Lords Sitting of 30 March 1860

Minutes.
PUBLIC BILLS.—3a Consolidated Fund (£850,000).

INDIA—THE PROPOSED LICENSING SYSTEM—PETITION.
LORD OVERSTONEpresented a Petition from Merchants and other Inhabitants of Bombay, unconnected with the Government service, against the proposed Measure of Taxation. The petition had been adopted at a public meeting convened by the sheriff, and attended by almost all the influential inhabitants, merchants, lawyers, and commercial men of Bombay. The petitioners, after a full discussion,

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condemned the proposed Government measure as unjust and unequal, and prayed that the House of Lords would prevent its becoming law. He could not pretend to be possessed of so much local information or to have studied the question so deeply as to be able to give any opinion of his own on the subject; but he had no hesitation in calling their Lordships' attention to the matter, both on account of the importance of the subject and on account of the large number of influential signatures appended to it. On these grounds he was Confident the petition would receive from their Lordships that respectful consideration to which it was so justly entitled. He thought it right to call to their Lordships' notice that in the course of the discussion which took place at the meeting, it was stated that a former petition which had been sent from Bombay had, on its presentation in this country, been received with silent contempt. Now, he felt certain that nothing of the kind could have occurred in their Lordships' House, and that this feeling must have arisen from some misapprehension but he alluded to this matter now because he felt certain that this petition would receive from their Lordships' hands all attention, and that their Lordships would not proceed to discuss the question without giving to the statements contained in this petition all the consideration which they so well deserved.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, he could not recollect that any petition representing the opinions of any portion of the inhabitants of India had been received either by the Government or by their Lordships with silent contempt. He recollected that in the course of last Session and during the former Administration of Lord Palmerston, several petitions were presented from various parts of India by noble Friends near him; but they were uniformly introduced by the noble Lords who presented them with observations stating the purport of the petitions, and calling the attention of the House to the importance of their representations; and these remarks had always been met by such respectful observations from the Government or other noble Lords as the subject required. As regarded the petition which his noble Friend presented, it was too late, in the best sense of the word; for it referred to the licensing system, which Mr. Wilson distinctly stated in his address had been abandoned by the Government because it was based on unequal and unsound principles.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEstated, that a petition which had been sent to him from India for presentation had remained in his hands, because, with the changes impending, he really did not know how it applied to the existing state of things in India.
Petition to lie on the table.

CHINA EXPEDITION.

  MOTION FOR ESTIMATE OF EXPENSES.
  EARL GREY EARL GREY moved for an
  "Estimate, as nearly as the same can be made out, of the probable Cost of the Expedition to China up to the Close of the Financial Year 1860–1; the said Estimate to include the Pay and Supplies for Her Majesty's Naval and Land Forces (whether of the Regular or Indian Army) if they should continue in China to the above Date, together with all Charges for Transport, Freight, Military Stores, and Coals."
  The noble Earl said the information which their Lordships at present possessed upon this subject was very scanty and imperfect. All they knew was, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in introducing his Budget, was reported to have said that during the present financial year, ending to-morrow, nearly £1,000,000 would be required for this purpose. That, he begged to state to their Lordships, was for the liquidation of expenses, the result of measures taken by the Government during the three or four months before Parliament assembled, and without the slightest authority from Parliament, which had had no opportunity of expressing its opinion of the purposes for which it had been incurred. Their Lordships had not taken notice of that irregularity, nor had any notice of it been taken in the other House of Parliament — the House which had charge of the public purse; but he (Earl Grey) was old-fashioned enough to believe that these expenses ought not to have been incurred by the sole authority of the Government, and without previous application being made to Parliament, or without Parliament having had an opportunity of expressing an opinion upon the circumstances. It Was true they had heard from the Secretary of State for War that Her Majesty's Government had, in the Estimates laid before Parliament, made a further provision to the extent of two millions and a half for the costs of the expedition in 1860–1; but that right hon. Gentleman, at the same time, said he would not speculate upon what might be the cost of those operations; and he (Earl

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  Grey) thought the right hon. Gentleman was highly prudent in declining to state that that Estimate would be the ultimate cost of the operations to be carried on. He would, indeed, be a bold man who would venture to predict what the cost would be, when he considered the enormous expense of conducting military operations at so great a distance from their resources, and the uncertainty when war had once begun of what might be its limit, or when it might be brought to a close. When all those things were considered, they must feel that it was only too probable that the cost of this expedition would swell to the most formidable dimensions, and have to be reckoned by millions. Even if these operations should be brought to as early and successful a close as it would be possible to hope for, still in that ease he believed there would have been a very considerable expense incurred; and of all those expenses he thought their Lordships ought to have a proximate Estimate. No doubt it was impossible that anything like an accurate Estimate could be prepared, nor was it necessary that such an Estimate should be presented; but it ought to be practicable to make out, for their Lordships' information, an account which would show the probable cost of the measures which had been already taken and ordered by the Government, on the supposition that no unforeseen contingency would arise. The Government ought to make out the cost of sending to China, and maintaining there, until the close of the ensuing financial year, the large naval and land forces which had been already ordered. That was the Estimate which be (Earl Grey) proposed their Lordships should call for. It was proposed to take the expenses up to the end of the ensuing financial year—and he indeed must be a sanguine person who expected the return of the expedition at an earlier period; and even if it should happily return before that time, the cost of the return voyage would absorb the funds provided, and there would be: no immediate reduction in the expenses pf the ensuing year. It was necessary that their Lordships should have this Estimate before them, in order that their Lordships and the country might have an opportunity of knowing what might be the cost which, in the most favourable event, would be thrown upon the country by the measures which had been taken by Her Majesty's Government. Their Lordships could not clearly understand what the Go-
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  vernment proposed to do without this Estimate; and it was the more necessary that they should have it before them, because, contrary to what used to be the practice of Parliament, Her Majesty's Government had adopted their measures, had undertaken this great expedition to a distant country, and had, in all probability, commenced a long and costly war without having first invited Parliament to express an opinion upon it. The ancient practice of Parliament was, that when war, involving probably a large expenditure, was imminent, it was felt to be the duty of Ministers, at the earliest period in their power, to call upon Parliament to advise the Crown, and to share the responsibility of Ministers. That was a good and a wholesome rule, and he regretted that it had been departed from in the present instance. It was true that the other House of Parliament had been asked for a Vote of £850,000 for the expenses which had been already incurred: but no formal judgment of Parliament had been asked upon the subject, and their Lordships had had no opportunity of expressing any opinion. That might be a convenient course for a Government to follow, but he did not believe it was consistent with the spirit of the constitution, nor did he think it was just to the Members of either House of Parliament, or to the nation at large. It might be a convenient course for a Government to throw the papers upon the table, as thereby a vote of censure could not be obtained without difficulty—for it was much more easy to avoid a vote of censure than to obtain a vote of approval. It was a difficult, an invidious thing for a Member of either House of Parliament to propose a vote of censure; but this he would say, it was by no means just to throw upon Parliament the responsibility of a silent acquiescence, although the measures which Government had taken might, in the opinion of Parliament, be erroneous; still less was it fair to expect that private Members would come forward in the character of accusers. It was not just that the nation should have to bear the cost and burden of, it might be, an expensive and protracted war, and the expenses of military and naval preparation, without the question being in the first instance submitted to the deliberative judgment of Parliament. Although the course pursued by the Government was one of which he did not approve, he owned he did not wonder that they had followed it. It

