THE EARL OF AIRLIE, pursuant to notice, moved for copies of any correspondence, in addition to that already presented to Parliament, that might have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and the British Plenipotentiaries in Paris as to the negotiation of the Treaty of Commerce with France. The noble Lord said that it was not his intention on the present occasion to provoke a discussion of the general merits of the Commercial Treaty with France which had recently been signed at Paris, nor to enter upon the question of its bearings on our financial and commercial policy. These were matters which would, no doubt, be fully discussed next week in that other assembly on whose decision the fate of commercial treaties and financial projects might be said to depend, and he had no desire to anticipate their deliberations. The object which he had now in view was, simply to endeavour to obtain from the Government some explanation of that which appeared to him a very important provision of the treaty, to which, however, he could find no reference in the correspondence respecting the negotiations which had been laid before Parliament, and to which, if his memory served him right, the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer made no allusion in the course of his speech on Friday last, though with respect to many other matters he entered into very detailed explanations. The provision to which he referred was to be found in the 11th Article of the Treaty, which ran as follows:—
The two high contracting Powers engage not to prohibit the exportation of coal, and to levy no duty upon such exportation.It would hardly, he thought be con- 1107 tended, though the provision was nominally binding upon both Powers, that there was much reciprocity in this stipulation. Nor in the course of the Correspondence respecting the Treaty could he find the remotest allusion to such an engagement on the part either of the French or the English Government. In that correspondence the subject of the coal trade was twice adverted to. In Lord Cowley's despatch to Lord John Russell, dated the 23rd of December, 1859, he stated that Count Walewski had informed him on the 22nd of December that he had had a conversation with Mr. Cobden which might lead to very important results; that, among other arrangements, the French Government might be disposed to admit British coal imported overland "at the same rate of duties as Belgian coal—seaborne coal to be subjected to the present duty for five years, when they would be assimilated to coal introduced overland." Lord John Russell, in his reply, dated the 17th of January, 1860, speaking of his desire that some of the commodities not now prohibited by the French tariff should be selected for early reduction, went on to say:—An allusion is, indeed, made by Count Walewski to British coal; but such is the market for that commodity, both in this country and abroad, that no public interest would be excited upon the question whether the duty charged on it in France is to be high or low, or whether the remission is to be immediate or postponed. Indeed, there still remains more or less of a disposition, which formerly was strong, to view the export of coal with jealousy, or even to subject it to fiscal restriction.Lord John Russell then proceeded to state what reductions in the tariff Her Majesty's Government was prepared to make in favour of French goods, and to intimate what relaxations in the French Tariff he expected in return. On the 31st of January the Treaty was received at the Foreign Office, and Lord John Russell wrote on the same day to Lord Cowley and Mr. Cobden, to convey to them Her Majesty's approval of the able and judieious manner in which the negotiations had been carried to a successful issue, and to intimate that the ratification of the Treaty would be sent to Lord Cowley as soon as it was ready. But not once in the correspondence —neither in the original proposal of Count Walewski, nor in the more fully developed proposal of Lord John Russell—nor in the despatch conveying Her Majesty's approval—was the engagement contained in the 11th Article of the 1108 Treaty even hinted at. It would really seem as if no equivalent whatever had been asked for in return for this concession on the part of England—as if it had been contemptuously thrown into the bargain as something too insignificant to be thought worth mentioning. Now, no one would plead that this was a matter of reciprocity; for though it was true that the engagement was equally binding on both countries, no one could expect that England would ever import coal from France. He did not wish to lay much stress upon the circumstance that so long as this Treaty should continue in force we should be cut off from one source of revenue of which we might otherwise have availed ourselves, though there were high authorities in political economy who were in favour of an export duty on coal. The question had another and, as it seemed to him, a much more serious aspect. No one, he thought, would deny that the matter had strong political bearings. He took for granted, what he believed was now universally admitted, that the issue of the next struggle which might take place upon the seas would be decided by steam. We in England, at least, were so satisfied of this that we had ceased to build any other vessels than steamships for purposes of war, and we had, at great expense, converted many of our sailing vessels into steamers. All other maritime nations were, he believed, imitating our example more or less rapidly. But from this state of things, it would follow, as a matter of course, that, other things being equal, that nation would have a great advantage in naval warfare, which, having itself coal in great abundance, and of good quality, was able to cut off supplies of coal suitable for steamers from countries with whom it might be at war. Now, we were at present in this position. It so happened that we had not only more extensive coalfields than any other nation in Europe, but that there was to be found in great abundance within these islands a kind of coal, commonly known by the name of steam-coal, better adapted for steam navigation than that which was possessed by any other European nation. Owing to its greater density, its bulk in proportion to its weight was very small, compared with the other kinds of coal, so that a much greater number of tons could be stowed away in the hold of a ship. At the same time a given weight of this description of coal would generate a much greater quan- 1109 tity of heat than other descriptions of coal. It was asserted that the advantage in this respect was as much as 44 per cent in favour of steam-coal. In a word, it was the most highly concentrated kind of fuel which had yet been discovered. Its admirable qualities were now, he believed, fully recognized by all those who were connected with the administration of the British Navy. It had been carefully tested by experiments conducted on board the ships of war of the French Navy; and the result of those experiments had been clearly to establish the superiority of the steam-coal of South Wales over any coal which had yet been discovered in France. And neither in Belgium nor in Germany was there any ground for supposing that any considerable quantity of steam-coal was to be found; while the small quantity of steam-coal extracted from the mines of those countries was not equal in quality to the produce of the English coal-fields. Under present conditions we had it in our power, if so minded, to cut off, or, at all events, greatly to restrict the supply to foreign countries of a material which might be said to be indispensable for purposes of maritime warfare. That could be done without in any way raising unpleasant questions as to matters of international law. Our right to prohibit the export of coal, was not and could not be a matter of dispute: it was a mere question of internal regulation, with which foreign Powers had nothing to do. We had the control in our hands. That control, if this provision of the Treaty took effect, we were about to abandon. He thought the inconveniences which might follow were too obvious to make it necessary for him to dwell on them at much length; but he would cite one or two instances by way of illustration. He would suppose during the ten years that