Lords Sitting of 23 March 1860

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1a Divorce Court. 2a Mutiny; Marine Mutiny.
Royal Assent.—Consolidated Fund (£4,500,000); Probate and Administration (India); Valuation of Rateable Property (Ireland); Medical Acts Amendment; Packet Service (Transfer of Contracts); Administering of Poison.

ELECTIONS, &c.

  ADDRESS FOR RETURNS.
  THE EARL OF AIRLIE,in moving that an Address be presented to Her Majesty for Returns respecting Persons qualified to vote at the election of Members of Parliament, the noble Earl said, that his Motion as originally drawn had likewise proposed to include the number of qualified voters assessed to the income and property tax; but he had received a communication from the Board of Inland Revenue to the effect that it would be impossible to furnish such a Return he had therefore abandoned that portion of his Motion. He presumed there would be no objection to the Returns in the shape in which he had now framed them; for all their Lordships must perceive the importance of having the information he now sought. As it was probable their Lordships would shortly be called on to consider a Bill which had been introduced into the other House to amend the representation of the people, it became very desirable to ascertain what effect the proposed alterations would have on the electoral body, and also, if possible, to obtain some conception of the extent to which these electors would be affected by the operation of direct taxation, which appeared likely to form a permanent part of the national system of finance. It was very desirable to see what proportion of the electors paid direct taxes, and what proportion did not pay them. He thought the Returns for which he moved would be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes, and it might fairly be assumed that those voters who paid the inhabited house duty, and who occupied houses of the value of £20, were also subjected to income tax and other direct taxes; and that the great majority of electors occupying £10 to £20 houses did not contribute in like manner to the national revenue. In a speech made not very long ago the present Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that in general the houses rated at from £10 to £20 were occupied by persons whose incomes varied from £50 to £150 a year. It was, then, only reasonable to suppose that as we descended towards £10 occupiers the proportion of voters who did not pay direct taxes would be much larger. If they ex-

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  amined the Returns of the number of persons assessed for poor rates on £6 to £10 ratings, it would be founds that the number of occupiers increased very largely as they descended in this scale. Of houses from £9 to £10 in value there were 42,000 occupiers; £8 to £9 houses had £51,000 occupiers; £7 to £8 houses were held by 78,000 persons, and £6 to £7 houses by 98,000 occupiers, or more than double the number of those holding premises of the next higher value; and it appeared that the occupiers from £10 to £20 followed the same rule of proportion. The subject was important, not merely in itself, but from the language which had been held by a leading member of the Government. In a speech lately delivered the Chancellor of the Exchequer intimated in very plain language his conviction that Parliament, as at present constituted, was disposed unduly to favour the rich classes at the expense of the poorer; and that it was therefore more disposed to indirect than direct taxation. This was a charge of a very grave nature, and one which it might not seem respectful to the Lower House for their Lordships to discuss; but he must observe that there was certainly a very remarkable coincidence between the language thus held and the opinions so often expressed by the hon. Member for Birmingham, who, since the introduction of the present Reform Bill, had become a warm supporter of the Government. He did not refer to the speeches which the hon. Gentleman, had lately delivered within the walls of Parliament, because he thought it must have struck any who paid attention to the subject that the speeches of the hon. Gentleman recently in the House of Commons had been singularly guarded, and that he was now supporting those to whom he had not hitherto shown himself disposed to evince any great degree of deference. But it would be found that during the recess, both by speeches and a letter, making allowance for varieties of expression, his sentiments were very much the same as those to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer so recently gave utterance. In the speeches of both there was an assumption that the indirect taxes were paid almost wholly by the poorer classes, that they were levied to favour the rich, and that the richer and middle classes contributed but little to the amount which those indirect taxes brought into the revenue. The sentiments of both the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the hon. Mem-
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  ber for Birmingham threw much light upon the Government proposal and their intention with regard to reform. He did not suppose that the Government had thrown that Bill upon the table as an isolated measure; but there were few who considered the subject who did not think that taxation and representation went somewhat together. The Reform Bill and the financial measures of the Government were certainly in harmony; for as one, if it were to pass, would to some extent overthrow the present electoral system, the other was calculated to revolutionize the fiscal policy of the nation. Perhaps he might be permitted to establish this point, and to make one or two observations on the Budget. Over and over again it had been alleged that the financial policy of the Government was identical with that of Sir Robert Peel, and that the objections urged against one might be applied with equal force to the other. But in reality the same resemblance existed between them as was borne by a caricature to the features which it was said to represent. That principle which actuated the measures of Sir Robert Peel was, to use a modern phrase, "conspicuous by its absence" in the proposals of the Government. If any one principle were laid down more strongly than another in the plans of Sir Robert Peel, it was that the expenditure of the year should be defrayed out of the current revenue. In 1842, when Sir Robert Peel entered upon his great work, he had to encounter a deficiency left him by his predecessors of more than 2,500,000, yet he reduced the taxation by £1,200,000. He did not count upon future years to bear the burden of the current year, nor postpone the obligations of that current year, but, by imposing an income tax and other taxes, he was enabled to make good that deficiency. In 1845 Sir Robert Peel carried still further the work he had begun, reducing the amount of taxation by upwards of £3,000,000; but in all his operations it was a cardinal point with him not to incur debt for the purpose of remitting taxes. He always maintained that the expenses of the year should be met by the revenue of the year. When in 1852 the then Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Disraeli) proposed to make both ends meet, after reducing certain indirect taxes, by applying to the purposes of the year a large sum of money which could not be said to be part of the revenue of the year, his proposal was objected to by Mr. Gladstone on the

