HL Deb 11 August 1859 vol 155 cc1319-34

Order of the Day for the House to be put into a Committee on the East India Loan Bill, read.


, in moving that the House do go into Committee upon the Bill said, that the financial condition of India had been considered at considerable length shortly before the dissolution of the late Parliament, and an intimation was then given by the late Government that it would be necessary before long to introduce a measure of the present description. So far the necessity of the Bill might be considered to have been acknowledged by all parties, and he might now move it through all its stages without entering into any statement in its support. But he thought it desirable that he should call their Lordships' attention to some facts connected with the financial condition of our Indian Empire. The deficits in the two years during which the mutiny had been raging was respectively £8,500,000, and £14,700,000. That, however, was to be expected, and the only observation he would make upon those figures was that the back of the mutiny had been broken before the great mass of troops sent from this country had arrived in India, and it was only since that period all the expenses attendant upon those forces had become chargeable upon the Indian revenues. It was only when they came to consider the deficit of the present year that surprise was excited. The total sum to be provided for the year 1859–60 was no less than £12,500,000. It was natural to ask why, now that the mutiny had been suppressed, there had not been a greater saving as compared with the previous year—than appeared upon the face of the papers—about £2,500,000. But, although £12,500,000 was the sum that would have to be provided by loan or otherwise, yet that was not the actual deficit of the year, since about £2,250,000 arose from charges for compensation for losses during the mutiny, and the necessity of restoring the balances to their former condition. The real difference between the income and expenditure strictly belonging to the year was about £9,300,000. But even those figures did not represent the whole saving that had been effected by the Indian Government; for the expenditure for 1859–60 included large sums paid on account of the railways, and the interest of the debt which had been incurred during the previous two years. If those extraordinary charges were deducted, the amount of saving effected in the military expenditure for 1859–60 would be found to be nearly £4,500,000. Some persons might be dissatisfied with the extent of the saving thus effected; but, the Governor General had lately found himself unable to send home as many troops as he had hoped to do; and it must also be borne in mind that the expense of bringing home troops was as great as that of sending them out. It had been stated that our Indian Empire was in a state of chronic deficiency, and that it seemed to be approaching a condition of complete bankruptcy. But that was really far from being a correct view of the subject. The truth was that when the mutiny began, the income and the expenditure of India were almost exactly equal, there having been for the preceding year only a small adverse balance to the amount of £170,000. A sum, however, larger than that adverse balance was owing to the charge incurred in the Persian war, and without that charge there would have been an absolute surplus in the year 1856– 57. Moreover, during the whole of the four years which preceded the mutiny the deficit had been steadily decreasing, and even a large proportion of the deficiency then existing was attributable to the large outlay incurred in public works. They might, therefore, say that at the commencement of the mutiny the financial condition of our Indian empire was by no means of an unsatisfactory description. Let him say one word with respect to the means which had been adopted for the purpose of meeting the deficiency which had arisen in the course of the present year. In the years 1857–58 and 1858–59, the deficits had been made good by means of loans effected partly in England and partly in India; and the sum raised by way of loan in this country exceeded by an amount of only £1,000,000 the sum raised in the same shape in India; the figures in the two cases being respectively £11,500,000 and £10,500,000 in those two years. But the power of raising money by loan in India had greatly diminished in the course of the present year. That result had been attribued to the financial measures adopted by the Indian Government; but he believed that facts were directly opposed to such a conclusion. The loan in India had been going on very satisfactorily until the end of last November or the beginning of last December, when the weekly subscriptions suddenly decreased by almost one-half. But that falling off had not been contemporaneous with any action whatever on the part of the Indian Government. In the first week in November that Government had indeed issued the Proclamation by which the Queen took into her own hands the direct government of India; but no person could attribute the diminution in the loan to that event. It could not be supposed that the Proclamation of the Queen's supremacy would tend to diminish the value of Indian securities. No financial step was taken by the Indian Government until the 26th of January last' and their financial policy could not have been the cause of a condition of the Indian money market which had previously been in existence. But as a sum of £10,500,000 had been raised by way of loan in India during the two preceding years, it was clear that the capitalists of that country must have felt, in the midst of the mutiny, the most perfect confidence in the continuance of our dominion. That view of the matter was clearly set forth in a passage contained in a despatch which had been recently received from Lord Canning, and that passage he would proceed to read to the House:— We are aware that it has been said broadly that our loan operations of late in this country have failed of success; but it is shown by the figures to which we have just referred that, speaking of those operations as compared with the operations of former years, this cannot be said with truth, and that it is not true absolutely, may, we venture to think, be assumed from the fact that in each of the two last years, during a crisis of unparalleled difficulty, we