Lords Sitting of 29 April 1858

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1a Customs Duties (No. 2); Barrel Organ Suppression. 2a Exchequer Bills (£20,911,500).
INDIA.—KINGDOM OF OUDE.

  PETITION.
  THE EARL OF ALBEMARLEsaid, that he had been intrusted with a Petition which rendered it absolutely incumbent on him to make a very few remarks. The Petition came from 12,000 of the Inhabitants of Manchester and Salford, and contained a request—probably the first of the kind ever made to Parliament—for the restoration of the Royal Family of Oude to the throne of their ancestors. Considering that British subjects had an unquestionable right to express their opinions to Parliament on any subject, provided their petition was couched in respectful language, he at once consented to present it; but he now stated, what he had before stated to the petitioners themselves, that it was not in his power to support the prayer. The annexation of Oude was a fait accompli, and restoration could not be made without shaking the British rule in India to the centre. Hence it became impossible. But at the same time he would guard himself from being supposed even for one moment to sanction the policy which led to the deposition of the King of Oude. No language could he too strong to express the abhorrence which he felt at the wholesale system of the annexation, or, more properly speaking, of the confiscation of the dominions of the Native Princes of India — that system which commenced particularly in 1848, and of which the deposition of this very monarch was the crowning act of folly and injustice. Considerable apprehensions were felt by those Native Princes who continued true to their allegiance in consequence of
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  these annexations. During the last Session of Parliament it was intimated to him on their part that they would desire that there should be some expression on the part of that House discountenancing that policy; and accordingly he entered a notice on their Lordships' business paper for that purpose; but it was suggested to him that any expression of the opinion on the part of the House at that period of the mutiny might be construed into fear. He consequently abstained from bringing the subject under the notice of the House further than by placing a memorandum on the notice paper. But it appeared that the proper time had now arrived for assuring the Native Princes who had preserved their fidelity that their rights would be respected. This would teach them that they had a prospect of better government from a responsible Minister of the Crown than from an irresponsible Minister inextricably mixed up with the East India Company. When the measure for creating a responsible Minister would come before their Lordships he did not pretend to say. He had seen that four different measures professing this object had been produced in the other House, and he believed that none of them would effect that end. He therefore proposed to resume the intention of which he gave notice in last Session, and on Monday, May 10, to move that
  "It is the opinion of this House that the principle of annexing Native States in India for supposed default of ' heirs natural,' or under pretext of misgovernment on the part of Native Princes, is a flagrant violation of international law, opposed to the feelings of the people of India, derogatory to the Christian character, and dangerous to the stability of British rule; that this House, therefore, pledges itself henceforward to abandon such policy."
  EARL GRANVILLEwished to ask the noble Earl at the head of the India Board a question respecting the despatch that had lately been sent through the Secret Committee to the Governor General of India respecting the treatment of the mutineers in India. With the principles comprised in that despatch he found no fault, though he apprehended there was a time not long gone by when the noble Earl was not disposed to be so lenient towards the insurgents. But it was satisfactory to find that the conduct which Lord Canning had all along pursued now met the noble Earl's approbation. But the point to which he wished to draw attention was this. The despatch had been sent through the Secret Committee. He apprehended this was a

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  somewhat unusual, if not illegal course, as there was nothing in the despatch which required secrecy, nor did it relate to peace or war, or any of those matters for which the transmission of a despatch through the Secret Committee was provided. What he wished, therefore, to ask the noble Earl was, whether he considered the transmission of that despatch through the Secret Committee was legal, or whether he considered it an illegal step to be justified by some peculiar circumstances.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he had no doubt whatever that the despatch was transmitted in a perfectly legal manner, and that all the prescribed forms had been strictly observed. The despatch did require secrecy, for it referred to a matter which he thought at the time he wrote it had occurred, but of which he could not be sure; and nothing could have been more injurious than the publication of that despatch if the matter to which it referred—the capture of Lucknow—had not taken place.;—for he was sure their Lordships would sec that it was highly desirable to pursue a line of policy after the capture which might be very inexpedient before that event. And although news had been received of the fall of the town, yet he was not sure that that despatch even now would have been published had not a question been asked regarding it in the House of Commons; so that it was thought better to give it. He did not know on what ground the noble Earl inferred that he was at one time averse to a system of leniency; he was sure that he had once at least, if not twice, advocated such a course last Session.
  Petition to lie on the table.

  DIVORCE ACT (IRELAND)—QUESTION.
  LORD LYNDHURSTwished to ask his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack, whether he was now in a condition to inform the House as to the probability of the Divorce Act being this year extended to Ireland.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, it was not the intention of the Government to introduce any Bill upon that subject in the present Session. If there were no other reason for coming to that determination he thought the compensation to the proctors was sufficient to deter them. It appeared that the compensation claimed by the English proctors amounted to £210,000, and if the measure were extended to Ireland, compensation to the
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  proctors there must also be given, which, though not to the same amount, would still be a considerable sum.
  THE EARL OF WICKLOWwas surprised to hear this declaration on the part of the noble and learned Lord, considering the great importance of the subject. Last year he called the attention of the then Lord Chancellor to the subject who assured him—
  THE LORD CHANCELLORrose to order. The noble Earl was not in order. A question had been put, he had given the answer, and there was now no question before the House.
  THE EARL OF WICKLOWagain attempted to address the House.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid he rose to order. He would move that the House do adjourn, in order to afford his noble Friend an opportunity to proceed. He had sat in that House a great number of years, and he had never heard such an objection taken before. He apprehended that his noble Friend did not mean to argue the question, but surely he had a right to express his opinion.
  Moved, That the House do now adjourn.
  THE EARL OF WICKLOWsaid, if the noble and learned Lord had sat in that House for five or six months he would not have thought of rising to order on such an occasion. He did not wish to occupy their Lordships' time, but he was going on to say that when in the course of the last Session he pointed out to the noble and learned Lord who then occupied the woolsack the inconvenience of having one law for England and another for Ireland, the noble and learned Lord fully admitted the inconvenience, and promised to introduce a Bill to assimilate the law on this subject.
  LORD CAMPBELLsaid, that justice had not been done to Ireland in being excluded from the Divorce Bill. Her Majesty's subjects in Ireland would be greatly aggrieved unless steps were taken to assimilate the laws between the two countries. He was astonished at the answer that was given by his noble and learned Friend. He could understand that it might not be convenient to proceed this Session; but he trusted the subject would not be lost sight of—because, what was to become of Irishmen if this law were not extended to that country? Were they still to be condemned to come to this House and have their marriages dissolved by Act of Parliament. No change was required in Scotland, because there the tribunals had the

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  power of dissolving marriages; but in Ireland no such power existed.
  LORD CRANWORTHsaid, he saw no; reason why the extension of the Divorce Act to Ireland should be mixed up with the question of compensation to the proctors, because the proctors would not be at all affected by such a measure. He could only say, and with all sincerity, that it was the intention of Her Majesty's late Government to introduce a bill for Ireland, though he guarded himself by saying that it might not he in exactly the same form. When they loft office they had not made up their mind as to the precise form in which they should introduce the Bill; and at the beginning of the present Session he was in communication with his right hon. Friend the Attorney General for Ireland, when the alteration of the Government occurred, and nothing more took place on the subject.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

BARREL ORGAN SUPPRESSION BILL.

  SECOND READING. NEGATIVED.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  THE MARQUESS OF WESTMEATH THE MARQUESS OF WESTMEATH, in moving the second reading of this Bill, said that, in respect to the nuisance of street music, a reconsideration of the Police Act was not only desirable but absolutely necessary. The persons who annoyed the inhabitants of London were, as their Lordships were aware, chiefly foreigners, and were brought over hero by persons who made a profit of their earnings, allowing them only a bare subsistence, He admitted that hospitality was due to foreigners, but he denied that the peace and tranquillity of the metropolis were to be sacrificed to their convenience and profit. Now, the defective condition of the Police Act with regard to this class of persons was admitted on all sides, and the annoyance they occasioned, particularly in cases of sickness, was perfectly intolerable. Only the other day a case came to his knowledge, in which a respectable person in Belgravia was under the necessity, during his wife's illness, of paying men to act as patrols on all sides in order to prevent the approach of those nuisances. Several persons had objected to his Bill on the ground that it would deny the public the gratification of listening to the German bauds. That was a mistake. A man
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  could not keep on blowing a wind instrument for ever; but a barrel organ never tired; it was a nuisance which never ceased, and was an object of universal detestation; and it was the object of his Bill to suppress it. But for his own part, he looked upon the streets as the place for traffic and not for tunes; still he would have no objection to expunge any portion of his Bill which seemed objectionable. He felt perfectly confident that if a Committee of their Lordships' House were appointed on the subject the police would fully bear out all that he had said upon this and a former occasion as to the inadequacy of the Police Act to deal with these nuisances; and as he would not strictly adhere to the precise terms of his Bill, but willingly adopt such Amendments as their Lordships thought necessary, he trusted they would consent to the second reading of the Bill.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a
  THE EARL OF WILTONwas understood to say that the nuisances the noble Marquess complained of were not, he thought, greater than the exhibition of Punch. He, for his own part, thought that the noise of a barrel organ was somewhat a relief to the usual monotonous sounds heard in our streets. He would oppose the second reading.
  LORD LYNDHURSTsaid, that when he came down to the House his noble Friend asked him if he would support the second reading of this Bill, and he consented to do so, on condition that it should be entirely new modelled and altered in Committee. His noble Friend in everything he undertook was over zealous; on almost every occasion he exhibited too much warmth. In endeavouring to get rid of this nuisance, would not this Bill, if carried, produce another of a much graver character? His noble Friend possibly was not aware that as his Bill was to be coextensive with the Police Act, and the Police Act operated in a radius of fifteen miles from Charing Cross, it would affect a district thirty miles in diameter. So that if any person played a single tune or a single note upon a flute in a public road at a distance of ten or fiften miles from London, he would be an idle and disorderly person, and was to be immediately dragged before a magistrate, and committed to prison for a month with hard labour. That was the main provision of his noble Friend's Bill. Was it possible that such a measure could pass their Lordships' House? They might read it a second time,

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  but they must entirely alter it and newmodel it in Committee. He had a very musical friend who lived in one of those holes called chambers in Old Square, Lincoln's Inn. This gentleman worked hard night and morning at the study of his profession, and he could conceive his looking out of the window early some May morning, seeing the sun shining upon the chimney pots — for it never shone upon anything else there—and being tempted to take a walk into the country. He might put his flute in his pocket, and walk off perhaps to Hampstead Heath, perhaps to Hornsey Lane, or perhaps to Richmond Hill. He might sit down and begin to blow upon his flute—which he did most beautifully. People would be attracted round him in considerable numbers; but after he had played for a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes a man in a blue coat, having a letter A and a number marked on the collar, would come up, and, presenting a piece of parchment or paper, say, "Read this!" "What does it mean?" "Oh! the magistrate is sitting at the King's Arms, and requires your attendance." "My attendance! For what?" "Why, Sir, you are an idle and disorderly person; you are idle yourself and make other people idle by attracting them by your beautiful playing on the flute?" "What does this mean?" "It's under the Westmeath Bill." "The Westmeath Bill: why, that must be an Irish Act." "No! Lord Westmeath's Bill. You must come before the magistrate. He is sitting to hear the case, and will commit you as an idle and disorderly person, and sentence you to one month's imprisonment with hard labour." This was a curious Bill. He did not know whether his noble Friend, who was one of the most straightforward persons he knew, objected to the performance of bands in the Parks on Sundays. [The Marquess of WESTMEATH made an observation.] His noble Friend said he did not interfere with that; Her Majesty's bands wore excepted from the Bill. That was true; but, while the Queen's hands played in Kensington Gardens, what happened in Victoria and Regent's Park?" By a side wind his noble Friend would put an end to what he considered a most excellent and laudable establishment — the performance of bands in the parks on Sundays. Further, there were many companies in the City of London which had private bands and made processions with them; but this Bill would
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  put an end to all such proceedings. On the 9th of November a great ceremony was performed, all the city companies went in procession with the Lord Mayor, accompanied by bands of music. Under this Bill all persons who played in those bands would be liable to be imprisoned for a month, with hard labour. What sense was there in that? At present there were in London many German bands of great merit which played in the streets surrounded by crowds of people, who were attracted by the beauty of their music. Did his noble Friend mean to say that all the persons who were attracted by their music were idle and disorderly persons or that if all the inhabitants of a street wished that one of these bands should play in it they should not have the music which they desired? Was he not right in saying that his noble Friend, in trying to abolish one nuisance, was creating a much more abominable one of another kind? A noble Friend of his (the Earl of Wilton) had alluded to Punch. He recollected that when some time ago this subject of street nuisances was discussed in the other House of Parliament Punch was by universal acclamation excepted; but his Pan-pipes would bring him within his noble Friend's Bill, and he would be at once sentenced to a month's imprisonment, with hard labour. There were some mews behind his house, and he had noticed that about the dinner hour of the inhabitants the street music was regularly detained in the neighbourhood of the small tenements therein. He had no doubt that the players were paid, and if they were it could only be because their performances were agreeable to the humble proprietors of homes in that district, and he had as little doubt that it exercised a softening influence on their manners. He recollected very many years ago, when he was studying in chambers, having a neighbour who was learning to scrape on the violin. He was at first disposed to complain of his neighbour's innocent pastime as an annoyance; but on a little reflection he said to himself, "Is it wise in me to object?" Let me see whether I cannot stand it without distraction. If I can, what an admirable discipline it will be to me in pursuing my mathematical studios. After a time he ceased to hear this "nuisance" as it was called—it made no impression on him. Again, he knew a story of a woman who took a house near to a blacksmith's forgo. On the day of taking possession she heard the black-

