RESOLUTION OF URGENCY. SECOND READING.

HL Deb 10 August 1860 vol 160 cc1037-90

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

said: *During the last few years questions of great importance in reference to the affairs of India have been brought with more than usual frequency under the attention of Parliament; and on almost all of those questions more or less difference of opinion has prevailed. But I think I may say with truth that on no subject has the difference of opinion been so great or so keenly contested as on the question which this Bill is intended to decide. In truth, my Lords, I believe that the amalgamation of the European forces of the late East India Company's service with the forces of the Line was long considered one of the main difficulties in the way of the transference of the Government of India from the Company to the Crown. I well recollect that in the discussions in 1853, during the Administration of Lord Aberdeen, on the "renewal of the charter," when various alternatives were before us, it was considered that the difficulties in the way of an amalgamation of the two armies were among the most serious of those which precluded any proposal being at that time made for the transference of the Government from the Company to the Crown. Nevertheless, after a few short years, the occurrence of intervening events and the progress of discussion, 1ms brought about such a change that a Bill has come up to effect that object, carried by an overwhelming majority in the other House—a majority not of a party nature, but, on the contrary, consisting of all the political parties into which that House is divided, and I should be guilty of affectation if I pretended to expect any serious probability of its being rejected by your Lordships. Yet I am sure that it is the opinion of the House that this is not a Motion which ought to be made as a mere matter of course. It affects too nearly the interests of the Indian Govern- ment; and, although I hope it does not affect the interests of any individuals, yet it affects too nearly the long-cherished convictions of a body of men of whom I may say with truth that England has every reason to he proud, to entitle the Government to deal with it in any stage without proving, as far as they can, that it has received due attention, and that every view of the subject has been carefully considered.

Although, therefore, I trust that it is an unopposed measure by the great majority of your Lordships, I think I am justified in laying before the House, in some detail, the grounds upon which the Government has proceeded. And inasmuch as many arguments urged against the amalgamation of the European local army with the army of the Line are derived not so much from the specific provisions of the Bill as from certain indirect consequences which it is assumed will follow it; let me direct attention to what the Bill is, and to what it is not—to what it does, and to what it does not do.

In the first place, then, although many arguments would lead us to suppose that it is so, this is not a Bill for the abolition of the local army of India. After its provisions have come into full operation there will still be a large local army, composed of the Natives of various tribes, who are trained to our military service; and although I do not deny that many changes will be the natural consequence of this measure, yet, if on other grounds it were considered advisable, you might continue the present system of management, and, to a large extent, the present system of officering the local army without the smallest interference as far as regards the provisions of this Bill. In the next place, it is not, properly speaking, a Bill for the abolition even of the European local army. The whole of the regiments of the late East India Company which have any historical recollections will preserve their identity, although the terms of service will be altered. They will retain their ancient names and banners, and the recollections of all their great achievements. The direct consequence of this Bill is simply this, that it will be out of the power of the Secretary of State for India to enlist for the future any European soldiers exclusively for the local service of that country; and thus, after a few years, oil the corps which are now local will become corps for the genera! service of the empire, liable in their turn to all the exigencies and requirements connected with the defence of Her Majesty's dominions.

Now, my Lords, I do not at all mean to depreciate the importance of the change which I have thus attempted to describe. At the same time I am prepared to argue that the importance and scope of that change has been very much exaggerated. A paper has been laid on your Lordships' table of great importance—no less than the protest of Sir James Outram, who lately occupied the position of President of the Council of India. That distinguished Officer describes the change in these words:—"It is an organic change in that military system under which India has been won and kept." I venture to say, in spite of the assent of my noble Friend opposite to this assertion (the EARL of Ellenborough) that, so far as concerns either the provisions of this measure, or its necessary consequences, such language is chargeable with very great exaggeration. One would suppose from this language that India had been won and had been kept, if not entirely, at least in a main degree, by the European army of the East India Company. I venture to dispute that assertion altogether; and as it is a matter of some importance, I trust the House will allow me to direct attention for a few moments to some of the facts connected with the past history of the European force in India. Before doing so, allow me to say that whatever is the amount of change which this Bill effects, it is a change infinitely less organic than that which was the only other alternative presented for the adoption of the Government. I beg the House to recollect that the maintenance of the status quo is not in question. None of the officers of the local army, and none of the public men who have espoused their views, contend for the maintenance of a small European local army. The question is, not whether we should retain the army which existed, but whether we should create a new army very much increased in numbers and in many respects very differently composed. I think I shall be able to prove, having regard to the past history of India; that the institution of a great and powerful European force separated from the army of the Line would be a far greater change than that which we propose—namely, that the comparatively small army which has hitherto existed shall be amalgamated with the Line.

In the first charter of the East India Company, in the time of William III., no limitation was placed on the powers of the Company as to the number of European troops which they might raise. They were enabled to raise as many recruits as were found necessary for the "defence of their forts and possessions." At that time I need hardly say, it was not foreseen that the East India Company, which was then a mere trading association, would one day become a great territorial power, and but little importance was consequently attached to their military proceedings; but the moment it was seen that they were likely to be that which they afterwards became, the natural jealousy of the English Parliament and Government was aroused, and statutory limitations were soon placed upon the power of raising European troops. And even long before this precaution was considered necessary, another step practically even more important had been taken, which tended to the same effect. Very Early in the history of India—in 1754, that is only four years after the famous defence of Arcot by Clive, the Crown resolved to send troops; of the Line to that country, and a detachment of the 39th Regiment, which still bears upon its colours the motto "Primus in Indis," formed no inconsiderable portion of the small European force which fought at Plassy. In the year 1773, when the Company assumed avowed authority over the province of Lower Bengal, their European troops amounted in number to 11,468, which, so far as I have been able to ascertain, was the maximum which had been reached until the other day. In considering however the importance of this levy, we must look not only to quantity but also to quality. Now there is abundant evidence, that the East India Company and the Government of India attached but comparatively small importance to their European forces. The truth is, that, with the exception of the Artillery corps, respecting which peculiar care was taken from the very earliest time, the European army was very ill organized, and in so inferior a state of discipline that the officers of the Company placed almost their entire reliance upon the Sepoy troops, under European command, and upon the regiments of the Line. In 1773 Clive declared that our existence in India depended upon the Sepoys commanded by English officers, and that the defence of the country might be intrusted to them alone, supported by a corps of Artillery, similarly commanded. In 1786 Lord Cornwallis gives this account of the European troops of the Company:— The Kings' British regiments must not be parted with. We have in reality nothing else, except the corps of artillery, that deserves the name of an European force. Again, he says, in the same year, The intense heat and unhealthiness of the climate are against all military discipline, yet I was astonished at the good appearance of the King's troops. The Company's artillery are very fine, but their European infantry, on whom the defence of these possessions may one day depend, are in a most wretched state. I leave your Lordships therefore to judge whether, as far as concerns the Earlier contests conducted by Warren Hastings and Lord Clive, it is not clearly proved that at least the conquest of India was mainly effected by the power which was exhibited by the officers of the Company in the organization of Native troops, and by the regiments of the Line which were sent from England to reinforce and support them.

Your Lordships will remember that the Board of Control was established by Mr. Pitt in the year 1784. One of its first acts was to insist upon a great reduction of the Company's forces in India. But the view which was taken on this subject, and the importance which was attached to it, is strikingly illustrated by a celebrated debate which took place in Parliament, a few years later. In the year 1788, when there was an alarm of a renewed contest with the French in that country and in Europe, and when it was determined to reinforce the garrison in India by a considerable force of European troops, the question arose whether that reinforcement should consist of regiments of the Line or of an addition to the local force. Thus the very question which we are now debating, was discussed for many days in both Houses of Parliament more than seventy years ago, and in that discussion Mr. Pitt laid it down as a principle, that ultimately the amalgamation of that army with the Line must be attempted, and said that he would not consent to the adoption of any measure which would render the attainment of that object more difficult. His words were:— Such a consolidation was undoubtedly to be wished for, and sooner or later it must be attempted. Of this he would shortly say more, and therefore in this place he would only suggest that Ministers, having this very object in view, had thought it more advisable to raise Royal regiments to serve in India than Company's regiments; because, if they had preferred the latter, they must have made the consolidation of the two armies, by so much, a work of more difficulty. The Declaratory Act which Mr. Pit then introduced, giving power to the Board of Control to send four new regiments of the Line to India, and to charge them on the revenues of the Company, was very keenly contested, and was carried with great reluctance and dislike on the part of a considerable portion of the House of Commons. It is recorded in the journals of that day that it was carried by a majority of only sixty-seven—a majority which, however small it might he considered in the first triumphant Parliament of Mr. Pitt, is one which any Ministry would now accept with very tolerable satisfaction. In consequence of the decision then come to four King's regiments, instead of four Company's, were sent to India, and from that time the number of the Company's European troops steadily diminished, having never, until quite the other day, reached the limit fixed by the Act of 1788—namely, 12,000 men. In 1796 that army was reduced to two regiments of infantry, or, as those regiments consisted of only five companies, in point of fact, to one regiment, in each Presidency; the formal change to that number in 1829 being only a matter of arrangement. That was the state of things down to the Affghan war. But I need go no further than the Minute of the Governor General, which has recently been laid upon your Lordships' table, to show that in the conquest and subsequent protection of India the European regiments of the Company have always been considered as playing a comparatively subordinate part. I do not mean to say that they have not always behaved with distinguished gallantry; that they have done; but I am showing the exaggeration of the language used by Indian officers, especially by Sir James Outran). Lord Canning says:— It appears as if these troops, forming as they did a very small portion of the Indian army, had been until lately almost overlooked by their successive commanders-in-chief. That does not look as if they had been the main instruments "by which India had been won and kept." I need hardly remind your Lordships that in accordance with the declared opinion of the Government of Mr. Pitt, Lord Cornwallis, at the desire of Mr. Dundas, drew up in 1794 a detailed scheme for the amalgamation of the two armies. Owing to difficulties of detail it was not carried into effect, hut both Mr. Pitt and Lord Cornwallis expressed the strongest opinions as to the expediency of the measure and the necessity for its ultimate adoption. I venture to maintain, therefore, that as there was no alternative for the Government except to adopt this measure which had so long been recommended, or to raise for the first time a large English army to he exclusively confined to India, the step which they have taken involves a change far less great, and far less formidable than the other.

In order to show your Lordships how great would have been the change produced by the adoption of the other course, I need only remind the House of the nature of the demand made by those who represent the views of the local force. I presume I may take the opinion of the Military Committee of the Council of India as fairly representing those views. Well, their demand is, that the whole of the artillery, three-fourths of the cavalry, and two-thirds of the infantry should be exclusively local. It is true that this opinion has been modified by various individual authorities, but the Governor General says that the Native force ought to be two-thirds of the whole army, and earnestly urges that on no consideration should it be less than one-half. Then, my Lords, I say that a Local European Army of such proportions would be entirely new. It is not the system under which our dominion in India was acquired, or has been maintained.

