MOTION FOR SELECT COMMITTEE.

HL Deb 19 April 1860 vol 157 cc1919-74

THE EARL OF EGLINTON

said, he wished to call the attention of his noble Friend (Earl Grey), who was about to bring forward the Motion of which he had given notice relating to the Government Reform Bill, to the propriety of including Scotland and Ireland, as well as England and Wales, in the reference to the Select Committee, if their Lordships should agree to its appointment. It was quite clear that if it was considered proper that the subject should be inquired into as regards England and Wales—and he had no doubt it was proper,—it was equally proper that the inquiry should be extended to Scotland and Ireland, especially as the Scotch Bill was essentially different from that proposed for England and Wales. It might be said that there would be sufficient work for the Committee if the inquiry were restricted to England and Wales; but, in whatever way it might be done—whether it was considered advisable to refer the subject of Scotland and Ireland to the same Committee appointed for England and Wales, or whether two Committees should be appointed,—he could not but think if the inquiry were assented to for England and Wales it should also be assented to for Scotland and Ireland. He therefore begged leave to call the attention of his noble Friend to the propriety of including Scotland and Ireland in his Motion.

EARL GREY

My Lords, in addition to what we learn from other less formal sources of information, we know by the Votes of the House of Commons, that there is before that House a Bill which professes to have for its object to amend the law relating to the Representation of the People. The progress of that Bill has not been rapid, since it was introduced on the 1st of March, and has not yet passed a second reading. It also appears to have met with a very moderate amount of approval either within or without the walls of Parliament. It may, therefore, be doubtful whether it will ever come under your Lordships' consideration; but, as it may do so, in anticipation of that event I think it right to ask your Lordships to appoint a Committee for the purpose of instituting an inquiry which, I think, may throw some useful light on the subject. My Lords, the measure is one of such momentous importance—any error into which we may be uufortunately betrayed in dealing with it may so deeply affect not merely the welfare but the safety of the nation—that I think your Lordships will concur with me that I shall have assigned sufficient reasons for appointing a Committee, if I can show, as I feel no doubt I shall be able to show, that there is information calculated to assist us in forming a sound judgment on the subject which is not at present within our reach, but which we may hope to elicit by inquiry. My Lords, I need hardly remark that one of the most important questions which can be raised in the consideration of a new Reform Bill, is as to what is to be the future right of voting in counties and boroughs; and, in forming a judgment on this question, it is desirable that, with regard to any extension of the franchise that may be proposed, we should know, as clearly as we can, what is the extent of the addition that will be made to the electoral body, and what may be the character of that addition.

Now, my Lords, as far as regards the future number of the constituency in the Boroughs of England, there are returns on your Lordships' table intended to enable you to form some estimate of the increase of voters by the extension of the franchise to the occupiers of houses of the annual value of £6 instead of £10; but, to show how little those returns can be trusted without further inquiry, I need only state this notorious fact, that whereas Her Majesty's Government have estimated the probable increase of voters from such a change of the franchise at somewhere about 200,000 persons, a great many gentlemen, who have very good means of forming a judgment, including among them the representatives of some of our largest constituencies, have declared that they are prepared to show that this calculation is entirely fallacious; that it ought to have been at the very least doubled; and that 400,000, not 200,000, is the smallest number which ought to be reckoned upon as the probable addition to the borough voters. This opinion is also supported by many persons of good local information. Since I came into the House I have been told of the case of a borough in Cornwall, where the Government estimate of the increase to the constituency is at least one-half below what it ought to be. I do not know whether your Lordships have observed the fact, but in many of the local papers there are calculations of the same kind. I do not mean to trouble your Lordships with unnecessary details, and I will not, therefore, refer to many instances; but I may name one as a sample of many others. It appears that the number of voters now on the register for Ashton is 1,052. According to the returns laid before Parliament, the estimated probable addition to the constituency, by reducing the franchise to a £6 occupancy, is between 800 and 900. A gentleman well acquainted with that town, has, however, stated in the local papers, that the probable addition to the number of voters there under the operation of the Bill would be, instead of 800 or 900, at least 2,000. Now, this discrepancy between the calculations made upon the point seems to me to be a matter of so much importance, that it becomes clearly our duty to inform ourselves more thoroughly with respect to it. By calling before us those officers of the Poor Law Board who have made these returns, and some of the persons engaged in the local administration of the poor law, as well as other witnesses from some of the principal towns throughout the country, we may be enabled to clear up the doubts which at present exist as to the accuracy of the returns, as well as to learn something of the probable condition in life of those electors who will be admitted to the enjoyment of the franchise under the proposed change. It is, moreover, desirable not only that we should acquire some information with respect to their condition in life, but also with regard to the degree of intelligence and education which they may possess. And while the point is one of considerable importance, so far as the boroughs are concerned, in the case of which the information before us is deficient and not trustworthy, it becomes of still greater importance in the case of counties, in reference to the position of which under the Bill we absolutely have no information at all. As far as I am aware Her Majesty's Ministers have not even made a conjecture as to the probable increase of the electoral body in counties if the contemplated change in our representative system should take place. This I cannot look upon as right. What the amount is likely to be of the proposed addition to the electoral body in the United Kingdom is, I contend, a question which it is of great importance to take into account in the decision at which we ought to arrive upon the measure which we are asked to pass into a law. The probable increase of the number of voters, and the character of that increase, are not, however, the only questions which I deem worthy of consideration in dealing with this subject. Although there are doubts entertained as to the amount of the proposed addition to the electoral list, there can be no doubt but that addition will be very considerable, and the distribution of the franchise under the new Bill very unequal. In some towns its operation will create very little difference as contrasted with the present state of things; while in others, in which the rents of houses are lower, constituencies enormous in point of number will be created. That being so, it becomes expedient to consider whether to intrust the privilege of returning Members of Parliament to those overgrown constituencies is a course which it is dangerous to take, or the reverse. It seems to me, I confess, that we already know enough of the operation of such constituencies—especially in the case of the metropolitan boroughs—to render it desirable that we should know more upon the points to which I am adverting, in order that we might be enabled to judge how far the allegations which have been made as to the working of such constituencies are true or otherwise. We have ascertained from Returns which have been laid before Parliament that in constituent bodies so large as those of which I am speaking only a small proportion of the number of electors entitled to vote avail themselves of the privilege. According to the latest Returns, for instance, which I have seen on the subject, it appears that in the borough of Marylebone, out of a constituency of 21,000, little more than 10,000 voted at a recent election. In other metropolitan boroughs the proportion of those who actually vote to those who possess the franchise is, I believe, not very different. We also know that the contests for those boroughs have been of a very expensive character—that individual candidates have paid for a single election as large a sum as £5,000, that being the amount only which was returned by the election auditor; while I fear we should deceive ourselves if we were to imagine that this was the actual extent of the expenditure which has in every instance been incurred. Now, it being clear from the Returns that only a small number of the electors vote on these occasions, and that the elections are exeedingly costly, even if we exclude any reference to illegal and concealed expenses which may have been incurred, it becomes expedient to ascertain to what cause these facts are to be attributed. We have been told by persons acquainted with the subject that the evils to which I have adverted are due to the great size of the constituencies in question. Those persons say that in consequence of the very great number of voters which they contain, no individual voter takes any great interest in the exercise of the electoral privilege, and that as a result it becomes necessary to use various means in order to bring men to the poll. It is, moreover, asserted that, although bribes may not be offered to particular voters at those elections, a system which partakes to a great extent of the nature of corruption prevails; that paid canvassers are employed; the interest of the publicans purchased by allowing long bills to be run up for the entertainment of these canvassers and their committees; that machinery of this kind is largely employed, and that the result of resorting to it is to make individual voters still more unwilling to go to the poll, inasmuch as they feel that their vote is practically valueless in opposition to the organized measures which are taken by the professional traffickers in those elections. It is added that this unwillingness is manifested especially in the case of the more intelligent and educated inhabitants of the boroughs in question, who abstain from recording their votes; so that practically the control of the elections falls into the hands of a cabal, of a self-appointed committee, and a little knot of intriguers, the choice of a representative being thus practically restricted to a comparatively small number of persons. That the facts are such as I have mentioned is openly stated in pamphlets and newspapers, and I cannot help thinking that we ought, before we create any more of those large constituencies, to ascertain what amount of truth there is in such assertions. It is, of course, no easy matter to get at the truth of statements of this description; but still I am not without hope that, from the information which I am told different persons are ready to afford on the point, we shall be able to throw much light (should your Lordships think fit to grant the Committee for which I ask) upon the machinery by which the elections to which I am alluding are conducted. It may turn out on inquiry to be the case that facilities for personation and various other frauds are afforded in consequence of the number of electors being so large that it is difficult to recognize them individually. It may be ascertained, also, that the extreme multiplication of the number of voters diminishes, not only the value set on the franchise by the person who possesses it, but also the feeling of responsibility under which he exercises the privilege. It may, moreover, appear that one of the chief securities which we now enjoy for the fair and proper conduct of elections arises from the fact that the voters feel themselves to be a select body, exercising the right with which they are intrusted under the supervision of many of their countrymen who do not possess the same privilege, and that this feeling materially tends to make them discharge their duties as electors for the public advantage. It seems to me to be all the more important that we should have accurate knowledge on these points because of that which we know takes place in the United States. I was much struck by reading in one of the newspapers a letter from its "Correspondent," who stated himself to be a citizen of New York, describing the state of things in that city. He declared it would be a safe wager that out of 100 citizens, taken at random, not 10 could tell who were their representatives in Congress, and not five who were the members for the town in the State Legislature—unless it was said, you happened to stumble on a member of one of the committees by whom these things are really managed. These small knots of self-elected agitators are the real electors for the great city of New York; and the expression used by the writer was, I think, that the body of the inhabitants have as little real choice as the person who is asked by a conjuror to draw a card from a pack, who of necessity draws the card that the conjuror has determined beforehand. That is the account given by an American citizen of the effect produced in that country by the extreme multiplication of the number of electors. And, therefore, it seems to me a subject well worthy your Lordships' consideration, before we determine very largely to multiply the number of electors, that we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to obtain information as to the real practical working of elections carried on by very numerous bodies. We ought to know what approach we are likely to make to the state of things which I have just described; we ought to know whether an extension of the franchise is likely to conduce to the better discharge of the important trust of returning Members to Parliament. If we were to judge from popular harangues, and from the many speeches which are made in Parliament, we might suppose that the extension of the franchise is necessary in order to give to many of our fellow-countrymen some advantages of which they are at present unjustly deprived. I want to know what is the real advantage of having a vote in the election of Members of Parliament. What good does a man derive from being one of some hundreds or thousands, who in the borough in which he lives, when a new Parliament is to be chosen, vote in the election of the Members? He derives no direct advantage from the privilege—I am supposing always that he does not make any improper use of it—a vote is in itself of no consequence whatever; for no man will say that it is of advantage to him to possess this sort of fractional share of the power of choosing Members of Parliament. But what is of the deepest moment to every man is, that the election of Members shall be so regulated as to afford the best security that the country shall be well governed, and that the interests of every class shall be fairly dealt with and consulted. This it is which is of consequence to every man, from the highest to the lowest; and the mere possession of a vote, irrespective of the objects for which that vote is to be exercised, is not for one single moment to be taken into account. Looking at the subject in this light, and considering it to be a question whether the extension of the franchise is likely to lead to a more honest and a more judicious exercise of the privilege and to the choice of a House of Commons better fitted for the discharge of its high duties, it will be for your Lordships, whenever a measure on this subject is brought before you, to determine what evidence we have that such an extension is required. For my own part, I do not hesitate to say, so far as we have at present any means of forming an opinion, that I see no proof at all that such an extension is either necessary or expedient. It seems to me that this is the opinion of by far the majority of those who have written on this subject in a dispassionate tone, and of the best and soundest thinkers who have expressed their views upon it. I do not mean to trouble your Lordships by citing these authorities; but there is one to which, from various circumstances, I attach so much importance that I will take the liberty of bringing it under your Lordships' attention. I am sure there is none of your Lordships to whom the name of the late Mr. Hugh Millar is not familiar; you must know him by reputation and the delightful works which he has published. You are well aware that by his high moral no less than by his intellectual qualities he raised himself from the station of a working mason to a position of great influence and distinction. As the editor of a newspaper of wide circulation he was accustomed carefully to consider political questions, his opinions with regard to which were decidedly Liberal; and having been himself a working man, he knew by experience the opinions and feelings of that class, and the whole course of his life showed how earnest were his desires to promote their real interests. Mr. Millar, in one of his very interesting publications, under the name of The Cruise of the Betsy, refers incidentally to the subject of the franchise, as to which he thus expresses himself:— Let Chartism assert what it pleases on the one hand, and Toryism on the other, the property qualification of the Reform Bill is essentially a good one for such a country as Scotland. In our cities it no doubt extends the political franchise to a fluctuating class, ill hafted in society, who possess it one year and want it another; but in our villages and smaller towns it hits very nearly the right medium for forming a premium on steady industry and character, and for securing that at least the mass of those who possess it should be sober-minded men with a stake in the general welfare. That is the opinion of Mr. Hugh Millar with regard to Scotland; and I would remind you that the franchise in that country is much less widely diffused in proportion to population than in England.

