§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH
rose, pursuant to Notice, to call the attention of the House to the State of the Money Market in India as affected by recent Notifications: and said,—My Lords, the recent accounts received from India give so serious a view of financial embarrassment and failure that I think it right to call your Lordships' attention to the facts. On the 22nd of January the Four per Cents were at 85, and the Five per Cents at 92½ on the 2nd of February the Four per Cents had fallen to 76, and the Five per Cents to 87, being a fall of 9 per cent in the Four per Cents, and 5½ in the Five per Cents. My Lords, that the Funds should fall at that moment was the last thing that might have been expected from the political aspect of affairs. Lord Clyde had been successful in Oude; all armed rebellion had been apparently put down; Tantia Topee, the Begum, and their companions, had either sought refuge in Nepaul, or had disappeared in the deserts, and we had had great successes in Central India; everything indicated that a general pacification of the country was at hand; and it is in that state of affairs that the Funds usually experience a rise. It is impossible, therefore, to attribute the great fall which has taken place to any other circumstance than the financial aspect of affairs. This is not a question confined merely to the state of the funded debt of India. I understand that the Bank of Bombay has been in difficulties which rendered it unable to afford the usual convenience of discount to the commercial classes, and commercial houses have thus been compelled to resort to the shroffs, and to give as much as 13 and 14 per cent for the use of money. Not only so, but it is said, and I am afraid with truth, that the Government of India are in such pecuniary difficulties that they have been unable to pay salaries in full and have actually been compelled to pay only what is called subsistence money to the officers of the civil service. I hope this 797 report is not true to the extent stated; but great apprehension exists on the subject in the public mind. Now, my Lords, undoubtedly this great rebellion must have been attended from the first with considerable pecuniary difficulty. It was found at an early period that the Government would be under the necessity of making alterations in the terms on which they were willing to receive subscriptions to the 5 per cent loan. They were compelled to permit the holders of the 4 per cent loan to pay their subscriptions, one-half in cash, and the other half in the loan at par, thus creating practically a 6 per cent loan. Until they did so very few subscriptions came in, and it was impossible to go on. Your Lordships may perhaps bear in mind that in 1852 or 1853 a grout financial operation was performed by the Government of Lord Dalhousie. Those who submitted to the reduction of interest then carried into effect, from 5 to 4 per cent, were under the impression that in the then state of India the Government would not be compelled at any early period to resort to a 5 per cent loan. But, unfortunately, at the end of sixteen or eighteen months the Government resorted to a 5 per cent loan; and the consequence was a great reduction in the price of the Four per Cents, and a great degree of discontent pervaded the whole country, and there has ever since been a want of confidence. That being the case, I feel satisfied, from all I have heard, that unless the Government had then determined to permit the holders of 4 per cent stock to subscribe at par to the new 5 per cent loan, it would have been perfectly impossible for the Government to go on. But that permission having been given, no difficulty was felt, and in the course of last year no less than £6,000,000 were subscribed to the 5 per cent loan in cash, and a similar amount in 4 per cent stock. Bullion, to the extent of a million, was sent from England, and bills also to a small amount were drawn on India from this country. But with that exception, by that loan practically of 6 per cent, and by admitting the holders of 4 per cent stock to subscribe, the Government have been able to get through their difficulties. In July last the Government of India addressed a letter to the Court of Directors, stating the amount they required for the ensuing year, and suggesting four modes by which it could be raised. They said: —To us the choice appears to be confined to one of the following expedients:—First, for this 798 Government to draw bills on your Hon. Court for any amount that may be required. 2nd.—For your Hon. Court to remit bullion to the extent of one and a-half or two crores to Calcutta and Bombay, in the proportion of half to each place 3rd —To open a 6 per cent loan for cash payments guaranteed for fifteen years, without closing the 5 per cent loan or interfering with the conditions under which 3½, 4, and 4½ per cent securities are received in part subscription to that loan, whereby the Government is virtually paying 6 per cent for the money it borrows. 4th.—To issue Treasury notes at Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta for not less than 500 rupees each, carrying interest at 6 per cent per annum, payable at the option of the holders or of the Government after the expiration of two years, and on condition that the said notes will be receivable as cash into the open loan of the day at par, and in liquidation of all demands of Government at the general treasuries of the three Presidencies, as well as in payments on account of salt, opium, and Customs.The Secretary of State for India in Council, after considering these alternatives, was induced to adopt the fourth proposition. I must confess I think that was a very unfortunate Resolution. I have seen no reason why he should not have told the Government of India to stand fast where they were—to let well alone—to go on receiving at the rate of £5,000,000 or £6,000,000 a year, which was as much as might have been expected from the resources of India—and to proceed on the principle of never disturbing the money market, and never proposing a novelty to monied men, except for some great, and palpable, and useful object. Now, it