Why, then, should we adopt such a proposal? There are great mechanical difficulties, if I may call them so, in the way of carrying such a plan into effect. I cannot mention the name of the late Lord Elphinstone without expressing, what I am sure is the general feeling of the House, our deep and heartfelt sorrow at his loss. We had looked forward to having his counsel and his advice upon this subject; and I believe that we are all deeply convinced that among the distinguished men who exerted themselves during that terrible Indian mutiny, none better deserved the vote of thanks, which was moved in such eloquent terms by the noble EARL opposite, than did Lord Elphinstone. What does Lord Elphinstone say as to the mere mechanical difficulty of raising a great European army for India? He says:— If we are to have a local European army, we must, in fact, begin almost afresh. Is it' worth while to do this? "What reasonable prospect is there of a local force, under any circumstances, being equal to the regiments of the Line? Above all, what possible chance is there of such a result being obtained with the officers of the late Bengal army? The opinion of Lord Elphinstone clearly was, that the officers of the late Bengal army, in reference to whose interests, in a great measure, that plan has been urged, were not capable of organizing and maintaining the discipline of a European force. And what, upon this point, is the opinion of Lord Canning, who supports the project of a large local army? His evidence, contained in a Minute on our table, is even more specific than that of Lord Elphinstone. He says: "Speedily to raise a European army for India, and to officer it efficiently from our present body of officers, is impossible." Now, look at the project which Lord Canning lays down for the purpose of raising this force, and see the objections which present themselves against it. In the first place, with reference to the late Indian mutiny, and the insufficient garrisoning of that country, it has been necessary to increase the troops of the Line there. Something like from 25 to 30 battalions were raised in order to meet that exigency. You have these 25 battalions of the Line in the highest state of organization and discipline. They add to the effective force of the empire, and are available for any other service they may he called on to perform. You would have to commence by disbanding these regiments of the Line. Is not that a very great and serious objection? And how are you to raise and officer the new regiments? Lord Canning says it cannot be done by the old Indian officers whose interests have been so much urged. For this purpose, therefore, you are to borrow the services of officers of the Line; and when they have succeeded in raising regiments something equal to those which you have already got, but which you must now disband, these new regiments are to be sent out to India, and placed under the control and guidance of those Sepoy officers who are declared to be unfit for such duties. Is not that a roundabout scheme, and one open to grave objections in point of Imperial policy? Again, there is one argument has been stated against the maintenance of a local force in India, to which, I own, I have never attached much importance,—namely, that a large local force would enter into injurious competition with the Line in the recruiting market of this country. It had always appeared to me, if you are to have 80,000 Europeans in India, that it would be the same thing as regards the demand made upon the field of recruitment in Englend, whether the 80,000 were divided between a local and a Line force, or whether they all composed one army. But the objections taken on this ground have gained I strength in my mind since I have seen the I demand of Sir James Outran) on this subject. Sir James Outram fully admits that a change of measures in regard to recruiting will be necessary, if there is to be a large local army in India; and lie has sent home an appendix to his Minute, in which he proposes that arrangements should be made to attract to the local force the picked men of the whole recruiting field in England. It surely cannot tend to promote the general interests of the empire, that the very best men who can be induced to enter the military profession, should have special inducements to limit themselves to an exclusively local service. Surely this would be a needless embarrassment in the main object you have had in all those improvements in the condition of the soldier, and in the recruiting system, which have lately occupied so much attention.

I think, my Lords, I have now sufficiently proved—first, that the maintenance of such an army would be entirely new; secondly, that it would be very difficult; and I now venture to add, that it would be in the highest degree dangerous.

It is often said that too much stress has been laid on the late strike or mutiny in the local European force in India; and in some respects I am not sure that this may not be true. But be it observed that the argument derived from the danger of mutiny has not been confined to those who object to a local European force. On the contrary, one of the arguments over and over again repeated in the papers on our table by the officers of the East India Company, is that it would be advisable to divide the army into two portions, and that the Queen's troops would keep in order the local force, and the local force in turn would keep in order the Queen's troops. The danger of mutiny is therefore an argument common to both parties; and the only question is—which system is least likely to expose us to the danger of serious insubordination and mutiny,—a large local force or an amalgamated army of the Line? The answer to that question must depend very much on the evidence we possess in regard to the discipline of the East India Company's former local army. I think it is clear that if the one force be inferior to the other in discipline, the danger of in- subordination must be greater in the case of that one, than in the case of the other. I know that in speaking of the discipline of the European regiments of the late East India Company I am touching on extremely delicate ground, and I beg to draw a distinction between discipline in one sense and discipline in another. I believe it is the universal testimony of all Line officers who have served in India that, as far as regards the discipline and the gallantry necessary in the field, no regiments in the world could exceed, as none have exceeded, the services of the Company's regiments. There is ample evidence to the same effect in the papers now on our table. But I must say there is a general concurrence of opinion that, as regards discipline in a different sense, and with reference to the relations between the men and the officers, the regiments of the local force are decidedly inferior to the regiments of the Line. I have already adduced some evidence on this point from the EARL ier history of the East India Company. I now turn to a more recent period. In 1828 the Duke of Wellington gave evidence before a Committee upon public expenditure. It was proposed to him that, in order to save the heavy expense of frequent reliefs in regard to colonial service, a number of corps should be put on the footing of a local colonial force, in the same manner as the European regiments of the East India Company. What was the Duke of Wellington's reply to that suggestion? He says:— The difference in the state of the King's troops in the East Indies from that in which the Company's European infantry is known to ha is conclusively against it—the colonial system of corps—in my opinion. The Duke goes on to say,— It is very extraordinary, and I can only attribute it to their being confined there for their lives, that it is so, but it is very extraordinary that the same description of officers, who form the Sepoys into remarkably good troops, cannot form the European infantry to be at all equal to the other troops. Evidence to the same effect as regards the condition of affairs at the present time, might be adduced in abundance. But I need not go further than the last Minute of the Governor-General. If it had been possible to maintain a contrary opinion, everything in the argument urged by Lord Canning would have induced him to adopt it. But his admission is emphatic—that "in this respect (namely, perfection of military discipline) they were much below the troops of the Line."

It is also admitted by Sir James Outram, in his protest against the proposed measure, that the discipline of the local force is inferior to that of the Line. He gives reasons, indeed, for it. It has arisen, he says, from causes over which the officers themselves have had no control—namely, from mistakes on the part of the Government, alterations in the rules of discipline, in respect to the power exercised by commanding officers over the men, and especially from the system of Staff employment. I am not now inquiring into the causes of this inferiority in discipline, but merely into the fact of its existence, and I believe it to be proved by the concurrent testimony of all who have written on the subject. I regret to observe a disposition on the part of the East India Company's officers to treat with some degree of depreciation what is called the more perfect discipline of the Queen's Army. They say it is the mere discipline of parade; that it does not in any way touch the efficiency of the force in the field, and is of no serious consequence. I am sure your Lordships will agree with me when I say, that we ought to watch with the greatest care and jealousy the operation of any cause which tends to affect, however slightly, the perfection of military discipline—any cause which tends to affect, even in the smallest degree, that sense of subordination and that principle of obedience which is the first duty of a soldier. After all, my Lords, what are we arguing about? Not about the efficiency of the local army in the field, but the danger of insubordination in the times of quiet and peace, when troops suffer the lassitude and inaction of long cantonment, and are not under the excitement of active service. The admission, then, of Lord Canning—the admissions of the late Company's officers themselves,—and the concurrent testimony of all former years, in respect to the high comparative perfection of military discipline in the Queen's Army is, in my mind, conclusive against a large and almost predominant local force. Some of the causes of their inferiority which have been assigned by Sir James Outram might probably be removed; but I do not believe they could be removed altogether. Look to the reason given by Lord Cornwallis for the inferiority of the Company's troops in discipline. He refers to the nature of the climate. Lord Canning also thinks this inferiority might, to a certain extent, be removed, but ho says emphatieally that "probably it would not have been possible to keep them up to the mark of their brother soldiers trained in England." It is clear that Lord Canning does not expect the local force ever to reach or equal the perfect discipline of the army of the Line. Well, but surely as regards the garrisoning of India, this is a matter of primary importance. Perfect military discipline is of primary importance even here, where civil authority is paramount, and where every time the soldier quits his barracks he is reminded that he is nothing but a citizen of the State. But in India all is different. There he sees and feels that the authority of the civil Government rests to a great extent on his sword; everything around him reminds him of his importance and his power; when he quits his barracks ho sees a subject population for although, I trust, we rule the people of India for their own good, it must be admitted, I fear, that we have hitherto kept India by the power of the sword. Therefore, I say, that a large local army feeling that the civil Government entirely depends on them, and in a state of comparatively inferior discipline, would be a source of perpetual anxiety; and I feel sure that the institution of such a force would be an experiment which no English Government would venture to attempt.

Indeed, my Lords, with regard to this question of discipline, it appears to me that the very arguments used in favour of forming this great local army are a sufficient indication of the circumstances of strong temptation in which they would be placed. It is argued that they, as the local force, are to be the permanent garrison of India the army of the Line being avariable, and comparitively accidental element. They are to be thus taught to believe, as, so to speak, one of the traditions of their birth, that India in an especial sense belongs to them, and that its Government rests on their courage and fidelity. Again, they are to understand that they are constituted with a special jealousy of the Horse Guards, which I hold with reference to this subject is but another name for the authority of the Crown. They are therefore to watch with jealousy any interference of the Imperial Government. Again, I find it argued that special relations ought to exist between the local Europeans and the Native army. And last, not least, for this is perhaps the most dangerous of all-it is one of the conditions OD which much stress is laid, that they are to have what is called a fail share of the good things of India. But who are to judge of what is the fair share? Can a great body of armed men, with habits and feelings specially localized, be placed in a more dangerous predicament? Can a Government be placed in a more embarrassing position? I know this view may appear rather overstrained to some; but I have good reason to believe and know that within the last few months—within the course of last year—and I appeal to my noble and gallant Friend, late Commander-in-Chief in India, (Lord Clive), whose accession to this House we are all proud of—I would appeal to my noble and gallant Friend whether, on some very recent occasions, it has not been found a source of serious embarrassment to him and the Government of India that there existed a necessity for dividing the number of commands in certain proportions, not with reference to the free' choice of the Government of the fittest men, but with reference to the necessity of consulting the feeling of a divided army.

Then, why should we run all these risks? That there is some risk every noble Lord must admit. Why should we incur the risk of insubordination and of jealous feeling between two great European forces in India? The main argument, which I know carries peculiar force with some, is that without it we shall lose the school of officers hitherto so invaluable in India. Now, I do not deny that certain changes in regard to the officering of the army in India, and in regard to Staff employments in India, will be the natural though not the necessary consequences of this Bill. But what I venture to maintain is this, that these changes, and no other, are precisely the changes which have long been considered absolutely necessary by the confession and complaints of Indian officers themselves.