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  smith's hammer for the first time, and thought it a nuisance. She went to the landlord and sought to got rid of her engagement. "Oh, no, Ma'am," said the man, "I can't let you off; try it for a week." A week elapsed, and by that time she ceased to hear the noise — it made no impression on her; and for ten years afterwards she lived in the same house, without suffering any inconvenience from the clang of the blacksmith's hammer or the sound of his bellows. He repeated, that it was impossible for their Lordships to pass this Bill in its present shape, but he would support it if his noble Friend would consent to remodel it completely.
  EARL GRANVILLEentirely agreed with every word that had fallen from the noble and learned Lord. Only a very small proportion of the community were gifted with such exquisite ears that they could endure none but the most refined and costly music; and he could not see why, for the sake, perhaps, of some rich and highly-sensitive connoisseur, a whole neighbourhood of poor people should be debarred of the innocent pleasure of listening to a barrel-organ. The allusion to foreigners in the preamble of the Bill seemed to pander to an unworthy prejudice; and for his own part he infinitely preferred the performances of a German band to the favoured musicians alone exempted from the operation of the measure — namely, the sham base and falsetto singers, who trusted to the strength of their own lungs for their success, instead of having recourse to a much milder and more harmless instrument. If any serious annoyance were created by itinerant musicians the existing police law provided a sufficient remedy for it. Moreover, these poor persons would not be found to play if people did not support them. And was it to be said that if the daughter of any noble Lord, or any nurserymaid, gave a penny to a poor boy to play upon a Jew's-harp for them, the child should be treated as a common vagabond? He hoped their Lordships would not assent even to the second reading of the Bill.
  THE EARL OF WILTONmoved, as an Amendment, that the Bill be read a second time that day six months.
  Amendment moved to leave out ("now,") and insert ("this Day Six Months.")
  VISCOUNT DUNGANNONsupported the Amendment. He gave every credit to the noble Marquess for his good intentions, but his measure was a very harsh and mistaken
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  one. Many persons liked to hear street bands, and he could not see why they should not be gratified.
  LORD CAMPBELLsaid, he was opposed to any "organic" change.
  THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, he was of the same mind.
  THE MARQUESS OF WESTMEATH THE MARQUESS OF WESTMEATH, in reply said, he did not pretend to be very expert at drawing Bills, and was quite willing that the measure should undergo modification in Committee. His sole object was to amend the existing Police Act, the wording of which, he maintained, was not sufficient to give the public the protection intended by its framers.
  On Question, That ("now") stand part of the Motion? Resolved in the Negative; and Bill to be read 2a on this Day Six Months.

CASE OF THE CAGLIARI.

  QUESTION.
  THE EARL OF AIRLIE THE EARL OF AIRLIE, in calling attention to the case of the (Cagliari, and asking some questions relating to the correspondence concerning it, said that in a recent speech of the noble Earl, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs', there were two statements, which he found great difficulty in reconciling with the papers which had been presented to Parliament. One of these statements was an expression of opinion on the part of the noble Earl; the other referred to a matter of fact. Alluding to the capture of the Cagliari, the noble Earl said that, under the circumstances it was impossible to take any strong measures, even if strong measures were advisable; he then went on to say, that the law officers of Her Majesty's Government had declared the condemnation and confiscation of the Cagliari to be illegal; and he added that he was not aware that any official communication of the condemnation of the Cagliari had yet been made to the Sardinian Government. Now, in the correspondence which had been presented to Parliament on this subject, there was a note from the Marquess D'Azeglio to his noble Friend who was then at the Foreign Office, accompanied by the decision of the Neapolitan tribunal. That decision decreed the condemnation of the vessel and all goods on board as contraband of war; such of the goods as were not contraband of war were ordered to be restored to the owner; and, as if to complete this mockery of justice, it was

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  declared that the unfortunate owner's claim for compensation was on the pirates who had seized his vessel, and were afterwards executed. He hoped some noble Lord learned in the law would to-night favour the House with an opinion as to the validity of this decision. For his part he thought it was impossible to reconcile it with common justice; but then he remembered that this was a question of law not of justice. In so saying he was raising no objection to the constitution of the Neapolitan tribunal. He simply wished to state the fact that that which the law officers of the Crown had declared to be illegal had taken place; and, on the other hand, that the noble Earl had stated his opinion that there was no ground on which this Government could have recourse to strong measures against the Government of Naples. Now it seemed to him that as the law officers had unanimously declared the confiscation and condemnation of the Cagliari to be illegal, the Government of Sardinia had a perfect right to remonstrate against the confiscation and condemnation, and that if its remonstrances were not attended to, it had a right to enforce them; and that Her Majesty's Government had a right to support our ally in her demands. Of course he spoke only with regard to the question of legality, and not at all as to the question of policy. There was also an ambiguity in the terms in which the opinion of the law officers was couched in reference to the condemnation of the Cagliari. It did not appear from what they said, whether they considered that the Cagliari was not within the jurisdiction of the Neapolitan tribunal, or whether the decision given by that tribunal was wrong, but he (the Earl of Airlie) must protest against the monstrous doctrine which had been laid down by a certain school of lawyers, that, however unjust the condemnation of the vessel might be, however corrupt the tribunal, however subject to undue influence or the power of the Crown, Sardinian subjects were bound to abide by the decision of the Neapolitan court of law, and had no right to apply to their own Government for redress, and that the Sardinian Government had no right to demand that redress. All the lawyers in England could not persuade him to assent to such a doctrine, nor did he think that all the lawyers in England would persuade Parliament to assent to it either. If the Sardinian subjects had no right to appeal to their own Government,
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  what right had the British Government to demand compensation for the detention of the Engineers—for the two questions could not be separated? As regarded the abstract right of persons to appeal to their own Government for redress for wrongs inflicted on them by a foreign tribunal the principle had been affirmed in both Houses of Parliament. He remembered that in the year 1850, a Resolution was moved in the other House of Parliament approving of the foreign policy of the Government of that day. It was contended by those who disapproved of Viscount Palmerston's policy, that he had overstepped the limits of international law by affording to British subjects resident in Greece that protection which they had not been able to obtain from the regular tribunals of the country, and that, however unjust were the decisions of those tribunals, from their decision there was no appeal. After a four nights' debate, the House of Commons refused to recognise such flimsy legal sophistries, and declared that the noble Lord was justified in obtaining cither by negotiation or force that justice which the native tribunals had not granted. He might be told that their Lordships had come to an opposite conclusion upon this point; but he held that it was not upon this point at all. The noble Earl now at the head of the Government did indeed move and carry a Resolution, part of which implied "that British subjects were amenable to the decisions of the tribunals of the countries in which they resided; but in the speech with which he prefaced his Resolution he distinctly excepted countries which were subject to despotic Governments, where the tribunals were notoriously and corruptly under the influence of the Crown. Thus, he might say that one House of Parliament by direct Resolution, and the other by implication, had affirmed the principle that foreigners resident in countries where the tribunals were notoriously corrupt and under the influence of the Crown were entitled to appeal from the decisions of those tribunals to their own Governments. He had refrained from touching upon the legality of the "capture" of the Cagliari, for that was a question in respect of which a difference of opinion existed amongst the highest authorities in the law. He did not mean to say that it was the business of Parliament to dictate the policy of Government, although he might say that Government had of late shown themselves very amenable to dicta-

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  tion; but when important statements as regarded foreign policy wore made in either House of Parliament they had a right to demand explanation. In the other House of Parliament, on the 17th of April, the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a similar statement to that of the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but he added that the international part of the question was quite distinct from any other question raised by the capture, and that this country was "only interested as all the great maritime powers were." He (the Earl of Airlie) protested against the tendency of such a doctrine as that. He should have thought that there existed between this country and Sardinia a strong bond of natural sympathy, in consequence of the similarity of the institutions of the two countries;—he should have thought that Sardinia was entitled to some regard as the firm and steadfast ally of this country. Let him be clearly understood. Not for one moment would he have it supposed that he wished the Government to allow the sympathy and the regard which they might feel for Sardinia, so to affect their judgment as to influence the decision which they might come to on the legality of the seizure and condemnation of the Cagliari; but if once that seizure or condemnation were shown to be illegal, and consequently the claim of Sardinia for the restoration of the vessel were shown to be just, he did say that this country would stand towards Sardinia in a position very different from that of other maritime powers, many of whom had not cultivated such intimate relations with Sardinia as ourselves. But Sardinia had a still stronger claim upon us than any which might arise out of the sympathy which we might feel for a country enjoying similar institutions with ourselves, or out of the regard which we might entertain for a faithful ally. It was impossible to read the despatch of his noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon), dated 29th December, 1857, without seeing that he (the Earl of Clarendon) was of opinion that the seizure and detention of the Cagliari were illegal, and that he was anxious that Count Cavour should object to the course which had been taken by the Neapolitan Government; and, although the draft presented to Count Cavour was couched in somewhat stronger terms than the despatch itself, still even the original despatch, if he had seen it, must have left upon Count Cavour's mind the impression that the Earl of Clarendon was of opinion
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  that the course taken by the Government of Naples was unjustifiable, that he was anxious that Count Cavour should object to that course, and that the English Cabinet was prepared to support the claims of Sardinia so far as they might be grounded in justice. He (the Earl of Airlie) said, therefore, that the Government were bound to act in the spirit of the despatch of the 29th of December; that inasmuch as they had, by their representations, induced Count Cavour to take a certain course and to make certain demands, they could not in honour abandon him now; but that they had no alternative but to support the claims of Sardinia, so far as those claims were reasonable and just. It appeared, however, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer wished us to divest ourselves of all consideration of kindly feeling towards our ally, to throw to the winds the expectations which we had raised in the mind of the Sardinian Government during the last three months; and to content ourselves with occupying the same position as "other maritime nations." He was far from saying that England was not interested in this question as a maritime power. On the contrary, we might well feel a deeper interest even than other powers in the strict observance of international law, because for the sake of improving that law we had made concessions which no other country could have made. There was a time when England was looked upon as not only the mistress but the tyrant of the seas, on account of the rigorous mode in which she exercised her belligerent rights; but at the Congress of Paris—acting in the interests of humanity and of civilization—she voluntarily abandoned those belligerent rights; and would she now, in the face of this act, allow the King of Naples to violate the conditions even of the old maritime code? He hoped the noble Earl had written an answer to the Marquess d'Azeglio's note, and that he had no objection to produce it. The noble Earl concluded by asking the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown had been taken by Her Majesty's Government on a document, dated Naples, Nov. 28, 1857, and entitled the "Decision of the Commission of Prizes and Wrecks" in the case of the Sardinian steamer Cagliari; and, if so, whether Her Majesty's Government would lay a copy of such opinion on the table of the House; and also, whether any Answer had yet been returned by Her Ma-

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  jesty's Government to a Note addressed by the Marquess d'Azeglio to the Earl of Malmesbury, dated March 28, 1858, and enclosing a communication from Count Cavour to Count Gropello, dated March 18, 1858?
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My Lords, I do not quite clearly understand what is the information which the noble Earl wishes to obtain from me. He has occupied the time of your Lordships for five and twenty minutes upon various subjects, some of them having reference to "another place," which, generally speaking, we are not allowed to mention here. I shall not follow him through all those subjects. As far as I can understand the noble Earl, however, he appears to imply by his first question that I was incorrect the other night when I stated my belief that the condemnation or confiscation of the Cagliari had not been officially reported to the Sardinian Government. I cannot positively say that that is the case; but I still am of opinion that that condemnation has not been officially reported; and for this reason, that it as yet has not been legally effected. I received this morning a despatch from Mr. Lyons at Naples, in which he states that, according to the Neapolitan law, there are three degrees of jurisdiction in prize cases. The first is that by which the Cagliari was condemned; the second is that by which the owners of the Cagliari have now appealed; and then, if the verdict of the first Court be confirmed by the second, there is still a third appeal to the King. So far as that point is concerned, therefore, I was perfectly correct; and I have been fortified in the opinion expressed by the Sardinian Minister at this Court. The second question which the noble Earl asks is whether I have answered the Marquess d'Azeglio's note of the 22nd of March last. That note has been answered; and, as no doubt it will interest your Lordships to be informed in what way Her Majesty's Government have answered it, perhaps you will allow me to go back a little and to refer to the events which preceded our reply. The note of the 22nd of March from the Marquess d'Azeglio to Her Majesty's Government began by stating that on the 5th of January last Sir James Hudson, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty at Turin, informed Count Cavour, the President of the Council, that his Government was disposed to object to the proceedings of the Neapolitan Government in the affair
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  of the Cagliari, because the vessels of war of the navy of the Two Sicilies bad no right to pursue and capture her beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the kingdom of Naples. The Marquess d'Azeglio added, that this principle being thus laid down, Sir James Hudson requested the Government of the King to inform him whether it took the same view of the capture of the Cagliari. The Marquis then proceeded to say that he was "formally charged to request the concurrence, and, if need be, the co-operation, of the British Government to bring this important affair to a successful termination." The only answer that I could return to that was the one I did, and, writing on the following day—the 23rd of March— to the Marquess d'Azeglio, I said:—
  "The undersigned has the honour to acquaint the Marquess d'Azeglio that his note will be duly considered by her Majesty's Government; but pending the answer which it will be the duty of the undersigned eventually to return to it, he thinks it right at once to state to the Marquess d'Azeglio that Her Majesty's Government had no cognizance of the note addressed by Her Majesty's Minister at Turin to the Count Cavour on the 5th of January, no copy of it having been received in this Office until it was communicated to the undersigned by the Marquess d'Azeglio on the 10th inst."
  Your Lordships are aware that there was an error committed by the Secretary of Legation at Turin—an error which may be best described in this way—that whereas he was directed by the late Foreign Secretary to ask a question, he made a promise instead. I cannot help regretting even now, as I did at the time, that that answer having been given to the Marquess d'Azeglio only three weeks after we came into office —Her Majesty's Government being well disposed towards Sardinia, having all the sympathies which Englishmen naturally feel for that bravo country, which has escaped so many dangers by the great judgment and courage of its present Minister, and whose soldiers were brothers in arms of our soldiers so recently—I cannot but regret, I say, having these feelings strongly within my own breast, that I should so soon have received the answer which I did from the Marquess d'Azeglio. I think, if he had considered the position of the Government—if he had given himself time to reflect upon it, and to have referred to his own Court, he would have avoided the inference which he drew, and which, I must say, was a rather painful one, that we were about to "abandon" Sardinia. My Lords, that was very far from