I know it has been stated that it is unjust not to give the working classes a larger share in the representation, and that they ought not to be excluded from their fair share of political power. If that were true, and if any such exclusion were really practised towards them, no man would more heartily concur than myself in the opinion that this was an injustice and ought to be remedied. But is it true? In the first place I venture to submit to your Lordships that from among the £10 householders in our boroughs the working classes are by no means excluded. In the present days of prosperous trade in this country there is no resident in an English borough who may not hope by industry and intelligence to become the occupier of a £10 house. Practically, a very considerable number of £10 householders have risen from the class of working men, if they do not still belong to that class. They are, besides, closely connected with the whole body of the industrious classes, and have a strong feeling of sympathy with them. I might also remark that voting is not the only means by which political influence can be exercised. A man who has either never possessed or has never given a vote may, by his character and ability, exercise a most powerful influence on public opinion. For instance, do you think the amount of political influence exerted by such a gentleman as Mr. Bright much depends on the effect of his individual vote? Nor has it, I think, been established that an extension of the franchise is necessary in order to secure that Parliament shall deal justly towards the working classes. As far as we can judge from experience, I submit to your Lordships that the electoral body in this country is by no means indifferent to the interests of the great bulk of the population. These matters must be estimated by their effects; and I ask whether the whole course of legislation for many years past does not prove that the Parliament which is returned under the existing rate of suffrage is sincerely desirous of doing what is just and fair by all classes of the community. It is said, I know, that there ought to be a more direct representation of the working classes—that it is not enough that a certain number of these classes already possess votes, and that Parliament, as now constituted, deals justly towards them; but that something more is required, and that there ought to be persons in the House of Commons who would more fully express their sentiments. I acknowledge that there ought to be in that assembly the organs and representatives of every class, and especially of the working classes; and that it is highly important, even whore their opinions may be mistaken and their wishes unwise, that they should still be expressed, because it is by being publicly stated and as publicly answered that any delusions which may possess the popular mind can most effectually be dispelled. But is this to be effected by a general and sweeping reduction of the franchise? I think there is great force in the argument that shows this cannot be the case. The industrious classes are so numerous, compared with all other classes, so like each other in their modes of living and general circumstances that it is impossible, by a general reduction of the franchise in our cities and boroughs, to secure to these classes a more direct representation without giving them a complete political predominance. That point, my Lords, requires great and careful consideration. Many persons, whose opinions are entitled to great weight, think it is impossible to obtain a satisfactory result without adopting a different principle. They say that by a simple reduction of the franchise you would do either too much or too little, and that, to accomplish your object, you must proceed on some different principle. By the variety of franchises existing before the Reform Bill all classes, it is said, were represented. In some towns the right of election belonged to the corporations or other bodies representing the more wealthy classes; in others it was vested in the householders or freemen who acquired the franchise by serving a seven years' apprenticeship. They returned Members representing the industrious classes, not only of those particular towns for which they sat, but of the kingdom in general. By this diversity of the right of voting in different places, there were thus opportunities for all classes in society to obtain a share in the representation; and it is contended that, if we wish to secure the same object, we must return, in some degree, to this principle. My own opinion, I confess, leans to the soundness of these views; but I forbear from entering into this question, because it will form no part of the inquiry I ask your Lordships to institute. The Committee will have nothing to do with devising any plans of reform; by the terms of the Motion I am about to make it will be limited to the humbler task of endeavouring to collect information that may assist your Lordships to form a judgment on any measure of reform that may be brought before you.

But I cannot ask your Lordships to enter on this limited inquiry, without expressing my opinion that one of a far more comprehensive character is urgently required. I believe that the principles on which a safe and effectual improvement of the representation can be accomplished have yet to be ascertained, and that the best mode of carrying these principles into effect yet remains to be discovered. I think that Parliament cannot safely deal with this question till it has been submitted to further inquiry; but I have no such claims on your confidence as to entitle me to ask your Lordships to entrust such a difficult investigation to a Committee moved for by me. I am not even prepared to say that any Committee of this House would be the best mode of conducting it; but I am not the less persuaded that it is necessary, and that if we would deal safely with this great subject, it must undergo a more searching and more dispassionate inquiry than it can receive in a discussion of a Reform Bill brought in by the present or any other Administration. The failure of the different attempts to pass Reform Bills within the last eight years, and the very small approval any of those Bills, framed by different Governments, have received or deserved, ought to convince us that it is impossible to arrive at any satisfactory settlement of this great question till the mind of the nation is more clearly made up as to what it wants, and till the leaders of the chief political parties can arrive at some agreement as to the measure that is to be passed. If Reform Bills are to continue to be brought forward and discussed in the manner they have been during the last and the present years, nothing but evil can arise to the country. The ultimate overthrow of the Constitution is what we must expect, unless this subject shall cease to be the battlefield of contending parties, and unless there is sufficient virtue and patriotism left among the leaders of all parties to enable them to agree, either to leave the question as it stands—and after all there is really very little practical objection to the working of our representation—or else to endeavour to concur in some measure framed according to principles which political wisdom and experience have suggested—and not with the mere purpose of catching a little fleeting popularity, or to patch up for a time a difficult and troublesome question. Unless they will do this there is danger of a great calamity befalling the nation, by the overthrow of the balance of political power. I believe that only a small fraction of the nation wishes to disturb the balance at present existing. The great mass of the people are well aware of the benefits they enjoy under our present Constitution; they are well aware that we enjoy a greater share of real liberty and of the blessings of good government than any other people on earth; and if the question were put to them distinctly whether they would abide by the main principles of the Constitution to which we owe so much, or whether they would depart from those principles to seek some new and untried system for the uncertain benefits it might confer, I am persuaded the answer of ninety-nine of every 100 in every rank of the community would be to abide by the constitution as it exists. But the danger is that in the strife of parties, and from weariness of a vain and barren struggle, the nation and Parliament may at length be prevailed upon to pass some measure of which the fatal working will not be understood till too late, and would only be known by experience; some measure founded on no principle, unsettling what exists, and settling nothing; some measure of which the apparent moderation would be only a snare and an additional danger, and which, if agreed to in the vain hope of obtaining a temporary respite from agitation, and a settlement of the question at least for a time, will be found on the contrary only to have increased all the existing difficulties, and to have opened the door to farther and indefinite changes which will be forced upon us in rapid succession till nothing is left to concede, and till our well-balanced Constitution is utterly overthrown, and an unchecked democracy is established on its ruins. That is what we have to fear, and what has happened in other nations, the example of the gradual corruption of free institutions in other countries, in ancient and modern times, ought to be to us a beacon pointing out the dangers on which we seem to be so blindly running. Above all, the example of the United States ought to be a warning to us that we cannot lay these things too deeply to heart. Let me remind your Lordships that the great men who brought the Revolutionary War with this country to a successful close established a Federal Constitution, by which they thought they had provided sufficient checks against the dangers of an unbalanced democracy. At that time the Constitutions of the several States were founded on similar principles. But almost every check then provided against abuse has been, one after the other, swept away, and the unchecked dominion of the mere numerical majority has been established, both in the Federal and the State Governments. My Lords, I believe if the contemporaries of Washington had been asked whether they would abandon the system then established for the one that has replaced it, they would have answered unanimously, "We will not try so dangerous an experiment." But the change has taken place, nevertheless, and how? By a succession of changes at first apparently inconsiderable in themselves, but all leading by a gradual, steady, and certain progression to that result which we now see. And how has that change worked for the happiness and well-being of the people of the United States?