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  ground that the expenses of the year ought to be met out of its revenue. But the same right hon. Gentleman now proposed to make up a narrow surplus of £460,000 by calling up the malt and hop credits, putting to the credit of revenue half the Spanish debt, and postponing the payment of £1,000,000 of Exchequer bonds; in fact, by appropriating pretty nearly £2,000,000 to the service of the year which had nothing to do with its revenue. When he read the financial statement he was struck with astonishment at it, and, as a supporter of the Government, he was most anxious to hear what plea they could put forward in its justification. Her Majesty's Ministers did not seem very desirous of discussion, but it was impossible altogether to evade putting forward some kind of reasons for this proposal, and, as far as he could learn, the chief argument put forward in its favour was that, as Sir Robert Peel had remitted taxes in the face of a deficiency, and Mr. Gladstone did the same, therefore the financial policy of this Government was identical with Sir Robert Peel's. But no attempt was made to account for the difference which was pointed out—that Sir Robert Peel, before he remitted taxes, always took care to cover the deficiency, which this scheme entirely omitted to do. He would not stop to inquire whether the circumstances of 1858 were parallel to the circumstances of 1860, or whether measures, which were justifiable when the country was slowly recovering from the effects of a very serious commercial crisis, could in any way be justified when it was admitted that the country was in a state of unexampled prosperity. The Budget now proposed was directly at variance with the principles which Sir Robert Peel laid down as the basis of a sound system of finance. When the Army and Navy Estimates were moved it was said that we were in a state of transition, and that there were large calls this year because great changes had to be made. That might be a good reason for asking for large sums, but it was no reason for forestalling the means of the year to come. In fact, we had been in a state of transition for the last twenty years; but if every Government had postponed some portion of their liability on that ground the floating debt would by this time have accumulated to an enormous amount. There was nothing in the state of Europe which justified the expectation that there would be any large reduction in the Army and Navy Estimates,
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  in which alone any really large reduction could be made. At this moment all Europe was looking to a quarter where a deed was being perpetrated of which he would not trust himself to speak. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had said, that if Savoy should be annexed to France, France would become an object of distrust to Europe; and on the 28th of January he wrote to Lord Cowley in the same tone. When an act was said to excite suspicion among the States of Europe, it implied warlike preparations and counter preparations—in fact, a state of armed neutrality. Yet, in the face of that state of things, the Government had introduced a Budget which would only be excusable if they were able to show that there was reason to expect that next year they would be able to effect a large reduction of expenditure. He thought he had a right to ask the Government the same question as was asked by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1852, when he asked, were they anxious to vote for a Budget which endangered the credit of the country? That was the language held by the right hon. Gentleman with respect to the Budget of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire; yet the only substantial difference which he (the Earl of Airlie) could see between the two Budgets was, that whereas the Member for Buckinghamshire proposed to advance £400,000 to the service of the year which was not properly part of the revenue of the year, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to apply in the same manner upwards of £2,500,000. He knew that the Budget had received the sanction of the other House by large majorities; but the issue whether it was a good one or not had never been raised. It was inseparably connected with the French Treaty, and many who approved the Treaty voted for the Budget lest they should lose the Treaty. There was another point to which he wished to refer. No one had complained more loudly or more frequently than the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the tendency of Parliament to encourage lavish expenditure; but it appeared to him that the measures the right hon. Gentleman had recently proposed removed the only practical guarantee against that evil—namely, that the expenditure ought to be defrayed out of the revenue of the year. With the one hand the Government protracted the expenditure, while with the other they remitted various sources of revenue, and left

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  the future to make up any deficiency which might arise. It was a question well deserving the most serious consideration whether or not the effect of the Reform Bill proposed by the Government would be to give an overwhelming preponderance in the representation to those classes whom direct taxation did not reach, and leave the minority, who seemed marked out for taxation, with no control over the fiscal arrangements of the country. It was necessary that, before they were asked to take that measure into consideration, they should have the fullest information on the points he had mentioned; and he hoped the Government would not object to the Returns he asked for. The noble Earl then moved an Address for—
  "Return of the Number of Persons charged with the Inhabited House Duty and qualified to vote at the Election of Members to serve in Parliament within each of the Counties and Parliamentary Boroughs in England and Wales: Also,
  "Return of the Number of Persons entitled to vote for Members of Parliament in respect of Houses of the respective Rentals of £10 and under £15 per Annum, £15 and under £20, £20 and under £25, £25 and under £50, £50 and under £100, £100 and upwards, in each and every separate Borough:" And also,
  "Return of the Number of Householders in each Borough inhabiting Houses of the Gross Rentals respectively of £6 and under £7, £7 and under £8, £8 and under £9, £9 and under £10, £10 and under £15, distinguishing the Number in each Class (1) not rated to the Poor at all, (2) rated only through the Landlord, and (3) excused from Payment of Rates from Poverty or other Cause."
  THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEsaid, the Government had no objection to the Returns moved for by the noble Earl; A portion of them had, in fact, been already presented to the House of Commons.
  Motion agreed to.

ANNEXATION OF NICE TO FRANCE.

  QUESTION.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, he was so sensible of the very serious condition of affairs on the Continent that he was not about to endeavour to extract any hasty expression of their views from Her Majesty's Government, or elicit, by any premature discussion, the opinion of their Lordships' House. The question he had to put was one that related simply to facts; and, though it might suit the convenience of despotic Governments to impart only such information as they chose on the progress of events, with such comments as it pleased them to permit, it
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  would be absurd for their Lordships to shut their eyes to the true character of those events, or accept as a correct account of them statements which they knew to be inconsistent with the truth. Both the Government and Parliament must soon pronounce their opinion upon what was taking place, and he would not touch upon questions of so delicate a nature at that moment. It was obvious that if we were to maintain a sincere and cordial amity with any country, there must exist between the Government of that country and our own the most loyal, frank, and thorough confidence. Some weeks ago there appeared a statement in a foreign newspaper to the effect that there were negotiations going on between the Governments of France and Sardinia for the cession of the districts of Savoy and Nice to France. When the announcement was first authentically made, the French Government were at great pains to impress upon the Government and people of this country that such annexation would be made only with the free consent of the King of Sardinia, and also with the free consent and goodwill of the populations concerned, and after communication with the great Powers of Europe. On two of those points he had nothing to say; he only wished to touch upon the facts connected with the consent of the people whose soil was to be annexed. He left wholly out of view the question of Savoy, because it would be impossible to deal with it without going into questions of much delicacy upon which he for one would not raise a premature, hasty, and, it might be, mischievous discussion. He should confine himself solely to the question of Nice. He need not dilate before their Lordships on the soundness of the principle that any such transference of allegiance as was talked of should be essentially founded on the goodwill and consent of the populations concerned. There was no mote formidable doctrine connected with despotism and what was called the "right divine of Kings" than the idea that their subjects belonged to them as a right, and that any portion of them could be handed over from one to another as they pleased. It would be absurd to dwell upon the falseness of that principle before any body of Englishmen, and it was the more unnecessary in the present case as the French and Sardinian Governments had rested their conduct on the efficacy and validity of the popular will in such matters. The transference of the town and county of Nice from

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  Sardinia to France had been announced, and already appeared to be considered an accomplished fact between the two Governments. But so far was it from the truth that the measure commanded the consent and free will of the population, that it was known to all the world that the municipal body of the town of Nice had only the last week, after a long deliberation, sent a deputation to the King of Sardinia to express their desire to remain under his rule, and to implore him, if separation must take place, to plead for them that the town and county should be constituted a neutral territory, which, as would be evident to those of their Lordships who were acquainted with the country it was well adapted to become. Into the propriety of the annexation he would not enter:—it might be a matter for negotiation between the Governments. All they had to consider was the necessity of having on the part of the French Government on this subject, as on others, frankness, fair dealing, and an adherence if not to promises at all events to announced statements. He observed that the Emperor of the French, in his address to the deputation from Savoy, introduced the question of Nice, without the slightest pretext, because no deputation from that district was present. He said:—
  "In fact, it is neither by conquest nor by insurrection that Savoy and Nice will be united to France, but by the free consent of her legitimate sovereign, supported by popular consent."
  He begged leave to say that this was not a correct representation of the state of things, and he said this on the authority not only of the inhabitants of Nice, but also of Englishmen resident there. Her Majesty's Government had first been told that there would be a general voting of the population, and afterwards that the votes of the municipalities would be taken. There bad been, neither. The French Government had no occasion to announce anything to Her Majesty's Government, so far as regarded the popular will in those countries; we had no right to ask for any promise or pledge that the wish of the people should be consulted; but if certain intentions on so grave a matter were voluntarily announced they ought not to be abandoned. If confidence and goodwill were to be established between the different Powers there must be sincere and frank relations between them. He was informed that the first wish of the inhabitants of the town and county of Nice was that they should remain under the sceptre of Sardinia, and
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  the second was that the territory of Nice should be neutralized. There were obvious reasons connected with the prosperity of the town why they should be anxious not to be annexed to France. He wished to ask whether Her Majesty's Ministers had received any communication from the Sardinian or from the French Government of the recent vote of the municipality of Nice relative to the cession of that town and its county by Sardinia, and to its absorption into the French Empire.
  LORD WODEHOUSEsaid, his answer to his noble Friend's question was that Her Majesty's Government had not received any communication either from the French or Sardinian Government relative to the vote come to by the municipality of Nice. The noble Marquis had commenced by saying that he would not touch on the very grave and delicate question of the cession of Savoy to France. Their Lordships would, therefore, agree with him that he had better confine himself to a simple answer to the question of the noble Marquess, and not enter upon a subject which was under the most serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