What does Sir James Outram say is the special value of this school of officers? He says it is "a school of officers intimately conversant with the workings of the Native mind." Now, my Lords, I do not wish to make any undue use of the great mutiny of 1857. I sincerely think that state of things arose out of many causes, and the mismanagement, perhaps, of many preceding Governments, and it would be most unjust and ungenerous to lay the blame of that event on the European officers who commanded the Sepoy regiments. They unfortunately trusted their men with such perfect confidence, that a very large number of them were massacred without a chance of escape; and those who did escape should be the objects of our perpetual honour, because they showed a degree of firmcess of mind and heroism which casts upon them immortal honour as British soldiers. But surely it is neither unjust nor ungenerous to say that they were not a school of officers who proved that they were intimately conversant with the workings of the Indian mind. The real truth is this, and it has been confessed over and over again—I heard it alluded to in very eloquent terms by the noble EARL (the EARL of Ell en borough) opposite several years before the mutiny took place—that for many years there had been a growing change in the relations which once subsisted, between the European officers and the Sepoy army; and I venture to appeal to him whether the events which took place in 1857 would have been possible in the EARL ier and better days of the army of the East India Company. The mutual confidence which then existed between the Sepoy soldier and his officer had for many years been broken down, along with the personal intercourse on which that confidence was founded. I am sorry to see that my noble Friend (Lord Ellen-borough) intimates dissent. But I have evidence on this point, the authority of which, I think, even he will be disposed to admit. I take one of the Company's most distingaished officers, who himself fell a victim to the mutiny, for he fell in the siege of Lucknow—I mean Sir Henry Lawrence. What does he say on the relations which had come to exist between the European officers and the men of the Sepoy regiments? Sir Henry Lawrence, like many officers in India, was in the habit of contributing to the periodical literature of the day, and ho communicated to the Calcutta Review a series of articles, since published in a separate volume, avowedly by him. Among these there are two most interesting articles on the reform of the Indian army, written in 1855ߝ56, before the mutiny, and before his mind could be influenced by any considerations arising out of that event. Referring to various changes in the organization of the Sepoy troops, he says:— By removing Native officers from corps professedly commanded and officered by Europeans, though too often really managed by havildar majors, opportunity would be given to the European officer to look into the interior economy of his re- giment or company. Seldom is anything of the kind done at present. So long as all is smooth and quiet on the surface, few inquiries are made. All may be rotten below; the jogtrot is followed, A mine may be ready to he sprung for all that nine-tenths of the officers would know. Many do not know the very names of the men of their own company. Surely these are remarkable words, considering the date at which they were written. But I have further evidence. I would now quote the testimony of another I distinguished Company's officer, who is happily still alive, and who occupies a distinguished position in India at the present moment. I mean Sir Patrick Grant. I find him saying, in one of the papers before Parliament:— Further, the officers are discontented, only looking forward to leave their regiment for some more pleasant employment, so that they perform, and unwillingly, the bare outline of their duty, and never, as a general rule, mix or converse with their men; but, on the contrary, too often refuse to listen to their complaints, at the best telling them to go to the adjutant, and, not unfrequently, Go to— don't bother me.…The consequence of this craving is utter indifference, not to say positive dislike, towards the men; and the engendering of a restless, discontented disposition, which is, I doubt not, communicated to the soldier. I ask your Lordships, 'do not these extracts from the testimony of such men substantiate what I said, that for some time there had been going on a deterioration in the relations that subsisted at an EARL ier period between the European officers and their men in India?

Now, what has been the remedy proposed, and loudly called for by many of the most distinguished officers of the Indian army? I have admitted that some changes will naturally follow this Bill; but it will be found that they are precisely such as would follow without it—namely, the formation of a separate Staff corps, the abolition of the system which kept men on the strength of their regiments when in reality they were employed elsewhere, and other changes of a similar nature. Again, look at this matter in a somewhat different point of view. Is the present system of officering the local army, and the present system of appointment or of promotion in India, so very perfect, that the necessity of making some change in that system should fill us with alarm? Indian officers, when opposing this measure, would appear to think so; but I observe that when they they have been writing or speaking without reference to this con- tested question, they always tell a very different story. Sir John Lawrence is a great opponent of this measure. A higher authority, I admit, can hardly exist; or one more distinguished in every way. Indeed, so far as my own opinion is concerned, I differ from him almost with greater doubt and hesitation, than from any man in regard to this question. Sir John Lawrence, in expressing his dread of the consequences of this measure, says— Were the civil and military appointments in India filled up from a general Staff corps, its officers would, no doubt, obtain the ordinary and subordinate posts of the service; bat such men would have little chance of high commands. They would never he brought forward, as has been the ease under the old system, with all its faults. Well, but what do I find his own equally distinguished brother, Sir Henry Lawrence, saying in reference to the state of things which, previous to the mutiny, prevailed in India:— Let no officer obtain the command even of a company until ho has proved his qualification. The present tests are altogether insufficient.…They should oblige each officer to evince moderate ability and moderate application. All men are not intended by nature to be soldiers. The sooner incapables find out the mistake of their parents in having put them into the wrong line the better for themselves and for the service. In no army are higher qualifications required. Is it good that one single individual officer should be a laughingstock to his men? They are nearly fifty to one of us. Such is the opinion of Sir Henry Lawrence in reference to the pre-existing state of the Indian army. And what, let me ask again, is the remedy proposed? "There must be a Staff corps," says Sir Henry Lawrence in the same paper; "whatever may be its inconveniences they will be less than those which now obtain." Lord Canning expresses a strong opinion not only that the Staff employments of India—that is to say, the military, political, and quasi-civil appointments, which are so largely filled in that country by military men, should be open to the Line, but he further urges that officers of the one service should be free to exchange info the other. Long before any question of the amalgamation of the two armies arose, it was suggested, as duo to the officers of the Line, that the Staff appointments in India should be open to them, and upon that point my noble Friend opposite (the EARL of Ellenborough), among others, gave very strong evidence. In answer to questions which were put to him he said:— The Queen's officers will, equally with the local officers (not to the same number probably), be entitled to command the irregular Native corps. Then the noble Earl was asked— Would you throw it open?—Certainly; supposing them to be competent, from a knowledge of the language. I think that everything should be equal with regard to appointments between the two forces. I think it would be very unjust to the Queen's army not to make it so. He was then asked whether the officers of the Line and those of the local army should be entitled to an equal share of those appointments. That reply was— No, not an equal share in proportion to numbers; that would put an end altogether to my principle. My principle is, that the Governor General should be at liberty to take the ablest men he could find anywhere; that they should be eligible, but have no rights. Lord Stanley: You do not admit, in short, the right on the part of any set of men to say, 'Here is a certain proportion of these appointments to be set aside for us?'—No, it is contrary to reason. Now, I venture to suggest that if Staff appointments in India were to he open to officers of the Line as well as of the local army, without the formation of a Staff corps, all the Members of which should be equally eligible, you would have constant difficulty in considering the respective claims of those two bodies of men, and the Indian Government would be compelled to govern its appointments not solely with reference to individual qualifications, but in a large degree by the necessity of considering the jealousy of rival armies. Sir James Outran), I may add, is a strong supporter of the establishment of a Staff corps, to which officers of both armies should be eligible. This measure, then, which certainly is one natural consequence of the proposed amalgamation, is also, as I have now shown, a measure the adoption of which was recommended by some of the most distinguished officers of the late Company, long before the present question had arisen.

I now come to what I regard to be the main question in the discussion of the present Bill—will you find officers of the Line willing to qualify themselves for Indian service, and devote themselves to an Indian career, as Company's officers have hitherto done? This is a question which to some extent may be matter of speculation, but on which there are not wanting both facts and arguments sufficient to lead us to a very safe conclusion. The noble EARL opposite (the EARL of Ellenborough), in reply to a question which was put to him on the subject, said— When a regiment is sent there certainly for ten years, or perhaps for a longer period, if an officer felt that by making himself acquainted with the Native languages he would have an opportunity of obtaining some civil or political employment, I think it is contrary to reason that those officers should not in a very great number of cases qualify themselves, because there is no very great difficulty in it. I find, moreover, that Lord Elphinstone expresses the strongest opinion that there would not be the smallest difficulty in procuring officers of the Line to undergo that peculiar education which would fit them to hold Staff employments in India. On this point I think my noble and gallant Friend on the cross benches may be induced to give us the benefit of his long experience, and may be able to inform us whether it is not the fact that numbers of officers of the Line would have been glad, even under the old system, if they had been able to enter the Company's service. Indeed, as the noble EARL opposite has truly said, it is "contrary to reason" to suppose that it should be otherwise, for there are few advantages in the military service at home at all equal to those conferred by the appointments in India, which is now to be open to any officer who chooses to qualify himself to hold them. The Indian career holds out the hopes of high emoluments and of opportunities of distinction such as are afforded to few officers of the Line in time of peace, either in this country or in the Colonies. Why is it, then, I would ask, that we should not expect officers of the Line to qualify themselves in sufficient numbers for service in India? The fact I believe to be that there are at the present moment upwards of 150 of those officers employed in the discharge of duties which under the old system were almost exclusively confined to officers of the local force. I am moreover given to understand that in anticipation of the passing of this measure a very large number of young men belonging to the Queen's regiments are actually undergoing the process of an Indian education to qualify themselves for Staff appointments in that country. The fears upon this score which some persons entertain, I therefore conceive to be unfounded, or at least very much exaggerated.

I now come to an objection to the Bill on which great stress has been laid by many officers of the Company's service, and that is, the fear of what is called the interference of the Horse Guards. In the presence of the illustrious Duke on the cross benches, this is a point to which I address myself with some embarrassment; the more so, as having frequently endeavoured to form a distinct conception of the idea which the "Horse Guards" presents to the mind of an Indian officer, I have always come to the conclusion that it is one pretty nearly synonymous with the origin of all evil. But be that as it may, there is nothing in this Bill which increases by one jot the authority that has hitherto been exercised by the Commander-in-Chief over that portion of the army located in India. In support of this opinion I again appeal to the views to which expression has been given by my noble Friend opposite (the EARL of Ellenborough), who says, in reply to the following question:— Q. What do you suppose that the power exercised by the Commander-in-chief here over that portion of the army which has been located in India has been hitherto?—Nothing whatever. I am not aware of any sort of communication between them. I believe I had occasionally the opportunity of sending to the Horse Guards information with respect to Queen's regiments with which they were not already provided. The illustrious Duke on the cross benches will also, I believe, be able to hear his testimony to the fact that he neither intends nor wishes that his authority, so far as relates to the troops in India, should be in any respect altered by the passing of the present measure. The Governor General of India will, as hitherto, possess supreme military, as well as civil and political power in India, and will he enabled, in conjunction with his own Commander-in-Chief, to confer any employments and commands which he may please on those officers of the Line, who then, as now, may be sent out to that country. This is a subject on which Mr. Willoughby has expressed a very sensible opinion. He says:— Because it is scarcely to be expected that the Horse Guards, overwhelmed with the business of superintending and controlling the Queen's army stationed at home and in the Colonies, can, in addition thereto, undertake the administration, in all its branches, of the military forces of an empire so remote and of such magnitude as India. Certainly not; it is neither to he expected, nor is it to he desired, nor is it intended, nor is it rendered possible by the provisions of this measure. In future, exactly as heretofore, the Horse Guards will send to India such general officers as the Government is desirous of employing in connection with the European army of the Line; but the disposal of commands, as well as the disposition of the troops will rest also, as heretofore, with the local Commander-in-Chief and the Government of India.

I have now only, my Lords, before sitting down, to enter my protest against the criticisms which have been passed on the conduct of the Government, both in Parliament and out of doors, in connection with the course which they have taken upon this Bill. It has been said, that we have introduced this measure against the opinion and advice of all who could be considered authorities on the subject; and at so late a period of the Session, that it has been impossible for Parliament to pay to its consideration adequate attention. I regret that the measure was brought so late before Parliament, but I trust that fact will be received as evidence of the sincere desire of Her Majesty's Government to examine into the subject with the utmost care. I do not deny that the measure has been considered, not only with care, but with some anxiety by the Government. It was impossible to read declarations from such men as Sir John Lawrence, Sir James Outram and others, that this measure would make an organic change in the system by which India has been won, and by which alone it can he kept, without feeling that it was absolutely necessary to sift the question thoroughly—to look at it in every possible point of view, and to see whether this amalgamation of the two European armies, is really fraught with the danger attributed to it. But I deny that the authorities, great as these undoubtedly are, have been altogether on one side; and I contend that we are entitled to exercise our own judgment, and to bring to the test of reason and of argument, the somewhat rhetorical terms in which Indian officers are accustomed to express themselves on the subject. And when they speak of the "system under which India has been won," I cannot forget that the main features of that system have had very little to do with the small European army of the Company, and will remain wholly in changed when that army is united to the Line. One main feature of the "system by which India has been won," has been in no way connected either with the Company or its army—namely, the employment of very eminent English statesmen in the Government of India. I can confidently affirm that there is nothing in this measure to diminish the inducements which have led the English Government from time to time to send out to India—there to spend and too often to exhaust their powers—some of the best and wisest of our public men. Neither is there anything which can tend to limit, but on the contrary, much which will tend to enlarge the field from which young men of enterprise and ambition have been hitherto drawn to the service of India. There is nothing, in short, my Lords, in this measure, so far as we can see, which tends in the remotest degree to withdraw from India any portion of those powers of rule which, in connection with the Government of that country, notwithstanding many errors, and I am afraid we must confess some crimes, have cast on our national character a lustre of an imperishable renown.

