HL Deb 17 April 1860 vol 157 cc1873-83

Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR,

in mov- ing the second reading of this Bill, said, it had been introduced on the recommendation of his noble and learned Friend (Lord Lyndhurst) who sat near him; and its object was to improve the procedure of a most important Court, with which the morality and domestic happiness of the community were intimately connected. For a great many years, practically speaking, any person who could prove that his wife had been unfaithful to him was considered entitled to a dissolution of the marriage tie; but that could only be obtained by an Act of the Legislature, preceded by an action for criminal conversation and by a suit in the Ecclesiastical Court. According to that practice those only who had a large sum of money to expend in these most costly proceedings could have the remedy they sought; but their Lordships most justly thought that this was not a legislative matter, but one for judicial consideration; that the remedy should be open to the poor as well as to the rich, and that a judicial tribunal should be established for that purpose. But a difficulty arose respecting those who should be the Judges of this new tribunal. It was experimental; it was desirable, first of all, to know what quantity of business was likely to be thrown into it, and not unnecessarily to increase the number of the Judges of the land. In the first instance, therefore, the Judges were the Lord Chancellor, the three Chiefs of the common law Courts, and the senior puisne Judges, with the Judge-Ordinary. It was enacted by the Bill establishing the Court that, as regards a very considerable portion of the business, the Judge-Ordinary, sitting by himself, should have power to do all that could be done by that tribunal; but there were several matters that were reserved for what was called the Full Court, consisting of three members—the Judge-Ordinary and two common law Judges to assist him. It had been found that there was great difficulty in obtaining this Full Court, the Judges being so much occupied with the increased business in their own Courts and at Chambers, going circuit, and attending that House; and to meet this difficulty it had been enacted that all the Judges of the common law Courts should be competent to act as Judges of this tribunal, the number being thus raised to seventeen. But still that was found an inadequate arrangement. All the business that could be done by the Judge-Ordinary sitting alone was speedily and satisfactorily disposed of; but that which required the attendance of three Judges had fallen most lamentably into arrear. Without the greatest inconvenience, and interfering with the administration of justice in other Courts, it was found impossible to obtain the attendance of two common law Judges to sit along with the Judge-Ordinary in full Court. It had therefore been suggested by his noble and learned Friend (Lord Lyndhurst) that the proper course would be to enable the Judge-Ordinary to do all that might be done subject to an appeal, with authority at all times to call in another Judge, or two other Judges, but to leave it to his discretion when that should be done. He entirely concurred with his noble and learned Friend in thinking that was the best course that could be adopted. He was fully persuaded that there was a great deal of the business now to be done exclusively by the Full Court that might be adequately performed by a single Judge, and to insist on three Judges was a mere waste of judicial power. There might be cases, no doubt, where a single Judge would hesitate to pronounce sentence; but he might then call in the assistance of his brother Judges in order to give such cases the fullest deliberation. He did not stand up for the doctrine maintained by some, that there should be only one Judge for every tribunal. There were cases in which it was desirable to have assistance before pronouncing sentence. He himself, after long experience, shrunk on many occasions from determining important questions of law without the assistance of his brother Judges; but there were many other cases in which justice was satisfactorily administered by a single Judge. Before this reform a single Judge sitting in the Ecclesiastical Court pronounced a sentence that was effective. The analogy here was not indeed complete, because that was only a sentence for separation a mensâ et thoro, and did not dissolve the marriage tie. But there was another analogy which he thought would remove all difficulty. By the immemorial custom of this country a single Judge presided at trials for life and death. At the assizes all over England capital cases were tried by a single Judge, and tried satisfactorily; for this reason, that if he had any doubts or scruples he consulted his brother Judge who was in the commission along with him, and he had this great additional resource that he could at all times reserve any question of law that arose for the solemn determination of all the Judges. He thought they might safely place the same confidence in the Judge-Ordinary of the Divorce Court. The learned person who now filled that high office had steered his course in a manner to give great satisfaction, and confer high benefit on the community; and, under this Bill, whenever he had the smallest reason to believe he might derive assistance in any particular case he would be enabled to call in assistance, and do what was necessary for the satisfactory settlement of the matter. This was the principal enactment of the Bill, and he hoped their Lordships would read it a second time. He by no means said, however, that this should be the permanent constitution of the Court. The respondent sometimes did not appear at all in cases which came before the Court of Divorce; so that the arguments and the evidence in those instances were all on one side In such cases the Bill gave authority to the Court to request the Queen's Proctor to instruct counsel to appear, so that both the parties to the suit might be represented. There was also another important point with which the Bill proposed to deal —the power of disposing of the property settled on the wife when a divorce took place on the ground of her adultery. That power did not under the existing law apply to executory settlements; but it seemed to him desirable that it should be so extended that the Court should have complete authority so to dispose of the property of the wife that the children of the marriage might suffer as little as possible by her misconduct. Any suggestions for the improvement of the Bill which their Lordships might offer should receive his most careful attention.

