§ Order of the day for the House to be put into Committee read.
§ Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.
§ Agreed to.
§ House in Committee accordingly.
§ Clauses 1 to 6 agreed to.
§ Clause 7.
§ LORD BROUGHTONsaid, he should rejoice at the abolition of the East India Company, if a better scheme for the government of India were substituted for it; but he did not think that this Bill would effect such a substitution. He thought that the substitution of the present system of governing India by a Secretary of State, or single Minister, to be called by any 1562 other name, to whom should be intrusted the administration of the whole government of India, would have been a far better scheme than that proposed by this Bill. He had arrived at that opinion after much deliberation and conversation with men of the highest authority on Indian affairs. This Council was part of the very essence and principle of the Bill. Since the introduction of the Bill a great change had taken place in the minds of Members of both Houses of Parliament as to the expediency of allowing a Council to interfere in the administration of Indian affairs. He collected from the speech last night of the leader of that House under the Palmerston Administration that his views as to the expediency of appointing any such Council had considerably changed since the introduction of Lord Palmerston's Bill. The present form of home government for India was no doubt liable to objections for which every man must be aware, on the ground of delay and differences of opinion between the authorities of Cannon Row, and Leadenhall Street. The shots they fired at each other, however, were sped from a distance, and were cooled by time. But when this new Council was formed, what would be the degree of antagonism—and antagonism there must be if the Council was to be of any good—when they met under the same roof and at the same board, and had to fire across the table? Unless some means could be devised for making this Council, he would not say a little more peaceable, but at all events a little more practical, their Lordships should not pass this clause. He was sure of that. He was opposed to any Council at all; but if he were for a Council it would not be for this Council, which was constructed in a manner that was calculated to ensure the greatest quantity of strife and difference of opinion. Some of the Members were to be East Indian servants—some were to be chosen by the Crown, and some not. He did not see how the objection of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough) was to be got rid of when it pleased God to remove any of the Members, and the Council had to be refreshed. The Secretary of State would probably be a person who entertained some general principles of government—such principles as were likely to be entertained by a person reared among the institutions of this country. But when he proposed some scheme to the Council for the government of India, the member of the Council 1563 acquainted with Bengal would say, "This won't do at all for Bengal; I know more about Bengal than you." The, Members who were acquainted with Madras and Bombay would say the same; and there would be the Secretary of State alone in the midst of these gentlemen, every one of whom would be better acquainted with India than himself. Then the Bombay gentleman would help the Bengal gentleman one day, and the Bengal gentleman would help the Bombay man the next; and the consequence would be that the responsible Secretary would be liable to be thwarted at every turn. Nor was this the only annoyance or difficulty that would beset him. Those who were acquainted with the system of Indian government must be aware that the great vice of Indian servants was that of making what were called minutes—minutes sometimes on subjects of no more importance than the water bottle before him—which it took hours to read and days to write. Suppose a Member of the Council to be in a minority, he would record his objections in a minute. He would not be satisfied, and would proceed thus. He would seek out some Member of Parliament and say, "I am in a minority in the Council on such a question; most good men are; the case is a good one; I can help you, if you like to make a speech. I wrote a minute of my objections; Mr. So-and-so says it is one of the cleverest he ever read." The Member was ambitious—most Members used to be; he did not know if they were now—and he replied, "Will you let me have it." The Member of Council says, "No, I cannot; but it is a clever document, take my word for it; ask in your place for a copy." The Government of the day would be obliged to say, "We cannot refuse this minute. Under a Parliamentary Government the opinions of the minority should be known at least, if not acted upon." The document was produced; it was read; its was clever; it was submitted to Sir James Graham, or some of those clever fellows in the House, and he was asked what was to be done, for the case was a hard one. He said, "Make a Motion, and we will see what we can do." A meeting of some twenty Members took place in some House or other—it might be the Crown and Anchor; the posts were assigned to each—"you are to bring forward this point, you this, and so on. Do not abuse the Governor General, for he is my friend; but abuse the Secretary of State; he is an un- 1564 fair man, and he is not of our party: abuse him." He could assure their Lordships he was not exaggerating what was a very possible case. He agreed with the noble Lord opposite that this might not occur in the first Council. The first members would probably meet with general approbation, and things would go on smoothly for a time; but that would not continue—it could not continue. Did any one ever find fifteen men in a room, even at a party of pleasure, who agreed altogether? If out of the fifteen there was one disagreeable man he would spoil the whole party. That happened in matters of amusement. But what might be the consequence if, when matters of government, when the best interests of the country were depending on the result, what was vulgarly but well called an "ill conditioned fellow" got amongst the party? The consequence would probably be this. One member of the Council would say, "You cannot agree with me, I cannot agree with you; no one can agree with that fellow; let us hand over the decision to the Secretary of State." That must be the only mode of settlement, or nothing would be done. These inconveniences were so entirely felt by the framers of this Bill that they had most judiciously deprived the Council of a great part of its powers, for they gave the Secretary of State power to act without the Council in some cases, and by the twenty-fifth clause they empowered him to act even against the Council. That was wise and proper if there was to be a Council at all. The effects of a bad plan and a bad project might be got rid of by having no project or plan at all. The great objection made to the existing system was what was called the double Government. Now, there was no double Government in the present system, unless a man riding on horseback, with an old woman behind him, might be called a double Government.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYWhich is the old woman?