Moved to Resolve, That as regards the said Bill, inasmuch as prolonged Uncertainty in respect to the System on which the European Army in India is to be constituted would be injurious to the Service and a serious Embarrassment to the Government of that Country, it is the Opinion of this House that the Circumstances which require Legislation on this Subject appear to this House to be of such real Urgency as to render the immediate Consideration of the same necessary.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH

My Lords, I approach the discussion of this question with very great pain. I am under the deepest obligations to both armies—as much to the local army as to that of the Crown—for the generous confidence with which they received me on my arrival in India, and which they continued to place in me during the whole period of my government, when I was deprived of other support to which I had an equal claim. The Government of which I was a Member was deeply indebted to them—equally to both armies—for the enterprise, the self-devotion, and perseverance, with which, standing shoulder to shoulder, they marched from victory to victory in Affghanistan, in China, in Seinde, and in Gwalior, terminating with success four wars in two years, and reestablishing everywhere in pristine vigour and strength the impaired prestige of the British arms. I never can cease to feel grateful to those armies for what they did—I have an equal gratitude to both. I saw no distinction between them; I knew no difference between a Company's officer and an officer of the Queen; they both served their country equally well. It is since my time that these jealousies and misunderstandings have grown up between these great and glorious services, which are the real foundation of this unfortunate measure. The noble Duke has done me the favour to notice several statement of mine when examined before the Royal Commission. I see nothing to alter in them. I adhere to them all. I am not answerable for the exaggerated demands which have so much prejudiced the question, and turned public feeling against the Indian army. I have always asked for equality between the two armies—equality, not of European troops, but equality in real strength, in which the command of the Native troops held by local officers would properly be taken into consideration. To that opinion I adhere. The noble Duke has spoken of this measure as a measure of amalgamation. It is no such thing. It does not proceed one step towards amalgamation; it is a measure for the extinction of the local army of India, and for the substitution in the command of the Native force, and in the performance of civil, military, and political services, of officers drawn from Her Majesty's regiments instead of officers provided by the local service. It is naturally felt by the Indian army that this proceeds from a feeling of distrust; it is an injury accompanied by dishonour. Nothing contained in this Bill authorizes the Crown hereafter to have a local service. Unless those officers and men who are now in the local service think fit, on the passing of this Bill, to volunteer for general service under the Crown, not one officer and not one man of that local service can be so amalgamated with the Queen's army as to be moved from the territories under the direction of the Governor General into this country or any other part of the dominions of the Crown. There has been, no doubt, some amalgamation, but it was the amalgamation of the bad. The 3,000 bad men who deserted, as I consider, from the Indian army last year, have been amalgamated with the Queen's service, into which they were permitted to enlist, and into which I would not have admitted one of them, to contaminate it by his presence. This is amalgamation, but this is the only amalgamation that has taken place. The errors of these men were thus condoned, and they have been placed by the side of honourable soldiers; while punishment has been inflicted vicariously on the men who remained faithful and who did not desert their colours, because they had the misfortune to have such bad men as their fellow-soldiers. My Lords, I consider that to be a case of extreme hardship. There can be no doubt that this measure has originated in the differences between the two services—how occasioned I know not—and from the strike, or exodus, as I have heard it termed, of the 10,000 men last year. But the latest measure of Her Majesty's present Government last year was to add 20,000 men to the very army which they now say ought no longer to exist! Let us understand how the question stands. The European local army, and the regiments of Native troops to which the local establishment supplied officers, were one army, and not two distinct forces. This Bill, in destroying the whole local European force, thereby puts an end to the system according to which young men are sent out from this country to command Native troops, and to remain locally in India. Whatever future services of this nature may be performed will be discharged by men who have gone through Her Majesty's army. What is the justification for this? The exodus which took place last year. I must say I think it very hard to condemn one body of men on account of the misconduct, not of themselves, but of others. I shall not defend, as some have done, the conduct of those 10,000 men last year; but I think it right to explain under what circumstances they acted. The great original misfortune was the declaration of Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, that if these men disliked being transferred to the Crown, it was but just that they should have an opportunity of obtaining their discharge. That was, in fact, the origin of the whole difficulty. Now, I must acquit Lord Palmerston of having deliberately made that statement. I am under the impression that it was an answer given by him to a question put in the midst of his speech. I am sure no Minister would have ventured deliberately to make that statement to the House. I do not think Lord Palmerston ever seriously entertained that opinion; and the provisions of the Act which now transfers this army to the Crown contain nothing in the slightest degree sanctioning the notion that any portion of these troops were entitled to be released from their engagements. The clause in the Bill proposed by Her Majesty's Government deals with the trans- fer of these men as if no doubt could exist of the right of the Crown to their services. Not one word was said, either in this House or the other, on the subject, and no man could have supposed last year that these fatal consequences would have ensued. And, although I expressed when in India, now seventeen years ago, my conviction that the country ought to be governed in the name of the Queen, I should have refrained from advising that measure had I believed that it would have led to the destruction of the local army. There was not only that unfortunate declaration of Lord Palmerston, but there was the conduct of the Government of India. I recollect having read, not long ago, in the recently published Despatches of the Duke of Wellington, an account of the course which he pursued in Ireland in 1808 under somewhat similar circumstances. There had been some loose expressions introduced into an Act of Parliament, in consequence of which some 10,000 militiamen claimed their discharge. Nothing could be more inconvenient at the moment, and yet there appeared to be a primá facie case in their favour. The question was referred to the law officers of the Crown, and the Duke communicated, confidentially to the officers commanding these different regiments all the arguments used by the law officers, in order that they might use them in reasoning with their men. The result was that the difficulty passed away and the men remained in the discharge of their duty. But in this case the only declaration that was made to the soldiers was that their claim was inadmissible. It is not enough to be just to the soldier, you must condescend to prove to him that you are just. That attempt never was made until at last, compelled apparently by circumstances, the Government of India offered these men their discharge, and then, and then only, when it was too late, Lord Canning condescended to give reasons to the men why he considered they had no claim, and why they were not entitled to their discharge. I never could understand the reasoning of some officers in connection with this subject, founded on the right which soldiers have to volunteer only, and not to be transferred from one regiment to another. There is a real difference when a man is transferred from one regiment to another. He leaves the officers who know him; he leaves his friends, he may be proud of the regiment with which he has served, and, more than that, the conditions of his service may he altogether altered. He may desire to remain in India, and the regiment to which he is transferred may be going home; he may desire to go home, and the regiment may be coming out. These are real differences, and it is but just that a man should be allowed to exercise his own choice. But in the recent case there was positively no difference at all. No man could discover that the name of the Queen had been substituted for that of the Company by any difference in his treatment. It was no more than if the number of the regiment had been altered, and surely that cannot be considered a sufficient ground for mutiny. It is the case of a principal who dismisses his agent and chooses to carry on his own affairs; all the agreements made with that agent on behalf of the principal remain binding on both parties. The reason of the thing was altogether against the men, but the reason never was given to them at the proper time, and the result was the loss of 10,000 men of the local army, and this Bill, which endangers our relations with India. In this country, and in other countries in which, in constitutional times, a great jealousy has been entertained of a standing army, you have always had a great, intelligent, and determined people to back the Government, and to support it against any dangerous measure which might be taken by that army. In India, there is no people, or, if there be, that people is either indifferent or hostile. It does not give its support to the Government. In that country, in which the Government is so denuded of all support but that which is derived from the army, it is necessary to take security in the composition of that army against the dangers which may arise from it. Such securities always have been taken. We have three Native armies; if we had had but one, considering especially the composition of one of them—the Bombay army—the probability is that the insurrection would have spread from one to the other, and we should have had to contend with all three Native armies, instead of being able to use one against the other. More than that, in each Presidency there is in the division of Queen's troops, local Europeans and Native army, another balance which gives security to the Government. I recollect the Duke of Wellington stating in this House that it was always held in India that the greater the number of religions you had in a regiment the safer you were—not that the greater number of religions gave you greater strength in presence of the enemy, but that it did not present any one bond of union of which those who wished to divest themselves of the authority of the Government could take advantage. This is just the principle which pervades the whole Indian system. On board ship you have seamen and Marines—the Marines have other duties to perform than those of hauling ropes and running round I with the capstan. To them we look in a great I degree as a security for the maintenance of order. I have more than once expressed my conviction that we must build our vessels in compartments, in order that we may not lose all by one accident, and I am confident that if you are determined to effect the purpose of the Government contained: in this Bill you will destroy the greatest security which you have for the preservation of India. The great danger in India is the danger of a mutiny. There is no other danger. I recollect very well, when I approached Madras on my way to Calcutta, at the end of February, not having received any news from India since October, I asked if we were near enough to communicate with the shore. I was told we were, and I desired them to inquire whether there was any news. I took the telegraph-book in my hand to take down the answer myself. It came, "Yes—very distressing from the north-west'—the army—destroyed."That was the first intimation I had on my arrival of the actual state of things then existing. I can assure your Lordships that that word "destroyed" was a relief to my mind. I feared a mutiny much more than the destruction of an army. I have remained firm in that opinion. I am not at all ignorant of the gravity of the circumstances which took place last year. It is on that account that I would desire your Lordships to lose no means of guarding against a recurrence of the same danger. May I be permitted to go back to Early history—to the time of the first great European conqueror in the East—Alexander? What example did he set us? He was compelled by the same desire to revisit home on the part of his men—which was the real cause—not money—of the misfortunes which occurred last year—to retrace his steps, and to proceed on his return to Europe. But what was his conduct? Did he omit to take precautions against the recurrence of that danger? No; he balanced the strength of his old legions from Macedonia and Greece by forming other legions of fresh recruits under different officers, and altogether under a distinct command, and, not satisfied with that, he formed a body of 30,000 Native guards under other officers, that there might be a triple security against a recurrence of the danger. He did that which you have done during the 100 years you have been fighting for supremacy in India—that which the Government now propose to abandon. I think I ought here to interrupt myself for a short time, and show your Lordships, if I can, the practical operation of this measure as I understand it. I will take the year 1856, before any great alterations were made by the mutiny. In that year there were 185 corps in the Indian army, of which 176 were Native and nine European. The Native corps had a number of officers, equal to half the number of officers in Her Majesty's regiments; the European regiments had an equal number to the Queen's regiments, if not superior. Therefore, these various corps were in point of fact equal in the number of officers to ninety-seven of Her Majesty's regiments. But Her Majesty will not have 97 corps in India; she will have a smaller number; and yet, with the greater number of officers possessed by the East India Company, observe how inconvenient was the demand for officers to command irregular regiments and fill other offices. It has been computed at six officers from each regiment. If this measure passes, and gradually effects the extinction of the local force, the demand upon the Queen's regiments for officers will be much greater than it has hitherto been upon the local army. There were ninety irregular regiments, each requiring three officers; in addition to that demand there was the staff. Now, it is proposed to make all Native regiments irregular, and more officers will have to be found. Besides that, it is stated by Lord Canning, and very possibly many may agree with him, that the number of these officers usually attached to an irregular corps is too small, especially where there is much detached duty. In addition, there is a large body of military police—a measure which was begun by myself. That police will have much detached duty, and for the purpose of preserving peace and seeing that the powers of the police are not abused there ought now to be one officer for every 100 men. If the Native army altogether is to be reduced to 80,000, that is to a number equal to that of the European troops, and if the police are not augmented beyond 40,000, yet still I think for officering that Native army and officering the police 950 officers would be required from the Queen's troops. I can assure your Lordships that if that number is taken in addition to all the other officers, for civil and political purposes, which if you mean to govern the country well must be taken, the demand will be such that there will be no regiment in India which must not, at least, part with twelve officers. I know it is intended that the troops shall be relieved every ten years. That was always the intention, but the intention has never been carried out. The larger the number of European troops the greater will be not only the expense, but the difficulty of carrying it out: and in time of war to send a tenth of your force out to India, and to bring a tenth of your force home, besides the ordinary reliefs and recruits, will be actually impossible. You will be obliged to violate your promise to the troops if you promise that they shall only serve in India ten years; and, having destroyed the local European army, you will have nothing to fall back upon. While you have that army you are safe to a certain degree, although you may not have all the force you desire. Another matter is well worthy of consideration. In the local regiments, as they have existed till now, the Governor General was quite certain that he should command the service of any officer at any time. He therefore had a complete power of selection from the whole force. It will not be so now, even if every officer should be as fit to take a detached appointment as officers of the Company's service were. It will not be so, because the demand will be so much greater that if every officer is willing to take the appointment there will be greater difficulty of selection. If all are willing to go, as they are now, there will be precisely the same complaint as there is now—that the able men are taken from the regiments and the refuse is left. But all will not be willing to go. Although I think a great many will qualify themselves, it is contrary to reason to suppose that all will do so, because men of mature age or of connections in this country will be so wedded to their habits or this country that it will be impossible for them to adopt the life of an officer in India. Observe the position of the Governor General. If the number is small he will have no selection, instead of having, as he has now, the selection from the whole body of officers. If they do not all care for such service the Governor General will be deprived of the power of selecting the best men. He therefore cannot carry on the Government as he does now. Give me leave to ask what is this Staff corps to be? Is it to be a permanent corps like the corps of civilians, in which every man who is once appointed has a right to an office? I protest, in the name of the Government of India, against the establishment of such a corps. Now, if an officer is unfit for civil or political situations, or even for the command of irregular troops, it is no disgrace to him. He may be a good officer in his own regiment; and if the Governor General finds him unfit he sends him back to his regiment, and places him at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. But what will be the state of things if there be a Staff corps, in which every man has a right to remain, and a right to be provided for, as in the Civil Service? Observe that those officers who are sent back to their regiments now, go back to that which they undertook when they arrived; they are no worse off than before. They have been better off when employed on the Staff, but they are not worse off when they go back to their regiments. There is, therefore, no difficulty in sending a man back who is unfit. But the Governor General will reflect before lie displaces a man who is unfit, when he will know that to displace him is to ruin him. Ho will have nothing to fall back upon. Therefore, I say I feel confident that, although the patronage of the Governor General will be left exactly where it was, he will not be able to exercise that patronage so satisfactorily hereafter as he can now, and that he will not be able, under the new system, to obtain the same body of able men for the public service. Although some gentlemen, and I hope many gentlemen in the Queen's army, going out as some must very young, will learn the language and make India the peculiar theatre of their occupations in life, it is impossible to conceal from ourselves that that will not be the ordinary state of things. The officers in Her Majesty's army are to a considerable extent in a different position and of a different class—I do not think of a superior class for the public service—but of a different class to officers of the East India Government. I do not think that it will be consistent with their tastes and habits to devote themselves in the same way to the public service in India. But more than that, it is most essential to maintaining kind feelings for the Natives that they should undertake these situations at a very Early period of life. It is impossible that a man of thirty, though perhaps he may be able to acquire the language sufficiently to speak it with facility, should accommodate himself in the same way to the habits and customs of the Natives. Allow me to impress upon your Lordships the immense importance of facility in speaking the language to every man who has any relations with the Natives, and that cannot be acquired at a late period of life. I recollect in conversation with the late Sir Charles Napier, I asked him whether he did not feel very great regret that he was not able to speak the Native language. I told him that I, as Governor General, estimated that a knowledge of the Native language would to me have been worth 10,000 men. He said, "that is exactly the value which I put upon it. I would rather in Seinde have been able to speak to the troops and the people, than have had an addition of 10,000 men." There is a great risk of having a body of officers placed over the Natives, who, though speaking the language scientifically, cannot speak colloquially to them, if they do not go out at a very Early age. And now allow me for a moment to ask your Lordships to consider how we stand at the present time with respect to the people of India, and whether it is desirable to make another great change? There can be no doubt that, however great a measure—and a great measure it was—the Proclamation of Her Majesty on her accession to the Government of India—however well that Proclamation was received, the expectations which it created have not been realized. The Government has not been conducted generally in the spirit of that Proclamation, and the result is great disappointment and discontent. There has grown up throughout the country, I regret to say, between the Europeans and Natives a very strong antagonism of race. Things are entirely changed in the few years which have elapsed since I was in that country. I looked upon every Native as a friend, and treated him as such, because I knew I might entirely rely upon him. They are now, I regret to say, regarded as enemies, and the feeling engen- dered in consequence is one of mutual hostility. I have said already that the only foundation either for the financial security or the general safety of the Government of India is to be found in a thorough reconciliation between the Government and the people. To the Natives we give education, and we especially endeavour to give them a knowledge of European literature and a power of reading and speaking English. They take advantage of our unwise permission. They do learn English, and by reading books published in England acquire feelings which are incompatible with our Government. And when they road newspapers in India which are published in English, I am ashamed to think of the disgraceful attacks which they witness not only on every tenet of their religion, but on all their domestic habits and customs. The English press in India is revolutionary in the attempts which it makes to turn the feelings of the Natives against us. What is going on at the present moment? We are endeavouring to introduce a now system of taxation. There is a tax which approximates to a graduated poll-tax on all artisans. There is to be a very much increased tax on that necessary of life with them—tobacco. There is, in addition to that, an income tax, and with regard to its imposition on land I must consider it a tax of most questionable justice. But of this I am quite sure, that it is impossible to make an accurate and just assessment of that tax, and equally impossible to establish a reliable tribunal to decide between the Government and the taxpayers. At present it is received joyfully, by the Europeans, because it presses hard on the Natives, and they are content to be pressed also if they see that the Natives are compelled to pay it. All these things are working towards the same end—and while this is going on, while this danger is inherent in your position, you determine upon a change which will disgust and alienate 5,000 officers commanding 200,000 men, and which will also be considered by the people as a breaking up of the securities which you have maintained for the Government of India, and as entailing upon them a Government, through a number of Queen's officers, not well conversant with their language, antagonistic to them in feeling on account of their religion and even on account of their colour, and not entertaining for them that consideration which has always been shown by the offi- cers of the local army. These things will inevitably alienate the affections of the people. I will not speak in terms which appear to me exaggerated, but I do assure your Lordships that I do not think things can go on long unless a great alteration is made. In this measure I see the beginning of the end. We have no real security in India but in adhering to the principles by which we have raised that empire. You are now asked to throw off all your traditional policy, and whereas in substituting the power of the Crown for that of the Company it was unnecessary to make any other change, that is considered a convenient opportunity for making every change, and this in a country in which everything ought to be stable, and in which nothing disturbs men's minds so much as the apprehension of alteration. My Lords, attached as I am to the army and to the people of India, to the advancement of whoso interests I have devoted now very nearly thirty-two years of my public life, I cannot regard without the deepest apprehension this great and dangerous change. I have endeavoured, as was my duty, to place before your Lordships as well as I could the reasons why you ought not to adopt the measure of the Government. I cannot hope that I shall have succeeded in altering your preconceived opinions; but under any circumstances it will be to me a great consolation that on this, perhaps, the last opportunity that I may possess, I have expressed my sympathy with the people of India, and have at the same time offered the assurance—the heartfelt assurance—of my undiminished respect and continued gratitude to the Indian army.