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  our wish Indeed; but, as the word "abandon" has boon used, let us consider for a moment what it means. To abandon means to forsake some one whom you are bound to protect, either by some natural law or by some recent and specific promise. But, my Lords, I have looked back through the eight months over which this controversy has extended, under my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Clarendon), and I must say that nowhere do I find anything like a promise given that the English Government will co-operate with Sardinia in the affairs between that Government and the Government of Naples; and, if we look at this question in a selfish view, I must point out that our connection with the matter at first was extremely slight. The only connection that England had with the seizure of the Cagliari Sardinian ship arose from the accidental presence of two English engineers on board of her, who had been imprisoned and had suffered in common with the rest of the unhappy crew of that vessel. I do not say this in order to flinch from that support which we are ready to give to Sardinia in seeking the recovery of that ship, but to show that the word "abandon" is not quite the fair word to apply to Her Majesty's Government, whatever the policy they may determine to pursue may be. My Lords, I need hardly say that in my opinion the Sardinian Government ought not to take advantage of the unfortunate error which was committed by Mr. Erskine when he unintentionally falsified the despatch which he was ordered to write; because it is clear, if you lay down that a Government may take advantage of errors such as that, that a country may be involved either in a disgraceful peace or in an unjustifiable war, through the technical error of a subordinate. I do not say that the Sardinian Government have taken advantage of this circumstance; but I allude to it because I have constantly soon it stated in certain papers that the error of Mr. Erskine actually bound the English Government to whatever he had written. Now, my Lords, if your Lordships will bear with me for a few moments, I wish to recall to your recollection what the position of the Government was with respect to this question when we entered office. We found a great variety and difference of opinions from the law officers of the Crown on various points. In fact, the law officers had at that moment no clear view of the case, and there were no salient points on which the Go-
  1938
  vernment could act. I thought, therefore, that it. was my duty to ascertain if there were any points on which the new law officers of the Crown could agree, and on which the Government could found a definite course of action. Before deciding upon that, however, it appeared to me that there was a peculiarly English question which required my immediate attention, and that was the liberation of the two English engineers. When we came into office, they had been in a horrible prison for eight months—one had lost his reason, and the health of the other was seriously impaired. I therefore felt that the first paramount practical duty of the Government was to obtain the freedom of those men; and accordingly we, without delay, sent Mr. Lyons to Naples with instructions to endeavour to persuade the Neapolitan Government to assent to their liberation. That was happily accomplished by the energy and ability of Mr. Lyons; and it is fair to say that the Neapolitan Government made very little difficulty in the matter. This only proves to me how unfortunate it was that, at the time when the capture took place, our relations with Naples had been broken off; because I am persuaded that, if we had had regular diplomatic relations with Naples at that time, the confinement of those men would have been restricted probably to a very brief period. On consulting the law officers of the Crown I had the satisfaction to find that they were agreed upon two points—first, that Park and Watt were illegally detained; that after the prima facie evidence against them they ought to have been released; and that we had a right, therefore, to ask for compensation for their illegal detention. we have, as your Lordships know, asked for that compensation; but up to this time we have received no answer from the Neapolitan Government to our application. On the second point, as to whether the Cagliari was legally captured or arrested or not, the law officers differ in opinion whether she was legally arrested, but are unanimous that it would be illegal to condemn her. I had the advantage at last, therefore, of finding the law officers unanimous upon two points, and the Government were accordingly enabled to act upon them. I have told your Lordships how we acted in respect of the two English prisoners. With regard to the other question, I had already ascertained that the feeling of Sardinia was so strong with respect to it, that it was not at all impossible that she might

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  have recourse to the ultima ratio of going to war with Naples, rather than wait the result of any further steps which diplomacy might suggest. I need not say how anxious Her Majesty's Government were to prevent that step; because I am sure, interested as your Lordships must be in this question, you cannot fail to recognize the dangerous consequences which might result if those two Italian States wore to come to a rupture. These two States represent the two extremes of Italian policy. If a war were to arise between them, there is little doubt that it would soon become a European war, the extent of which as to territory or time it is impossible to speculate upon. If Sardinia and Naples were to go to war, it is impossible to suppose that Austria would long remain quiet; and, if Austria were to move, I leave your Lordships to say how long France was likely to look on with her arms folded. I go further than that in my apprehension. Anxious as I am that Sardinia should remain the model of a constitutional Government in Europe, I say that the greatest misfortune that could happen not to Sardinia only, but to Europe, would be a war thus begun, because I believe it will be found that constitutional liberty is almost invariably the child of peace and reason, and is seldom established by the sword. Strongly imbued with these feelings and this apprehension, I wrote to the Sardinian Government in answer to the note of the 22nd of March, saying that Her Majesty's Government entirely accepted the description given of the question by Count Cavour himself to Sir James Hudson, in reply to the despatch of my noble Friend opposite of the 29th of December. Count Cavour says:—
  "This is a legal question, and I have wished to treat it legally and on its own merits. I have been blamed for coldness and for not treating it politically rather than internationally."
  Sir James Hudson, in reply to this, on behalf of my noble Friend, stated, that in his opinion also it was a purely legal question. In these very words of Count Cavour I might answer the noble Earl opposite, who has charged the Government with lukewarmness, in not going to war with Naples. [The Earl of AIRLIE: I made no such charge.] I stated to the Sardinian Government that our law officers, having determined that the capture of the Cagliari was legal, but that her condemnation was illegal, it is evident to us that the King of Naples was right in the be-
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  ginning and the Sardinian Government wrong, and that at this moment the Sardinian Government was right and the King of Naples was wrong. We therefore offered to Sardinia our good offices for the purpose of persuading the King of Naples to abandon the condemnation of the Cagliari, and to restore her and her crew to Sardinia. At the same time I stated to Count Cavour that we thought it would be the most unhappy disaster if Sardinia should resort to hostilities with Naples before taking every step which diplomacy could suggest to avoid such an unfortunate result. The step which I advised him to take was one springing out of a proposition of my noble Friend opposite at the Conference of Paris, for which, I think, all civilized nations have reason to thank my noble Friend that he obtained the concurrence of the representatives of several of the first States of Europe. In the protocol of the 14th of April, 1856, of the Conference of Paris, there is the following passage:—
  "The Earl of Clarendon having demanded permission to lay before the Congress a proposition which it appears to him ought to be favourably received, states that the calamities of war are still too present to every mind not to make it desirable to seek out every expedient calculated to prevent their return; that a stipulation had been inserted in Article VII. of the Treaty of Peace, recommending that in case of difference between the Porte and one or more of the other signing Powers recourse should be had to the mediation of a friendly State before resorting to force. The first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain conceives that this happy innovation might receive a more general application, and thus become a barrier against conflicts which frequently only break forth because it is not always possible to enter into explanation and to come to an understanding. He proposes, therefore, to agree upon a resolution calculated to afford to the maintenance of peace that chance of duration hereafter, without prejudice, however, to the independence of Governments."
  When my noble Friend had made that suggestion one Member of the Conference rises after another, and agrees to the principle of it, Count Cavour among the rest:
  "Whereupon the Plenipotentiaries do not hesitate to express, in the name of their Governments, the wish that States between which any serious misunderstanding may arise should, before appealing to arms, have recourse, as far as circumstances might allow, to the good offices of a friendly Power."
  My Lords, I think the cause of civilization received a vast service from the principle here laid down by my noble Friend. I therefore referred Count Cavour to this protocol, and I advised him, in case of the continued refusal of Naples to agree to

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  give up the Cagliari, notwithstanding our joint efforts, to have recourse to some friendly Power to obtain an arrangement of the matter without recourse to hostilities. I have as yet received no answer to that despatch; but, I may say, that I believe the other great Powers of Europe view the matter in the same light as Her Majesty's Government, and that they will use their efforts to persuade both parties to have recourse to the means which are recommended in the protocol of the Conference of Paris which I have just read. That, my Lords, is the case as it at present stands. I do not know whether the noble Earl opposite meant his speech as an attack on Her Majesty's Government, or on me personally; but I think you will be satisfied that I have done my duty in using my best efforts for the maintenance of that peace which is so invaluable to Europe.
  THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, I think Her Majesty's Government have shown a sound discretion in the course which they have pursued in this matter. As I understand from my noble Friend, they have recommended the Neapolitan Government to restore the Cagliari and her crew to Sardinia; and, in the event of a continued refusal on the part of the Neapolitan Government, they have recommended the Sardinian Government to resort to that principle to which Count Cavour, along with the other Plenipotentiaries, assented in the Conferences of Paris. It is important that a maritime Power like England should not allow any act of illegality on the high seas, respecting which we arc entitled to interfere, to pass unnoticed, or unavenged if necessary; but it is still more important to be quite clear that we are right, and not to put forward any claim which we should not be justified by the law of nations in enforcing. There appears to have existed, from the very first, a great doubt as to the legality or the illegality of the capture of the Cagliari. Indeed, it is not only on this point; but, as your Lordships will have seen from the papers, on every point throughout this question, that the action of the Government has been hampered by legal doubts which it was impossible to disregard. High authorities have been of opinion that the Neapolitan Government was justified in seizing and detaining the Cagliari; and high authorities, on the other hand, have held that the Neapolitan Government was not justified. There is also an impor-
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  tant question as to whether the Cagliari was voluntarily surrendered, but that may be at once dismissed; the only question we have to deal with is, whether she was legally seized. The captain of the Cagliari ay have announced to his crew and the passengers that he intended to carry the vessel to Naples, and there to give an account of all that had passed; but the commander of the Neapolitan cruiser could know nothing about that. He had orders to seize the Cagliari—he discovered her at sea, twelve miles from land, he fired a shot at her to bring her to, signaled for her master to come on board, sent an officer to take charge of her, and carried her into port. It would be perfectly absurd, therefore, to say that the Cagliari was voluntarily surrendered; she had no means of resisting, and she would have been sunk if she had resisted. The question is, therefore, was the seizure legal? That question was first raised by ourselves. We heard that it had been stated by some of the liberated portion of the crew that the Cagliari had been seized several miles beyond the Neapolitan waters; we referred to them, we ascertained that such was the fact, and we then took the opinion of the law officers of the Crown whether the Neapolitan Government was justified in pursuing and detaining a Sardinian vessel beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Naples, and whether, if the Cagliari had been an English vessel, Her Majesty's Government could have demanded her release. Feeling, at the same time, that as the vessel was Sardinian, was owned by a Sardinian, and was sailing under the Sardinian flag, we should have no right to make any demand on account of her unless the Sardinian Government interfered, we instructed Sir James Hudson to put to the Sardinian Government the same question which we had addressed to the law officers. We asked what were the views of the Sardinian Government on the matter, and whether they intended to object to the proceeding of the Neapolitan Government, on the ground of the vessel being seized beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Naples. At the same time I expressed on our part an opinion, certainly in strong terms; but we purposely avoided any suggestion that this opinion should be acted upon, nor did we offer any advice on the subject, for this simple reason, that we had not then received the opinions of the law officers. The propriety of our course was made clear three or four days afterwards; for when we did receive the opinion