§ LORD BROUGHTONNot the noble Earl, certainly. This so-called double Government was no double Government. But the double Government was brought back by this Bill, One of the great inconveniences of the present system was said to be this, that Parliament could not interfere as much in the Government of India as it could, if there was a single responsible Minister. Now, he thought that one of the great advantages of the present system was, that it prevented the perpetual 1565 introduction of Indian questions into Parliament. That was his decided opinion. They could not govern India on these terms, especially with the increased facilities of communication which now existed between this country and India. He would therefore keep the Government of India out of Parliament as far as possible. But this measure would really diminish the responsibility of the Indian Minister, because he would be fettered by the existence and by the control of his Council. If the Secretary of State was outvoted in the Council on some question or plan of Indian Government, he would, in stating the plan in the House of Commons, indicate to his friends that though he was moving the plan, it was not his—that he was overruled in the Council. The Council might object to the Secretary of State taking matters out of their cognizance. That had been said to him when at the Board of Control very frequently; and what was his answer? "I don't think so; you are quite wrong." There was civility on both sides, and there was an end of it. But that would not be the case now with these gentlemen, who had their friends in Parliament, in the City, and everywhere. If this Bill passed, it would create that form of government which had been condemned by all authorities on Government—an imperium in imperio. Though the members of the Council themselves might not sit in Parliament, there was nothing to prevent their sons, or sons-in-law, or fathers-in-law from doing so. For the fifteen who could not sit, there might be thirty nearly connected with them who could sit in Parliament, and who could do the work better than themselves. The more they considered this scheme, the less likely did it appear to hold together. He did not say that he was sure it would fail. He did not want it to fail. It was a dangerous thing to prophesy about what was to happen to-morrow or at home. It was a safer course to predict what was to happen in 100 years, or in Armenia, or some distant part of the world. All he said was, that if the measure did succeed, it would succeed against the experience of all the men he had ever heard talk on the subject, against the experience of the country, and against their Lordships' experience with reference to other matters. It was said, "Would you trust one man with the government of 180,000,000 of people?" Why, they trusted the noble Earl(the Earl of Derby) 1566 with the government of a great many more than 180,000,000; one man was responsible for the government of the whole empire. [The Earl of DERBY: With his Cabinet.] He selected his Cabinet on that principle; so would the Secretary of State for India. If there was anything which the Prime Minister could not settle offhand, the Cabinet would be assembled. He (Lord Broughton) would rather trust one intelligent, honest man with the management of affairs with which he had been previously properly acquainted, than he would trust half-a-dozen men. The Secretary of State would have no difficulty in getting a staff about him. He might easily get a sufficient number of men to advise and assist, not to thwart him, but to give opinions; in this way, if a proper choice were made of the Secretary, the Government of India would be conducted as well as human prudence could devise. The notion of the necessity of a Council had arisen from the functions of the old Court of Directors. Did their Lordships think that the despatches were written by the Court of Directors or any of them? When he was at the Board of Control they always recognised certain hands, and knew, or thought they knew, who wrote each of the despatches, as well as if they had stood behind the gentleman's chair while he was doing it. It was one of the great merits of the Court of Directors which ought to be recorded and never forgotten, that they chose good servants and wise servants. Did their Lordships ever know a foolish person choose wise servants? Never. The servants of the Court were as good men as were ever found for the performance of their functions, and those men were available now. Mr. John Mill was alive—so were many others; he mentioned Mr. Mill, without any intention of disparaging others, because he was a well-known and distinguished man. There were others at the Board of Control whose assistance would be most valuable. Upon great questions of peace or war, the Secretary of State would of course summon his Cabinet, and take their opinions and advice. He would ask Low matters were conducted at the Board of Admiralty? He had been told that the experiment had been tried of conducting all the business by a Board instead of by the First Lord; but when they met they fell asleep. Sometimes one man did not agree with the First Lord, and threatened to talk him out. There was such a thing, he believed, as the Treasury Board; 1567 he should like to know how often that Board met. They might do so occasionally; but he was told that it was not a real, consultative, deliberative Board. If the Treasury did not require a Board, why should the Secretary for India require one? Surely, if anybody needed others to share his responsibility, the master of the British dominions for the time being, the First Lord of the Treasury, must do so. It was certain that the Secretary of State for India never would derive from such a Council as the Bill proposed any light or knowledge that he could not get from others, without the embarrassment of a deliberative Council. He entreated the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) to reconsider this question, if there was any chance of doing so. It was perpetuating the worst part of the old East India Company. The proposed Council would be like the Phœnix, that
Soared and shined, another, and the same.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, that the noble Lord had made an amusing speech, but he had drawn largely upon his fertile imagination, and had misrepresented the provisions of the Bill. His object was to pass the Bill, and if he followed the noble Lord in discussing all the points he had raised and all the clauses he had adverted to, and if other noble Lords did the same, the Bill could scarcely be passed during the present Session.
§ LORD BROUGHTONThe clauses I referred to all relate to the Council.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYBut they were now discussing the Bill clause by clause, and it was contrary to all order, upon a clause which constituted the Council, to discuss everything relating to that Council. This was entirely beside the question, which was whether a Council should be established for the advice and assistance of the Secretary of State, and to that question, contrary to the example of the noble Lord, he should confine his observation. The noble Lord had said that because the Treasury Board and the Board of Admiralty did not meet as Boards, there was no reason why the Secretary of State for India should have a Council to assist him. But the Council proposed was upon a totally different footing from any of the Boards referred to. The Secretary of State would allot the business among the different members in such a manner as he thought most convenient for the public service. It was part of the duty of the head of a department to allot the business in such a 1568 manner as was most convenient, and a discretionary power was given to the Secretary of State in the Bill to divide the Council into Committees for the despatch of business. Special power was given to the Secretary of State to divide the Council into Committees for the despatch of business, and to obtain the assistance and advice of the most competent persons. The questions of how the Council was to be constituted, what should be its duties, and so on, would be discussed on the different clauses; but the question raised by the noble Lord was—should the Secretary of State have a Council at all. It was true this was a main principle of the Bill; and if upon one question more than another there had been a universal agreement in both Houses, it was this—that it was expedient that the Minister for India should be assisted by such a Council to a certain degree. The Bill of the late Government proposed a Council of eight members, to serve for ten years. By the Bill introduced when Lord Ellenborough was at the Board of Control, the Council was to consist of eighteen members; they would of course have divided their duties. But that the Secretary of State of India should have the means of resorting, not unofficially but officially, to persons of great experience and knowledge on all subjects connected with India was a principle that had been adopted and laid down by almost all men of any eminence who had been called upon to discuss the question. He wholly denied that this Council was a recurrence, or any thing like a recurrence, to the double government which had existed under the former system. The evil of that double government was this—that there were two separate and entirely distinct authorities, each of which expressed an independent opinion—that these authorities were frequently brought into conflict or collision—and that it required voluminous correspondence and a great deal of time to settle their differences and obtain their entire concurrence and consent. Here there was no such double government—no such conflict of authorities; the council was not an authority adverse to or competing with the Secretary of State; its duties were precise and limited; they were limited, except in particular cases, to giving advice and opinion to the Secretary of State; and that advice and opinion he was at liberty to adopt or reject as he thought fit. There was nothing to fetter or diminish in the slightest degree the responsibility which he 1569 owed to Parliament. He agreed with the noble Lord that it was desirable in practice that the affairs of India should, as far as possible, be withdrawn from the weekly and daily discussion in Parliament; and the most probable way of doing that was to surround the Secretary of State with a body of persons of eminence and distinction, of knowledge and experience, to whom with regard to every question he had it in his power to apply, not for authority, but for advice and opinion; and that advice and opinion would be given with a perfect knowledge of the subject. The principle of Council or no Council was all that was involved in this clause; upon that principle rested the main provisions of the Bill; and he trusted that their Lordships would not reject a clause which had been almost unanimously agreed to by the other House, and a principle which had the sanction of every authority.