MUTINY BILL.—SECOND READING.
Order of the Day for the Second Heading read.
EARL DE GREY AND RIPON EARL DE GREY AND RIPON moved, that the Bill be now read 2a
LORD PANMURE,in rising, pursuant to notice, to call the attention of the House to the present state of promotion in the army by the sale and purchase of commissions, said he would take the present occasion to draw their Lordships' attention to the military administration of the army, and to a matter connected therewith of grave anxiety and importance. Their Lordships were no doubt aware, from the history of the proceedings of "another place," that the subject of promotion by purchase in the army had been discussed at considerable length by the House of Commons. He confessed he was somewhat surprised and disappointed to find the result of that discussion to be an announcement on the part of his right hon. Friend at the head of the War Department, that he was about to recommend to Her Majesty a change in the system that had so long existed, and under which, with all its defects, the British Army had attained a position of which this country might be proud—a change, too, which, in his opinion, would strike a heavy

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blow at the root of that system. Her Majesty's Government had given the House of Commons to understand that, acting on the recommendation of a Commission appointed two years ago, they intended so far to alter the rule and system of the sale and purchase of commissions in the army as to exclude from the category of commissions to be sold or purchased the rank of lieutenant-colonel. The Government did not proceed to condemn the whole system of promotion by sale and purchase; they only proposed to lop off one of its principal limbs. If that limb, however, went, he was perfectly certain that all the rest would follow until nothing of the body would be left. Now, 'on what grounds, he would ask, was the system of purchase pronounced to be so faulty as to be dealt with in this summary manner? He would admit that there were blots in the system, which every one must wish to see removed. Still, their Lordships should never forget that ever since we had a standing army the system both of the sale and purchase of commissions had existed in connection with promotion. He believed, indeed, that during the reign of William III. the system was abolished for a time; but the inconvenience was found to be so great that, in the reign of Queen Anne, it was again restored and recognized, and it had ever since prevailed. The sale of commissions in the British army had been originally instituted, not for the purpose of introducing youths into the army, but to enable those who had got to the top of the tree to leave the army, and to open the stream of promotion, so that the officers of the army might not be a senile and antiquated body of men. The system of purchase had operated to that end. It had, moreover, not only introduced into the army a steady stream of promotion, but had also established an impartial system of promotion, under which an officer who was prepared to purchase was secure of his step in spite of all the interest that might otherwise have caused other officers to be put over his head. He would undertake to say that under this plan of promotion by purchase the British Army had attained to a system of appointing officers which, with all its defects, was not only the envy of every other army, but was superior to that of any army in the world. One of the defects complained of was that, whereas the regulations declared that certain prices should be paid for commissions, it was a notorious fact that prices far higher—in some cases almost double the
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regulation amount—were constantly paid for those commissions. He would admit the fact. Every one connected with the administration of military matters must know it. Every Secretary at War and Secretary of State for War, and every Commander-in-Chief for years past, had given their attention to the subject, and had endeavoured to check the practice, but they had been unable to prevent money being given for money's worth, and they had all been obliged to connive at it. It was said that this advance beyond regulation prices was a scandal, and that it was dishonourable on the part of an officer to pay the excess. He could not admit that. The word "scandal" implied something that was dishonourable; but he contended that to pay an extra price for a commission was not a dishonourable act. If it were dishonourable to pay the advance how many gallant officers had been guilty of it, and how many successive Governments had connived at it; how many Commanders-in-Chief had been obliged to shut their eyes to it? He asserted that the practice was no scandal, but that it was an inconvenient practice, which he should be glad to see checked. Then it was said that the result of the system of purchasing and selling out was that young men made the army a plaything for a few years, and that having suited their convenience and passed their time agreeably they sold out, threw up their commissions, and never returned to the service. He was surprised that any one should mention this as an argument against the system. To his mind it was an argument in its favour. Any system which favoured the introduction into the British Army of young men able to pay for commissions, which made them for a number of years amenable to discipline, which taught them all that was to be learnt in a regiment, and which qualified them when they sold out and went back to their counties to become officers of militia, officers of volunteers, or to connect themselves with any military matters in their localities—such a system, he said, conferred advantages on the country for which it ought to be grateful; and as regarded the young men themselves it was one of the greatest advantages that could be conferred upon them. It was said that the system stood in the way of those who could not rise in the army by purchase, and prevented their promotion. Here, again, he totally differed from those who would change the practice now in force, because he knew, from

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his own experience, that men wholly unable to purchase a single step of promotion had risen to the head of their regiments, through vacancies caused either by death or resignation, far sooner under the system of purchase than they ever could have done if the principle of promotion by seniority alone existed. He thought, therefore, that the three objections he had named, with the exception of the first, were no objections at all; and if no greater accusations than those can be brought against the system, the Government did wrong in interfering in any way with it. But it appeared that the Commission and the Government had doomed the system to a very serious change. The Commissioners consisted of ten individuals, six of whom joined in the Report; but three signed a counter Report; and he had reason to know that the fourth individual—Colonel Wetherall—would have joined in that counter Report if he had not been sent to China. After all, then, the Report of the Commission was the Report of only six of its Members; and when it was considered who the four dissentients were—that one of them had been an efficient Secretary at War in his day—he meant Mr. Ellice, the Member for Coventry—and that the others were officers of great distinction in the army, one of them, General Wynyard, having himself hardly ever purchased a step by which he rose, he thought their opinions should have prevented the Government taking any sudden and rash steps on the subject. It was proposed, as he gathered from the speech of the Secretary for War, that purchase of the rank of lieutenant-colonel should no longer take place. Then, having rendered the rank of lieutenant-colonel no longer attainable by purchase, how was it to be reached? He believed the Commission and the Government had given up the idea of promotion by seniority. They found, he apprehended, that by the system of seniority promotion might fall upon men whose qualifications for command nobody could ascertain, and that it would end in placing at the head of regiments men of long service, but who had too many years on their shoulders, and who were unfit for actual command. But he presumed it was not meant to interfere with the right of majors to become lieutenant-colonels—that if a lieutenant-colonel died it was not intended that the senior major should be deprived of his right of promotion which he now enjoyed. Therefore, he would confine his observations to those cases in
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which a lieutenant-colonel was disposed to sell out. It was proposed that if a lieutenant-colonel disposed of his commission, he should be succeeded by an officer to be selected by the Commander-in-Chief from the active body of majors in employment throughout the service. Now, it appeared to him that if ever there was a plan devised which would have the effect of throwing an apple of discoid into the different regiments, and which would interrupt the harmony that existed in those regiments—which it was their bounden duty to encourage—it was the system of calling upon the Commander-in-Chief to exercise this odious and invidious selection of officers, to be carried over the heads of the majors in the regiment, and made their commanding officer. The senior major in a regiment might not be the very best major the Commander-in-Chief knew of in the army, and the invidious duty was put on him of naming another major to take the command of the regiment, and, from that moment, the senior major stood marked as an incompetent man and unfitted to command. Was that a position in which it was fair to put a British officer? Perhaps the senior major was a favourite in his regiment; and in that case how would the officers regard the introduction of a stranger as lieutenant colonel, and in what spirit were they likely to render him obedience? This would destroy at once the whole regimental family system, that had been the foundation of the glory of the British Army, that had bound all together, upwards and downwards, in one friendly compact, and furnished a key to the secret that had enabled the British Army to achieve so many successes. It was said, why not put the army on the same footing as the navy? His answer was that the two services were totally dissimilar. When the officers were brought together in a ship they had never, perhaps, seen each other before; they might perhaps know each other's names from the Navy List, and no more; and while they remained in the ship together they did not make one family. The commanding officer was a family by himself, the wardroom officers formed another family, and the gunroom officers a third, and these three families were totally distinct and separate. But in a regiment the officers were essentially one family, from the lieutenant colonel downwards; they blended into one mass, and that harmony and discipline and high tone prevailed, for which the British Army had so