In bringing this part of the subject under your attention, I wish to say nothing which can wound the feelings of a people for whom, individually, I entertain the highest respect and admiration—but it would be false delicacy in me to abstain from describing the evils which now afflict that kindred nation, and which the best and most enlightened of their own citizens are the first to admit and deplore. I will endeavour then, shortly to point out to your Lordships what is the state of things now existing in the United States, as described by witnesses of the highest authority, native and foreign. In the first place, it is admitted that the ablest and more enlightened citizens of the United States are absolutely excluded from all share in the Government. They not only exercise no public functions, but they have not even the smallest influence over the acts of the Government. They are perfectly helpless and powerless, and the whole power, both legislative and executive, has fallen exclusively into the hands of those men who do not scruple to flatter the lowest passions of the mob. The effects of this are seen both in the Executive Government and in the Legislature. I do not intend to dwell upon the topic, but we all know in what manner the relations of the United States with foreign nations are carried on. Everybody is aware of the unscrupulous, overbearing tone which marks their intercourse with foreign nations. If any one European nation were to act in the same manner, it could not escape war for a single year. We ourselves have repeatedly been on the verge of a quarrel with the United States. With no divergence of interests, but the strongest possible interest on both sides to maintain the closest friendship, we have more than once been on the eve of a quarrel, and that great calamity has only been avoided because the Government of this country has had the good sense more than once to treat the Government of the United States much as we should treat spoilt children, and though the right was clearly on our side, has yielded to the unreasonable pretensions of the United States. There is a danger that this may be pushed too far, and that a question may arise on which our honour and our interests will make concessions on our part impossible. If from the Executive Government we turn to look at the proceedings of Congress and of the State Legislature we find them marked by habitual coarseness and vulgarity, and sometimes even disgraced by scenes of actual violence. We find that their measures, instead of being directed by a desire to promote the welfare of the nation by enlightened legislation, seem to have no other object but to satisfy the cupidity or the passions of their members. Let me point out to your Lordships just one remarkable contrast between Congress and the British Parliament. In our Parliament, which has been condemned as so faulty, public opinion—that is, the opinion not of mere numbers, but of the enlightened and educated part of the nation—has been strong enough to enforce the application of sound political science in our financial and commercial legislation. It has swept away all protection, and has placed our revenue laws on a system which is admitted to be, on the whole, wise, sound, and beneficial. But while public opinion has been able to do this in England, contrary to the wishes and contrary to the supposed interests of that landed aristocracy which is said to possess undue power in Parliament, and to abuse it for the oppression of the nation, Congress, on the contrary, has maintained the very narrowest system of exploded protection; and at this moment the revenue laws of the United States are of such a character, that no man who has the slightest pretension to a knowledge of the subject, can doubt that they impose a great and needless burden on the mass of the community for the benefit of a few. But, worse than this, the system has led to the most hideous corruption, which pervades every department of the Government. This is universally admitted and deplored, not by one party or one set of men only, but by all. The fact has been set in the clearest light by one of the highest authorities to which I would venture to appeal, that of the President himself. In a letter dated February 23, 1859, Mr. Buchanan speaks of "the disastrous influence which excessive and lavish expenditure of the public money may exert on the character of our free institutions," and he goes on to say:— A strong tendency towards extravagance is the great political evil of the present day. Money from the national treasury is constantly demanded to enrich contractors, speculators, and agents, and these projects are gilded with every allurement which can be imparted to them by ingenuity and talent. Claims which had been condemned by former decisions, and had become rusty with age, have been again revived, and have been paid, principal and interest. Indeed, there seems to be a general rush to obtain money from the treasury on any and every pretence. He adverts in this passage to one of the most extraordinary modes of corruption which can be imagined. Some old claim on the Government, which has been considered and rejected years ago on good and sufficient grounds, is brought forward again, and by an arrangement among the parties who are to share in the benefits of the de- cision, the old decision is reversed, and this fancied claim is satisfied by an extravagant grant from the public treasury. This system of corruption is shamelessly avowed in the maxim which is loudly proclaimed, "To the victors belong the spoils." The meaning of this is, that each new President of the United States is to make a wholesale dismissal of public servants, and to fill their places without even the slightest pretension to any reference to the fitness of the new holders, but solely with reference to their claims on the party which has brought him into power. Still more remarkable is the fact that it is openly asserted that Acts of Congress and of the State Legislatures are often obtained by direct pecuniary corruption. One case of this kind—a railway case—attracted much attention two years ago, and was mentioned in the City article of The Times. It appears to be the practice of Congress to make grants of public lands to some of the Western States for the purpose of enabling them to encourage the formation of railways. These grants are in the first instance obtained from Congress in the corrupt manner I have described, and, when obtained, are used very much in the same manner by the Legislatures of individual States. A railway in Wisconsin obtained an act of the State Legislature making to the Company a grant of land by the wholesale purchase of the whole Government of the State. The case was so flagrant that it became impossible ultimately to refuse an investigation, and the following facts were reported to have been clearly proved:—Thirteen Members of the Senate received bonds to the amount of £35,000, in sums varying from £2,000 to £5,000 each; sixty Members of the House received sums varying from £1,000 to £2,000 each, and only four Members voted for the Bill without pay. The Governor of the State received for his share in passing the Bill £10,000—the Government is supposed to be carried on economically there, and the salaries are small, but with such irregular gains its public servants are certainly not less costly to the State than our own more highly paid ones—his Private Secretary got £1,000, the Lieutenant-Governor got £2,000, the Controller of the Bank £2,000, and the Clerks of the House from £1,000 to £2,000 each. Then there is a gross sum put down for "outsiders"—that is lobby agents and various undefined expenses of that kind—£50,000. This does not rest upon mere loose statement; it is the result of an official inquiry by a Committee of the Legislature—it is the history of the transaction as reported by a Committee of the succeeding House of Representatives. That is an example of the state of things which has arisen in that country. Before leaving the subject of America, there is another point which I really must mention. I stated to your Lordships that the President of the United States, with the most praiseworthy spirit, had written a letter to caution the country against the extreme extravagance which in modern times has prevailed; but I am sorry to say the President appears to be himself unable entirely to resist the effects of the system; because there has been an inquiry into the state of the navy in the United States, and the result of that inquiry has been the publication of a mass of documents which I am sure no man can read without the greatest astonishment. Contracts are proved to have been habitually and avowedly made to promote, not the interest of the public, but of the individual. A physician is shown to have been appointed to be agent for the purchase of coal, who knew nothing about coal, who never did anything in the purchase of coal but signing the certificates brought to him, and who received the appointment in order to share with others the profit of the contract. More than this. We have letters addressed to the highest officers of the Government calling on them to grant contracts to particular individuals for electioneering purposes. One letter is addressed to Mr. Buchanan himself, urging him in the strongest manner to have the contract for the machinery of a steam-sloop assigned to a particular house in Philadelphia with a view to obtaining their influence in the approaching election. There is no disguise. It is put openly that it is of importance, in the then state of the election, that the contract should be given to this particular house. I appeal to your Lordships whether, if a letter were addressed to the First Lord of the Admiralty, making a demand of that kind, and it were proved that he had listened to it for a moment, he would not by the universal indignation of all parties in Parliament, and out of it, be driven from the councils of the State. But how did the President of the United States treat the matter? The letter to which I have referred was simply sent to the Secretary of the Navy with this indorsement:— The enclosed letter, from Colonel Patterson, of Philadelphia, is submitted to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy.—J. B. Such corruption produces its natural effects upon every interest and upon every class in the country, and above all, I am sorry to say, upon the administration of justice. Your Lordships are all aware that not many years ago the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States were regarded with the greatest respect, not only there, but in this country. The Judges were enlightened, honest, honourable men, and their dicta were often quoted in our own Courts as of high authority. How has this state of things been altered? Under the system which has arisen in America, appointments to the Supreme Court, like all other appointments, have been used for party purposes and as a natural consequence, that Court has lost the high character it formerly possessed. It no longer commands the respect which it did in better days, and some of the decisions which it has recently pronounced have excited the disgust of all high-minded men in America. But this is by no means the worst—in the Federal Courts the state of things is not good, but at least they have still Judges who hold office during good behaviour, and may therefore venture to act with independence. But in many of the States—I believe I may say in most of them—the Judges are now elected. They are not only originally appointed by election, but they are appointed only for short periods; consequently they are looking forward to re-election;—and in some States they are elected annually, and their salaries are voted annually by the Assembly. This has arisen, because when the undisputed dominion of a numerical majority of the nation had been established, they will not bear to have the desires and passions of the hour checked by a firm administration of the law. The effect has been to degrade the character both of the Bench and the Bar. It is stated in the American newspapers, and the evidence is confirmed by that of impartial observers, that the laws in that country are now become mere cobwebs to resist either the rich or the popular feeling of the moment. While the rich and the upper classes are excluded from any legitimate influence in the government of the country, the illegitimate influence of money is greater than ever, and it is stated that rich men have little to fear from the law in a majority of the States of the Union. How it acts when any popular feeling is involved will be best understood from a short statement which I beg leave to make to your Lord- ships. In the autumn of 1858 there existed a quarantine establishment which had been established by the authority of the Legislature and of the Government in the neighbourhood of New York. The situation was one where many villas had been built for the citizens of New York, to which the quarantine establishment was regarded as a nuisance, and its removal was desired. The inhabitants of the district attempted to get it removed, and, not succeeding in doing so by legal means, the course they took was to assemble and burn it down. No secret was made beforehand of what was intended, on the contrary, the time at which the outrage was to be committed was openly proclaimed, and at the time appointed the rioters accordingly assembled and deliberately set fire to and destroyed the building. They first removed the sick, but I believe the lives of some were lost by the exposure to the weather they endured. Not the slightest attempt was made by the authorities to resist the outrage which they knew to be intended, and only a nominal attempt to punish the perpetrators. Proceedings were taken against them, but I find in a local paper, those proceedings described as a protracted farce, and the result was a decision from the Bench that, as the quarantine establishment had been pronounced a nuisance by the grand jury, the rioters were justified in burning it down. This is a sample of the manner in which the law is now expounded in one of the States of the Union. I say nothing of those abuses, of which I am afraid there can be no doubt, in the police of New York that make life and property unsafe in many parts of that great commercial metropolis. I refer only to known facts, which stand on clear official statements, and which cannot be denied or doubted.

Perhaps I shall be told that there is no danger of our coming to such a state of things as this—that the reverence of Englishmen for law and justice, and their desire to see it fairly administered, are so great that they will never for a moment follow such an evil example. But I believe that seventy years ago these feelings were quite as strong in America as they now are in England, and I beg to remind your Lordships that when you once establish the irresponsible power of a mere numerical majority of a nation, they are led on insensibly from one step to another, until the consequence is the establishment of such a tyranny as I have now been describing. I believe that this experiment of Government by a numerical majority has been tried in America under circumstances of far less danger than it would be in this country; and I refer your Lordships to an admirable letter which records for our instruction the opinion formed on this subject by the great historian and statesman, in whom this House, this country, and the civilized world, have lately experienced so irreparable a loss. I refer to the letter of Lord Macaulay, in which he points out with his usual power of language and of argument that, in a country still so imperfectly settled as the United States, where the population have the opportunity of spreading over a wide territory, the experiment of government by a numerical majority has been tried under far greater advantages and with far less danger than it would be in a thickly-peopled country like our own. I have referred to these things because I think they ought to render us cautious how we take any steps which may lead to the establishment of such a system of government in this country. But we do not need the example of America in order to enable us to judge what must be the character of such a Government if established here. From the speeches which have been delivered during the last two years to various audiences throughout the country by a gentleman of great energy and talent—I mean Mr. Bright—we may form some conception of the degree of moderation, wisdom, and justice, with which power would be exercised if placed exclusively in the hands of that class to whom his speeches were addressed. I will not trouble your Lordships with quotations from those speeches; if your Lordships will but look at the points that were cheered, you will see some test of the degrees of wisdom, moderation, and justice, with which power would be used, if entrusted exclusively to a single class.

I feel I have already trespassed too long upon your Lordships' attention. I will therefore pursue this topic no further, and only express my hope that what I have said may be sufficient to satisfy you of the propriety of granting the Committee I ask for, in order to inquire whether by adopting the changes which are now proposed in the representative system, you would not virtually concentrate the real power solely in the hands of a particular class, and deprive all other classes of their proper share. Let it not be supposed I object to a well-considered measure of Reform. I never expressed the opinion that the Reform Bill of 1832 ought to be a final measure. I do not think that finality belongs to human legislation. But this I have always said, and this I still say, that when you have a Constitution which secures to the people the blessings of good government and the largest amount of liberty, and is practically found to work well, you ought not lightly to disturb that arrangement, and above all things you ought not to adopt any change of which you cannot see pretty clearly the probable effect and ultimate consequences. You are bound to remember that the Constitution of this country is, as it is well described by our greatest political writer, a well-balanced and complicated machine, and that if you venture to disturb its operations with a rash hand, you may throw it out of working order. Even in correcting admitted faults you may do harm, unless you take care at the same time to correct faults in the opposite direction. I believe that the circumstances of the times impose upon us a great and solemn duty; and when any Bill of Reform is brought before us it will be our duty to give it our deliberate attention, and to refuse steadfastly to pass any measure, unless we are satisfied it will promote the future interests of this great country. In order to enable us to discharge that duty, and to provide us with information on which we may form our judgment, I beg to move, in the terms of my notice— That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire what would be the probable Increase of the Number of Electors in the Counties and Boroughs of England and Wales from a Reduction of the Franchise, and whether any or what Change is likely to be made in the Character of the Constituencies by such Increase: Also, what Difference there is between large and small Constituencies in respect of the Proportion of registered Electors who usually vote in contested Elections, and into the Causes of any such Difference which may be found to exist, likewise into the Means by which Elections in very large Constituencies are practically determined, and into the Expense incurred in conducting them.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

