Lords Sitting of 29 July 1858

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament.—The Lord Clifford of Chudleigh, after the Death of his Father; and took the Oath prescribed by the Act of 10th Geo. IV. to be taken by Peers professing the Roman Catholic Religion.
PUBLIC BILLS.—3a Friendly Societies Act Amendment; Government of British Columbia; Art Unions Indemnity; Reformatory Schools (Ireland); Metropolis Local Management Act Amendment; Drafts on Bankers Law Amendment; New Writs.

UNIVERSITIES (SCOTLAND) BILL.

  COMMONS' REASONS CONSIDERED.
  Commons' Reasons for disagreeing to some of the Lords' Amendments considered (according to Order), which Reasons were as follow;—
  "The Commons disagree to the Amendment in page 2, being to leave out Clause 3, for the following Reason:
  "Because by the Act of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Years of Her Majesty, Chapter Eighty-nine, all Professors of the Universities of Scotland were relieved from the Necessity of taking the Religious Test to which they previously were subject, except those holding Chairs of Theology, and although the Offices of Principals in all the Colleges, with Two Exceptions, were included under the Designation "Chairs of Theology," this proceeded apparently on the Assumption that the Holders of these Offices were actually Teachers of Theology, while, in point of fact, none of the Principals of any of the Colleges, except St. Mary's, St. Andrew's (a Theological College, and not affected by the Clause struck out by your Lordships), have as such taught Theology for more than a Century and a Half; and because these Offices of Heads of Colleges are Situations of Dignity which ought to be open to Persons of Eminence, of whatever Denomination, and whether Clergymen or Laymen.
  "The Commons disagree to the Amendments to Clauses 8, 9, 10, and 11, for the following Reason:
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  "Because by making Professors Co-electors of the Rector with their Students they would be placed in a Position hurtful to their Dignity and Influence.
  "The Commons disagree to the Amendment in page 15, being to leave out Clause 26, for the following Reason:
  "Because the Distinction between the Two Classes of Professors, proposed to be done away with by this Clause, is, as set forth in the Report of the Royal Commissioners of Visitation appointed in 1836, invidious and unjust, detrimental to the Interests of the University, injurious to Her Majesty's Prerogative, and deriving no Countenance from the Rights and Charters of the University.
  "With the preceding Exceptions, the Commons agree to the Amendments made by the Lords to the Bill.
  THE DUKE OF MONTROSEsaid, he thought the views taken by the other House in regard to this measure were erroneous, but he was afraid that if their Lordships were to insist upon their Amendments the effect would be to cause the loss of the Bill. To prevent such a result, and having regard to the importance of the measure, and the value of the reforms which it would introduce into the Scotch Universities, he therefore proposed that their Lordships should decline to insist on their Amendments.
  THE EARL OF HADDINGTONconcurred in the noble Duke's desire to avoid risking the fate of this Bill; and though he extremely regretted the course taken by the other House on this subject, he could not advise their Lordships to enter at this period of the Session into any controversy with that assembly. He could not, however, but regard the mode in which the other House had dealt with the test applicable to Principals and Professors of Theology in these Universities as a severe blow to the Established Church.
  LORD CAMPBELLsaid, he had formerly supported the repeal of the test which required all Professors in the Scotch Universities to belong to the Established Church, because he had thought such a restriction unjust and inexpedient. At the same time, an exception was made in regard to the heads of the Universities, who had always been connected with the Established Church. Still he hoped that their Lordships would not insist on their Amendments, as by their doing so the Bill might be lost, and therefore, though most reluctantly, he acquiesced in the course recommended by the noble Duke.
  Then it was moved, not to insist on the Amendments, to which the Commons have disagreed.
  On Question, Whether to insist on the said Amendments?
  Resolved in the Negative, and a Message sent to the Commons to acquaint them therewith.
  After a few words from the Earl of MINTO,

CORRUPT PRACTICES PREVENTION ACT CONTINUANCE BILL.

  COMMITTEE. REPORT.
  House in Committee (according to order).
  Bill reported without Amendment.
  LORD EBURY LORD EBURY moved, that the first clause should be omitted, which enacted that a candidate may provide vehicles for the conveyance of electors to the poll, but shall not give them money to pay for their conveyance. Having had an opportunity, on Tuesday last, of stating his objections to this clause, it would not be necessary for him now to trouble their Lordships at any length. The clause, he contended, was not necessary at all; but even if it were necessary, the mode of carrying the intention into effect was a most inconvenient one, and contrary moreover to every principle of legislation on the subject for the last twenty-five years. This being his opinion, he hoped to induce their Lordships to concur in his Amendment. Now, as to the question of the necessity for the clause. Noble Lords opposite disclaimed any intention of a dissolution of Parliament, and therefore he might assume that there was not likely to be a dissolution between now and next Session. Were there to be any contested elections between now and then? It was true that there were rumours that two Members of the House of Commons were to be elevated to the peerage; but neither in North Cheshire nor in South Devonshire was there likely to be any contest in the elections to fill up the vacancies the elevation would occasion. This measure, therefore, was not necessary to meet any circumstances likely to arise before next Session. Something had been said about an uncertainty in the law, and his noble Friend had talked of the case of "Cooper v. Slade" upon that point. It was true that there was an uncertainty in the law, but there was no uncertainty whatever in the practice of the House of Commons. He had had great experience in the trial of election petitions by Committees of the other House, and there was no case in which a Member had been unseated by the House of Commons for having paid the bonâ fide travelling ex-
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  penses of voters. In "Cooper v. Slade," what had taken place was adjudged to be a corrupt contract; and what was decided was, that you must not write to a voter and say, "If you vote for me I will pay your expenses." It was stated to be the intention of the Government next year to submit the whole question as to elections to the consideration of a Select Committee, and therefore this particular clause was at present totally uncalled for. Even supposing there was a necessity for the clause, he believed the mode of carrying the intention into effect was an inconvenient one. The noble Earl the Lord Privy Seal, in moving the second reading, had described the Bill as a measure intended to enable poor voters to exercise their franchise; but were they sure that the enabling poor people to vote was really what was desired? There was not a word in this clause about poor voters, in contradistinction to any other voters. What it did was to allow a candidate to carry every single voter to the poll in a chaise and pair. He would read to their Lordships a few words of warning which he had received from an election agent. That gentleman said, that the expense of conveying voters to the poll at an election was one of a very serious character; and he did not hesitate to say that such expense was, to a very great extent, wasteful and grievously corrupt and extravagant. He went on to say, that from his experience he was convinced that this clause would add enormously to the expense of elections, especially in county contests, and would enable the possessor of the longest purse to win. That was that gentleman's opinion. This clause was not only different from, but was contrary to the principle which bad governed the whole tendency of legislation since the passing of the Reform Bill. Year after year measures had been carried for preventing the exercise of undue influence and for lessening the expense of elections; the time for keeping open the poll had been greatly reduced, the cost of bonds and colours had also been abrogated, refreshment tickets had been declared illegal, and each step that had been taken had been in the direction of greater purity of elections. Almost every one of the recommendations of the Committee of the House of Commons of 1834 had been carried into effect, and he begged to recall to the recollection of their Lordships the concluding paragraph in the Report of that Committee. It Was to this effect:—

