Lords Sitting of 17 March 1857

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2ª Customs' Duties; Racehorse Duty Act Amendment; Cinque Ports Act Amendment; Pauper Maintenance.
3a Commissioners of Supply (Scotland) Act, 1856, Amendment.

CRIMINAL BREACHES OF TRUST.

  OBSERVATION.
  LORD ST. LEONARDSsaid, he presumed that it was the intention of the Government to bring in next Session a Bill to render in certain cases breaches of trust by executors and trustees criminal acts. He had no doubt that that Bill would meet
  2382
  with very general acceptance. Great care, however, should be taken not to subject to criminal punishment such executors and trustees—whose office was merely gratuitous—as acted innocently, although erroneously. He regretted to see that the office of trustee and executor had been made a sort of business. Two Bills had been introduced into Parliament to enable the South Sea Company and another company to carry on, on a gigantic scale, the trade of executing the trusts of every estate in the kingdom. The project of the former company was a failure, but the latter company had commenced business on the limited liability principle. He could not help feeling that a great number of trustees and executors would be compelled to procure the aid of that company in the execution of the trusts which had been reposed in them by their testators; but nothing could be more dangerous to the best interests of society than the perversion of the office of trustee and executor into a mere trade. His main object in adverting to this subject was to urge upon the Government the necessity of accompanying their promised Bill to render criminal certain breaches of trust by another measure for the protection of such trustees as might have honourably and innocently, although erroneously, acted in the execution of their office. He regretted that at present the courts of equity punished with extreme harshness trustees and executors even when it was proved that they ought not to be regarded as answerable for the breaches of trust preferred against them; and he therefore hoped that in the ensuing recess his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack would consider the subject with the view of measures being brought in next Session not only for the punishment of criminals defaulting, but also for the protection of innocent, though misled, trustees.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that the noble and learned Lord was right in supposing that Government intended to bring in the Bill next Session on the subject of criminal breaches of trust, which would, if circumstances had permitted, have been introduced in the present Session. It was difficult to define what constituted a criminal breach of trust; but what had been done was to extend that denomination to certain defined breaches of trust, wilfully committed by the trustee for his own benefit. He did not mean to say that cases equally criminal might not

  2383
  be left untouched because of the impossibility of giving a definition to include them. With respect to the hardship that might affect innocent trustees for not having discharged their duty when they wished to do so, he feared that was a difficulty which it was impossible for the Legislature to meet.
  LORD ST. LEONARDSthought that the proposed Bill should be extended to any society taking on itself the office of trustee and executor.

THE HOSTILITIES IN CHINA.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  THE EARL OF HARDWICKEwished to press on the noble Lord the Minister for War that the despatches from the commanders in the Chinese waters relating to naval and military operations should be made public, as it was customary to publish the despatches from commanders in chief with respect to naval actions fought. To-day, as usual, he had seen accounts from the correspondent of The Times, and also accounts in other papers, giving the whole history of the operations which had taken place, and therefore he thought it not unfair to ask the Government whether those accounts contained a true story—because, to use a vulgar phrase, we had been "licked" if the published news were true. He put the question to the Government, not from any feeling of joy or exultation at an event of that kind, but for the purpose of ascertaining whether those officers in whom the Government had put so much confidence, whom they considered able and well informed on the character and power of the Chinese nation, and whom they were about to support with all the strength of the State, were really fit to conduct undertakings of this kind—whether they were sufficiently acquainted with the nature of the Chinese waters and properly appreciated the events which were likely to occur, and whether they deserved to be trusted to the extent to which they were trusted? The Duke of Wellington once observed of a distinguished individual, that he was a very clever man, but never saw to the end of a campaign; and it certainly appeared to him that Sir John Bowring had not shown that prescient knowledge with respect to the character and power of the Chinese nation which he was supposed to possess. He pressed the Government for the production of these despatches because, if the published statements
  2384
  were untrue, it would be a great satisfaction to their Lordships to know so; and if on the other hand they were true, their Lordships ought to be satisfied, or rather dissatisfied, by being made acquainted with the fact that those officers, who were so much trusted by the Government, had neither the ability nor foresight to conduct operations of the magnitude and nature required.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he understood that his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had stated the other evening that there was no objection to the production of the despatches desired by the noble Earl. He would make it his duty to inquire why they had not yet been produced. With respect to what had fallen from the noble Earl respecting the naval officers in the Chinese waters—
  THE EARL OF HARDWICKEwas understood to say that it was to Sir John Bowring that he had referred.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he really did think that Sir John Bowring had been made to bear so much that it was not necessary to throw on his shoulders responsibility for inefficiency and want of judgment in conducting naval operations, particularly as it appeared from the papers before Parliament that the instructions first given by Sir John Bowring were given with the full concurrence of Admiral Seymour and Consul Parkes. For the course pursued there were precedents in the China Seas, for on two previous occasions the British authorities there did, with only two vessels, what had been done now, and then the mandarins complied with the demands made. He denied, therefore, that the Admiral and Sir John Bowring were chargeable with want of judgment in commencing the operations with the force at their disposal.
  EARL GREYsaid, he believed that every one of these expeditions, made with a small force against a nation so numerous as the Chinese, acquainted to a certain extent with the implements and materials of warfare, and daily improving in their knowledge of them, always had the effect of teaching them something more, and led to the danger of collisions being repeated. This was one of many other considerations which the Duke of Wellington felt strongly when he (Earl Grey) sent out the orders in 1847 with the noble Duke's concurrence. It was the opinion of the Cabinet of that day, not only that no subordinate authority should decide whether cause for offensive