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  of the law officers it was to the effect, that under the particular circumstances of the case the Neapolitan Government wore justified in following the Cagliari and seizing her, and that Her Majesty's Government, mutatis mutandis, would not be justified in taking any objection to that proceeding. The communication to Sir James Hudson was not precisely of the nature my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Airlie) has stated. It was not in support of any claim the Sardinian Government had brought against the Neapolitan Government, because they had not brought any claim at all. As regards the other circumstances connected with this despatch, I do not think that the alteration of the despatch bears out what my noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury) has said as to its having become a promise. It was, no doubt, very improper to alter the despatch; but Sir James Hudson was not exactly aware of the reason why the matter was put in interrogatory. The object of the despatch was simply to ask what view the Sardinian Government took of the matter; for, as we had not then received the opinion of the law officers of the Crown, we were not in a position to recommend a course. But, although it was very improper to alter the despatch, Sir James Hudson found in the despatch a strong expression of opinion, and did not know how far the Government intended to act on it, and therefore I do not think so much blame is attributable to him as has been attached to him. However, having received the opinion of the law officers of the Crown, it was impossible for us to insist on our objection to the capture of the Cagliari. I still think, however, that, in conformity with international law, a ship of war has no right to interfere with a foreign merchantman on the high seas. She may demand the merchantman's papers to ascertain her nationality, but that being once ascertained, she has no further right to interfere with a foreign merchantman unless at the time in commission of an act of piracy. No such act was attributed to the Cagliari at the time and place where she was seized, but the law officers said, that under the particular circumstances of the case, the Neapolitan Government were justified in pursuing and capturing her. I suppose, therefore, that particular circumstances may perhaps justify an exception to that which ordinarily must be held to be the rule of international law, and that without these circumstances it would be impossible to contend
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  that the seizure would not have been a violation of international law. It is impossible to deny that the Cagliari had been employed in a very nefarious proceeding. A number of persons, who got on board as passengers, having taken possession of the vessel, landed a body of men at Ponza, overpowered the garrison, killed and wounded several persons, and released the prisoners who were confined in the castle. The Cagliari took the latter on board, and proceeded to the Gulf of Policastro, and at Sapri a great number disembarked, and endeavoured to raise an insurrection against the Government of the country. The officer in command of the Neapolitan steamer was no doubt aware of these circumstances, and did not know under what circumstances a number of passengers had overpowered the crew. These particular circumstances might justify, in the opinion of the law officers, the Neapolitan vessels in pursuing and seizing the Cagliari. I think that under similar circumstances we should have done the same thing. I think, mutatis mutandis, that we should not have hesitated to pursue and detain any vessel, under whatever flag sailing, that had landed on our shores men who committed acts of outrage and violence. I think that had the captain of a British frigate captured a vessel which had been so used for insurrectionary purposes against our Government, an immediate inquiry would have been ordered; but I do not think that, having ascertained all the facts of the case, the Court of Admiralty would or could have condemned the vessel. The Neapolitan frigate which seized the Cagliari, brought her into port. There was ample evidence that she was a regular and well-known trader, that her papers were all in order, and that a largo number of her passengers had embarked for Tunis. There was evidence, also, that the crew had been overpowered and compelled to work the vessel under the orders of the parties who were guilty of these insurrectionary proceedings; and they had evidence that after those parties left the vessel at Salerno the captain communicated to the crew that he would proceed to Naples to inform the Neapolitan Government as to everything that had taken place. Yet notwithstanding all these facts, all this evidence—with the manifest circumstance that the diversion of the vessel from her original course, and her subsequent capture, must have been an enormous loss to her owners—the Neapolitan court,

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  without, I must say (having regard to the commonest principles of justice, and the rules of international law) the shadow of a pretext, held that the vessel was a lawful prize. I share, my Lords, in the satisfaction expressed by my noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury) that there is no difference of opinion amongst the law officers of the Crown on the subject of the condemnation of the vessel being illegal. I also heard with pleasure that my noble Friend bad asked for an indemnity for the two Englishmen, and that he does so on the recommendation of the law officers of the Crown. I am glad of it, because I stated here in December last that it would turn out that the accusations against Watt and Park were frivolous to the last degree. The first charge against them was, that they had not been provided with passports. The law officers say in their last opinion that it is not unusual for engineers not to be provided with passports; but, my Lords, it is not only not usual, but the general and uniform practice of engineers employed by foreign steam-boat companies is not to have passports; because if they have their names on the muster-roll, that is considered a sufficient certificate of their nationality and business, and Watt and Park had their names on the ship's muster-roll. The next charge is, that they were in possession of a letter from Miss White. This would constitute no ground of accusation; but it was not a letter; it was a paper not addressed to any particular person, but was a direction written in English for the information and guidance of the engineers of the Cagliari, who were, of course, English. The third accusation is that the engineers did not convey the ship to Tunis. Such ignorance is hardly credible, but it appears by an interrogatory to which Watt was subjected, that he was asked if he could bring evidence in support of his allegation that the Cagliari was not steered by the engineer. The fourth charge was that these two engineers had committed certain acts on land, whereas it was proved that neither of them had been on land at all. I hope your Lordships will bear in mind that her Majesty's late Government were altogether ignorant of the circumstances under which those two men were dealt with. We knew nothing of what had taken place on board the Cagliari; we knew nothing of the circumstances under which the parties were set on shore at Salerno. The Neapolitan Government had possession of the vessel, the passengers,
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  and the crew, and the greatest secrecy was maintained; we were not able to obtain any information on the subject. No one can lament more than I do the sufferings which our poor countrymen were exposed to. Certainly, had we known the facts, nothing-would have induced us to tolerate their maltreatment. It was stated that six months ago they had not the protection of the British Government; but we had no means of knowing to what extent that protection was required. We had no information to show us that the Cagliari bad not left the port of Genoa with the full knowledge of all on board as to how she was to be employed. The fact of this vessel leaving Genoa at the time Mazzini attempted to gain possession of that city, and other circumstances, created suspicion in the mind of the Sardinian Government, who sent a ship of war to bring the vessel back; we had nothing to prove that these engineers did not land at Sapri to take part in the insurrection; although we had great doubts as to the probability of the offences charged against those men having been committed, we could not assert their innocence; all we could do was, to secure for them, as far as possible, a speedy and fair trial, and that in the meanwhile they should be well treated. We instructed the consul to visit them; but it appeared that it was contrary to the Neapolitan law, for prisoners to be allowed to see the persons engaged in conducting their defence, and the British consul was regarded in the light of a law adviser, because it would have bee competent for him to communicate with the advocate of the prisons. However, as it turned out that these men ought never to have been detained for a single moment, they were clearly entitled to indemnity. I go farther than the law officers, and say that we are entitled not only to demand an indemnity for these men on account of their cruel, unjust, and illegal detention, but also by reason of the deception practised on us by the Neapolitan Government; because, though the English consul was not allowed to sec them, he was informed that the Sardinian Government furnished them with money, that the English residents at Naples had subscribed to supply them with clothes, and that they were so well treated that there was nothing to be desired on that ground. On the 5th of August, Signor Carafa officially informed us that, owing to special instruction which had been issued, Park and Watt were perfectly well treated and had nothing to desire. The Neapolitan Government thus assumed

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  a responsibility to the English Government for the treatment of these men; and although we had no high idea of the state of Neapolitan prisons, or of the manner in which persons confined in them were treated by the Government, we could not suppose that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Naples would give us a solemn assurance that Park and Watt, in consequence of special instructions, were perfectly well treated and had nothing to desire at the very moment when they were suffering all the horrors and misery which we now know of, and which so clearly entitle them to indemnity. In September we requested that Park and Watt should be released, still not knowing the sufferings to which they were exposed, but being convinced of their innocence, having got from their employers in Genoa the best character of them, and having also heard of their illness. Signor Carafa again gave us an official assurance that the men were both in perfect health, and at the same time repeated the reasons why the Consul could not be allowed to see them. Great stress has been laid in the newspapers upon the fact that on the 8th of October the Consul informed us that our demands would never meet with compliance unless they were accompanied by a strong remonstrance. The truth is, that I anticipated the Consul upon that point, for on the very day on which he wrote to me— namely, October 8th, that a strong remonstrance was necessary, I sent a despatch to Naples expressing the hope that a voluntary compliance with our demands would save Her Majesty's Government from the necessity of repeating them in a different manner and through a different organ. On the 23rd of the same month, Signor Carafa repeated all his reasons for not admitting the Consul until the act of accusation was completed; but that our despatch of the 8th had produced its effect was apparent, from the fact, that three days afterwards the Attorney General announced at Salerno that Park and Watt might see their friends and relations. It was not till November that we knew from the liberated prisoners that the crew had acted under compulsion, and it was not till the 5th of December that we had any idea of the treatment to which these men had been exposed, because even in November we received a letter from Mr. Pugh, the English clergyman at Naples, stating that the two engineers were confined in an airy room, and had distinctly told him that upon the whole they were well treated, and had nothing to complain
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  of except being carried handcuffed through the streets, and not having received letters from England. I say, then, that as we have since ascertained how entirely erroneous these statements were, and how deliberately we were deceived—I can use no other word —by the Neapolitan Government, we are entitled upon that ground alone to demand indemnity. I was always of opinion, my Lords, that Park and Watts ought not to be detained; that there was not an atom of evidence against them; that the time would come when we should be able to ask for compensation for their sufferings; but as long as they were in the hands of the Neapolitan Government it would have been manifestly imprudent to excite irritation against them by announcing our intention to seek indemnity. We are now, however, at liberty to do so, and I rejoice to hear from my noble Friend opposite that we arc not only to demand compensation for them, but to support the Sardinian Government in their claims for restitution and indemnity, because those claims are founded upon the same ground as our own, namely, the illegality of the proceedings of the Neapolitan Government.
  LORD WENSLEYDALEthought it was of the utmost importance to consider deliberately what course they should adopt. He would not enter into any detailed argument on the main question, upon which there was a great diversity of opinion in both Houses of Parliament, and between the law officers of the Crown of the past and present Government; but all, he believed, except the present and perhaps the late Attorney General, were agreed that there was a right on the part of the Neapolitan Government to pursue and seize the vessel. He could conceive an analogous case; he would suppose that a number of American filibusters should purchase and fit out an American vessel, land on the coast of Jamaica, rob and pillage the country, and attack the Queen's troops, and then re-embark and sail away, and that an English frigate should pursue and capture the vessel, beyond the maritime league from the shore on the ground that she had been engaged in the outrageous acts. It could not be a question that Her Majesty's frigate had authority to pursue and capture such a vessel. The crew of the vessel, though lawfully under the American flag, would in the supposed case have, he thought, been unquestionably guilty of piracy, and the vessel was without doubt seizable by the law of nations on the high

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  seas. If the American vessel had been previously seized and taken from the real owners by pirates and used for piratical purposes by them, it seemed to him to make no difference as to the right of seizure. He was, therefore, strongly inclined to concur in the opinion of the present Solicitor General that it was a lawful act, on the part of the Neapolitan frigate, to seize the Cagliari, and carry her into Naples for examination. Then it became a question as to whether the Neapolitan Government had a right to adjudicate on the question of piracy and condemn the ship on that account, and also to punish the crew. The Queen's Advocate and the present Solicitor General give as their opinion that the condemnation was unwarranted; but whether it was so simply wrong as to be only reversible on appeal, or so clearly against a 1 principles of justice, in re minimé dubia, as to be void by international law, they leave undecided. As there was this conflict of opinion among the law advisers of the Crown, both under the late and the present Government, he would repeat his suggestion that it would be wise in Her Majesty's Government to take the best possible opinion, that of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, who, by an Act of Parliament, had power to consider these questions, and to report its opinion to Her Majesty thereon? The noble and learned Lord went on to show that this power thus delegated to the Committee of the Privy Council had been in several eases, which he cited, most usefully exercised on questions of international law and home policy, as well as on questions of individual dispute. When he first recommended the adoption of this course, he was told by his noble and learned Friend near him (Lord Cranworth) that such a reference could not be made to the Judicial Committee because this question might come before them in a legal form. That objection was quite untenable, because the Judges were now required to answer questions put to them by the House of Lords upon cases which might come before them in their judicial capacity, and indeed would necessarily come on many occasions, as, for instance, in McNaughten's case, when they were asked as to the rules of law on the subject of insanity giving an immunity for crime, a case of very frequent occurrence in criminal courts. A decision of the Committee of the Privy Council would settle all the im-
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  portant questions in the case of the Cagliari might have some effect with the Sardinian Government, and would enable our own Ministers to act according to law in a case of some nicety.
  LORD CAMPBELLsaid, he would not at that hour of the evening enter into a dissertation on the law of nations, but would take the opportunity of expressing the difference of opinion he entertained from his noble and learned Friend as to the expediency of making any reference of this matter to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. He had great respect for the Committee of the Privy Council, and happened to be a Member of it; but he did not think that any good was likely to arise from referring the present case to that learned body. No doubt the Act of Parliament to which his noble and learned Friend had referred, gave power to the Privy Council to consider this subject; but the question was, whether there was any necessity for it, or whether there was any advantage to arise from it. In the first place, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council might not be unanimous in coining to their decision; they might differ like the Solicitor General and the Queen's Advocate, and this would give to the King of Naples a plea for refusing compensation which he did not now possess. Another reason was, that this being an international matter, the Committee of the Privy Council was not a recognised tribunal. It was not like the Court of Admiralty but merely the Queen's adviser, and for but purpose of expressing to Her Majesty their opinions on questions submitted to their consideration. The reference too, was quite unnecessary; because, on the points in which the English and Sardinian nations demanded compensation, there was no doubt whatever about the law. Without giving any definite opinion on the doubtful question as to the right of the Neapolitan cruisers to seize the Cagliari, he thought that under the circumstances of grave suspicion in which the vessel was placed, the Neapolitan Government might well have supposed that those on board of her still had hostile designs against them, and would have been excusable in at least overhauling her: that, however, did not justify them in imprisoning our fellow-subjects and confining them in a dungeon, where they were exposed to such dreadful hardships that the one lost his reason, and the other had his constitution undermined. For this there could be no justification or

