HL Deb 07 June 1860 vol 159 cc4-19
LORD TEYNHAM

having presented petitions in favour of Manhood suffrage and Vote by Ballot, moved the Resolutions of which he had given notice, as follows: That this House, greatly desiring the Settlement of the Question of Parliamentary Reform, for the satisfaction of Men's Minds, for the Sake of the Peace of the Country, and that the Business of Parliament may be proceeded with without let, is willing to give its most careful Consideration to the Prayer of the Petitions which have been presented to it in favour of Manhood Suffrage and Vote by Ballot; this being the broadest Basis for the Elective Franchise which has been presented to it by Petition: That this House hopes to be able to discern them who for any Reason ought not to be allowed a Vote, and to point out the Means whereby improper Persons may be deprived of the Franchise after it is legally possessed; so that, on the one hand, no Man shall be left without the Franchise against whom no just or sufficient Reason for his Disfranchisement can be assigned; and, on the other hand, no Man shall be put on the List of Voters, or continued thereon, against whom just Grounds of Disfranchisement can be alleged and proved: That this House is, therefore, prepared to recommend such Alterations in the Criminal, Vagrant, and Poor Laws as shall appear necessary to cut off from the Register of Voters all improper Persons: In this Way the House hopes to grant the Spirit of the Prayer of its Petitioners for Manhood Suffrage and Vote by Ballot, not only without Detriment to the common Weal but with great Advantage to the same. The noble Lord said, that besides the few petitions he then had the honour to present to their Lordships, in an earlier part of the Session he had presented very numerous petitions, principally from Northumberland and Durham, in favour of Universal Suffrage and Vote by Ballot, and from other parts of the country in favour of the Ballot alone, and, therefore when it was said that the people generally were indifferent to their political rights, he thought these petitions with their numerous signatures afforded sufficient proof that a large portion at least of the unrepresented classes were greatly interested in the question. Deeply conscious of his own weakness and incompetence to perform the task he had undertaken, he had only ventured to address their Lordships, under shelter of the petitions of the people; but at the same time he must admit that he fully adopted their statements, and in the remarks which he was about to address to their Lordships, he wished it to be understood that he fully approved in his conscience the truth and justice of the cause he was advocating. In former days there were Colonies of this country which it pleased Parliament, in its wisdom, to endeavour to tax. A voice, that of Mr. Otis, was raised in their behalf; and President Adams remarked, "I do say that Mr. Otis' oration against writs of assistance breathed into this nation the breath of life." It was like the lightning. It came unexpectedly. It did its work, the fruit of which remains to the present day, whilst it itself is unremembered. Thus revived, the people of these Colonies—not of one or of some, but of all thirteen together—rose in opposition to that attempt, and, after a long struggle, they secured their independence. They were told that in like manner there was a very large number of unrepresented persons in the United Kingdom who were in the same position, and who, notwithstanding all that had been said and done, were like so many dead men's bones. But the experience of the United States bade him hope better things concerning them, namely, that the same views would breathe life into these dead men's bones. In the contest for truth, in the struggle for justice, almost uniformly the battle, in the first instance, was of the weak against the strong—eventually the weak triumphed. Now the unrepresented in England were weak—they were poor—their claims were mocked; yet the experience of history led to the belief that better hopes might not in vain be entertained for them. Mr. Otis said, "I have waited years in hopes to see some one friend of the Colonies pleading in public for them. I have waited in vain." He had in like manner ventured to undertake the cause of the unrepresented in their Lordships' House, feeling that if he did not, it was not likely that another would take his place. The sum and substance of his Motion was this—that their Lordships would be willing to give their most careful consideration to the prayer of the petitioners in favour of universal suffrage and vote by ballot; and if their Lordships thought fit, that a Select Committee or Royal Commission might be appointed to inquire into what was necessary to be done in order that the prayer of the petitions might be granted. In the eloquent speech recently made by Mr. Gladstone at Edinburgh, he said, "I think it is eminently British to admit the voice of the governed in the choice of governors." This is an eulogium of universal suffrage. Therefore, in that sentiment he fully agreed, and at the same time he congratulated the University of Edinburgh on the choice which they had made by the selection