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  showed impliedly that they had but little confidence in the strength of the case which they would have to submit to Parliament, had they come forward to ask for its support. Had the Government done so, they would have been called upon to prove that the quarrel with China was a just one—to show that the Chinese were not entitled by the law of nations to resist by force the breaking down of the barriers erected for the protection of that river which gave access to their capital—how it was that the precedents which had been followed in the wars with other nations, and especially in the last war with Russia, had been neglected in this instance—how it was, in short, that a convention had not been signed with France clearly defining the objects of the war. In undertaking combined operations with an allied and independent power there were always difficulties to be overcome in order to maintain cordiality and to prevent jealousies and animosities from arising. In order to guard against those dangers it had been customary at the very earliest possible period, and before anything was done, that the terms should be clearly defined and agreed upon, so that there should be no room for doubt or dispute as to the real objects in view, and what one allied Power had a right to expect from the other. Nothing should be left to vague understanding —nothing to conversations of which there might be an imperfect and jarring recollection. Whatever passed in conversation ought to be recorded in due diplomatic form. The precedent of the Russian war showed that those precautions had not been needlessly observed; and still more recent events showed that one at least of the stipulations in the Russian war convention would not have been useless—that neither of the contracting parties should seek for itself any territorial accession in consequence of the war. Would such a precaution be needless now after what they had seen within the last month? Had the question been submitted to Parliament, Ministers would have been asked what advantages were to be derived from the war —what was the promised end of all this costly preparation—were the cost and risk commensurate with the advantages to be gained? Of the advantages, which would be gained and the effect which these would exercise on the national safety and honour the House had yet received but the most imperfect and vague explanations. They had been told that a great expedition was
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  sent out to enforce the performance of the Treaty of Tien-tsin and to obtain an apology from the Emperor of China for the occurrences which had taken place at the mouth of the Peiho River. There was not a particle of evidence to show that without any expedition at all there would be any obstacle to the execution of the treaty in question; and he must add that, if an apology was all that was wanted, they would have to pay very dearly for it — for an apology from a semi-babarous sovereign they would have to pay five or six millions of money. The more he considered the subject, the less he was able to perceive what end could be gained at all commensurate with the hazards which must be incurred. If it were proposed to obtain from the Chinese by force concessions which they would not yield except to force, then it appeared to him that those concessions would be of very little value; for what guarantee had they that as soon as the force should be withdrawn the concessions would not also vanish? And if on the other hand the Chinese Government did not yield without necessitating the employment of the force sent out, he wished to know how its operations were to be directed, and with what likelihood of success. It should not be forgotten that with a large land force, such as they proposed to send, the difficulties of transport were very great; then there were the dangers of climate, the difficulty of procuring supplies, and the uncertainty which must exist as to what measures it would be proper to adopt; in short, it appeared to him to be an act of great rashness to send under such circumstances so large a land force to China. Well, but let them suppose these operations were as successful as they could desire, what would be the result? What interest had we in China beyond the extension of our trade? Were they to burn the Chinese towns, to slaughter the people, to devastate the country, and bring upon it all the inevitable calamities of war? Every blow we struck at China more or less recoiled upon ourselves; and supposing that our triumph extended even to the overthrow of the existing Government, why then we should be in a worse position than ever. The results would be to China most disastrous, to ourselves anything but beneficial. He assured their Lordships that from the best information he could gather, such a shock as it was proposed to give to the Chinese Government was not at all unlikely to over-

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  turn it; and what it might be very easy to overthrow it might be very difficult to provide a substitute for. How were peace and order to be preserved in that immense empire if the machinery by which it had hitherto been regulated were broken up? We had had some experience of former doings at Canton, where our proceedings had brought upon that portion of the Chinese empire a state of anarchy. Hitherto our trade with China Had been most flourishing and prosperous, and one of the main causes of that was that the Chinese Government had maintained order and security, so that the people were able to carry on the operations of agriculture and to produce their tea and sugar and those other articles which formed her staples of commerce. But should there ensue a state of anarchy, not only would the best trade between China and England be hazarded, but also that very important trade between China and India. He believed that in such an event not less than between £7,000,000 and £8,000,000 of revenue would be sacrificed. He feared there was too much reason for believing that that the rebellion in the Chinese Empire was the consequence of our war with China in 1840. When in office he had had an interesting conversation with Dr. Gutzlaff, who told him that it was to the war, and especially to the effect of the large pecuniary indemnity which England enforced, that the rebellion was owing—that by it her finances and her Government were crippled and paralysed, her great officers were left unpaid, and in every instance there was greater suffering than there had ever been before; that by the war the maintenance of order and security was destroyed; and Dr, Gutzlaff described in most moving terms the ruin and misery which arose from that insecurity and from the disorganization of the Government. The finances of the empire were crippled—the officers of the Government were left unpaid, and to obtain a subsistence were driven to a greater degree of corruption than they had previously practised, the administration of justice was neglected, and so much misery and distress was caused that the people broke out into rebellion. From the papers already on the table of the House it would be seen that the rebellion had caused a falling off in production, and with that our trade must also suffer. He was not now asking their Lordships to pass judgment on the policy of the war. In order to discuss that important question it would be neces-
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  sary to go into the whole of our relations with China since 1840, and a mere Motion for a return was not a fitting occasion for such a discussion. In his positition, too, unconnected with any party, and having no right to look for support from any part of the House, he was not the proper person to call for such a judgment. He had therefore merely touched on the surface of the question in order to show that it ought to be discussed, and that it was one on which the Government ought to have invited the judgment of Parliament. All he desired was to show how wrong it was that the question should not have been submitted to Parliament and a decision taken upon it in the ordinary constitutional manner; but in pointing that out, however strong might be the opinion which he personally entertained, he should not attempt to bring forward those arguments which he thought might fairly be used to prove that there was no justification for the war. With these observations he would conclude by moving for the Estimate of which he had given notice.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, that the noble Earl himself, while moving for an Estimate of the cost of the Chinese expedition, said that he would be an extraordinarily clever man who could venture to predict the cost of a Chinese war. According to his own showing, therefore, he was now asking for a Return which he believed the Government could not furnish with any accuracy. He wished to call their Lordships' attention to the position in which they stood. As regarded the action which took place at the mouth of the Peiho river last year, those occurrences had taken place before he came into office, and therefore he (the Duke of Somerset) considered himself no more responsible for them than the noble Lord was. To pretend to throw upon the present Government any responsibility for such transactions would be going quite beyond all Parliamentary precedent. But it ought not to be forgotten that when the news of those occurrences reached England the public mind was thrown into a state of very great alarm, for it was feared from the Report that neither British life nor property was safe at Amoy, or Shanghae, or Canton. Under such circumstances, he asked, was it not the duty of the Admiralty to take immediate steps for the sending out of a force sufficient to protect the lives and properties of British subjects? The course that the Government had adopted in reference to these transactions had been fully