have obtained from Indian resources alone the means of meeting not only the extraordinary charges of the State, but also the immense disbursements of all the railway companies in this country. He (the Duke of Argyll) believed that to be perfectly true. Under the Bill then under their Lordships' consideration the Government would be invested with a power of raising in this country the money required in India; and he believed that when Indian capitalists saw how easily the money could be borrowed in the English market they would again be induced to come forward with their former readiness to contribute to loans of that description. It was very satisfactory to find that there had been no falling off in the revenue. It was a thing which at one time could hardly have been thought possible, but it was nevertheless a fact, that the revenue raised in India during the mutiny was as large as that raised in the year which had preceded that outbreak. [The Earl of ELLENBO-ROUGH indicated dissent.] The noble Earl shook his head, but the figures showed the accuracy of his (the Duke of Argyll's) statement. The Indian revenue in the year 1856–57 was £31,700,000; and the revenue during the first year of the mutiny was almost exactly of the same amount. In the second year of the mutiny it was larger by a sum of nearly £2,000,000, and the estimated revenue of the present year, including the produce of new taxes, was larger by a sum of somewhat more than £4,000,000. A large sum had, within the last year, been remitted to India in bullion, but that need not alarm this country. Such a remission would be necessary so long as the present outlay on railways continued. The following explanation was given to the Secretary of State for India under the late Government by the Indian Government on this subject:— The necessity for this requisition arose, not from any discovery that our gross expenditure would be largely in excess of what had been calculated, or that our revenues would be greatly less than had been expected, but solely from the great and sudden falling off of subscriptions to the loan. This circumstance, which even now has not been satisfactorily accounted for, was beyond foresight. But we had never concealed from ourselves, or from your Lordship, that such a contingency was possible. It was clear, he thought, that there need be no alarm in the public mind with reference to the large demand made on the Treasury for remittances in bullion. Before he sat down he wished to say a few words on the present condition of our Indian empire. It was not surprising that great alarm should exist in the public mind at a deficiency of £9,000,000, £10,000,000, or £12,000,000 in our Indian revenue, and that very wild schemes and advice should be given as the remedy of this state of things. He saw it said that we could not save our Indian empire otherwise than by dismembering it. It was contended that the whole misfortune was due to the policy of annexation, and that we had better give back to the Native Princes a part of the territory that we had taken from them. This was not a remedy that any Government would be likely to adopt. Nor was it true that the present extent of our Indian empire had been the result of a deliberate and preconceived policy of annexation. It had come to us step by step and bit by bit, simply from the close contact between the vigorous civilization of the West and the decayed civilization of India. Where an attempt had been made to settle a war without annexation, as in the case of the first Sikh war, the attempt had utterly failed, for Lord Dalhousie as soon as he arrived found himself involved in a second Sikh war. The annexation of Oude was not an annexation of conquest, but arising from other causes, and justified, as he thought, on other grounds. He believed that it would be a crime of the highest order to restore that kingdom to the dominion of the Sovereign from whom we took it. That annexation once made was an irrevocable act. The annexation of the Punjab no one would regret who remembered that it was in great part through the aid given by the Governor and people of that province that our Indian empire had been rescued during the recent mutiny. Then it was said that it was necessary to break down the great office of the Governor General, and constitute independent Presidencies. There had been for a long time complaints on the part of the minor Presidencies that they were held by too tight a reign. Without entering into the merits of this proposal he would only now say that the natural course of things seemed to him to be adverse to its adoption. The progress of events, the introduction of railways and telegraphs, tended rather to unite than divide our empire. During the late mutiny the Governor General had been enabled to send orders to Sir John Lawrence and Mr. Frere, on the very confines of our empire, with more rapidity than the Marquess of Wellesley had been able to communicate with Lucknow and Hydrabad. He knew that great complaints were made by the minor Presidencies that more money was not laid out in them upon public works. That expenditure might be required, and might eventually be profitable, but it would not in the first instance tend to the saving of money, but rather to the increase of expenditure. The reduction of civil salaries was pointed out as another mode of restoring the finances of India, and a detailed report on this subject was under consideration both in India and at homo. But even if a reduction were made in the salaries of civil servants in India the increasing demands of the administration of a great empire would compel the Government to lay out that saving upon other salaries. Upon the whole, therefore, and on the average of years, it would not be advisable to look to the reduction of civil salaries as a means of restoring the balance between income and expenditure in India. Those salaries must be high to induce the best men in this country to give their lives and abilities to the service of India. If those salaries were reduced below the point which would secure the services of the best men we should make a great mistake. He came back then to the proposition that the only hope for the finances of India must be in reduced military expenditure. The military expenditure of India in ordinary years had been before the mutiny £12,000,000, excluding all extraordinary charges. That