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETfelt some surprise at the language of the noble Earl, for he thought his noble Friend (Lord Broughton) was quite right in discussing the question of the Council upon the first clause relating to that body. The noble Earl appeared to think that the speech of his noble Friend was one that ought to have been made upon the second reading; but their Lordships had quite enough before them yesterday in discussing whether the dominions of the East India Company should be transferred to the Crown. The noble Earl said that all parties were agreed upon the subject of a Council; but having more leisure than the noble Earl he had carefully read the discussions which had taken place in the other House of Parliament, and found the greatest diversity of opinion upon all the questions relating to the Council—of whom, for example, it should consist, whether its members were to be elected for life, what their powers were to be, and how they were to be appointed. It would be most unwise in their Lordships to say whether there should be a Council or not without knowing what sort of Council it was to be, and what the Bill proposed. He believed that as the Bill was first prepared the Council were to meet on the requisition of five members; but that power had been taken from them. Then they were to see the despatches that went to India; but there was no provision that they should see those that came from India. Indeed the greatest jealousy was shown of the Council throughout the entire Bill. The noble Earl told the House 1570 last night that secrecy would be observed by the Secretary of State in regard to the operations of war and dealings with Native States. But how was the Secretary of State to go on in case of war without the Council? He would have to come to the Council for money; and was he likely to obtain that unless they were told all about the objects for which the money was wanted? Those fifteen gentlemen would naturally be desirous to see all the papers—they would hold meetings to consider the subject, and before the money was given they would insist on knowing all about the business on hand. He knew something of the Admiralty, of the Treasury, of the Board of Control, and other public departments, but he must say he had never seen or heard of the business of any of theta being conducted after this fashion. What would the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs think if he had a Council the members of which would have to be informed of every important transaction in which he was engaged, and that too before he would be able to carry out his policy—take, for example, the recent outrage in Arabia? How would he like to have a number of gentlemen going into his office, turning up his papers, and insisting on being made acquainted with the business he had on hand? Why he would be apt to turn them out of doors. The members of this Council were to be excluded from Parliament, but nevertheless the consent of Parliament was to be obtained to all important measures that were resolved upon with regard to India; and the Secretary of State was to be left to grapple alone with these cases in which the wrongs, real or supposed, of Native Princes were sometimes taken up with so much professional zeal in the House of Commons. With regard to the supposed influence of the Council he would put this case. Suppose, when Sir Colin Campbell came home—as he hoped he would, and receive the honours which awaited him—suppose when he took his seat in that House he were to make a statement regarding the organization of the Indian army and the best means of securing its health and efficiency—what would be the effect of that statement as compared with the opinions which might be held by the fifteen old men who constituted the India Board? Would their opinions have the slightest weight alongside of those held by such a man as Sir Colin Campbell? He believed this Council had answered its 1571 purpose—it had got the Bill through the House of Commons, and he thought that now the best thing for the Bill would be to get rid of the Council altogether. The only effect of setting up a number of Old Indians as a Council would be to interfere with and annoy the Secretary. Most of them would have been long out of India; they would have lost the thread of policy, and in no respect would their counsels have any great weight. The House of Commons passed this Bill under the idea that they would make the Secretary of State responsible; but they nevertheless established a Council which, whenever money was wanted, would have him entirely under control—for he would be unable to move in opposition to the views of a majority of the Council. Perhaps the Council might say they wished to lay by so much money for purposes of irrigation; but the Secretary of State might think it was more desirable to expend it on barracks, in order to improve the health of the army. In such a case, whenever a question as to the health of the troops was raised in the House of Commons the Secretary of State would be compelled to say be was no longer responsible for the health of the troops, because his hands were tied. How could they say there must be divided management and not divided responsibility? This was a problem which they must solve, and unless they could solve it the best thing they could do was to strike the present clause out of the Bill. If the Council were given up the Bill would be worked much more efficiently, the Secretary of State would be able to originate measures and to carry them out with more energy than would be possible if it were retained. He would move that the clause be omitted from the Bill
§ THE EARL OF ALBEMARLEsaid, that he had, on a former occasion, stated at length the objections he entertained to the constitution of a Council. He could not see any advantages in a Council that were not equally attainable in a Secretariat with a staff proportionate to the work to be done. But he had another objection to the constitution of the Council, to which, as the noble Duke had rightly said, their Lordships were bound to look. He objected to its constitution on the ground that its members for the most part would consist of those very "Old Indians" who had always declared that system to be perfection which had recently exploded in rebellion. He asked 1572 whether this class of men were best suited to carry out a new system of government for India? He did not altogether share in the panegyrics which had been bestowed on the Board of Directors; but they were wise in their generation:—they did not select "Old Indians" for their servants. In 1817, when the Earl of Buckinghamshire was President of the Board of Control, he found the East India Directors could not write their own despatches. He immediately requested that a class of men should be appointed to do the business for them, and those persons were introduced under the name of Examiners, and, quoad the duties of the East India Company, these were the persons who virtually carried on the government of India. There were great names connected with the Company in that capacity who had never set foot in India; and, amongst others, John Mill (the historian), Mr. John Stuart Mill, and Mr. M'Cullagh. Now, what, he would ask, was an "Old Indian?" He was a person who possessed great knowledge of a small locality, who knew nothing of India itself, and was in utter ignorance of English statesmanship. What was wanted in this Bill was more of the European element. The Indian element, which had hitherto prevailed, had got them into the scrape, and the European element was required to get them out of it. The Indian Councils were composed of men who had been many years in India, but the great majority of those gentlemen were never out of Calcutta in their lives; and what was the consequence? Residing in only one part of India, they supposed that all the inhabitants of the country were like those docile creatures by whom they were surrounded, and then they resorted to extreme measures, and attempted to strip the proprietors of the North-West Provinces of their lands, and were surprised to find they had roused them into rebellion. He should only add that he intended to vote with the noble Duke.