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  "Your Committee are of opinion that every measure regulating the election of representatives should be based on the broad principle that the representative should be placed in the House of Commons, if possible, free of expense."
  That was the true principle, and now, for the first time in their legislation, they recognized the absurdity that a candidate should be liable for the personal expenses of the voter. Why should the candidate be liable? If a man were unable to walk to the poll to record an independent vote, let him be carried by all means; but why at the candidate's expense? Why should not the cost fall upon the Consolidated Fund? It would be quite as reasonable as that the candidate should pay it. He should, no doubt, be told that the House of Commons were the best judges of this matter, and that they had sent up the clause by a large majority. But this was not the first time that they had done the same thing. On the last occasion they sent it up backed by a much larger majority; but their Lordships expunged it nevertheless, and received the heartfelt thanks of every honest and independent elector throughout the country for doing so. This clause aimed a deadly blow at the purity of elections, and he trusted that their Lordships would defend their own independence and the independence of the voter by striking it out of the Bill.
  Moved, To leave out Clause 1.
  THE EARL OF HARDWICKEsaid, the reason why this Bill had been introduced was, that in the existing state of things candidates did not know how to act with regard to the conveyance of voters, and the single object of it was to remedy the present unsettled state of the law in regard to that question. If, as his noble Friend said, the recent, decisions of the House of Commons were, in favour of allowing it, he did not see bow his noble Friend could object to the Bill. Under the existing state of things, those who were most desirous of keeping, within the pale of the law were placed at a disadvantage as compared with others, It was urged as a practical objection to this Bill, that after it was passed no voter would go to the poll without being carried. He did not concur in that opinion, especially as the name of every person carried, the distance he was carried, and the charge for his conveyance would have to be published. The real question was, whether the law should be placed on a clear intelligible footing, instead of being left doubtful and in such a state as to encourage evasion? It was
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  for the advantage of all parties that some strict defined rule should be laid down on which all might act alike.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, he entertained insuperable objections to this clause, and thought, if it passed, the Bill ought to be called a measure for the "promotion," not the "prevention," of corrupt practices. It would open the door to all sorts of corruption and bribery and would give the advantage in every case to the wealthiest candidate. He recommended that the question should be deferred until it could be dealt with in the large measure of Parliamentary Reform which the Government had undertaken to introduce next Session.
  THE EARL OF WICKLOWwas of opinion that the question involved should not be allowed any longer to remain in its present doubtful state. He was in favour of the clause, believing it was only just and fair that the candidates should defray the expenses of bringing the voters to the poll, rather than that the latter should be burdened with such a charge.
  LORD CAMPBELLcomplained of the late period of the Session at which so important a measure had been brought before their Lordships. It was read a second time, he believed, on the very day fixed by the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees as the last day on which their Lordships would read any Bill a second time, and therefore, if not contrary to the letter, it was contrary to the spirit of the noble Lord's Resolution. Arguments might be urged on both sides of the question, and he was not prepared to give any positive opinion upon them. It was very important that the honest and poor voter should be placed in a position to exercise the franchise; but to give him facilities might open the door to bribery and corruption. In his opinion, instead of removing doubts in the law, this clause would give rise to many difficult questions, for the decision of the courts of law. The question was far too important to be decided satisfactorily in the last week of the Session, and the necessity for legislation was not urgent, and it had been announced in the other House that a Reform Bill was to be introduced next Session, when the whole subject would be discussed. It was impossible to doubt that the clause would add greatly to the expense of elections. Non-resident electors would be brought from remote parts of the country, from the Continent, and possibly from Australia.

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  The expenses not being payable to the voter himself could only be paid by an agent, and a special messenger might be sent to accompany each non-resident voter. Then would arise the question which he had no doubt would soon be discussed in Westminster Hall, whether conveyance did not include refreshment and conveyance back again—whether all the consequences of what was enacted were not enacted. Those were specimens of the questions which would arise, and as no evil could result from postponement, he entreated their Lordships not to agree to the clause.
  LORD REDESDALEreminded their Lordships that the Corrupt Practices Act of 1854, came up after the day fixed as the last day on which they would read a Bill a second time, and was read a second time as a Bill of urgency. This Bill had received the approval of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, and he thought they were justified in acceding to a proposition which came to them with such authority, and which peculiarly affected the privilege of the other House.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, there was this very essential difference between the dates of reading this Bill and the Bill of 1854 a second time. In this case, the last day on which they would read Bills a second time happened to be fixed five days before the end of the Session, and in 1854 it was eighteen days before the end of the Session. He did not think that too much stress ought to be laid upon the supposed acquiescence of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell in this clause, because the former noble Lord distinctly stated that there were arguments on both sides, and Lord John Russell expressed a strong opinion that this ought to be merely a continuance Bill. He concurred with the noble and learned Lord in his objection to the period at which their Lordships were called upon to pass a measure which was only read a second time on Tuesday at the tail of twenty-eight other Orders of the Day. Lord Lyndhurst thought the Bill in its present shape so objectionable that he had authorized him to obtain a pair for him against the clause if their Lordships should divide upon it. When their Lordships remembered that the Secretary of State for the Home Department had expressed an opinion that this Bill ought to be referred to a Select Committee, and that it was the intention of the Government to bring in a general measure in the early part of next Session, there could be
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  no pretext for hurrying their Lordships into the adoption of a premature and ill-considered alteration of the law. He had, therefore, great pleasure in supporting the Motion of his noble Friend.
  On Question, Whether the said clause shall stand part of the Bill? their Lordships divided:—Contents 43; Not-Contents 23: Majority 20.

  CONTENTS.

  Chelmsford, L.(L. Chancellor.)

  Sandwich, E.