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  palliation. If it were admitted that the capture of the ship was lawful, was it lawful to seize the English subjects who were on board engaged in their lawful calling, and against whom there was not a shadow of suspicion? He was delighted to find the unanimous opinion that prevailed amongst their Lordships as to compensation being demanded of the Neapolitan Government for the sufferings of these individuals; but on that point there was no necessity for any reference to the Committee of Privy Council. Then came the question as to assisting the Sardinian Government in what they demanded. They complained of the shameful condemnation of this vessel, against all justice and against all law. Of course, if the owners of the vessel could be implicated in any act of hostility or piratical design, the ship could be made a lawful prize; but this was not the case; on the contrary, the owners were not only not guilty of such complicity, but were as much aggrieved by what had been done as was the Neapolitan Government itself; and when these facts came out, it was an act of the greatest injustice in any tribunal to proceed to the condemnation of the vessel, Such a judgment as that was entitled to no respect whatever. He paid the greatest deference to the opinions of his noble and learned Friend, but he must differ with him as to the necessity of this reference, for he felt that it was calculated to do more harm than good.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEhoped the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, would lay before the House the despatch from the Marquess d'Azeglio. It was necessary to have a clear understanding as to the contents of this despatch, for upon it much depended the action and line of policy that the Government ought to take in the matter. He understood the noble Earl to have advised the Sardinian Government to be quite certain of the law of the case, and to pursue a moderate course; and if the Neapolitan Government would not consent to surrender the vessel, to assent to a mediation; and also that Her Majesty's Government would support the Sardinian Government. Now, the real point which it was desirable to know, was the state in which the Government stood at the present moment with regard to its engagements towards Sardinia. It was clear from the papers that had been published that the Sardinian Government expected and had asked the support of the British Govern-
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  ment, and he wished to know what answer the British Government had given to that demand. And when he said support, he meant really to ascertain what kind of support—because, when we talked of giving moral support to the Sardinian Government, while we had no Minister at Naples, we were talking of that which was nothing and of no account, unless we promised and gave a support of a more substantial character, which might be required. The noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had said, that Naples and Sardinia represented two extreme opinions in Italy. Now, he (the Marquess of Clanricarde) entirely dissented from that opinion. The Sardinian Government, in his view, represented no extreme opinion, but on the contrary represented sound, moderate, constitutional opinions. Extreme opinions were represented, he was afraid, occasionally in Italy, but by persons of a very different class and character, with which the Sardinian Government had no connection whatever, and of which the Sardinian Government was the warmest and most efficient opponent. His noble Friend who had brought forward this question (the Earl of Airlie) did not say the Government were to blame for not going to war, nor did he wish this country to go to war, and he did not express anything of the kind; but the question was, whether the Neapolitan Government should be allowed by us as well as by the Sardinian Government to do wrong, and to persist in that wrong. He trusted and believed that in this matter Her Majesty's Government had acted rightly. That was the point to which the attention of Parliament and the country was directed, and he believed that if this despatch and the answer of Her Majesty's Government were laid on the table, it would be satisfactory to the House and the country.
  LORD CRANWORTHconsidered that a reference of this question to the Committee of the Privy Council would place the Government in an awkward if not discreditable position. He would not discuss the question of the rights of either country. As far as England was concerned, the question of right had been decided, and a demand had been made for reparation upon the Government of Naples. But it was now proposed to refer the question to one of our own tribunals, as to whether another country, Sardinia, had a good claim against a third country, Naples; and he could not conceive anything more

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  calculated than the reference proposed to the Committee of the Privy Council to place the Government in a difficult and embarrassing position. Let the result of this discussion be either one way or the other, he did hope there would he no reference of the subject to the Committee of the Privy Council.
  THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, that he fully agreed with the opinions expressed by the noble and learned Lord and by the Lord Chief Justice, that this matter ought not to be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. As had already been said, such a reference was in the first place now unnecessary; in the next place it might be extremely inconvenient were different opinions to be expressed by that learned body; and, lastly, their decision when given would not be binding upon a foreign country. For these reasons, although the noble and learned Lord was right in saying that Parliament had the power to refer the matter to the Privy Council, he thought it was inexpedient to do so. If his noble Friend (the Earl of Airlie) had been supposed to have represented Sardinia as being a country of extreme opinions, he was exceedingly glad that the noble Marquess opposite had given him an opportunity of explaining this misconception. What his noble Friend did say was—not that Sardinia was a country of extreme opinions, for he rather concurred with the noble Marquess in thinking that Sardinia, in an unexampled manner considering all the circumstances of the case, maintained a sound constitutional Government on the soundest principles—what the noble Earl did say was, that Sardinia and Naples were, as regards their system of government, two extremes—that Sardinia was understood to represent the most liberal principle in Italy, and Naples the most extreme or despotic opinions the other way. It was in that sense that the noble Earl intended to explain that they represented two extreme opinions. He (the Earl of Derby) would not prolong the discussion that had taken place; he rose principally for the purpose of expressing his satisfaction at the manner in which his noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Clarendon) had expressed his valuable concurrence in the course that Her Majesty's Government had taken on this occasion. He thought that concurrence of opinion, coming as it did from that side of the House, would materially strengthen the hands of Her Majesty's Government in carrying on the
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  further negotiations which were still in progress. This was most satisfactory to the Government, and most honourable to the noble Earl who so expressed himself. As regarded the question put to him by the noble Marquess, whether Her Majesty's Government were prepared to lay on the table the correspondence with the Neapolitan Minister, the Marquess d'Azeglio, he had to say that he was not at present prepared to lay that despatch upon the table; and he thought that on reflection the noble Marquess himself would see that, although upon the present occasion his noble Friend, in answer to the question of the noble Earl opposite, thought it expedient and desirable that they should explain the course—the general course— that Her Majesty's Government had pursued, and intended to pursue, on this important question, yet it was quite impossible, while negotiations were still pending and in progress, that they should step by step lay on the table of that or the other House of Parliament those despatches and those representations which they had made to Sardinia, and the answers they had received from Sardinia; and thus by putting out the whole correspondence piecemeal, interfere most mischievously with the conduct of the diplomatic negotiations that were still going on. In addition to the satisfactory concurrence of opinion on this important question that had characterized both sides of the House as to the correctness of the course Her Majesty's Government had pursued, and were now pursuing, he was happy to say that Her Majesty's Government were acting also strictly in concurrence with the views of the French Government. The French Government, he was enabled to say, had declared a very deep interest in the question, and in the preservation of international rights arising out of this question; and he believed the French Government had almost entirely concurred in the opinions entertained by Her Majesty's Government on this matter, and had certainly entirely concurred in the advice given to the Sardinian Government as to the mode of proceeding they should adopt in the event of reparation being refused by the Neapolitan Government. On one point which he thought had been misunderstood by some noble Lords, he would make one remark. The noble Earl seemed to have understood that we had supported Sardinia in her demands for restitution and indemnity. But the question of indemnity was one which, as between England and

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  Sardinia, had been kept quite distinct from the question of the seizure and restitution of the vessel. The question of a pecuniary indemnity had not been raised by Sardinia, and the English Government had thought that they ought not to bind themselves up with any question of indemnity to the owners of the vessel. What the Government had done was, to promise to give Sardinia the aid of all their moral force in pressing her demands upon Naples. All that they had promised was their good offices, and they had, in concert with France, recommended Sardinia not to have recourse to any measures of violence, but to act on the principle of calling for the mediation of some third Power. Having explained the course Her Majesty's Ministers had taken, he hoped it would be to the satisfaction of the noble Earl opposite. In this House so much forbearance had been shown in the matter—so much reluctance had been shown to interfere with negotiations, which he hoped would lead to a satisfactory termination, that he should much regret if anything occurred to interfere with such negotiations, the satisfactory termination of which he must observe were rather impeded than promoted by repeated discussions of the question.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

  REPORT OF COURT OF DIRECTORS.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL, in rising to move for the Report of the Court of Directors to the General Court of the East India Company upon the two Bills before Parliament relating to the Government of India, said that he was extremely unwilling at that critical hour of the evening to trespass at any length upon their Lordships' attention, but he felt it to be his duty to move for the production of this Report, because he thought that their Lordships and the country should be made fully aware of the difficulty in which they were placed with regard to legislating for the government of India. It was not his intention to make any observations in a spirit of political hostility to the Government, or to discuss the merits of the measure which they had introduced in any party spirit; but he "wished to point out to their Lordships the position in which they were placed. In one respect an advance, and a most important one, had been made, and he did not attach any blame to the present Go-
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  vernment for having changed the course which at one time they intended to pursue. He thought that it was undoubtedly true that the vote of the House of Commons (carried he believed by so large a majority as 200), made so essential a change in the whole position of the question that the present Government were quite entitled to say that, whatever their previous opinion had been, they were by that vote bound to proceed to legislation for the government of India; and he most sincerely hoped that the Session would not come to a close without the question being settled one way or another. He quite agreed that so long as the Court of Directors was the de facto Government of India it ought to be respected; but no one could deny that after what had taken place the authority of the Court of Directors had been materially diminished, and that the more perhaps when the character of the noble Earl at the head of the Board of Control was borne in mind. It was notorious that the noble Earl had never been disposed at any time to pay any great deference to the Court of Directors, and he could not conceive that after what had occurred that deference on the part of the noble Earl would be increased, and he felt hound to say that the answer which had been given by the noble Earl to a question addressed to him earlier in the evening appeared to him to place the matter in a more serious light. He need hardly say that he most heartily concurred in the eulogy which had been passed by his noble Friend upon the despatch which had been sent out by the noble Earl in reference to the policy to be pursued in India towards our revolted subjects; but he thought it must remarkable that that despatch should have been sent through the Secret Committee. It appeared to him that if the course of sending despatches through the Secret Committee were recognized and adopted, then, in point of fact, the President of the Board of Control would possess absolute authority over the government of India, and might, by employing that machinery, act as he pleased, without in any way consulting the Court of Directors. Although he was willing to admit that under the circumstances the present Government were bound to proceed to legislation, he could not say that their subsequent proceedings had tended to render the solution of the question easier or more simple. Shortly before the late Government proposed their scheme, the noble Earl opposite expressed distrust beforehand for any

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  scheme which would materially alter the present system of constitution, for he said that constitutions grew up and could not be made. He therefore expected that the noble Earl, when he came into power, would bring forward a scheme which would he a considerably less change in the present constitution than that of the late Government. But in reality, upon a comparison of the two Bills, he found that the Bill of the present Government involved an entirely now constitution for India; there were in it far more elements of change, it was much more complicated, and was more open to the objections that it created a new constituency, than the Bill of the late Government. He was not desirous upon that occasion of entering into any defence of the plan of the late Government, for no doubt a time would come when the principles upon which it was founded would be fully discussed, and he would therefore only say, that the principle upon which the late Government had proceeded was that of making as little essential change in the main branches of the constitution for the government of India as was consistent with the necessary condition of removing what was in reality a more fiction, and of assuming the Government in the name and under the authority of the Queen; whereas the Bill of the present Government proposed far greater changes. The Bill of the present Government had, however, been withdrawn, and the House of Commons had been invited to discuss the subject in the form of abstract Resolutions. Now, that was, it appeared to him, a most inconvenient course, and one that could not present a fair issue to Parliament. It had been laid down as an abstract principle that in order to secure efficiency and independence the system of election was necessary. He objected to that. What did Her Majesty's Government mean by independence? Did they mean to secure it as regarded the position or the authority of the members of the Council? A great deal too had been said with regard to the principle of election. What did they mean by the principle of election? There was no abstract principle involved in election—it depended on the practical definition of those who were to be the electors and the functions of those who were to be elected. So far as the abstract idea of election was concerned, it stood in immediate connection with a notion which was very prevalent in this country, but in which he was perfectly sure neither his
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  noble Friend the President of the Board of Control nor any other member of Her Majesty's Government concurred. It had been stated day after day in the press— and the same notion was involved in many of the passages of the Report of the East India Company for which he intended to move,—that one of the main difficulties connected with the transfer of the government of India from the East India Company to the Crown was the undue authority and power which that transfer would confer upon the Crown. Such expressions as these had been heard during the recent debates on this subject—"The Council must he such as to exercise control over and check the Minister intrusted with the administration of Indian affairs," &c. Almost every page of every document that had recently proceeded from the East India Company insisted on the same notion—notindeed very consistently, for one part of the paper contradicted the other; though that was not to be attributed to any want of ability on the part of those who drew up those documents, hut to the false position in which the Court of Directors were placed. These sentiments originated in the memorable contest of 1783, the greatest in our Parliamentary history, the effect of which upon the policy not only of England, but of the world, was felt even now. The chief question in that contest was whether the government of India could be transferred to the Crown without dangerously increasing the power of the Crown. Persons who totally forgot that, the whole of the circumstances under which that contest was carried on having been essentially changed by intervening events and measures, that difficulty at least did not exist, still repeated that question. The danger dreaded in 1783 was not so much the transfer by Fox's India Bill of the Government of India as of the whole of the commerce of India to the Crown. But there was no commerce to be dealt with now. No one need now apprehend that a transfer of the Government of India from the East India Company to the Crown would make the Crown the monopolist of all our Indian commerce. But even a still greater chance had since that period taken place, which seemed to be very much forgotten by those who objected to an increase of the power of the Crown. He referred to the change that had taken place with respect to patronage in India. It was then argued that there would be nothing to prevent a Minister from ap-