Moved, That the Bill be read 2a.

LORD ST. LEONARDS

said, that when it was originally proposed to constitute this Divorce Court, he had expressed his opinion that the Assistant Judges would never be regular in their attendance to perform a duty additional to their already heavy labours. They now proposed to fall back upon a single Judge in deciding on a dissolution of marriage, and other important matters. But what would have been said if such a proposition had formed part of the Bill when it was originally introduced? He contended that ably as the present Judge Ordinary discharged the duties of his office, with the utmost zeal and ability, the power which this Bill proposed to confer upon him was one which the Legislature would never have consented to confide to a single Judge. The best plan would be to refer the Bill to a Select Committee. The Bill as it at present stood would create general dissatisfaction. Since the Judges of the Common Law Courts were unable to attend to make a full Court, it was necessary that some other tribunal should be constituted. The effect of the Bill was to set aside all previous settlement of the question. Notwithstanding, however, that there were strong objections to the Bill upon these grounds, as well as because of the mode in which it interfered with the subject of marriage settlements, he should not oppose the second reading.

LORD LYNDHURST

said, he wished briefly to call the attention of the House to the mode in which his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack proposed to get rid of an admitted evil. Was his noble and learned friend (Lord St. Leonards) prepared to leave the law as it now stood? Two years and a quarter had elapsed since the present Court of Divorce had been called into existence. During that period 509 cases of divorce à vinculo had been entered on its records. Of these it had disposed of 177, and 232 remained to be heard. Supposing, then, that the Court were to proceed with the same degree of activity it had hitherto displayed it would take four years to dispose of the arrear of business with which it had to deal, and before the expiration of that time new cases would have accumulated. Now, he should like to know how his noble and learned Friend, who objected to the present Bill, (Lord St. Leonards) proposed to redress an evil so intolerable. There were two courses open to him in order to effect that object. He might either provide an additional number of Judges or enable the Judge-Ordinary to discharge the functions of his office without been obliged to call in the common law Judges to his aid. The assistance of those Judges had, he might observe, been made avilable up to the present only sixty-five days, or about thirty days for each year since the establishment of the Court; so that if the Judge-Ordinary were not empowered to dispense with their services the arrears of his Court could not be worked off before the lapse of the time which he had just mentioned. What course, he would ask, was it under those circumstances desirable to take? It appeared to him that there was no alternative but to dispense with the attendance of those learned personages, or else to ap- point additional Judges, and to the latter course considerable objection would be made by that and the other House of Parliament. Let it be considered what the nature of these cases was. A divorce à vinculo matrimonii depended upon the result of a trial for the offence of adultery, and such trials were, generally speaking, of a most simple character, and, for the most part, depended for their decision upon matters of fact. He might add that previous to the establishment of the Divorce Court trials for crim. con., which were of a similar character, took place before a single Judge. It was universally admitted that no man could more satisfactorily deal with such questions than the learned Judge by whom the business of the Court was at present with so much zeal and ability transacted—cases involving points of the utmost difficulty, such, for instance, as the nullity of marriage. Divorce à mensâ et thoro used also to be disposed of before a single Judge in the Ecclesiastical Courts; while in the Equity Courts the Master of the Rolls and the Vice Chancellors sitting separately decided upon questions—subject to appeal—by which the rights of individuals with respect to vast amounts of property were affected. His noble and learned Friend on the woolsack had referred to the assizes, where cases of great magnitude as regarded the property at stake, and of great intricacy in point of investigation, were continually decided by a single Judge. Questions of the utmost nicety in criminal law were decided by the same tribunal. Why, therefore, should they not trust the Judge of the Divorce Court to sit alone in deciding the cases which came before him? His noble and learned Friend had very properly referred to the power conferred in the Act of Parliament of calling in the assistance of one of the Judges of another Court in cases of great difficulty—a power similar to that which was exercised by the Judges of almost every Court. Another noble and learned Friend—who was not now present, and who was, he believed, at that moment in the neighbourhood of a very excited and disturbed population—had on a previous occasion called their Lordships attention to the question of collusion, against which he maintained that it was most important to guard. Undoubtedly collusion ought to be guarded against; but how were three Judges sitting in a Court more competent for this purpose than a single Judge? A clause had been very properly added to the present Bill by which the Queen's Proctor was authorised, at the desire of the Court, to appoint some person to investigate the case,—partly, he had no doubt, with a view to the detection of collusion. Whether this provision would be effectual for the purpose he would not pretend to say; but, at any rate, that was not the question which was now before the House. He was satisfied their Lordships would feel the absolute necessity, both in order to uphold the power of the law and the credit of the constitution, that justice should neither be delayed nor refused. The present condition of business in the Divorce Court was, however, productive of the greatest possible delay, amounting to a refusal of justice. On every ground he hoped the Bill would therefore be read a second time, unless any other measure remedying the inconvenience to which he had adverted could be pointed out by any noble Lord.