  2385
  war had arisen or not; but that, if cause had really arisen, it was the height of rashness and imprudence, without such preparation and means as would make insistence hopeless, to attempt hostilities. It was only by acting on such a principle that it was likely that bloodshed would be prevented on one side, and, on the other, that the risk of danger and discredit would be averted from this country. He asked whether the events which were now stated to have taken place did not afford a signal proof of the justice of this view of the question? What had happened? Admitting, for argument's sake, the war to be just and politic—though he thought otherwise—yet it had been begun with inefficient means, so that, after burning 7,000 houses in a defenceless town, and after committing acts of violence and cruelty—for so he must call them—on a defenceless population, the British forces were now reduced to a state of ignominious defence, waiting for reinforcements in order to enable further proceedings to be adopted. This was placing the British nation in a position not at all creditable, and it arose from the sanction which had been given to the adoption of a course directly opposite to that which had been adopted by successive Secretaries of State, and renewed so recently as 1853 by the Duke of Newcastle.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHobserved, that there was no charge against the Admiral. The charge against Sir John Bowring, the friend of the noble Earl the President of the Council, was that he had entered upon this war without foreseeing the probable results of the opposition that he would encounter. The excuse of the noble Earl was that other mandarins had been beaten by a smaller force—as if all mandarins, because they were alike in dress, had the same understanding. Sir John Bowring ought to have known that all depended upon the individual character of the man who had the disposal of the Chinese military and naval forces. Sir John Bowring knew the character of Commissioner Yeh, and he must have known the weakness of character of the mandarin with whom Sir John Davis had to deal, and the course he should have pursued was precisely the reverse of that pursued by the former Governor.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, that the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough) had framed his argument upon the knowledge of the events to which he had referred,
  2386
  while Sir John Bowring had, of course, to form his judgment before the events occurred. His noble Friend (Earl Grey) had certainly sent instructions to General D' Aguilar not to repeat an attempt with an insufficient force; but if he was not mistaken his noble Friend had previously approved an attempt which had happened to be successful, although success had resulted from the very rashness of the undertaking. At the same time, he did not think he was illogical in saying that it was not fair to put on Sir John Bowring exclusively the odium, if any odium existed, of having miscalculated the strength of the military and naval forces at his disposal. The first duty of Sir John Bowring was to consult the Admiral, and to act upon the advice he received from him as to the disposition of the forces; and whatever ridicule might attach to him for saying so, he was of opinion that if a certain operation, with a very inferior force, had been successful under certain circumstances, some encouragement was thereby afforded to create a belief that a similar proceeding with a stronger force would be successful. He had the honour of the acquaintance of Sir John Bowring, and he certainly would not shrink from considering him as his friend at a moment when he was subject to unjust and intemperate attacks.
  EARL GREY: His noble Friend had said he (Earl Grey) had approved a similar attempt made by General D' Aguilar. If his noble Friend would read that despatch he would find that it was cautiously worded so as to approve the manner in which a certain enterprise was effected. He was careful to express no opinion upon the prudence of the attempt itself, but he thought the troops were entitled to praise for the gallant manner in which they had conducted the operation. His opinion of the prudence of the measure was to be collected from the peremptory terms in which a repetition of any such attempt without a previous reference to the Home Government was positively prohibited.
  THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, that although in a question of military and naval tactics the Admiral and General would be the fittest judges, yet the question here turned upon very different considerations. The Admiral had only recently arrived upon the station, and he knew nothing, and could know nothing, whatever of the character, the disposition, and means of resistance which might be afforded by an