My Lords, it is not the intention of the Government to oppose the Motion of my noble Friend. We are perfectly willing that the inquiry asked for—though the terms of the Motion are somewhat loosely worded—should be instituted as far as it is capable of having a proper and useful direction given to it. It must be, however, on the distinct understanding, which I believe my noble Friend admits, that it is a bonâ fide Motion for the purpose of obtaining information which will guide us in our deliberations on the measure of Reform when it comes up from the other House of Parliament, and that the appointment of the Select Committee is not to have the effect of shelving the question, or causing unnecessary delay in the consideration of the Bill, when it shall come up from the House of Commons. Upon that understanding the Government are prepared to enter into the inquiry with my noble Friend. If, indeed, the Select Committee now moved for were to inquire into all the matters my noble Friend has referred to—into the decay of nations in ancient and modern times, the alleged decline of the American constitution, and the state of the United States now as compared with what it might have been had the institutions devised for it by General Washington and his associates been maintained—I should indeed despair of any progress being made for a very considerable time, and should regard with unmitigated commiseration the unhappy lot of the Members chosen to serve upon the Committee. But I understand my noble Friend intends the inquiry to have a more definite direction. Some of his observations seemed to imply that he wished the inquiry to be directed to the verification or correction of certain Returns produced by the Government for the purpose of informing Parliament of the probable effects of the measure they have introduced; and the Government are perfectly willing that the accuracy of these Returns should be tested by the Committee. I do not, therefore, at present deem it necessary to enter into any defence of these Returns; but I must say I was surprised at the way in which my noble Friend treated that question. My noble Friend, in proof of the inaccuracy of the Returns, said he need only refer to the fact that several Members of Parliament representing important constituencies had, in their place in the House of Commons, stated that in reference to their own respective boroughs the Returns were most erroneous. I admit that several Members of Parliament have challenged the accuracy of these Returns as regarded their respective boroughs; but I am informed by the Department from which the Returns emanated, that, in consequence of these allegations, inquiries have been made in the specific cases referred to, and the Returns have been found perfectly accurate. The charges of inaccuracy are almost all couched in the vaguest terms, and are founded on letters of individual electors to their Members, who say that as the result of their private inquiries they have come to the conclusion that the Returns are inaccurate. I think that the statement of the public Department which has had access to the official records of the various boroughs is possessed of more authority than the unsupported assertions of any individual constituent. One alleged source of fallacy in these Returns has been pointed out more specifically. It has been said that in a very large number of boroughs the strict requirements of the law are not complied with, and that all the persons who are assessed for poor rates are not entered in the rate-books. That is perfectly true. There are, I believe, a large number of parishes and boroughs in which the system of compounding for tenancies is adopted, and in such cases the names of the tenants do not appear in the rate-book. But I can assure your Lordships, on the authority of the Poor-Law Department, that specific instructions were given to clerks of unions, who are officers of intelligence and education, that in all cases of compounded tenancies, though the names of occupants are not entered in the rate-book, the whole number of tenants of the required value should be included in the Returns. I believe that has been done in all cases, and although there may be some slight errors in the Returns, I shall be surprised if there are found to be any serious ones. In the instructions sent down to the boards of guardians great care was taken that those officers should understand the object of the Returns that were to be obtained—namely, to give Parliament as near an estimate as possible of the numbers of male occupiers of various classes of tenements. The noble Earl has referred to a noble Lord behind him (Lord Vivian) as having pointed out the incorrectness of the information procured. I can assure the noble Lord that, as far as regards the source of error that has been commonly dwelt upon, it has not been allowed to operate against the accuracy of these Returns. It is perfectly true that as elaborate Returns have not been obtained with respect to the county constituencies, as have been laid before Parliament with respect to the boroughs; but there are other means of getting access to an estimate of the county franchise. There are various Returns before Parliament from which that information can be gathered by any noble Lord who refers to them. Another reason which has prevented the Government from presenting to Parliament such full particulars with regard to the county constituencies was that a £10 franchise in counties was a prominent feature in the Reform Bill brought in by our predecessors in office. Such a franchise has been over and over again voted by the House of Commons; and, as compared with the proposed borough franchise, it is objected to by very few persons in either branch of the Legislature. Having said thus much in reference to the assent of the Government to the institution of this inquiry, and carefully guarded them from being supposed to admit it as a cause of delay in the consideration of important measures which may come up to us on the subject of reform, I should have been well content to say no more on the general question. But I am sure your Lordships will feel, after the speech of my noble Friend, that any Member of the Government who follows him would be guilty of a very grave dereliction of public duty if he allowed all that has fallen from the noble Earl to pass without some observation, or, I think I may say, without some protest. I have this difficulty in answering the remarks of my noble Friend on this question, that they appear to me so wholly wide of the mark. My noble Friend occupied the attention of the House for nearly an hour with very interesting details of the degeneracy of the American democracy. Now, if any Bill had been introduced into Parliament by any Government proposing to lower the franchise in this country as it has been lowered in America, or proposing a system of universal suffrage and the ballot—which, by the way, is termed across the Atlantic "the sneaking ballot"—then I should willingly receive the lecture of my noble Friend as a grave argument against our measure. I have no hesitation, my Lords, in saying that I should view with the greatest possible alarm and dismay the institution of universal suffrage, especially if accompanied by the ballot. I believe they are two great instruments of modern despotism, most hostile to the liberties of mankind. I see them used all over Europe, sometimes to cajole, sometimes to terrify, the poorest and most uninstructed of men into a surrender not merely of their own liberties, but of the liberties of others who are more enlightened and more independent than themselves. But I repudiate altogether the lesson read us by my noble Friend as applicable to any measure proposed or likely to be proposed in this coun- try by any Government. The noble Earl has intimated very clearly that he desires no change whatever in the existing constituencies of this kingdom. He is opposed, at least, to all reduction of the borough franchise. I ask my noble Friend, and I ask the House, whether that is an opinion which any Government is now in a position to act upon? His observations on this point were received, I thought, with very faint acquiescence by noble Lords opposite, I beg the House to consider what has been the history of this question, and what is the situation in regard to it in which the leading men of all parties have been placed by their course within the last ten years. It is now upwards of nine years since the First Minister of the Crown undertook to deal as a whole with the question of Parliamentary Reform. Since then we have had six successive Governments; every one of which, except the short-lived Government of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby), in 1852, has pledged itself to bring forward a measure at the earliest possible opportunity to settle, if it could, this great question. I must say I heard my noble Friend's language on this subject with astonishment. Recollecting as I do that he was himself a Member of the Liberal Government in 1852, which, on the united responsibility of the Cabinet, directed the attention of Parliament, through the Speech from the Throne, to the question of Parliamentary Reform, and which afterwards proposed a Bill to reduce the borough franchise to a £5 rating, or an amount, at the highest estimate, not differing more than 20s. from the borough franchise of the present Government—I say my noble Friend was responsible with his colleagues for that measure; and from that responsibility, let me tell him, he cannot escape. When, therefore, I hear him protesting that there is no necessity whatever for dealing with this question, or at least for dealing with it in the way of reduction, I can only ask him, "When did this conviction flash upon his mind?" He was no young and inexperienced statesman in 1852. He had had a long acquaintance with public affairs, and he knows how the decision of the Government was then brought about. [EARL GREY: Hear, hear!] I quite understand the meaning of that cheer. My noble Friend intends to intimate—what has over and over again been alleged by all the opponents of Reform—that this question has been raised through the personal indiscretion of a statesman who was then one of his colleagues. ["Hear, hear!"] I am astonished at that intimation from my noble Friend, for, although we may not all have been in the Cabinet of 1852, we all know, from our access to the public sources of information, what then took place. The determination of Lord John Russell's Government to deal with the question of Reform did not originate—as is sufficiently proved by the Parliamentary transactions of the period—from any personal desire of Lord John Russell to take the subject up. For what was the fact? Lord John Russell's Government was more than once defeated, if I recollect aright, on a Motion by an independent Member of Parliament—one of their own party, indeed, but unconnected with the Government—who was vigorously opposed by Lord John Russell—I mean Mr. Locke King—on this very question of a £10 franchise in counties. The Government in consequence of that vote resigned. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) was called upon to form a Ministry; and in a speech which he made in this House, stating the reasons which had induced him to relinquish the task committed to him by the Queen, he gave a long and very able analysis of the division that had occurred in the other House. He proved that Lord John Russell's Government had been placed in a minority, not by the votes of those with whom the noble Earl was politically connected, but by a majority composed of members of its own party voting against it on the question of reform. I contend this disproves the assertion of my noble Friend that this question of Reform was raised by any personal desire of Lord John Russell. It was raised by an independent Member of Parliament on the question of the £10 county franchise; and it was then felt by the independent Liberal party that the subject could not be dealt with merely incidentally or in detail; that if they touched it at all they must deal with the whole question; and the Bill of 1852 was accordingly introduced. I can only account for the change of opinion which has come over the noble Earl's mind by that long interval which separates the speculations of individuals acting in an isolated position from their convictions when Members of a Government acting together and responsible for the conduct of public affairs. What is the position in which the borough franchise stands? I have never thought that full justice was done to the Reform Bill of the late Government; but the greatest injustice that was done to it was inflicted by its own unnatural parent. It was most ably drawn, and conceived on distinct and definite principles. One of its most prominent features was that the Reform of Parliament should be dealt with exclusive of any lowering of the franchise. Let me quote the words of the right hon. Gentleman who introduced the measure of the late Government. Mr. Disraeli said, in introducing the Reform Bill:— I am ready to admit that there are many persons quite capable of exercising the suffrage who do not live in £10 houses, and whom I should wish to see possessing the suffrage. But should we obtain that result by—I won't call it the vulgar expedient, because the epithet might be misinterpreted, though I should not use it in an offensive sense—but by the coarse and common expedient which is recommended, by what is called ' lowering the franchise in towns?'" [3 Hansard, clii. p. 984.] Hero is another passage from the same speech:— It certainly would be most injudicious, not to say intolerable, when we are guarding ourselves against the predominance of a territorial aristocracy and the predominance of a manufacturing and commercial oligarchy, that we should reform Parliament by securing the predominance of a household democracy." [Ibid, p. 985.] On the 31st of March, Mr. Disraeli again says:— That being my opinion, I cannot look upon what is called reduction of franchise in boroughs but with alarm. I have never yet met any argument which fairly encounters the objections that are urged against it." [3 Hansard, cliii. p. 1246.] Now, I think that these passages of Mr. Disraeli's speech bear out the assertion I now venture to make, that one of the prominent features of that Bill—the essential feature which distinguished it from all other Bills previously introduced—was that it proposed to deal with the question of Reform somewhat in the same way as I suppose my noble Friend proposes to deal with it—without lowering the borough franchise. I do not, my Lords, in saying this, mean to throw ridicule on such a mode of procedure. The opinion may be maintained by many. I was well aware that it was maintained by Mr. Hugh Millar, whom my noble Friend has quoted tonight, and others, that the present borough franchise is low enough. We are not of that opinion. But what happened with the Bill of the late Government? I am not speaking of its treatment ab extra, but of its treatment at the hands of its own parent. During the discussions that arose in the other House of Parliament every subsequent speech of Mr. Disraeli was marked by a distinct step backward on this point. He declined to admit that it was one of the principles of his Bill. When pressed on the point he would give no definite answer. Everything was a matter of detail and to go before the Committee. That was not dealing fairly with the Bill of the late Government. Let me now direct the attention of the House to what was said by the same right hon. Gentleman when the new Parliament assembled. When the late Government was defeated on the Motion of my noble Friend Lord John Russell, the first thing they did, both in this and the other House of Parliament, was to say, "Remember we do not go to the hustings with this Bill—we are quit of it altogether":—and one of the objects in being quit of it was to get rid of the mode in which it proposed to deal with the borough franchise. I can readily admit that there was a good deal of claptrap talked at the last general election; but I may appeal to noble Lords on both sides whether, although there was no sort of democratic excitement, there was not a considerable and almost universal pressure put on all those who addressed the constituencies in regard to the question of the borough franchise, and whether Members of the Conservative party did not find it generally necessary to profess a reconsideration of their Bill in reference to the borough franchise. When the new Parliament met, a vote of want of confidence was moved, and what was the deliverance of Mr. Disraeli on this most significant of all heads? He was then combating the vote of want of confidence. He had been speaking of the £10 county franchise, and he says:— The question of the borough franchise was not in that condition of maturity. Until the last great debate that question has never been thoroughly grappled with in this House. It has never been brought forward by persons of stay eminence, nor has it at any time attracted or commanded much attention. Well, in that direction we proceeded very cautiously, as you must do with that part of a subject for which the public mind is not so ripe as for the other. …. I am perfectly ready to admit, on the part of the Government, that that proposition was not favoured by this House, nor was it sufficiently favoured by the country to be one upon which we can insist. The question of the borough franchise, however, must be dealt with, and it must be dealt with, too, with reference to the introduction of the working classes. We admit that that has been the opinion of Parliament, and that it has been the opinion of the country as shown by the hon. Gentlemen who have been returned to this House. …. We are perfectly prepared to deal with that question of the borough franchise and the introduction of the working classes by lowering the franchise in boroughs, and by acting in that direction with sincerity, because, as I ventured to observe in the debate upon our measure, if you intend to admit the working classes to the franchise by lowering the suffrage in boroughs, you must not keep the promise to the ear and break it to the hope. The lowering of the suffrage must be done in a manner which satisfactorily and completely effects your object, and is at the same time consistent with maintaining the institutions of the country."—[3 Hansard, cliv. p. 139.] Now, I ask my noble Friend, considering all that has taken place on this question; considering the measure for which he himself was responsible; considering the pledges which every Government have been obliged to take; considering the course taken by the Conservative party, and the manner in which they have struck their flag upon this question—does he think it possible that any Government could bring in a Reform Bill that does not deal with the borough franchise? And is there, after all, anything so very dreadful in this lowering of the borough franchise to a moderate degree? There seems to be a theory now prevailing in some quarters, which I apprehend is quite a new one—that society is stratified in horizontal lines, each layer wholly distinct and even opposite to the next; and as in nature different strata, though in close contact, are yet separated from each other by innumerable ages, so all classes that lie below the present constituency are wholly separated from them in feeling, thought, and aspiration; that they are arrayed against their fellow citizens above them, hostile to the institutions of the State, jealous of the rich, and would interfere with the rights of property and the other constitutional principles on which the liberties of England depend, I ask, is there any foundation whatever for this theory in the actual life of England? When you come to deal with the artisans and lower classes of the country, do you find that they are animated by this spirit of hostility to you and your institutions? I saw in the public papers not long ago, at a great Conservative dinner given to the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) at Liverpool, Lord Stanley was reported to have given distinct utterance to this sentiment, which I believe to be true, that the working classes of this country are mainly Conservative in their disposition. And, if that is really your belief, why such a horror of lowering the borough franchise? My noble Friend talked as if the proposition of the Government was to introduce into this country the mere despotism of numbers. Why, the whole question is the lowering the borough franchise by 80s. It is quite preposterous, I say, then, to address lectures to this House on democracy in America, as if we were going to introduce universal suffrage accompanied by the ballot—of which I, too, have a great horror, although I question if the effects of such a measure would be as terrible as my noble Friend appears to imagine. A very remarkable inquiry was moved for by my noble Friend (Earl Grey) during the last Session of Parliament on the subject of the municipal franchise, with a view to its effect on the discussions likely to take place in reference to the Parliamentary franchise. I shall beg your Lordships' attention to some of the facts which came out in the course of that investigation. It appears, by what I really believe was a mistake of the intention of Parliament, a system of very nearly universal suffrage, as regards the municipal franchise, was introduced into many boroughs; and my noble Friend represented that this had been productive of very serious inconvenience where it had come into operation. The Committee appointed at my noble Friend's instigation reported fully. The balance of evidence was, I think, in favour of my noble Friend's assertion, that serious inconvenience had arisen in several boroughs of England; that at Newcastle and other towns bribery and corruption had taken place at municipal elections: but I should explain that the class of voters in these towns is of the very lowest kind. But, after all, this inconvenience was trifling as compared with that we might have expected from the theory I am now venturing to combat, of the hostility of the various classes to each other. Some very remarkable evidence was given in this Report, to which I wish to call your Lordships' attention, with regard to the borough franchise. The Report most probably was drawn up by my noble Friend. I find in the Report to which I refer a passage to the effect that the higher order of artisan is to a man quite as intelligent and independent as the smaller shopkeepers, who, generally speaking, occupy dwellings of which the rates are paid by the landlord. The Report goes on to say that any measure which would disfranchise such men would deprive the electoral body of a valuable and respecta- ble element. The question was put by the noble Earl to several witnesses what line they would propose to draw with the view of securing in the respective constituencies the higher and better class of artisans, and for the purpose of excluding the very poor classes; and I find on looking through their evidence that almost every one of them fixed upon a £6 or a £7, and in some instances on a £5 rental as representing the points at which this line ought to be drawn, to admit the higher class of artisans and exclude the lower classes. Is this evidence which my noble Friend seeks to ignore in dealing with the question of the borough franchise? The line fixed upon by the Government is that which the Committee recommended. They have taken a £6 franchise; and in doing so they have, I believe, adopted a perfectly safe course, inasmuch as they will thereby be admitting to the exercise of the franchise that class of artizans who are by no means a lawless or reckless body of men, but who are, on the contrary, as intelligent and quite as well fitted to possess the suffrage as the smaller class of shopkeepers, and quite as independent in many towns. Now, my noble Friend also spoke this evening as if the constituencies which would be created by an uniform franchise would be in themselves necessarily of an uniform character. I must, however, contend that he could give expression to no greater fallacy. The statement of the noble Earl would not be correct even if it were confined to the case of a £6 franchise in any one town. A £6 householder in the Tower Hamlets, for instance, occupies a position entirely different from a £6 householder in Marylebone, and the same observation applies with equal justice to the east and west ends of Manchester. But if this be true of individual towns it may be still more fairly said with respect to the different boroughs which are scattered over the face of the country, some of which are of a purely agricultural character; that is to say, whose artizans and shopkeepers have relations rather with the neighbouring county gentlemen and farmers than with the manufacturing class, while the relations of others stand upon the contrary footing. When, therefore, my noble Friend seeks to secure variety by means of a varying franchise he seems to forget to take into account the different effects which will be produced on different parts of England by a franchise uniform in itself. Instead of uniformity I contend that the result would be that Members would be sent to the House of Commons representing every variety of interests. The House will, I hope, excuse me for having trespassed so long upon their attention, but I could not, as a Member of the Government, deem it to be consistent with my duty to sit down without entering my protest against the doctrines which the noble Earl has this evening laid down. I may, perhaps, before resuming my seat, be permitted to say a few words with regard to the question of delay. The noble Earl in the commencement of his speech intimated that the Reform Bill had hitherto made slow progress in the other House of Parliament, and implied that this delay was owing to the dislike of the measure which there prevailed. My noble Friend has, however, omitted, in dealing with that part of the subject, to lay before the House two most important facts, the first of which is that the discussion of the Bill has, perhaps unfortunately, but certainly unavoidably, been retarded in consequence of the fact that it was brought forward concurrently with a financial scheme of unusual importance. He forgot, in the second place, to mention that the Conservative party in the House of Commons announced it to be their intention not to oppose the second reading of a measure the principle of which might be regarded as having already received the sanction of the Legislature. Under these circumstances I do not think that my noble Friend is justified in supposing that it is not the desire of the leading men of all parties that the settlement of the question of Reform should be effected during the present Session, and by means of the present Bill. Nor can I too earnestly impress upon your Lordships the conviction that serious complications may arise from postponing that settlement. Such a course may prove dangerous to the constitution, and could not be otherwise than injurious to the character of our public men. Their sincerity in dealing with this important question is already becoming suspected, and a contrast is drawn by the journals of the day between the professions with regard to it which they make at general elections, and the language which they make use of in their places in Parliament. Do you desire, then, to defer all decisive action in the matter until the country becomes the scene of widespread agitation, or is it not rather your wish to set it at rest at a moment when you may do so without being influenced by undue external pressure? I entertain no doubt as to the answer which ought to be returned to such a question; and I trust now that we have before Parliament a measure of Reform which, in its main features, is not essentially distinct from that of the late Government, a sufficient degree of public spirit and a sufficient absence of acrimony will be manifested on the part of the majority in both branches of the Legislature to enable us, if not to pass the Bill in its present shape, at all events, to fix upon the amount of the franchise in boroughs and counties to which we shall be prepared to assent. I shall only add that it is the sincere wish of Her Majesty's Government that this question should be kept no longer—to use the phrase of the noble Earl—"dangling" before the House and the country, but that it should be settled in a manner consistent with the increased political liberty of the people, and at the same time, with the due maintenance of our political institutions.