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long been distinguished. Now, if the head of that family were to be introduced in the way now proposed, it would do more to break down the system he had described than any other that could be devised. He would take another instance. Suppose a regiment was in Hong Kong, and the lieutenant colonel retired from the service—the Commander-in-Chief, in the exercise of the duty imposed upon him, might select a major who had distinguished himself in some other part of the world, and nine, ten, or twelve months might elapse before he was able to join his regiment. Under whose charge was the regiment to be in the meantime? It would be under the charge of the senior major, whom it was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to supersede. These were points which he thought the Government would do well to consider before they gave effect, in the shape of a warrant, to the proposed change. The only other point to which he would allude was the financial part of the question. If a lieutenant colonel applied for leave to sell out, how did they mean to treat him? Did they mean to tell him that there was no objection to his selling out, but that the only sum they could give him was the bare amount recognized by the regulations of the army. The Commander-in-Chief knew that the lieutenant colonel had given £2,000, £3,000, or £4,000 more than the regulation price for his commission; but, notwithstanding that his paying those large sums had been winked at, was it intended to withhold from him the surplus amount he had so paid? To do so would be an act of robbery. They must calculate on great loss if they wished to do justice to the officers of the army by repaying the sums they had laid out, and this would continue till the time came when these officers were put on their guard against giving the large sums they had hitherto been accustomed to pay. With those observations, he should leave this matter in the hands of Her Majesty's Government; but he earnestly hoped that before they finally decided upon taking such a step as he had referred to, they would well weigh what the British Army had become under the existing system, and the risk they would run of destroying its prestige by adopting another.
EARL DE GREY and RIPONsaid, nothing could be more natural than that the noble Baron should have availed himself of that opportunity of bringing the
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question of the sale and purchase of commissions in the army under their Lordships' notice; because it was the noble Baron himself who appointed the Commission for the purpose of inquiring into and reporting upon the whole subject, and it was in consequence of the Report of that Commission that the consideration of the Government had been specially directed to the question. The first part of the noble Baron's address was directed against the idea of those who desired the total abolition of purchase; and his speech would have been appropriate had it been made in the other House of Parliament on a recent occasion; but as the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War then stated that it was not the intention of the Government to take any steps for the abolition of the general system of purchase, but that on the contrary, Government would view this abolition with alarm, it was not his intention to enter into a general discussion on the merits or demerits of the purchase question. Sure he was however that the system could not be dealt with as a whole, in the manner proposed by some, without leading the country into the expenditure of a large sum of money to compensate officers who were prohibited from purchasing, and to provide pensions on retirements, in order to prevent the promotion of the army from stagnating, and to supply the facilities for advancement that purchase gave. The Government entertained no such scheme as the noble Baron suspected. The question was, whether the system of purchase, such as it now was, was one that ought not to be dealt with at all, or whether its evils were of a character to call for the application of a remedy. The first evil was one the existence of which was not now denied—it was the giving high and exorbitant prices for commissions beyond those set down in the regulations. The noble Baron said there was no ground for any charge of scandal or dishonourable conduct; and far be it from him (Earl de Grey) to use any such words in speaking of a practice that prevailed almost universally among officers of the army. He was glad that the noble Baron had not taken the line taken by some, of denying the facts of the case in reference to high prices. It was a prevalent and general practice even in the infantry to give prices very large, sometimes exceeding as much as 50 per cent on the prices authorized by the regulations. But in considering these questions they must not forget that these prices were

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given in direct contravention of the law; it should not be forgotten, that there was an Act of Parliament in existence that strictly prohibited this, and provided punishment and cashiered any one guilty of the offence. The words of the Act were recalled to the attention of officers in the Queen's regulations. It was passed in 1805, and could not be said to be obsolete, seeing that it was put into operation the other day for the punishment and imprisonment of parties who had contravened its provisions. The Mutiny Act, moreover, which was annually passed by Parliament, and of which he had just moved the second reading, contained a clause especially referring to the matter, and provided other penalties for a transgression of the regulations. Therefore they stood in this position with regard to high and illegitimate prices; they had a law and a code declaring that to give or receive them was illegal; and yet, as the noble Baron said, officers in the army still carried on the system, and successive Commanders-in-Chief were aware of the fact. That was unquestionably true; and the reason why no active steps had been taken to put a stop to the practice was, that successive Commanders-in-Chief had found it impossible to lay their hands on any individual case (and the illustrious Duke on the cross benches would confirm it) in such a manner as to justify proceedings under the Act of Parliament. But there still remained the evil of giving these large prices at all. He believed it might be shown to be the opinion of the best and highest military authorities that it would not be desirable to abolish the regulations that exist, and to throw open the market for commissions; and the evidence before the Commission, including that of Sir J. Scarlett and others went to show that the practice of giving these large prices "was a most injurious and ruinous practice." Recently they had had strong illustrations of this. In the cavalry, at the commencement of the year, there were sixty-five vacant cornetcies, which there appeared to be no prospect of filling. This resulted from the high prices of commissions in the cavalry and the great general expenses of that branch of the service, which were suited to the class of men that alone were able to enter it. The result was that by consultation between the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary for War an order had been issued at the Horse Guards to reduce the price of commissions in the cavalry to
1126
the same as those in the infantry, and the consequence had been that there had been more applications for commissions than they had had in some months past. These questions were now no longer matters of theory or of conjecture, but of fact. But these were not the only grounds that rendered it necessary to deal with this subject. There had taken place recently in the system of promotion in this country certain changes of great importance applying to officers who had risen above the regimental ranks, and which he thought must be considered in connection with this question. The effect of them had been that whereas before the war in 1854 there existed a system of promotion by brevet, so that an officer having once attained the rank of captain, went on progressively though slowly to a higher rank, that system had been altered with general approbation, and now there was no means of getting to a higher rank in the army except by having served in certain regimental positions or on the Staff. Another most salutary alteration bad been made, by which after a short period no officer would obtain one of these staff appointments except by undergoing tests of a severe and important character. The consequence of these changes was that the position of the man who could not purchase was rendered more difficult in consequence of the orders of 1854–58 than under the old system. The evil of high prices was one which had attracted considerable public attention, and the question now was, whether the other changes did not render a consideration of the whole system of purchase desirable; and whether the plan proposed by the Commission was worthy of approval or not. The noble Baron had said truly that this Report of the Commission was signed by only six members of it: that three other members signed a different Report: and that the other member, though he did not hear the whole of the evidence, expressed his readiness to sign the Report of the minority. But nobody could say that the names which were appended to that Report were names not entitled to respect, for they were all names of persons of influence, either as military men or as civilians whose opinions were well entitled to consideration. What were the objections which the noble Baron urged against the plan proposed? He did not understand the noble Baron to say that if the plan were adopted it would not have a great tendency to lower the