of so able and eloquent a man as Mr. Gladstone to be their Rector. The petitions which he had presented had in many instances been signed only by the chairman presiding at public meetings, who thus represented the views of hundreds and thousands of persons. If they thought the views of the petitioners were transient, their feelings evanescent, or that they would ever be satisfied till the prayer of their petitions was heard, the House knew not the stuff of which the Tyne-side men and Cornish miners were made; and, in the words of Burke, he would say, "Reflect how you ought to govern a people who think they ought to be free, and think they are not." Their Lordships would do well to weigh the thoughts of men who are disfranchised, and who, having petitioned for their freedom, should their petitions be disregarded, have to fear lest their disfranchisement be perpetual. What such may brood over is well put by Otis. He said:— The very act of taxing exercised over those who are not represented appears to me to be depriving them of one of their most essential rights as freemen; and, if continued, seems to be in effect an entire disfranchisement of every civil right. For what one civil right is worth a rush after a man's property is subject to be taken from him at pleasure, without his consent? If a man is not his own assessor in person, or by deputy, his liberty is gone, or lies entirely at the mercy of others. Again, a common idea seemed to prevail that the unrepresented were—if he might use the expression—represented by those who were represented, and that Parliament had become the trustee for a majority of the people. On this subject he would venture to remind their Lordships of what had been said by Burke: "Perhaps we might wish the Colonists [say the non-electors] to be persuaded that their liberty is more secure when held in trust for them by us (as their guardians during a perpetual minority) than with any part of it in their own hands." That such a wish is unavailing, and what would be the result of entertaining it, their Lordships may learn by comparing the circumstances under which they were then met and those under which Edmund Burke addressed the other House of Parliament. At that time there were some hundred thousand descendants of the people of this country living beyond the sea, whom it was endeavouring to tax. The unrepresented of the people of England now are more numerous, mingled at home with those who are represented, and daily seeing the coat of many colours which you have placed on your Joseph, who lives in a ten-pound house. These, unrepresented, you yet tax. The grievances of the Colonists and of your petitioners are one and the same. The men do not differ. The Colonists were Britons: so are these. These think and feel as those thought and felt. In method of action, through difference of circumstances, the twain may not be one; but in the effect of action no dissimilarity will be found, taxation without representation ceasing to exist. The method of conciliation which ought to have been pursued was that, as you could not give representation, you should desist from taxing. Now, you cannot cease to tax; it is, therefore, your duty to give representation, to quell by kindness and by justice the existing, the growing, discontent. The refusal of the demand of your petitioners might be attended with even more fatal consequences than was the disregard of the appeals and warnings of that great orator. He therefore earnestly implored their Lordships to listen to their plea while it was yet time. He begged to direct their attention to the way in which universal suffrage had been presented to the human mind. In every age and time the greatest truths had been taught by means of fables. A good fable is like the sun. It is capable of illuminating all mankind in every age; and their Lordships remembered the fable of the trees who met to choose a king, and when the olive and the vine were asked to reign, they refused. Finally, as they well knew, the choice fell upon the bramble. Here was universal suffrage, and the fable owes its origin to the fact of a king being so elected. "All the men of Shechem gathered together, and all the house of Millo, and went and made Abimelech king." Next to the Sacred writings, he might refer to Shakspeare, and the language put into the mouth of Brutus in Julius Cœsar would occur to their Lordships' recollection— What means this shouting? I do fear the people choose Cæsar for their king? The fear now, however, would be, not that Cæsar were chosen, but that the suffrage was in the people's hands. Again, how small is the difference between the philosophy of nature, expressed in fables, and that of the schools, set forth in learned terms? They are alike derived from observation. What say the thoughtful of universal suffrage? An eloquent Member of the other House of Parliament lately, in his speech on the Reform Bill, recognized the abstract right of the people to a vote; but he treated that right as a thing of nought. Now, we had not known an abstract quality unless we had first become acquainted with it when it was not abstract. For an abstract quality to be, there must be something having the quality in it. Thus, for