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  pointing to these great pro consular commands any person he pleased, whatever might have been his previous qualifications or services. One of the dangers that constantly flitted before the eyes of public men in England at the period he had alluded to was that of nabobs, as they were called, coming back from India to England, with their ill-gotten wealth, to influence by corrupt means the House of Commons and the Government. He need hardly say that that danger had been completely removed by the various statutes which had since passed. No person could now be appointed to any of the great offices in India who had not had experience of Indian service; and so far from fearing the return to England of men who had filled such offices we should only be too rejoiced to secure their services in the proposed Indian Council. He believed that every one who considered the subject would be convinced of the absurdity of talking about giving to that Council an independence which the Government did not intend to give to them, and which they themselves would not desire;—namely, one which would enable them to control the Minister intrusted with Indian affairs. This doctrine was laid down in one part of the document for which he was moving; but in another part of it they were told that the Council must be one not to control but to advise the Indian Minister. And here he must express the astonishment with which he had read a statement of a right hon. Friend of his, for whom he had the greatest respect, during a very recent discussion in another place, that the power exercised by the President of the Board of Control over the Government of India had been lately increasing, and that of that power this at least might be said, that it was one which had never received the formal sanction of the Legislature. Now the fact was that the machinery of the Secret Committee, through which the power of the Board of Control was exercised, had received the sanction of Parliament over and over again. There could be no greater mistake than to suppose that Parliament ever contemplated that in the case of Indian wars the Executive should be under any other control than that which was exercised at home with reference to European wars. No doubt, in the case of European wars there was an indirect check upon the Executive, because they had to come down to Parliament for money to enable them to carry them on; but as to the power of the Executive
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  to declare war or make peace, it was the same in India as in England. He must, therefore, protest against such a misstatement of fact coining from so high an authority as his right hon. Friend. He fully concurred with an observation made some months ago by a noble Friend of his in that House, that there was a tendency in the public mind in this country to overrate the importance of questions connected with Central Asia, and should be very glad to see more fully recognized the truth that, after all, the great danger to our Indian empire arose from inefficiency in its internal government, and that so long as we devoted attention to its internal improvement, we might look with indifference upon any advances that might be made by Russia or any other power in the direction of Central Asia. But to return to the proposed Council. It was one of our greatest boasts that we had entirely got rid of the commercial principle with regard to those who were intrusted with the government of India, and he could conceive nothing more disastrous than a re-introduction of the very principle which, with immense advantage to India, we had succeeded in eliminating. He would refer to a speech made by his noble Friend opposite during a discussion on the government of India in 1853, when his noble Friend said that "experience had satisfied him that it might be inconsistent with the public interests that the commercial element should prevail to any very great extent in the Direction, as much public inconvenience might be occasioned by persons engaged in commerce having previous knowledge of fiscal changes in India." Their Lordships must admit that his noble Friend's observations on that occasion were singularly free from anything like party spirit; that they were not intended to embarrass the Government, but simply to point out the best machinery for the Government of India. His noble Friend expressed the strongest possible opinion against the principle that commercial interests should he represented in the government of India; and of all things, he said, it was most undesirable that there should exist any suspicion that the members of the Indian Government were personally interested in mercantile transactions. He did not deny that the mercantile interests of England were very much bound up with the peace, progress, and prosperity of our Indian empire. If those interests were represented, not individually,

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  but by the action of a united Council for India, he believed that they would be materially advanced; while, if particular interests only were to be represented, the result would be disastrous to the real welfare of India. He thought, therefore, that the view which was expressed by the noble Earl in 1853 was sounder than that which he had embodied in his Bill of 1858. The noble Earl was generally supposed to be the chief authority for the introduction of the elective principle; but he had looked over his evidence in 1853, and he found that the noble Earl only advocated election as an alternative if nomination was not adopted; but it could be no matter of doubt that in 1853 the opinion of the noble Earl was that the only principle on which the system of election could be maintained was, that it would introduce into the Indian Council men of the greatest knowledge and experience. The great objection to the present system was, that owing to the nature of the canvassing and of the constituency to be canvassed, the best men would not expose themselves to the trouble and expense of a contest for a seat in the Direction. The same result must be expected when the constituency was extended beyond what it was at present; and be was satisfied, therefore, that the principle of election as contained in the Bill would fail. After the evidence which the noble Earl had given upon all these points before the Committee, he had been puzzled to understand the scheme which had been propounded under the authority of the noble Earl. A great deal had been said of late about the impropriety of mixing up party politics with Indian affairs; the events of the last few years had, he thought, clearly illustrated the importance of those great party organizations by which large measures of reform had been inaugurated and carried to a successful issue, and had shown that they afforded the best means of sifting great public questions and maturing great public measures; but there was an element usually in party politics which he should heartily wish to sec excluded from all considerations connected with the government of India. When he looked for an explanation of the departure from his formerly expressed opinions by the noble Earl, his belief was that the noble Earl found himself not sufficiently strong, in a Parliamentary sense, to carry that which, in the abstract, he considered to be best for the government of India. We could not continue, however, to deal
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  thus with this serious and difficult question. He did not believe that the difficulty would be great if they maintained the essential feature of the existing system; but if they entered upon extensive and new plans of representation which did not exist at present, they would involve themselves in endless troubles. The problem with which they had to deal was not easy of solution; it was how to govern a, distant empire under an absolute government abroad, yet under the influence of a popular government at home; how to bring to bear upon the people of India the light of our purer faith, of our more extended knowledge, of our more perfect civilization; and how at the same time to defend them from the evils which were inseparable from the maintenance of our rule, from the waywardness of popular opinion, and the suspicion of selfish interest. Surely that was a task, the noblest ever given to a people to perform,—a problem the most difficult that a Government ever had to solve! He entreated the noble Earl, then, not to present to Parliament the naked idea of election enunciated in the Bill which he had introduced, but which was now abandoned, coupled with an imaginary independence which he did not give, and with a pretended authority and power which he did not confer. The noble Earl must have formed a higher estimate of the good sense of the English people than he had before entertained from the mere fact of their having rejected his plan for representing certain great cities in his Indian Council. He recommended the noble Earl to propose some such scheme as he had frequently propounded when in opposition; for if he did so he was satisfied that from no section of politicians would he experience the slightest tendency to thwart his endeavours at legislation. In conclusion he begged to move —
  "That there be laid before this House, the Report to the General Court of the East India Company from the Court of Directors upon the Two Bills now before Parliament relating to the Government of India."
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: Whatever may be the difficulties, my Lords, with respect to the future government of India, Her Majesty's present Ministers are not responsible for them. I deprecated at the end of last year, and I deprecated this year, the consideration of the subject in the present circumstances of India. I said that if you were merely to introduce the Queen's name, and were to

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  carry on the government in her name, it would, in my opinion, strengthen the government of India, and that few alterations would be required in order to effect that purpose; but that beyond that I was most unwilling to attempt to go in the present circumstances of the times. Her Majesty's late Ministers apparently had not made up their minds upon this subject before Christmas. At all events, they were asked what they intended to do, and, as they declined to give any answer, I concluded that they and not made up their minds. They did so, however, during the recess, and immediately after the meeting of Parliament, they intimated their intention of proceeding to legislate, and a Bill was prepared and introduced. I think that they took a step very injurious to the welfare of India in disturbing the question at this time; but I must say that I have heard with the greatest satisfaction what full from the noble Duke. I rejoice that he is of opinion —and I trust that those who were recently his colleagues agree with him—that, having begun to legislate, we must go on; because it would be pregnant with danger to India if, after having cast a stigma upon the government of the East India Company, you should practically confess your weakness and your inability to create a Government which should take the place of that which you had so stigmatized. The news of the overthrow of Lord Palmerston and of the overthrow of the East India Company will arrive in India at the same moment, and they will create confusion from one end of the country to the other. You must go to the rescue. Whatever Parliament may think best in its wisdom to do, let it proceed at once to the consideration of this great question, and let it not leave India for the next six or seven months without a Government. Depend upon it, my Lords, the state of that country is not such as to make it desirable or advisable to add to the difficulties in which the Government is already involved. While I express my gratification at the expression of opinion which has fallen from the noble Duke, I may in turn impart to him some slight gratification by informing him that, whatever may be my differences of opinion with the East India Company, it is impossible for any individuals to conduct public business in a manner more amicable than the East India Company and myself. That has always been the case. I am now for the fourth time at the Board of Control, and I never have had a
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  dispute with the East India Company nor with any individual member of the Court of Directors. It is impossible for two bodies to co-operate more amicably, and, I hope, more efficiently than the East India Company and the Board of Control at the present moment. It has always been so. I did them justice in this respect last year. I said that I did not believe they could have thrown any obstruction in the way of the Government, that if they could do so at any time they would not be likely to have done it last year, and that that, consequently, could be no reason for proceeding to immediate legislation with respect to the government of India. I said so in distinct terms last year, and I believe I repeated it this year. The great evil of the present system is the necessary delay. It is impossible to overcome that difficulty. I was asked early in the evening for an explanation of the circumstances under which I had passed a certain despatch which has just been printed through the Secret Committee; but if I had attempted to pass it through the public department that letter would not have gone till now. It would have taken three or four weeks to do it; and, though in this particular instance I was perfectly justified by law in what I did, I can well believe that there may have been cases in which Presidents of the Board of Control have been induced to stretch the law in order to do that at once, which they felt it was essential for the public service should be done. I impute nothing to the Court of Directors. It is the system, and it is impossible to avoid it, even with the best intentions. They cannot extricate themselves; and I can assure your Lordships that the difficulty is sometimes extremely serious. I do not mean to follow the noble Duke into a discussion of the Bills or the Resolutions, nor will I go back to my speeches or my evidence, which I have never read since it was printed; but when the noble Duke says that I have proposed a plan which changes the present Government of India more essentially than the plan of the late Government proposed to do, let me tell him that he is entirely in error. The plan proposed by his colleagues established a Council of eight persons nominated by the Crown. They must of necessity have resided fifteen years in India, or they must have served in India for ten years. Now Her Majesty's army in India at the present time—and it is probable will so continue for some time to come—amounts to between 60,000 and

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  70,000 men; and it is extremely desirable that some of the officers of that army should find their way into the Council, but this I must say, that by the Bill of the late Government, the officers of Her Majesty's army are sedulously excluded from the Council. But more than that, the provisions of the first Bill practically excluded fresh English minds; and I know that is a most serious evil. No person could have sat in that Council but men grown grey in India and wedded to Indian opinions on all subjects. I felt in India the great inconvenience of not having a fresh English mind to support me in my Council. I had no fault to find with the gentlemen who funned my Council, but they were thoroughly Indian in habit and opinion—all their views were Indian; they knew nothing of English modes of thought. The light which breaks in upon this country does not break in upon India till long long afterwards. And so it would have been in this proposed Council. The only person in the Council who would have English opinions would be the Secretary of State himself, and he would practically be seriously embarrassed, because he would have in his Council no one able to support his views. Practically, under the present system, which is one of election, and always has been, there has been no occasion on which there were not in the Court of Directors some commercial gentlemen, some gentlemen who had not Indian minds, but who brought English opinions to act on opinions formed in India. I think it is of great advantage to preserve that element in the Council, and it is of much more importance to do it now than it was five years ago. There has been a great increase of late in the commercial intercourse with India. In the course of the last four or five years there have been, or, under existing arrangements there will be, invested in India in railways and permanent works not less than £30,000,000. Persons with capital are beginning to turn their attention to India; and I must say I think it most advisable that we should have in the Council, especially under present circumstances, some persons with whom the President may advise upon subjects connected with commerce between England and India. In the Bill which we proposed, means were taken which appeared most advisable for effecting this object, namely, by the admission of persons to the Indian Council by election. The noble Duke said much, but I shall say little, on the elective principle.
  1966
  But this at least I may recal to his mind— if the noble Duke will do me the favour to refer to my former declarations on this subject, and he seems to have read my speeches a great deal more carefully than I ever did—he will find that this year, last year, and on all occasions on which I have spoken of the future government of India, I have always insisted on a Council, and I have invariably maintained that it should be appointed, in part at least, on the elective principle. Now I will distinctly explain why I think this is desirable. When I came to consider and settle the provisions of the measure, I naturally asked myself what I should desire to find in the Council, if by accident I should happen to be the first man charged with the government of India under the new system. I thought that I should like to obtain there not only advice from the ablest men of every service in India, which was secured by that part of the arrangement by which nine members were to he nominated by the Crown, but also from the ablest men who could be discovered, and whom, in fact, the Government could not discover, to advise in matters of Indian commerce; I knew that in point of fact that the Government had not the means of finding those persons. The Government could find without difficulty the most distinguished men of the civil service; it might ascertain easily the fittest men in the military service; but it has not the means of discovering who are the fittest commercial men to sit in such a Council. That can be done only by election, and I considered it absolutely necessary that to obtain the class of men I have mentioned we should have recourse to the elective principle. But I desired more than that. I see from day to day questions put about India and opinions expressed about India arising from strong and laudable feelings no doubt, but also—I may be pardoned for saying—from an ignorance of the real state of that country, which fills me with alarm. I did, and I do desire, to give the Minister who may have the charge of India a Council so independent, so respectable, so influential, and with so great a hold upon the country, as by their support to afford him great strength in resisting the pressure which might be made upon the Indian Government in the House of Commons. I know not whence the Council is to derive this strength, except from a system of election. The system of nomination, however perfectly, however discreetly, and however hon-