LORD VIVIAN

said, he did not rise to address their Lordships on this question; but reference having been made to a letter which he had received, he begged to say that the person who wrote that letter was a person on whose ability and accuracy he could rely. The writer of the letter was the clerk of a particular union in the county, and contained the following passage:— Since I had the conversation with your Lordship on the subject of my return to the Poor Law Board I have revised it, and find it to be strictly correct. On the face of the rates there would appear to be an addition of 55 electors, but, as the gross estimated rental in the Bodmin rate is 20 per cent below the actual rent, the addition would really be much greater. Mr. Bray, the town clerk, tells me that he has gone through the rates of Bodmin borough and parish with the overseers, and that eighty at least would be added to the constituency under the £6 rental franchise. This would be just double the number given in the printed Report. As I made all the necessary deductions before my Return was forwarded to the Poor Law Board, I am at a loss to conceive why 20 per cent has been since deducted from the number on the rates.

THE EARL OF DERBY

I cannot, my Lords, but apprehend, after what has fallen from the noble Duke who has just addressed you, and who deprecates the introduction of acrimony into this discussion so strongly, that he and the other Members of Her Majesty's Government are not even yet sufficiently impressed with the vast importance of this subject, and that the noble Duke himself, more especially in the speech which we have this evening heard from him, and by the reference which he has made to the conduct of former Ministers, is less desirous—or would, at all events appear to be less desirous—to arrive at an amicable and satisfactory settlement of this question than of keeping alive the spirit of party agitation, and seeking to throw upon the shoulders of his political opponents that which, according to him, is the invidious task which he and his colleagues have very reluctantly undertaken. The noble Duke has favoured us with his historical reminiscences; and though my recollection extends a good deal further back than that of the noble Duke, the noble Duke has one advantage over me, because, I cannot, of course, presume to enter into any discussion of those mysterious conversations, and those various inducements which were held forth at the time when the noble Duke was a Member of the Cabinet, and of which I know nothing, but which led to the original introduction of the Reform Bill.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

I alluded to what took place in Lord John Russell's Cabinet in 1852, of which I certainly was not a member.

THE EARL OF DERBY

At what period in 1852?

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

I think I am right in stating that the first Reform Bill of Lord John Russell was introduced in the month of February, 1852.

THE EARL OF DERBY

In extremis?

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

Possibly.