whiteness to be, there must be snow, or the snowdrop, or somewhat else. So, for an abstract right to be, there must be a man having the right in him. How came it to be in him? The answer is, it is his birthright; and the preamble of 12 & 13 Will. III., c. 2, claims it for him, saying—"Whereas the laws of England are the birthright of the people thereof." Now, since this abstract right has been lightly treated, since they who set it aside overlook that they are unjust, for an abstract right is a real right; and since they perceive not their want of wisdom—for their decision will be appealed against, and eventually with effect—it is necessary to notice that though an abstract quality often, perhaps, may be evanescent, as is the case with colour, yet it is not so with an abstract right. It is a man's throughout his life; it is his successors' from generation to generation. Thus our fathers thought at the time of the Revolution, for we read in 1 William & Mary, c. 2, s. 2, which is an Act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, that all and singular the rights and liberties then asserted and claimed were the true, ancient, and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom. It being then ac- knowledged that a vote for a Member of Parliament is an Englishman's abstract right, it is his legal right at the present day; and, ere I finish, having first shown more fully that it is his right, it will be my duty to point out how he may plead, or assert his birthright—the right which he himself inherits, and which it is his duty to hand down to his children after him. From the abstract right to a vote he would pass to the analogical reasoning which sustains the doctrine of universal suffrage. Whenever several States have been forming, or have formed, a political union, each Slate has had a vote. In such cases we see universal suffrage. In the Helvetic Confederacy each canton sent two deputies to the General Assemblies, and each canton and associate State had a voice and a vote. This is set forth in the arms of the Confederacy, which were a medal, with thirteen shields for the several States, filling up the space just within its rim; the medal having also an inner circle, within the rim of which six shields containing the arms of the most important associate States were placed. In the Dutch Republic the voting was not by hands, but by States. Some States had more representatives at the Assembly than others; but each State had one vote alone. Here again is universal suffrage. The arms of the Dutch Republic were a bundle of arrows, with the legend, "Concordiâ res parvœ crescunt: discordiâ maximœ dilabuntur." The stars and stripes of the United States proclaim, analogically, universal suffrage throughout the world. In confirmation of his argument from analogy, he would draw their Lordships' attention to a remarkable passage in the history of the contest for their liberties so successfully carried on by our North American Colonies. When they declared their independence they consisted of thirteen States. But it so happened that at the second Congress, met at Philadelphia on the 27th of May, 1775, the delegates of twelve States only were present. At that Congress they began to tax their Union to raise an income to defray the expenses of the war. Bills of credit were issued to the amount of three millions of milled Spanish dollars, and the twelve united Colonies were pledged for their redemption. So scrupulous were they not to violate the principle for which they were contending, they would not pledge the credit of the colony whose representative was not there to vote. He now came to universal suffrage as it existed in the Church of God. The judicious Hooker, in his great work on the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, said, that "the natural subject of power to make laws civil is the commonwealth, so we affirm that in like congruity the true original subject of power also to make church laws is the entire body of that Church for which they are made. Equals could not impose laws or statutes upon their equals." Nevertheless, in England, where all men were equal before the law, the represented took upon themselves to impose laws upon the unrepresented, which Hooker said they could not do. Archbishop Whitgift, in his answer to the Admonition in 1572, admitted that in the Apostolical times, and down even to the times of Cyprian, the people had a voice in the appointment of their ministers, and that they sometimes made a right good choice; and, quoting Ambrose, with reference to the election of Eusebius, he adds—"He worthily proved a notable man, whom the whole Church elected; he was rightly thought to be chosen by God's appointment, whom every man desired." Thus the fear of universal suffrage is neither founded on the experience nor on the opinion of the Church of God. If we now search the world's history to note the opinions of communities asserting for the first time, or anew, their liberties, and seeking to establish them, we shall find that among them every man had his duty to perform, and no one was excluded from, the common privileges of the State. If the question of suffrage arose, it was universal. The oldest document of