this Treaty was to be in force, that France should come into collision with some other Power, England remaining neutral. He would suppose that, so far as France was concerned, England disapproved entirely of the war; that her sympathies were enlisted on the other side, though she did not think it necessary to take on herself the part of a belligerent. He would suppose, further, that the operations in which the French forces were engaged, depended, to a great degree, on the equipment of their steamers; and that a material element of success was the capability of those steamers to remain at sea under steam for a considerable time 1110 without being obliged to return to port to coal. That, it was obvious, must depend to a great degree on the quality of the coal with which they were supplied. That would be a case in which, by this provision, we should be bound to furnish to France any quantity of that warlike material which was most required for the success of her operations against a friendly Power with whom we sympathized. Suppose, again, that this country were engaged in war with some maritime Power, or with a combination of maritime Powers, France preserving her neutrality. Under the provisions of this Treaty we were bound to allow French traders to export our coals, whatever might be their ultimate destination. Coals might be freely exported to the ports of the Power with which we were at war, or to the nearest convenient neutral port, if the enemy's ports were too strictly blockaded. He would cite only one instance more. With most of the European Powers we had commercial treaties; and in almost all those Treaties there was inserted what was called a "most favoured nation" clause. Under those Treaties we wore bound to afford to other nations the same commercial advantages as we gave to France. Suppose circumstances should arise which should lead to serious misunderstandings between England, on the one side, and several of the great European Powers on the other, and that there was reason to apprehend a coalition on the part of those Powers against England-Such coalitions there had been, such coalitions there might be again. But under this provision we should be bound, up to the very moment when war should be declared, to allow every one of those States to export from this country, and to accumulate in their own dockyards, coal to be supplied to steamers which were to be employed, it might be, in endeavouring to effect a descent upon our own shores. It might be that, under such circumstances, and in consequence of the difficulty in which this provision had placed them, the Government of the day might be compelled to take upon itself, as the Governments of this country had sometimes done in days gone by, the tremendous responsibility of precipitating the conflict, and of striking the first blow before the preparations of the combined Powers should be completed. But in that case the responsibility would in reality rest, not upon those who might be compelled to take it, but upon the head of that Government which, by assenting to 1111 this inconsiderate and ill-advised concession, would have rendered such a step necessary. The people of England, if he knew anything of their temper, were above all things jealous, and justly jealous, of proceedings on the part of their Government which might tend in any manner to impair the maritime superiority of their country over other nations. And how could they be otherwise? It was not long since the Prime Minister told them,—for, though the words were spoken to a deputation, yet the words of a Prime Minister of England went forth throughout the land, and not through this land only, but through Europe and to the ends of the earth,—that the very existence of this country depended upon the maintenance of her superiority at sea. If we gave effect to this treaty, and to this provision, let them beware that there arose not ere long a cry in England that this treaty must be torn up and scattered to the winds, because its provisions were incompatible with the security of the country. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in that great speech the other night, in which he unfolded his commercial policy, and surpassed even all his former efforts, had expressed a hope that this Treaty might tend to knit together in bonds of amity those two great and high-spirited nations whose conflicts had often shaken the world. So far, at least, as this provision was concerned, he (the Earl of Airlie) could see in. it nothing but the fruitful source of mutual jealousies, of distrust, of dissensions, it might be of enmity and war; and it was in the interest of peace, as much as for any other cause, and because he wished from his heart to see a good understanding between Prance and England established and maintained—because he wished to see an alliance, not of the Government only, but of the nations, that he deprecated this provision. He did entreat the Government that they would use their influence with the Government of Prance to induce them to allow this article to be revised. Surely, it could be no part of the design of the French Government, under the guise of a Commercial Treaty, to introduce—to smuggle in as it were—a provision which at no distant period might preclude the Government of England from taking steps which they might consider necessary for the security of the country; and, if such a project really had entered into the mind of the Government of Prance, it was not possible that 1112 Her Majesty's Government could desire to assist them in carrying it into effect. But if it should appear that difficulties were likely to arise which would render it impossible for the two Governments to agree to revise this provision of the Treaty, then he hoped that Parliament would take that step which was expressly recognized by the terms of the Treaty itself, and that it would, at all events, postpone the consideration of the Treaty until a satisfactory arrangement had been arrived at with regard to this provision. It was probably quite unnecessary for him to state that in the step he had taken and in the observations he had made to-night he had not been prompted by any spirit of hostility towards the Government. On the contrary, he thought he had acted a very friendly part towards them in taking an early opportunity of pointing out to them that the provision which he had been discussing was open, not only in his opinion, but in the opinion of many of their habitual supporters, to the very gravest objections, and in affording them an opportunity of giving explanations and of producing papers which might throw a light upon the subject. He was anxious to know, and, no doubt, the House and the country were also anxious to know, when this proposal was first made and by whom it was broached, when the Foreign Secretary was informed of it, whether it was submitted to the Cabinet, whether any instructions on the subject were transmitted to Lord Cowley and Mr. Cobden, whether any communications were received from them on this subject by Lord John Russell, what was the nature of those communications, and whether Lord Cowley and Mr. Cobden were entirely agreed upon this point. Lord Cowley did not seem to have been much consulted respecting this Treaty. In his first despatch to Lord John Russell his Lordship said—If Her Majesty's Government decide upon pursuing this negotiation, it cannot be intrusted to better hands than those of Mr. Cobden. The merit of whatever may be effected will rest solely with him, and it is but fair that he should have the satisfaction of putting his name to the final arrangement.Again, in his letter of January 23, he said —The way had been so completely cleared by Mr. Oobden's previous active exertions, that the task which I have had to perform has been comparatively light.That task must certainly have been very light indeed, and the negotiation even 1113 seemed to have proceeded a considerable length before Lord Cowley had any official information on the subject. The noble Earl concluded by moving—That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, for Copies or Extracts of any Correspondence (in addition to that already presented to Parliament) which may have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries in Paris respecting the Negotiation of the Treaty of Commerce with France.