  2387
  exasperated population. Sir John Bowring, on the contrary, had been a resident at Canton for many years, and it was but becoming and necessary in all matters involving the feelings and character of those people that the Admiral should refer and defer to the advice and experience of Sir John Bowring. Now, upon two points Sir John Bowring had been proved to have made a gross miscalculation. Repeatedly, in the course of this correspondence, he informed the Secretary of State that it was only necessary when this question of entering into the city of Canton was mooted that we should make a demonstration, that such a demonstration would be at once successful, and that there was not the slightest reason for apprehending any disaster, the responsibility of which he expressed himself ready to take upon himself if he could only obtain the desired permission to make the attempt. Successive Secretaries of State had refused to give him leave, but in defiance of them he had endeavoured to carry out his own views, and he could not now escape from the responsibility. Again, in the course of the correspondence that had been laid on the table, Sir John Bowring had repeatedly asserted that the only objection to his entering the city was on the part of the mandarins, and that the Chinese population had no objection to it. If that were so at the commencement of these proceedings, there was the more reason to complain of the conduct of Sir John Bowring in having converted a population who were friendly into the most bitter and resentful enemies that this country ever had. Those were the charges against Sir John Bowring; and without considering the means at his disposal, and miscalculating the opposition he was likely to meet with, and of which the Admiral could know nothing, he had taken upon himself the responsibility of disobeying his positive instructions, and had plunged the country into a war the end and cost of which no man could foretell.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, there are now two distinct charges against Sir John Bowring. Their Lordships must see the inconvenience of a debate which thus turned upon the character of an absent authority. The noble Earl who first rose complained that our military operations had ended in defeat, and that the Admiral had been obliged to assume a defensive position.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHacknowledged that the debate was irregular,
  2388
  but he would not detain their Lordships more than a moment. He believed that Sir John Bowring held the position of commander in chief. He was not merely the Governor of Hong Kong, but all the military and naval forces were under his direction. No doubt it was his duty to communicate with the Admiral and General with regard to any military and naval operations; but, having heard the opinion of those officers, Sir John Bowring became responsible, not merely for what he ordered, but for what he permitted. He must exercise his own judgment; and it was not fair to go to a military or a naval man to divide the responsibility with him. They could make but one answer, and Sir John Bowring must stand between them and the difficulty in which they were placed.
  LORD PANMUREsaid, that no doubt Sir John Bowring, like the Governor General of Canada, was the commander in chief of the forces. But what was the meaning of that? The meaning was, that if warlike operations were to be undertaken he was to decide what was to be done; but, as to the manner and the mode in which the operations were to be conducted, he should like to know how it could occur to any man of sense that Sir John Bowring at Hong Kong could direct the operations at Canton? He did not wish to put upon Admiral Seymour any responsibility that ought to fall upon Sir John Bowring, but he must say that in carrying out the details of operations which had been arranged in a council of war, where the advice of Admiral Seymour had been called in, to throw the responsibility of those operations entirely upon Sir John Bowring's shoulders was scarcely fair. Admiral Seymour found himself in a narrow river with ships drawing a considerable draught of water, and assailed by ships that drew very little water, which were coming out both above and below him; and to say that, because Admiral Seymour had quitted one position to take up a stronger position, the British force had been "licked," was quite contrary to the fact. Admiral Seymour had not been beaten. He had taken up a position necessary for the defence of his fleet. He had destroyed all the defences of the Chinese in those waters, and in neither of the positions that he had taken up had he shown any want of ability in guarding his ships from the attempts of the enemy to set them on fire. With reference to the position of affairs in the Canton river, one

  2389
  fact ought to be known to their Lordships which was mentioned by Admiral Seymour in a letter written after his public despatch was sent off; it was to the effect that the Emperor had written to the Chinese officers at the four ports, directing them to remain on terms of peaceful and amicable relations with the English, notwithstanding what had happened at Canton.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, the statement he made the other day was founded on what appeared in the public papers—namely, that a fire-boat had blown up under the bows of one of Her Majesty's vessels. He stated that in his opinion no fire-boat ought to be allowed to come close enough for such an event to occur. The noble Earl was quite wrong in supposing a mere rowing guard would keep off fire-boats, and if he would take the trouble to read the despatches written during the last war, under the direction of Sir George Cockburn and the Duke of Wellington, he would find there were more effectual means than that for protecting the fleet against fire-boats. It ought to be distinctly understood that there was no charge against Sir Michael Seymour for the manner in which he had directed the force at his disposal. The charge was against Sir John Bowring for having undertaken the operations at all.
  THE MARQUESS OF BREADALBANEdefended, upon high authority, the operations undertaken by Sir John Bowring and Sir Michael Seymour.
  LORD COLCHESTERcontended that Sir Michael Seymour had acted wrongly under pressure put upon him by Sir John Bowring, and that the latter only was to blame.