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  approved by public opinion. The noble Earl, indeed, said that Parliament ought to have been summoned. But that was not the opinion of the Earl of Derby; land it was plain that no advantage would result from the summoning of Parliament, but that, on the contrary, it would greatly have increased the excitement which already prevailed. What the people of England required was, that immediate steps should be taken to redress the wrong, and to demand an apology for the outrages which the Chinese had committed. Parliament was perfectly, aware of the course which the Government had taken; the papers and instructions to Mr. Bruce had been laid upon the table, and they showed sufficiently the mild and moderate course which had been adopted by the Government in demanding from the Chinese Government reparation for the wrong they had committed. He could not understand what course the noble Earl would have desired. He could see no more prudent course open to the Government to pursue than the one they had adopted in this case. He did not agree in opinion with the noble Earl that no outrages had been committed by the Chinese. He thought, on the contrary, there had been throughout duplicity and deception on their part, and no one could read the papers which had been laid on the table without seeing that the Chinese had tried to evade the reception of the Ambassador. The instructions to Mr. Bruce were, that they would try evasion, and that he must insist on the Treaty. The Chinese did not clearly and boldly say, "By the Peiho you cannot come." On the contrary, they led Mr. Bruce to believe that he could come that way. They did not say, "We have put up barricades, and will not allow you to pass;" but they said, "We will remove the barricades, which have not been put up against you, but against rebels." If that was not duplicity and evasion, he did not know what was. But the noble Earl went back and told them that this Chinese expedition was to be the commencement of a new policy. Surely he must remember that it was not a twelvemonth ago that a treaty had been entered into by his noble Friend (the Earl of Elgin), and that that treaty was to have been ratified at Pekin; but if the Chinese thought fit not to fulfil their promise, but to enter into an open war with the English forces, surely that was not a new policy, but returning to a state of things which existed before the
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  treaty was agreed to. The noble Earl said these wars caused a very great increase in the Estimates, and that this course of policy ought to be checked; but if he looked back he would find that ever since 1840, or even earlier, our relations with China had been very unsatisfactory. Every two or three years during the last twenty years there had been some outbreak, some outrage, some complaint, and, if not war, a state of things very nearly approaching war. In 1843, he believed, we had more men in China than we had now, and we had been constantly paying largely, because the unsatisfactory state of our relations with China compelled us to keep a large force there. This state of affairs was attributable to our never being able to communicate directly with the Chinese Government. We communicated with Viceroys at the ports, who sometimes took one view and sometimes another. Sometimes a Viceroy, to gain popularity, would put a humiliation on the barbarians, as they were pleased to call us. If we were in force and matters looked serious, the Viceroy was recalled, and they took off his head, or obliged him to commit suicide, which was a way they had of getting rid of an obnoxious Minister in that country. If, on the contrary, the Viceroy behaved in a friendly manner to foreigners, he was very likely to bring on himself the odium of the Chinese. Our object by this expedition was to put our relations on a more satisfactory footing, and, if that were accomplished, no matter what it cost, he should deem this the most economical expedition which had ever been sent to China, and he should not estimate its cost without reference to its results. He really could not see what milder course the Government could have pursued. In his position at the Admiralty he certainly could not censure Admiral Hope, who had shown so much courage and gallantry at the head of the expedition. Errors of judgment there might have been; but he was not speaking of professional tactics, and he was not criticizing the operations, but he was speaking of the gallantry and courage of the British seamen and their officers, which had not been surpassed by any expedition ever sent from this country. And in what position should we have been in if we had not sent out an expedition to demand redress for the outrage that had been offered? Did the noble Earl think that under those circumstances commerce would have gone on, or that

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  the English at Shanghai and Hong Kong would have been safe? The noble Earl said that trade would be destroyed by this war. If the result should be injurious to trade it would be unfortunate; but fortunately the Chinese did not manage their affairs as they were told in this country they ought to manage them. He had beard debates upon China, and he had heard, year after year, that our policy was most destructive to trade. But trade had gone on increasing more and more. The Chinese were a peculiar people. They would fight with us in one part of the country and trade with us in the other. The annual average value of British produce exported to China was, in the eight years from 1834 to 1842, £926,000; from 1843 to 1850, £1,700,000; and from 1851 to 1859, £2,299,000. During the whole of this time there had been frequent disputes and wars with China; but trade was developed and increased more and more rapidly. Now as to the noble Earl's Motion, it was clearly impossible to give the cost of the expedition to China in detail, because it must depend on occurrences which might take place from month to month, and almost from day to day. If the Chinese Government agreed to the Treaty and the demands which the Government made, which were very moderate, namely, that they should have such relations with the Court of China as would prevent those complications which were constantly taking places then he did not think the cost would exceed the estimate. He found that there was a greater force in China in the beginning of 1858 than at the present time. There had been a considerable force there for the last fifteen or twenty years, and he put down the additional force consequent upon the present state of affairs at about 5,000 men. The cost of transport and of stores would be large—he feared as much as £200,000— but he hoped that the Estimate taken this year would be sufficient to carry on the operations and bring back the force, if, as he hoped, the matter ended peacefully. The supply of coals and of naval stores at Hong Kong would also entail large expense—it would be one of the heaviest items, and he set it down at £150,000. These were the chief items; but he considered that the whole Navy Estimates next year chargeable to China would be about £680,000. He would not pledge himself to that amount, and he should be sorry to lay an Estimate of that kind on the table,
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  because he thought Estimates ought to be made with more precision and official responsibility than he could undertake in reference to this subject. The whole expense, must depend on the news which arrived from month to month. There might be reasons for sending out more vessels, or for bringing home some already sent out, and with Hong Kong at such a distance it was impossible at present to lay estimates on the table. The noble Earl had referred to the former war at Canton. Upon that question the Government went to the country, and the country decided in favour of the Government. The course of the Government then was different from the course which was taken now, because under the peculiar circumstances of the Treaty with China, the course now taken was marked by the utmost possible consideration. He could not conceive any course more moderate and forbearing, unless they had apologized to the Chinese for having sent any Ambassador, and for the affair at the Peiho. It had been said that it would be impossible to trade at Canton if we went to war with China; but he had been informed by persons who had been out there that the people of Canton showed no-dissatisfaction with our occupation, and that English officers could purchase any articles in the shops, and order them to be sent home to them, just the same as in Regent Street. At the same time, he thought it desirable that our troops should as soon as possible be withdrawn, as the occupation was, of course, attended with considerable expense. It was alleged to be very inconvenient to undertake the expedition jointly with France; but it was only natural and proper that, the injury having been inflicted on the two countries on the same occasion, the demand for reparation should be made by them in unison. When the small gun-boats went up to the mouth of the Peiho, the French force was represented alongside of the English, and a French and English officer appeared side by side in front of the forts of Taku, when a handful of Europeans kept their ground before 20,000 of the enemy, and refused to retreat until they were recalled by order of their commanding officer. France and England were together when the outrage was committed, and should, therefore, be together in demanding redress. He trusted the noble Earl would not insist upon the production of Estimates which must necessarily be of a very conjectural character, and which,

