THE NAVAL RESERVE.

HL Deb 01 May 1860 vol 158 cc423-54

LORD LYNDHURST

rose to call the Attention of the House to the State of the Naval Reserve; and to ask Her Majesty's Ministers for an Account of its present Condition and probable future Progress; and said: My Lords, I am anxious to call your attention to a subject that appears to me to be one of great importance—the actual state of our navy, and more particularly that branch of it which is distinguished by the title of the Royal Naval Reserve. I cannot pretend, my Lords, to enter into many details connected with this subject; and if any noble Lord, more acquainted with the details of the naval profession than I can pretend to be, had undertaken this task, I certainly should have remained silent; but, finding that no Member of this House appeared to be disposed to bring this subject before your Lordships, I have felt it my duty, at no little inconvenience to myself, to present it to your notice. I shall endeavour, in what I have to state, to confine myself to a simple narration of facts, for the purpose of placing before you as clearly as I can the actual state and the future prospects of the navy, and for the purpose of conveying information to the nation which I think ought to be possessed by every man in this empire. It must not be supposed that I am about to state anything that can be at all prejudicial to the public service. Almost everything that I am about to state may be collected from public documents; and I believe I may say generally that Foreign Governments, rivals to this country, are more minutely acquainted with the condition of our army and navy than the great mass of our own people who are not within the immediate circle of official knowledge. My Lords, upon the strength of our navy the character, the influence, and, I think I may say, the existence of this country depend. When I say the strength of our navy, I mean thereby the comparative state of the English Navy as contrasted with that of Foreign Powers—for that is the essential consideration. I was informed the other day that a very able man, an Engineer, and a member of the Fortification Commission, being asked, "What defence do you consider the best for our country?" answered shortly and emphatically, "A powerful navy—a powerful fleet." My Lords, I am old enough to remember the whole history of the Revolutionary War, and of the war which succeeded it with the Empire of France. Step by step, and victory after victory, notwithstanding all its efforts—and every one must recall the gallantry displayed by the French Navy—that navy was by the great victory of the Nile, the victory of Lord Duncan, that of Lord St. Vincent, and the great and splendid victory of Trafalgar, reduced at the termination of the war to such a state that for twenty years after that period we remained, as far as our navy was concerned, in a state of perfect tranquillity. My Lords, that state of things has always been galling to the French, and they have at different times expressed themselves in terms of great feeling upon the subject. When Admiral Lalande lay with his fleet in the Bay of Salamis, expecting orders to follow our squadron to the coast of Syria, being continually disappointed and receiving no such orders, he, in a moment of irritation at the manner in which he was treated, expressed himself in the strongest terms upon the subject. I mention this circumstance as an illustration of the feeling entertained by the members of the French Navy with regard to the state to which they were reduced by the triumphant victories of the British. After expressing his indignation at the conduct of the Trench Government in not giving him the orders which he anticipated, the French Admiral of whom I have been speaking said, among other things, "England inflicted upon us a series of cruel defeats and humiliations, which caused, and ever will cause, every French sailor's heart to beat in presence of the English." Such, my Lords, was the result of the efforts made during the great French war. Very little change took place until after the memorable event which I now beg to call to your attention—I mean the accession to supreme power of the present Emperor of the French. In the year 1848 he was elected President of the Republic; and in the following year that celebrated Commission was appointed for the purpose of considering the reorganization of the navy of France. That Commission was composed of fifteen or more of the most able men selected from the navy and from the civil service of France, and they have framed a code of regulations of the most complete kind for the purpose of stimulating and directing the efforts of the French Navy. I have stated one remarkable date with respect to the issuing of that Commission. There is another date equally remarkable. No Report was called for from that Commission until after the celebrated event of the 2nd of December. About twelve or fourteen days after that coup d'éted—namely, on the 15th of December—a report was called for by Louis Napoleon, and from that time the most strenuous exertions have been made to carry all the recommendations of that Commission into effect. I mention these facts in order that your Lordships may see how far you can reconcile the dates and facts which I have stated with a certain conversation which is supposed to have taken place between a Frenchman and an Englishman, and which was published to the world some time back. My Lords, need I say that that Commission was in terms directed against this country? If you look to the evidence of the persons who were examined before that Commission, and to the remarks of the Members, you will see that England was at that period almost the sole object which Louis Napoleon had in view. M. Collas, who was the Secretary to the Commission, says:— The first thing to establish is the number of ships France ought to and could put to sea the day war is declared; for this basis is certain, the enemy is known; there can be no question but of England. That gentleman does not stand alone in the evidence which he gave before the Commission. Some of your Lordships, perhaps, may have read the opinions appended to the Report. The President of the Commission, M. Daru, discussed the manner in which a French fleet, with a proper military force on board, might make a successful attack upon the shores of this country. Admiral Dupetit Thouars, a well-known name, goes in much greater detail over the same ground, stating how easily a landing might be effected, and showing to demonstration the view with which that Commission was appointed and the object to which its result was directed. My Lords, the result of that Commission and of the admirable system which was formed under it has turned out to be a formidable navy—a formidable navy of steam-vessels, to which alone I confine my observations. What were the Government of this country and the Admiralty doing in the meantime? For a considerable period they were absolutely supine. No notice was taken of what was being done on the other side of the Channel, until at length, alarmed at the progress which had been made by the French Government in reorganizing their navy, they began to exert themselves, and by a most extraordinary effort and expenditure of money they have at length succeeded in forming a fleet, I believe at this moment about equal, but not more than equal to that of France. As I understand the matter—and I have it from the Reports upon the table—at the beginning of last year our fleet consisted of twenty-nine sail of the line, and the French fleet of precisely the same number. Although we were at that time equal in ships of the line, the French were far superior to us in what they consider of infinite importance—the number of frigates. While we had only twenty six frigates, they had thirty-four. What addition has been made to our fleet since the commencement of last year I am not informed. We shall perhaps hear it from the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) this evening; but I do not imagine that at this moment our fleet exceeds—or if it does, only in a small degree—the steam naval force of France. And now, my Lords, allow me to make an observation founded upon this supposed equality. If your steam navy is nominally only equal to that of Prance, it is in reality much inferior to it. I speak the opinion of every naval man with whom I have communicated; I speak the opinions of the members of the French Commission. They all say, "the English have so many points to defend, that with an equal navy they can never bring the force to compete with us that we can bring against them." And I have heard it stated by more than one naval authority that in order to place ourselves on a footing with the navy of France we ought to have nearly double the number of ships which they can bring into action. But it is sometimes said that our seamen are so much