§ LORD MONTEAGLEsaid, he felt as great a respect for the distinguished gentlemen who had been in the service of the East India Company as any other noble Lords could do; still he did not think that even the combination of the highest endowments in persons whose experience had been exclusively acquired in the civil service could be all that is necessary for the future government of India. They must have a direction of a different kind to bring that government into complete harmony 1573 with English institutions; yet, by the system proposed they would exclude from the House of Commons fifteen of the best men who could advise that House on Indian subjects. Without some Parliamentary restraint upon the Secretary of State, they would leave him a complete and positive despot; but, by the exclusion from the House of Commons of every member of the new Council, that uncontrolled despotism had been recommended as the best system to adopt. He could not, however, agree to it. There had been objections raised to the members of the Council which were not sound, for it should be remembered that that Council would not be merely a Board of Treasury, a Board of Trade, a Privy Council Office, a War Department, a Foreign and Home Secretaryship, and a Board of Admiralty, but it would be charged with the functions of all, and with Legislative duties in addition. No doubt the Council would have occasion to meet in one body to dispose of the most important business brought before them, but it was by a division of labour in Committees that they could alone be enabled to get through the whole business efficiently; the same system was proposed to be adopted, or rather continued, by this Bill. It should be remembered that they were not dealing with the business of a Department, but with the Governments of many great States, and all analogies drawn from Downing Street and Whitehall failed when they attempted to apply them to our great Indian empire. The only President of the Board of Control in our time, and who had acquired practical experience in India, was the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough). Almost all the other Presidents of that Board possessed no practical knowledge of the dominions they governed—and were their Lordships wise in depriving Parliament of the assistance of those who had had experience in India, because on account of that experience they had been selected as Councillors for India? When they spoke so disparagingly of "Old Indians," he would ask what they would not give for the assistance of such a man as Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone, or others whom he could name? But, for some reasons which he could not fathom, such men, if added to the Councils, were banished from Parliament. At the commencement of the Session their Lordships returned an answer to the Speech from the Throne, pledging themselves to give their utmost deliberation to the affairs of India. How 1574 imperfectly had that pledge been redeemed? They now found themselves in the middle of July, with the knowledge that their days were numbered, in the midst of a discussion where great differences of opinion existed—opinions as contrasted as those which had been foreshadowed as likely to exist among the Council. This, too, without witnesses, documentary evidence, or effective guidance. If Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone were now in Parliament, and could enter into the direction of affairs, or if Sir Thomas Munro survived, and were amongst us, what would they not give for their advice? There were many whose great names were sufficient to defend the Indian service and the class to which they belonged from vituperation and the sneers of those who disposed of the argument by their use of the designation of "Old Indians." While they sought the assistance and advice of eminent men who had served in India, they should not make complaints against a clause which admitted into the Council eminent public men who had served in India. But why should they rashly exclude from Parliament the services of those men? When it was stated that there was a growing feeling in favour of a Minister without a Council, he invited those who ventured on such an assertion to test that statement by taking a vote upon it either in this House or the other House of Parliament. He was for a Council effective and consultative, exercising a moral control, though he did not deny that the Secretary for India should be supreme, and empowered to act alone when circumstances demanded and justified such exercise a his authority.
LORD WODEHOUSEsaid, he could not agree with the noble Earl that the general feeling was now in favour of a Council. He believed that there was formerly such a feeling, for it was a natural one, and one which he had himself shared. Everybody must at the first blush agree that the Minister charged with the affairs of an empire so vast and so varied as India ought to have the assistance of persons who possessed the greatest knowledge of the country; but the more they went into the question, the more they would be convinced that the construction of an independent Council for such a purpose was impossible. He had arrived at that conscientious conclusion; and if he wanted any confirmation of that view of the case, it would be supplied by the Bill which had been sent to their Lordships by the House of Commons. 1575 That Bill was neither more nor less than a compromise—a compromise between the principle of having a responsible Minister and the principle of establishing a controlling Council. They would find in it one set of clauses which seemed to give the Council great power, and they would find another set which took its power away altogether. There seemed to be in the Bill a desire to create a balance of power; and a balance of power they had got—the power of the Government was, in point of fact, completely nullified by the Bill. Nobody could be more averse to despotism than he was himself; but in the Bill they were dealing with an executive Government, and an executive Government must in some respects partake of the nature of a despotism, or it must be inefficient; but a check was provided against despotism on the part of the Executive in this country by the constitutional action of Parliament; but nobody had proposed that the action of the Executive should be nullified by the action of Parliament. He knew that there was a disposition on the part of Parliament to encroach upon the Executive; but he know of no more dangerous principle than that it should so encroach. An Indian Minister would of course be responsible to public opinion; but the Council they proposed would be responsible neither to the Minister nor to the public opinion—that was, supposing the theory of the Bill was carried out. But the other House, while it had created a Council over which no one had control, had taken very efficient means to prevent the danger of an independent Council. It had taken care that there should neither be an efficient Council nor an efficient Minister. By the 27th clause it was proposed that all matters at present discussed by the Secret Committee should be left entirely to the Minister. There was a vague idea prevalent that to entrust the highest interests of India to any one man would be dangerous to the public service; but the Bill carefully provided that those very interests should be entirely removed from the cognisance of the Council. But it might be said that the Bill gave the Council a control over the finances of India. Yes, and a more inconsistent power was never conferred, because the Council would have to deal with questions of finance, connected with circumstances of which they would have no cognizance. Again, the country, deluded by the speeches they had beard, thought that when such men as Elphinstone, Frere, Outram, and Lawrence 1576 came home, they would immediately have seats in the Council. But just imagine such men sitting in Council, performing duties which might be entrusted to clerks, and never being consulted about those more important matters in which they had been, for twenty or thirty years before, engaged—questions of war and peace, of treaties and negotiations? Such men would never enter the Council at all. They would rather endeavour to enter Parliament, and in that capacity they might render essential service to their country. He did not complain that the matters he had referred to were withdrawn from the Council; for he thought that they would be much better left to a responsible Minister; but in pursuing the shadow of an independent Council, he was afraid they had impaired the efficiency of the Minister.
LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEsaid, that if the Amendment of the noble Lord were carried the Council would be set aside altogether. He was not prepared to vote for going that length as the Council appeared to him to be an essential part of the Bill; at the same time he would be ready to join with those noble Lords who might feel disposed to suggest Amendments with regard to its constitution. The great object of the Bill was to insure direct and complete action for the Government of India, and he was not prepared to say that that could be accomplished so well without the agency of a Council. It struck him that a Council so constituted as to admit those who had the greatest experience with respect to the affairs of India would be the best. He was bound at the same time to admit that, in his opinion, the Council as proposed was far too numerous. He was of opinion that a Council of five or seven at the utmost would be far better than a Council of fifteen, as proposed in the Bill. He would not on the present occasion intrude further on their Lordships' attention, except to repeat that, while he would not take part in a vote to exclude the Council altogether, he was quite prepared to join with those who desired to make a change in its constitution.
§ LORD ASHBURTONsaid, he thought the great use of a Council would be to examine into the details of the administration of the Government of India rather than to give advice on matters relating to peace and war; and after all, the real question their Lordships had to consider was the best way to preserve the liberties of the people of In- 1577 dia. The Indian empire was governed by an absolute power, and the only check upon that power existed in England. The grievances of the Natives were never heard until they rose in mutiny. At present every act of our officers in the East came home and was carefully examined; and he hoped the same accurate supervision would be perpetuated under the Bill; otherwise we could never hope to ensure the people from injustice. It must not be supposed that the demoralisation of our Bengal army had now become apparent for the first time. In 1833 statements were made which showed the necessity there was for immediate reform. When the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) went out to India, he took one of the best possible measures that he could possibly have adopted. He established a police, and withdrew the army from the demoralising duty of guarding traitors and gaols, to which, from what had since occurred, he was afraid they again returned. In 1853 the necessity of some measures to avert a threatened disaster, was again acknowledged; and why were they not taken? Because all the officers to whom the Government was entrusted held their appointments by so fleeting a tenure, that none of them had time to devise and introduce a better system. He trusted that the Bill would remedy that evil, and would also render a continuous and consistent Indian policy possible. Hitherto the East India Company had known that their only chance of resisting the power of the Crown had laid in the choice of able persons to serve them, and hence there had been a desire to secure the most eminent persons for the office of Director; but what reason was there to expect that the Council would be superior to the officers of any other department of the Government? When vacancies had to be filled up the ordinary motives would prevail, and there would be an indisposition to set aside an old and faithful servant in favour of a stranger.
§ LORD BELPERsaid, it appeared to him rather extraordinary that it should be proposed by the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset), to intrust the momentous interests of our Indian empire, without any control whatever, to a single Minister, who would perhaps be totally inexperienced in Indian affairs. He knew it was said that the Minister would be responsible to Parliament, but it was always urged that Parliament ought not to interfere in Indian affairs, except on occasions of extreme im- 1578 portance. It was argued that it was impossible to reconcile responsibility to Parliament with a Council thus composed. He did not see that difficulty; for, although the Minister must ultimately be responsible to Parliament, he would act under the knowledge that in differing from persons well informed and well acquainted with India, who had the power to record their opinions, He must be prepared to defend his own decision by the weightiest arguments. He should like to see the enactment with regard to the powers now exercised by the Secret Committee expunged, so as to have all matters brought before the Council, because he was afraid that if the Secretary of State had the power, when he pleased, to act upon his own responsibility without consulting his Council, a great part of the advantage expected from the Council would be lost.
§ EARL GRANVILLEsaid, that whatever opinion might be entertained as to the expediency of having a Council, constituted as proposed, it had been generally agreed that some Council was necessary. For himself, from the beginning he had had doubts as to the expediency of a Council, and these doubts had been strengthened by reflection. Their great object, however, was to pass a bill simplifying the government of India, and for that reason he thought that it would be better that the present Motion should not be pressed to a division.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, as he understood the noble Earl, the object of this Council was to give advice. That was an object which would have been obtained by the Bill of the late Government, but he thought this Bill failed very much in that respect. The Council would degenerate very much into a small Parliament. Why so large a number should have been selected he did not know, unless it were to absorb some twelve Directors, at any rate that would be the result. With the view of reducing the number he would move the insertion of the words "not more than" before fifteen.
§ Moved after the first "of" to insert "not more than."
§ THE EARL OF DERBYwould assure the noble Marquess the number fifteen had been chosen without the slightest desire to provide places for individual expectants, but rather because they thought that number necessary for the discharge of the duties devolving upon them. Indeed his noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough) 1579 thought that eighteen would be necessary to discharge these functions. If these words were inserted it would not only affect this clause but make many of the others, to a certain extent, inapplicable. When the noble Marquess compared this Bill with that of the late Government, he seemed to have forgotten that in the constitution of the Council, the mode of proceeding, functions, power over the Secretary, the course with regard to secret despatches, the meetings of the Board, and the much-objected-to restriction on the finance—in all these respects this Bill was so nearly taken from the other with which it was compared that when they came to these clauses he was afraid the Government Bill would be charged with being a servile imitation. In fact, the noble Lord opposite and the late President of the Council had been expending their witticisms on their own Bill.
§ Amendment put, and negatived.
§ Clause agreed to.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETthen moved "to disagree to the said clause."
§ Question put, "Whether the said clause shall stand part of the Bill.'
§ Resolved in the Affirmative.
§ Clause agreed to.
§ Clause 8.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, this clause gave the present Directors power to elect seven persons from among themselves and from among the number of those who were now or who had been Directors. The gentlemen who were now in the direction, and who were to have this power of electing seven from among themselves, and those formerly in the direction eligible to be elected, were of the average age of sixty, and the united ages of the fifteen would be 900. The persons who had been made to retire from the direction had been declared to be persons inferior to those who remained, and he could not see the propriety of asking the latter to elect men whom they thought inferior to themselves. The persons thus made eligible were now five or six years older than when they were in office, and he had never heard that an old man improved by being laid on the shelf for five or six years.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, he thought it might safely be left to the Court of Directors to elect those whom they might think the most capable men among those who were at present serving, or who had before served in their body. He did not think the point raised by his noble Friend 1580 was one of much importance, and he saw no occasion for altering the clause.