  Wicklow, E.

  Cleveland, D.

  Dungannon, V.

  Manchester, D.

  Hardinge, V.

  Hutchinson, V. (E. Donoughmore.)

  Bath, M. [Teller.]

  Salisbury, M.

  Melville, V.

  Strathallan, V.

  Amherst, E.

  Bathurst, E.

  Aveland, L.

  Beauchamp, E.

  Cloncurry, L.

  Carnarvon, E.

  Colchester, L.

  De La Warr, E.

  De Freyne, L.

  Derby, E.

  De Ros, L.

  Desart, E.

  Dinevor, L.

  Ellenborough, E.

  Dunsandle and Clanconal, L.

  Graham, E.(D. Montrose.)

  Ker, L. (M. Lothian.)

  Hardwicke, E.

  Plunket, L. (Bp. Tuam, &c.)

  Jersey, E.

  Leven and Melville, E.

  Redesdale, L.

  Lonsdale, E.

  Sondes, L.

  Lucan, E.

  Stewart of Garlies, L.(E. Galloway.)

  Mansfield, E.

  Portarlington, E.

  Saint Leonards, L.

  Romney, E.

  Wynford, L. [Teller.]

  NOT-CONTENTS.

  Somerset, D.

  Boyle, L. E.(Cork and Orrey.)

  Lansdowne, M.

  Effingham, E.

  Campbell, L.

  Granville, E.

  Chesham, L.

  Harrington, E.

  Churchill, L.

  Minto, E.

  Cranworth, L.

  St. Germans, E.

  Ebury, L. [Teller.]

  Somers, E.

  Foley, L. [Teller.]

  Eversley, V.

  Rivers, L.

  Stratford de Redcliffe, V.

  Stanley of Alderley, L.

  Torrington, V.

  Wodehouse, L.

  Wycombe, L. (E. Shelburne.)

  Audley, L.

  Resolved in the Affirmative.
  Bill to be read 3a To-morrow.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA BILL.—COMMONS REASONS CONSIDERED.
Commons' Reasons for disagreeing to some of the Lords' Amendments considered (according to Order).
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, it could hardly be expected that on a question of so much importance, and involving so many varied considerations as this, there should not be differences of opinion between the Members of each House of par-

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liament, and also between the two Houses themselves. Your Lordships made several Amendments in this Bill, to the greater number, though perhaps not the most important, of which the Commons do not object. There are, however, five Amendments which were made by your Lordships to which that House has objected, and for objecting to which they have sent up Reasons to your Lordships. Perhaps it may be convenient that, instead of dealing entirely separately with each of these Amendments, I should at once state the course which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to take with regard to them all, leaving the decision upon each for separate discussion and consideration. The first Amendment to which the House of Commons have disagreed, and insist upon their disagreement, will be found in the seventh line of the ninth page of the Bill. As the Bill came from the House of Commons, it was provided that, with regard to all despatches which might require secrecy—and that there were some that did require it was not denied by any one—the Secretary of State should exercise the functions heretofore performed by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. It was objected by my noble Friend the noble Earl below me (the Earl of Ellenborough) that that provision gave to the Secretary of State, not only a power which was not absolutely necessary, but a much greater authority than is now possessed by the President of the Board of Control, because, although the President may insist upon sending out any secret orders he pleases, he must communicate them to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company; and, therefore, although he is not bound to follow their advice, he must necessarily have a consultation with them before taking a step which may lead to very important consequences. My noble Friend argued with very great force that the Secretary of State would now be placed in a position of more complete independence than was the President of the Board of Control, and might upon his own responsibility, and without hearing the opinion or advice of any of the Councillors with whom the law surrounds him, take a step which might have most important and most prejudicial effects. In compliance with these representations of my noble Friend, it was agreed to introduce into this clause words requiring the Secretary of State, before sending out secret orders, to communicate them to the Vice President
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of the Council and one other member of the Council, to be elected by himself. I think that that was a wise and judicious arrangement, and one which, without too much cramping the authority of the Secretary of State, secures to him the same means of obtaining assistance and advice as are possessed by the President of the Board of Control under the existing system. It is, however, the opinion of the House of Commons, that the provision which we introduced "tends to divide the responsibility of the Minister, and to create anew the Secret Committee, which, under the new Government, will be no longer necessary." There is no question that, to a certain, but very limited extent—because the Secretary of State has the power of overruling the Councillors whom he consults—it does relieve him from responsibility. If the House of Commons are of opinion that that responsibility should be so whole and undivided as not to require that he should consult any person whatever before he takes so important a step as sending secret orders out to India, undoubtedly that is a view which is not carried out by the Bill as it was sent down by your Lordships. What the House of Commons means by saying that the Secret Committee will under the new Government no longer be necessary, they do not explain, and of course I cannot explain it for them. I cannot say that I think the Amendment was an injudicious one, or that its rejection by the Commons is a desirable alteration of the Bill. At the same time, I do not think that, considering the very great interests which are involved in the passing of this Bill, the Amendment made by your Lordships is of sufficient importance to justify you in adhering to it against the wish of the House of Commons, and therefore I shall propose that your Lordships do not persist in that Amendment. For the same reason, because I think that the question involved in them, though not an inconsiderable one, is only of subordinate importance, I shall ask your Lordships not to insist upon the Amendments made in page 9, lines 27, 39, and 40. The objections taken by the Commons to these Amendments appear to me to be rather inconsistent with that to which I have just referred. In that instance they objected that the Amendment introduced by your Lordships tended to divide the responsibility of the Minister. In this instance, in which your Lordships proposed to give to the Secretary of State undivided re-