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  in the case of the army, were rendered very complicated by the circumstance that many of the troops would be removed from India instead of going out direct from this country.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY:—My Lords, it is not my intention to trespass on your Lordships' time at any length. I think the noble Earl who brought this subject under your Lordships' notice was quite right when he deprecated any debate on what may be called the China question; but my noble Friend, the noble Duke opposite, has entered largely on that question; and I think I should hardly be doing justice to the Government of which I had the honour to be a member, if I did not make some observations on what has been stated by the noble Duke. I have been particularly anxious not to make any comments on what passed in the Peiho, lest I might be thought to be in some degree criticising the actions and the conduct of Mr. Bruce, who was placed, most undoubtedly, in one of the most difficult situations ever occupied by any public servant. But I cannot submit to have it supposed-much as I appreciate Mr. Bruce's ability, and sensible though I am of the difficulty of his position—that I give that entire approbation to his proceedings on that occasion which my silence might be taken to imply, and therefore, after what my noble Friend (the Duke of Somerset) has staled, I felt obliged to state my opinions with respect to what passed. Undoubtedly, Mr. Bruce followed his instructions most faithfully in many respects; but those instructions did not foresee the events which subsequently took place. I confess I had foreseen that all that finesse which had been said to characterize their former proceedings would be again had recourse to by these barbarians, but I did not expect that hostilities or the application of force would result from what was proposed to be done. Those instructions to Mr. Bruce were therefore forwarded on the supposition that matters would be carried out without any fighting on any side. The spirit of those instructions—which I am sorry I have not before me, because it is difficult to recollect phrases—was, that Mr. Bruce should insist that the treaty should be ratified. Many of the noble Lords present are very conversant with the terms of diplomatic correspondence, and they will hardly say that the word "insist" in such correspondence bears any other meaning than that there should, in case of neces-
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  sity, be a pressure of argument and a positive determination verbally expressed that such and such an event should take place. Certainly the word "insist" would not imply that any further steps were considered necessary. I do not blame Mr. Bruce for what took place beyond this— that having a very wide latitude for action, I think he exhibited too much precipitancy. That is the only fault I find with him; and in saying that I think I ought to explain myself. It appears from the papers furnished to Parliament that the original commissioners who had negotiated the treaty entered into a correspondence with Mr. Bruce. He insisted on the treaty being carried out. They said they must communicate with the Court of Pekin on the matter, and on the 12th June, I think it was, they informed Mr. Bruce that they had sent a courier to Pekin who must take 11 or 12 days to reach that city, though he rode at the rate of 200 miles a day. This courier carried to Pekin the proposals and the determination of Mr. Bruce, and was to bring back the reply of the Imperial Court to those propositions. He could not have reached the Imperial city before the 22nd or 23rd June, and then three or four days ought reasonably have been allowed the Government to consider the proposals and what answer it should return to them. But, my Lords, if I understand those papers accurately, it was on the 20th of the same month Mr. Bruce and the English and French admirals determined to attack the mouth of the Peiho. I believe it was on the 24th, or within a day or two of that date, the battle was fought. It appears to me, therefore, that it was physically impossible for the reply to Mr. Bruce's ultimatum, sent by the original commissioners to Pekin, to have come from that city to the mouth of the Peiho. In my opinion, then, Mr. Bruce's fault, and his only one, was his not waiting for the arrival of the reply to the despatch of the commissioners who had forwarded his ultimatum to Pekin. It may have been purely an error in the Chinese commissioner, who offered him another way up, which, perhaps, he was quite right in refusing to accept; but that official had no connection with the correspondence which was at that time going on with the capital. I can only judge from what I see in the papers, for though Mr. Bruce's despatch is directed to me, and was sent over to me, I received no private letter from him, or anything that would elucidate his rea-

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  sons for acting as he did further than his statements in the public despatch. He may have had other reasons than those therein stated, and I should like to know how that is; but judging from what I have before me, I think his fault was precipitation in hurrying forward before he could reasonably have had an answer from the Chinese Government. The noble Duke says that we should not be afraid of our trade with China suffering from those transactions, because that trade has continued to go on though we have had from time to time, during a period of many years, several wars with the Chinese. Now, I think this is a post hoc propter hoc argument of my noble Friend, and that it is not logical. The fact of our trade with the Chinese surviving our previous hostilities with them does not prove that if those hostilities had not taken place that trade would not have been much better. I am not one who would consent to see the honour of this country not maintained. It is necessary to have the treaty ratified, and, therefore, I cannot find fault with the Government for this expedition; but I must express my opinion on a point which I consider to be very important. We are apt to talk of this Chinese nation as a barbarian nation, and of its Government as a barbarian Government. We may call them so, if we please; but the Chinese Government is anything but a barbarian Government. They are a very clever people and a very well educated people, and I believe they have very nearly as much knowledge of what is going on as we have ourselves. But supposing this so-called barbarian Government to be really barbarous, I do not think the way to civilize them is by treating them as barbarians. At one moment we treat the Chinese as a barbarous, and at another as a civilized people. When the Government send out an Ambassador to China they usually send out a gentleman connected with one of the first families in this country, appointed and gazetted with all the regular forms of diplomatic appointment, such as those by which Lord Cowley or any other Ambassador is appointed; he is presented by the Foreign Secretary to kiss the Queen's hand; all the titles and powers of an Ambassador are conferred upon him; he goes out with the usual retinue and staff, and more than that, on the occasion of sending an Ambassador to China, he went out with letters from the Sovereign. Then, the question arises, why was not international law ob-
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  served and a declaration of war made? The noble Duke the Secretary for the, Colonies, when speaking on this question the other night, said that we had always been in a state of war, and that we were in a state of war although the treaty was made and ratified; but I will remind the House that that was not the original state of things. The original state was a state of peace, because war had not been declared at all. If the Chinese are to be treated as any other European State or Sovereign by sending out an Ambassador, the same forms and ceremonies ought to be observed with respect to peace and declarations of war. The noble Duke has said that no other course can be followed. I think this course might have been followed. I think that Mr. Bruce might have taken upon himself the responsibility of negotiating the matter with the Chinese Government, and have said that if the demands of our Government were not acceded to war would be declared by England against China; and I do not think that the Chinese are so thoroughly benighted and stupid as not to understand the menaces of war. Even now I say that, having treated the Emperor of China as other Sovereigns, and placed him on the same footing as you do our Queen, you ought not to carry this war out without a legitimate declaration of war. I know that objections maybe raised against it, and that objections may be raised as regards our trade and commerce; but that is no reason why you should keep up the anomaly that exists, that the usual course of action on such occasions should be violated, and that, although the Chinese have been designated a barbarous people, that is no reason why they should not adopt the system of international law. By not doing so you will expose yourselves to the cruel chance of having your prisoners ill-treated, because there was no declaration of war. Another difficulty would arise in connection with blockades. The last time that hostilities took place in China it was the greatest good fortune that there were none but British ships engaged, because there was no doubt that if our ships had stopped the vessels of other countries without having declared blockade they would have violated or evaded the law of nations. I cannot help thinking that even for our own credit, and allied as we are with such a great empire as France, our operations will be made legal by a declaration of war. I agree with the noble Duke that we cannot be expected to make anything like a