§ Clause agreed to.
§ Clause 9.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, his noble Friend had last night made some jocose remarks upon the arrangement in this clause, by which alternate appointments were to be made by the Crown and the Council, and he seemed to think that as the clause stood the balance between the elected Members and the nominated Members would be disturbed. If his noble Friend thought the arrangement was defective he would not object to the introduction of a clause by which, as vacancies occurred, they should be filled up alternately by elected and nominated members, in such a way as to preserve the proper proportions of the two.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, it was unncessary to introduce a new clause, as the correction could be made in the existing clause; and he suggested the introduction of words for that purpose.
§ Amendment made.
§ Clause, as amended, agreed to.
§ Clause 10.
§ THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURYproposed that after the words, "ten years at the least," there should be added, "and (excepting in the case of late and present Directors and Secretaries of the East India Company) shall not have last left India more than ten years next preceding the date of their Appointment."
§ THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, the object of the noble Earl was to get the most recent experience in the Council, but as the alteration was not necessary and might restrict freedom of choice he must oppose the addition of the words.
§ Motion, by leave of the Committee, withdrawn,
§ Clause agreed to.
§ Clause 11, (Council are to hold office during good behaviour).
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he believed that by this clause the Members of the Council were to be appointed for life. He much preferred the provision in the Bill of the late Government, and in the first Bill of the present, which made the tenure for a term of years only. It was impossible to predicate of any man that he would be fit for duty during the whole period of his life. Indeed they could not say with certainty that any man would for the next five years be fit for duty, much less for life. He recollected 1581 that the late Sir Robert Peel never promised office to any man, because although he might be fit at the moment, yet he might be altogether unfit when a vacancy occurred. There was no doubt a sort of safety valve in the shape of pensions to the members of the Council after ten years' service; but, whatever might be the collective wisdom of the Council, he was confident that their individual wisdom would be such that they would greatly prefer remaining in office at £1,200 a year, with all the patronage, to taking a pension of £500 a year with no patronage at all. He thought it would be much better that the members should be appointed for five years only, as the Government and the Council would then have an opportunity of reconsidering the propriety of any individual appointment. The consequences of appointing men to public offices for life had been most injurious to the public service. He happened to know that there was a case not long ago in which a gentleman in the East India directorship was so utterly inefficient that he could not perform any business whatever except distribute his patronage, which was done by his wife. That lasted for three years. Another gentleman was so utterly inefficient that when he was put out of the directorship five years ago it was impossible to make him understand that he was out; and he persisted in going continually to Leaden-hall Street to take his seat as a Director. Now, he (the Earl of Ellenborough) wished to avoid such scandals. Five years, he thought, was quite long enough. That period would enable the Government and the Council to eliminate three Members every year. The noble Earl concluded by moving that the appointments should be only for five years.
§ Moved, to leave out "during good behaviour" and to insert "for five years."
§ THE EARL OF DERBYthought his noble Friend must have been unfortunate in his old acquaintances in Leadenhall Street and elsewhere. There might be exceptional cases, but practical experience, he believed, showed that men in judicial and other public situations did not, when a moderate retiring pension was offered to them, hold on, when they had become unfit for the performance of their duties. The late Government proposed that the appointments should be for ten years; but the House of Commons, with the view of securing the independence of the Council, determined that the appointments should be for life. 1582 He certainly could not agree with the proposition of the late Government that the appointments should be for ten years, and much less could he agree with the proposition of his noble Friend.
§ EARL GRANVILLEthought that the difference of five, eight, or ten years was of no great importance, so long as there was some restriction. It was impossible to say that any fifteen men, however well they might be known, were the best men to serve on a Council like this for life. If they were not re-eligible it would be impossible to avoid their giving stale advice.
§ Amendment negatived.
§ Clause agreed to.
§ Clause 12, which provides that no Member of the Council, appointed or elected, should be capable of sitting or voting in Parliament,
§ THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURYproposed as an Amendment to substitute for the words "no member," the words "not more than three members at the same time." As the clause was framed he believed that its effect would be to exclude from the Council some of the very best men who could be placed upon it. For example, it would deprive the Council of the services of such men as Lord Canning, Lord Dalhousie, Lord Ellenborough, and Sir Colin Campbell, if he should return to this country and be made a peer. His object was to provide that men of this description should not be precluded from sitting on the Council.
§ THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEhoped the Government would adopt the Amendment, otherwise the best men would be excluded from the Council. It was a great object of ambition with those who had served in India to terminate their career in Parliament, and they would prefer a seat there to any temptation held out by the Council. He could see no reason for a limit of three as proposed by the Amendment. They should admit all or exclude all. It would be very dificult to carry out in practice the principle of a limitation. It was not likely that any great number of the Council would be in Parliament. The average number of Directors in Parliament had never exceeded five.
§ THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGHsuggested that the words "or elected" should be struck out. If that was done, the elected members only could sit in Parliament, and the difficulty as to the danger of Ministerial corruption would be avoided.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHhoped 1583 his noble Friend would adhere to the Bill as it stood. A conflict in the House of Commons between the Minister and his Subordinates would be most unseemly and most injurious, and he urgently entreated their Lordships not to adopt any suggestions for the alteration of the clause.
§ Amendment negatived.
§ THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE moved, at the end of clause to insert the following words ("or shall hold or carry on any Office, Business, Trade, or Profession from which any gain or profit may arise").
§ EARL GRANVILLEadmitted that the members ought to be excluded from Parliament; as to the suggestion of his noble Friend (the Earl of Albemarle) he thought they were entitled to ask what were the real intentions of the Act on this point, and whether a rule was to be laid down that the members should devote their whole time to the duties of their office. If the pressure of business was such as to require fifteen members, it would be rather an anomaly to allow them to engage in any other business.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, it was certainly not intended that those gentlemen should be dilettante members of the Council. The business of the Council must be their primary duty, and whatever time was required from them by the business they would be called upon to give up to it. Further than that he could not go. With regard to the Councillors being Members of Parliament, there must of course be great inconvenience in having them sitting on the opposite side of the House and taking different views on Indian and other matters from the Secretary of State: moreover, to give the Secretary of State the power of holding out to a Member of Parliament the prospect of getting a permanent situation of £1,200 a year, on condition of supporting the Government, might lead to great Parliamentary corruption.