was about the amount now voted for the military service of the whole British empire, and he could not doubt that the defence of our Indian empire would be maintained, now that tranquillity had been restored, for even a smaller sum. If that sum were sufficient before the mutiny it would be more than sufficient in future. There was no longer any Native Power that could give the Indian Government any uneasiness. The complete disarmament of our own subjects was proceeding. We might not be able, nor perhaps was it desirable, to deprive them altogether of small arms. But not a gun could be cast in India without our consent, and it had been proved that a Native army without artillery was useless. It was beyond all question, he thought, that our relative superiority to the Natives had not only not decreased but rather increased. On all those grounds he thought the true solution of the present difficulties was the reduction of the Indian military expenditure to a sum not greater than it was before the outbreak of the mutiny; and unless the Government could do that, he confessed he saw no immediate prospect of bringing the expenditure within the revenue. He assured the House that the subject would continue to receive the anxious consideration of the Government.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into a Committee upon the said Bill.


My Lords, if I were to go through the different topics which the noble Duke has touched upon, I should certainly occupy your Lordships' attention till the time fixed for the termination of the Session. Least of all do I wish to go into the question of annexation, which is far too wide and too important a subject to be discussed in an incidental manner, at the close of a Session. I will refer, therefore, only to the financial topics, and on these I wish to say as little as possible. I cannot oppose the present Bill, because I recommended the very measure, and no doubt the state of things has not improved since that time. At that time we had every reason to believe that the Government would be able to borrow all the money they wanted; but now the power of borrowing is nearly gone. I have looked over the Indian Estimates, and I cannot help thinking that the expectations of revenue are over-estimated, and I think also that the expectations of deduction in the military expenditure in Madras and Bombay are still more over sanguine. However, your Lordships have read the papers, and you can form your own opinions upon the subject, I must say that I think it is very hard upon the Indian Government, and most intolerable, that in the midst of their financial difficulties they should be compelled to pay £5,000,000 towards the mercantile speculations of the gentlemen who have determined to establish railways in India. I do not think that the expenditure on railways should be mixed up with the general expenditure of the country; and I do hope that if any further guarantee is granted to any speculators in railroads, it will be provided that the money shall be drawn out where it is paid in, and that the Government in its relations with them shall simply act as bankers. Many years ago, before the Government of this country determined upon granting guarantees of 5 per cent upon the railway speculations, I ventured to caution your Lordships and the public against the danger likely to arise from these transactions. I said, and I think it stands to reason, that it should be so, that if you offered to guarantee 5 per cent upon the expenditure, and gave the shareholders whatever advantage might be derived from the surplus profit, it would be idle to attempt to induce persons to lend you money at 4 per cent, or at any less rate than 5 per cent. The consequence of this course of the Government has been to extinguish its power of borrowing money under 5 per cent. I most deeply regret it; it has created a burden most severe, and has introduced great complication into our monetary transactions in India. The state of things now is, that after this year allowing £7,000,000 to be borrowed, we are obliged to sanction the borrowing of £5,000,000 more. The remedy does not solely lie in an increase of taxation. I venture to caution the Government against establishing any new taxes. It is only by increasing the pressure of the old taxation that the Government can safely increase the revenue; but I confess I do not expect any material improvement in our financial condition from an increase in the revenue. It must be effected by diminution of expenditure. I have seen it announced that it is the desire of the Government to induce Mr. Wilson, a very able gentleman, to go to India, to act as Chancellor of the Exchequer there, and to be an Extraordinary Member of the Council. I think this step is a right and proper one. I had myself the same design some thirty years ago; I had it in contemplation then to send a very able man, and one of great capacity, to undertake a similar office; and if the then Government had lasted long enough I think it not at all improbable that the arrangement would have been carried out. Your Lordships will recollect that on more than one occasion I urged on the House and the Government the expediency of substituting a statesman for a lawyer as an Extraordinary Member of the Council. If Mr. Wilson, or any other gentleman accepts the office—and I hold very strong opinions as to the duty of public men to serve their country—I hope that he will have the assistance of other able men; for without such assistance I fear he will not be able to effect much good. I think that any gentleman who goes out as Chancellor of the Exchequer will find himself very much embarrassed if he has not the same assistance which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has in this country. Whoever undertakes the office will have to produce order out of chaos. It is impossible to describe any state of things worse than that which I recollect to have existed in financial accounts of India. We had to teach the public servants not only habits of business but habits of obedience, and this latter duty was the most difficult to accomplish. But with the assistance which he might take out, and the assistance which he will obtain there, he will be able to reduce the accounts to something like an intelligible state, and I think that then a very material reduction may be made in the expenditure. I agree