seems to me that the issue of Treasury notes, or what we should call Exchequer bills in this country, is totally inapplicable to India. In this country we have a large amount of floating capital at all times seeking for temporary investment; but even here the Government are anxious lest at any time the amount of Exchequer hills should become inconveniently large. It is different in India, where there can hardly be said to be any capital whatever in search of temporary investment. If this measure had been successful to the full extent by means of Treasury notes it would have resulted in the greatest injury to affairs in India. It would have been an injury, because there are different sorts of banks in that country. In the chartered banks money is placed at call, and at all times the money deposited with them may be withdrawn. Now, if you offer inducements to withdraw that money, the result will be that the banks will be unable to afford the usual mercantile accommodation unless they sell stock, and thereby derange the money mar- 799 ket. But the injury will be still greater with regard to banks which are not chartered. There the money is held for considerable periods, at notice varying from ten days to a year. The money so deposited is laid out by the banks in advances on indigo and other products; and if the money be withdrawn from those banks the result will be that they will be compelled to withhold their advances, and there will be a commercial panic. I should, therefore, deprecate the success of a speculation on the part of the Government, based on the issue of a very large amount of Treasury notes, or what we should call Exchequer bills. I observe that gentlemen who write for the public press in India generally desired that the Government should have recourse to a loan with biddings, as practised in this country; but I apprehend that the state of things in India is not suited to an operation of that kind. In this country capital is in large masses, and the parties in the possession of it can act in concert, and thus there are great facilities for raising a loan in the manner adopted here; but it is different in India, for there, whatever capital there is, is dispersed over the whole country in comparatively small sums and in the hands of a great number of persons, who have no means of concert whatever such as exist in England. I think it would be almost impossible to procure the co-operation of these small capitalists for the purpose of raising a loan, and the result would be, that the loan would fall altogether into the unmerciful hands of the Natives. Again, in this country, when a loan is thrown upon the public market, there is a direct or implied pledge on the part of the Government that they will not resort to the market for another loan, except under extraordinary circumstances, within any short period of time. It is next to impossible to give such a pledge in India, where difficulties exist such as take it out of the power of the Government to look forward at any time and say what amount of money will be required. India, in fact, is always at war or on the verge of a war; and, under such circumstances, it is impossible to calculate with precision what amount of money will be wanted for the public service. The revenue, too, in India is, as regards one very important branch, that of opium, of a very uncertain amount. This being the state of things, on the 26th of January the Government published a notification that, after the 30th of April, the Four per Cent and other stocks, on terms equivalent 800 to par, would no longer be received in subscription to the loan then open, but that Treasury bills would be issued at an interest of about 5¾ per cent. There was an error, as I have endeavoured to show, in attempting to raise a large sum of money by Treasury bills in a country which was not suited to a financial operation of that kind; find there was this further error, that it necessarily depreciates the Four per Cent Stock. On the 22nd of February a further alteration was made. It was then declared that after the 1st of May Treasury bills should be issued, not at 5¾ but at 4¾ per cent; that is, the Government having failed altogether in inducing persons to afford them the use of their money at 5¾, asked them to do the same thing at 4¾ per cent. They seem to have thought a Treasury note had a special value like that of a Sibylline book. Another loan was proposed at 5½ per cent, and to that loan the 5 per cent stock might be subscribed; but not a word was said about the 4 per cent stock, in which the great mass of the money is invested, and it is therefore no wonder that the Indian Government have found it difficult to raise money on loan. It is obvious, in the position in which the Government of India are now placed, that there is no reasonable expectation that they can extricate themselves from these difficulties without the interference of the Government at home; and what we have to consider is whether it is open to us to do anything to relieve the Government of India. What it occurs to me that the Government ought to do is, instead of taking power to raise money in this country to the amount of £7,000,000, they should take that power to the extent of £12,000,000. I think that is the course which will have to be adopted, and I hope to hear a confirmation of my views from Her Majesty's Government. It seems to me contrary to all reason that when we are told by political economists to purchase all things in the cheapest market and to sell in the dearest, the Government of India should be compelled to obtain money, without which it is impossible to carry on the service of the country, in the dearest market instead of the cheapest. The noble Earl concluded by moving an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty forCopies of all the notifications issued by the Governor General of India in Council, from the commencement of the year 1857 to the present time, relative to the terms on which the Government of India would receive money on loan; and to call the attention of the House to the state of 801 the Money Market in India as affected by the more recent of such Notifications.