  1601
  near estimate of the expenses incurred, and that it would be deceiving the House and the country to attempt to do so, and I think all that we can do is to ask for money on account.
  THE EARL OF ELGIN: My Lords, in the position in which I stand, and with the prospect before me of being required to proceed from this country to China, in the hope of interposing to put a speedy close to the unfortunate hostilities that have broken out, I cannot but feel that I should not be taking a course conducive to the public interests if by any premature expression of opinion in this House I were to fetter the discretion which it is absolutely necessary that I should possess, if I may hope to achieve any beneficial result by my mission. At the same time, connected as I have recently been with our diplomatic proceedings in China, and deeply interested as I must be, because of my relationship to the individual who represents Her Majesty's Government in China, I might, perhaps, be chargeable with want of respect to your Lordships if I were altogether to maintain silence on this occasion; and if I were to allow the observations of the noble Earl who has just spoken to pass without remark. The noble Earl has confined his reproof and reflection on Mr. Bruce to one particular—that he had shown precipitancy in not giving sufficient time for the transmission of the communication he had made to the Imperial Commissioners at Shanghae, and the return of that communication at the mouth of the Peiho. Now, I would remind the noble Earl, that if Mr. Bruce had extended the period for the return of that communication to the Peiho, and had remained there without proceeding up the river, the time specified in the treaty for the exchange of the ratifications would have expired. If, indeed, the Chinese had been obviously acting in good faith, and if this delay had indicated no intention to take advantage of the expiry of the time for ratifying the treaty, I should be ready to admit that Mr. Bruce might have run this risk, and that out of consideration for the Chinese Government he might have allowed the period fixed for the ratification of the treaty to have passed over. But I will remind the noble Earl that that is not exactly the state of the case; because, in the month of March, acting under the instructions of the noble Earl himself, I communicated to the Chinese Commissioners that Mr. Brace was on his way for the
  1602
  purpose of proceeding to Pekin, there to exchange ratifications of the treaty. Moreover, in order to conciliate the Chinese authorities to the utmost extent, I made a concession, for which, when things looked brighter and more hopeful than now, I have been reproached by some. Finding how unwilling the Chinese were to tolerate a permanent English Minister at Pekin, and although I still believe and hold most firmly to the opinion, that unless, in some shape or in some form or other, we have direct relations with the Court of Pekin, we never shall have permanent peace with that country—notwithstanding that feeling, and in order to meet the objections of the Chinese Commissioners, I stated—and in doing so I believe I obtained the full approval of the noble Earl —to the Commissioners that if they received with all due honour Her Majesty's representative when he came out to exchange ratifications of the treaty, and if they carried out in perfect fidelity every other clause of it, I would submit to Her Majesty's Government my opinion that it would be desirable that Her Majesty should exercise the option she possessed under the Treaty of Tien-tsin not to establish a Minister permanently at the capital, but to send him from time to time to the capital, as circumstances might arise and render it desirable. Consequently, the Chinese Commissioners not only knew that Mr. Bruce was coming up in order to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty, but I had, as I thought, laid before them the strongest possible inducements I could devise to induce them to receive him properly and at the proper time; and if, with such indications of bad faith, Mr. Bruce had allowed the period for the exchange of ratifications to pass, and if in consequence of that circumstance difficulties had been raised to the ratification of the treaty—and if it had further been known that the naval authorities had informed him some days before that there was no difficulty in removing the obstructions in the river—I feel confident that a very heavy responsibility would have rested on him, and the non-ratification of the treaty and all the consequent evils that might have followed would have to be thrown upon him. The noble Duke has explained the difficulty that there is in meeting the specific Motion made by the noble Earl; I will only say, therefore, that I sincerely hope—nay more, entertain the most confident expectation—that the result will prove that my noble Friend has taken

  1603
  a very exaggerated view of the liabilities which these unfortunate affairs in China will entail on this country. The question which my noble Friend has raised, to a certain extent is a speculative question; but there is behind it a practical question of the most serious character — what are the measures, by the adoption of which we may best hope to bring this unfortunate state of affairs to a close, and establish peace with China, upon a footing that will relieve us for the future of the heavy expenses we annually incur for the protection of our trade? That is a practical question which has necessarily occupied the attention of practical men interested in China, whether as merchants, philanthropists, or statesmen. It has occurred to some of them—and the opinion is shared by Her Majesty's Government— that as I negotiated the Treaty of Tientsin—acting in concert with my distinguished and able colleague, Baron Gros, the representative of the French Emperor, and whose honour and loyalty I cannot speak of too strongly, or in terms too warm —it is possible that our return to the field of action at the present time might give the Chinese Emperor an opportunity of proposing terms of accommodation, and of intimating that it really is his intention to carry out faithfully and honourably the stipulations of the treaty into which he had entered. When it was proposed to me that I should proceed on this mission I gave the only answer which. I think a public servant could give to such a proposal. I am by no means insensible of the honour of a seat in Her Majesty's Council, or indifferent to other advantages I forego by proceeding on this mission; but I felt that no considerations of this description should militate against my doing what public duty required. There was only one difficulty; and although it is of a personal character I venture to appeal to the sympathies of your Lordships in referring to it. I could not have undertaken this mission, if I felt that its proposal implied on the part of Pier Majesty's Government any slight or reflection on my relative, who represents our Sovereign in that part of the world. I have been assured by the Government that that is not the case, and that there is no want of confidence in my relative; but that the reason of its being supposed that I might have some advantages in dealing with this question arises, iii the first place, from the circumstances to which I have alluded; and, in the second place, from the
  1604
  fact that I have naturally, proceeding from this country, greater means than he can possibly have, of knowing what are the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government; and I think I may add that, in consequence of what took place during the recent visit I paid to the French capital—of knowing, also, what are the sentiments of the French Government on the subject. I can only say that my object in proceeding to China is to defeat, by all the means I can, the calculations made by the noble Earl behind me as to the cost and evils that will attend this war. I concur in what has been said by the noble Duke, that it is necessary, in the interest of our commerce with China, that we should, in some way or other, carry on our communication direct with the Imperial Government. It might be very well, if we could go back to the state of things that existed during the time of the Indian monopoly, when the trade between this country and China was conducted at one port, and by a privileged body of merchants. That was a condition of things not very favourable to the extension of commercial intercourse; but although it had certain advantages, it is impossible for us to revert to such a state of things. Even if we were willing to return, still it would be impossible to induce other nations to do so, who have also obtained treaties with the Chinese. Therefore, what we have to do is to put our commercial and other relations on the best and safest footing. The Emperor of China has entered into treaty obligations with this country; but owing to the arrangements under which our diplomatic intercourse has been conducted since the Treaty of Nankin, it has been utterly impossible ever to solve any difficulty that has occurred between the countries, except either by war, or by acts of war; and I am prepared to show, if we were to go into that question, that not one single year has passed since the ratification of the Treaty of Nankin, during which individual consuls at different ports have not taken on themselves to commit acts of war. It is true that they have not always led to actual war, because the Chinese have been afraid to resent these acts; but if they had done so, we should have been obliged either to support our consuls believing them to be in the wrong, or to abandon them at the risk of leading the Chinese to misapprehend our motives in so doing. These acts of war have been committed by Consuls having the highest reputation for consideration and kindness,