better that they give us the superiority. My Lords, let us not delude ourselves in that manner. The change in the mode of navigation has very greatly altered the whole system; and, although I agree with Sir Howard Douglas, that seamanship is of considerable importance, still it is very different at this moment from what it was at former periods. I have stated the comparative force, and also the amount of the material, of the French and English navies. Let me call your attention for a few moments to what is still more important, their personnel—the mode of manning their navy. By the inscription maritime, which is part of the French system, every seaman in the merchant service, of whatever rank, common seaman, master and mate, must be entered upon the register and pass through the navy; and an authority, whose name I dare say is familiar to the noble Duke opposite, M. de Fleurian, states that at the time he wrote there was not a sailor in the French marine that had not passed through the navy. Independently of this inscription, there is another measure of great importance adopted, called the levée permanente, under which a very large class of men have to pass seven years in the navy. What is the result of this state of things? The result has been stated over and over again; and forms a very important part of any comparison. It is, that the moment a French ship is built they have a trained crew ready to put on board; whereas we have to wait months after a ship is in commission before we can send her to sea. Again, if any great or sudden emergency calls for the fitting out of a fleet, France has trained seamen ready to put on board their vessels, which they can do with the utmost expedition. And how are her seamen trained? They are regularly edu- cated in seamanship, in gunnery, in everything that is necessary for the purposes of warfare. One of the regulations proposed by the Commission and adopted by the French Government requires that 10 ships shall always form a squadron of evolution, and shall, at all convenient and proper times, go to sea with a view to exercise the seamen. It was, I learn, stated the other day in the other House of Parliament that 40,000 French seamen are regularly employed in the fishing trade off the North American coast, near Newfoundland, and that the French Government, in order to encourage that trade as a nursery for seamen, pay a bounty amounting to more than the value of the fish that is caught. That is a course not consistent with the principles of free trade, but perfectly consistent with the principles laid down by Adam Smith in his admirable work. Now, my Lords, let me turn to the other side of the account. Everything, as the French say, depends upon the personnel—that is, on the manning; and I am disposed to agree in that remark. What is the force that we require? A Channel fleet equal to that of France, with the means of replacing it in case of disasters. We also require a Mediterranean fleet and a fleet of observation for the protection of our distant possessions. What force have we got, how are your ships manned, and what materials do you have for manning such a navy? And here my Lords, let me remind you that in the event of reverses you are not in the same situation as France would be in on the defeat of her fleet: for independently of any landing on your shores, if France were to obtain the mastery of the Channel and to blockade your ports, what becomes of the country? what becomes of your revenue? what becomes of your trade? what becomes of your means of feeding your people? The whole kingdom would be thrown into a state of permanent confusion. These are grave considerations which should convince you that you ought not to be content with an equal force. Nothing short of what is necessary for your absolute security ought to satisfy you on a subject of this kind, so vital to your interests, and even to your existence. My Lords, what are our means of manning the fleet? I will not speak upon my own authority; I will quote to you testimony which cannot be controverted. I will adduce the authority of Lords of the Admiralty, of First Lords, and even that of the noble Duke himself. What is the language of Sir Charles Wood, late First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking on this matter in the other House not long ago? He says:— I have no doubt that if time be allowed, in the course of two years we should have not the slightest difficulty in adding to our navy as many men as might be required, but it is when the emergency arises that the difficulty is felt. What we want is, not that that number of men should be put on board at the end of two years, but in two months, or in two weeks. Russia and Franco can do that, Here, my Lords, is another authority—for this is not a recent state of things; but one that has continued for the last ten or fifteen years. Admiral Berkeley, lately first naval Lord of the Admiralty, says:— We have a Reserve force of thirty sail of the line, ready for commissioning, and fit to proceed to sea in a few days. That is cheering—encouraging in the highest degree. But what does the same gallant Admiral add? "But where are the men to man them without having recourse to impressment?" Recourse to impressment! Every man throughout the country admits the impossibility of our again having recourse to impressment. My Lords, when it was proposed to send an expedition to the coast of Syria, the Mediterranean fleet was upon a peace establishment; and not only so, but it was far short of its complement of men in consequence of sickness and other casualties. And it become necessary therefore repeatedly to apply to this country to send out an additional supply of seamen. Hear what the gallant Admiral to whom I have referred says on that subject—and it would be impossible to give a better or stronger authority:— The first reinforcement of the seamen, or rather persons so called, did not arrive till the month of January (six months after the warning was given!) and it amounted to 600 men only. Thus we were left for a period of six months expecting continually, with ships, the complements of which were reduced below their peace establishments, to come into collision with the French fleet, the ships composing which were fully manned and no means spared to render them in every respect efficient. Add to which it since appears that the French were fully aware of our weakness, and were only waiting for orders from their Government to enable them to take advantage of it. Such was the state of things at the period to which I have alluded. It has existed, as your Lordships will perceive, for a very considerable length of time, and no ade- quate means have been taken to remedy the evil. But, my Lords, I can bring the case down almost to the present day—to the time when our fleet was sent to the Baltic to attack the fleet of Russia. See what was the state of our navy at that time. Admiral Berkeley wrote to the commander of that fleet in the Baltic to this effect:— Have any of your ships tried for men in a Norwegian port? It is said that you might have any number of good seamen from that country. We were so reduced that when we sent out only one single fleet we were so incapable of manning it that the commander of that fleet, not having a sufficient number of English seamen, was desired to search on the different coasts of the country in the neighbourhood of which he lay to see if he could not supply his deficiency by foreign seamen. Is it possible to present a more unfavourable picture of the position in which we stand? Again, my Lords, Admiral Berkeley, in writing to that commander that he was about to send out two vessels, the James Watt and the Prince Regent, states that they would soon join him; but he afterwards adds that "men are wanting, and it is impossible to say how long it will be before they are completed." On the subject of the navy he writes thus:— Notwithstanding the number of landsmen entered, we are come nearly to a dead standstill as to seamen, and after the James Watt and Prince Regent reach you I do not know when we shall be able to send you a further re-inforcement for want of men. Something must be done, and done speedily, or there will be a breakdown in our present ricketty system. My Lords, I have brought these observations down almost to the present day, and I am afraid at this moment we are not in a better state than that which is described by the authorities to which I have referred. What, then, is to be done? There is one point arising out of the new system of naval warfare to which I wish to call your attention. A blow can be struck in a moment. It does not take time to prepare it. In the course of the evidence given before the Commission to which I have referred it is stated—and many naval men concur in the correctness of the opinion—that the striking of the first blow in the event of a naval war will be almost