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sponsibility with regard to the appointment of the members of the Councils of the Governor General, and of the different Presidencies in India, the House of Commons say that that undivided responsibility ought not to rest with the Minister, and that "it is undesirable to increase the patronage of the Minister without providing a check upon its exercise." The distinction between the views of the two Houses is this. According to your Lordships' Amendment the Secretary of State was called upon to make these appointments in Council, which rendered it necessary for him in every case to lay the proposed appointment before the Council, and to listen to any objections which might be raised to it. The House of Commons have rejected that Amendment and restored the clause to the form in which it originally stood—namely, that the Secretary of State shall make these appointments, not only with the knowledge of the Council, but also with the concurrence of the votes of a majority of the Councillors. As the previous alteration leaves to the Secretary of State too large a discretion, I think that this unduly restrains his powers and places too much in the hands of the Council as a body the appointment to very important offices, thereby encouraging what my noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough) particularly deprecates—canvassing and the looking to individual members of the Council rather than to the Secretary of State in this country and to the Governor General in India. I object to this alteration, but I am not prepared to ask your Lordships to persist in an Amendment which has been deliberately and carefully considered and rejected by the House of Commons. The next two Amendments to which the Commons object are in pages 10 and 11, and involve the principle of appointment by competition. Now, I wish to draw your Lordships' attention to the exact state of the case, and to the questions which are raised by the Bill as it was sent up from the House of Commons by your Lordships' Amendment, and by the rejection of that Amendment by the other House. As the Bill originally stood, it was proposed to substitute the Secretary of State and the Council for the President of the Board of Control and the Court of Directors of the East India Company. With these authorities have hitherto rested the appointments to the civil and military services of the Company; but candidates have been re-
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quired to undergo a very severe and, to a certain extent, competitive examination. The particulars of that examination, and the amount of competition which was to be introduced into it have been regulated, not by an Act of Parliament, but by instruments proceeding from the competent authorities; and in substituting the Secretary of State and Council for those authorities the Bill, as originally introduced, gave to the Secretary of State the same power of making regulations, to be confirmed by Order in Council, as was formerly exercised by the Court of Directors and the President of the Board of Control. The House of Commons, however, went a step further, in the direction of a competitive examination, and proposed not only that all candidates should be subjected to such an examination, but that the result of that competition should, without reference to any other circumstances or any other conditions, regulate the order of succession in which candidates should receive their appointment. I do not wish to enter into the general question of the principle of competitive examination for admission to the civil or military service; but I think there are two grounds on which your Lordships' Amendments may be fairly vindicated, and their rejection by the House of Commons may be reasonably objected to. The one is, that the principle of competition was exactly as much secured, subject to the consent of Parliament, by the Bill as it stood in the first instance, and by the system as it existed under the East India Company, inasmuch as the regulations being made and confirmed by Order in Council, that Order in Council, or any other Order varying those regulations, having to be laid before the House of Commons, that House had an opportunity of expressing its opinion as to the expediency of such variations. And seeing how much the principle of competition is on its trial—perhaps its successful trial—at this moment, I think it was not judicious absolutely to tie the hands of the Executive Government as by an Act of Parliament to lay down such stringent rules as to the necessity of appointing the most successful competitor. Another objection is, that hitherto the regulation of appointments to the civil and military service of this country has not been under Act of Parliament, but by the direct authority of the Crown—of course under the responsibility of its advisers. This clause might therefore be regarded as, to a certain extent, infringing

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on the prerogative of the Crown in respect to these appointments. I must, however, fairly admit that there is a partial answer to this objection as far as the civil service is concerned; for, though undoubtedly such a regulation as to the civil service of this country would be an infringement on the prerogative of the Crown, it is not so clear that that infraction would extend to the case of India, because it is not a prerogative which the. Crown has hitherto exercised there. It is a power and a prerogative which the House of Commons and Parliament are for the first time vesting in the Crown—namely, the administration of Indian affairs by direct management, and by the patronage—which is the important point—connected with the services of India. Therefore it is competent for Parliament to hand over that power and authority to the Crown sub modo—that is to say, subject to such conditions as at the time of the transfer it may deem fit. Though I do not assent to the principle adopted by the House of Commons—though I think it an unwise course so to fetter the hands of the Executive and of the Indian Minister, as well as to limit the discretion of Parliament itself—yet in regard to the civil service I ant not prepared to advise your Lordships to insist on your Amendment. But I must say, there is another branch of the service which appears to me to stand on quite a different footing. You are now handing over to the Crown the supreme authority over the army of India; but, by the 33rd clause of this Bill, it is provided that all appointments to cadetships shall be vested in Her Majesty. And if you provide, as I think you must do, that with regard to the military service of India, as well as with regard to the military service of this country, all appointments of this description should be vested in the Crown, it is almost a contradiction in terms to say, in the first instance, that all cadetships in the scientific branch shall be vested in Her Majesty, and to follow that up by saying that no persons shall be recommended except in the precise order as they come out of a competitive examination, and that the Crown shall he compelled to exercise its authority according to the result of that competition. With respect to the civil service, it may be argued that, practically speaking, the Crown does not exercise that authority over appointments which is perhaps by the strict theory of the constitution vested in it. But, in reference to the army, whether
2256
of this country or of India, it is of great importance that we should not lose sight of the principle that the Crown, and not Parliament, is the true source of appointment and of promotion. That is a constitutional principle which I confess I should see abandoned with very great regret; and I think this point has not been maturely considered by the House of Commons. As to admission to the civil service, the question was raised in the other House, was deliberately discussed, and a division taken upon it, when the Government, no doubt in a thin House, was left in a minority. This being so, and the other House having come to a deliberate decision on this subject, that is another reason why we should not insist on our Amendment with regard to it. But the power of the Crown in theory and in practice over appointments and promotions in the army I hold to be a matter of very considerable constitutional importance. The House of Commons, however, appears rather hastily to have inferred that the same necessity applied to the military as to the civil service; and, accordingly, it introduced into this clause Amendments relating to cadetships in the scientific branches corresponding to those applicable to the civil service. This was done without taking into serious consideration and discussing whether there is not a broad constitutional distinction between the power of the Crown over the civil and military departments respectively. This is a point of such great moment that, without saying that, even if the other House should adhere to its opinion, I should think it preferable that this important measure should be lost, and that these long discussions should be protracted to another Session, with all the inconvenience attending such an ad interim Government of an empire like India, still it would be unwise for your Lordships hastily and at once to adopt the decision of the House of Commons in rejection of your Amendments. And as respects the provision that the Crown shall be bound to grant cadetships precisely in accordance with the success of the candidates in a competitive examination, it. is, I believe, due to the prerogative of the Crown, due to your Lordships' own position, due to the great interests involved, as well as respectful to the other House itself, that it should be invited to consider the marked distinction between the two cases, and that as the formal mode of attaining that end your Lordships should be advised to insist on

