able to act without being subject even to the suspicion of being controlled and overborne by any foreign Power. My noble Friend has almost brought the question of the temporal power of the Pope to a reductio ad absurdum. He stated, and stated truly, that without the aid of a foreign Power no Government can be maintained which is not in accordance with the public feeling and public opinion; and that no laws can be maintained which are not in accordance with the spirit of the times and the extension of popular rights; and that the spirit of the times required a large concession of popular rights and liberties; and then he goes on to argue that such extension of popular rights is inconsistent with the temporal power of the Pope. The reductio is very obvious—that the maintenance of the temporal power of the Pope as a sovereign—I mean reigning over anything which may be dignified by 799 the title of a territory—in the present state of Europe, is morally impossible. But suppose it to be morally possible, I can truly say that, if I were a conscientious Catholic as I am a conscientious Protestant, I should feel the deepest pain and the deepest mortification at the position in which the head of that Church at the present moment finds himself. If the maintenance of his temporal power is essential to his spiritual authority, and if he finds that the exercise of that temporal authority at every point comes into opposition and collision with the feelings and wishes and desires of his subjects, I can conceive no heavier blow which could be aimed at the spiritual authority than that it should he supported by acts utterly at variance with the feelings of the people. If I were a devoted servant of the See of Rome, I would say, "Bring the See of Rome into harmony with the people of Italy and with the Catholic feelings of the world; away with the temporal sovereignty and the temporal possessions, the cares of which and the responsibilities of which necessarily, according to my noble Friend, bring the Papacy into daily conflict with the feelings and wishes of the people; but let him maintain that independence which it is absolutely necessary the head of the Church should possess, and let that be secured, in such a manner as may seem best, separate from the temporal power—by which I mean reigning as a sovereign over a certain extent of territory." The two might be easily reconciled, and in that manner alone can I conceive it possible to devise an arrangement of this difficult question, How it is to be arrived at I do not pretend to say. It is a difficulty with which, however much we may desire to see it settled, we in this country have no means of dealing. For the solution of it we must look to the feelings of the Catholic Powers of Europe generally, and to the growing conviction which must force itself upon the mind of the Sovereign Pontiff; if, indeed, he has a right sense of the superior importance of the spiritual authority over the maintenance of the temporal power. We can trust to nothing except the conviction on the part of the Catholic Powers and the Papal See that such a solution is the only one by which the spiritual authority can be reconciled with its temporal independence. But I concur that the less this Protestant country interferes, the more it leaves it to the Catholic Powers of Europe, and the more it ab- 800 stains from interference and intervention, while at the same time it does not close its eyes to the importance of maintaining the real independence of the Sovereign Pontiff, the better is the prospect of arriving at that solution which we all desire, however difficult it may be of attainment.
§ House adjourned at Seven o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.