THE EARL OF DERBY

I merely wish to say, in answer to the noble Duke, that he need not have reminded us of the special inducements under which particular Members of the Cabinet were led to sanction the propositions which he has taunted the noble Earl with having assented to. I do not know anything of them; I do not pretend to know—I do not wish to know—anything in reference to them. But he has gone further, and he has certainly surprised the House by one fact—which, as it has been stated by the noble Duke, I must assume to be a fact—namely, that Lord John Russell, of all men in the world, was extremely unwilling to deal with this question of Parliamentary Reform, that he, to the best of his power, resisted the reduction of the county franchise to £10, and that he was opposed to the measures which afterwards he certainly proposed. Lord John Russell was dragged, a reluctant victim to circumstances, bound to the chariot wheels of a triumphant Parliamen- tary majority; and so, contrary to his own earnest desires, at variance with his own cherished opinions on the subject, Lord John Russell became a convert to the principles of further Parliamentary Reform. Perhaps some few years hence we may find the noble Duke himself assenting to the principle of universal suffrage and vote by ballot, which he says, much as he dislikes it, is not altogether so bad as it is represented. The noble Duke, I know not why, has thought fit to deal with the measure proposed by the late Government, and the terms and conditions on which that Bill was introduced; and, little as I desire, and still less as I expected, that any such discussion would have been forced on us, I am not unwilling to meet the noble Duke on that ground, and to state precisely the course Her Majesty's Government then took, and which they thought best adapted for the final settlement of the question. The noble Duke has stated, not quite correctly, that on the first entry of that Government into office, I pledged myself to the introduction of a measure of Parliamentary Reform. I carefully guarded myself against giving any such pledge. But I did pledge myself that during the recess Her Majesty's then Ministers would devote their best attention to the consideration of that very difficult question, with the hope that, if there was public feeling such as we trusted to find at both sides of the House, we should be able to submit a measure, which, if it failed to satisfy the extremes of either party, would receive the sanction and support of all moderate men. I stated at the time that I was induced to take this course, not by any conviction in my own mind that for practical purposes an alteration of the existing system of representation was positively called for, but by the fact that successive Ministries had pledged what might be considered the honour of the Crown—had pledged the Crown in person—to an attempt to settle the existing difficulties. Accepting the responsibility of that promise, and trusting we might be met in a spirit of fairness and generosity, I endeavoured—without a sense of its intrinsic necessity, but I hope I need not say I honestly endeavoured—to redeem the pledge which had been bequeathed to us by our predecessors. I was glad to hear from the noble Duke opposite that justice has not been done to the merits of that Bill. Its history is fresh in the recollection of your Lordships, and I need not remind you of the course which the discus- sion took. The noble Duke has taken the opportunity of referring to speeches made prior to the dissolution by my right hon. Friend who then filled the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Disraeli); and he has quoted passages in which he stated that it was necessary to deal with this question with a view to the representation, more or less, of a portion of the working classes of this country. That representation we endeavoured honestly to secure, without the injurious consequences which, as I believe, are involved in the measure of Her Majesty's present Government. We did not think it was desirable or expedient that the borough franchise should be reduced generally below £10, so as to create that flood of the lower class of voters which would be introduced if the present Bill should unhappily receive the sanction of your Lordships and of Parliament. I acknowledge that Parliament differed from us on that ground; but we thought it was a matter of no insignificant importance to secure it by the identification of the borough and country franchise. The material distinctions between these have been already so far done away with that they can hardly be said to subsist in practice; and therefore in reducing the county franchise to the same amount as that in boroughs, where we declined to lower it, we acted on the opinion, which I hold now, that identity of the franchise affords the best security against future agitations for the reduction either of one or of the other. I was very much struck with what took place in the course of the elections which followed the overthrow of the Government. To the circumstances under which that overthrow took place I will not now recur. We had been in hopes that our propositions would have met with fair and candid consideration; that if the Bill, to a great extent, had met the views of hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition side of the House they would have been willing to sanction the second reading, and to discuss with us in Committee what seemed to them most to require amendment. The noble Duke thinks this a fitting occasion to taunt us as if we had abandoned the views which we entertained, though all our efforts were directed to prevent the agitation of these questions before the time at which they would properly come on for consideration. And how was that measure met? Not even by moving Amendments, or by stating the objections which they might entertain; but, for the purpose of escaping from the necessity of moving Amendments, it was met by an abstract Resolution, such as we know noble Lords and hon. Gentlemen opposite are very well practised in laying down, but which on certain questions they subsequently find it absolutely impossible to adhere to. By that ungenerous device, aided by concert with other parties, and by an understanding, in which, if we are to believe what is passing at present, one of the parties seems to have been very much deceived as to the intentions of the Government, a narrow and small majority was given to the Opposition. An appeal to the country followed, the result of which undoubtedly was to return a House of Commons which did not approach the discussion of specific principles, but in a mere party fight between opposing bodies, gave on a vote of want of confidence a majority which was certainly not large, but was still sufficient to overthrow the Government and to change the hands in which power had been deposited. During the elections I was much struck by a speech made by the right hon. Gentleman who now fills the office of Secretary of State for the Home Department, (Sir G. C. Lewis) in which there was a great deal of very good sense, on which I hoped Her Majesty's present Government were about to act. In that speech the right hon. Gentleman declared his opinion that under the circumstances of the case it was matter of absolute necessity that any person or any Government who proposed to bring in a Reform Bill should distinctly point out to the House the points as to which, in the opinion of the Government, there existed a necessity of Reform, the specific defects in the former Reform Bill which required to be corrected, the points in which it had failed to answer the expectations of its promoters, and in what respects it had failed to satisfy the just expectations of the country; and having thus realized the difficulties of the case and perceived what were the defects of the former Bill, they should apply the provisions of the new Bill to remedy those defects, and should be able to point out what specific remedy they were prepared to prescribe for the objections which had been raised. When it was first announced that Her Majesty's present Government intended to introduce a measure of Parliamentary Reform to satisfy the just expectations of the country, and above all, to comply with the wise recommendations of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, I went down, I confess, with great anxiety and the deepest interest to the place into which, by the courtesy of the House of Commons, your Lordships are permitted when discussions are taking place. Of course, I am precluded from referring in the slightest degree to what I heard in that place. On going into the House, as I recollected the same great actor performing the same great part twenty-five years previously, I certainly was considerably struck with the very altered condition of the benches and the galleries as compared with what I recollected them on the occasion to which the noble Lord specifically called our attention by saying that he would bring forward this Reform Bill on a day that was not without its significance, namely, the 1st of March. If by significance be meant the significance of contrast, certainly no day could be better devised, if he proposed to compare the 1st of March, 1831, with the 1st of March, 1860. I said I would not refer to what I heard fall from the noble Lord in the discussion; but as by an habitual breach of privilege we are enabled to obtain some information as to what takes place in this and the other House of Parliament, I can entirely corroborate, by my own personal testimony, the accuracy of those statements by which we were enabled the next day to collect what were the views of Her Majesty's Government in introducing this measure, and by what principles they intended to be guided. I must confess—if I am not speaking disrespectfully of the House of Commons—that the tone of the debate appeared more to resemble the discussion on a Turnpike Bill than that on a measure of Parliamentary Reform; and I cannot say that the mode in which this great scheme was brought under the consideration of the House was such as to bespeak for it very grave consideration or to load to the expectation that it would be soon and satisfactorily settled. As far as I could collect the opinions of the Government on the following day, it did not appear that any consideration pressed upon their minds beyond the number of persons that would have to be added to the constituencies to redeem the pledge which had been given. No effort was made to point out the specific defects of the present system; there were no attempts to show that under the existing system many persons properly qualified by intelligence, by position, and by capacity for exercising the franchise, were improperly excluded from it, while others, inferior to them in every respect, enjoyed, or rather possessed that privilege. And there is one point on which, I confess, I am not prepared to go with the noble Duke; it is the appreciation he appears to attach to the possession of the franchise. The main object of the franchise is to secure the representative body that may best conduct the government of the country; that object must be attained mainly by the quality of the constituencies and the votes of those who can wisely and judiciously, freely and independently, exercise their privilege. It was impossible for us not to see that there were large classes who, by the provisions of the last Reform Bill, confining the vote to £10 householders, were altogether excluded from the franchise, though perfectly qualified and fully entitled to possess it; and it was very important they should be added to the constituency, whatever their number. By a variety of franchises we thought we should add to the constituencies, not the whole body of the working classes, but a considerable number of them, applying sufficient tests to show that they were the most steady, intelligent, and industrious, as well as the least improvident of their class—the least migratory, and having the deepest interest in the locality, and in the general welfare of the country. To that class we were willing and anxious to extend the franchise; and now I hope the noble Duke will understand in what sense we were willing and anxious to admit the working classes to a fair share of the representation. We proposed to give the franchise to persons who for a certain time had occupied furnished or unfurnished lodgings, often at a considerable amount of rent. This lodger franchise would also have included many industrious mechanics and artizans, as well as many persons of education, property, and intelligence, very superior to several classes which now possess the franchise, and who, merely because they are not £10 householders, are now, to a great extent, excluded from the exercise of the privilege. We proposed also that the possession of a certain amount of personal property, of deposits to a certain amount in a savings bank, should constitute a claim to the franchise. In short, we were desirous to give a right to the elective franchise to every one who could show he had a permanent stake in the country, and from whose character and mode of life we had reason to believe he would exercise the privilege honestly, temperately, and judiciously, and to the best of his ability. These were the principles for which we contended; and when the present Bill was introduced I hoped to hear that where we had fallen short of expectation, or where our measure left any practical difficulty or grievance, to those difficulties and grievances a remedy had been applied. But all I heard with regard to the franchise was this—that the number of the constituencies must be increased. Now, except so far as the increase may have an undue influence on the present constituencies, the number of the electors is the least important point. It is the quality of the constituencies that is important. If you have a properly qualified constituency—whether it is 200,000 or 500,000, or even 1,000,000,—the mere question of numbers is the least important at all. You may add 1,000,000 to the constituencies so that the quality be irreproachable. But the only question that appears to have entered the minds of Her Majesty's Government is, by what reduction of the franchise could they obtain a given number of electors? In introducing the Bill the only argument of the Government was this,—looking at the boroughs, a £9 franchise will give so many votes; an £8 franchise so many more; a £7 so many more; and by a £6 franchise we shall obtain exactly 203,000 additional votes. That is literally all the argument of the Government; it took a £6 qualification because it would give 203,000 votes, neither more nor less. If that is the only argument on which the £6 qualification is to be adopted by the House of Commons, then the inquiry asked for by the noble Earl, and which I am gratified to hear will be acceded to by the Government, though under some pressure.—[The Duke of ARGYLL: No pressure.] No pressure! Very well; but I was about to say that if the main argument for the Bill is that these 203,000 voters will be no undue augmentation of the constituencies, then it is important to ascertain what may be the probable result of the extension. And I am afraid, when we come to examine, we shall find Her Majesty's Government has no very accurate foundation for the estimate it has submitted. The noble Duke says the Government consents to this Committee of Inquiry under no pressure, that it is voluntarily conceded, and that the subject deserves investigation. I think Her Majesty's Government must have some doubts on their own minds whether their data are as clear as they are supposed to be, and whether there is not room for fur- ther inquiry into the practical results of the measure they have proposed. Then the noble Duke says the Committee is conceded on the understanding that it is not proposed for the purpose of delay. I am quite prepared to say that the Committee will not be used for the mere purpose of delay; but if the noble Duke supposes that, whatever the degree of progress made in the inquiry, legislation on this subject is, nevertheless, to go on, then Her Majesty's Government is placed in a position I cannot comprehend. The investigation is either intended to satisfy the mind of Parliament or resolve the doubts of the Government as to the accuracy of its own data; the noble Duke himself thinks it likely to be useful. Useful for what? For the purpose of determining whether this measure ought to receive the sanction of this and the other House of Parliament. You are not asking for the inquiry merely for your own information and instruction; the investigation is intended to ascertain whether a certain measure can be wisely, safely, and judiciously adopted by Parliament. Then, I say, if Parliament passes the measure, and the Committee continues its inquiry, Parliament, after it has passed it, may receive a Report stating that the Bill has been sanctioned on erroneous data, and is a dangerous measure. The Report of the Committee may condemn a measure you have already passed. I earnestly hope the House of Commons will take full time to consider the data that may be laid before the Committee. The loss of one Session, or even of two Sessions, would be more than adequately compensated by the certainty of proceeding on sound data, and knowing the probable consequences of the measure. On a subject important enough in itself, but insignificant in comparison with this—the system of purchase in the army—I was glad to hear my right hon. Friend the Secretary for War declare that the Government did not intend to proceed one inch beyond the stage of which they could clearly see the effect and consequences. I only hope he has inculcated the same caution on his colleagues with regard to this far more important question. The inquiry of this Committee may tend to throw light upon a subject which is at present in great darkness, and enable us to judge how far we can adopt a proposition which has been very imperfectly and unsatisfactorily laid before us. I should deprecate it as a great misfortune if this House should be under the necessity of rejecting a measure sent up by the House of Commons, or, by important modifications of it, seek to force upon the House of Commons provisions which they did not approve. I do not mean to say that the question does not vitally affect your Lordships. It affects the whole country generally—it affects the whole constitution; but it is important that the main provisions of a measure which relates directly to the representation of the other House should be introduced with the sanction of that House. Still, whatever may be the objections to a modification or rejection, if this Bill were to come up to your Lordships in its present state, with its present simple provisions—simple they are called, and simple they are, undoubtedly, in one sense, but most dangerous they will be found—I should think its rejection for the purpose of further consideration infinitely preferable to the adoption of a measure, the most unstatesmanlike, the most unconstitutional, and the most inconclusive of any which has been submitted by any Government on this important subject. My Lords, without impugning the motives of the Government, or imputing to them or the persons employed by them any wish to deceive, we deny altogether the accuracy of the Returns which have been submitted to Parliament, and we are prepared to show that in regard to many boroughs they are notoriously erroneous. Every day almost I receive letters from persons offering evidence to show that such is the case in regard to this borough or that. That is a point which ought to be fairly and carefully inquired into, and the Committee might very advantageously make the inquiry. But, even admitting the Government Returns to be correct, what is the alteration which they are about to make? According to those Returns, the number of borough voters is now 440,000; to this it is proposed to make a gross addition of 240,000. Allowing a deduction of 20 per cent, there is a net addition of 203,000. That may seem to be an unimportant addition, but you will recollect that there is a very small addition to the metropolitan constituencies. Deducting the metropolitan and University constituencies from the whole body, the number of the present constituency is 288,540, and to this you are about to add 203,000. Therefore, according to the Government Returns, you are about to make an addition of 5.7ths to the existing constituencies; and the whole of this addition is not to be taken, as was proposed in our measure, from a number of classes, some higher and some lower, but all from the very lowest class, from the very lowest scale of voters. Of this gross addition of 254,000 not more than one-third are between £8 and £10 householders; the other two-thirds are between £6 and £8. If we are to assume, as I am afraid we must, that the lower we go in the scale of voters, the greater is the risk of a want of judgment, a want of due appreciation of the vote—of a liability to undue influence and corruption—then I say that, on the Government's own showing, the change which they propose is sufficiently important to make us pause and consider before we admit so large an infusion of what I must call, without offence, the democratic element into the House of Commons. But, if the information which reaches me is anything like correct, the numbers mentioned by the Government afford no just view of the real state of the case. The increase of 203,000 of which they speak, according to some, must be more than double; and no statement which I have heard places the addition which ought to be made to it at less than 50 per cent. And recollect that this addition is not made equally over the whole constituencies of the country. There are more titan thirty towns in which, even assuming the correctness of the Government figures, the addition to the existing constituencies would range from 100 to 380 per cent. How is it possible to argue that these boroughs will not be in the possession and under the control of the very lowest class of voters; and that that which has happened by the reduction of the municipal franchise will happen also in regard to the Parliamentary franchise—that parties who have no concern whatever in the expenditure will be those who will virtually regulate taxation? Consequently, even if you have no corruption, if you have none of those scenes which the noble Earl opposite has so forcibly described as the result of a low franchise in the United States, you will, at any rate, set an irresistible temptation before the lowest class of voters to tax for their own benefit, with an ignorant prodigality of which no judgment can be formed, those higher classes whom they erroneously suppose to be the authors of the great expenditure. The noble Duke reminded us—and I can assure him there was no danger of our forgetting it—that this Reform Bill which is to give this great power to the lower classes is introduced simultaneously with an important Budget, I must say that the very fact of the simultaneous introduction of the two measures requires double caution from Parliament before taking the irrevocable step which is proposed to us. The noble Duke thinks that the noble Earl who introduced this Motion—in my opinion with much moderation, judgment, and power—went out of his way to point out the dangers which have resulted in the United States from the preponderance of the lower order of voters. But is that warning wholly to be thrown away in considering a Reform Bill for this country? Have we not those among us, exercising great influence over this very low class of voters, whose boast is that they desire to Americanize our institutions? Have we not too much sanction given by high authority, as connected with the Budget and prospective finance, to the notion that the present taxation presses too heavily upon the lower classes and too lightly upon the higher? Have we not heard rejoicing at the anticipated success of the Budget, on the ground that if we need to make any effort at any future time, either for defence or to carry on a war, the expense must fall upon the rich few and not on the many poor? and was not the impossibility of raising sufficient sums by direct taxation for military operations referred to with exultation, as being an important result of this valuable Budget? And now you are asked to give to a class of voters most likely to be under such influences a preponderating control over the finances of the country, at the very moment when such a Budget is introduced, and when the deficiency, too, promises to be even more serious next year than it has proved this present year. Nay, more; it was stated by the Government that we ought to leave financial questions to the unbiassed decision of the new Parliament. Is not that a reason why we should not constitute the new Parliament in such a manner that it will be open to those influences and temptations which are most likely to surround it? And is it an imaginary danger, when we are told by those who boast of their influence over the large body of non-electors, that their power will so far preponderate as to render any increase of revenue, except by direct taxation, wholly impossible, that this measure will cramp the resources, fetter the energies, and do away with the military power of the country? That alone is reason enough for a severe examination into the accuracy of the data and the amount of power which the Government are about to throw into the hands of a portion of the community whose loyalty and good feeling I do not doubt, but whose proneness to be acted upon by interested agitators, and whose inability to form a just view of political subjects, I venture, with all respect to their many virtues, greatly to fear and regret. I will only revert to one point with regard to the accuracy or inaccuracy of these Returns. It seems to be supposed that the discrepancy between the number of electors and the number of houses affording a qualification is because the persons for whom a composition is made do not appear. That is not the fallacy in the Return to which I wish to refer. But there are two fallacies which the noble Duke will see at once go to the very root of the basis which the Government have taken for their measure. Your Lordships will recollect that the argument of the Government is that only a certain number will be added to the present amount of electors. Two questions then arise:—What is the present amount? and, What is the number about to be added? For the purpose of ascertaining the present number of electors the Government have taken the parochial registers. Now, these registers do not give the number of electors, but they do give the number of names. Consequently, if one name is repeated half-a dozen times, it represents five more electors than is really the fact. I apprehend that no means have been taken by which that fallacy has been avoided. The Return certainly gives the names, and not the present number of electors. That is the less important fallacy of the two. The more important is this:—the Government have taken as their data the gross estimated rental, and have obtained Returns of the houses the gross estimated rental of which is £10 and upwards, £9, £8, £7, £6, and so on. By-the-by, the Government have a Return of the Houses the gross estimated rental of which is £5, and I should very much like to see it, for the reason which I am about to state. The gross estimated rental is taken as the basis on which the Government proceed, making a deduction of 20 per cent for tenements occupied by women and unoccupied. But though the gross estimated rental is taken for the purpose of rating, it is not the rental value, and it is notoriously, upon an average, 20 per cent below the rent actually paid. The qualification is not upon the gross esti- mated value, but on the actual rent which each individual can prove to the Revising Barrister that he pays. It has been found that in many cases persons rated at a gross estimated value of less than £10 are electors, because they can prove they are paying above £10, and that is the only mode in which to account for the fact that the registered electors are greater in number in some boroughs than the total number of £10 qualifying houses—because a few freemen or a few freeholders will not account for the discrepancy. If that is so, it is very likely a £5 or a £4 gross estimated rental will make a voter under a £6 qualification, and I should like, therefore, to see what is the Return which the Government have in their possession of the gross estimated rentals of £5. I know they have it. I know at least that they sent for it, and I can only suppose that they do not produce it because they are relying on the accuracy of their calculations, and, as they do not propose less than a £6 qualification they do not think it necessary to give the Return lower. But if an estimated value of £4 or £5 should give, as is very likely, votes under a £6 qualification, the Return may, perhaps, astonish Her Majesty's Government, and supply facts of which they are not at present aware. I am sorry that the observations of the noble Duke should have led me into so detailed a discussion of the operation of a measure which is not actually before us. But I do think it is of great importance that Parliament should not legislate upon this subject without full and accurate data, more especially seeing that there is no great public impatience; that, provided Parliament is seen to be dealing honestly with the question, there is no danger of any great or serious agitation, and that there is no deep anxiety among large classes of the community for any great alteration of the existing system; and, moreover, seeing that there is the utmost apprehension of the consequences among the more respectable even of the lower class of existing voters, I do think it is a matter of the deepest importance that there should, be a full, searching, and impartial inquiry before the Committee moved for by the noble Earl. I hope that whatever time may be occupied by the Committee in bonâ fide inquiries, the Government will not attempt to force through, in ignorance of facts which are necessary for our proper judgment, a measure, whether for weal or woe, the most important which has ever been submitted to Parliament, and which, in its present state, I am painfully convinced is likely to endanger the whole balance of the constitution, to return a House of Commons irreconcilably at variance with this House, and to lead to perpetual collisions between the two Houses, which it is the bounden duty of every Minister to keep in harmonious action. If, unhappily, the Bill, unguarded by other provisions, should pass, and a preponderance of power be given to one class, I fear that the result will be not only to unsettle the constitution of the country, but either to make your Lordships' House a permanent obstruction to the legislation of the Lower House, or to sweep it away altogether, and with it to sweep away the Monarchy and our most cherished institutions. I do not say this to prevent its adoption after full discussion, if it be wise and practicable, but because it is of vital consequence that no step, which must be irrevocable, should be unadvisedly taken in a matter of such deep importance.

EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, I have carefully listened to the three speeches which have been made this evening. The speech of the noble Earl who opened the discussion was moderate and philosophical, but it was certainly equally applicable against the Bill which became law in 1832. There was one argument which the noble Earl addressed to the opposite side of the House, which I can hardly think likely to have much effect. One of the disastrous consequences which we are told will follow if we lower the franchise too much, is that we shall have a Legislature that will have recourse to protective duties. I do not believe that if we went much lower than is proposed, such would be the result; but it is a singular argument to address to a party who have only very recently been converted from the doctrines of protection. I regret, also, the very strong attack made by the noble Earl upon the institutions of America, and am afraid that, coming from so distinguished a Member of the Upper House of this country, it will produce much irritation in the minds of the people of the United States. I agree in some of the remarks which he made, although generally they were much exaggerated; but the adoption of such a constitution as that of the United States is very different from the moderate extension of the franchise which has been proposed in this country. The noble Earl, as an instance of the injurious effects of democratic institutions, referred to the corruption by which Railway Bills had been promoted in one of the States; but I am afraid our own early legislation in such matters was not so entirely pure and free from reproach, as to justify us in attributing the bribery in America solely to the democratic character of the Government. I was surprised to hear the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) accuse my noble Friend (the Duke of Argyll) of having indulged in acrimonious language. In the whole of that able and closely-reasoned speech, I did not, for my own part, hear a single phrase fall from him to which that epithet could be justly applied. My noble Friend, it is true, quoted Hansard; and it is sometimes very disagreeable to remind noble Lords of what they and members of their party have formerly said; but he did so only in a historical way, for the purpose of showing how public men on both sides of the House have gradually arrived at the conclusion which Her Majesty's Government have now adopted. The noble Earl opposite has given us an account of his own conduct in connection with the Reform Bill of the late Government. He has made the very singular acknowledgment that when he, as the Prime Minister of this country, introduced his Reform Bill into Parliament, he entertained at the same time the deliberate and clear conviction, that such a measure was unnecessary. It is also not a little remarkable that the very strong declaration made by Mr. Disraeli, as leader of the House of Commons, on the part of the late Government, that it was necessary to deal with the lowering of the franchise in boroughs, should have remained uncontradicted and unqualified, so as to have its full effect on the vote of the House, and that the noble Earl should now tell us it was then, and is still, his firm conviction, that the only sound principle to be adopted is the maintenance of the two franchises on an equality. The noble Earl then made an attack on the principle of the Bill which has been introduced by the present Government. It is, however, quite irregular to discuss a Bill not before us, and I do not think it desirable to do so; but, as the noble Earl asserted that the Government, determined to get a large quantity of new voters, had gone down as low as they could to catch hold of them, I feel bound to state the principle upon which we have proceeded. Considering the great spread of intelligence of late years among the population of this country, the Government are of opinion that it is desirable to extend the franchise to a number of persons who may usefully exercise it. Entirely disagreeing with the view that as long as a man is well governed he has no interest in having his humble share in the Government of the country, and holding that an element of strength is added to the Constitution when all those who are capable of exercising the franchise properly are allowed to do so, we have thought it desirable to see how far down we can go, without producing that enormous increase of numbers which would swamp the other interests of the country. Both the noble Earl, who moved for the Committee, and the noble Earl opposite, say that we have gone too far. The noble Earl opposite, however, should recollect that, according to the admission of Mr. Disraeli, his own Bill would have increased the constituency of the country by something like half a million. The noble Earl said that, arguing from the returns of the Government, we proposed too large an increase of the constituency, but that he had reason to believe the Returns were altogether inaccurate. I can only repeat what has been already said, that the Government believe that they are as accurate as it is possible for Returns of that description to be. I will not go into details, which had better be left to the Committee to inquire into; but I may say, in answer to the noble Earl, that very generally the gross estimated rental is the actual rental paid. The noble Earl regards the willingness of the Government to agree to this Committee as an acknowledgment of our guilt; but our object is simply to satisfy those who question the accuracy of our Returns that their suspicions are groundless, and that we have framed our measure neither on erroneous nor insufficient data. I would ask the noble Earl whether, when he was eloquently advocating the Reform Bill of 1832, he had in any degree as distinct a notion of what would be the result of the extension of the franchise as we have in regard to the present measure? The Government consent to the appointment of this Committee with the most sincere desire to meet the wishes of those who are anxious to procure full and accurate information on this important subject; and any Returns which are in our possession, or which we can obtain, shall be unreservedly at the use of the Committee. I am not clear, however, that any great political advantage will be derived from this Committee; and I wish the noble Earl had explained more fully the manner in which the evidence required is to be pro- cured. Much of it will, of course, consist merely of copies of rate-books and other official records; but a portion of it will take the shape of estimates, and the mode in which such estimates are to be formed seems a difficult point. I am not sorry that the Committee has been moved for, but there is much in the general tone of the speeches on the subject which I certainly do regret. The noble Earl, in deprecating the language employed in treating of the question of Reform, alluded, I understood, to what had been said by one speaker who has expressed his views of the effect of Parliamentary Reform on the financial arrangements of the country. Now, I believe that speaker to be a very earnest and sincere man, although I disagree with many of the views which he holds, and among others his representation of the aristocracy as selfish, illiberal, and opposed to the popular feeling. I believe that representation has made no impression on the public—it has fallen flat on the public ear, because hitherto they have seen reason to believe the contrary. But I must say I can hardly understand any course more likely to strengthen the hands of anybody who wishes to create a prejudice against the aristocracy than for the noble Earl to seize this early opportunity of attacking a measure which his own party in the other House do not venture to oppose on the second reading, of proclaiming the hostile feeling with which it will be received when it comes into your Lordships' House, and of expressing his opinion that it should be postponed for a Session or two. I do not think the noble Earl is justified in using such language to represent the feeling of the House of Lords. I believe that, while your Lordships are averse to any dangerous innovations, you are convinced of the desirability of disposing of this question at a moment when the working classes are moderate in their claims and hopeful of receiving justice at your hands without the exercise of any extraordinary pressure. I cannot believe that, either directly or indirectly, the adoption of this measure will produce the fearful consequences predicted by the noble Earl opposite—the destruction of all our institutions, the Monarchy not excepted. On the contrary, I hold the firm conviction that it will tend greatly to strengthen those institutions and promote the happiness and prosperity of the nation. As I have said, the Government do not oppose this Committee; but I wish to protest against the idea that its appointment is in any way to tie our hands in promoting our measure of reform, or that we are to be restricted in advancing it through Parliament by the length of time the Committee may think fit to bestow on any point of the inquiry.