  1967
  estly applied, cannot create a body which would obtain to the same extent the confidence and respect of the people. No purely nominated Council can have the same weight with the country as a body, a portion of which is elected by influential constituencies. I may be wrong—the Government may possibly find the best men—I question whether they could find the best commercial men—but without the application of the elective principle they will not be able to find men who will enjoy the public support to the same degree as a body of men added upon the elective principle. Those were my reasons for desiring the introduction of the elective principle. It is no new opinion of mine. It is one which I have often expressed. In all the advice which I have given in respect to this great subject I have perhaps been led away by a jealousy — an almost morbid jealousy—which has at all times animated mo, of that system of jobbery and corruption which I knew must be fatal to the Government of India. I knew that I should never do wrong in this respect—I would never commit a job; but I could not trust those who might follow me. If I have gone too far on any point, my only object has been to render it impossible that any person who might follow me should be able to make that a bad government which I wished to make a good government. My only object has been to lay the foundation of a government which should enable us to make India happy, strong, and powerful, and which should connect her for ever with this country. I thought that by connecting the Council of India with some of the greatest cities and towns in England —with the greatest representative power that I could find—I should have found a principle of stable connection between India and this country, and a principle which would have effectually prevented any one of my successors from jobbery and improper conduct, but which would have enabled any one of them who did what was right to support his opinions against the mistakes which might be made in Parliament. I may have been wrong in all this; but that has been my object— a thoroughly public object—to give India a good government. I do trust that the friends of the noble Duke, acting in the spirit in which he has spoken to night, will feel that it is absolutely necessary to go on. If this work is to be accomplished let it be accomplished this year. Whoever they may be who are to administer the
  1968
  affairs of India, do not let India remain in a state of doubt and uncertainty a week longer than is necessary. Depend upon it, my Lords, you must not trifle with the security of India.
  EARL GREY: My Lords, although I concur in some of the observations of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough), yet I differ from both him and from the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) on one very important point—namely, the necessity of settling the question of the home government of India during the present year. I quite concur with the noble Earl in thinking that Her Majesty's late Government acted most unadvisedly in launching this question during the present Session; and I am also obliged to concur in the opinion that the vote of the House of Commons in favour of the introduction of their Bill has considerably increased the difficulties of leaving the homo government of India as it is. But, admitting these increased difficulties, I conceive that the dangers of delay are not to be compared with the danger of taking a false step upon so important a subject. If we now organize the home government of India upon a wrong principle — if we adopt a system which may not work according to our expectations—that false step will probably be irreparable. Everything that has taken place in this country since the question has been raised—the proceedings in the other House, and the proceedings out of doors—has tended to convince me more and more that the public mind is not yet prepared for dealing with this subject in the manner in which it ought to be treated. If I felt this conviction before, I must say it has been strengthened by the speech of the noble Duke. Able as that speech was, I cannot help thinking that, with regard to many points, it showed that the real difficulties of the case were not understood by my noble Friend, and that the principles which ought to govern our legislation for India have not yet been so thoroughly investigated that any one is qualified to deal with the subject with the wisdom which its treatment requires. Let me also say in passing that I think the danger of delay in settling the home government of India has been considerably exaggerated on all sides; for, after all, what is it that remains in doubt? The only question in doubt is the manner in which the authority of the Government at home is to be exercised over the government of India. There is no dispute at all that at this

  1969
  moment Her Majesty's Government is supreme. The President of the Board of Control enjoys powers so large and complete that his policy must be adopted by the Directors of the East India Company; and if—as I am persuaded is the fact, and as I never doubted would be the case— the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) acts most harmoniously with the Directors — if he has no difficulty with them—the only alteration you would introduce by any new Bill would be some modification of the manner in which the Cabinet of the day might act upon the Indian Government. That is the way in which the home government of India is managed, and you would not, by either of these measures, touch materially the constitution of the home government. On the other hand, the Native population of India have relations almost exclusively with the Governor General. They have nothing to do with the authorities in this country. They can know and understand but little of the machinery by which the conduct of the Governor General is controlled by distant authorities in England. They look only to the Governor General, and, whether we pass a new Act or the present system be continued, the Governor General will continue to be in their eyes, as he is now, the representative of British power. The result will merely be, if we adopt a new measure, that some vague rumours will be current among them of alterations, which they will be totally unable to comprehend, in the manner in which the Governor General receives his instructions from home. I cannot, therefore, apprehend any serious difficulty in India from a little delay. I do not deny that there may be some difficulty. I do not deny that the introduction of a Bill has given rise to more difficulty than would have existed if the measure of the late Government had not been laid before the House; but I say that the difficulty is greatly exaggerated, and that it is not to be compared with the danger of committing an error in establishing a permanent constitution for the government of India. I venture to say that, in my opinion, the principle upon which the authority of the home government of India should be established has hitherto not been considered as it ought to be, either by Parliament or by the public. There ought to be full discussion and deliberation upon that subject before we can safely pronounce an opinion as to the best mode of legislation. Let me remind your Lordships of what has
  1970
  taken place. A few months ago there ran through the country a sort of general cry for the substitution of the power of the Crown for that of the Company with regard to the government of India. I think any one who looks at the manner in which that cry arose and was expressed must agree with me in the opinion that it originated rather from passion and panic than from sober consideration. I believe that what people meant at that time was, that they wished the government of India to be controlled by the Cabinet of the day, in the same manner in which it managed the administration of other parts of the empire. In a petition which was presented, I think, from the Chamber of Commerce of Manchester, a desire was expressed that a Secretary of State for India should be appointed, who should be assisted by four under-secretaries. When the subject was looked into, however, it was found that the proposition that a Secretary of State, with very little control and advice, should manage the affairs of our enormous Indian empire, was utterly opposed to common sense and reason. According to the constitution of this country, it would be absolutely necessary that the head of the Indian Department, like every other Cabinet Minister, should hold his place by the uncertain tenure of a Parliamentary vote; and it is therefore scarcely possible that a person placed in so high a position could be qualified for it by long Indian experience, or trained for it by the studies of a life. To expect, then, that a person without control or assistance should efficiently administer the affairs of such an empire as India seems to me a simple absurdity. For five years and a half I discharged the duties of Secretary of State for the Colonies, a large proportion of which possess representative institutions, and are inhabited by a population of British origin, so that the functions of the Secretary of State with reference to them are limited and comparatively easy. There are, it is true, some of our Colonies which have not representative institutions in a population capable of receiving them with advantage, and the Government of these colonies, therefore, requires to be more closely superintended by the Secretary of State, but it is scarcely necessary to say that they are not to be compared in point of population or complexity of interests with our vast Indian empire. Our empire in India, I believe, now involves the interests of about 180,000,000 of

  1971
  people. But it is notorious that, with regard to the administration of colonial affairs, complaints have heen made against every successive Secretary of State, and that it is impossible for any Minister to conduct the department in a manner satisfactory to all those whose interests may be affected by his policy. In old times a wish was frequently expressed that some control should be exercised over the Secretary for the Colonies, but how much more necessary would be such a power with regard to a Secretary of State for India. In the case of India, it is not only necessary that the Secretary of State, and the Government which be represents, should be assisted by competent advisers, but, notwithstanding what has been said by the noble Duke, I think it is requisite that he should be controlled. The noble Duke has said, "All you want is a council of advice and assistance, and not of control; and there is, therefore, no utility in the principle of election." I admit that the Government of this country must, in the end, be supreme; they must have the final decision of every question; hut still a very powerful moral control may be exercised— which, although simply moral, will not be less effective, and which can only be exercised by a powerful and independent body. Hitherto the Court of Directors has been that body. When I presented a petition to your Lordships from the East India Company, I called attention to the fact that in many cases the Directors of the East India Company, when they felt that right and justice wore on their side, had resisted the wishes of the Ministers of the Crown, and that, when they were supported by right and justice, their resistance had been effectual. It is absolutely necessary that the body which is associated with the Minister in regulating the affairs of India should have this independence. The noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) said he wanted a Council which would strengthen the position of the Minister in the House of Commons, and prevent the measures which were brought in there from being the mere sport of factious debaters. But it is essential to the very idea of a Council, able to give such support, that it should exercise some degree of control. You cannot have responsibility without power. As to the control which Parliament wants to exercise, let me remind your Lordships that the interests of India and of England may sometimes clash. There is a well-known case,
  1972
  that of the Chinese war of 1840, which the East India Company denied was a war undertaken for Indian purposes, and the expenses of which they contended ought to be paid for by this country, and that no part ought to be paid for out of Indian revenue. Now, is it not very possible that the House of Commons and your Lordships' House might feel tempted to put an undue burden on the people of India for Oriental wars; and is it not, in order that India may he justly and wisely governed, indispensable that there should be some body—call it by what name you please—which shall be able to exercise an impartial authority (or perhaps I should call it influence rather than authority), and which shall be able to state the case of India in a manner to command attention and insure justice to that country? This, I think, is absolutely necessary; and how is it to be accomplished? By the Bill of the late Government the Crown was to nominate a Council of eight, whose tenure of office was to be for eight years, two going out annually; and in all cases where the Council was equally divided, the casting vote was to be with the Minister. How would this have operated? There would always have been two Members of the Council on the point of going out, and anxious to be reappointed, and there would always have been two more just appointed. The Bill, therefore, was so drawn that there would have been at all times a majority at the service of the Minister of the day, and the Council would be no check upon him at all; it would have made him perfectly supreme, and would have reduced the Council to a mere shadow and a name, exercising no moral power whatever. I do not suppose such a result was intended; but if this had been the very purpose for which the machinery of the Bill was intended, it could not have been more admirably contrived. While agreeing, however, with the noble Earl opposite, that we want an independent Council—a Council which will exercise great influence, and which, from its numbers and its composition, will have such a hold on public opinion that no Government can quite set aside its views—while admitting that this is what we want, I still cannot concur in the noble Earl's argument that election will give us such a body. I am afraid that election never has been, and probably it is never likely to be, a very good way of selecting men for the discharge of particular functions — func-

  1973
  tions which they arc paid for assuming It is an admirable way of selecting persons to express the opinions and the wishes of the electors cm matters in which they are themselves concerned; hut I am quite at a loss to understand how it can he expected that — taking the electors of the City of London for example—they would be likely to exercise a very wise discrimination in choosing a Member for the Council of India. The appointment of paid officials is a subject of all others on which electors arc apt to go wrong. Take a. vestry, a board of guardians, or any other body you please, I am afraid that selections made by them, whether of an overseer, a policeman, or a beadle, are determined by interest and by canvassing rather than by any special fitness. It has always been held that the most discreet choice in such instances is not made by means of election, and I cannot help thinking that if you were to have a numerous constituency of this sort, elections would only be won by management out of doors. You would have little cliques or parties, like the "caucuses" in America, and a few irresponsible individuals would virtually nominate the Members of your Council in the name of the numerous constituencies which you professed to establish. I am bound to say that I think the great fault of the present government of India arises from the manner in which the elections by the Court of Proprietors have degenerated. Formerly, I believe, the existing Court of Directors virtually influenced the choice of those who were to come in, and the election was therefore a merely nominal one; practically, the persons elected were, to a great extent, those who the Directors thought would make desirable colleagues. That was the way in which elections worked formerly; and within my own times the system produced a very able body of Directors, who performed their functions with very great ability. Now, I would suggest whether our best course would not be to adopt avowedly—and with some further guards and precautions—that which was substantially the arrangement existing in former times. It might easily be provided for by these simple means:—Allow the Council or Court themselves to choose the new Members who are to be appointed, subject to the check that such nominations shall not take effect without the approbation of the Crown, and that that approbation shall not be signified until the names of the persons intended to be appointed have been laid before both
  1974
  Houses of Parliament, either House to be able to signify its dissent. Experience shows that self-election, though it is apt to degenerate into jobbing and corruption, often answers the object, and provides very able and efficient bodies of men. We have seen in old times how the corporations under such a system continued in many instances very efficient bodies. What was wanted was some check upon abuse. While, therefore, on the one hand, I see objections to a system of election, and while, on the other hand, objections may justly be raised to the principle of direct nomination by the Crown, I venture to suggest whether it might not be as well for us to meet half way, and allow Members of the Council to be appointed subject to the restrictions I have mentioned, thus establishing, not a system of nomination by the Crown, but one in which the Crown would nevertheless exercise great influence. I throw this out merely as a suggestion; but I say again, that the very variety of opinions existing on this subject, and the number of considerations that must be taken into account, all show to my mind that this subject is not yet ripe for legislation. The question requires to be further discussed in Parliament as well as out of doors; and, if this is done, I believe it may be dealt with hereafter much more satisfactorily than it can be at present. I therefore, for one, cannot but rejoice in the prospect which I think I see, of a great change of opinion on this subject. A little while ago, as I have said, the public seemed to be in favour of a sudden and a sweeping change in the government of India. That feeling has passed away; and it is a remarkable circumstance that both the late and the present Government, in proposing to abolish the East India Company, have tried which could go furthest in praises of the very body they were about to extinguish. The noble Viscount lately at the head of the Government (Viscount Palmerston) praised the East India Company very warmly; and, in the same manner, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, in introducing the Government measure, spoke in the highest terms of the working of the existing form of government. Now, I cannot help believing that such opinions, expressed by those who agreed in nothing else, will lead to a great change of feeling on this subject, and will reconcile the public with the prospect which exists that this question will remain over for another year. What