  1605
  towards the Chinese. A very excellent gentleman, who is now in Japan, and who in one of the "blue-hooks" has written a paper indicating a warm and kindly feeling towards the Chinese—Mr. Alcock—a few years ago found it necessary to stop the whole -junk trade proceeding to Pekin, and to threaten the capital with starvation. His justification for the proceedings he adopted was, that if he had referred the case to Her Majesty's Representative at Hong Kong and made the outrages which led to his acts the subject of diplomatic correspondence, it would have been bandied about from "one official to another in distant parts of the Empire, three months would have elapsed before his communication reached the capital, and a still longer period before it could have been put in a course of settlement. In consequence, however, of the summary but, in point of international law, unjustifiable course taken by Mr. Alcock, the matter was settled in the course of a week. I maintain, therefore, that it is desirable to put an end to that state of things, and although there is a certain amount of reluctance on the part of the Chinese Government, I am confident it is the greatest kindness that you can possibly confer upon the Chinese Emperor; because most of the difficulties into which the Chinese get arise from their entire ignorance of foreigners, of their power, and of the principles by which they are guided; and no doubt if we had a Resident in that country and an establishment where they had communications with the capital—if we had intelligent Ministers representing this and other countries, no doubt they would be able to advise the Chinese Government, and keep them out of the many scrapes and difficulties into which they fall. Some persons say, why should we go to Pekin? We have no interest in China but that of our trade. I entirely concur in the opinion that our only interest in China is that of our trade. But trade cannot prosper unless there be security for the persons and property of our merchants, and that the present system fails to give. In proceeding to that country my object will be to carry out my instructions, and bring to a close the hostilities which have lately broken out between the countries. The noble Earl may, perhaps, not have considered all the consequences that would follow if we resorted to a declaration of war against China. It would compromise to a very large amount the revenues both of India
  1606
  and England. A declaration of war would carry destruction and devastation among the people of China, and would also entail ruin and distress on large bodies of British and other merchants in the China trade, besides inflicting a most unnecessary and enormous amount of misery on a portion of the population of China with whom we never had a quarrel, and who were always desirous of maintaining the best of terms and the most amicable relations with us. If affairs in the north of China are conducted as I hope they will be—and I have perfect confidence in the gallantry and prudence of both the military and naval authorities out there—and if they have the issue I confidently believe they will have, any acts of war which are committed there will take place chiefly between our troops and the troops of the Emperor of China. I do not undervalue the loss of human life even under these circumstances, but that is, comparatively speaking, a lesser evil than the consequences that we should entail on the great population of the rest of China if we resorted to a general war. It has been laid down as a doctrine that pressure on individuals never brought a war to a close. I do not know how far that doctrine may be true; but I believe that, as regards China, the great mass of the population have no connection whatever with the causes of complaint that have arisen, and that the only way to put an end to these complaints is to deal directly in all our negotiations with the Government of; the country.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURYsaid, he wished to explain that he did not mean to express a desire that any further pressure should be placed upon the population of China; but if we were going to undertake a war which would employ 20,000 men, he thought that such a war should be preceded by a declaration of war against the Emperor of China. He would remind the noble Earl that the arguments which, on this subject, he had applied to China, would equally apply to any other nation.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, I cannot refrain from taking the present opportunity of stating in this House that, in my opinion, no public man has ever been called upon to make a greater sacrifice than that which the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Elgin) is asked to make, when he is requested to return to the scene of his former labours in China. In doing so I, of course, think he only dis-

  1607
  charges a public duty; but at the same time I cannot help feeling that he is not the less entitled to the gratitude of his country. It would be impossible, I have no doubt, to find anywhere a person to whom the conduct of our negotiations with the Chinese Government could, with so much hope of a peaceful solution, be intrusted. He has already conducted, so far as I can understand, all the negotiations in which he has taken part in that country with, I may perhaps say, fortunate audacity, but certainly with a degree of ability of which the exercise is but rarely witnessed in the performance of great public functions. It is, in my opinion, also matter for congratulation that he is likely, on his return to China, to be associated with the same representative of France between whom and himself such friendly relations on the former occasion existed. Under all these circumstances, I more confidently entertain than I should otherwise do the hope of a pacific result being attained by means of the commission with which the noble Earl has just been intrusted. I at the same time feel that we have in dealing with this question great difficulties to encounter, notwithstanding the circumstance that we may expect to have the same cordial co-operation with the French Ambassador as before. One of the most serious of those difficulties is that, in conducting hostilities with a desire to secure peace, we shall be compelled to act in conjunction with a Power whose interests are not ours, and which is not animated by our views. We seek for nothing but peace with honour. France, I fear, desires honour without peace. We desire to shake hands with the Chinese Government, and to be on good terms with the Chinese people. The French have declared it to be their wish to chastise them. Now that word "chastise" is not one, my Lords, which ought to find a place, under such circumstances, in the language of a civilized State; and I earnestly trust—indeed, I feel confident—no feeling such as that which it indicates will animate the noble Earl opposite in prosecuting the mission which he is about to undertake. It is sad to be obliged to enter into a war in which success or failure will be almost equally a subject of regret. The latter will cause us not only great material loss, but also bring with it disgrace. If, on the other hand, success is to be achieved by directing military operations against Pekin, it can only be obtained by producing one of the greatest—one of the most extensive
  1608
  —one of the most appalling calamities with which any portion of the human race can be afflicted. Of this there can be no doubts. The example of the dreadful war of 1842 justifies the opinion on the subject which I entertain. The advance of a hostile army on Pekin, with the prospect of its being captured, would be sufficient to cause every woman and every child within its walls to be sacrificed by their relatives. Such, my Lords, would be the dreadful effect attendant on our success; nor can it be denied that the occupation, even for a short period, of the Chinese capital by our troops would operate to destroy altogether the authority of the Chinese Government from one end of the Empire to the other, and give general triumph and victory to that horrible collection of men, hardly qualified to be classed among human beings, who have for so many years desolated that country. The noble Earl has seen with his own eyes the effect of some of the struggles which have taken place in that quarter of the world, and I feel assured he will be induced by every sentiment of humanity to do all that lies in his power to uphold the authority of that Government which, maintained in authority, may be able again to establish the prosperity of the Chinese Empire. I entertain the highest respect for the opinions of the noble Earl on this subject. No man's opinions with respect to it are entitled to be held in greater estimation. I am, however, at the same time obliged to confess that I have never been able to comprehend why so much importance has by some persons been always attached to the presence of a British Minister at Pekin. If, indeed, a representative of this country were admitted willingly into Pekin, with an express desire on the part of the Chinese Government to have him there for the purpose of mutual communication and advice, and with a view of preventing those calamities which war has occasioned in different portions of the empire, in that case, no doubt, great advantage to China and to ourselves would be the result. But if it be a question of forcing a British Minister into Pekin, there to take up his residence—a constant menace and humiliation to the Chinese Government—I cannot, I confess, understand how his presence will be productive of that benefit which has been expected. The noble Earl in the course of his speech referred to a most valuable and interesting paper written by Mr. Alcock, which appears in the blue-book, and the statements contained