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your Amendment, which strikes out that absolute and imperative condition imposed on the Crown of selecting for cadetships in the scientific branches of the army those persons who may have most distinguished themselves at the examination, and that, too, in the exact order in which they have so distinguished themselves. There is another clause as to which the House of Commons seems to have shared the misapprehensions entertained by some of your Lordships. I allude to Clause 54, which was much discussed here, and which requires that whenever any order directing actual hostilities to be commenced shall be issued, the fact of its issue shall be communicated to both Houses of Parliament. In the original provision the communication to Parliament was to be made within one month from the date of sending out the order; but your Lordships amended it to three months if Parliament should be sitting, adding at the same time the words "unless such order shall be revoked or suspended." If Parliament was not sitting, then the communication was to be made within a month after its next meeting. Perhaps the clause is not sufficiently explicit, because the intention is, that if at the end of three months Parliament should not be sitting, then within one month after the resumption of its deliberations the notice in question should be given. But the House of Commons seems to have thought the first and second conditions inconsistent with each other, and it says that the period of three months does not harmonize with the one month after the meeting of Parliament, which meeting may take place immediately after the issue of the order contemplated by the clause. That misconstruction existed in this House, and I regret that words were not inserted to make the meaning clearer; but the grounds stated for allowing an interval of three months after the declaration of hostilities were really such as it would be impossible for the House of Commons to resist or overlook. These grounds were, that the orders might be sent out to India—and recollect it is with India you are dealing—for the commencement of hostilities. They could not be received within a month in that country, and after their receipt circumstances might possibly arise which would prevent the Governor General either from reasons of discretion or actual inability, from carrying those orders into effect. He might send home word, "It is quite clear we
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shall have to engage in warlike operations, but it is necessary to temporize; I have not at command sufficient military resources, and I shall not be prepared to execute your orders within the next two months." In the meantime, however, before it was possible to send back this answer to this country—nay, even before the order itself could reach India—the clause as it first stood required the fact that such an order had been issued to be promulgated and laid before Parliament. The consequence of that would be that the very next mail would take out to India news that directions had been given to commence hostilities, and every country against which such hostilities had been ordered would have ample notice of your intention to make war upon them, although your own Governor General might have told you that for two or three months to come he would not be prepared to act upon your instructions. Thus, you would be actually giving your enemy—or rather your intended enemy—full warning of what you were going to do, while at the same time your own instruments had not the means of giving immediate effect to your directions. No one, therefore, can, I think, doubt the propriety of the alteration made by your Lordships to cause the fact of such an order having been sent out to be announced to Parliament not within one month, but within three months after its issue, so as to afford time for communicating with India, and learning whether or not there would be any difficulty in promulgating the order. Your Lordships, as I have already said, have also inserted in this clause words providing that if such orders were suspended or revoked, then it should be unnecessary to lay them before Parliament at all. Clearly, if they are not to be acted upon, it would be unwise to inform the persons with whom you have to deal that you ever intended to declare war against them. The clause then enacts that these orders shall be communicated to Parliament, if it is then sitting, within three months. This will give the Government three months' grace, at the expiration of which they will be bound to lay the orders they have issued before Parliament. If, however, after that interval has elapsed, Parliament should not be sitting, then the Government will have had the advantage of the three months already given them for the issue and promulgation of the order, and as soon as the Legislature re assembles, or within one

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month after its re-assembling, it will be incumbent on them to communicate to it the fact that the hostilities had been ordered. I propose that the clause shall provide that the order shall be communicated to both Houses of Parliament within three months after the sending of such order if Parliament is sitting, and if Parliament is not sitting at the end of such three months, then within one mouth next after the meeting of Parliament. That, I think, would carry out what were your Lordships' intentions. It removes the obvious misconstruction which the House of Commons has put upon the clause. With that alteration I think they would be of opinion that the clause is reasonable and just. I shall, therefore, my Lords, propose, with regard to Clause 54, that we do insist upon your Lordships' Amendments as altered by the Amendment which I propose to insert in it. My Lords, these are all the objections which the House of Commons have made to the Amendments made by your Lordships in the India Bill, and I thought it more convenient that I should make a general statement with regard to them rather than make a separate statement on each. My proposition, therefore, is not to insist upon your Lordships' Amendments as far as regards the first and second of these Amendments, and also with regard to the third, so far as it relates to the civil service, but to insist upon your Lordships' Amendment and to submit it again to the further and more deliberate consideration of the House of Commons with regard to cadetships in the scientific branches of the military service; and also to insist upon your Lordships' Amendment with another Amendment of a clause which I cannot but think has been misapprehended and misunderstood by the House of Commons.
EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I do not rise for the purpose of offering any objection to the course proposed by the noble Earl. In the first place, I entirely agree to the very judicious course which under the present circumstances he has proposed that we shall take; and in the second place, the Session is so nearly at an end that I agree with the noble Earl it would be perfectly idle to insist upon all our Amendments. At the same time I cannot help adverting to the strange conduct of the Government with regard to this Bill. The noble Earl, by the fact of his being Prime Minister and leader of this House, by the exercise of that influence which a
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Government always exercises at the end of a Session, is virtually master of the proceedings of this House, and in that capacity I think he is necessarily bound to watch over the dignity and propriety of the proceedings of this House. I do not wish to wander from the question before the House, but to illustrate my meaning I must allude to another question, which was very recently discussed by your Lordships—I allude to the Jewish question. In that case we followed implicitly what was laid down by the noble Earl as the most proper course to be adopted. We on this side of the House remonstrated strongly against certain proceedings connected with that Jewish question as likely to throw ridicule and a certain amount of discredit on this House. As soon as the proceedings were closed here, public opinion certainly was expressed in every possible way in the sense that we expected. Of course there was no help for that. But when the matter came before the House of Commons we found in the report of the proceedings that every side of the House agreed in the objection we had made, and I think this House, as a body, had a right to expect that some of the Members of that Government which induced us to take the course we did should have vindicated that course in some manner—instead of which two of the noble Earl's colleagues in the other House remained perfectly silent, and one of the Secretaries of State expressed his regret that the House of Lords, having taken a course which they thought wrong, did not at least act in a straight forward manner. With regard to this Bill, and in reference to that clause to which the third Amendment refers, and which relates to competitive examination, an Amendment was proposed to which I strongly objected. The noble Earl said the House of Commons had adopted on that subject a course which he did not think judicious. But it was not a private Member of the House of Commons who proposed that course; that clause was proposed by one of the Members of Her Majesty's Government, the President of the Board of Control, and, therefore, by one who was bound to be in accord with the opinions of the Government on the subject. When the Amendment was proposed objected strongly, on the first blush, that it was an Amendment which appeared to me to take away the whole security which was thought necessary by the President of the Board of Control. But I was met by what ap-