EARL DE GREY AND RIPON

said, that after the eloquent speech their Lordships had just heard, it was necessary that he should pray their Lordships' kind indulgence when he ventured to address them on a subject of this nature. He should not pretend to speak on his own authority, which was as nothing on this question, but should be able to quote on his side of the question authorities as high and weighty as that of the noble EARL himself. The noble EARL was undoubtedly actuated by a desire to promote the welfare of India; but he could assure the noble EARL that he had no monopoly in that respect, but that Her Majesty's Government in framing this measure were as desirous as he could be himself of increasing the welfare and prosperity of all classes in that portion of Her Majesty's dominions. The noble EARL said that he always considered that the greatest danger to the permanence of our Indian Empire was mutiny; and he was right. A mutiny had occurred in our Native army which had swept the Bengal army from the face of the earth; and still more recently a disturbance, if it did not reach to the magnitude of a mutiny, took place in our local European army in India, which affected 10,000 men. He must remind the noble EARL that both those events had taken place since he (the EARL of Ellenborough) was in India; and therefore he ought not to forget that these events had themselves rendered necessary many changes. The noble EARL had urged two main practical objections against this measure;—the first, that it was intended to have in future only one European army in India; and the second that according to that plan it would be impossible to supply the Indian Government with qualified officers to carry on the civil and military administration of the country. With regard to the first objection, he had heard the language of the noble EARL, if not with surprise, certainly with pain. The noble EARL said that we ought to build our Indian army in compartments. That was a sound opinion as applied to Native troops; but was the same system necessary with regard to an army drawn from this country? The noble EARL said that you must have in India two European armies, one composed of Queen's, and the other of local troops, because, if there was only one army, dangerous combinations might arise which might threaten the safety of your empire. If that was a true principle, it ought to be carried further, and not only in India, but in all our Colonies and at home we ought to have this system of double armies. If we could not trust to the loyalty and the discipline of the British army in India, why were we to trust to them anywhere else? The result of adopting such a system would be, that we must have our army everywhere drawn from different sources, so that the various portions of it might be arrayed against each other. The danger of a local army arose from the fact that the troops could not be removed. If dissatisfaction occurred in a regiment of the Line, it would be at once removed from India and the danger would be over. He would oppose to the authority of the noble EARL that of an Indian officer of great experience, who was himself a member of the Indian army, and was deeply attached to it. Sir John Malcolm said:— Some have whispered that there was safety to the State in such differences, but such persons have forgotten that the very alarming events which form the ground of their dread have been almost in every place the result of these jealousies and divisions. They are ignorant, also, that it is much more easy to create and maintain a bad spirit among a limited body of men who are affected by some local circumstances than it is to spread such a spirit through more extended numbers and a wider sphere. These words, spoken so long ago, might almost be imagined to have been written for the very purposes of this discussion. They distinctly pointed out that the danger of disaffection arose from the existence of a local army never refreshed by a return to England, and constantly maintained within the comparatively narrow limit of that portion of the empire. He did not think that their Lordships would be inclined to imply by their votes that evening that any danger would arise from the maintenance in India of an army of 70,000 or 80,000 troops of the Line. Whatever necessity there might be for maintaining distinctions between the different portions of the Native army, he contended that no such necessity existed in the case of Her Majesty's forces. The opponents of the proposed amalgamation said that the local force should be the largest; but in the past history of India the local European army had been extremely small. Their Lordships had to decide therefore between the scheme of the Government and the scheme of the opponents of amalgamation, the latter scheme involving at least an equal amount of change with the former. The noble EARL himself agreed that if we maintained a local force in India at all, it must be one of considerable magnitude, otherwise it would sink into a subordinate position, incompatible with the status of officers of high character and ability. The noble EARL said there was a necessity for a greater number of officers, and that under a system of irregular instead of regular Native troops they would not have an adequate number of officers available for Staff employment in India. The question as between regular and irregular Native troops was, however, irrelevant to the subject before the House, and if any change should be adopted in that respect, it would not be adopted as the result of this Bill. But even if one-half of the European army in India consisted of local troops and the other half of troops of the Line, the number of officers available for the Staff would he the same A greater number could not be drawn from a local force than from a Queen's force. It had been argued in "another place" that Queen's officers would not be fit for these appointments, or, if fit, would not be willing to accept them. If they were favoured with the opinion that night of his noble and gallant Friend the late Commander-in-Chief of India (Lord Clyde), the House would doubtless be told that there would be no difficulty in obtaining a sufficient supply of Staff officers from the Royal army. But were the case otherwise, it would surely be easy to increase the Staff corps from other sources.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH

was understood to remark that that could not be done under this Bill.