LORD WODEHOUSEhad no objection to furnish copies of or extracts from the correspondence referred to, though he did not know that they would afford the information which the noble Earl seemed to desire. His noble Friend said that Lord Cowley had apparently been very little consulted, and that the Treaty had really been negotiated by Mr. Cobden. Now, nobody had the slightest desire to conceal that. The Treaty was negotiated principally by Mr. Cobden, and he (Lord Wodehouse) did not think that public confidence in it would be diminished by a knowledge of this fact. With respect to the 11th Article of the Treaty, he did not understand his noble Friend to object to the engagement that no export duty should be levied on coal; but to the stipulation that Her Majesty's Government should not prohibit the exportation of coal from Great Britain. Now, on this point his noble Friend had failed to take into consideration the 19th Article, or "favoured nation clause," in which the two high contracting Powers engaged "not to enforce one against the other any prohibition of importation or exportation which shall not at the same time be applicable to all other nations." This stipulation would prevent Her Majesty from prohibiting the export to France of any article which was not also prohibited from being exported to any other country. That was a provision, therefore, which any Government would be very loth to adopt, because prohibition, if made at all, must be general. The stipulation was one which it was very important to bear in mind when considering the operation of the special provision contained in the 11th Article, and it seemed to him to afford an answer to one portion of the noble Earl's speech. The noble Earl's principal objection to this provision arose from the inconvenience or the danger which might be incurred if the English Government were unable to prohibit the export of coal to France in case of war or intended war. Such a prohi- 1114 bition, he said, would entail a heavy responsibility upon the Government, and would be regarded as a first step towards hostilities. But the prohibition would be just as serious whether any such article were contained in the treaty or not. If war were apprehended with France, and it was necessary to forbid the exportation of coal, it would matter very little whether such a treaty had been concluded or not; the angry feelings which would be aroused by any such prohibition would be the same in either case; and the breaking of a commercial treaty would not add to the inconveniences of war. The noble Earl argued as though we ought to reserve all our steam-coal for our own navy; but this we could only do as regarded all other nations as well as France. He (Lord Wodehouse) thought, therefore, that exaggerated apprehensions had been expressed as to the effect of a provision which merely recorded the intentions of Her Majesty's Government not to prohibit the exportation of an article of the greatest importance to the manufacturers and to the trade of France.
§ THE EARL OF HARDWICKEsaid, that the present conversation raised, in fact, the question of the whole Treaty, which he considered a very one-sided affair—wholly on the side of France. As far as regarded political considerations and the future, he would not deny that when the time arrived that the export duties and the import duties of the two countries should be placed on the footing on which they would probably be placed some years hence, very great advantages might be derived from the Treaty; but when we gave away by Treaty—by solemn Treaty—to a neighbouring country, and bound ourselves hand and foot not to retract the engagement, whether we liked it or not, until a very critical moment should arrive—important resources of the State, the Government ought not to be surprised if the jealousy of the people was excited. He looked on coals as the great power which this country possessed for aggression or defence, and he protested against that portion of the Treaty which, in words so specific and remarkable, withdrew from us the power of retracting at any time the exportation of that most important element in warfare. To say that the engagement was reciprocal was to place silk against coals—an utter absurdity. There was no equality in this, at all events. This very power of prohibition on both sides operating in this unequal manner, was an evidence of 1115 what is stated at the outset, that the Treaty was altogether a one-sided one. Supposing that some unfortunate circumstance should arise, and that with regard to the "most favoured nation" clause, we quarrelled with Russia, and stopped our trade in coal with her, our trade in that article would still be continued with France; and supposing that France should be a neutral Power, the trade in coal between France and Russia would offer so important a source of revenue to France that she would be anxious to pursue it to any extent, and we should be obliged, at the risk of grievous offence to France, to continue the coal trade virtually to our enemy, owing to being pledged not to prohibit the exportation under any circumstances. To tie ourselves to such an engagement in such a manner that we could never retract, was a mode of proceeding he could not understand.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he thought the noble Earl had very much exaggerated the importance of this matter, for he did not believe that any country in Europe would be prevented from going to war by the want of English coal. Did their lordships believe that if France wished to go to war with England want of coal would prevent her? Certainly he did not. In the expenses of a war, the additional amount to be paid for coal would be insignificant. The advantage to France of the free exportation of English coals consisted in its lessening the expense of French manufactures, by keeping down the price at her own mines. If the French were to set up manufactures, it would be only on the guarantee of getting coals at a reasonable price. If they found the price of coals suddenly raised against them, they could not compete with our manufacturers; they could not do this without cheap steam power. Supplying the French with coal was putting them on a level, and enabling them to compete with our manufacturers; if they had not coal they could not compete. But the question of coal was only one of the points which made the noble Earl object to the Treaty. He objected to it from beginning to end. He said, "We give everything to France, and we get nothing in return." He (the Duke of Somerset) considered this Treaty a measure valuable as the commencement of a new era for trade. It was the foundation of a new system of intercourse between England and France and all the countries of Europe, and he believed that hereafter it 1116 would produce amicable relations in place of the warlike preparations which were now, unfortunately, so visible throughout Europe. He believed that this Treaty would be found, if carried out for a year or two, most advantageous to this country. To withdraw from the Treaty the provision against retracting the prohibition of the importation of coal would excite the jealousy of the manufacturers of France, and induce them to suspect that we were actuated, not by a desire for mutual prosperity, but for our own selfish ends. Supposing a French manufactory started, and the English, acting under a presumed commercial policy, checked the exportation of British coals, what would be the result? The French must carry on their works with