§ THE EARL OF CLARENDONwished to know whether any member who at the time of his appointment or election might be engaged in trading or banking would be obliged to give it up, as persons appointed to under Secretaryships or similar offices are now compelled to do?
§ THE EARL OF DERBYreplied, they could not continue any business requiring a degree of personal attention which would interfere with the duties of their office; but he could not admit that a man should be disqualified because he was an eminent merchant, or a great banker, or a sleeping partner in a great brewery.
§ THE EARL OF CLARENDONsaid, the same rule ought then to be applied to the offices he had mentioned.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHstrongly urged that the Councillors should not be allowed to engage in trade. Not a month would pass but they would have large contracts to take up for shipping, or to open or close a loan for India, or to decide upon a railway; and it would be much better that they should be above suspicion by their being free from trade altogether. All possible grounds of suspicion of motives of self-interest, on the part of the Councillors, should be avoided.
§ THE EARL OF MALMESBURYsaid, there was no analogy between the members of Council and Under Secretaries of State. As to the noble Earl's (the Earl of Ellenborough's) objection, if he was so averse to members being engaged in trade, what became of his own pet scheme of firms having representatives from the great trading powers in England?
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he had always thought that, if they were to have a Council entirely devoted to their duties, they ought to retain no interest which could possibly be affected by their official acts.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEbelieved it was a fact that £4,000,000 of supplies were now annually contracted for in London which could be more advantageously obtained in Calcutta; but the object was to keep up the City influence.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, that the government of India was essentially a government of records, as had been remarked by a noble Lord opposite, who had been himself President of the Board of Control. Everything was reported home, and the documents passed through the various departments. He could assure their Lordships that, if every member of the Council were to attend every day for four or five hours, there would be ample for them to do. The great difficulty was to have all the details and records before them which were necessary, in order to arrive at a sound conclusion.
§ EARL GRANVILLEproposed the insertion of words which would oblige every member of Council, on his appointment, to give up any trade or profession in which he might be engaged.
§ THE EARL OF HARDWICKEwas of opinion that even the sacrifice of four or five hours a day on the part of the members of the new Council would not be in- 1585 compatible with the discharge of commercial pursuits, and that it would be of great advantage to have the experience and general information of gentlemen largely engaged in commerce.
THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he was strongly of opinion that such a restriction as was proposed ought not to be made. Persons in trade might very probably be the best members of Council. At all events they ought not to disqualify persons who might be otherwise qualified for the duties of the office.
§ LORD CRANWORTHthought that no man ought to be in such a position that his interest should clash with his duty; and on that ground he was of opinion that no person engaged in any trade or profession should continue in the Council.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETthought that they ought to make the Council as free from the suggestion of suspicion as possible, and he was, therefore, favourable to the proposed restriction.
§ LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYalso thought that men engaged in commercial transactions ought not to have seats in the Council.
§ On Question, whether the said words shall be there added?
§ House divided:—Contents 35; Not-Contents 50: Majority 15.
1586| CONTENTS. | |
| Marlborough, D. | Audley, L. |
| Newcastle, D. | Belper, L. |
| Somerset, D. | Boyle, L. E. (Cork and Orrey.) |
| Ailesbury, M. | |
| Camden, M. | Calthorpe, L. |
| Lansdowne, M. | Cranworth, L. |
| Delamere, L. | |
| Albemarle, E. [Teller.] | De Tabley, L. |
| Chichester, E. | Foley, L. [Teller.] |
| Clarendon, E. | Hamilton, L. (Belhaven and Stenton. |
| Ellenborough, E. | |
| Granville, E. | Monteagle of Brandon, L. |
| Harrington, E. | |
| Powis, E. | Mostyn, L. |
| Saint Germans, E. | Somerhill, L. (M. Clanricarde.) |
| Shaftesbury, E. | |
| Stanley of Alderley, L. | |
| Sydney, V. | Stewart of Garlies, L. (E. Galloway.) |
| London, Bp. | |
| Ripon, Bp. | Wodehouse, L. |
| Wycombe, L. (E. Shelburne.) | |
| Ashburton, L. |
| NOT-CONTENTS. | |
| Chelmsford, L. (L. Chancellor.) | Bathurst, E. |
| Beauchamp, E. | |
| Cleveland, D. | Brooke and Warwick, E. |
| Manchester, D. | Carnarvon, E. |
| De La Warr, E. | |
| Bath, M. [Teller.] | Derby, E. |
| Salisbury, M. | Doncaster, E. (D. of Buccleuch & Queensberry.) |
| Amherst, E. |
| Graham, E. (D. Montrose.) | Chichester, Bp. |
| Oxford, Bp. | |
| Hardwicke, E. | |
| Leven and Melville, E. | Bagot, L. |
| Malmesbury, E. | Bateman, L. |
| Pomfret, E. | Colchester, L. |
| Romney, E. | Crofton, L. |
| Rosse, E. | Denman, L. |
| Sandwich, E. | De Ros, L. |
| Shrewsbury and Talbot, E. | Dinevor, L. |
| Farnham, L. | |
| Verulam, E. | Gage, L. (V. Gage.) |
| Wilton, E. | Grantley, L. |
| Melros, L. (E. Haddington.) | |
| Clancarty, V. (E. Clancarty.) | Raglan, L. |
| De Vesci, V. | Ravensworth, L. |
| Dungannon, V. | Redesdale, L. |
| Hardinge, V. | Sheffield, L. (E. Sheffield.) |
| Hutchinson, V. (E. Donoughmore) [Teller.] | Sondes, L. |
| Templemore, L. | |
| Strathallan, V. | Wrottesley, L. |
§ Clause agreed to.
§ Clause 13 agreed to.
§ Clause 14, providing that any Member of Council may, by writing under his hand, which should be recorded on the Minutes of the Council, resign his office, and that it should be lawful for the Queen to grant to any person having held the office of Member of Council for ten years a retiring pension during life of £500, agreed to.
§ Clause 15, referring to the Appointment of Secretaries and Officers of the Council of India.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, that those who were appointed should be gentlemen possessing a knowledge of engineering and works in that country.
§ Clause agreed to.
§ Clauses 16 to 21 agreed to.
§ Clause 22.