1127
price of commissions; and he (Earl de Grey) took it, indeed, that that effect must be admitted as likely to follow. The illegitimate prices which were given were given mainly for commissions of field officers. But then it was said that the tendency of this change would be to injure the regimental system of the British army. He certainly was the last person who would feel inclined to say one word against the advantages of the regimental system of the British army, for no doubt that system was the strength and life of our army. The question was how far the changes now proposed could be said to militate against that system. It must he borne in mind that under the present system officers did not always succeed to the command of their own regiments, and that the system of exchange brought in persons from other regiments to take the command. The fact was that one-fourth of the regimental lieutenant colonels were persons who had bought into their regiments from other regiments; and this calculation did not take in the case of majors, many of whom had also in the same manner come from other regiments. He had not heard that the regiments in which this was the case were less efficient than those in which promotion had gone on more directly. When it was said that this system of selection would have the effect of entirely preventing the possibility of promotion going in the regiment, he denied that such would be the effect; it did not substitute a system of general seniority, and there was nothing in the proposals of the Commissioners to prevent a Commander-in-Chief from promoting an officer in his own regiment. The noble Baron said that the difficulty of exercising selection would be enormous, and that if it were exercised it would create great dissatisfaction. But it must be remembered that in regard to all the higher appointments in the army it was necessary to exercise the principle of selection. The question was, whether the position of a commanding officer of a regiment was one of sufficient importance to make it necessary to have a selection—for it was admitted that for positions of great importance there must be selection. He could not help thinking that the position was one of such importance that the person charged with the duty of selecting commanding officers of regiments should have his power of choice as little fettered as possible. What was wanted was, that if there were an inefficient man in a regiment you should
1128
not be prevented from passing him over; and it would be easier, under the proposed plan, to say, "Here is a man more fit," than to say, "You are so unfit, that though the rule is to promote by seniority, still I cannot promote you." The hardship pointed out by the noble Baron in reference to the senior major, at Hong Kong for instance, taking the command of a regiment for months and then being superseded, was a hardship which might occur under the present system in the event of the senior major not having money to purchase, and therefore being passed over. He could assure their Lordships that, in approaching this most difficult and important question, he was deeply impressed with the necessity of proceeding with the utmost caution. It was necessary in taking any step so closely affecting the interests of the British army that caution should be used, and that whatever might be determined on should be well considered, and determined on only after consultation with military authorities, and hearing all the objections that could be urged against it. In the other House his right hon. Friend (Mr. Sidney Herbert) had recently been called upon to state his opinions, and he had done so fearlessly; and for himself, he (Earl de Grey) ventured to think that the reason which induced the Commission to arrive at their conclusions and the Government to adopt the conclusions were reasons of great importance. He believed that the step proposed to be taken would not decrease the efficiency of the army, and would remove from it evils of a mischievous and objectionable description.
THE EARL OF LUCANsaid, he was very glad to hear from the noble Earl that the Minister of War had not yet made up his mind on this very important question, and that he would confer previously with the military authorities. He (the Earl of Lucan) did most earnestly implore the Government to consider well before they adopted a step which, in his conscience he believed, would prove fatal to the interests of the British Army. He frankly admitted the evils which arose from the large sums spent upon commissions; but these were given in excess of the regulations, and were no arguments against the purchase system. His belief was, that those evils might be easily cheeked, as they were when he first joined the army. There was nothing so grating to the ear, and so unpalatable, as to be told that public employment, and particularly commissions in

1129
the army, could be obtained by purchase. But he must observe that it could scarcely be truly said that commissions in the British army were purchased. A certain regulated sum of money was deposited when an officer received his commission, which might be held, to a certain extent, as a security for his good conduct. It was only by permission he could recover it. There was no transaction between one officer and another. On quitting the service, the officer retiring did not ask for permission to sell his commission to any particular officer. He asked leave to retire, receiving the sum he had originally deposited; and it was for the Commander-in-Chief to select his successor. When he (the Earl of Lucan) first came into the army, nothing was more common than for the Commander-in-Chief to select an officer from one regiment to fill the vacancy in another, especially when promotion had been too rapid in the one, and too slow in the other. It was a very ordinary practice; he thought it a very wholesome one, and that it would be wise to revert to it. The system of purchase, he believed had worked efficiently and well; he believed that no system in any ether army had worked more or even equally so. He was satisfied that there were no regiments in the world superior to British regiments. Foreign officers might be more scientific, but for honour, for fidelity, or for bravery they were not surpassed, if equalled, by those of any Foreign army. In using the word bravery he was only doing justice to his own feelings. When he recited a conversation he had held with Marshal Canrobert subsequent to the Crimean war, that distinguished general said to him "Je dis—et j'ai tonjours dit—qu'il n'existoiant pas dans le monde de plus brave soldats ques les soldats Anglais, à l'execption de leurs officiers," or that there were no braver soldiers in the world than English soldiers, unless it were their own officers. Much had been said about the ages of officers, he (the Earl of Lucan), was convinced that throughout the English army officers of the different ranks were ten years younger than in Foreign armies. This arose from the purchase system, which, though answering its purpose so well, they were about to tamper with. It was proposed, he believed, to abolish purchase for the future after a certain rank. Since the noble Lord gave notice of his Motion, he had applied himself to reading the evidence taken before the Commission
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on whose recommendation the Government's intentions to abolish purchase after the rank of major was founded. He would undertake to say that in the whole of the evidence there was nothing to support the contemplated alteration; he was unable to put his finger on a single expression of any officer which could be adduced in support of such a course. If they were to judge from the questions put by the Commissioners, it would appear that they had made up their own minds before entering on the examination; for, not content with examining, re-examining, and frequently cross-examining their own witnesses, they pressed them so hard as to torture them into the admissions they were anxious to procure. Sir Colin Campbell, Sir Duncan M'Dougall, and Lord West, supposed to be generally opposed to the system of purchase, were examined; though favourable to particular alterations, they were unanimous in condemning the plan recommended by the Commission. He should like to know whether the noble Lord, the Under-Secretary for War, or his chief, had considered the difficulties likely to accrue from the change proposed. No officer entering the army in future is to be secured in his advancement beyond the rank of major, in either the infantry or cavalry. What rule did the noble Lord propose to adopt with respect to the Guards? Would he allow officers to purchase their companies and obtain the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and so be able to ascend to the highest ranks in the profession, at the time that officers, entering the cavalry or infantry, could not be sure of attaining a higher rank than that of major? If such were the intention, did the House believe the country would tolerate it? If there were no other objection, in his opinion, that in itself sufficed to render the scheme impracticable. What was to be done with the Artillery? There was no selection in that corps, every officer must become a lieutenant-colonel in process of time; was it to be tolerated that artillery officers were to obtain, by seniority, that rank which would enable them to succeed to the highest grades in the army, while the officers of cavalry and infantry could only obtain it by selection? That was a difficulty which he saw no way of getting over. If once the principle is established that majors of other regiments are to be selected, the regimental major, as a rule, must be made ineligible, otherwise, there would be such a slur on his character and capacity,