EARL DE GREY AND RIPON

That was a point on which he was not prepared to give an opinion. The noble EARL said the Governor General would not have power to choose officers from the Line and attach them to the Staff corps. His fears on that point were entirely groundless. A man might be a very good regimental officer, and yet be perfectly unfit for Staff employment or to take the command of a Native regiment. In such a case the Governor General would be able to dismiss him from the Staff at once, and he would become an officer on half-pay, in the same way as any other officer of the Queen's army under similar circumstances. It was intended that the Governor General's power to appoint or dismiss the officers of the Staff should be entirely unfettered. If, as the noble EARL said, the great danger in India was the danger of mutiny, nobody would deny that its best preventive was the maintenance of a strict discipline. It was therefore our duty, more especially under the present circumstances of India, to take care that those European troops who were to be the exemplars to all the other military forces in that country should he disciplined in the best manner, and be under the most perfect control. Now, no one who read the papers could fail to perceive that the regimental discipline of the local army was inferior to that of the Line. Sir James Outram, the late General Jacob, and other eminent authorities, although opposed to the amalgamation scheme, recommended that every officer before being appointed to a Native regiment should pass through a European regiment, in order that he might learn discipline. When regiments remained long, still more if they remained per- manently in India, the climate tended to enervate them, and was inimical to that perfect discipline which, however it might provoke the sneers of some, was nevertheless the only satisfactory basis of a sound military system; and this measure was the result of a determination on the part of the Government to institute a sound system of discipline in India. Ho earnestly trusted that the unhappy estrangement between the Natives, and the Europeans, in India would soon die away. That feeling could not be laid to the charge of any Governor General or any Secretary of State:—it was one of the results of the terrible crisis through which that country had lately passed. He knew that Queen's officers had been accused of treating the Natives with contumely and contempt; but he did hot believe in the truth of those accusations. He was confident that those distinguished men who had from time to time held high commands in India, with the presence of one of whom they were honoured on that occasion, and whose services in the field had won, built up, and now recovered our wondrous empire in the East, had ever used their utmost endeavours to secure the best possible treatment of the Natives of that country. It would be the duty of every Commander-in-Chief in India, whether this Bill passed or not. to see that the same course was pursued by the officers of the Queen's army. He did not think it was fair to suppose that the men who go out in Line regiments are more likely in this respect to forget their duty than young cadets sent from this country to join Native regiments in India under the existing system. He would not detain their Lordships longer. The question was not whether they could continue things as they were; they must make a change in one direction or another; and after the events of last year; after the mutiny of the local European troops in India, which the noble EARL himself had condemned in the strongest terms, it was impossible, mutiny being the great danger of that empire, to overlook that event, and maintain a local European force in India. If any Member of the Government thought the adoption of this measure would operate with injustice to the officers of the late East India Company's army, or increase the antagonism of race and produce injury to the Natives, it never would have been proposed; but it had been brought forward after deep consideration of all the difficulties of the question, after much doubt and hesitation, and he earnestly hoped and believed that, if adopted, it would not lead to the unhappy results prophesied by the noble EARL, but place the foundations of our Indian Empire on a more sure and stable basis.

THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

My Lords, before this discussion closes, I feel bound, occupying the high military position I do in the country, to make some few observations on the Bill now before jour Lordships. And I do so with great doubt and hesitation; for I feel that after the eloquent speech of the noble EARL (the EARL of Ellenborough) any observations of mine must appear weak and inefficient. I listened with great attention to the speech of the noble EARL, but I regret to say his conclusions were altogether different from those at which I have arrived. My Lords, with reference to what has lately taken place in India, I have had opportunities of hearing this important military and political question discussed from a variety of points of view; and, after giving the subject the fullest and most anxious consideration—after taking the opinion of military men especially, in whom I place the most implicit reliance—and of none more than my noble and gallant Friend (Lord Clyde), who sits behind me—I have certainly come to the conclusion that the time has arrived when this great question must be dealt with. The noble EARL in the last portion of his speech, referring to the various difficulties that had presented themselves in India, and the changes which resulted from the recent misfortunes that had occurred in that country, expressed his regret that this great additional change was now to be introduced into our Indian Empire. But he entirely forgets that it is impossible that Parliament can postpone its decision on the changes which must result from those events. My Lords, if there be one point upon which I have never heard a difference of opinion it is this—that this great question must be settled immediately. Upon that point all military men, whether officers of the Line or of the Native army in India, are entirely agreed. This is a question it is impossible to postpone; it is a question which it would be most dangerous, were it possible, to postpone—one which, if postponed, would lead to more unfortunate jealousies, heart-burnings, and feelings of discord, than even now exist. Militarily speaking, I cannot understand how it is possible to defend the maintenance of two separate and independent European armies in India under the present system of governing that country. I can understand how two armies could coexist when the Government of India was conducted through the medium of the Court of Directors; but, when that divided authority ceased, and the direct authority of the Crown took supremacy in India, as in every other part of Her Majesty's dominions, I cannot comprehend how two European armies of different constitutions can owe a divided fealty and allegiance to one undivided Sovereignty. Even supposing that these local troops were of a more local description than is now proposed, I do not see how they could be maintained without reference to the authority of the Crown; for I must declare my entire concurrence in what fell from the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll), that when you hear of the Horse Guards the phrase really means the authority of the Crown; in fact, this is virtually what is wished for by those who are opposed to the amalgamation of the armies—that a certain proportion of European troops of the Queen's army should be placed in such a position in India that the Queen's authority can really not be exercised over them; for the Queen's authority over European troops must rest with the Commander-in-Chief, and that authority is to be put on one side altogether. I hope, however, that it will not be supposed for a moment that I mean to afford any grounds for an observation which I regret to hear sometimes made—that the Commander-in-Chief in England wishes personally to exercise any authority over the troops in India greater than that disciplinary authority which your Lordships would wish to see resting with that officer. The Commander-in-Chief at home never has interfered in the slightest degree with the Line troops of the army serving in India; and the same system exactly which I has hitherto existed it is intended shall continue. There is nothing in this Bill to I lead your Lordships or any one else to suppose that any change is intended in that respect. I for one am very free to admit that any Statesman placed in the position of the Governor General of India must be invested with unbounded authority in every respect, both military and civil, as long as he holds that high and important position. But the question of the jealousies and heart-burnings between two different bodies of European troops is one of a very different character; and the sooner you get rid of such feelings the better it will be for the public service—the State must be better served when all join heartily together in undivided allegiance. I have the greatest confidence in the loyal intentions of the officers of the Indian army. I believe them individually and collectively a high-minded, a high-principled, a noble race—men who would do their duty by the State, whether as local troops or not: hut I think it is more than human nature to expect that they should not be jealous of the troops of the Line; while, on the other hand, the troops of the Line were naturally jealous of the local force when they saw them getting all the good things for themselves. Now, if this measure be passed, the Governor General will be still able to dispose of the troops in India in any manner he may think fit. The noble EARL says that the Bill will very much curtail the Governor General's power of selection for the various appointments, civil and military. But I beg to assure my noble Friend that there is nothing in the measure which will in any way change the power of the Governor General. Suppose he wishes to take any man he may think qualified from a regiment of the Line, and put him in the Staff corps, or to hold any position of trust in India, he will have entire power to select him, only then another officer will be appointed to the regiment from which he has been taken. Hitherto when officers have been elected to fill appointments in India their places in their regiments have not been filled up, and the consequence has been that the efficiency of those regiments became impaired. In future, when selections are made, the officers upon whom those appointments are to be conferred will be transferred to the Staff corps, and the vacancies thus created in their regiments will be at once filled up. Again, I have heard doubts frequently expressed as to whether a sufficient number of officers of the Line, willing to devote themselves to an Indian career, can be found; but, for my own part, I must confess that my experience on this point—and it has been considerable—has led me to form the conclusion that there will be no dearth of officers of that description. In support of this view I may observe that nearly three out of every four young men who apply for commissions in the army specially solicit appointment to regiments serving in India in preference to those located at home or in the Colonies. I believe that to be a sufficient reason for supposing that we shall have no lack of officers of the Line anxious to go to India. And there is a very simple and natural cause why that should be so, inasmuch as an officer going to India and not possessed of large means—as is the case with so many who enter the army—finds himself, the moment he lands in that country, an independent man, his means being so increased that he is no longer obliged to look to his family for assistance,—with a career open to him which would not present itself to him in the same degree in any other part of the world in time of peace. So much for that objection. But it is also contended that a deteriorated class of officers would, under the new system, enter the service. Now, all I would say in answer to that argument is that you will find an officer of the Line has, almost in every instance, a brother, a cousin, or some other connection in the Indian service; and how, under those circumstances, it can be maintained that an inferior class of men will enter the army under the operation of this Bill I am at a loss to understand. For my own part, the point is one on which I entertain no apprehension. It has also been repeatedly asserted that officers of the Line will not qualify themselves for local service in India. And what, let me ask, is the reason advanced for making that assertion? Simply that officers of the Line have not hitherto been in the habit of so qualifying themselves. Those who rely upon that fact, however, must bear in mind that hitherto appointments in India have to officers of the Line been hermetically sealed, those appointments having been reserved for officers of the local force. My noble Friend who spoke second in the debate (the EARL of Ellenborough) it is true, taking a high-minded view of the subject, has long argued that appointments in India ought not to be confined exclusively to the local troops; and I admit that of recent years they have, in some degree, been placed within the grasp of officers of the Line; but then the appointments which the latter received were of a character inferior to those which were conferred on the former. I have, under these circumstances, the strongest conviction that when appointments in India are freely thrown open to officers of the Line they will render themselves as capable of filling them as the officers of the local force have hitherto done. My noble Friend in the course of his speech alluded to the irregular Native service in India, and expressed a doubt whether European officers of the Line would arrive in India sufficiently young to be able to qualify themselves sufficiently to be made available for duty in that service. Now, if I were of opinion that they would not, I should, I confess, hesitate as to the expediency of passing the Bill before the House. My belief is, however, that as there will be a large number of regiments of the Line employed in India, in which there will be a considerable number of young ensigns, cornets, and lieutenants; and, inasmuch as there will be no restrictions placed on those young officers qualifying themselves for transfer to the Staff corps, there will be no difficulty experienced in finding men ready to learn the Native languages, and that not superficially, but thoroughly and colloquially. I come now to the question of discipline, which is one extremely grave and important; but in dealing with it I know I shall have the sympathies of my noble Friend (the EARL of Ellenborough), who is too much a soldier not to feel that those troops which are best disciplined must also be the most efficient. The question is, nevertheless, a very delicate one to handle; but, while I experience some difficulty in speaking upon it, I feel assured the sentiments to which I may give expression will not be misunderstood by the officers of the Indian army, for the whole of whom I entertain the highest respect and esteem, and that they will not suppose I desire to class them in point of efficiency below officers of the Line. I distinctly disclaim all intention to do anything of the kind; but, if any difference in the degree of the discipline of the two forces exists, I should be disposed to attribute it to the deteriorating effects of the Indian climate, which invariably—I can speak of my own knowledge—so acts upon regiments of the Line which have passed any long time in that country that they become so deteriorated as to render it necessary that they should be reformed and reorganized on their return home, before they can be considered fit to take the field. It is to the effects of the Indian climate therefore, and not to any want of zeal or energy on their part, that any falling off in discipline in the case of the European army in India is, in my opinion, to be attributed. Be that, however, as it may, the question of discipline cannot be got over, and we must not shut our eyes to the fact that almost every eminent authority on the subject distinctly and unreservedly declares it to be his conviction that the discipline of the local European regiments in India is not equal to that of regiments of the Line. I mean such discipline as it is expedient to keep up in a time of peace as contrasted with one of war, when every Englishman knows how to bear himself with gallantry and honour. I am speaking, in short, of that regimental condition which it is necessary to maintain in time of peace even more than in time of war, when the excitement of the contest rouses men to more than the ordinary degree of energy. To uphold such discipline is, I contend, of the last importance, and I for one can never share in the contrary view, which I regret to find is maintained in some quarters. The fact that the discipline of the Line is superior to that of the local European force in India, ought, I think, to have the greatest weight in the consideration of this question. My noble Friend has stated that it would be desirable to have one army to act as a check upon the other in India; but I am somewhat astonished that he should advocate the adoption of a course which would necessitate the keeping up of a larger army in India than, as experience has proved, would otherwise be required, and that, too, simply with the object of one force watching the other. There is another matter which has been largely referred to, and upon which great stress is laid. I allude to the unfortunate bugbear of "the Horse Guards," which seems to cause so much unpleasant feeling in various quarters. I do not know what the Horse Guards may have been in former days, but, as the present representative of that establishment, I am quite ready to invite the public generally to enter our walls and to cross-examine me as to every act and deed of mine since the day I became Commander-in-Chief. A great many charges are constantly brought against the Horse Guards. I am perfectly ready to meet them if I could only know what they are. It is hinted that the Horse Guards have an immense amount of patronage at their disposal, which is always badly exercised—and, in short, that it is only distributed with a view of showering favours on certain individuals. I hope it is unnecessary for me to assure your Lordships that the fact is otherwise; but I wish to take this opportunity of stating in this House, and through this House to the country, that as far as I individually, and the officers acting with me, are concerned, the only object we have at heart is the welfare of the State and the welfare of the army, and that any mistake which may be committed is due to an error of judgment, and not to any wilful error of intention. Such is my opinion of the officers of the Indian army, that I can assure those who suppose I think otherwise, that I consider that among the advantages arising from the present Bill, not the least will be that a large body of valuable and efficient officers will be added to the general military service, and will become available for employment in conjunction with the officers of the army, in operations in any part of the world which the requirements of the State may hereafter necessitate. At the time of the Crimean war not one officer belonging to the Indian army was in a position to serve there; and it was not till after various regulations had been made for draughting them into Turkish and Irregular corps that we were enabled to avail ourselves of their services during that great contest. That is a state of things which I regard as highly unsatisfactory—quite as much so as if the officers of the Line could not be employed in any portion of Her Majesty's Indian dominions which was thought desirable by the Governor General. I make these observations with the desire of expressing my views upon the question of amalgamation, which my noble Friend seems to differ from, and I think this Bill will carry out the objects in view. I most conscientiously believe that its details, when carried out, will produce an entire amalgamation; but, whether that object be successfully attained or not, I repeat that my sentiments, and those of the authorities at home towards Indian officers are of the most cordial and friendly nature; and while we think it of the utmost importance that the two armies should be united, we are careful to avoid expressing any sentiments which can be construed to be unfavourable either to the military or personal character of the officers of the Indian army. I appeal to my gallant Friend behind me (Lord Clyde) whether there has been any instance in which they, or I, have refused to put forward all the recommendations which he sent home in reference to officers of the Indian army during the late emergency. If an examination were made into the relative proportions of honours and distinctions awarded to the two services, it would be found that those awarded to officers of the Line were but few in number as compared with those of the local army. I do not complain of that: I do not mention it as matter for regret; but I feel it right to do so, because it is said that the moment the amalgamation takes place these officers will be entirely put on one side. There are a great many other military matters connected with the amalgamation on which I should desire to touch, but as the subject has been so fully debated I will not enter into them. I will say—and say most earnestly—that my sincere belief is that if this valuable measure be postponed, very serious mischief will follow to our military position in India; but, if it be adopted, nothing, I think, will more tend to restore harmonious action in that great territory. The subject of reliefs is the only one which remains for me to allude to. The noble EARL (the EARL of Ellenborongh) seemed to doubt the possibility of our furnishing reliefs.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH

In time of war.

THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

I think the noble EARL will admit that in time of war the system of reliefs, like every other military department, must exhibit considerable irregularity. But I maintain that it would be as easy to send out reliefs in time of war as to furnish the draughts which would be required for a local force; and that young recruits would much sooner dwindle away than a complete regiment, which has vitality in itself, and can therefore be moved about with less risk. I admit the difficulties are great, but I do not believe they would be greater than in the reinforcement of a local army, and, with every respect for the opinion of the noble EARL, I cannot therefore assent to it. As far as my acquaintance with this Bill extends, there is nothing in it which in the smallest degree trenches on the undivided power of the Governor General, supported as he will be in military matters by his own Commander-in-Chief. There is no intention whatever on the part of the home authorities to interfere directly or indirectly with the power to be exercised by the Governor General over the army in India, and I believe Her Majesty's Government are fully impressed with the belief that to attempt any such interference would be one of the most dangerous steps that could be adopted. For these reasons I am of opinion that the measure may be passed without incurring that risk of which my noble Friend is apprehensive.

THE EARL OF DERBY

My Lords, I feel that it may appear presumptuous in me to offer even a very few observations to your Lordships after the high authorities to which we have this evening listened. But at the same time, as my noble Friend has expressed his intention of dividing—though I may say, in passing, I hope under present circumstances he will abstain from doing so—I should he sorry that a vote were taken on this question, which has been one to me of great care, great anxiety, and great attention, without saying a few words in explanation of the course that I am about to take. I wish I could entertain the same confidence as to the results of this measure which has been expressed by the noble Duke on the part of Her Majesty's Government and by the illustrious Duke on the cross benches who has just sat down; and I wish I did not to any extent share the apprehensions expressed by my noble Friend beside me (the EARL of Ellenborough); but I confess that I do look forward to the effects of this measure—or, rather, to the measures which will result from it, with considerable anxiety and apprehension, which are by no means diminished by the prospect before us being so extremely vague and by the very imperfect explanation of the intentions of the Government. The noble Duke stated that the Bill about to pass would not produce certain important consequences—that is to say, that those consequences are not involved in it; but the noble Duke at the same time was compelled to admit that in this Bill was contemplated the introduction of ulterior measures, which will flow as natural consequences from it. What those consequences are and how those difficulties are to be mot Her Majesty's Government have not stated to the House. The great objection which I feel to the measure arises from the conflict of the opinions which have been given by the highest authorities respecting the propriety of the amalgamation of the Indian army, in whichever of the various senses of that phrase we are to understand it. It unfortunately happens—I do not say it is without exception—that almost all of those who have been most intimately connected with the Indian service are for maintaining the existing system, while all those who are connected with the Line have given their opinion in favour of a general amalgamation. Before I proceed I wish to say a word as to what I mean by amalgamation. I do not for a moment dispute—on the contrary, I admit, and I contend for the necessity of concentrating as far as possible in one hand the authority over all Her Majesty's forces in India. With regard to the discipline of the troops, it is necessary that a superintending power should be exercised with that discretion which I am sure will always characterize the administration of the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty in this country. But with regard to the service itself, and to all employments, whether civil or military, I concur with the opinions which have been expressed by nearly every one who has spoken, and by no one more emphatically than by the illustrious Duke, that the undivided authority and responsibility should rest with the Governor General in the first instance, and in a subordinate and concurrent way with the Commander-in-Chief in India, and not in this country. I repudiate also altogether, as an argument which should enter into the consideration of this question, jealousy of the Horse Guards and the patronage which it is supposed will be vested in that department. I am perfectly certain that all those who have been connected in any way with the illustrious Duke at the head of the army, must know that there is no man less desirous of absorbing patronage into his own hands, or so little capable of abusing it; but in point of fact, I do not believe that this Bill for the amalgamation of the Indian army as a consequence will, in the slightest degree—especially after all the restrictions recently imposed on the patronage of the Horse Guards—increase the amount of that patronage or afford the slightest legitimate ground for jealousy on account of any supposed transfer of power. But there are two senses in which we may speak of the word amalgamation of the armies, and which has been alluded to by the noble Duke who introduced this subject in a speech of singular ability and clearness. There are two views of the question—one involving the consideration of a single army equally applicable to the service in all parts of the empire; and the other, an overwhelming local army in India, assisted by a subsidiary force from the Queen's troops; and if, on the one hand, the alternative proposed were to absorb, in the hands of the local army, the whole of the military power in India, or, on the other hand, so completely to effect an amalgamation as that not a single soldier in India but should be in the general service—if that were to be the alternative, then I should undoubtedly prefer the entire amalgamation to placing the whole military power in the hands of a local force. But that is not what I understand by the question as between the amalgamation and the status quo. The noble Duke has told us that the continuance of the static quo is impossible, but be has not furnished us with any reason why it is so. There are very considerable advantages in having in India a certain portion of the army consisting of local forces only enlisted for local services only. I do not deny to the illustrious Duke that the discipline of a regiment permanently attached to one particular service, more especially in time of peace and in a climate like India, and when the men are permanently attached to one particular service, is liable to be deteriorated and relaxed, as compared with the discipline of a regiment fresh from homo or colonial service. For that reason, as the illustrious Duke knows, for the subject has frequently been discussed by us, I have always thought it desirable constantly to infuse into that local force fresh blood from British regiments, and, both with regard to soldiers and officers, to incorporate them in such a manner as to make them all amenable to the same discipline and the same authority, equally framed for time of peace and of war. But the only question which I think is a legitimate subject of discussion is whether it is expedient, or whether it is not, that a certain portion of the forces of India should be specially devoted to local service and confined to India as at present. The objection which I have to this measure is that it solves that question, or at least calls upon Parliament to decide upon it in favour of amalgamation, and against the existence of a local force, without furnishing us with any information as to the scheme by which the Government think they can overcome the obvious difficulties which surround the carrying into effect their proposal. The Bill before us, as my noble Friend has remarked, is simply for the gradual extinction of the present local force. It is not for the amalgamation but for the gradual but certain extinction of the local army; and there is this extreme inconvenience affecting it, that by the engagements entered into that extinction must be a process extremely gradual and slow. You cannot carry it into effect so long as there is a single officer or soldier enlisted under the terms of service prescribed by the Indian regulations. There are many points on which we are left entirely in the dark, with regard to which it would have been very desirable that some information should have been furnished to us. There is the question of the establishment of a Staff corps. We ought to know what is to be the nature of that corps, how far it is to have a monopoly of Staff employment, how far it will be attached to the Indian Government, and how far the officers are to be brought hack to the permanent strength of their regiments, if they do not efficiently perform their duties. All these are circumstances that affect the practical working of the measure, and I think that, before we come to a decision on the question that we should absolutely do away with the local army, we ought to have a comprehensive scheme from her Majesty's Government of what they propose to substitute for it, and how they mean to meet the difficulties of the case. The question of reliefs has been adverted to by my noble Friend near me and by the illustrious Duke, and we were told by the illustrious Duke that there was no difficulty in ordinary times of carrying on a system of reliefs for that portion of the army which is in India. But there is this difficulty to be considered:—if instead of having 20,000 British troops in India you permanently have 30,000, it is necessary that, in order to supply reliefs to the extra 60,000, you should also have an addition of 30,000 to the regular army, in order to carry out the reliefs at five and ten years for that increased number of 60,000, which, though not at present, you will have to relieve. I do not mean to say that under the present system you are not obliged to send out continual recruits for a very large body of men; but that is quite different from periodical reliefs of regiments; and if instead of having 20,000 men in India you have permanently 80,000, you must have an addition to the regular army to make good the relief required by these extra 60,000. This is a question of serious importance, but overlooked in the Government statement. Then there is the consideration whether after you have made this change you will have the same facilities for a permanent supply of officers qualified to fill important appointments. It is quite true that many officers will go from this country in the prospect of Staff employment and other advantages in India, and qualify themselves by learning the languages and for holding other appointments, yet undoubtedly there will be a diminished number of officers who will go out, as far as young men are concerned, with the determination of attaching themselves to the country, of making it the country of their future career, and the scene of their future fortunes; and there will be a still smaller number of persons who will go out with the intention of making India a permanent residence, and of studying the habits, education, feeling, and character of the Natives. You cannot expect that when a man goes out with his regiment to serve ten years in India, with the prospect of quitting India with his regiment, that he will pay the same attention to, and take the same interest in, the well-being of India and the welfare of its Natives, as those who go out as young men knowing that their whole future career is identified with and bound up in the well-being of India. Then there are very considerable difficulties in the way of amalgamation arising from the different character of the different services, and I presume it is the intention of her Majesty's Government as the operation of this Bill altogether does away with the local force, that the Indian system of promotion shall be done away with also, and that the system by purchase is to be introduced into the Indian as well as into the home service. That, again, is a large and important question, and one of considerable difficulty, and on which we have no explanation on the part of the Government. Another question about which the Government has not given the slightest intimation as to how they propose to deal with it, was the question of officering the Native regiments. So far as they are concerned, you must have two separate armies—of Native and British troops—and it is not to be supposed that they are to be put on the same footing. By the existing system there is a constant provision for young men being sent out to he educated specially in the Indian service, and attached to the Native regiments, and formed for their command and management. I will not say whether in all cases they have fully performed the duties expected of them; but at present you have a body of men who understand the Natives; but what provision is made now that the local force is abolished, to bring up a body of men for the special service of officering the Native regiments? I have heard no explanation from the Government on this very important point. I cannot help thinking that although there may be many officers willing to enter the Indian service, and even, as the illustrious Duke on the cross benches says, this service is rather preferred by the great majority of officers who enter the army, I cannot help thinking that when you are going to multiply the British force in India—say to the extent of one-third of the British army being in India—there will be great disinclination to enter a service in which, in all probability, one-third of their military career will be passed in India. It may be true that to some officers it is a great inducement—it would be a great inducement—to have a career in India; but that is rather an argument in favour of the establishment of a local force, than for the introduction of a general system by which every man who enters the army will have, in all probability, to spend a considerable portion of his time in India. I am very unwilling, at this time of night, to detain your Lordships with observations which will fall with little weight from me; but I wish to express my opinion that we are adopting a course without sufficient knowledge, and without sufficient consideration. We cannot foresee the result of what we are doing, and we are pledging Parliament to a measure so far from perfect that there will be no possibility of retreating from the position which we have taken up, while no provision is made for meeting the difficulties and dangers by which the question is surrounded. On the other hand, I agree with what has, been stated by the illustrious Duke—that I it is very desirable an Early agreement I should be come to. I cannot shut my eyes to the fact, that this measure has received the sanction of a very large majority in the other House; and I should consider it a misfortune, which I do not think likely to occur, I if, after that strong expression of opinion, if, after the determination of Her Majesty's I Government, and after the expression of opinion by the illustrious Duke, it should be made a matter of uncertainty what course will be pursued. Although I wish Her Majesty's Government had more carefully considered the consequences, and more clearly proved what may be contemplated from this measure, before they called on Parliament to pledge themselves to it, yet, on a balance of evils, and in a choice of difficulties, I shrink from taking on myself the responsibility of advising your Lordships to again throw the matter into a state of uncertainty. I prefer to leave to the Government, who, I presume, have more mature schemes than they have already disclosed, the responsibility of the great and dangerous work which they have taken in hand, and I shall certainly be sorry if I am called upon to give my vote upon the second reading.