§ THE EARL OF DERBY moved the omission of the words empowering a certain number of the members of the Council to require a meeting of the body within the space of three days. He did not think that provision could be necessary, as the Council must, by another clause in the Bill, meet at least once a week.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he thought that cases might arise in which it would be desirable that the Council should have that power. It would, besides, add to the dignity and importance of their office.
§ EARL GRANVILLEsaid, it appeared to him that such a power would only enable the Councillors to take up a hostile attitude towards the Secretary of State.
§ Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause, as amended, agreed to.
§ Clauses 23 to 26 were agreed to.
1587§ Clause 27.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he would not repeat the observations he made last night upon the regulations as to seeing the despatches which had hitherto passed through the hands of the Secret Committee. Formerly these despatches might be inspected by the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman and one member of the Court of Directors. He would suggest that the Secretary of State should be obliged to communicate his despatch to the Under Secretary and one other member of the Council.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, that if there were any inadvertence, it was the inadvertence of noble Lords opposite, for this clause was copied from Clause 22 of the Bill of the late Government. If his noble Friend thought any advantage would arise from the provision he suggested, he had no objection to bring up an amended clause on the Report, to carry out the suggestion he proposed.
§ EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he did not see the necessity for such a check on the Secretary of State, who would have to communicate with the Cabinet upon all matters of special importance. That, in his opinion, would be quite sufficient.
§ THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEsaid, he thought there would be a singular inconsistency in forming a Council to advise the Secretary of State, and then enabling him to dispense with their advice on all questions of paramount importance. He hoped his noble Friend at the head of the Government would introduce the provision he had stated.
§ Clause agreed to. Clause 28 agreed to.
§ Clause 29.
§ EARL GRANVILLEsuggested that the Governor General and the Governors of the several Presidencies should have the power of appointing the members of their own Councils respectively.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, that he had no very strong opinion upon the subject, and that he would reconsider it before the bringing up of the Report.
§ Clause agreed to.
§ Clause 30.
§ THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE moved the omission of words in it which make the consent of a majority of the Council necessary to any regulations made by the Secretary of State as to the distribution of patronage in India and the restoration of suspended officers.
§ Amendment agreed to.
1588§ Clause, as amended, agreed to.
§ Clause 31 agreed to.
§ Clause 32 (Admission of Candidates to the Civil Service of India).
§ THE EARL OF DERBY moved an Amendment, transferring the power of making regulations for the admission of persons into the Indian civil service to Her Majesty in Council.
§ EARL GRANVILLEopposed the Amendment. So far experience had shown that the system of open competitive examination had worked well. It surely could not have been the intention of the noble Earl to smooth the passage of the Bill through the House of Commons by inserting this clause. [The Earl of DERBY: No!] Then he was inclined to think the President of the Board of Control had followed the example of the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellen-borough) in abstaining from communicating with the Prime Minister upon the business of his department.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, the alteration was not proposed with regard to the sanction or non-sanction of the competitive principle, but because it was found that the clause was an infringement on the Royal prerogative.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he must correct the noble Earl (Earl Granville) who had made the observation, not for the first time, that he was in the habit of abstaining from consulting the Prime Minister. He never laid down the principle that he would not communicate with the Prime Minister. When he did not communicate with Sir Robert Peel he invariably communicated with the Duke of Wellington. The Duke of Wellington was thoroughly acquainted with India, and Sir Robert Peel knew nothing about it. He once asked Sir Robert Peel a question about India, and the answer he received prevented him from ever repeating the experiment.
§ EARL GRANVILLEhad understood the noble Earl to state that he never communicated with Sir Robert Peel, and he inferred that the noble Earl thought it better to exercise his independent judgment.
§ Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause, as amended, agreed to.
§
Clause 33,
All appointments to cadetships, naval and military, and all admissions to service not herein expressly provided for, shall be vested in Her Majesty; and the names of persons to be from time to time recommended for such cadetships
1589
and service shall be submitted to Her Majesty by the Secretary of State.
THE BISHOP OF OXFORDthen proposed an addition to the clause vesting the right of nominating to chaplaincies in India in future alternately in the Crown and in the Bishop of the diocese in which the chaplaincies were situated. He hoped he should have the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government on the subject. From the commencement of legislation in connection with the East India Company they were bound to maintain and provide certain chaplains and ministers for their principal factories. Hitherto these appointments had been made by the Board of Directors at home, but under this clause they would transfer the appointment of all these chaplains to the Secretary of India. He, however, would propose that this should be done alternately by the Secretary of State and by the Bishop of the diocese. This would assimilate the ecclesiastical system in India to that of the system at home; and there was precedent for it in an Act passed by the late Sir R. Peel. It was desirable the resident Bishop should exercise this power, seeing that there were many missionaries whose fitness and whose merits could not come duly under the cognizance of the Secretary of State; and by the method he proposed one-half the patronage would be in the hands of the Government and the other half in the Bishop.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHwas happy to bear his testimony to the merits of an efficient and most respectable body of men; but he had as much confidence in the nominations of the Secretary of State as in those of the Court of Directors. It would be a most injudicious act at the present moment to permit the Bishops in India to take gentlemen from the missionary body and connect them by chaplaincies with the Government.
THE BISHOP OF LONDONsupported the Amendment. It had been said that it was in the power of the Bishops already to distribute patronage; but the only patronage he knew of was that of the Bishop of Calcutta to nominate his own archdeacon. He was far from wishing to import into this discussion the tone of the platform, but the feelings of the religious community ought not to be ignored, and it was generally thought that we ought to show a more manly and straightforward policy in regard to the Christian religion.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYthought it would 1590 be exceedingly disadvantageous to have chaplains situated at such a distance dependent, not on the Government, but on their Bishops, thus giving rise to a conflict of authorities. The chaplains were stipendiaries of the Government, and it was of great importance that the present relations between them should be maintained.
THE BISHOP OF OXFORDsaid, the noble Earl had not met his arguments in any way. The question did not relate to the dependence of the chaplains either on the Bishops or the Government. His proposal simply was, that the Bishops should have an alternate share with the Secretary of state in the appointment of the chaplains.
§ Amendment negatived.
§ Clause agreed to.
§ House resumed; and to be again into Committee on Monday next.
§ House adjourned at half past Twelve o'clock A.m., to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.