decisive of the result. This, then, is a true and unexaggerated picture of our condition. My Lords, it is our duty not to deceive ourselves—it is our duty to take care that the country is not deceived; it is our duty to meet the difficulty in a manner corresponding with the emergency. What, then, is to be done? Two years since the Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry as to what course should be adopted for the manning of the navy. At the head of that Commission was my noble and gallant Friend who sits before me (the Earl of Hardwicke). No selection could have been more proper, from the gallantry, naval skill, as well as from the civil experience of the noble Earl. That Commission met in July, 1858, and made its Report in the February following—that is, about a year ago. What did they recommend? An addition of 4,000 sailors to the Home Reserve. I believe I may state, although I shall be happy to be contradicted on that point, that not one of these men has yet been raised. I am glad to read the smile on the countenance of the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset), which leads me to suppose he means to correct my statement to this extent, that out of 4,000 perhaps 1,000 men may have been raised. We shall, however, have a correct statement by-and-by from that noble person. They further recommended 5,000 Marines to be added to the present force—I believe not a single Marine has yet been raised after the lapse of a year. They also recommended 2,000 to be added to the Coastguard. Now, my Lords, I call your attention to this point, for great confusion has been allowed to prevail upon the subject of the Coastguard. There are two descriptions of force comprised under the designation of the Coastguard. There is a revenue Coastguard, and a Coastguard on board eleven ships scattered along our coast. Of the eleven ships I give the noble Duke joy. They never go to sea. The ships are occasionally driven by steam from one port to another, as convenience may dictate; but there is no mode of effectually training to seamanship the men who form that part of the Reserve. The other department is divided into two bodies—the fleet men and the shore men. It is most material to attend to this distinction. The fleet men amount to 3,200, and they are most admirable seamen. You cannot find a better body of seamen in any quarter of the globe. But there are 1,400 shore men, who are of no use whatever to the navy. So that when you talk of an increase of 6,000 Coastguardmen—for that is stated, I understand, as the amount of this Reserve—while that force embraces 3,200 admirable seamen the balance consists of these Coastguard Volunteers whom I have before described. I have it on the authority of many men connected with the service, and Admiral Martin, in his pamphlet, states it in most distinct terms, that the only real Coastguard consists of 3,200 men. Well, my Lords, this is a lamentable catalogue. But let me go on to the main point. The main point for your consideration, and to which I am about to call your attention is the great Naval Reserve—the Royal Naval Volunteers. It was stated by the Commission that it was absolutely necessary immediately to raise such a body of men for the purpose of supplying all the defects that might arise in our navy, and for the purpose of being prepared to meet any contingency. I was very anxious to see the subject taken up by some noble Lord of authority in naval affairs; but as the duty has fallen to me, who am only a civilian, I am desirous in calling your attention to the subject to support myself by sufficient authorities. I will quote, therefore, the Report of the Commission. The Report says:— The force we require must be composed of trained seamen, and, as the necessity for such a reserve is urgent, it must in the first instance be recruited from adults. That is the language of the Commission. What is the language of Admiral Berkeley on this subject? No person can consider the ease with which a powerful squadron might be manned and rendered available for hostile purposes,—the great increase in the number and power of their steam-vessels, together with the menacing aspect at times of our foreign relations—without coming to the conclusion that the present state of our Naval affairs demands the most serious and prompt consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and that it is a matter of paramount necessity—a necessity which, to my mind, neither brooks delay nor admits of compromise—to adopt such measures as shall, in the event of a sudden outbreak of hostilities, place a reserve force at the disposal of this Department sufficient to man effectually, and at a few days' notice, at least twelve or fourteen sail of the line. Such, my Lords, is the language of the Report of the Commission moved for by my noble and gallant Friend near me. The noble Lord has been a Lord of the Admiralty, and is possessed of great experience and knowledge in naval matters. This Report was made in the month of February of last year. The subject was of an urgent nature, one which demanded in dealing with it the most prompt and in- cessant activity. What then has been done? The fact, I believe is, my Lords, that no attempt was made to raise a single man until the 1st of January last, in accordance with recommendations of the Commission. And what, let me ask, is the number which is now stated by Lord Clarence Paget to have been obtained for this most important Reserve of 30,000 which ought to have been immediately raised? Why, 800 men constitute the whole of the force, whose services have been secured in the space of three months; so that at that rate it would take about ten years to raise the whole 30,000; and, in the meantime, one-third of the number raised would, owing to sickness, or some other cause, be found to be missing. Under these circumstances I think I may safely say that the Admiralty have not succeeded in carrying out the scheme which was recommended by the Commission as one which it was absolutely necessary to carry into effect for the security of the country, and which is also viewed in that light by every naval man who has directed his attention to the subject. The fact is, my Lords, the scheme is an absolute failure, and is so regarded, I believe, by the members of the naval profession almost without exception. To what causes, then, let me ask, is this failure to be attributed? As to the circumstances to which it is owing, there may be some doubt, although of the fact itself there can be none entertained. There is, however, one circumstance which it appears to me may have in some degree conduced to this result. Sailors are, as a general rule, very simple-minded men and do not like entering into complicated terms of engagement. Now, I hold in my hand the regulations issued by the Admiralty by which the seamen who enrol themselves in this service are asked to abide. They consist of 159 clauses. Now, my Lords, there is not an attorney in the United Kingdom who could make himself master of these 159 clauses in one fortnight. How then can it be expected that a common sailor, who is, generally speaking, wonderfully jealous of the Board of Admiralty by which he has been so often imposed upon, will enter blindfold into engagements, the nature of which he cannot comprehend. Why, my Lords, I, who was a member of the legal profession, and who formerly knew something of the practice of the Courts, should be obliged if, in the vigour of my life, I were reduced to such a position as to render it necessary for me to join the naval Reserve, under such conditions as these, to call to my assistance, Mr. Bellenden Kerr or Mr. Coulson, or some other eminent conveyancer, in order to make myself acquainted with the various provisions of this absurd document. In these regulations there is to be found, in my opinion, one obvious cause of the failure of the scheme to which I am referring, and it was an act of gross absurdity to issue such regulations. I should certainly be very shy of entering the Reserve Force under them were I a sailor. Towards the latter part of last autumn I was much among naval men, and they all told mo the same story, that the Naval Reserve had turned out a miserable failure. I am, in saying so, giving expression to the views of many persons competent to form a judgment on the subject. A sum of £5 or £6 is given to those seamen who enter the Naval Reserve, and you suppose then that you have bought their services. You cannot buy them at the price. You will not find men to join the force for that amount. If the number of 30,000 sailors were, in accordance with the Report of the Commission, raised, you would at the present rate of payment expend on that body only £180,000 a year, while the total amount of your Naval Estimates reaches the sum of £12,000,000 sterling. But you ought to bear in mind that all your machinery is of no use, and might