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peared to me a very fair argument at the time—that while practically it would not interfere with open competition, as to admission to the civil service, it would at the same time save a great constitutional principle and prevent an encroachment on the prerogative of the Crown: and to that this House yielded. I strongly objected to the Amendment with regard to the re-constitution of what will practically be a Secret Committee; but I felt that the noble Earl's authority on the opposite side was strongly in favour of the Amendment. I urged every reason which appeared to me why it was most desirable not to fetter the Secretary of State. The Amendment, however, being proposed by the noble Earl was naturally carried. Now, if this Amendment was worth anything, it was to have been expected that Her Majesty's Government would have made some effort to complete that which was the work of the Prime Minister. But not a bit of it. If I am to believe the reports of the proceedings of the other House, the President of the Board of Control voted against this Amendment, and stated that in his opinion the Amendment was perfectly indefensible. Well, then, I come to the next clause. What the House of Commons have done with regard to it I think rather bears me out in what I took the liberty of pointing out on each successive clause connected with patronage,—that whereas a great outcry was raised against the late Government as to the imaginary amount of patronage which they were about to transfer to themselves, every single change that has taken place under the direction of Her Majesty's present Government has been to increase the patronage conferred upon the Secretary of State; and, therefore, I am not surprised that the House of Commons should have insisted on some cheek being retained upon the exercise of patronage. If your Lordships had adopted the course which we on this side of the House suggested, and which was so strongly supported by the noble Earl the late President of the Board of Control, you would not now be obliged to abandon your Amendment as to the nomination of the Members of the Councils of the Governor General and Governors respectively. I think the House has some reason to complain that that confident communication which they should for their own sake have maintained has not, at all events, been maintained between the Members of the Government sitting in each House in order
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to keep up that consistency between the proceeding of the two Houses which think is most important to the dignity and honour of both Houses of Parliament. With respect to the Amendment proposed by the noble Earl as to competitive examination, I must say that I feel some pride that the noble Earl, after having opposed my Amendment, should now be the person to oppose one portion of the Amendment of the House of Commons. I must be again allowed to say that if there by any validity in the objection to take from the Crown the appointment of the military cadetships, the same objection applies to the civil appointments. With regard to the last Amendments, I can only say that I feel very grateful to the noble Earl for having so very clearly stated the reasons why we, during two stages of the Bill, pressed upon him those alterations, and which I am glad to say, except with a verbal Amendment, he intends now to insist upon. I have stated why we on this side of the House think we have good reason to complain of the conduct of the Government with respect to this Bill, but at the same time it is far from my intention to object to the course proposed by the noble Earl.
LORD CAMPBELLsaid, he had a few observations to make with respect to the passion of the House of Commons for competitive examinations. He believed, with great respect for that House, that they were running quite wild upon that subject. He was himself an advocate, not for the competitive examination, but for a discriminative examination for the purpose of ascertaining whether people seeking public offices knew their business; and he was of opinion that the system might be usefully applied to candidates for seats in the House of Commons. He would, in fact, imitate in that case the practice which prevailed in Scotland, of requiring a Judge at the period of his elevation to the bench to act for a time in the character of a "Lord Probationer," and to give proof of his capacity for deciding causes before his appointment was confirmed. It appeared to him that as the House of Commons was now pushing the competitive system to a point which would interfere with the prerogative of the Crown, it was time to inquire whether it would not be well to adopt a discriminative examination, for the gentlemen who sought to obtain admission into that assembly and to "pluck" those who should not be found properly qualified, by

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their knowledge of law, of finance, and of other subjects, to discharge the duties of legislators.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, although I perceive with the greatest possible concern and regret the Amendments which have been made by the House of Commons, I do not feel disposed to comment upon what took place in that House with respect to them. I admit that on all great questions the largest amount of ability is displayed by the gentlemen who lead the debates in that House, and, although I most deeply regret the opinion which appears to be generally entertained there with respect to competitive examinations, yet I should be sorry to attribute to the Members of the other House any but the most conscientious convictions of duty in adhering to their opinion. I shall not trouble your Lordships with any general observations, but shall proceed at once to the questions at issue. If it be true, as the House of Commons state, with regard to the first point, that it is impossible to defend the Amendment which your Lordships have made, I can only regret that the House of Commons did not give better reasons for insisting on the Bill as it stood when they sent it up to your Lordships; for I find that they declare, in the first place, that the submitting of the secret despatches to two members of the Council would tend to divide the responsibility of the Minister. My Lords, it could not by possibility have that effect, because the members of the Secret Committee are constituted only for the purpose of inspecing the Secret Despatches, and they would have no power of objecting to those despatches or of preventing their being sent. They would have no other power, in fact, than that of offering, in a confidential manner, their opinions with respect to them if they happened to differ from the Minister. I will give you an example, the application of which I am sure you will admit. The other day I wrote a despatch with regard to Lord Canning's Proclamation. That despatch was in the hands of the Secret Committee for six days. No objection was taken to it and no representation was made to me on the subject: but if I had stated that as a reason for my responsibility being considered to be divided—if I had endeavoured to shelter myself under the circumstance of that despatch having been so submitted to the Secret Conunittee—I do not know what result of such an excuse might have had
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with your Lordships, but I know that I should have been Considered generally to have acted in a spirit of poltroonery. It would have been said, that I had not the slightest ground to stand upon, that my responsibility was complete, and that the circumstance of the despatch having been submitted to the Secret Committee in no way relieved me of that responsibility. It is said that the Bill will create anew the Secret Committee, which, under the new form of Government, will not be necessary. But my Lords, the real change effected by this Bill in the practical Government of India is not great. With the exception of the Queen's name, which I deem very valuable, and the nomination by the Crown of the Governor General and Governors, there is no great practical alteration in the mode of governing India, especially since it has been determined to continue in the Council half of the existing Court. How, then, can it be said that the slight change which has taken place affords any reason for discontinuing the Secret Committee? In my opinion there is no change, however great, in the Government of India which could have dispensed with the necessity for submitting the secret despatches to some second mind. This is the real value of the Committee. It is advisable in the course of human nature for any man, be he whom he may, to submit everything of great importance that he writes to some other mind. Be that mind an inferior mind, let the person possessing it have no power whatever over his proceedings, still there is an advantage in being compelled so to communicate; and that advantage I desire to mantain. Remember, my Lords, that this provision for a Secret Committee was inserted in the original law for the Government of India by no common men; but that it was put there by Mr. Pitt and the first Mr. Dundas, two of the ablest men who ever swayed the councils of this country. Be assured that they did not do it without good reason. The President of the Board of Control bad then, as now, colleagues to whom he could refer; but it was thought advisable that persons connected with India and who could understand the real bearings of the case, should at all times have despatches of importance submitted to them and should have the power of expressing an opinion with regard to them. These were my reasons for desiring the introduction of that Amendment. However, I agree with my noble Friend that it is not of so much importance as that