high-priced French coals, or give them up. It was not a question of war and peace. let war arise; and, as between belligerents, all treaties ceased to operate. If we wanted to toll the French they might compete with us in manufacturing skill, one thing was requisite, and that was an assurance that they should be secure of getting coal at a certain price. What was the argument of the French on this subject? They said the prosperity of France really required that they should exclude English coals, and for this reason: English coal had done them mischief; it had come in and prevented the French from developing their own mineral resources; if this coal had not come in, the French would have opened up the coal fields of France. Coal was now brought in cheap, and they did not sufficiently develope their own resources, and if war came suddenly upon them they would be unable to compete with England. It would take them some time, they maintained, before they could open their own coal pits, so as to replace the quantity that would be withdrawn by the stoppage of the English supply. Now, this was the French mode of arguing this point. But it appeared to him (the Duke of Somerset) that the view taken in that House to-night by the noble Earl relative to retaining the power to stop the exportation of coals, would be in every respect a great mistake. If we did prohibit the exportation of coals, it would necessarily excite so strong a feeling as to be almost tantamount to a declaration of war.
§ EARL GREYagreed with the noble Duke that the objection taken by the noble Earl really involved an objection to the whole treaty, and on that very 1117 ground he concurred with the noble Earl. He did not wish to impose any restriction on the export of coal. The county with which he was connected' was deeply interested in that export, and when in the other House he took an active part in the opposition to the duty on the export of coal proposed by Sir Robert Peel, which though it did not succeed at the time, succeeded shortly after, for the duty lasted only a year or two. He also trusted that circumstances might never arise to make it the interest of this country to prohibit the export of coal; but still they could not say what might be the state of things in future years, and therefore he objected to deprive the Government and Parliament of the power, should circumstances require it, of putting a stop to the export of coal. He agreed, however, with the noble Duke that the objection extended much farther—it extended to the whole system of making-commercial regulations, which ought to be settled according to our own domestic interests, a matter of stipulation with foreign countries. He did not object in themselves to most of the changes provided for by the commercial treaty. He had no wish to continue any protection in favour of the British silk manufacturer, of the colonial wine-grower, of the home watchmaker, or of any one trade affected by the treaty. All those protections were bad, and should be got rid of as soon as possible. He might doubt, indeed, whether, looking at the present state of the country and the condition of our finances, the duty upon wine was one which ought to have been selected for reduction. He was con-finned in that doubt by a very high authority, because he found, in his instructions to Mr. Cobden and Lord Cowley, Lord John Russell himself expressly stating that there were other duties which would have a prior claim upon the attention of our Government, were it not for what we were to get in return. In a subsequent part of the same despatch, Lord John stated that, looking at the different nature and the much higher value of French as compared with British brandy, and having regard to the interests of the Exchequer, the Government thought that 10s. would be a proper duty for French brandy. But the duty now proposed was one of 8s. 2d. only. A duty which was nominally equal might not be really so, and when articles differed much in intrinsic value, the same duty would bear upon them with an unequal pressure. British brandy was much 1118 cheaper and less valuable than French brandy, and to put the same duty upon both might, in point of fact, be tantamount to imposing a differential duty against our own producer. Such, so lately as the 17th of January, was the opinion of the Government. He was inclined to adhere to it still. We should, perhaps, learn from the correspondence which had been moved for, what were the reasons which had induced the Government to alter their opinion. But that, was not his main objection to the treaty. He objected to making commercial questions a matter of stipulation with foreign countries. A commercial treaty debarred Parliament from dealing with financial questions as it ought to do, according to its own unbiassed judgment, unfettered by any foregone conclusion between this country and France, but with reference only to our own domestic interests. It was, he thought, an infringement of the power and rights of Parliament. It was, moreover, a return to the old vicious principle of making commercial regulations a matter of bargain with foreign countries, which we knew from experience led to the adoption of a narrow and restrictive commercial policy. We knew that so long as we made our own admissions of foreign produce contingent upon the mode in which foreign countries dealt with our produce, no progress was made in relieving Europe from the evils of a restrictive system. We knew, on (he other hand, that when we ceased to trouble ourselves with the conduct of foreign nations and regulated our import duties simply according to our own interests, commercial freedom made great progress, not only in this country, but throughout the whole of Europe. Yet now we were returning to the old pernicious system. We were going to reduce certain duties upon French produce, not for the sake of the advantage which we might derive directly from their reduction, but for the sake of certain other concessions which France was to make with regard to British produce. What would be the effect of such a policy? The immediate tendency would be to confirm the French people in all those prejudices which now held firm possession of their minds; to make them believe that the impending change in the system of protection which had so long existed among them was to take place for the benefit, not of French, but of British industry; to lead them to look to the gain they might obtain 1119 from the admission of their produce to our markets, instead of to the direct advantage of relaxing their own commercial law. That was extremely dangerous. If the opinion of France became really in favour of commercial freedom, no doubt a sound system would speedily be established; but if it remained as at present, then he feared there was very little chance of an effectual reform. Their Lordships would observe that the advance which France made on the road of commercial freedom, as far as the Treaty was concerned, was most inconsiderable. She retained her whole system of navigation laws, and she bound herself to no duties upon our manufactured goods lower than 30 per cent in the first instance, and 25 per cent afterwards. The only articles upon which she made any material reduction were coal and iron, which she wanted in order to stimulate her manufactures. That was a very partial advance, and for the sake of such a small advantage to be gained from France we were sacrificing a great principle, and at the same time confirming all those mischievous prejudices