1131
that he would be compelled to leave the service. He believed that there was no officer in the service so sensible of the extraordinary difficulties of the scheme as the Commander-in-Chief himself. He had had no conversation with the illustrious Duke on this subject; but he had read his evidence, and to almost everything that had fallen from him he entirely subscribed. The Government were attempting to lay upon the Commander-in-Chief a duty which it would be impossible for him to discharge. There was nothing in the world so difficult ns to know beforehand who would make a good lieutenant-colonel. It rarely happened that a major had any opportunity of showing that he possessed the qualifications requisite for the command of a regiment; the illustrious Duke must be always doing injustice, for he defied the Commander-in-Chief to say that he had sufficient means for forming an opinion as to the relative merits of the officers from whom he would have to choose his lieutenant-colonels. The illustrious Duke knew that he had not, and he had, in fact, told the Commissioners so; and the consequence would be that he would have to fall back upon the worst of all systems—promotion by seniority. With one exception there was not a single word in the evidence given by the Commander-in Chief before the Commission to which he (the Earl of Lucan) and every officer in the army would not subscribe. The illustrious Duke said that it was so unusual to veto the appointment of an officer he could not exorcise the power, unless he received an unusual amount of support from the public. With great respect he must say that it was the fluty of a Commander-in-Chief to consider the interests of the service before he thought of the individual. It had been stated before the Commissioners that under the present system improper persons were placed in the command of regiments; under what system must that not occasionally happen? It was nevertheless, surprising how few cases had been brought forward. Sir James Simpson mentioned two; but he did not state how they had obtained their rank—whether by seniority, purchase, or selection. One had died in the service, and the other, for anything he knew, might be in it now. He (the Earl of Lucan) felt bound to say that the Commander-in-Chief, whoever he might he, neglected his duty if he allowed an inefficient officer to remain at the head of a regiment. By the reports of the Inspectors the Commander-
1132
in-Chief became acquainted with the capacity of all commanding officers; when one was reported unfit, he should intimate to the officer to withdraw. The illustrious Duke says that that was already done; but the Commander-in-Chief did not discharge his duty if he went no further. Unpleasant as the step might be, he ought, on the officer declining to retire, to send down two General Officers to verify the report and at once act upon their decision. They were told that in the French army the lieutenant-colonels were selected; but the Commissioners probably did not know that in that service the chef de bataillon performs the duties of our lieutenant-colonels; and these are not selected, and in their commands they can prove their qualifications to be selected for the higher rank of lieutenant-colonel. Majors in the English army seldom have the opportunity of showing their qualification for command. With regard to the seniority system, it was unnecessary for him to say a word. The Artillery, in which that rule prevailed, had actually memorialized in favour of purchase; for promotion in that service was so slow that it was hardly possible to keep it supplied with officers of an age fit for active service. Had it not been that seven or eight new battalions had been added, the efficiency of the corps in the field would have been most seriously injured by what he might almost term the senility of its officers. Again, to give promotion, £60,000 or 70,000 a year were spent in retiring allowances. He did hope that the Government would not attempt to carry out the scheme laid down by the Secretary for War without first giving it a most careful reconsideration.
THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, the noble Lord who had introduced this subject to their notice (Lord Panmure) had expressed himself strongly in favour of maintaining the purchase system in its integrity. The noble Lord had expressed surprise that the Government should have taken another course, although well aware that two members of the Cabinet had subscribed their names to the Report of the Commission which proposed to modify the system. He was surprised that the noble Lord, if his mind was made up that the purchase system was excellent, should have raised the question by the appointment of the Commission. Why was the whole question opened, if the noble Lord was confident he was right? He (the Duke of Somerset) had never agitated the ques-

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tion, but it now seems that the noble Lord wanted to stifle an inconvenient question, and so appointed a Commission. He (the Duke of Somerset) had spoken in the other House against the exaggerated notion of the evil effects of the purchase system, which, although it had some evils, had great advantages. The noble Lord asked him to be at the head of the Commission and appointed other Commissioners. Why was that done? He called it hardly fair conduct on the part of the noble Lord. The Commission was "to inquire whether promotion in the army is to be advanced by the purchase of commissions at a fixed price, and to report whether it is expedient to make any change in the existing system." Why, if the noble Lord was convinced that change was not wanted—why in the world did he appoint the Commission? The Commission was appointed: was it intended that they should make a heavy blue-book and hang up the question—at least while the noble Lord was Secretary of State. But when the Commissioners carne to look honestly into the question they came to results that did not at all suit the noble Lord. The Commission arrived at the conclusion—and he was prepared to defend it—that the command of a regiment was a most important trust and one which ought not to be bought and sold. That was the position which he (the Duke of Somerset) took, and he wanted to see it confuted. He said that the command of a regiment was a matter of deep importance to the honour of the country, because the issue of a battle might depend upon it. But further than that he believed it was admitted by every one that not only the whole management and efficiency of the regiment, but the health of the men, depended on the commanding officer. It was stated that the mortality in the Crimea varied very much with the efficiency of the lieutenant-colonels in command. Was it right then that they should allow a man, because he had money, to be put in command of a regiment, in which position he might sacrifice the lives of the soldiers and the honour of the country, rather than interfere with the system of purchase? He said the command of a regiment ought to be made by sleection, and he was prepared to show that there were means of making that selection. It had been stated over and over again, and it was stated by the noble Lord himself, that there are at the Horse Guards what are called confidential reports, which are open only to the eyes of the Com-
1134
mander-in-Chief, of the character, conduct, and acquirements of every officer in the army. General Sir George Brown said: "The Commander-in-Chief has the means of knowing the character for efficiency and intelligence of every field-officer in the army if he chooses to go to the Adjutant-General's office to get the information." These were the means of making selection, and yet they had been told by Sir James Simpson that men had often and must under a system of purchase rise to the command of a regiment who were totally unfit for it. They could not be passed over. The veto of the Commander-in-Chief was a very difficult and serious thing. They had the advantage of the evidence of the illustrious Duke the Commander-in-Chief, who told them how invidious it was to put a veto on the appointment of an officer; and the illustrious Duke also said that he felt it desirable to exercise that power, but that it was necessary for the Commander-in-Chief to be supported by public opinion if he should ever have resort to it. The power to veto an appointment does exist, but it is not exercised. That showed that some alteration in the existing state of things was required; and he said that it was far better to select in the first instance than veto an appointment when made. To veto a person appointed was far more invidious to the individual than to select another, because when they selected they did not say to him, "You are very bad," but only "There is somebody else who, under the circumstances, we think preferable." The real question involved was whether they were to consider the interests of the individual officers or the interests of the public service. In this country, with the House of Commons and the public strongly taking up individual cases, it was very difficult to decide individually for the interests of the public service; but the command of a regiment was so important that it ought to be done. There was no difficulty about noncommissioned officers. They were always selected. But it was said that, if it were attempted to apply the principle of selection to officers high up in the service, it could not be done. He believed the Commander-in-Chief had the means of doing it, and, if the illustrious Duke would permit him to say so, he thought he ought to do it if the declared opinion of Parliament called upon him to undertake the duty. No wonder foreigners thought us a nation of shopkeepers when they found us bargaining