the Swiss Confederacy is dated the beginning of August, 1291. This is its proclamation:— Know all men that we, the people of the valley of Uri, of the community of Schwitz, and of the mountains of Underwalden, seeing the dangers of the times, have solemnly agreed and bound ourselves by oath to aid and defend each other, with all our might and main, with our lives and property, both within and beyond our boundaries, each at his own expense, and against every enemy whatever who shall attempt to molest us, either singly or collectively. Here each was self-taxed; and here we have proof that it is a libel to assert that men who seek to attain universal liberty are unwilling to bear their share of the expense. At a first nocturnal meeting to oppose the House of Hapsburg, held in 1307, thirty-three patriots resolved that the freedom they had inherited from their forefathers they were determined to assert, and to hand down to their posterity untainted and undiminished. Three of them, Werner, Walter, and Arnold, held up their hands to Heaven, and in the name of the Almighty, who has created man to an inalienable degree of freedom, swore, jointly and strenuously, to defend that freedom. Thus we learn that they who know what liberty is, and are striving for its enjoyment, consider that man cannot alienate it voluntarily, so that his children shall not inherit it, nor allow it to be wrested from him, so that it should cease to be. At Uri each male of the age of sixteen had his suffrage. Mr. Gladstone, in the speech already noticed, added that it was eminently British to train men for the discharge of manly duties by letting them begin their exercise betimes. Thus the Swiss father, whose son stood by him, rifle in hand, when he was contesting with the enemies of the liberties of his country, did not disallow him his place in the public assemblies of his people. The lad who fought with his father, with his father had a vote. In the Grison country, in elections and in all public deliberations, every male of a stated age had a vote. The history of the Dutch Republic in a remarkable manner asserts that every freeman has his duty to perform; and so far as the question of supply was concerned, affords proof that it was judged just that taxation and representation should be strictly co-extensive. By the 8th Art of the Union of Utrecht, January 23, 1579, it was ordered that all the inhabitants between the ages of eighteen and sixty should be enrolled for the defence of the country; and so carefully and firmly was it held that every one who had his duty to perform had also his liberty to enjoy, that on the 24th of July, 1581, the States proclaimed every inhabitant absolved from allegiance to the intruder on his country, while at the same time, in the name of the population, they swore fidelity to the Prince of Orange. For the fiscal example referred to, we must go back to the Congress at Ghent, at the first meeting of the States of the Netherlands in 1477, where it was resolved that cities are not to be compelled to contribute to requests which they have not voted. The history of the Colony of Massachusetts affords an instance of universal suffrage in a peculiar form. At first considered a Christian State, every member of the Church was a freeman, and every freeman had a vote. In 1631 others tried for a vote, but they were overruled. But at a general court for elections in 1634, twenty- four of the principal inhabitants appeared as the representatives of the great body of freemen, and, before they proceeded to the election of magistrates, the people asserted their right to a greater share in the Government than had hitherto been allowed them. In France, although revolutions were frequent, there were certain principles on which the people, whenever they obtained their liberty, invariably insisted. Thus, the Moniteur of March the 5th, 1848, published: "The Provisionary Government of the Republic decrees, Art. 6—'All Frenchmen of twenty-one years of age are electors.'" And the recent events in Sicily confirm all this reasoning. One of the proclamations runs—"Sicilians! to arms all of you! Sicily shall once more teach the world how a country can be freed from its oppressors by the powerful will of a united people." One is not singular, then, in supposing that these lessons of the battling of people for freedom are to be used for their instruction whose liberties are more or less improperly curtailed. Amongst these, universal suffrage always found a place. Garibaldi, in his address to the Romans, called on them all to arm, and he signed his name, "G. Garibaldi, General of the Romans, appointed by a Government elected by universal suffrage." Well done, universal suffrage! And the Constitutional Defence Committee, now sitting in Parliament Street, could not with reference to the present condition of the House of Commons address itself to the electors. Its language is, "Fellow Countrymen." He would now call their Lordships' attention to what had been the practice in England for many years with regard to the suffrage. In the 28th of Edward I. he read that "the King had granted unto his people that they should have an election of their sheriff in every shire." That involved