§ THE EARL OF DERBY
My Lords, it is difficult to overrate the importance of the question which my noble Friend has brought under the consideration of your Lordships. I only wish that in replying to his observations I had the means of following him with the same clearness and distinctness which he brought to bear upon a matter, with which I confess I am not very familiar. Therefore if I fail in being as explicit as is desirable, I must claim your Lordships' indulgence. My wish on the part of the Government is to conceal nothing from Parliament in respect to the affairs of India; and it is therefore without hesitation, though with regret, I say that the financial accounts, and the financial condition of that country are not as favourable as they were when the Secretary of State for India, acting upon the advices he had then received, brought forward his proposition for raising a loan of £7,000,000 in this country. My noble Friend has very correctly stated the proceedings which have taken place, beginning with Lord Dalhousie's reduction of the 5 per cent open loan, and following them through the subsequent stages, including the raising of money by means of allowing the reduced stock to be paid in at par, together with an equal amount of cash, for the purpose of meeting what is called a 5 percent loan, but which, as my noble Friend has truly said, is practically a 6 per cent loan. In this state of things it was thought desirable by the Government of India to give notice that after the 30th of April that operation should be discontinued; that the open loan of 5 percent should be closed, and that there should be an issue of Treasury paper bearing interest at something like 5¾ per cent. I am not prepared to say whether it was altogether judicious or not to give notice of the issue of these 5¾ per cent notes, at the same time that it was announced that after the 30th of April, the nominal loan of 5, but real loan of 6 per cent should be closed; but I have no doubt that the Government of India made their calculation, that the intimation that after the 30th April the 4 per paper would not be received and would augment the quantity of that paper which with an equal amount in cash would be offered to the Government before that date. I confess that this is a question on which I should speak with great deference for the opinion of my noble Friend, especially when his views on the matter are opposed to 802 mine. I allude now more particularly to what he has truly spoken of as being the immemorial policy in India—that of keeping open loans. There may be circumstances in the state of India of so peculiar a character as to render that policy necessary; but as a general practice I cannot imagine anything more objectionable than keeping open loans of an undefined amount. The result of Government finding itself in funds, and taking the stop adopted by Lord Dalhousie—namely, that of paying off the subscribers to the 5 per cent loan, and then issuing a loan at 4 per cent, is naturally to create a considerable amount of discontent among the lenders of the first loan. When a change of circumstances has taken place, and when it becomes apparent that the Government is in distress and difficulty, and it is not known what amount will be required, lenders always hang back to see whether Government will not advance their terms. The greater the difficulty in which the Government is placed for money the greater the reluctance of lenders to come forward, because they were always expecting that a greater amount will be required and higher terms offered. I cannot but think that the principle which my noble Friend considers so advantageous in this country is equally applicable to India, and that the Government in announcing their intention to raise a loan should intimate plainly and distinctly the amount which will be required, and that as in this country there should be an understanding that when a certain sum is asked for it is not intended to ask for another loan within a short space of time. I see in the last notification to which my noble Friend referred which we have received by telegraph from Bombay, without any explanation of the circumstances connected with it, there is an announcement that in the course of the next year after the 30th of April a now loan of £5,000,000, and no more, would be raised at 5½ per cent in India. [The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH: "A further sum by Treasury notes."] I shall have occasion upon another evening to advert to that subject, when it will be my duty to lay before your Lordships a statement of the present condition of Indian finance, together with the reasons which induced the Government to believe at the time they made a proposition to raise a loan of £7,000,000 on Indian security, that that amount would be sufficient, mid the circumstances which have induced them with- 803 in the last few days to entertain a different opinion. Some time after the Secretary of State for India introduced the Bill for raising that loan, intelligence reached us from India which, obliged us to alter our opinion on that point; and I do not hesitate to state to your Lordships, that whether we do so by Amendment in the present Bill, or by the introduction of another, it will be necessary for the Government to apply to Parliament during the present Session to raise an additional sum of money in England on Indian security. I have here, my Lords, the Estimates on which the Secretary of State for India based his calculation, the £7,000,000 would suffice. It was laid upon the table on the 18th of February. It appears from that Return that £5,377,000, or, in round numbers, £5,500,000, would be the whole deficiency up to the 30th of April, 1860. Moreover, that deficiency would include an increase on the estimated cash balance for the present year. That