which prevented the people of France from adopting a wiser commercial system. He could not doubt that if we had abstained from the Treaty, if we had left matters to the operation of the good sense of the French people, and of their experience of the effects of our own changes in our commercial policy, we should very soon have witnessed much larger results. Indeed, if he were not misinformed, the French Emperor had already had it represented to him by a high authority that France could no longer bear the double burden of the enormous expenditure necessary to maintain her large establishments, and of the evils arising from a multitude of restrictions upon her industry. If, instead of teaching the French people to believe that their interests were sacrificed to ours, and that the proposed changes were to be made for the benefit of England, we had allowed matters to proceed as they were, remitting all those duties with which the Government intended to deal,—always providing that such a step could be taken with advantage to our own interests and with no injury to the Exchequer—but avoiding any stipulation upon the subject, he was persuaded that we should have done far more than we were now likely to do for that commercial freedom and that intercourse between the two nations which, in common with the noble Duke, he believed 1120 to be of inestimable value. He regretted that we had not taken that course for another reason. A great part of the reductions which were to take place in the French tariff were not to come into operation for a very considerable period. Now, we knew from our own experience that in changing from a narrow to a more liberal system of commercial policy the period of greatest danger was at that moment when the new system had been determined upon, but not yet brought into operation. At that time we had all the apprehension and exaggerated alarm which was created by the change, and we had not experience to correct it, nor had we the corresponding benefits to neutralize those partial inconveniences which must always, in the first instance, result from a large change of commercial policy. His fear, therefore, was that till some time after 1861, when the change was to come into operation in France, there would be great pressure and distress among those interests which were going to be deprived of part of the protection which they had hitherto enjoyed; and during the whole of that interval the blame of that distress would be thrown upon this country, an angry feeling against England would be created in the minds of the French people; and he was afraid among large classes of them it might even go so far as to lead to a desire to interrupt the operation of the Treaty by a quarrel with us. He doubted much whether the effect of this Treaty during the next year and a-half might not be to drive into the ranks of the war party, which he was afraid already existed in France, some of those who were now the advocates of peace with this country. This was a serious political inconvenience, and one which ought to be well considered before any treaty was finally concluded. He was, however, told that the reason for concluding this Treaty was, that the general opinion of France was hostile to free trade, and that even the Emperor, powerful as he was, could not carry a law for the abolition of the existing protection even through such a Legislature as that of France. To his mind this was the strongest argument which could be urged against the Treaty. Much as he valued freedom of commerce, he valued political freedom still more; and desirable as he thought it that France should have the benefits of free trade, he could not think it for her advantage that those benefits should be forced upon her 1121 against her deliberate opinion. Nay, further, if it was true that the opinion of France was so hostile to this step, that even in such a Legislature as now existed there, the enormous power of the Emperor would be insufficient to carry a law for the relaxation of prohibitions, what wore we to think of the conduct of a foreign country which assisted the Emperor in overbearing so strong and deliberate an opinion on the part of the country, and in order to do so departed from the principles upon which it had for many years acted, and abandoned the policy which had at last been adopted by statesmen of all parties, —that of making its financial measures independent of those of foreign countries? Could we take such a course without giving just offence to every man in France who desired that his country should remain in possession of the smallest fragment of political liberty? Did he think that this treaty would cement the alliance between the two countries, none would hail it with more delight than himself; but, while admitting that such would be the effect of free trade, he denied that that would be the result of this Treaty. On the contrary, it seemed to him that its direct tendency would be to excite in France a state of irritation against this country, to postpone the period at which real freedom of trade might be established between the two nations, and to bring it to pass that for at least a year and a half, the state of things should be full of political danger.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, he rose to call attention to the circumstance that, while the noble Earl who opened the discussion had confined his objection to one article of the Treaty only, the noble Earl who had just addressed the House had raised the general question of the soundness of the principles upon which the Treaty was founded. That was, he thought, hardly a convenient occasion for the discussion of so wide a question; but he could not avoid pointing out to their Lordships that those who took objection to the Article as to coal were generally influenced by a general dislike to the abstract principle upon which the Treaty was founded. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) who had just sat down was very fond of abstract principles, and when he got upon one, he generally rode it to death. He did not complain of his doing so with the principle of free trade; but he thought the noble Earl had entirely misapprehended the principle on 1122 which this Treaty was founded. It was not founded upon the old and exploded theory of reciprocity treaties. It was not an exclusive Treaty between England and France as regarded the articles on which it operated. There was no mention with regard to articles from other countries; but it was understood by the French Government that our operations were not to be confined to French articles, but to all articles of the same kind from whatever country they came. That was the essential difference between the old reciprocity treaties and the present. The noble Earl had not defended the abstract principle of free trade, as it had hitherto been contended for in Parliament, correctly. He (the Duke of Argyll) did not believe it had ever been laid down as an abstract principle that never, under any circumstances, ought fiscal changes to be made the subject of commercial treaties. What was contended in both Houses, and by the advocates of free trade, was that when certain changes for our own fiscal purposes were desirable, you should not wait until you could persuade other countries to give you additional benefit before you adopted such a measure; but he never heard it contended —and it would be contrary to common sense to contend—that they were not to take the one advantage in addition to the other. It was a fair principle