LORD CLYDE,

who was almost inaudible, was understood to say that his experience in India had entirely convinced him of the absolute necessity of having only one European army, moveable as one force, maintained at one point of discipline, and acting, as it were, with one soul. On his arrival on one occasion at a station, a night's journey from Simla, the Adjutant General of Artillery, a most distinguished officer, addressed the Chief of the Staff, and asked what the General was going to do. He said the General was going to speak to the men. The officer said they were past that. This anecdote showed what was the discipline of a European local force. He had never before seen troops in such a state that they would not listen to their officers; but to avoid the great evil of employing other European troops against them, he was obliged to form a commission, before whom the men appeared and stated their grievances. There were many other circumstances which came to his knowledge and made him arrive at the conclusion that for the character and honour of the country it was necessary that there should be but one army and one discipline. He entirely concurred in all the opinions which the illustrious Duke had expressed, and it was almost painful to him to disagree with the noble EARL, of whose extreme kindness he was deeply sensible (the EARL of Ellenborough), when the noble EARL said that this measure ought to be postponed. The business must be settled at once. To remove the jealousies and suspicions which he must admit existed, it was very desirable that some decision should be arrived at, and that the opinion of their Lordships and of the Government should be no longer left in doubt.

EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, I am sorry to have to say anything which may weaken the effect of what has fallen from the noble and gallant Lord who has addressed you for the first time to-night, and whom we all consider to be so valuable an accession to our number; but there are one or two words which at the close of the debate it is my duty to say referring to some things that have been said in the course of it. The noble Duke who introduced the Bill on behalf of the Government referred to the difficulty which arose, from the existence of two European armies, to the transfer of the Government of India from the Company to the Crown when Lord Aberdeen was in power; and for many years past I have understood that one of the great advantages of the abolition of the East India Company would be the removal of that anomaly which, as the noble and gallant Lord has clearly pointed out, must end in jealousy and inefficiency. I have listened with great interest to this debate, and that which fell from the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) with regard to the history of the Indian army was new to me, and, I dare say, was new to many of your Lordships, and I was anxious to hear what arguments would be used on the other side. Two speeches only have been adverse to the Bill; but the speeches of those two noble EARL s differ very much in the amount of their opposition. But I confess I do not find in the speech of the noble EARL (the EARL of Ellenborough) any answer to the statements made by my noble Friend (the Duke of Argyll). The noble EARL assumes that the ground upon which we recommend this Bill is solely what took place with respect to the mutiny of European troops last year; but the noble Duke, in bringing this subject before your Lordships, dwelt as lightly as possible upon that event, and adduced a whole string of arguments in support of the measure to which the noble EARL never alluded. The noble EARL said that our European army in India ought to be "in compartments," so as to insure that one part would, if necessary, act against another. That phrase about a division into compartments was employed by Lord Elphinstone in one of his papers, but was applied, and applied more justly, to the necessity of a certain division of races and districts from which you could recruit your Native army. In the case of an European army dealing with a Native population there is already a sufficient division into compartments, and it is erroneous to suppose that anything more is required for the security of the empire. He also dwelt upon the unwillingness which, he said, exists on the part of the officers of the Royal army to devote themselves to Indian life; but upon this point he was conclusively answered by the illustrious Duke (the Duke of Cambridge), whose experience up to the present day must have much more weight than that of the noble EARL, who acquired it many years ago, and who can have no knowledge with regard to the feeling of young officers of regiments of the Line now. I also think that the objection as to relief was answered by the illustrious Duke, who showed that in time of war, when, and when only, any difficulty could arise, it would be quite as easy to send the necessary relief's to regiments of the Line as to send the necessary recruits to the local army. The noble Earl then went into a variety of topics, such as the state of Indian finance and of the feelings of the Native population, which, although of the deepest importance in themselves, are entirely foreign to the question how we shall organize the European army which we are to have in that country. The noble EARL opposite (the EARL of Derby), in a very fair and candid speech, in which he deprecated any opposition to this measure, complained that my noble Friend the Lord Privy Seal had dealt with only two alternatives, an entirely local army or an entirely Royal army, in which case he should have preferred the latter; but he had entirely overlooked a third alternative, which was embraced in a scheme of his own—that of having a small local army connected with a Royal army. That suggestion entirely upsets the argument of the noble EARL below the gangway (the EARL of Ellenborough), who thought that the great advantage of the local army would he to overawe any disposition to mutiny which might arise in the Royal army—because for such a purpose a small local army would be of no use. With regard to the want of discipline in the local army, the noble EARL appealed to the illustrious Duke whether it had not always been his intention as much as possible to introduce fresh blood into that army by means of officers from the Royal army; but that also is entirely contrary to the views of the other noble EARL, who attached importance to the officers of the local army being brought up without any introduction of foreign blood, and with the feelings naturally engendered in a local army. The noble EARL then complained that the Government had introduced this Bill in this simple form and without communicating to Parliament a full and detailed scheme, including all the arrangements which they proposed to adopt. That matter was very fully considered by the Government, and I believe that we came to a right decision upon it. One advantage which will result from the course which we have adopted is, that when the general principle has once been decided by Parliament we shall receive from the Members of the Indian Council, who are opposed to our decision, the honourable help which they are sure to give and are even now giving in arranging the details of the measure in the most satisfactory manner possible. I believe that Her Majesty's Government have got a scheme which, upon the whole, they are prepared to carry out; but as in working it out some of the details will probably require alteration, it would, in my opinion, have been most unwise to stereotype them in an Act of Parliament. I do not think it necessary to go into a full discussion of all the details which have been referred to in the course of this debate, but I wish to relieve the Government from the charge of having brought forward this measure with precipitancy or without sufficient consideration. We had the advantage of seeing and considering the plan which was prepared by the late Government, and of hearing from all parts of India what were the opinions entertained of that plan; and I must say that, whatever may be the merits or demerits of the other two schemes, that smaller plan which was prepared by the noble EARL by no means satisfied the wishes or expectations of those who were most anxious for the maintenance of a local army. I Bay, therefore, that instead of acting with precipitancy, we have proceeded with the greatest consideration, and at the same time entirely in accordance with the necessity which exists for an immediate settlement of this question, and which, as my noble and gallant Friend has said, is so great that it would be better to decide it wrongly than not to decide it all. With one observation which was made by the noble EARL opposite I entirely concur—namely, that in which he appealed to the noble EARL below the gangway not to divide the House upon this question. I am not afraid that if he did so, the Government would be placed in a minority; but I think it most important that, after the protest of the noble EARL has been delivered, as much unanimity as possible should be exhibited with regard to this measure.

Resolution agreed to.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 2^a objected to; and, on Question, agreed to; Bill read 2^a accordingly; and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.