as well be thrown to the bottom of the sea, unless you have a number of seamen sufficient to man your fleet. In framing these regulations, then, the Admiralty acts, in my opinion, somewhat after the fashion of a workman who, in making a clock, constructs the machinery admirably, using the very best materials for the purpose, but who, when he comes to make the mainspring, through some false notion of economy, uses imperfect materials, and renders the whole work, as a consequence, comparatively valuless. I may, however, be asked what course I should propose to be taken with the view of remedying the existing state of things. My answer to such a question as that is, "I have pointed out a great evil demanding immediate removal. It is not for me but for Her Majesty's Government to provide the remedy." I may, however, say, that I had a letter sent to me by a gallant Admiral, Admiral Bowles, suggesting a conscription of some sort, with the view of forming a maritime militia. This is a suggestion which I leave for the consideration of the Government. The con- clusion on the subject to which I have been addressing myself at which I have arrived is, I may add, that in point of material—that is to say, in ships—you are far below the requirements of the country, while so far as the manning of the fleet is concerned you are in a situation the most deplorable. I do not mince the matter. Our position in this respect ought to be known throughout the country. No man ought to be ignorant of the real facts of the case. I do not seek to ascribe the existence of those shortcomings, to which I have alluded, to inefficiency on the part of the Board of Admiralty, though I cannot say that I look upon that Board as a well-constituted body. A civilian who probably never knew anything of naval affairs, who never, perhaps, even owned a yacht, is placed at its head. There are also four naval Lords, to each of whom different departments of the service are intrusted, the proper administration of the details of which is quite sufficient to occupy the entire of his time; so that there is an absence of that superintending control which is requisite to direct the machinery. Such a system as exists at present cannot lead to anything but failure. The state of things, indeed, is not quite so bad as that which prevailed in former times, when a Dutch fleet sailed up the Medway and burned our ships at Chatham, and when not a single Lord of the Admiralty was at his post, the only official connected with it who was to be found on the occasion being the Secretary, who ran to and fro shaking his hands, and sending his silver in one direction and his gold-bags in another, to place them beyond the reach of spoliation in case of the landing of the Dutch. There has been, I admit, a change in the conduct of affairs at the Admiralty since that period, but not such a change as the requirements of the country imperatively demand. I ask your Lordships if I trespass upon your time in dealing with this important subject to a greater extent than is convenient? I assure you the inconvenience is ten thousand times greater, in all probability, to me in my own person than is that which you may experience. I shall then, with your permission, again briefly refer to the evidence of Admiral Berkeley, who states that from the moment he went to the Board of Admiralty he strenuously advocated the necessity of an available reserve to a large extent. I may here, perhaps, remind the House of that to which it is, perhaps, not requisite to allude—that the construction of the Board of Admiralty is not only such as I have pointed out, but that its members do not continue to be the same for more than a few years, inasmuch as, owing to the frequent changes of Government, one set of officials, as a matter of course, are obliged to give place to another equally uninformed as to the details of the service and equally inexperienced as their predecessors. Admiral Berkeley adds:— The constant change of Boards—above all, the frequent change of the individual at the head of the Board—renders it almost a hopeless task; it requires perseverance in one system in detail, as well as a whole. No scheme can prosper that is so constantly altered, and, above all, any scheme on the subject of manning the navy, as well as establishing a Reserve, must be steadily persevered in, and the one end kept constantly in view. Again he says:— From the first moment at which I entered the Board of Admiralty to this time, I have strenuously advocated the necessity of forming a Naval Reserve to a large amount; but from the frequent changes which take place in the Board of Admiralty, and in the individuals at the head of the Board, it is almost a hopeless task, and it requires the utmost perseverance in a new system of details as well as in the whole subject. No scheme can prosper which is so constantly altering, and, above all, any scheme for manning the navy, and establishing a Reserve, must be studiously persevered in, and kept constantly present and in view. These are the opinions of the gallant Admiral to whom I have referred. There is another opinion with which I will take the liberty of troubling your Lordships—it is that of a former friend of mine, a most gallant Officer, of high character, loved by all who knew him, and standing high in public estimation. It is the opinion of Sir George Cockburn. He says:— Having filled the station of confidential or principal sea Lord of the Admiralty for more than seventeen years, I feel that my opinion regarding the constitution of the Board may sooner or later be deemed worthy of consideration and attention; I therefore am induced to place in writing the decisions to which my experience has brought me on this point. I have, then, no hesitation in stating that I consider the present establishment of that Board to be the most unsatisfactory and least efficient for its purpose that could have been devised. He then recommends "that the Admiralty Board should be abolished, and a totally new governing body established." My Lords, I have only one more observation to make. I find that at this moment, and with this state of things existing, there is a party actively employed in the north of England in liberalizing and improving, according to their sense of the term, the fiscal system of the country, with the declared object—not unsupported, I am afraid, by pretty high authority—of putting an end to all taxes on articles of consumption, and placing the taxation almost entirely on realized property, and on realized property according to a graduated scale. This is done with the avowed object of introducing here the social equality, or, according to the expression used by a high authority, that species of social equality, that exists in France, and which is cherished in that country, regardless of civil liberty. Another object they have in view is to pull down the wealthier and aristocratic classes, who, they say, are the favourites and patrons of the army and navy, and to reduce those national establishments to a lower status. So that, while the navy of France increases from year to year, while its continuance in its present strength is provided for till 1871, the navy of England is to be reduced—and for what purpose and under what pretence? In the expectation that the nation will continue to possess the friendship of the Emperor of the French; in the expectation that, by the further exchange of cotton and pottery for wine and silks, a warm friendship may be established between this country and France. These are the views entertained by men who are aspiring to the Government of this country—men who, if they could, would place themselves at the head of the whole power of England. They would reduce us to the state of humiliation I have described, instead of maintaining our establishments as they now exist, and holding high the honour and reputation of England. And finally, my Lords, under these circumstances, I see that a noble Lord in the other House—with an indefatigable spirit that does not find sufficient employment in disentangling the complicated phrases of M. Thouvenel, and opposing the logic of his facts, instead of watching the course of events in Europe which require all his attention and all his powers of mind—as it were in a spirit of mischief, and living only in troubled waters, has at this time thought it right to bring forward a measure that opposes one class of the community against another; he would entirely remodel our constitution when all men should come forward in its support: and this he has done at a time when, in the opinion of all who have reflected on the circumstances, every class ought to unite in support of the honour and independence of the nation. The noble and learned Lord conculuded by putting the Question of which he had given notice as to the state of the Naval Reserve, its present condition, and probable future progress.