universal suffrage. Then by the 7th of Henry IV. it was enacted that "proclamation should be made in the full county of the day and place of holding a Parliament, and that all who might be there should attend to the election of their knights for the Parliament, and that in the full county they should proceed to the election freely and indifferently, notwithstanding any request or commandment to the contrary." Though there were limits in the boroughs at this period, universal suffrage prevailed in the counties, in proof of which he might quote the preamble to a statute of Henry VI., which stated that "elections had been made by a great and excessive number of people dwelling within the counties, and who for the most part were people of small substance, and of no value, every one of whom pretended to have a voice equivalent to the most worthy knights and esquires;" and then the 40s. freehold qualification was enacted, and in proof that it was then intended to forge a yoke for the people, and to feel sure that it was on their necks and held them down, it is to be noted that the 23rd of Henry VI. c. 14, enacted, that no man who was a yeoman or under could be elected. Now, he contended that an Act of Parliament might be void ab initio; Parliament might exceed its duty, and pass Acts which were not legal. On this point he would give authorities, and the first he should quote was an American authority, Clinton's Digest of Decisions, in which there was this passage:— The Legislature is not supreme; it is only one of the organs of the absolute sovereignty which resides in the whole body of the people, and when it steps beyond that boundary, its acts, like those of the most humble magistrate who transcends his jurisdiction, are utterly void. If that were so, by what authority had the franchise been taken away from a vast majority of the people? Such an Act of Parliament was void ab initio.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

said, he could not allow it to be stated that an Act of the Legislature which had received the Royal Assent had not the full force of law. The American authority the noble Lord quoted could have no import in this country.

LORD TEYNHAM

said, he would quote an English authority, and that was Lord Coke, who said— In many cases the common law will control Acts of Parliament, and adjudge them to be utterly void; as when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, the common law shall control it. Now, he asked, if legislation could go beyond its boundaries, was legislation with regard to the franchise one of those occasions? He must again fall back upon American authority. In the seventh article of the Constitution of the State of New York it was provided that no one should be deprived of his franchise and privileges but in accordance with the common law, which Mr. Justice Bronson interprets to mean that no member of the State shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of his rights or privileges, unless the matter shall be adjudged against him upon trial heard according to the course of common law. It cannot be done by mere legislation; and Justice Story said fundamental principles seemed to require that the right of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred, at least, no Court of justice in this country would be warranted in assuming that the power to violate and disregard them—a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty—lurked under any general grant of legislative authority, or ought to be implied from any general expression of the will of the people. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well-being without very strong and direct expressions of such an intention. Parliament, however, acted without any expression of the will of the people in taking away their franchise, and he contended that Parliament exceeded its duty in the time of Henry VI., when it took away the right of the people to vote in counties. A stream cannot control the springs from which it came. Children are shameful who rise up against their parents. So Parliament in the time of Henry VI. erred when it abused many of the electors of its county Members and acted wickedly in depriving them of their votes. It was guilty of patricide. He thought the people should set forth in their petitions that they gave no authority to Parliament to deprive them of their votes, and they should ask that that and the other Acts which hung upon it should be repealed. There was an Appeal from Parliament to the common law, and he thought the unenfranchised should choose an irreproachable man living in a county, and on his behalf plead in a court of common law to have his name put upon the rolls of Parliament in spite of the statute of Henry VI. There were two occasions in our history whereon our forefathers overruled the written law. The first Parliament of King Charles II. passed an Act declaring the Parliament then sitting a lawful Parliament, notwithstanding any want of writs, or other defect; and in the first convention of William and Mary also passed an Act to the like effect. In an analogous manner, if the electors and non-electors should fail in their petitions and fail in their application to the courts