  1975
  chance s there, I may ask, of any legislation with respect to India in the course of the present Session? Hero we arc at the end of April, and the Resolutions upon which a Bill is to be founded have still to be discussed in the House of Commons. Moreover, we are in this position — that we have the present Government bringing forward one plan, the late Government proposing another plan, while a distinguished friend of mine, who was formerly at the head of affairs (Lord J. Russell), proposes a third measure based on principles which differ essentially from either of the others. Then you have the Manchester Chamber of Commerce recommending one thing, the Liverpool Chamber suggesting something quite different; and, in short, such a chaos of opinions prevails, that we do not seem to have decided yet on the first principles upon which we ought to proceed. Such being the state of things, can you suppose that a Bill will come before your Lordships' House at a season of the year which will enable us to pass upon it a deliberate judgment? It seems to me that such a hope is impossible of realization. Sooner or later the attempt to legislate on India in the present year will be abandoned; and, if it is to be abandoned, the sooner this is done the better.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I cannot, I confess, my Lords, understand, after listening to the speech of the noble Earl who has just spoken, why he should have been so loudly called for, or why he should have been so loudly cheered by the opposite side of the House, inasmuch as, with the exception of the objections he raised to the introduction by the late Government of any measure at all, and to the appointment of the Council proposed by them, his speech is diametrically opposed to the scheme for the future government of that country which has been laid before Parliament by the present Government. The noble Earl has, in fact, utterly destroyed the scheme of the Government, and he advocates, in the strongest manner, that delay which the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough) says will be a fatal step at the present moment. I shall not, upon this occasion, trespass upon your Lordships' time at any length; and I must, at the outset of the few observations which I have to make, be permitted to express my entire dissent from the statement of the noble Earl opposite, to the effect that Her Majesty's late advisers are responsible for the difficulties in which the Indian question is now in-
  1976
  volved. The noble Earl has chosen to say that the steps which were taken by the late Government, in reference to this important subject, were of a very hasty nature, and that we did not know our own minds with respect to it, even immediately previous to the Christmas recess. Now, I have not had that experience of office which many of your Lordships possess, but I must say I never knew a measure to be more carefully considered than that which was laid before Parliament by the late Ministry. The deliberations upon it were begun very early in the autumn— indeed, if the noble Earl will refer to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, he will find that it was furnished with a short sketch of our plan before Parliament broke up for the Christmas holidays, and that it entirely agrees with the scheme subsequently embodied in our Bill. I say, therefore, that the charge of having framed an impromptu constitution, which is brought against us, is one which there is no evidence to support. With respect to the manner in which the noble Earl and the Court of Directors work together, I can only say that that is a point upon which, after the statement which he himself has made, I do not entertain the slightest doubt. Everybody who knows the noble Earl must be aware how agreeable a person he is to do business with. But I am not, at the same time, sure that the fact to which I have just alluded proves all that the noble Earl would wish to establish. It is not a fault of the noble Earl if we on this side of the House consider and reflect on what he says—all that falls from him carries with it immense weight, and deserves the greatest consideration. I am, therefore, quite justified in referring to opinions formerly expressed by the noble Earl; and, in doing so, I find that, in the evidence which he gave before the Committee, he stated very fairly that, when President of the Board of Control, it was he who governed India. In his speeches in this House he has invariably maintained, that by the President of the Board of Control India ought to be ruled.
  "I will toll you," said the noble Earl, "the mode in which I effected that object. I made it a point to know every subject better than the Court of Directors, and, if the President of the Board of Control does know every subject that comes under their joint consideration better than the Court of Directors, and makes it well understood that he will adhere to his determination upon any particular point, you may depend upon it that body will very soon discontinue its attempts to check him."

  1977
  Now, I would ask whether the noble Earl's own words do not entirely justify the argument of the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) as to the uselessness of establishing an independent Council as a check? I shall not now enter into a discussion of the comparative merits of the two measures which have been introduced to the notice of Parliament upon this subject. I may, however, be allowed to advert to the observations which the noble Earl has made in reference to the constitution of a Council for India. He says my noble Friend, the noble Duke near me, has made a mistake in supposing that he had ever spoken in favour of a nominated Council in this Mouse. The noble Earl will, however, I think, find that in one of his speeches he distinctly declared his preference for a Council selected by the Crown, as opposed to one chosen by election; while in another he expressed it as his opinion, not only that the system of nomination was superior to that of election, but that the mixed system was particularly open to objection. He contended that, if we were to establish a system of that description, the result would be that, when a man of great knowledge and experience offered himself to the notice of the constituent body, the electors would say to him— "You are sure to be appointed by the Government. We will elect somebody else." The noble Earl, therefore, has not boon quite so consistent in his views upon this subject as he would lead us to believe. The Council proposed by the Bill of the late Government was intended to assist and advise the Minister for India. Here, again, I must refer to an opinion of the noble Earl, expressed this very year, in which, if I am not mistaken, the noble Earl, referring to the constitution of the Court of Directors, said that he did not approve of one or two of the nominees of the Crown, yet he was bound to say that the five nominees, in reputation, strength, and weight, were worth the whole of the others.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: I said it was a bad constituency that elected them, and that I made a good one.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Then I do not know why the Government, if they made a good system, should have immediately abandoned it.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: We have not abandoned the elective principle.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Although the noble Earl says that he now thought it
  1978
  necessary to have this element of election. I think there is a great difference between the scheme which the Government has abandoned and that shadowed forth in the Resolutions. According to the noble Earl's original scheme, there were to be three constituencies in operation, while now, I understand, he proposes that there should be only two. That surely is a great departure from a plan which he seems disposed to look upon as having been perfect. I quite agree with the noble Earl that the Crown generally appoints superior men; and we hoped to secure, by means of the nomination of the Crown, subject to the general supervision of Parliament, men of the greatest experience in Indian affairs —men who would feel that their reputation was at stake, and who would be likely to render great service to the country, not only by the advice which they might give, and by the influence which their characters and special knowledge would give, but also by entering their protest against any measure which they might deem to be prejudicial to the interests of our Indian empire. The scheme of the noble Earl would, upon the contrary, I think, prevent the best men from being available for the public service; and I am not quite sure, however respectable may be the names which have been submitted to Parliament upon the part of the Government, as constituting the nominated portion of the Council, that they are, in the opinion of high Indian authorities, the very best that could be selected. With respect to the proposition of the noble Earl, that the Council should be entitled to give their advice to the new Minister for India only when called upon by him, I shall merely any that it appears to me to be one which is very much open to objection. The noble Earl says that he feels very strongly the importance of securing a commercial element in the Council; but, if I mistake not, he has more than once denied the utility of having an English mind in a Council for India, asserting that the mind of England was sufficiently represented by the Minister, who exercised the supreme power, and declaring that, while a man of sense would resort to a Council for India for advice, nobody would think of going for advice to his bankers. On one point I quite agree with the noble Earl. I fully admit that he is not a jobber; on the contrary, I believe him to be a public spirited man, and no one would be more unwilling than he to perpetrate a job

  1979
  Still, I think that if a clever and ingenious man had set himself to devise one scheme which would be more certain than another to lead to jobbery, he could not have devised one more fitted for his purpose than that of creating constituencies in five great towns, for the purpose of electing a certain portion of the Council for India. With regard to immediate legislation, I agree with the noble Earl, and not with my noble Friend behind me (Earl Grey); for it is of the greatest importance that, after it has been announced in India that the Queen wishes to assume the government of India in her own name, it should not go forth that her intention had been frustrated by her own subjects. That would be a most fatal— a most damaging step. The Queen's name was never of greater weight in India than at the present moment; and although, undoubtedly, many difficulties will arise in the re-organization of the empire, nothing can be more fatal than delay in legislation, or the permanent continuance of the pre-sent Indian Government.
  LORD MONTEAGLEobserved, that the course adopted by those who had preceded him was more than usually irregular. To raise a discussion with respect to a Bill which had been withdrawn in the House of Commons, and on Resolutions which had not yet been laid before their Lordships, was a mode of discussion which it was extremely inconvenient to pursue. But there were other considerations which ought not to be overlooked. They were approaching the consideration of this great question perfectly unprepared for their high functions, without inquiry, and without authority, save what they could collect from the literature of the day, or from casual conversation among themselves. No official correspondence, no papers were laid before them, and if they determined to deal with the subject thus hastily and crudely brought before them, the result would not be beneficial to the nation or creditable to Parliament. If the House undertook the consideration of this question, still more its solution, in this state of imperfect knowledge, they would find themselves in the position of being consenting parties, more or less willing, to the very course which had been so eloquently deprecated that evening. Upon former occasions — in 1813, 1833, and 1853 — Parliament did not venture to approach this great subject without a deliberate examination of facts, without taking the evidence of witnesses, and
  1980
  collecting the opinions of those who were best qualified by experience to guide the Legislature to a just decision. The noble Earl at the head of the Board of Control (the Earl of Ellenborough) had told them of the impression that would be produced in India by the announcement of the intended change in the form of government of that country. Without any disparagement of the high authority of the noble Earl, he (Lord Monteagle) wished to hear the opinions of others also who were competent to speak upon this important subject. The House did not know what was the opinion of the Governor General, nor had they the aid of the judgments of many eminent men who were conversant with the subject in all its details. It was also much to be lamented that Lord Dalhousie was prevented by ill-health from attending their debates and giving them the assistance of his judgment and experience upon a matter of this vital importance. It should be noted, that not only were they at present in a worse position from want of information than they were upon any former occasion, but that the step which Parliament was now asked to take was infinitely more important and more difficult than any they had ever previously adopted in reference to India; and he must say they were called upon to take it without having had time or opportunity of giving it the consideration to which it was pre-eminently entitled. To what would this lead Parliament? In all probability the question would drag on in the other House to the close of the Session. It would reach their Lordships, when it could not be effectually discussed; and then it would be hastily concluded, without dignity, honour, or credit to the Parliament of England. We had formerly acted with more prudence and discretion. Yet, what was the opening of the trade of India in 1813, or the abolition of the China monopoly in 1833, or even the constitutional change effected in 1853, compared with the mighty revolution which they were now called upon to sanction? Nor were these our sole dangers. He would just remind the House of one or two important facts. The advocates of the East India Company had, with great truth, called our attention to the important fact, that whatever might be the defects of the double Government, as it was called, the interposition of the Company had at least prevented the introduction of party spirit into Indian debates. From

  1981
  that danger we had been free since the time of Mr. Fox's India Bill. But could we hope for such a spirit of calm impartiality at the present time? He would put it to their Lordships whether there was any chance of India being regarded at present as neutral ground? Was any one sanguine enough to believe that, under the particular circumstances of the present time, and at a moment of party struggle, it would be the India Bill that would really be discussed in Parliament? We might be formally summoned to a second reading of that Bill, but the real subject of the Vote would be who should govern England. They all knew the legislative question would sink into a mere shadow in comparison with the political interest of conflicting parties. This rendered the present the most difficult solution of the Indian question ever yet presented to Parliament. Looking at the question from every point of view, the present moment was the most inopportune for legislating upon so difficult and important a subject. Let not the House be led astray by exaggerated representations of the dangers of postponement. There are greater risks on the other side of the question. The dangers of passing a bad law would be permanent, but the dangers of postponement, if any, would be merely temporary. The noble Earl the President of the Board of Control himself stated, before any Indian Bill was introduced, that he felt the inconvenience of legislating at the present time and under existing circumstances, and that, if undertaken at all, it should embrace but one single enactment. He (Lord Monteagle) entreated the House not to commit itself to a Resolution in favour of immediate legislation. He had little doubt that to postponement they must come at last. Nothing whatever had been said by any Member of the Government which could induce him to think they entertained the opinion that it was expedient or wise to rush into legislation in the present Session. In what state was the question. Had it as yet made any progress? No, because the Government and the Opposition were equally in doubt as to the expediency of legislating at the present. The subject was beset with difficulty, even in its first and simplest principles. Even on the point which seemed to promise the nearest approach to unanimity, the governing India in the name of the Queen, great differences would be found to exist. When Lord Hardinge was examined before a Committee
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  on his return from India, with all his experience fresh upon him, and with the authority he justly possessed both individually and officially, he told the House of Commons that he anticipated very considerable risk and inconvenience from bringing the Government of India and the Crown into closer relationship. But every day proves how much we stand in need of further and more accurate information respecting India. If their Lordships had been discussing the Indian mutiny not now but at the assembling of Parliament, in what a different spirit would they have approached its consideration. How many reports wore circulated and believed which influenced their minds and opinions in reference to the question of the Arms Act, and to other measures in which Lord Canning had been concerned! How many there were disposed to censure what we now admire and command! How often were men biased by what they had heard of the crimes and atrocities of the Bengal army! Were their Lordships' now disposed to believe in the truth of many of those statements as credulously as they were six months ago? They knew well that the conclusion to which their better-informed reason would bring them at the present time would be very different from that to which they were formerly led. Upon all the grounds he had stated then, he submitted to their Lordships that the perils we should incur by inadvertent and inconsiderate legislation must be infinitely greater than any that could spring from postponement, and to that conclusion be trusted their Lordships and the other House would also come. Bills and Resolutions developed themselves in countless varieties of clauses and Amendments, and he earnestly hoped that by the ingenuity, knowledge, and talents of those who proposed them, Parliament might be compelled, from a sense of duty, to give them their deliberate attention; and then, with still greater fervour, he hoped that the result of their deliberations might add to a consciousness of the perils of hasty legislation, a conviction of the impossibility of legislating at all at a moment of political strife and excitement like the present.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEthought that no course could be more unwise or unjust, or more injurious to the country, than the postponement of legislation on the subject. His noble Friend (Lord Monteagle) said that they needed further inquiry; but it should be borne in

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  mind that the regulation of the Home Government was merely a preliminary step, and they could not proceed to consider the reorganization of India until that was removed which stood in the way of all improvement—the Board of Directors. He denied that it was a senseless cry that had been raised to alter the government of India; for it was a cry founded on the fact, that India had hitherto been shamefully neglected, that her resources had been left undeveloped, and that the British public would he unable to realize the advantages they ought to derive from that magnificent possession so long as its government was confided to the East India Company. The matter must be settled without delay, for the commercial public of England would no longer allow the introduction into India of British capital, British manufactures, and British settlers, to be longer impeded by the policy of the East India Company. They were now arriving at what they might fairly hope to be the beginning of the end. The Indian Government would be obliged to consider a new system of laws and a new military organization, and unless some measure was passed settling the Home Government the desired improvements would never be introduced, for they were not to be expected from those who had brought about the present state of things in India. He maintained that the India Bill of the late Government was a rational Bill, for it provided as a Council a body of men able to advise and aid the Minister for India. He had proposed about twelve months ago to alter the present system, and if his suggestion had been then adopted it would not have been a moment too soon, and he trusted that now no further delay would take place in effecting that object.
  Motion agreed to.
  House adjourned at half-past Ten o'clock, till To-morrow, half- past Ten o'clock.