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET

My Lords, I am not sorry the noble and learned Lord has brought this important subject under the notice of the House; but I trust the speech of my noble and learned Friend will not induce your Lordships to imagine that since I have filled the office of First Lord, I have been unmindful of the necessity of maintaining our navy in full force. Undoubtedly, the condition of the navy is far more important to the country than the existence of any Board of Admiralty or any Government; but I must say when I heard the speech of the noble and learned Lord I expected that he was about to come to the conclusion that I had unnecessarily reduced the Navy Estimates and cut down the expenditure; because in a great part of his speech he assumed that the Admiralty had reduced our naval establishments, and the number of our ships and men. I do not consider this in any way a party question, and I may say, shortly, that the desire of the present Board of Admiralty, as of preceding Boards, is, and has been, to maintain the navy in the most efficient condition. On my accession to office in the present Board of Admiralty, I directed my attention to the Estimates; and I thought, looking at the programme of work left to be done by the late Government that the money to be voted was not quite sufficient for the result to be accomplished. I therefore added £100,000 to the Estimates on account of ships to be built. I did so in an earnest desire to complete within the year the programme laid down by the late Board of Admiralty. And I can say that during the last eight months more men have been employed in our dockyards than at any previous period of the history of the country. I do not exclude the time of the great war, down to 1815; and in this statement I exclude the factories altogether, which form another great division of our naval establishments. I speak of the shipbuilding department only. Undoubtedly, in the present year this exertion has been somewhat diminished; there was much inconvenience in continuing to carry on work at so great a pressure. Therefore, as far as the works undertaken by the late Government are concerned, they are still going on, but at the same time I thought it convenient and advantageous that for this year works should be differently arranged. We are now, I may say, forward in ships of the line, and the noble and learned Lord is right in saying that what we require, therefore, is to bring on a smaller class of vessels. Not that I purpose altogether to put a stop to the operations on ships of the line, but it has been agreed that they shall be left in frame in such a way that they may season and improve, at the same time that they can be finished off rapidly if an emergency should arise; and by this means the chief energies of the dockyards can be applied to the smaller vessels. The noble and learned Lord referred to the ships we have now afloat. I find that we have built, and that there are afloat, 50 ships of the line.

LORD LYNDHURST

Do you include block-ships?

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET

I am not taking the block-ships into account.

LORD LYNDHURST

Or sailing ships?

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET

I do not count them.

LORD LYNDHURST

Are those vessels all completed?

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET

They are all afloat. I do not mean that they are all in the first class of steam reserve; and nothing could be more unwise than to complete their equipment, because the moment you put in the machinery and set up the masts and rigging you stop the ventilation, and the wear and tear begins from that moment, and the expense mounts up at an enormous rate:—but those that are afloat are in different states of efficiency and forwardness. Had I known that the noble and learned Lord intended to call attention to the state of the vessels in the different classes of reserve, I would have prepared myself with a statement of their position. We have, as I have said, 50 ships of the line afloat, 37 frigates, 17 corvettes, 88 sloops, many of which are very powerful vessels, 26 smaller vessels, 24 gun-vessels, and between 150 and 160 gunboats. That is our steam force at present afloat.

LORD LYNDHURST

Have you an account of the French navy?

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET

I have an approximate account, but I will not vouch for the accuracy of the figures. They have 33 ships of the line afloat, and they are building six or eight—in all about 40; of frigates, they have 38 afloat and 12 building, making 50 in all—they surpass us in frigates; of corvettes, sloops, and all the other classes of vessels they have 104, which would not at all equal the number of our smaller vessels. The noble and learned Lord referred to a former period, and to the evidence of Admiral Berkeley as to our having 30 sail of the line for the defence of the country, which could be got ready in any emergency to go to sea. We have now 21 or 22 sail of the line at sea all properly manned—that is, more fully and efficiently manned than at any previous time, as we made an addition some months since to their complement. Some time ago I looked to ascertain what would be the complement of a fleet thus fully manned in the Channel or Mediterranean, and I found it would represent upwards of 21,000 men. As regards either the force afloat or the manning of the fleet, I therefore do not believe that the objections can be sustained. The noble and learned Lord said that on a certain occasion our fleet in the Mediterranean was insufficiently manned, and that every one had complained of their condition. No doubt, if ships are sent to sea, they should be efficiently equipped; and I do not think that such a state of things as was experienced during the Syrian war is likely to occur again. With regard to the Russian war, it is well known that we were called on suddenly to send fleets both to the Baltic and the Black Sea, and no doubt the Admiralty of that day was under great difficulties in manning the fleet. But before long what was the case? Why we had one fleet in the Baltic and one in the Black Sea, both very efficient. The fleet in the Black Sea in particular was very efficient—as to the Baltic fleet he would not say that it was all that was required. But if it were contended that we should take none but first-class seamen we should never get them—the question was whether we had men to man the fleet efficiently. On the whole I believe that, not merely as regards the vessels and machinery, but the general arrangements for equipping and sending vessels speedily to sea, at no time were the preparations in so forward a state as at present. I now come to the subject of the highest importance—the men. The noble and learned Lord says we have the ships, but the ships are not half-manned; but it so happens that it is just the contrary difficulty under which we have laboured. On coming into office I found certain Estimates prepared and a £10 bounty in existence. I adopted these, and before the month of August I found that the number of men voted by Parliament was exceeded by 1,000. The news of the Chinese disaster arrived in September, and I did not think it was prudent, under these circumstances, to put a stop to the enrolment of seamen; the result is that for the last six months we have been 5,000 in excess of the Vote. This year we determined to cover that larger number by a larger Vote, but they were still coming in so rapidly that I was obliged to come to the determination only to take able seamen, or ordinary seamen who had already served on board the fleet and been drilled to the guns. When the noble and learned Lord says that if we look to the last month or so, it will be found that we were not getting men. Of course that was so. The men we have are included in the Estimates, and it was not likely I should be taking additional men when I had already 5,000 men more than had been provided for. The noble and learned Lord had referred to the Reserve recommended by the Royal Commission. I have directed my attention to the Commission and their recommendations. The noble and learned Lord has stated correctly that the Commissioners recommend three or four measures. They recommend that the Coastguard should be increased to 12,000 men. I have taken in the Estimates some 10,000 or 11,000 more than last year; and, besides covering the excess in the Estimates this will provide a body of seamen in port ready to put on board ship as soon as they are commissioned. With reference to the Coastguard—

LORD LYNDHURST

Which Coastguard?