not to withhold from our own people the advantages remission gave them, until they obtained advantages from other countries; but it was a violation of common sense to say that when they secured both they were not to do so on the abstract principles of free trade. In this instance the matter arose in the course of communications between the Governments of France and England. The French Government said: —"If you are going to make certain changes, and will do it in a certain way, we shall be able to give you a double advantage by a remission of some of our duties." To adopt the course recommended by the noble Earl, and to reject this offer from admiration of the principles of free trade, or in deference to the constitutional forms of France, would have been a great mistake in policy, and a course against the interests of England. The noble Earl said that under this Treaty the French interests affected would suffer from exaggerated alarm, and that injury would accrue from the introduction of the change. This, however, was an objection that did not really aim at the form of the Treaty, but would 1123 apply equally if the Emperor made the proposed changes in any other form. Despite of these apprehensions, he thought the noble Earl would admit that in the end the operation of the Treaty would be favourable to the French people, and that speedily. That the view which he took was the correct one was shown by a reference to the Resolution moved by Mr. Ricardo in the House of Commons on the 25th of April, 1843, and supported by the noble Earl, which declared—
That it is inexpedient that any contemplated remission of import duties should be postponed with the view of making such remission the basis of commercial negotiations with foreign countries;the whole stress of the Motion being that you should not delay remissions until other countries gave you a corresponding advantage.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLThe speeches must be read with reference to the particular transaction which was attacked, and with reference to the Motion which was made. He did not deny in the abstract that it might be better, if it were possible, to operate in the direction of free trade, and not to delay making remissions until other countries offered you a return; but years had clapsed and there had been no sign of any relaxation of the French tariff. Would their Lordships believe that our whole export trade with France was less than that to our single colony of Victoria? Was not that a state of things which any Government would desire to remedy? His noble Friend had not drawn a fair inference from the speech of Lord John Russell, who had said that the productions to which allusion had been made were not such articles of primary necessity as to entitle them "on those grounds" to the interference of the Government. There were, however, other grounds which called for that interference. It should be remembered that every one of those duties which were to be remitted must have been abandoned under that reform of our fiscal system which was proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The great object which Her Majesty's Government had had in view was to simplify our tariff and make a general reform of Customs' duties, and he maintained that 1124 every duty dealt with had fallen naturally in their Way. He was surprised to hear his noble Friend quote British brandy as something that ought to be protected. Why, British brandy was a counterfeit article, and his noble Friend, who was a Protectionist one moment and a Free-trader the next, contended that we ought to maintain a high duty upon French brandy as a protection against British brandy. In reference to another portion of his noble Friend's argument, he should observe that his noble Friend himself did not deny that the Emperor of the French had acted in that matter in conformity with the principles of his own constitution; and it seemed to him (the Duke of Argyll) that it would be something more than a Puritanical superstition on the part of the British Government if they were to refuse to accept that great boon to the two nations immediately interested because it was not granted in the form most suited to what his noble Friend called the political liberties of France. That was a matter which Her Majesty's Government must have left entirely to the discretion of the French Government, and it was not a point on which they were called upon directly or indirectly to express any opinion whatever. Before he sat down he wished to offer a few remarks on the subject of coal, to which a reference had been made by his noble Friend (the Earl of Airlie) who had commenced that discussion. He was bound to acknowledge that he had found, both from private conversation and from other sources, considerable fear and jealousy entertained of that portion of the Treaty by persons who looked favourably upon its general provisions. That showed the great sensitiveness—he readily admitted the just and natural sensitiveness—of the public mind in this country in reference to every question which in any way affected the maintenance of our naval power. But he trusted that the clear and able explanation which had been given by his noble Friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Lord Wodehouse) would remove the misapprehensions which appeared to prevail upon that point. No one, he believed, could doubt the perfect harmlessness to this country of that article of the treaty by which we engaged to place no duty on the exportation of coal for revenue purposes. The experiment of imposing such a tax was made by Sir Robert Peel in the year 1842; but it had been 1125 found a disastrous—he might almost say discreditable—failure, and it had been abandoned by the same great Minister in the year 1845. His noble Friend (Earl Grey) was always a most strenuous opponent of that duty. He showed that it was wrong in principle, that it imposed restrictions upon trade, and that, from its vexatious interference it was a duty that could not be maintained by a British Parliament. In 1845 this export duty upon coal was repealed by Sir Robert Peel, who said:—
We do think it will be an important principle to establish, that with respect to exports there shall he no duty leviable. I am unwilling to make any exception to this principle, that with respect to exports no duty shall henceforth survive."—[See 3 Hansard, lxxvii., 478.]No one would contend that this engagement not to impose an export duty on coals for purposes of revenue was not perfectly harmless. Then, as far as that was a political question, it had already been explained by his noble Friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs that, in truth the only effect of that clause was to put France in precisely the same position to us with regard to the export of coal in which all other nations were placed, because under existing treaties we could not prohibit the export of that article to any one nation, unless we were to extend the prohibition to other nations. He apprehended that if that clause were expunged from the treaty the same effect would be produced as far as regarded the power of prohibition by the provision that extended to France the "most favoured nation" clause, which was an essential part of all commercial treaties. With regard to the case of a contemplated war, he should say he thought that discussion had shown that noble Lords were not aware of the enormous interest connected in this country with the export of coal. The fact was that the