with the noble Duke, but I go much further than he does, in deprecating the announcement of any reduction in the stipends attached to the civil service. I feel perfectly certain that while that resolution would not be productive of any great benefit to the finances, in a political point of view it would produce the most injurious effects. It would, in fact, produce a revolution in the mode of conducting the business of the country, because it would produce a revolution in the men. The civil servants during the first few years of office get into debt; during the few subsequent years they pay off their debts and become free men; and it is only during the last few years that they are in receipt of a salary large enough to allow them to realize sufficient to enable them to come and reside in this country with any degree of comfort. If you reduce their income, you will make it still more difficult to realize these sums, and you will defer the period of their return. You will thus stop promotion, and thereby declare that India is no longer to be governed by young men, but that it shall be governed by old men. It has been the youth employed in the public service of India, more than anything else, which has tended to that success which we have enjoyed. There is this further reason. Before the salaries were raised to their present rate, there was more than suspicion of the probity of the persons employed in the public services in India, and the present system is in some sense a guarantee for the probity of those who administer the government of the country, in which each collector may be said to exercise the power of a pro-consul. During the last thirty years I have known of only three cases of such suspicion. The Government of India has been raised and sustained by the youth and energy of its civil servants, and I trust that nothing will be done to impair the service. I think that the Chancellor of the Exchequer of India may make some deductions in the Native establishments. I confess I have always looked with regret and displeasure at the continual increase of Native establishments. You cannot appoint a new official without immediately receiving a demand for an enormous establishment that doubles the expenses connected with the department. I doubt the expediency of these great establishments. I believe there are persons who, in a great measure, take advantage of their positions to do benefit to themselves and injury to the service. I am quite sure that an intelligent, energetic Government might most materially reduce these establishments, which would be a great saving to the public. I remember, several years ago, calling for a return of the civil servants of the State, when I found that they were more numerous than the army; and yet that is for the purpose of carrying on the ordinary business of the country. My Lords, there is no doubt that great reductions must be made in the military establishments, and I very greatly regret that this Session has terminated without our having received from the Government a statement of their views with respect to the reorganization of the Indian army. My own views on that subject are very distinct. I feel the necessity of a great increase to the European force, far beyond its present strength; and I know that the expense of the European force is practically equal—number for number—to the expense of three Native establishments. Therefore, if we increase to double—almost to treble—the European force, looking at the same time to the increase which has taken place in the Native force, of which we have so much reason to be jealous, this does appear to me to be an act of unreason, and I cannot comprehend how the Government has not taken advantage of the first moment of re-established tranquillity to commence with energy to reduce the establishment of these Native regiments. It is of very little use to reduce the privates only; there must be a reduction of officers as well. Without that there is no economy. And I believe up to the present time—I do not speak with absolute certainty—there has been little or no reduction in the officers of regiments in India; so that the staff remains almost the same that it was two or three years ago. My Lords, I hold it absolutely necessary to have this great European force in India, and I think that a great European force should be formed as economically as possible; for of this I am quite certain, that that which is most politic is also most economic. It should be a principle of our Government to create in the European army a balance of the local force against that which is called the army of the line; and, moreover, that they should have a Native force which would balance the European force. It is only by a system of balances that we can ultimately hope to retain our empire in India. My Lords, proceeding on that principle, I would at once effect a reduction—and the present state of things renders it practicable—of the entire number of Native troops which is in excess of the European soldiers that you have in that country. That would be a reduction of no less than 94,000 or 100,000 men—for your Lordships may hear with surprise that at the present moment, while we have in India 110,000 Europeans, we have besides that European force 194,000 or 195,000 Native troops, in addition to 80,000 policemen; indifferently armed and disciplined no doubt—but making altogether a Native force of 275,000 armed men, while the European force is but 110,000. I feel that it is only by a very large and immediate reduction of that Native force that it is possible for us to look ultimately for a reduction of the Indian expenditure. I will not look gloomily on the future of India. It is the noblest empire that ever was acquired by man—at least it might be made so by good government. It is to the eternal honour of this country that 100 years have expired since we acquired that empire; and perhaps it is even more to our honour that in the last two years we were enabled to recover it when it seemed nearly lost. There is nothing that would ever induce me to relax the hold which this country has on India; and I only trust that this Government, discarding every consideration but that of the public interest, will determine to do everything which it is possible to do to enable us to retain that empire, and, retaining it, to confirm our rule to the benefit of the people.