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET

Not the Naval Coast Volunteers, but the old Coastguard. Of these there are, first of all, 3,183 who serve on shore, and the officers attached to this force are 259. The crews of the district ships number 2,594; and, in addition, there are the crews of the coasting cruisers, consisting of 827 men. Not including the civilians, to whom the noble and learned Lord has also referred, there are thus of Coastguardmen ready to be put on board ship 6,862 men. The noble and learned Lord seems to attach little importance to the Coastguard ships, because he said they do not go to sea; but he forgets that attached to these vessels there are 14 or more gunboats, which are attached to the vessels round the coast, and in these the men are continually exercised. The crews for the most part are men who have served in the fleet, and a most effi- cient and excellent body. More than 900 of them are petty officers, which shows the superior class of men who enter the force. It is said that the numbers of the force ought to be raised considerably; but to do that at once would he very injudicious. At present the Coastguard service is a great attraction to seamen—men who have served their ten years in the navy are eligible, and are very glad to get into it. It was only the other day a ship came home and a great number of men elected to go into the Coastguard; and if we were to fill up that serviceable force with any other than experienced and able seamen we should be committing a great injustice and injury to the men in the navy, and discouraging those who are willing to enter the navy, and who are looking forward at the end of their term to get into the Coastguard. The noble and learned Lord did not speak as if he had a very high opinion of the Naval Coast Volunteers, and said he wished me joy of it—by which I supposed he rather meant the contrary. I would only state that there are in the Naval Coast Volunteers 7,000 men. I have received very gratifying reports from the chief officers at Liverpool, Hull, Leith, and numerous other ports upon the coast where they are stationed, all concurring in the conclusion that they are a fine and able body of men, quick at drill, well disciplined, good marksmen, well acquainted with their duties, accustomed to the boats, and altogether an admirable acquisition to the service. It is true they were only intended to serve in the event of emergency, and that they are intended for the defence of the coast; but for that purpose they are a most able and effective body of men, and the reports regarding them from all the different districts are of a highly favourable nature. I think then that as far as the Coastguard and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve are concerned, that these statements are most satisfactory. It is quite true that the Commission on Manning the Navy recommended that the Naval Coast Reserve should be a body of 10,000 men, and that at present we have only 7,000. In considering this subject we must contemplate the position of the mercantile marine of this country as well as the position of the navy. A great many men have recently been coming into the navy, but the mercantile marine has of late been drawing largely upon seamen. I have a Return from all the ports relative to the rate of wages given, and I am in- formed that wages are now better than they have been in most former years. I have Returns from London, Liverpool, Bristol, Plymouth, Newcastle, Sunderland, and other places, and the general observation is to this effect, and that they are sending to other ports for men. There is a competition thus created between the mercantile marine and the navy which tends to affect the Naval Reserve; and the men when they can get those high wages will not come into the navy; so that the very prosperity of the merchant service to a certain extent embarrasses the advance of the naval force. The noble and learned Lord had stated that the Royal Naval Reserve was to be raised to 30,000; but I think the Commission put it at 20,000. As regarded that force undoubtedly there are great difficulties in framing the regulations. The noble and learned Lord laughed at the regulations, and asked, how could the seamen follow them? If these regulations were part of their business and their duty I might agree with the noble and learned Lord; but that was not the case. The regulations for the most part are addressed to the shipping masters and the officers who enrol the men. I believe all the regulations which seamen are required to know can be printed on a single sheet. All we want in regard to this force is a little time. We did not begin to pay the men until April, and we all know that seamen are not very likely to come forward until the pay begins. The scheme has only been a month in operation, and I believe the men are entering very fairly; somewhere about 1,000 have joined, and they are all of them fine men, excellent sailors. In raising this force the Board of Admiralty was unanimous in thinking it desirable that we should only admit at first what are called "able seamen," and not admit ordinary men; because we wanted to get a class of men who would all of them be useful as the nucleus of a ship's company, and to keep out that class who would join only for the sake of the money, and when the emergency arose would not be forthcoming. A letter has been forwarded to me, written by the seamen of Hartlepool to the seamen of Aberdeen, which shows very satisfactorily what is the feeling of the men on the subject. The seamen of Aberdeen, it appears, did not like the scheme, thinking there was some trap in it, and they wrote to the seamen of Hartlepool to ask their advice. The reply was:—"Upwards of 100 men hare joined the force here, all like it, and the general opinion is that before long all the eligible men in Hartlepool will be included in it." They added, that there was going to be a demonstration to forward it; the scheme is popular with the men of Hartlepool, and they have every confidence in the Government not sending them on a foreign station—any man who is afraid of being called upon in a time of emergency is not fit to be a reserve man. That is their feeling—and very creditable it is to them. They say, "We are doing well in the merchant service, and we do not want to be sent out to any of your little wars to China or the River Plate, or any of those places where you are always carrying on some small hostilities; but when it comes to a regular European war, we will take our share in it with any man." Taking all these forces together, we have a total reserve of about 14,850 men, and, considering they are all good men, that is not a force to be despised. The noble and learned Lord says we ought to have enrolled a larger number of reserve men; and I have no doubt that, if we had gone about offering bounties to any sort of men, we should have made a much larger show on paper than we do at present. But that would have been a very injudicious course in the long run. The right course was to begin well, and to look to efficiency as much as numbers. I am told that if we had taken the worst class of men, the best class of men would never have joined. The course we have taken has two advantages—it does not involve so large an expenditure as if we had taken men of all classes; and it gives us the nucleus of a valuable force hereafter. The noble and learned Lord talked with a total disregard of economical considerations; but if we are to establish a force which is to last, we must pay some attention to economy. If we were to establish it on an extravagant and wasteful system, Parliament would very soon be for putting it down again. What the country wants is a force that shall grow and be efficient, and the cost of which will not be excessive. I believe by the measures we have taken we shall attain that result. The noble and learned Lord said we could not expect men to join for £6 a year. I have heard that before. Suppose you were to give £10 or £15 a year. In that case a seaman would never go into the navy, because he would be much better in the Naval Reserve with £15 a year, and serving in the merchant service, or picking up odd money in any way. Many of them would continue for their whole lives pensioners on the public. You ought to give a man just enough to be a tie upon him, but still not enough to make him better off than the sailor in the navy, nor so as to induce him to discontinue his service in the mercantile marine, qualifying himself for service in the navy. It has been said that we should give as much as £20 a year. If we did so, the men would live ashore, and in a few years they would be a set of drunken fellows, unfit to serve their country at sea. The Commission recommended £5. We raised the sum to £6, but I had great doubts about it, and it was only after consultation with experienced and competent persons that I thought, on the whole, £6 would be a better sum. There is another body to which the noble and learned Lord has not referred, but which I consider far the most important part of the force—I mean the boys. What we want is to bring in boys to serve in the navy. A boy who has been a couple of years at sea training in the Government ships is a better man for the Royal Navy than almost any man you can obtain from the mercantile marine. What, then, have the Admiralty done in respect of boys? In 1855, which was a year of war, we entered 4,000 first and second class boys; in 1856 we entered 3,000; in 1857, 1,800; in 1858, 1,690; and in 1859, 5,147. There are 8,200 first and second class boys now serving in our ships. It must always be borne in mind that in training boys for our ships the proportion of boys must have some reference to the proportion of men, and that, therefore, we must take in only such a number of boys as can be absorbed in the fleet. But we have not yet reached that point, and in the Estimates for the present year, besides the 11,000 excess that I have of men over the Estimates of last year, there is an addition of 2,000 boys. We are, therefore, training a large number of boys for the navy. I think that is a very wise course. Captains just returned from sea have told me that the boys make the best sailors in the navy, and that we cannot have too many of them. Accordingly, I have had some vessels prepared, and am now having more prepared, for the purpose of training boys. The House, however, is aware that a very great expenditure may be incurred if orders are too hastily given for anything that may be suggested, much of which may be avoided by proper consi- deration. The noble and learned Lord has referred to a kind of compulsory service. I believe that if anything could make your navy unpopular, and cripple your efficient force afloat, it would be the attempt to establish a compulsory service. The noble and learned Lord adverted to another point, which he seemed to think the root of all the evils he pointed out. I do not think, however, it is such a great misfortune that the First Lord should not be a professional seaman. I may refer the noble and learned Lord to a speech made by the late Sir Robert Peel, in which he showed the House of Commons what befel our naval First Lords when we had them. He described how Lord Howe had been hunted down, how Keppel had been treated, what had become of Lord St. Vincent. Lord Howe was absolutely hunted out of his place, and I do not think Lord St. Vincent was a very successful First Lord. We cannot, in fact, make a remarkably good show of our naval First Lords. After all, however, the question is not between civilians and seamen. In a Parliamentary Government the Board of Admiralty must be properly represented in Parliament. If you have got a good naval officer in Parliament, I see no reason why he should not be made First Lord; but I do not think it is absolutely necessary that the First Lord should be a professional sailor. Anybody who knows what the details of the Admiralty are, how many questions there are which have nothing to do with service afloat, must admit that for the administration of the navy it is not essential that a man should have had a naval education. I agree with the noble and learned Lord that it is a misfortune there should be such constant changes in the Board; but that evil is not now so great as it was formerly. When I came into office I found a gallant Admiral there who had been one of the Board in the time of the noble Earl opposite, and I think it is always desirable to retain the services of some Members of the Board. But there is also an advantage in some change. What is now done at the Horse Guards, with respect to a compulsory retirement at the end of five years, is done in an indirect way at the Admiralty. You change some of your men and retain others; there is an infusion of fresh blood, and other members of the profession have an opportunity of serving in the Admiralty, where they acquire knowledge which makes them better officers for high command when they return to sea. The no- ble and learned Lord has not referred to block-ships; but it has been frequently asked in "another place," "Why do you keep block-ships in different harbours?" I admit that they are useless for the purpose of going to sea; but for the purpose of drilling men, and as batteries to guard the mouth of rivers, they are useful vessels. If we were to condemn them, and send them back to the dockyards, they would be stripped, become hulks, and not worth refitting again. I think it is desirable, therefore, to keep them up as long as they will last, and can be turned to a useful purpose. Some of them are still good and efficient batteries, and, if their services were required, would be able to defend the mouth of our rivers. I shall not follow the noble and learned Lord into other questions upon which he touched. We may talk about them more conveniently when we come to consider the Budget. Let us not mix up anything of party with this question. What we all want is, that our navy should be powerful. It may be that difficult times are coming, and we ought to be prepared for them. Let no consideration of party, or of Admiralties, or of Governments, prevent us from doing whatever is necessary to render our navy efficient. That, I think, is the right course to be taken, and it is one in which I hope and believe all parties will co-operate together for the common good.