  1609
  in which I do entreat the Government as well as the noble Earl to weigh well before he sets out on his present mission. From it he will learn that unless some control is placed upon our own merchants and people in China no hope of permanent peace with that country can reasonably be cherished. To their conduct I feel confident it is due more than to any other cause that we have been forced into those hostilities, the occurrence of which from time to time we have had to deplore. During that period when our merchants trading with China were under the strict control of the East India Company no wars with China took place. A single ship occasionally visiting Canton was found sufficient to preserve unimpaired our interests in that quarter. Since that time, however, there has been a continued succession of wars with China, and I know not one of them to which the misconduct of our own people and their disgraceful avarice has not materially, either directly or indirectly, contributed. So far as the present war is concerned, I can only say I regard it, as I have clone from the commencement, with utter horror. It is an unjust war. It was so from the beginning. It is not, my Lords, lawful to make war for the purpose of making money. To do so is to commit a crime. We have already received one great rebuke during the progress of our operations in prosecuting the hostilities with the Chinese people in which we are engaged. I hope we may not receive one still more severe. We are now in a position in which it is, perhaps, impossible for us to arrest our course. It is a position, however, which we have brought upon ourselves. It is based upon wrong, and wrong will not continually be protected by Providence. I will not, upon the present occasion, say more on this distressing subject. I say distressing, because I am acquainted, perhaps, better than most of your Lordships, with the real character which a war with China presents—for when I was in India I had a considerable share in the direction of operations against that country. I then received a despatch which contained a statement giving an account of the suffering of the Chinese people, in consequence of the prosecution of hostilities, which I durst not publish. I have never generally made known the details of the horrors which thus came under my notice. I fear we are about to witness others of a similar character, for it is difficult for us so to conduct the war as to avoid their repeti-
  1610
  tion. I, nevertheless, trust that the noble Earl opposite, fully alive, as I am sure he is, to the importance of the mission which has been committed to his hands, and seeing how deeply it bears upon the honour and interests of this country, as well as upon the much higher object of humanity itself, will endeavour, to the utmost of his power, to bring this sad contest to a pacific termination.
  EARL GREY,in reply, said he was persuaded that if there was a wish on the part of the Government to give the information he asked for, there would not be the slightest difficulty in so doing, for, all he wanted was an approximate calculation. But if the Government told him that they would not, or could not, give the information, it was not for him to press the matter furtlier—he would only say that the refusal of the information was a symptom that the case was much as he bad described it. He quite agreed with the noble Duke that it was most proper to send reinforcements to protect the lives and properties of Englishmen, but he wanted to know whether 18,000 or 20,000 men were to be sent out in the approaching summer for the protection simply of our interests? He complained that we were making preparations for an offensive war. He thought that their Lordships ought to have been invited to express their opinion when the whole question could have been carefully considered. He still hoped that though late this question would be brought before them; for if it were, he was persuaded that those communications to which the noble Earl who last spoke had referred would be required by the House. It was impossible to read the memorandum of Mr. Al-cock without blushing for the conduct of Englishmen in Japan, or without feeling how deep was the responsibility the Government was incurring by its proceedings in that part of the world. Under all the circumstances, sending out the noble Earl (Earl Elgin) was, perhaps, the best course that could be adopted; but he regretted it had not been taken at an earlier period. The Government had declined to give the information his Motion asked for, and he should not press it to a division.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he had once been compelled to make an estimate for a Chinese war, and he could state it was quite possible; it was done quickly and proved correct.
  Motion, by leave of the House withdrawn.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

  PRIVATE BILLS.
  On the Motion of LORD REDESDALE it was Resolved—
  "That no Private Bill brought from the House of Commons shall be read a Second Time after Tuesday, the 3rd day of July next:
  That no Bill confirming any Provisional Order of the Board of Health, or authorizing any Inclosure of Lands under Special Report of the Inclosure Commissioners for England and Wales, or for confirming any Scheme of the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales, shall be read a Second Time after Tuesday, the 3rd Day of July next:
  That when a Bill shall have passed this House with Amendments, these Orders shall not apply to any new Bill sent up from the House of Commons which the Chairman of Committees shall report to the House is substantially the same as the Bill so amended."

THE WHITWOBTH ARMS.

  QUESTION.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNasked, What steps Her Majesty's Government have taken in order to secure for this Country the Benefit of Mr. Whitworth's Inventions in rifled Fire Arms and Projectiles? The noble Earl said that in putting his Question he should ask the indulgence which was usually extended to a new Member of their Lordships' House, whilst he endeavoured to state the reasons which had induced him to bring forward this matter. He had sat for many years in the other House of Parliament, and during that time his practice had been never to bring forward any private grievance; and he might mention that he had placed this notice upon the paper without any communication whatever with Mr. Whitworth. He brought the matter forward as a question of national importance. He was not one of those who were at all alarmed at any number of his countrymen meeting an equal number of any other nation in arms; but he thought it was the duty of the Government to take the very earliest opportunity of securing for the country every new invention in fire arms and projectiles. The Secretary for War had asked for £15,000,000 for the Army Estimates, and had said that the increase was partly to be accounted for by the providing of new arms and projectiles which had been recently introduced, and which a number of foreign countries were rapidly adopting. He would not wish to say one word in disparagement of the weapon of Sir William Armstrong,
  1612
  for he believed his guns were very superior to any guns which had been before invented, and he believed that Sir William deserved well of his country. There was, however, one point which required explanation; for it appeared to him that Sir W. Armstrong occupied an anomalous position. Sir William Armstrong, he believed, had been appointed Superintendent of the Royal Gun Factory; and he believed that he was also a contractor under Government. He had no doubt that this fact was susceptible of explanation; but at first sight it would appear to be somewhat anomalous that the same person should be a contractor and also Superintendent at the Royal Gun Factory. He should wish to have this explained; and to hear that in appointing Sir William Superintendent of the Gun Factory, the Government had no intention of placing in the hands of his firm a monopoly in supplying artillery. He believed that recently a very greatly improved gun had been invented by Mr. Whitworth; and every person who knew Mr. Whitworth knew that he was one of those individuals who were fortunately not rare in this country: Mr. Whitworth commenced business as a working man in the employ of Messrs. Maudslay and Co., and had worked himself up from the position of a mechanic to the highest pitch of professional reputation. He was looked up to by scientific men not only in this country but in every quarter of the world. When a new invention was required, Mr. Whitworth was almost universally consulted. When the great scientific question as to the correction of the standard measure of this country was brought forward, Mr. Whitworth was consulted; and when a new machine was wanted to turn out some of the work which he saw around him in that chamber, the architect of the Houses of Parliament applied to Mr. Whitworth. Mr. Whitworth had not only invented a gun, but he had submitted it to experiments which had shown it to be most successful. Everybody said that it was the best gun which they had ever seen. Now, what was it that induced Mr. Whitworth to turn his attention to projectiles? It was this, that in 1854, during the Crimean war, the Government applied to him and requested him to devote his great talents to improving our weapons. In 1854 he turned his attention to the manufacture of a rifle, in which he proved so successful that he produced a weapon surpassing any of which we had any former experience.