said, that having been very much mixed up with the administration of the affairs of that important dependency, he might be permitted to offer a few observations on the present occasion. He wished to express his regret that this Bill had not been introduced at an earlier period, in order that the question might have received that deliberate attention and consideration which its gravity required. The measure before the House was, in his opinion, fraught with deeper and larger consequences than were involved in the mere financial question; for the position of India as regarded monied interests could not be separated from other important details. He agreed with the noble Duke in thinking that there was no cause for despondency:—if he had any such feelings they would be derived from alarm at the want of vigour, unity, and responsibility in the Indian Government. It had been supposed last year, when the system of double government was abolished, nominally that the evils arising from a want of responsibility would be put a stop to; but unhappily in reality they were still found to survive. He hoped that when Parliament assembled next year effectual measures for remedying this defect would be adopted. Nothing could more strongly illustrate his meaning than what has happened on the recent act by European troops, he would not call it of mutiny, but certainly of insubordination. Did anybody doubt that revolt might have been avoided by good management; and, if so, on whom was the responsibility to devolve? Was it on Lord Clyde, Lord Canning, the Council of India, or the Council at home or the Secretary of State? No one could say where it ought to rest; and it was therefore clear that, as regarded the administration of Indian affairs, there was a total want of responsibility at the present moment. He regretted, likewise, that the difficult subject of Indian finance had not been approached in a bold and intelligible spirit; especially as regarded the question of a national guarantee. Why was not this at once made an Imperial question? Why was the credit of this country not directly given in aid of India? They would save millions by so doing. He believed that if the time ever came when India could not meet its engagements no one would be bold enough in this country to repudiate the debt. To attempt to repudiate that debt would shake both their political and commercial credit. He could not hear Gentlemen talk about abandoning India without a certain amount of shame. Abandon India! We never could consent to give up the pride of centuries, to restore to barbarism the countries in which we had implanted civilization, and to abandon the hopes which we entertained of bringing millions of our fellow beings by safe, cautious, and steady steps, to a holier aspiration and purer belief. He was, however, surprised that the noble Duke had not informed their Lordships what course would be adopted by the Government as to any future financial assistance which might be required by India—whether it would be afforded in the shape of a guarantee or by any and what other means. The question which was now most pressing was the equalization of the expenditure and revenue of India. To accomplish this both the civil and military expenditure must be reduced. Yet to the reduction of the civil expenditure the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough) was absolutely opposed. Three years ago he ventured to suggest that the emoluments of the civil servants might be reduced; and though he was then accused of rashness, similar opinions had lately been expressed by both Secretaries of State Lord Stanley and Sir Charles Wood. His opinion was that, as had been well urged by the noble Duke, you ought to make the scale of payment such as would induce good men to enter it, but nothing more. The Indian civil service was a very fine service, but it was the highest paid service in the world. The remuneration of its members was from the beginning a competency, at the end an ample fortune. He saw nothing in the climate of India which rendered it necessary that public servants in that country should receive salaries so much higher than those which were paid in other colonies where equal discomforts had to be encountered; still less could he account for the fact that gentlemen going from Ceylon to Madras should at once jump from comfort to luxury. Payment ceased to be judicious when it merely resulted in an increase of expense without a corresponding increase of efficiency. He did not think that a reduction of salary would diminish the probity of the civil servants. Probity was not necessarily the consequence of a high salary; and, indeed, the wealth which induced luxury was more likely to impair than to promote it.