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it would be desirable to risk the passing of this measure by insisting upon it in opposition to the opinion of the other House. But then comes another Amendment of far greater importance, which, in reality, goes to the whole constitution of the Indian Government, and I confess that it is with very great regret that I find that my noble friend does not intend to insist upon it. The House of Commons say that it is undesirable to increase the patronage of the Minister without providing a cheek upon its exercise; but in this Bill they have greatly increased the patronage of the Minister without any check whatever. They have given him the power of creating the Governor General, the Governors, and the Members of the Council also; and they have given him a great increase of patronage in the disposition of the establishment of the India House and likewise in the nomination to cadetships, without any check at all. But that on which I insisted is not patronage. Appointments to the Council in India are not appointments which a Government would ever venture to look on in the light of patronage. They will only be made in the exercise of the highest function of the Executive Government that of providing the very best persons to assist in carrying on the most important branches of administration in India. No Government would ever venture, in the way of a job, upon appointments of that description. But this I know, that it is most desirable that there should not be a double Government in India. Under the Bill, as it stands now, the Government name the Governor General, while the Council will name the Councillors of the Governor General. The Council may take totally different views with respect to the most important matters from those taken by the Governor General. Beaten here, by the power of the Secretary of State in the Council, they may, through their appointments to the Council in India, very materially affect the conduct of public affairs; for recollect that the Governor General, though he has the power of overruling his Council in extreme cases affecting the highest interests and safety of the state, has not the power which is given to the Secretary of State by this Bill of overruling his Council on all occasions. It is only in extreme cases that he can do so, and there might be in his Council gentlemen opposed to the Governor General, who might reduce his authority to contempt by continually thwart-
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ing him; yet the power of appointing those Gentlemen you leave to the Council here. I think that this is a most material error. I have always deemed it necessary that all persons in India should look to the head of the Government alone, or, if not to him to the head of the Government here. What would be the position of my noble Friend near me if the principle proposed to be applied to the Governor General were carried out in my noble Friend's case—and if he, placed by favour of Her Majesty's confidence in the position of First Minister of the Crown, were to have all his colleagues chosen by the noble Lords who now sit opposite? Yet that is exactly the position in which you place the Governor General of India, who has to conduct matters as important as those which fall to the lot of my noble Friend. I think, therefore, that this is a most serious error in the constitution of the new Government of India, and that it perpetuates all the vices of the old administration. You re-appoint to the Council half of the existing Court of Directors, with all their traditional policy, and you enable them to appoint the Councillors of the Governor General, although it is notorious that according to their old prejudices every Governor General is regarded as an enemy unless he adopts a course of subserviency to the Court. I cannot agree, therefore, with the Commons in their objection to this clause. It would be idle to think of dividing the House upon the subject, but I cannot give my assent to it, because I believe that it will lead to great evils. Then comes a very important question with respect to which my noble Friend concedes one-half, and insists upon his own Amendment as to the other half. When he makes a distinction between the military and civil services I think he has good ground to stand upon. There is a material difference between them. When competitive examination was first established for the civil service, I admitted that there was considerable advantage in disconnecting the civil service from the Court of Directors, and that advantage still will continue to exist to a certain extent although the Court will have become a council. Feeling, therefore, that a great political as well as social revolution is there by accomplished in India, I do not object to my noble Friend's determination not to insist on his Amendment on this point; but I rejoice that he insists upon it in the other. My Lords, I cannot but regret that

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the House of Commons has fallen into what appears to me a dangerous error with respect to open competitive examination as the only road by which, for the future, admission is to be obtained into the military service of India. I am quite sure that there is not only in the House of Commons, but also out of doors, a great error as to the classes which are to be benefited, and injured by this great innovation. The establishment of competitive examination does not in the smallest degree affect your Lordships' House—it does not affect your relatives or connections, nor the connections of the great landed gentry of the country. I regret to say, that Members of your Lordships' House and of the other House, and the first gentry in the country, have not endeavoured—except in very rare cases—to obtain for their sons situations in the service of the Indian Government. I regret it deeply, because I know it is by far the best field which any man can have for the exercise of his abilities, and it affords the highest rewards for the display of the highest virtues. I regret that this House has not participated in the glory which has been reflected by late events on the servants of the Indian Government. But I desire, my Lords, to retain these appointments in the class which has hitherto held them. That class is the class of educated gentlemen which occupies the centre of society, which extends on the one side to the confines of the class which lives by buying and selling, and on the other to the class of which your Lordships are Members—persons who have the means of providing for their sons otherwise than by professions of a lucrative description, of doing that for them which I think is the greatest misfortune that can befall any man—enabling them to live in idleness. This class embraces clergymen, country gentlemen of small incomes, lawyers and all the learned professions, officers in the army and navy, and all that great class of persons having a mediocrity of fortune, but of the highest and most cultivated intellect. It is from that class which it is intended by this clause to take away these appointments. In sanctioning this principle, Parliament has introduced a property qualification for appointments in the public service, because there is no doubt that it is by paying highly those who cram candidates for these appointments that they will be obtained. It is only by the expenditure of large sums in this way that it will be pos-
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sible for the future to enter the service, and the gentlemen who have hitherto obtained appointments have not the means of incurring this expenditure. But the education obtained in these cramming colleges is not the highest species of education—that which is obtained at home by the example and conversation of good parents is by far the highest. You cannot compare for a moment the education which the sons of clergymen and officers get with the education obtained by the sons of rich grocers or linendrapers, who will be successful in these competitive examinations. Depend upon it this is a great and most injurious social revolution. I cannot view it in any other light. I look upon it as fraught with the greatest danger, and I do trust that the House of Commons, on reconsidering its present opinion, will be induced to acquiesce in this Amendment. I rejoice that for the present my noble Friend will insist upon the Amendment which he made in Committee, though that Amendment is not altogether satisfactory to me. I vote against the whole clause. I desire to maintain the Indian army as it is, to draw it altogether from the same sources, which are perennial founts of every thing that is noble, and everything that is virtuous. Can we desire to have men in the public service superior to those who have been derived from that source? It is now, too, when the scientific branches of the army have in the highest degree distinguished themselves and performed the greatest public services, that we are to change altogether the system by which appointments are made, to deprive them of the hope of being followed in the same noble career by their sons, to destroy their prospects of being able to provide for their families, and not only thus to injure them, but, as they must understand it, to inflict on them a great offence. These, my Lords, have always been my opinions, and it is impossible for me to refrain from expressing them.
Then it was resolved not to insist on their Lordships' Amendments on Clauses 27, 28, 29, 30, and 32; but to insist on their Amendment on Clause 34.
An Amendment made to the Bill; Committee appointed to prepare Reasons to be offered to the Commons, for the Lords insisting on some of their Amendments to the said Bill to which the Commons disagree; to meet immediately. The Committee reported Reasons prepared by them; agreed to; and Bill and Reasons returned