  1613
  Two Committees had been appointed by the War Office to investigate the merits of the rifle; but, though it was proved to be superior to all others, it was not adopted into the service. He hoped he should not be told that financial considerations were against its adoption, for he thought no Government should allow financial considerations to stand in the way when the efficient equipment of our soldiers was in question. But Mr. Whitworth had declared that the price at which his rifle was furnished afforded no criterion of what the cost would be in a completely organized establishment; and he had offered, if the Government would allow him, to improve the machinery at the Enfield factory. Since then Mr. Whitworth had turned his attention to the manufacture of rifled cannon, by which a ball was to be carried to the distance of five-and-a-half miles. He heard from a gentleman who had fired it, and who had never fired a gun in his life before, that with two shots he hit a mark, which was six feet high and one-and-a-half foot broad, at the distance of two-and-a-half miles. He had the authority of Sir John Burgoyne for stating that he had never in all his life seen such an admirable weapon. Mr. Fairbairn, the eminent mechanist, of Manchester, declared himself unable to re-frain from writing a letter to The Times congratulating Mr. Whitworth and the country on the great success that had attended his gun. The whole mechanical population of Lancashire witnessed its success at Southport, and there were not Englishmen only then present, but parties representing the French, the Russian, and almost every other European Government. In self-defence Mr. Whitworth had been compelled to erect a manufactory at Manchester; and as his experiments were carried on without aid from the Government he had opened a shop for the supply of his weapons to all who chose to ask for them. Under these circumstances he felt bound to ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they had taken to secure to this country the benefit of Mr. Whitworth's inventions in rifled arms and projectiles?
  EARL DE GREY AND RIPONsaid, it would scarcely be necessary to tell the noble Earl or to assure their Lordships that the great results of the trial of the gun which had been invented by Mr. Whitworth, as exhibited by the experiments at Southport, had engaged the attention of his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War and of Her Majesty's Government:—for
  1614
  those experiments had attracted attention in every part of the country, and the Report of their results had received the best consideration at the hands of the Ministry. He begged further to state that the object of the Government in regard to this matter being simply to obtain for the country the weapon which was most efficient for warfare, his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War had determined that a formal trial of this gun should take place, under the supervision of the officers of the Government appointed to superintend experiments of this nature, and who were wholly unconnected with any particular manufacturer or inventor — namely, the members of the Ordnance Select Committee, presided over by an officer of great experience, Colonel St. George, who himself was present at Southport at the first display of the rifled cannon invented and recently exhibited by Mr. Whitworth. Nothing could be more important than that this country, distinguished as it was for its triumphs of mechanical genius, should be provided with the best weapon of defence that could be invented; and he (Earl de Grey) could assure the noble Earl that no adherence to preconceived opinion would deter Her Majesty's Government from selecting that weapon which, after investigation, should turn out to be the best. He was sure, however, that the House would not desire Her Majesty's Government to decide without a full and careful examination. They were anxious, therefore, to propose this trial; Mr. Whitworth had declared himself ready to submit his gun to the examination, and was anxious for an opportunity of again displaying the merits of his inventions. There could be no question, as the results at Southport showed, that the gun would prove itself a most valuable engine of warfare under any circumstances under which it might be tried. There was one point, however, in his noble Friend's speech which he (Earl de Grey) had heard with less pleasure than the rest. His noble Friend appeared to draw an unnecessary comparison between Mr. Whit-worth's invention and that of Sir William Armstrong. Both the inventors were men of great ability and of remarkable energy —and whilst he quite agreed in the eulogy which had been passed upon Mr. Whitworth, he must take exception to that part of his noble Friend's speech which seemed to convey something of a reflection upon Sir William Armstrong's present position. There was no intention on the part of Her

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  Majesty's Government to give to Sir William Armstrong, the company which he represented, or to any other person, a monopoly of Government manufacture. In stating that Sir William Armstrong was a contractor with the Government, the case was not put quite fairly. The noble Earl must remember that the late Government entered into certain arrangements with Sir William Armstrong relative to the works at Elswick, which were of a very peculiar character. Sir William Armstrong gave up to the Government his invention and all the improvements which he had subsequently made in it. In return he was appointed to the office of Engineer of Rifled Ordnance, with a salary of £2,000 a year. That was the position of affairs on the accession to office of Mr. Sidney Herbert; and as rifled cannon were those most wanted, of the pattern which had been patented by Sir William Armstrong, he put an end to the manufacture of smooth-bore guns, and established Sir William Armstrong— who, under the arrangement made by General Peel, was at the time an officer of the Government—as Superintendent of the gun factories. But in taking this step the Government had no intention of creating a monopoly, and if Mr. Whitworth or any other person could prove that another description of weapon was better adapted to the general purposes of the service it would, of course, he the duty of the Government to adopt it. With reference to the Whitworth rifle, it must be remembered that at the time the comparison was instituted it was by much the more costly weapon. Cost, was of course, an element of considerable importance in reference to rifles, which were to be furnished to all British troops. No doubt, Mr. Whitworth was now able to produce a much cheaper arm; but at the time the experiments were made his "rifle was much more expensive than the Enfield. A Committee had been appointed, which would commence its sittings almost immediately, to inquire into and report upon the best form of rifle, and the Government had every disposition to examine into the matter in the fullest and fairest spirit. He felt confident Mr. Whitworth would never be afraid of a fair trial, and that he would show every disposition to meet the views of the Government.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNexpressed himself satisfied with the explanation of the noble Earl. He disclaimed all intention of making insinuations against
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  Sir William Armstrong, though it must be admitted that the position of that gentleman was anomalous.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Twelve o'clock.