of common law, were to choose their own representatives, and those representatives assembled at Westminster and called them- selves the Commons House of Parliament, he questioned very much whether it would not in deed and in truth be the Commons House of Parliament; and it might be that, thus, not in two instances, but in three, it might be read by their children hereafter that a Parliament, summoned not by ordinary writ, met at Westminster, and determined itself to be the Parliament then and there. His notice of Motion referred to the practical manner in which the question ought to be dealt with. He thought they ought not to give, as in France, the vote to persons in the army and the navy, nor should it be granted to criminals, or idle paupers, or vagrants. Before leaving the question of the suffrage he would refer to an opinion that at least direct taxation and representation should go hand in hand, given by a Judge by no means friendly to popular rights. James the I. having claimed a duty on imported currants, a merchant, named John Bates, refused to pay it. An information was laid against him in the Exchequer, and Chief Baron Flemming held that "the imposition is properly upon currants and for them, and is not upon the defendant, nor his goods, who is a merchant, for upon him no imposition shall be, but by Parliament." He would not detain their Lordships long on the question of the Ballot, but he was bound to refer to it as it was part of his Motion. The Ballot was used in certain cases by the House of Commons in the reign of Queen Anne, and it is instructive and appropriate to the subject to survey the House that employed it. There was a general election in 1710. The influence of the mob was in a particular manner remarkable in the election for the City of Westminster, when Mr. Medlicot and Mr. Cross being set up by the Church party, some of those who offered to give their votes for their competitors, General Stanhope and Sir Henry Dutton Colt, were knocked down and sorely wounded, which obliged many of their party to return home without polling, whereby the first two candidates had a vast majority. In a similar manner the Church party carried the election for the City of London. In consequence, a Bill was brought into the Commons to prevent bribery, but it was lost on the question that the Bill do pass. This was the Parliament that passed the Bill fixing a qualification for Members of Parliament, doubtless hereafter to free some of the existing Members from their late competitors; and it had the effrontery to call the Bill, an Act for securing the freedom of Parliaments. On the day they threw out the Bribery Bill, the Commons proceeded to the choice of Commissioners to examine the value of lands, and other interests granted to the Crown, &c., and for the protection of its own members the votes were taken by Ballot. In the democratic cantons of Switzerland the votes were openly given; but in the aristocratic canton of Berne it was sometimes otherwise. By a succession of lot and Ballot the candidates or first-chosen men were reduced to two, and by Ballot of the whole assembly one of them was elected. In the reign of Queen Elizabeth the Ballot was employed by the Presbyterians of Northamptonshire, who were by no means a cowardly set of people. The manner of voting for a Moderator in the classes is thus described in Bancroft's Dangerous Practices. "Then he, that conceived the prayer, sitteth alone in scrutinie, and every one giveth his voice secretly to him." Then how could it be said to be un English, when it was still resorted to in the reign of Queen Victoria by our fellow-Englishmen the colonists of Australia? Many, on this subject, spake of Englishmen, as though they were not men, and would not protect themselves as others did. We are thus reminded of how the people put Henry the V. without the pale of our common nature, and of how they were reproved. Henry, speaking in disguise, says:— I think the King is but a man as I am; the violet smells to him as it doth to me; the element shows to him as it doth to me; all his senses have but human condition. His ceremonies laid by, in his nakedness he appears but a man; and though his affections are higher mounted than ours, yet, when they stoop, they stoop with the like wing; therefore, when he sees reason of fears, as we do, his fears, out of doubt, be of the same relish as ours are. So, if an English elector fears, his fears are of the same relish as an Australian's, and he would be gladly pacified by the Ballot, as the Australian's are. He allowed that the electoral franchise was a trust; but the voter should therefore be enabled fairly and fearlessly to discharge that trust. He was acting judicially when he had to decide on the fitness of a candidate, and for his conduct in that capacity he could not legally be called to account, so that there was no ground for making his vote public. In conclusion, the noble Lord said, he regretted that it had been his duty to trespass so long on their Lordships' attention in moving these Resolutions. The sum of what he asked was that they should pledge themselves to give to the petitions their serious consideration. The noble Lord then moved his Resolution.