balance, as calculated for the 30th of April for the present year, is £789,060; and it is proposed to increase it to £1,000,000 for the 30th of April, 1860. After this, the deficiency was estimated at £5,500,000. Under these circumstances it was that the Government had come to the conclusion that they would have a sufficient surplus to cover any possible contingency in the way of demand from India. If they asked for a loan of £7,000,000. But shortly afterwards— that is to say, on the 26th of January— a letter was despatched from the Governor General in Council stating the course they had pursued with regard to closing the receipt of 4 per cent notes, in part payment of the subscription to the 5 per cent open loan from the 30th April, and also stating their intention to issue Treasury bills bearing interest at the rate of 5¾ per cent. The despatch goes on to ask for the earliest instructions in respect to the manner of raising money subsequent to the first of May next, when the subscriptions to the open 5 per cent loan may be expected to cease. It states that the choice of measures is confined to these three: first, to open a 6 or 5½ per cent loan, according to the condition of the money market at the time; second, to issue 5 per cent paper at a discount; and thirdly, to supply all deficiencies by the remittance of bullion from England. It further states that the Government in India cannot feel sure of success in financial operations there, if they be not stimulated by the conviction 804 that they are not depending wholly on India for money, and it suggests a remittance of £1,000,000 in bullion—one-half to Calcutta, and one-half to Bombay. That despatch was acknowledged on the 9th of March in a despatch from the Secretary of State for India, in which it is stated that it is quite impossible for the Government to entertain the idea that all the financial demands of India could be supplied by means of bullion from England; but at the same time the Government complied with the request to transmit £1,000,000 to meet immediate wants. A portion of this bullion has already gone, and the other portion will be forwarded by the mail to-morrow. We then proceeded to consider what course should be adopted hereafter; but after that despatch was written, and before it was sent out, we received a second despatch—one dated February 5th —to which I shall briefly call your Lordships' attention. It contains a much more gloomy view of the prospects of Indian finance. According to the despatch, it appears that even allowing for an increase of revenue, as compared with the present year, to the amount of 280 lacs, on which they think they may fairly calculate; there would be for the year ending April, 1860, a deficiency of not less than than 1,144 lacs, or £11,500,000 in round numbers. Deducting from that amount the £1,000,000 which is already exported from England, and we have left a deficiency to provide for of £10,500,000; but that £10,500,000 proceeds on the assumption that it would be necessary before the 30th April, 1860, to raise the immediate balance to £12,000,000. The full amount remained as balance in hand should not be much less than £12,000,000, but at the same time £12,000,000 is a large sum to be retained in hand to meet the emergencies, and the deficiency might be still further reduced, and which I stated at £10,000,000, by lowering the respective balances. Calculating, therefore, that they would be so reduced, you will still have a deficiency of £9,500,000 to account for. The Indian Government have felt it their duty and incumbent upon them not to depend altogether upon loans, but to make an effort to ascertain whether it was not practicable to a certain extent to increase the amount of the local taxation of India, and to raise a certain proportion of the sum required by loans in India; and by the despatch sent on February 5th, and only received the other day, the Governor General of In- 805 dia in Council has announced his intention of raising a certain amount partly by fresh taxation and by a slightly increased taxation of imports, partly by an increase and extension of the system of stamps to the Presidencies to which they have not hitherto been extended, and partly by a species of excise duty on home-grown tobacco. There was also a question as to taxation by means of succession duty; it is stated to be the subject-matter of serious and careful consideration before it can be imposed, and no estimate had been taken for it by the Governor General. The estimate, therefore, that he has taken is, that by taxation, by imports, and by stamps, he would raise £1,000,000, and by an excise duty on tobacco probably £500,000. That amount of £1,500,000 being taken from the £9,500,000 leaves £8,000,000 of deficiency still to be provided for. Now, of the £8,000.000 so to be provided for the Governor General states his intention or his expectation of raising £5,000,000 by means of a loan in India, as shown by the papers just received, and he states that in order further to meet the exigencies of the Indian Government, he hopes that the British Government will be able to remit to him from this country an additional sum of £2,000,000 in the course of the year in bullion, in addition to the £1,000,000 previously applied for under these circumstances. Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion — and I think it right to state it now and at once, in order that there may be no concealment from the public, and that the whole case may be before them—that it will be necessary in the course of the present year to ask your sanction to raise a further sum of money beyond the £7,000,000. I will not at the present moment say the precise sum, because in the uncertainty necessarily consequent on some of the items of expenditure, it is difficult to ascertain what will be required; but I may say that the sum that will be required in the course of the present year will certainly not be less than £3,000.000. and possibly may come up to the £5,000,000, of which my noble Friend has spoken. I ought also to observe that in calculating this deficiency on the part of the Indian Government it is exclusive altogether of any claims for prize money, and also of any claim for compensation which may be made for damage or injury done in the course of the mutiny in matters of compensation; but these compensations may, to a certain extent, be met by the appro- 806 priation of the territories confiscated and the forfeitures that have taken place. With regard to the question of prize money, it is difficult to calculate what the amount of it may be. On the other hand; it is fair to set against these requirements another item of which no account is taken on the side of the home account; that is to say, deposits received in this country on account of railway expenditure in India, which is calculated, according to the accounts of the current year, at least at £4,500,000, and in the course of the next year it will be very considerably larger. The estimate in calculating the probable deficiency includes the amount which will be expended in railway operations in India; hut, on the other hand, there will be a sum, in all probability, of £4,000,000 that will be received on deposit here, and consequently, being transmitted for the purpose, will go so far in diminution of the amount of deficiency in India. In the estimate taken of the home accounts no credit was taken for the £4,000,000. I am not sure that I have succeeded in placing before your Lordships, as clearly as I could desire, the precise amount of the financial embarrassment that appears to threaten India at the present moment. I can only give your Lordships the latest intelligence we have received. With regard to the question of my noble Friend as to whether the Bank of Bombay has been compelled very much to limit its accommodation, and whether the salaries of the Government officers are in any degree kept back or on y partially paid, I can only say, in reply, that we have not any information on that subject from the Indian Government. The only information that we have received is, as I before stated, by telegraph from Bombay, and it conveys only an intimation of the intention of the Government to raise the 5½ per cent loan alluded to, commencing 30th April; but it does not make mention of any additional embarrassments to those of which we have already heard. With regard to the Motion of my noble Friend, I may say that I have not the least difficulty in laying on the table the various notifications. I certainly concur with my noble Friend in thinking that the frequent changes in these notifications, and the frequent alterations affecting the money market in India, have been, and if they are persevered in must continue to be, a very serious inconvenience, and seriously detrimental to Indian finance. But in laying these communications on the 807 table of the House I think I shall best consult the public interest, and best perform the duty that the Government owe to the country, if I accompany them with the very latest information received, and I shall therefore in addition to them lay on the table the despatches referred to from the Indian Government, of 26th January and 5th February, with the answers respectively sent to these despatches from the Indian Board, of the 9th and 16th of the present month. The whole question will then be fully and unreservedly before Parliament and the country; and under these circumstances I trust that, whether we proceed at present with the Bill now before Parliament, and which it is exceedingly desirable should be as quickly passed as possible, or whether we proceed to ask for £7,000,000, and subsequently for the sum within the limits I have mentioned, I trust that no imputation will be cast upon the Government for having in the first instance received information of the insufficiency of the sum, and then being subsequently compelled to come to Parliament again. It would no doubt have been more convenient if we had had the information which is now before us, so as to have asked for £10,000,000, or probably £12,000,000 in the first instance, but not having it, it will probably be more convenient to proceed with the Bill as it at present stands; I believe it is now fixed for a third reading in the other House. Under these circumstances I deem it right to give your Lordships and the country the fullest information that will, in all probability, and I may almost say with certainty, show the necessity for raising the further sum within the limits I have specified.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE
said, that the noble Earl had told them that he would furnish information and copies of the notifications as to the finances of India, but did not give them any information generally as to the means of permanently alleviating the financial embarrassments of India. These financial embarrassments, he thought, were not altogether occasioned by the mutiny, but where in no small degree attributable to previous mal-administration; for if the resources of India had been properly developed the revenue would have been ample to meet any necessities. The system of open loans and borrowing money to meet deficiencies year after year was utterly ruinous. The taxation of India had reached its utmost limit; yet they had virtually confided the admi- 808 nistration of the finances of India to the old Directors of the East India Company, who had already so grievously mismanaged them; for there were three of them in the new Council. It was upon England, and that at no distant period, that the ruinous effects of this mismanagement must fall, if some steps were not immediately taken to remedy it.
§ THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE
had heard with sorrow, but without surprise, of the growing deficiency in the finances of India. The fact was that India required a Reform Bill quite as much as, if not more, than England. He had heard with regret, but not with surprise, that it was intended to resort to a species of taxation, of the worst character. An excise duty upon tobacco had already been attempted in the Presidency of Madras, and although it had a population of 23,000,000, most of whom were habitual smokers, it never yielded more than £50,000 a year, and was consequently abandoned. The Government must first improve the condition of the inhabitants of India before they could hope to increase the returns from taxation of this nature. Where the labourer was paid only 1½d. or 2d. a day, and the landholder paid 18s. out of every 20s. of the produce of the soil to the Government, there was but little hope of any large consumption of excisable commodities. The resources of India were immense, but in proportion to their immensity so were they neglected by the Government. In 1842 the late Sir Robert Peel indulged in a prophecy that the time would come when the consequences of such neglect would fall heavily upon England, and he was sadly afraid the prediction was not far off its accomplishment. The present system of raising Indian loans was radically bad: it excluded the Native capitalist from contributing towards the exigencies of the country and thus throw away one great security for the stability of British rule there. In his opinion the entire system should be changed, and India made to raise and support her own loans.
§ LORD MONTEAGLE
said, it was unnecessary for the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) to defend himself from the suspicion of withholding information at the time the original loan was opened; but it was highly desirable to have every information now. He wished that this discussion had taken place a little earlier, but he had no doubt that the discussion even now would do something towards remedying this state 809 of things. If the story were true that the servants of the Government in India were paid only part of their salaries, he thought that that fact was likely to cause serious peril to us in India. He knew that the noble Earl had stated that he had not received any information upon the subject; but notwithstanding that, he thought that the news bore every mark of authenticity. He believed it would be a great mistake to suppose that if the day ever should come when there was a deficiency in the revenues of India, England could be saved from the responsibility of making up that deficiency from her own resources. Of course, it was undesirable that any pressure should be put on prematurely, but the people of this country should accustom themselves to consider a contingency which might, but he hoped would not, arise; by so doing, they would learn that it was their interest, as it certainly was their duty, to pay some attention to Indian subjects. As to increasing the taxation, to do so effectually they must first increase the wages of labour and the power of production; and as to a tobacco duty, they could only levy that by making tobacco a Government monopoly, by imposing a duty similar to our hop duty, or by managing tobacco as they do opium. It was economy to which they must look for the restoration of the finances of India. If the Government of that country kept up in time of peace military establishments which would be fully justified by a state of war, and by that alone, it would he impossible to keep the finances of India in a state of balance, and to avoid contracting new debts and loans. He trusted that all the papers that could throw light upon the state of Indian finance would be laid upon their Lordships' table before the India Loan Bill came up from the other House.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH
wished to remind their Lordships that, as the India Bill passed their Lordships' House, it contained a clause which made it lawful for the Crown to send certain Commissioners to India to inquire into the financial accounts, the application of Indian revenue, and the mode of auditing Indian accounts. This clause was omitted from the Bill in the House of Commons; but the circumstances which had since arisen had made him regret more than he did at the time that this clause had not passed. It merited the consideration of the Government whether they should not send a competent person from the Trea- 810 sury, the Board of Customs, and the Board of Trade to institute a real investigation into the accounts, and to give Parliament clear light upon the finances of India. He had endeavoured, with the assistance of a gentleman who had been Financial Secretary in India, to make them out, and together they had not been able to understand them.
§ THE EARL OF DERBY
I am inclined to agree in my noble Friend's suggestion; and it is under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government whether some person should not be sent out to India to make an effectual investigation of the financial affairs of India, and to bring home more experience and knowledge of the subject than is possessed by any authority in England.
§ Motion agreed to.
§ THE EARL OF DERBY
then moved—That an humble Address he presented to Her Majesty for Copies of Despatches from the Governor General in Council to the Secretary of State for India of 26th January and 5th February, 1859; and of the Despatches in reply of the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General in Council of 9th March and 10th March, 1859.
§ Agreed to.