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to the Commons. The said Reasons are as follow:—
"The Lords insist upon their Amendment in page 11, line 6, for the following reason:—
"Because it is a Principle universally recognized that appointments to and Promotion in the Military Service of the Country should proceed directly from the Authority of the Crown; and it appears to be a Violation of this Principle to prescribe such Rules by Authority of Parliament as absolutely to fetter the Discretion of the Crown in the Exercise of this Prerogative, which, moreover, is distinctly admitted and confirmed by the Terms of the 33rd Clause of this Bill.
"The Lords insist upon their Amendment in page 17, line 8, for the following reason:—
"Because they believe that the Objections of the House of Commons are founded on a Misunderstanding of the Clause, and they have inserted an Amendment in the Clause which they believe will remove that Misunderstanding, the said Amendment being to insert in the original Bill the Words ("at the End of such Three Months") after the Word ("sitting") in page 17, line 9.
"With the preceding Exceptions, the Lords do not insist on their Amendments to which the Commons disagree."

CIVIL BILLS, &c. (IRELAND) ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

  COMMITTEE. REPORT.
  House in Committee (according to Order).
  Bill reported without Amendment.
  THE EARL OF ST.GERMANSobjected to the clause which gave power to the Lord Lieutenant in Council to remove Assistant Barristers. Only those Members of the Council who were summoned would attend, so that the Lord Lieutenant, with two or three members of Council, might remove any assistant barrister. He did not see the necessity of the provision, and he hoped that his noble Friend would agree that it was not essentially necessary.
  LORD CAMPBELLsaid, he quite concurred that only those members of the Council who were summoned would attend, because no member who was not summoned had a right to be present. The objection would have been got rid of if the power of removal had been vested in the hands of the Judicial Committee. The Lord Lieutenant in Council meant the Lord Lieutenant, associated with such two or three of his colleagues as he chose to summon. Instead of the Lord Lieutenant in Council, he thought a better tribunal would have been formed of the Lord Lieutenant, associated with those functionaries who formed the court of appeal under the Incumbered Estates Act.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMOREsaid, that there were sonic assistant barristers who were labouring under "permanent infirmity," and who were obliged to appoint deputies to perform their duties. The Bill gave these persons retiring pensions, and it enabled the Lord Lieutenant in Council to remove them if they did not resign. The assistant barristers would have the power of proving before the Privy Council that they were not labouring under permanent infirmity, and the clause as amended in the other house provided that all the members of the Privy Council resident in the county should be summoned to attend, and should receive notice of the business before them. He proposed to amend this clause by restricting the Privy Council to Members residing in Dublin and in the county in which the assistant barrister lived.
  LORD CAMPBELLthought the explanation was sufficient.
  LORD CRANWORTHthought it was a question whether they would not lower the position of assistant barristers by placing them on a different footing from that of the Judges of the superior courts. If assistant barristers were to be dismissed in this way, the question would be raised whether the same system should not be applied to others, and in that way great difficulties might arise.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYstated the case of Mr. Jemmett, the local Commissioner of Bankrupts, which he had brought before the House recently, and said that there might be a demand in such a case for a dismissal in a similar way. The facts in that case were not denied, but the learned Lord on the woolsack said he had no power to dismiss a Commissioner of Bankrupts, who could only be dismissed upon an Address of both Houses. If dismissal by a summary mode were instituted the practice would be carried still higher. In the other House of Parliament many questions had been raised about seine Irish Judges, who could not, it was said, perform their duties, and yet would not resign until their political friends came into power.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMOREwished to point out that as long as an assistant barrister performed his duty no question would arise. The only object was to prevent the duties of assistant barristers being performed by deputies who were incompetent and irresponsible.
  LORD CAMPBELLthought that the

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  clause, as amended, would provide a tribunal which might be implicitly trusted.
  Amendment agreed to; and Bill to be read 3a To-morrow.

THE QUEEN'S COLLEGE, CORK,

  NOTICE OF MOTION WITHDRAWN.
  THE EARL OF ST. GERMANS, who had a notice on the paper for the production of a letter written by him to Lord Palmerston in 1853, respecting the Queen's College at Cork, said he had put his notice on the paper in consequence of a passage in the Report of the Commissioners on the Queen's Colleges in Ireland, which imputed blame to the Government with which he was connected with respect to certain dissensions that then prevailed. On reconsideration, however, he thought it better not to make the Motion, as he found that the letter to which it referred contained animadversions on the conduct of certain parties, which it would not be beneficial to the public service to publish. He could assure their Lordships that when he was in Ireland nothing engaged his attention more than the condition of this college. He was in constant communication with Sir John Young, the Chief Secretary, with the Lord Chancellor, and with the Attorney General, and he took no step in the matter without the concurrence of those eminent persons. Had the more energetic and decisive action which the Commissioners seemed to recommend been adopted at that time, it would, he was convinced, have produced very injurious consequences to the college, by causing the secession either of that distinguished scientific man, Sir Robert Kay, or of the Vice President and many members of the colleges. He did not wish to impute any blame to the Commissioners, and was convinced that if they had seen papers which he was quite willing to show to them they would have come to a conclusion different from that at which they had arrived.
  THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, that not having seen the Report of the Commissioners, he could form no judgment upon the merits of the case; but if that Report contained anything which the noble Earl thought reflected upon his conduct, nothing could be more natural than that he should take the earliest opportunity of setting himself right with their Lordships and the public. Under the circumstances he thought that the noble Earl had shown equally good judgment and good feeling in not pressing for the production of a
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  letter some portions of which might have been injurious to the feelings of others.
  House adjourned at a Quarter past Nino o'clock, 'till To-morrow. Half-past Two o'clock.