1135
as we did at present about the command of our regiments. Even the Duke of Wellington in time of war, as is stated in the evidence of the Commission, when he wanted to name a man to a command, could not do it, because that officer did not possess the money. There was a practical evil and the Commission had indicated the remedy which ought to be applied—the opening of a wider field for selection. He would not go into the question how that ought to be done. That was a matter which the Commission did not proceed to consider, because, when it was found that the members of it were divided, it was thought best not to go further into details, but to set down their opinions on the general question and leave them for the Government to deal with. They only indicated the general opinion that selection ought to take place in nominating to the command of regiments. The noble Earl who had just spoken (the Earl of Lucan) said that no officer had been in favour of the recommendation. Well, but what of Sir James Scarlett, who considered that the principle of selection might be resorted to in all the higher ranks above that of captain? Up to captain it was proposed that when they came into the army by purchase they should be permitted to sell out. One great advantage of purchase was that it opened a way to retirement, and thereby tended to recruit the lower ranks with young men. Were the principle of selection adopted, he entertained very little doubt but it would be judiciously carried out by the illustrious Duke. The illustrious Duke had not only the advantage of position, but he was placed high above all the strife of party; he would not be hampered by the various relations of society, and he would be able to exercise the principle of selection so as to give real efficiency to the British army. There was no other army in the world where the principle of selection was not acted upon, and more especially in the command of regiments this was the case, even in the Indian army. As to making regulations against excess prices, those regulations would be futile—the only way to deal with them would be to adopt some such system as had been proposed by the Commission. High prices were not given until they came to high places. Of the existence of the evil there could be no doubt. Again, he said here was the evil—there was the remedy. A noble Lord had asked what if a regiment should be sent to China, and its commanding officer should
1136
be sent invalided home? How meet that case? Would you send out an officer to take the command? He (the Duke of Somerset) had just done that very thing. A regiment of marines had been sent out to China, whose commanding officer had been invalided—the junior officer had the command for six months. He (the Duke of Somerset) tried to get the best man he could find. He told those whom he consulted he must have the best man to send out there. Well, he sent him. He hoped he had done right, though, according to what the noble Lord (Lord Panmure) said, it would appear as if he had not done so. As to selection, the whole merit of it would depend upon the ability and fitness of the scheme or plan devised for carrying it out. Let them lay down the general principle that all commands of regiments were not to be given according to money but according to fitness. He knew the Horse Guards possessed the means of carrying out this principle, and that it might be adopted. The Commission had laid down only the general plan; but the details of any scheme would, of course, require the grave and serious consideration of the military authorities, assisted by the advice of officers of experience in the different services. He had thought right thus far to express his opinion, having been a member of the Commission whose proceedings had been so much canvassed during this discussion.
EARL GREYagreed in the expendiency of not prolonging the debate. He would only say a few words at this time of the evening, and as the House was so thin. The noble duke spoke of the importance of the office of commanding a regiment. He entirely agreed with him, and that the importance of obtaining the best men for that command could not be exaggerated. The noble Duke said, men ought not to be placed in such high posts merely because they had money to buy them. He (Earl Grey) replied, certainly not; but the question was how they were likely to get the best men for the command of regiments. The noble Duke said, by the system of selection. Well, but, in his opinion, however speciously the plan of selection sounded in the abstract, still its exercise implied an almost superhuman amount of knowledge and firmness—knowledge, to be rightly aware of the abilities of each officer, and firmness to resist all the influences which would be brought to bear directly and indirectly on any Commander-in-Chief. Such knowledge no Commander-in-Chief could

1137
ever fully possess—he must necessarily trust to the reports furnished to him. And would there be no danger of bias, or partiality, or envy, or other motives, in those reports? Could he—how could he be sure he had the most correct data to go upon in his selection? The Commander-in-Chief might be willing to do his best; but doing his best he must still trust to, and be to a great entent guided by, the opinions of others. But how was it possible, when a vacancy occurred in the command of a regiment, for any Commander-in-Chief, especially in time of peace, when officers had no great opportunity of showing their respective qualities, to obtain proof, satisfactory not only to his own mind, but to the mind of the public, that there was some other major in the army so decidedly superior to the senior major of the regiment in which the vacancy occurred that he ought to have the preference? The present system was a system of seniority qualified by purchase. But the practical effect of the system of selection would unquestionably be to substitute for the present system of seniority, qualified by purchase, a system of almost unmitigated seniority, for the habit would soon become established of giving vacancies in command to senior officers except in the case of marked and glaring disqualification. That was his own opinion, and, judging from the evidence of the illustrious Duke before the Commission, such was the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief also from his experience in that high office. Would they, under the new system and the proposed manner of its working, get better officers? He (Earl Grey) would reply, certainly not. The noble Duke was quite wrong in saying a man was made lieutenant-colonel merely because he had money, for it was the bounden duty of the Commander-in-Chief to see that no unfit person was allowed to make the purchase. Moreover, the system of purchase gave great facility to the Commander-in-Chief for passing over those officers who, in his opinion, were not efficient. It was difficult to say to a man against whom there is no positive fault to be found, who has discharged his duties honestly but is deficient in the qualities required for the command of a regiment, "Remain in the service; I must pass you over—casta slur upon you, and blight your prospects, and you will be exposed to the disrespect of all your brother officers; but still you must remain." Whereas by the purchase system he might say in a friendly
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way to this officer, "I advise you to sell out. I cannot promote you. I feel it to be my duty to appoint some one else, therefore take my advice as a friend and sell out." He knew that bad been done. This prevented unfit men from being promoted to the command of regiments. Let it be borne in mind too that the British military service was one of the hardest in the world. We sent our regiments to the most distant parts of the globe—to the most unhealthy climates—they had no opportunity of distinguishing themselves—Were they then to promote an officer to whom chance afforded an opportunity of distinguishing himself, over the head of an equally brave and efficient officer, who might have been quite as much or more capable, but who had not been afforded the same opportunity of bringing himself into notice? The system of selection, too, would, in his opinion, cause much jealousy, and might, perhaps, lead to appeals to public opinion—to attempts to depress brother officers in the estimation of the press and the public, and to increase their own importance, than which nothing could, in his opinion, be more pernicious. They had seen a little too much of that already. He feared that officers would be desirous of increasing their own importance at the expense of others in the same service, which would be, he repeated, a most serious misfortune. There were two courses open to them, either to adhere to the system of purchase or to abolish it altogether. A great deal had been said, and perhaps might be said, in favour of each of these courses, but with respect to the proposal of the Commission he confessed he could see nothing to recommend it, on the contrary it ingeniously united the objections to both the other plans without the merits of either, and he had never heard any man, not a member of the Commission or of the Government, who was in favour of the scheme. In his opinion it would be better to abolish the system of purchase altogether than to adopt their recommendation. It had been argued that abolishing the system of purchase as to lieutenant-colonelcies and retaining promotion by purchase in all the inferior ranks would put an end to the practice of paying what were called illegitimate prices for commissions. Notwithstanding all that had been said on this point his opinion was that there was no objection whatever to these high prices except that they were in contravention of a certain law