prohibition of that export would destroy one of the great branches of our trade. In the year 1842, when Sir Robert Peel imposed the export duty upon coal, the quantity which we sent abroad fell short of 1,500,000 tons; but since that duty had been abolished our export of coal amounted to little less than 7,000,000 tons, valued at £3,000,000. That was a trade with which no Government would interfere except under the pressure of some extreme political emergency and danger. It was not merely the coalowner who was interested, but an enormous amount of British shipping was engaged 1126 in the trade, so that under no circumstances short of life or death could the Government interfere with this great export trade. In case of war no doubt we could do anything, and we should be justified in breaking through this article of the Treaty. But unless we prohibited the export of coals to all other countries, how could we prevent the Americans, Swedes, or Danes from exporting coals from England and taking them to France? He hoped that the House and the public would sec that, except so far as this article of the treaty was open to all the abstract objections that might be taken to other portions of it, there need be no public alarm or anxiety whatever about this clause. He should say, for his part, that he looked upon it as one which was calculated to produce a very important effect, of an entirely pacific character. Coal was valuable for war, but it was much more valuable for commercial and manufacturing purposes; and he thought nothing could be more desirable than that a great interest should rise up in France, depending wholly for its prosperity on the constant supply of English coal. We should, then, establish between ourselves and the people of France, in reference to that article, relations similar to those which existed between us and the people of the United States of America with respect to cotton. He felt persuaded that the nature of our relations with the American people in regard to the supply of cotton had contributed more than any other circumstance to prevent the causes of potty irritation between the two nations from expanding into a war. He believed that if the same relations existed between us and France, the same effect would be produced; and he looked to the export of coal to France, and the introduction of French produce to this country on advantageous terms, as the grounds on which we might hope to lay the foundation of a better feeling than had hitherto existed between the people of the two countries.
§ LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, that every one must be glad to witness an extension of the commercial intercourse between this country and France; but there might, nevertheless, be special reasons why he might doubt whether a Treaty such as this was the most desirable means of accomplishing that end. It was not from any doubt he entertained as to the value of the abstract doctrines of political economy that he saw objections to this Commercial Treaty, but because he was 1127 opposed to those doctrines being in any way bound up with Commercial Treaties. He objected to Commercial Treaties for the same reason that Sir Robert Peel did—because they unnecessarily and often mischievously tied up our hands in the regulation of our own fiscal system. By the Treaty now under consideration we entered into engagements, not with France only, but with the whole world, for a period of ten years, and during that time our hands would be completely bound. The arrangement proceeded upon the principle that duties should be abolished on all articles of foreign produce, except on a few great articles of consumption, which were retained for the sake of revenue; and then to make good the deficiency we were to have recourse to an income tax, a tax specially obnoxious to the people of this country; and which all Chancellors of the Exchequer had hitherto deemed it impossible to retain in its present shape, if it was to become a permanent impost. There were two articles in the Treaty involving matters of great importance to which he would briefly refer. The first article was that in which France declared that, over and above certain duties which were named, she maintained her right to levy such differential duties as she pleased on foreign shipping entering into French ports. He should like to see the entire correspondence that had taken place, in order that the course pursued by the negotiators on this point might be ascertained; for he could not but believe that great exertions must have been made by them to obtain something for us in regard to this matter, seeing that we ourselves had surrendered everything. The other article to which he referred was, that by which we bound ourselves not to impose an export duty on coal conveyed to the ports of France, or under any circumstances to prohibit its exportation. Now, what was coal? It was a great element, no doubt, in manufacturing industry; but in time of war it was a munition of war quite as much as any other article universally acknowledged to be such, and which was contraband of war. Some doubt might have existed on this subject previously to the Russian war; but since that time it had become an evident fact that the whole naval marine of any country must depend on the article of coal. The noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) had spoken of the importance of creating a manufacturing interest in France, which should be absolutely 1128 dependent upon England for a supply of coal. But the people of France were under no necessity of coming to this country to obtain coal for manufacturing purposes. The coal of Belgium was equal to our own for manufactures, and they could obtain it there, as well as in their own country; but for the purposes of war, English coal was superior to that of Belgium, or any other country. By this Treaty we should secure to France the right of obtaining coal from this country, whenever she might contemplate any hostile movement, either against ourselves or others; for their Lordships would observe that France had reserved to herself the right to resort to our shores at all time and under all circumstances for coals. He would suppose that we were likely to go to war with Russia, a country which had no coal of her own, and which, therefore, had to depend for her supplies on foreign countries. We might, in such a case, wish to prohibit the exportation of coal, and say that we would allow no coal to be taken from our shores to the Baltic; but France might step in and say she had a right under this Treaty to take our coal where she pleased; and so we might have French ships coming to Swansea, and taking away cargoes of our best Welsh coal for the use of Russia, which by the engagements of this Treaty we should be unable to prevent. Persons of the highest authority, and in whose opinions he had great confidence, agreed with him in thinking that in the article of coal, at least, there should be an exception to the rule adopted in this Treaty, and this was a matter which he would take the liberty of pressing upon the serious attention of the Government. The Treaty was not to be considered as finally concluded till it received the sanction of Parliament. He hoped, therefore, Her Majesty's Government would lose no time in re-opening the negotiations with the Emperor of the French, who was himself the real negotiator, and that they would endeavour to obtain the omission of this article of the Treaty before it was further proceeded with in Parliament.