LORD CRANWORTH

said, he was inclined to concur in the proposition of his noble and learned Friend (Lord St. Leonards) to refer the Bill to a Select Committee; not because he believed it would be materially altered or improved, but inasmuch as the subject was one of vital consequence, and which interested the public to a great degree. Having had the honour of proposing the Bill in its original form, he differed from his noble and learned Friend in thinking that there was in the Bill now before the House an entire departure from the spirit of the original measure. The original mode of obtaining divorce was not strictly judicial. After a proceeding in the Ecclesiastical Court, and an action for crim. con., an application was made to their Lordships' House, which really amounted to an application to the Lord Chancellor, with one or two of the law Lords, and sometimes to the Lord Chancellor alone. It was impossible originally to ascertain to what extent the change of system would increase the number of applicants; and in the temper of the House at the time the Bill was passed a larger measure than that introduced would not have been accepted. Regard, therefore, being had to the feeling of the Legislature at that time, it was thought the best course to associate the Lord Chancellor or the Chief Justice with the Judge Ordinary in dealing with cases of divorce a vinculo matrimonii; and the burden which was thus cast upon them did not seem at the time very heavy, inasmuch as the total number of days occu- pied in their Lordships' House in the hearing of cases of divorce was usually not above two or three in the whole year. It had been sometimes thrown in the face of those who introduced and supported the measure, that the number of applications had been greatly increased; still, so far from shrinking from the responsibility of the measure, he was prepared to maintain that this circumstance afforded conclusive evidence for the necessity for such a change in the law, because by it relief was granted to persons who formerly could not have hoped to obtain it, it being under the old system unattainable, except at the cost of several thousands of pounds. By the Bill, as originally framed, the Lord Chancellor and one of the Chief Justices, with one of the senior puisne Judges, were appointed to assist the Judge Ordinary; but it was soon found that neither the Lord Chancellor nor the Chief Justices were able to attend, and a Bill was then introduced allowing any of the Judges to sit and try cases. But it being now found impossible to get through the causes because of the arrears, which accumulated faster than they could be disposed of, the only remedy was either to allow the Judge Ordinary to dispose of cases alone, or to create some other legal functionaries to assist him. To the latter course there was, he thought, an insuperable objection, as these legal functionaries would have nothing to do but to dispose of cases a vinculo matrimonii, which never presented any features of difficulty, except from the single circumstance that collusion might exist between the parties seeking the divorce. To check collusion he did not believe three Judges were in the least better adapted than one; and, though he did not mean to say that it would be entirely successful, he believed the interference of the Queen's Proctor, which it was proposed to sanction, afforded the only safeguard. He trusted that the measure, in its present form, or with but trifling alteration, would be passed into law, for he regarded it as the only practical solution of an admitted difficulty which had yet been proposed.