I say that there is no luxury in India.


That must be a matter of comparison; what one man might consider a luxury another might consider a necessary; but he thought he was justified in saying that, compared with that of officers in other colonies, the condition of the civil servants in India was luxurious. He thought there might be a much larger employment of uncovenanted servants, and that in this way economy and reduction might be effected. One advantage of reducing the salaries of the civil servants would be that you would enlist that powerful body in support of other reductions, which, so long as their own emoluments remained untouched, they would always oppose. This reduction must, as Sir Charles Wood had said, emanate from home, and before that could take place there must be a considerable reduction in the home Government itself. You must reduce what the present Prime Minister called that gigantic job the Indian Council. You must reduce its members to six, make them heads of departments, and so get rid of the committees, which were rather committees of conversation and discussion than of action, and which would be found by all Secretaries of State rather encumbrances than advantages when prompt action was necessary. After all, however, the great saving must be effected in the military expenditure, and he was glad to hear the noble Earl say that in his opinion great reductions might be made in both the Native and the European forces. Another question which involved expenditure Was the maintenance of a local European force. That question had in fact been decided by a Bill which was now waiting for second reading by their Lordships, and which while professing to waive, really settled the great question which was referred to the Commission which considered the re-organization of the Indian army, for it provided for a larger European local force than we had ever had before. Two steps which would facilitate the reduction of the army would be the establishment of an effective police, and the adoption of a system of paying money in notes through the medium of branch banks, instead of the present practice of carrying bullion with an escort of troops from one part of the country to another. The noble Earl, in speaking of the expected mission of Mr. Wilson to India, had spoken of him as a Chancellor of the Exchequer. He had never understood that he was to act in such a capacity, and he was sure that if he was to have anything like the powers of a Chancellor of the Exchequer in England it would involve a great interference with the Government of India. All that he imagined that Mr. Wilson would have to do would be to take office as a Councillor, to examine into the accounts, and to institute, if he could, an effective method of keeping them, and to report to the Governor General, who would either act upon his own responsibility or after reference home. Mr. Wilson would find that he had a good deal to learn and might possibly meet with considerable opposition, particularly if he was to have thrown upon him the invidious task of reducing the expenditure. He hoped, however, that he would be armed with such authority, and so backed at home that the country might obtain the full advantage of the suggestions which he might make. If we could effect a considerable reduction in the military and a small reduction in the civil expenditure, our only other resource for producing a balance would be an increase of taxation. He was quite ready to admit that such an increase would be difficult; but he could not help thinking that some taxes might be found, such as a succession duty, to which the Natives were accustomed, which they would pay willingly, and which might produce a large addition to the revenue. He hoped that, without oppressing or injuring the Natives of India, money might be raised by additional taxation. He believed that the merchants of India were of all persons in a civilized state the most exempt from taxation, and he was of opinion that means might be adopted to arrive at a knowledge of the amount of their gains as had been done in the case of traders in this country assessed to the income tax. Therefore, he did not despair of obtaining a similar revenue in India. If the taxation could be increased without injuring or annoying the Natives, and if the expenditure, civil and military, could be reduced, the future of India might be looked to, not with apprehension, but with more sanguine hopes than it seemed at present to be contemplated. That immense empire, hitherto a source of glory to this country, might then become a source of wealth, and afford an open field to men of energy and industry who would not only found their own fortunes, but add fresh honour to the English name.


said, that the noble Lord supposed that he had said that there might be an immediate reduction of European troops. He had expressed no decisive opinion on that point, as he had not sufficient knowledge with respect to it; but he trusted that the time was not far distant when some reduction might be made. When, however, the number of European troops was reduced, it would be necessary to reduce the Native troops to a similar amount. With respect to the appointment of Mr. Wilson, there could not be the smallest objection to make one of the Members of Council a financial member, but it should be clearly understood as his duty that he must co-operate with the Governor General.

Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

Bill reported, without Amendment, and to be read 3a To-morrow.