EARL GRANVILLE

said, it was impossible to have listened to the speech just delivered by the noble Lord without acknowledging the earnestness and sincerity with which he had advocated the doctrines he considered so important to the future welfare of the country; but this made it all the more imperative on him (Earl Granville) very briefly and plainly to state that it appeared to him that it would be impossible either for himself or the House to consent to the Resolutions which the noble Lord had proposed. The form and language of those Resolutions were somewhat unusual; but without applying to his noble Friend the Chairman of Committees to decide questions on which it would perhaps be painful and embarrassing for him to give an opinion, he (Earl Granville) must endeavour to show that the substance of these Resolutions was such as to make it impossible for the House to agree to any one of them. They were four in number, and the House was asked by adopting them to affirm a fact, and to express a hope or intention. Their Lordships were, in the first instance, called upon to say that they "greatly desire the settlement of the question of Parliamentary Reform." He (Earl Granville) certainly did greatly desire it, and he could not doubt that their Lordships felt the same desire. He could not, therefore, attribute the very thin attendance of their Lordships that evening to any want of interest in the matter, but rather to a feeling that this was not the most practical way of dealing with the question. But it would be perfectly impossible for them to declare "that this House is willing to give its most careful consideration to the petitions in favour of manhood suffrage and vote by ballot;" because adopting a formal Resolution of that sort would be going so far as to imply their intention of favourably considering that request. In the next Resolution they were called upon to express a hope that they would be able "to point out means whereby improper persons may be deprived of the franchise after it is legally possessed." This was precisely one of the most difficult things it could pos- sibly be proposed to them to attempt, and the noble Lord offered no scheme for effecting that object, and yet in the third Resolution he suggested that "the House should recommend such alterations in the Criminal, Vagrant, and Poor Laws, as shall appear necessary to cut off from the register of voters all improper persons." The last Resolution, which contained the pith of the whole, declared that the House "might grant the spirit of the prayer of the petitioners for manhood suffrage and vote by ballot, not only without detriment, but with great advantage to the country." Now he (Earl Granville) was extremely desirous of reforming the present representation, and he had been endeavouring during some weeks to elucidate whatever evidence could be obtained to show that a considerable extension of the franchise might take place "without detriment to the common weal, but with great advantage to the same." But when they came to manhood suffrage he was not prepared to give any countenance to the adoption of any such proposition. He need not follow the noble Lord through all his philosophical, religious, historical, and almost treasonable reasons for adopting universal suffrage; indeed his memory would fail him if he attempted to do so. The noble Lord had indeed referred to precedents, and this was always desirable in discussing constitutional questions. But if the ballot was once resorted to by the House of Commons in the reign of Queen Anne, it was not quite clear that that ballot was the secret ballot, and it was clear that the system then tried was condemned. The example of the Presbyterians of Northamptonshire could hardly be applicable. With regard to the suffrage, it was not correct to say that universal suffrage existed in the reign of Henry VI., for the suffrage was then confined to freeholders alone, and was even then thought to be too widely extended. Perhaps, too, their Lordships might be inclined to think that the novel precedent drawn from the Fables of Æsop told rather against than in favour of universal suffrage. The noble Lord had referred to the appeal of Caesar to the whole Roman people. That illustration brought forcibly to his mind what, in his opinion, was the strongest objection to universal suffrage. He believed that the inevitable tendency of universal suffrage was either to a weak and inferior government, or to anarchy, and finally to the destruction of liberty and the establishment of despotism. And when the noble Lord urged the example of 1848 in France, he (Earl Granville) must remark that the form of government which had arisen in France was not such as we could wish to see arising in England. Switzerland was, no doubt, a country from which very sound lessons of liberty might be learned, but it was very different from our own country in its size and in its position, and in all its circumstances. The noble Lord had said that in Switzerland, as soon as the father put a rifle into his son's hands to qualify him for the defence of his country, that lad became possessed of the franchise. Yet the noble Lord himself proposed, in England, to deprive every man in our army and navy of the franchise; and so the absolute doctrine broke down of the indefeasible right of every man to vote who had not disgraced himself by crime. For these and other reasons he thought it was not desirable to adopt the Resolutions moved by the noble Lord.

Resolved in the negative.

House adjourned, at a quarter before Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.