§ EARL GRANVILLEsaid, it was clear that within the next ten years no Government would attempt to impose a restrictive duty on coals, which, while it would bring in a very small revenue indeed, would have a disastrous effect in restricting an enormous trade which was now carried on, besides giving rise to attempts 1129 to evade the Custom-house regulations. The noble Lord who had just sat down and all who went before him, had carefully avoided the arguments used by his noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty. His noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs clearly pointed out that, whereas there were "favoured nation clauses" in our treaties with most countries, that we should not impose prohibitions on any article going into those countries unless we extended the same prohibitions to all other countries in the world, we could not therefore prohibit coal going to France unless we did so to all the world besides. His noble Friend (Lord Stanley of Alderley) said under this Treaty we could not prevent France carrying the coal she got from this country to Russia. He was surprised that it had not occurred to his noble Friend, who was so much mixed up in the late war with Russia, that we never issued any proclamation at all during the war with regard to coal itself, but that with regard to other articles contraband of war we did issue a proclamation to all countries north of Dantzic; and those countries would doubtless have complained of that if they had not felt that the belligerent rights of nations overrode all the stipulations of commercial treaties. Even if his noble Friend (the Earl of Airlie) was right in putting the immense value he did on English coal, did he believe that a rich country like France would ever be found at the beginning of a war without an adequate supply of coal? The instant peace was broken between two nations, all the obligations of a treaty of commerce were thrown to the winds. Besides, the noble Earl was under a misapprehension when he supposed France had no coal of her own. France obtained coal from Belgium; and, in addition to that, a commission of scientific men in France, who had been directed to institute inquiries on the subject, had reported that if France chose to make the necessary efforts she might obtain a supply of coal, both of the richer and poorer qualities, sufficient for her consumption within her own territories. He was convinced the more the question was considered the more clear it would be, and the more of a bug-bear would the opposition appear which was now made to that part of the Treaty, which was intended to facilitate the export of coal to France. He 1130 did not think it necessary to trouble the House with any remarks on the general policy of the Treaty; but he might read an extract from a speech made by Sir Robert Peel, in the House of Commons on the 11th March, 1842. Sir Robert Peel said:—
We have opened communications with Spain for the purpose of forming a commercial treaty with that country, strongly urging on that country the policy of encouraging international commerce. As to this treaty, I can say nothing more at present than that the proposition was favourably received by the Spanish Government. We have, further, negotiations pending with Sardinia and with Naples; we have commercial treaties arranging with some of the South American States; we have, moreover, intimated to France our earnest desire to resume negotiations for the completion of a commercial treaty, founded on principles, as I believe, of reciprocal benefit, and having a tendency to strengthen the ties of amity and friendly feeling between the countries."—[8 Hansard, lxi., 452.]When he (Earl Granville) found that commercial treaties with France, though they had been sometimes negotiated on false principles, had been concluded by Pitt, Huskisson, and Peel, and that the latest attempt had been made by Richard Cob-den, he did feel some confidence that even to err with them was, in some respects, more satisfactory than to be right with his noble Friend (the Earl of Airlie).
THE EARL OF AIRLIE, in reply, contended that the Treaty did not put France on the same footing as the other European Powers were before it was concluded. The engagement with regard to France was absolute. There was nothing said in it about our not prohibiting the export of coal to France without our prohibiting it to all the world besides. He denied that he had ever said that as a matter of general policy it was desirable to prohibit the exportation of coal. What he had said was that it was not desirable to enter into engagements which, in cases of emergency might be found extremely inconvenient. He apprehended that we had as good a right to impose export duties as other countries had to impose prohibitions on imports. The noble Duke the First Lord of the Admiralty said we could not prevent war by prohibiting the export of coals. What he (the Earl of Airlie) had said was, that the coal found in this country, being in great part so superior to all other kinds for purposes of steam navigation, if we could restrict its importation into France, we should, in the event of hostilities becoming probable, be able to 1131 place ourselves in a bettor position than we should be under the Treaty. He should wait with great anxiety for the papers on this subject, and he hoped they would have a greater effect in removing his objections than the speeches he had heard on the part of the Government.
§ Motion agreed to.
§ House adjourned at a quarter to Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.