1139
or regulation. That regulation ought, in his opinion, to be altered. It would be necessary to have a regulation price, for it could not be permitted to an officer to carry on an auction for the sale of his commission. There ought to be a regulation price, and then, if the senior officer said he was ready with this sum, he ought to have the commission; but if by mutual agreement between the parties a sum beyond the regulation were paid for a commission, he saw nothing to condemn in the arrangement. What was the objection to it? Whom did it injure? If it was done by common consent, instead of being an injury, it was an advantage, since it promoted the greater frequency of those transactions and kept the army young. If the reason for this change was to compel lieutenant-colonels to go out, taking the regulation price, then it was a plan of downright robbery. He advised Her Majesty's Government, if they made the change proposed, not to shirk the honest obligation to meet existing interests. He knew, and all the world knew, that the payment of prices beyond the regulation had been the general practice for years with the sufferance, to say the least, of the highest military authorities. In former years he believed there had even been cases in which negotiations for the sale of commissions beyond the regulation price had actually been carried on through officers at the Horse Guards. To turn round upon officers who had been thereby encouraged to pay high prices for their commissions now and say they must go out with only the regulation price would be nothing better than robbery. If the Government made any change in the existing arrangements they were bound to ask Parliament for the means of making a fair compensation to officers whose interests would be affected. He should advise Her Majesty's Government, if they wished to abolish the system of purchase gradually, rather to begin at the lower end than the higher. An ensign never paid more than the regulation price, and there would be no objection to say to the ensigns, "The public will pay you the money you advanced;" and then in a few years they might get rid of the system of purchase without injustice; but, for his own part, he deprecated the change altogether, and believed the system to be attended with great advantages. In the first place it was most desirable that the officers of the army should be of a younger age than they could be otherwise kept, without going to an enor-
1140
mous expense for retiring pensions. Then in the next place, the political advantages of the present system were most important. It was highly useful that gentlemen of wealth, who were afterwards going to occupy important situations in the country, should in their younger days be placed under the control of military discipline. The system of sale and purchase also prevented the army from being too exclusively professional in its character. He was old-fashioned enough to think that to keep up a large standing army was, under any circumstances, rather a dangerous thing to a free country. It was formerly regarded as a political axiom that standing armies were dangerous to free institutions, and he believed that what had rendered an army compatible with our free Government was that it was officered by gentlemen closely connected with the general society of the nation, having interests in common with the rest of their countrymen, and not looking to promotion as their only object. A body of officers who had their profession only to trust to would be animated by very different feelings, and would naturally be very favourable to war. The system of purchase had mainly contributed to preserve our army from this spirit, and we had thus avoided many serious evils existing in other countries; our system had both ensured a rapid succession of officers in the army, and a community of interests between those officers and the gentlemen of the country.
THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE: My Lords, I do not think it would be respectful to your Lordships if I allowed this discussion to close without saying a very few words to this effect—that in my peculiar position it would be very indelicate in me to enter into any arguments on this subject, inasmuch as my opinions are known. They have been given before the Commission of which my noble Friend the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) was the President. Those opinions were given before this question was under your Lordships' consideration. They were given in the most unbiassed manner to the Commission, and I request to say that I have not changed them since. This is all that I will observe; except to add thus much, that, whatever may be the decision that may be come to, I can assure the noble Duke, I can assure this House and the country, that as far as I am personally concerned, it shall be my earnest and anxious endeavour—difficult as it may be, and, as I may perhaps consider it,

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impossible—to carry out that decision in such a manner as to promote the best interest of the army, and if of the army the best interests of the country also.
VISCOUNT HARDINGEwished to express the opinion that the compromise proposed by the Secretary for War would not work satisfactorily. He thought it had been clearly shown by the two noble Earls; who had spoken that evening, and by the noble Lord who had introduced this discussion, that such a system would lead to heart burnings and to great dissatisfaction in the army. The result would be that political pressure and private friendship would be brought to bear upon the authorities, which it would be very difficult to withstand, and that esprit de corps, which ought to exist among the officers of the British army, would be destroyed. He had at one time entertained the opinion that the principle of selection by merit was one that might be introduced into the service with advantage; but after reading the evidence of the noble Earl opposite and of His Royal Highness on the subject he confessed he had changed his opinion, and he was now of opinion that it could never be fairly or practically carried out. The Commander-in-Chief had stated before the Commission that if a vacancy occurred in a regiment in the West Indies, and a major were sent out from home to supersede all the captains in the regiments, it would be a great hardship upon those officers who had been serving there in a bad climate with their colours. Then, what was to be the test of selection—was it to be the fact of an officer being a good drill, or being well acquainted with the interior economy of his regiment, or was it to be scientific acquirements? On all these points every Inspector of a regiment in their reports would differ. Then, what did the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) say? He said he would not enter into details, and could not explain how those were to be carried out; but when the Secretary for War came down to the House, and propounded so crude and imperfect a measure, the House had a right to ask how those details were to be carried out? The Secretary of War had stated he viewed with alarm and apprehension the total abolition of the purchase system. He (Viscount Hardinge) hoped the Under Secretary for War shared somewhat in that alarm, for in the House of Commons he made able speeches in favour of total abolition. The late Lord Raglan stated before the Commis-
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sion of 1840, that he should be very sorry to see the system of selection introduced into the army under any circumstances, because he thought it would lead to every possible abuse. The scheme of the Government he considered very objectionable, and he trusted, if it were not too late, that the Government would reconsider the question, and not introduce into the army any sweeping measure or hastily considered changes.
LORD PANMUREsaid, that an accusation had been made against him by the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) that he had had a Committee or Commission appointed for the purpose of shelving this question. He entirely repudiated that accusation. He appointed the Commission, not because he was convinced that it was necessary, in order to promote the character of the British officer, but in order to satisfy the demands that had constantly been made for it in the House of Commons. He must say he thought that Commission had taken evidence in a most extraordinary manner. For example: the whole evidence of Sir C. Trevelyan consisted of questions and answers, the whole of which were written by that gentleman himself and placed in the hands of the Commissioners, and in many cases the witness corrected the questioner.
THE DUKE OF SOMERSETexpressed his regret if be had said one word that would cause pain to his noble Friend, or that could be deemed an imputation upon his personal character.
Motion agreed to.
Bill read 2a accordingly; and committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.
House adjourned at a quarter before Nine o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.