EARL GREY

My Lords, I must in the first place apologise to a noble Earl on the other side (the Earl of Eglintoun) for having from inadvertence omitted to notice the suggestion he offered to me immediately before I rose to address your Lordships, that I should alter the terms of my Motion so as to extend the inquiry to Ireland and Scotland. I do not doubt that a similar inquiry to that which I have proposed for England is also wanted for the other parts of the United Kingdom; but I think in inquiring into the representation of England, one Committee will have quite as much work as it can well get through. My Lords, I turn now to a matter which affects myself personally—I mean the share which I had in the responsibility of proposing to Parliament the measure of Reform brought forward in 1852. The allusion which has been made to-night to that subject imposes on me the necessity—I assure your Lordships it is to me an unpleasant necessity—of explaining the circumstances which induced me to join in that course. Having had some anticipation that some remark might be made on that subject, I have obtained the permission of Her Majesty to refer to what took place in the Cabinet at that period. My explanation is a very simple one. I cheered the observation of the noble Duke when he said, I implied that the Reform Bill of 1852 originated from the indiscretion of my noble Friend then at the head of the Government. I am bound to say that such is my opinion; I think the original difficulty on this subject arose from the fact which is, I believe, well known to all your Lordships, although it may never perhaps have been publicly stated—namely, that three or four years before that Bill was introduced Lord John Russell, as the head of the Cabinet, without any previous concert or communication with his colleagues, committed himself by expressing in the House of Commons the opinion that the time was come when a change ought to be made in the measure of 1832. That opinion was expressed without the intention to express it having been intimated, as far as I know, to any one of his colleagues, and certainly not to the Cabinet. I believe when that announcement was made it was not approved by any, or at least not by more than one or two, members of the Ca- binet. For myself, I can say it had my most entire disapproval—a feeling which I did not attempt to conceal, as Lord John Russell can testify. It is perfectly true, as the noble noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) has remarked, that subsequently circumstances occurred in 1851, which rendered it exceedingly difficult for Lord John Russell's Government to avoid dealing with the question of reform. In that year, as the noble Duke has stated, the Government of Lord John Russell was defeated in the House of Commons on Mr. Locke King's Motion for extending the right of voting in counties to £10 householders, and in consequence of that defeat the members of the Administration unanimously agreed that they ought to tender their resignation to Her Majesty. But the task of forming a new Government having been abandoned or declined by the noble Earl opposite and by Lord Aberdeen, Lord John Russell and his colleagues found themselves almost compelled to resume their offices. For myself I must say that nothing but an apparently overruling necessity compelled me to concur in this determination, on account of the inconvenience that I foresaw would ensue from the pledge which Lord John Russell had previously given on the question of reform, and which he had renewed still more explicitly in the debate that preceded the defeat of the Government. With the opinion I entertained and avowed on this question, it was with extreme reluctance that I consented, after this occurrence, to continue a Member of that Administration. But, looking at all the circumstances of that time, I felt it to be my duty to remain in the Government; and I did so, distinctly reserving to myself the right not to be regarded as standing pledged to any measure of reform until I saw what might be proposed, and not disguising my conviction that to disturb the question at all was inexpedient if it could be avoided. Such was the situation of affairs when Parliament was about to meet in 1852. The Reform Bill, which was afterwards laid upon the table of the House of Commons, was submitted to the Cabinet. For my own part I never approved it. I thought it open to the gravest objection. But, my Lords, I was induced to consent to its being introduced into Parliament by this one consideration—I felt sure that the Government was on the eve of falling, and it so happened that at that time the principal attacks made upon it were directed against the particular department with which I was intrusted. I did not think that it would be honourable towards my colleagues, or right towards myself, that at such a moment I should appear to run away from the post which I held; and being persuaded that the Bill had not the remotest chance of passing—having stated that to the Cabinet before it was brought in—I undoubtedly acquiesced in its introduction. My Lords, I freely acknowledge that in doing so I made a grievous mistake. Although my anticipations, both as to the fall of the Government and the utter failure of that Bill—which I will say unreservedly deserved to fail—were fulfilled, I confess I had not sufficiently weighed the importance of having a' measure of Reform recommended by the Crown to the attention of Parliament, or of having such a measure, even though it could not pass, introduced on the responsibility of a Government. I frankly admit that I was greatly to blame for allowing any consideration of any other kind to induce me to waive my objections to that measure and become a party to it. My Lords, I am afraid that, in the present state of public affairs, there is no public man on either side of this or the other House who can honestly acquit himself of having ever committed mistakes with regard to this important subject. I believe we have all been more or less to blame; but I think the time has come when, without reference to any feeling of reluctance to acknowledge past errors, or, indeed, any personal feeling whatever, we ought to deal with this grave question as the public interests demand. We were all, I think excusably, a little insensible to the extreme importance of this subject a few years ago. The discussions, however, of the last few years, I must own, have opened my eyes far more than before to the extreme danger of mooting this question. I believe that many of your Lordships, many Members of the other House, and the great majority of the nation, are now, in consequence of past discussions, far better aware than they were a few years ago of the real difficulties of this subject; and it follows that if we are convinced of these difficulties, and that there is no practicable mode of safely settling the subject, then I will say that prudence commends us not to deal with it. It has been said that the arguments I have used equally apply against all reform, and might have been urged against the Bill of 1832. Let me remind your Lordships how utterly different are the circumstances of the present time and those of the year 1831 when the first Reform Act was proposed. I believed then, and I am convinced now, that at that period it was a question between Reform and Revolution. A state of things then existed in which it was absolutely necessary that there should be a great displacement and transfer of political power from one class to another. For some time previous, and chiefly in the reigns of George III. and George IV., great abuses had arisen; owing to which the House of Commons had ceased to be any longer the organ of the enlightened opinion of the country. Its measures had come to be habitually directed not to the benefit of the community at large, but rather to the benefit of the few. So deep a sense of these abuses existed in the mind of the nation that a state of things prevailed which could by no possibility have been continued; and, unless a change had been accomplished by peaceful means, it would have been brought about by violence. Fortunately a measure of Reform was proposed, and, in spite of difficulties of which the public can now form no adequate estimate, was passed safely into law. The experience we have since had of its working is an ample justification of those who brought it in. The measure, no doubt, had its defects; but considering the excitement of the times in which it was carried, and the difficulties against which its advocates had to struggle, it is to me still matter of surprise that it should be marked by so few faults as are to be found in it. The fact of its having been passed as it was does great honour, if I may be permitted to say so, to the Government by whom it was introduced, and especially to the chiefs of that Government in both Houses of Parliament. The patience, the perseverance, and the ability with which the then Lord Althorp, as leader of the House of Commons, almost unassisted, sustained the whole burden of carrying that measure through Committee were beyond all praise. Is the situation now by any means to be compared to what then existed? Far from it. There is no urgent and pressing necessity for any violent displacement of political power from one class to another. Even the authors of the Bill do not contend that there is, but rest their arguments in its favour on other grounds, admitting that the House of Commons, as it is now constituted, discharges its high duties with success; that in the last twenty-eight years it has accomplished more useful and practical reforms than have been effected in any equal period of our history; and that it has shown an earnest desire to promote the good of the nation at large. The noble Duke stated that he was surprised at my speech as altogether wide of the mark, seeing the Government had not introduced a measure of universal suffrage and vote by ballot. I did not go into any discussion of the details of a Bill which is not before us, and which, if it does come before us, will, I trust and firmly believe, do so in a very altered shape. But I spoke of the general principle of the measure, the danger of greatly increasing the power of mere numbers, compared to the higher classes of society. I argued against making changes in that direction, leaving the extent to which they are to be carried to be determined by no new principle, but by mere arbitrary limits, while all the reasons assigned for the measure proposed are applicable to a larger one. I contended that by doing this we should be left without any ground to rest upon. It was against such a course that I cautioned your Lordships, and I have yet to learn that in moving for this Committee such an argument was misapplied or inappropriate. I believe, on the contrary, that it deserves your Lordships' best consideration. My noble Friend who spoke last (Earl Granville) deprecated the tone of my observations with reference to the United States of America. I trust I said nothing against the character of the American people. No one admires the character of the American people more than I do; there can be stronger proof of their great qualities than the fact that a Government so faulty in its construction and so imperfect in its arrangements should work even so well as it does. But while we feel at liberty to criticise the conduct and character of the potentates of Europe, I can see no reason why we should not express our views as to the institutions of America with equal freedom. My noble Friend expressed his fears that the effect of instituting these inquiries will be to lower this House in the opinion of the country. I, for one, do not feel the least afraid of such a result. Your Lordships' conduct will be judged rightly by the people. I firmly believe that at this moment there is among the most intelligent and educated classes of this country an earnest hope that your Lordships will perform your duty fearlessly and wisely; that upon that rest their main hopes; that they feel that while in the other House of Parliament a large proportion of the Members are, from various circumstances, afraid to act on their real opinions, and while we are told if that House were to be polled on this Bill by ballot it would be rejected by a large majority, and yet, that by an open vote it would pass by as large a one,—they feel while that language is held almost openly, that it does become this House to consider these matters with boldness, with fairness, and with determination. As to the sort of understanding of which the noble Duke has spoken on which this inquiry is to be conducted, I must profess my entire agreement with the noble Earl opposite. Most undoubtedly I do not move for this Committee with any intention of delaying the Bill. I believe we shall have time to obtain the information we require before we are called upon to consider the details of the Bill now before the other House of Parliament; but if the Bill comes before us earlier than I at present suppose, or if the inquiry should prove wider and lead us further—and I see important information bearing on the Bill, likely to be elicited—I utterly repudiate the idea that we ought to force the Bill forward without waiting for information.

Motion agreed to.

The Committee to be named To-morrow.

On the Morrow the following Lords were named of the Committee:—

Ld. President	V. Eversley
Ld. Privy Seal	L. Ashburton
M. Salisbury	L. Stanley of Alderley
Ld. Steward	L. Overstone
E. Derby	L. Belper
E. Spencer	L. Egerton
E. Grey	L. Liveden
E. Lonsdale	L. Llanover
E. Cathcart	L. Taunton
E. Stradbroke	L. Stratheden
V. Stratford de Redcliffe

House adjourned at half-past Nine o'clock till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.