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE

said, the noble Duke had so fully answered the speech of his noble and learned Friend that there was very little left for him (the Earl of Hardwicke) to say in reference to the points to which attention had been more immediately called. But as his noble and learned Friend had enlarged very much on the whole subject of the navy, and had gone back to very ancient times, he might be permitted to say that so far as he had read the history of the navy, this question of the difficulty of manning the navy had been for a long period of time one of anxiety, and frequently the subject of debate in both Houses of Parliament. The country in former times relied upon the impress, and though he was sensible that this was au unpopular topic, yet he must remark that former Governments had taken very great care that the power of the Crown should not be injured in this matter. His own conviction still was that in time of emergency the necessities of the country might be so great that they might be forced to have recourse to the law which authorized them to compel seamen to serve in the defence of the country. His noble and learned Friend stated that he brought this subject forward, having first waited to see if precedence would be taken by any noble Lord who, as he was pleased to say, better understood the subject; but he (Earl Hardwicke) felt very happy that his noble and learned Friend had undertaken the task. He might, however, remind him that he (the Earl of Hardwicke) had not neglected his duty, inasmuch as he had early in the Session called the noble Duke's attention to the state of the Naval Reserve. His noble and learned Friend had stated truly that after 1815 there was great neglect in not keeping up our naval power; and he also stated that at the time we went to war with Russia our Baltic fleet was in a lamentable state, as to manning, in consequence of the condition of the Reserve of the country. But his noble and learned Friend forgot to state that though there had been great omissions under previous Boards of Admiralty, yet it was during the Government of his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) that our power in the Baltic was mainly created by the Duke of Northumberland, who during the short time that he was in office had constructed no less than nine heavy screw ships. No doubt, after the Russian war, operations came to a standstill, and remained so until the attention of the country was again aroused by a sense of danger. It happened that his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) was again called to the councils of the Crown, and during the short time that he remained in power the British fleet was much improved by extraordinary exertions, but also with economy in its true sense. During the time that his noble Friend was in office he believed that the fleet was increased by fourteen or fifteen sail of the line, and that there were also eight or nine more such vessels on the stocks nearly ready for launching; a Channel fleet of considerable power was formed, the Mediterranean fleet was strengthened, and there was a vote granted for an increase of 8,000 seamen and 2,000 Marines. Much attention had been excited by statements as to the supposed facility with which the French were able to man their fleet and send it to sea, and he himself knew it was a question with the former Government as to their power of doing this. It was stated that the French had a reserve of 60,000 men; but he believed it was known to officers of their own fleet that not more than half that number was at any time available to man the navy: 30,000 trained seamen, however, was a most formidable force, and therefore it was that his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) issued a Commission to inquire if anything could be done to increase our power in that respect. He desired to do everything he could to forward the views of the noble Duke for the improvement of the navy, but he must say that he was surprised that more rapid execution was not taken in reference to the recommendations of that Commission for forming a Naval Reserve. The noble Duke said that it was not until the month of March last that efficient steps were taken; but it was in May of last year that the Commission reported. The object of the Commission was to lay the foundation of a permanent Reserve, to be used in case of emergency; and it was recommended that a system should be adopted for bringing closer together and interweaving the mercantile marine and the Royal Navy; and with this object, it was proposed that in each of the twelve great ports there should be a school ship capable of receiving from 1,000 to 1,200 boys, who should be trained by a naval education, and who should, at the expiration of a certain period, go into the merchant service if they thought fit, or into the permanent Reserve. By now enrolling adults the late Government hoped to relieve the immediate wants of the service; but the main object was to be effected by means of the school ships. What they had heard as to the Reserve was not highly encouraging, but he believed that if once the system took with the seamen there would soon be a very considerable body of men ready at the call of the country. He only regretted that so long an interval had been allowed to elapse between the presenting the Report of the Commission, and going seriously to work to form the Reserve. He believed that the raising 5,000 Marines, in addition to the 15,000 we already possessed, was a most important step; but care must be taken that there were no more Marines than could from time to time be made available; for, if there were more than were required for their proper duties, they would be no longer Marines, but ordinary soldiers. He thought, however, that 20,000 Marines would never be too many. Those men when trained were a most useful and efficient body. They could be sent to sea on all cases of emergency, and having received practical education in gunnery, they make capital artillerymen. If a 50-gun ship were to be sent to sea on an emergency, by putting 50 Marines on board of her they would have a trained artilleryman to each gun, who with the assistance of such men as could be got together for the service would be able to fight a tolerably good action. With regard to the Coastguard, the view the Commission took of them was, having ascertained that the number at present was insufficient to protect the revenue of the country, they thought that the amount of the force should be increased to 12,000. In the present uneasiness that prevailed as to the peace of Europe, he thought it would be wise to raise the Coastguard to that standard; more especially as the number of the men stood at 10,000 according to the statute, although it had never reached that number. The noble Duke very properly remarked that the Coastguard service was considered as an honourable resting place for the most excellent of our seamen after they had rendered valuable service to the country for a series of years, and that it was intended to keep it exclusively for that purpose. That arrangement might be very good in times when there was no restlessness or uneasiness felt in reference to our foreign relations; but in such times it ought to be opened at once and the number raised. The idea entertained by the Commission was, that if they got rid of the landsmen we should at any moment be enabled to obtain from the Coastguard service, if they were raised to 12,000, a sufficient number of seamen to man twenty sail of the line, and could replace them in the Coastguard duties by the Militia. We had the Coast Volunteers; but the objection to that force was that they served under certain conditions, and could not be sent more than three leagues from the shore; consequently, however valuable the services of that force might be in regard to ships cruising in the Channel, they would be comparatively useless for any other purpose. But after all, he should say that the Naval Reserves were nothing as compared with the importance of maintaining an efficient fleet of well-manned ships, which would form the nucleus of a great naval force in the event of war. The country must, therefore, be content to pay the amount of money that would be necessary to maintain for the service of the State a powerful Channel as well as Mediterranean fleet. With a permanent peace establishment of not less than 60,000 seamen and marines, together with such a Naval Reserve as we might now hope to possess, he thought that they might reasonably consider the country in a perfect state of security. It became a matter of great importance to the British sailor, if he desired to preserve his liberty from any interference, and was anxious to be saved from seeing the press-gang again at work, that he should enter willingly those Reserves; for the country must be defended at all hazards, and their Lordships as well as all others must bear their share of the dangers of the crisis, and suffer the same inconveniences in times of invasion or of threatened invasion. If the seamen did not wish to be impressed, they must voluntarily undertake the duties which the State now asked them to perform upon terms easy in themselves and highly lucrative. A retaining fee and a pension was, after all, no small advantage to these volunteer seamen for the performance of those duties required for the defence of their wives, their children, and their homes.

LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY

said, that the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty had omitted to answer one portion of the speech of the noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord Lyndhurst). He had omitted to state how it was that the recommendation of the Commissioners in reference to the increase of the Marines had not been carried out. The Commissioners had recommended an addition of 5,000 men to that admirable force, who, being organized and experienced in gunnery, were ready to go to sea at a moment's notice, and were as fit for service as any seamen who could possibly be obtained in times of sudden emergency. He trusted, therefore, that the recommendation of the Commissioners on this point would be fully carried out by the Government.

LORD COLCHESTER

expressed a wish to offer a few observations in reference to compulsory service before the noble Duke answered the question just addressed to him. He thought the House must have been extremely gratified with the clear and satisfactory account which the noble Duke had given of the steps which had been taken by the Government to secure the efficiency of the navy and a good Naval Reserve. There was an impression in the navy that naval officers were never to be permitted to fill the office of the first Lord of the Admiralty, and he was therefore glad to hear the noble Duke express an opinion that members of the profession ought not to be excluded from such appointments. With regard to the necessity of retaining to the Government power to compel seamen to serve in cases of emergency, he admitted that the system of impressment formerly enforced was extremely unpopular, and he had no wish that that power should be used unnecessarily, or except as a last resort. At the same time he thought that the power ought to be retained, because he feared that the expectations entertained as to the result of the establishment of a Reserve might prove too sanguine, and that if occasion should arise for calling out the men forming the Reserve they might not be found forthcoming. No doubt, many men would accept the bounty, but would they be forthcoming when required? The First Lord of the Admiralty might "call spirits from the vasty deep; but would they come when he did call for them." He did not mean that the men would be unwilling to serve their country, but they might be absent on trading voyages. He would also remind the House that on the commencement of a great European war the merchant shipping interest would prove a powerful competitor with the Royal Navy, and the men whose services were calculated upon in case of emergency might, when that emergency arose, be found to have entered other services. It was essential that on the breaking out of a war we should have the superiority at sea; for if the enemy had the superiority for five or six weeks, he would capture all our homeward bound merchant ships, and instead of serving on board the fleet the men would be carried to foreign prisons. Under those circumstances, he thought it absolutely necessary that the Government should possess the power of impressment in case seamen declined voluntarily, when war broke out, to join the Royal Navy. The prejudice among seamen against compulsory service was not so much on account of its being compulsory, as in consequence of the indefinite period for which they, the seamen, had formerly been required to serve. That grievance was, however, removed by the Act of 1835, which limited compulsory service to five years; and he trusted that if the necessity should ever arise, the Government of that day would not be deterred by the fear of popular clamour from using the powers with which they were, by law, invested.

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET

, in answer to his noble Friend (Lord Stanley of Alderley) had meant to state that the number of marines was originally fixed at 15,000. The late Government provided for raising them to 17,000, and the present Government to 18,000; but he thought it undesirable to raise more than 1,000 additional in the present year, because if they were too hastily raised a proper discretion could not be exercised as to the quality of men accepted; it would also increase the difficulty of drilling them properly—and it was of the utmost importance that they should be well drilled before they were sent afloat. There were now on shore 6,000 Marines—the number which the Commission had recommended that we should have in order to put on board in case of any emergency. As to impressment, of course that power belonged to the prerogative of the Crown. That power, he was sure, no advisers of the Crown, whoever they might be, would ever recommend the Crown to use, except, in the case of such extreme necessity that he would not anticipate it.

THE EARL OF SHREWSBURY AND TALBOT

thought the House and the country owed a debt of gratitude to his noble and learned Friend for having introduced the question, and it was most satisfactory to know that the debate had taken place without the slightest symptoms of party feeling. There was only one point on which he wished to make a remark, namely, in reference to the training of boys. He thought great advantage would result from training boys in the duties of a man-of-war whether they were intended for Her Majesty's service or not, so that when in after years a case of emergency arose and their services were required they would have little or nothing to learn. "With respect to the power of impressment, it was quite clear that it must not be abolished, though it was also clear that in the present state of public feeling it could not be exercised except in cases of urgent and imperative necessity.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

said, that although impressment had been in abeyance for a considerable number of years there was not the smallest doubt but that the power of exercising it belonged in full vigour to the prerogative of the Crown. That power could only be abrogated or altered by an act of the Legislature of the country. He trusted that there would be no necessity ever again for exercising that power; but if the necessity should arise, he repeated, there was not the smallest doubt of the legality of it.

House adjourned at Eight o'clock, to Thursday next, a quarter before Five o'clock.