LORD REDESDALE

said, the Bill had been attended with the effect which he had always predicted—namely, that the business was so overwhelming as to render it impossible that it could be conducted under the provisions contained in the first Act. In the Report issued by himself on account of his inability to agree in the recommendations of his brother Commissioners, the opinion had been expressed that the effect of making divorce a common law remedy, and of removing the discretional power which had been exercised by their Lordships, would cause it to be granted in many cases in which it would have been refused by Parliament, and that thereby respect for the matrimonial tie would be greatly lessened. Everything which had occurred in the Divorce Court since it had been established had done much to lessen in the country the sanctity of the matrimonial tie; every year brought additional evidence that such was the course towards which things were tending in this country. Take the jokes that were now levelled at marriage and the Divorce Court, so common in the pantomimes and burlesques, and they must be admitted to afford strong proof that the marriage tie was no longer regarded by the people of this country with the sanctity that had hitherto attached to it. He had no objection to the alterations proposed by this Bill; but he thought some more stringent measures ought to be adopted to prevent abuse. When the question of divorce was first proposed to be taken within the domain of common law, it was argued that the proceedings of the Divorce Court should be regulated by the practice which was wont to prevail in their Lordships' House. But before the Bill passed through Parliament a departure from that rule was made; for a clause was introduced by which women were allowed to sue for divorce, which their Lordships had never permitted; and other departures had taken place under the practise of the Court from the discretion vested in the Judge being too much limited. For instance, a case occurred last year, where a man married a woman who had just before been notoriously living with another man as his mistress. After living a short time with the person who married her, she went back to the man with whom she formerly lived, and the husband sued for and obtained a divorce. He was sure their Lordships would never have granted a divorce in a case of that kind. He thought such cases ought to be prevented by authorising the Judge to exercise a discretion under such circumstances similar to that which had been exercised by Parliament. He had nothing further to say to the proposition itself, but he could not help fearing that if the cases of divorce were to be disposed of by a single Judge, they would not long be left to this high Court only. At present divorce was brought within the reach of men of moderate means. The cry would soon be raised to bring it within the reach of men of any means; and he believed that an attempt would be made to have divorces settled in other and cheaper courts than that in which it was decided at present. He concurred in all that had been said on the subject of collusion, and he would suggest that there were often cases where the friends of parties could throw important light on that question if they were admitted into the suit. For instance, it might happen that an unfortunate young man might be entrapped into a connection with a woman who was in collusion with her husband to procure a divorce; the relations of that young man might, if they were permitted, give such information as would prove the collusion. He thought, also, that compelling both parties to appear, would prove of great advantage.

EARL GRANVILLE

said, he thought it was not desirable that this Bill should be referred to a Select Committee, as it would only lead to delay. The Bill contained no new principle, and there was therefore no real reason for the proposition of the noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord St. Leonards).

THE LORD CHANCELLOR,

in reply, said he had anxiously watched the proceedings of the Divorce Court, and he earnestly desired to prevent any abuse of its powers by the suitors. He had proposed a Bill last year, by which the Judge of the Court was authorized to call in the assistance of the Attorney General in cases in which collusion between the parties to a suit was suspected. The clause was agreed to by their Lordships, but was rejected by the House of Commons. He had in the present measure done his best to prevent such collusion. It had been stated during the debate, that the Common Law Judges had time enough to preside in the Divorce Court; he contended that they had not; they were overwhelmed by the business of their own courts; and it was more advisable to give one Judge the power of deciding, than to create new Judges. He objected to refer the Bill to a Select Committee; it contained nothing that required investigation; it was limited to a single point—giving additional powers to the single Judge; and this point it was better to discuss and settle in the full House, which, he hoped, would agree to the second reading.

Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly; and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.