  TICKET-OF-LEAVE MEN.—QUESTION.
  VISCOUNT DUNGANNON VISCOUNT DUNGANNON rose to ask the Lord Privy Seal whether the system of granting tickets of leave was or would be for the present suspended, until some means were found for disposing of them, by transportation or otherwise? He hoped that when the new Parliament assembled some measure would be produced with this object. There had been a Bill pending, which had been brought in by the Government, but which, with many other measures, had been lost for the present, by the sudden dissolution now intended. The present system was most fearful in its operation, tending to increase crime to a
  2390
  terrible extent, and dangerous to the peaceable part of the community. The public, therefore, had some claim for a satisfactory explanation on the subject before the close of the Session.
  THE EARL OF HARROWBYsaid, it was not intended to suspend the operation of the ticket-of-leave system as to the small number of convicts to whom it could now be applied.
  VISCOUNT DUNGANNON: What is the number?
  THE EARL OF HARROWBYcould not tell the exact number, but it was very small. With regard to the future, the Government intended to re-introduce the Bill, recently withdrawn, for consideration in the new Parliament.

CHINA.

  PAY OF TROOPS, &c.—QUESTION.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEinquired of the Secretary of State for War what pay and allowances the officers and soldiers about to be sent to China were to receive; and whether he would lay upon the table of the House an estimate or return showing the comparative cost of the British regiments serving in the Persian Gulf and upon the coast of China? He (the Marquess of Clanricarde) understood that the troops about to serve in China were not likely to receive such high pay as the troops serving in the Persian Gulf; and he could not understand upon what ground the distinction was to be made, seeing that the troops about to proceed to China were embarking upon an enterprise fraught with danger to their lives and health, and one in which there would be as little excitement or hope of glory as any in which British troops could be employed. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough), the other night, had alluded to the camp followers in India. He (the Marquess of Clanricarde) confessed he was ignorant of the necessity of attaching camp followers to the English troops on their arrival in China; but he had no doubt such necessity existed, inasmuch as their services appeared always to have been in requisition. Be that as it might, he should be glad to hear from his noble Friend the Secretary of State for War a reply to the question he had put to him.
  LORD PANMURE: My noble Friend is quite right in one respect—there is a difference between the pay of the troops serving in the Persian expedition and that

  2391
  of the troops about to be sent out in the expedition to China. The troops serving in the Persian expedition are drawn from the Indian establishment, and have been receiving the regular pay and allowances assigned to troops belonging to the East India Company; but the troops going from this country to China are in a different position. They are now going on an expedition from this country, which is to be paid for out of the funds of this country, and they will not be put on the same pay and allowances as the East India Company assigns to our troops serving within their territories. The troops will receive the usual pay, and every precaution besides will be taken that their rations—which will be above what are called the ordinary rations in time of war—are prepared and served with a view to the maintenance of their health; but there will be no increase of pay to the troops absolutely. With reference, however, to the officers, there is by the regulations an allowance called an "extraordinary field allowance," which every officer receives in advance, preparatory to taking the field. The officers will receive six months of this extraordinary field allowance, which will enable them to prepare for taking the field. But in Hong Kong there is a colonial allowance, as at the Mauritius and Ceylon, paid to the troops serving in that colony, and on arriving at Hong Kong that will be made good to the troops going out on this expedition, so as to place them in the same position as the troops now serving at Hong Kong. These are our intentions with regard to the troops about to serve in the Chinese expedition, and I shall have no objection to lay upon the table a return of the nature for which the noble Marquess has asked. I have only to add that, while this expedition will be conducted with a due regard to economy, every attention will be at the same time paid to the health of the troops and to their maintenance in a state of efficiency; and, for that purpose, the Government has resolved that, as the troops will land in China when the hot weather will prevail, an adequate number of camp followers from India shall be attached to them, and General Ashburnham has been instructed to apply his Indian experience in apportioning those camp followers among the troops on their arrival at Hong Kong. In addition to that, arrangements will be made at Penang for conveying the sick by means of steam vessels
  2392
  between Hong Kong and that station; and I trust that every precaution will be taken to prevent that sacrifice of life from disease which unfortunately happened among the troops during the former expedition to China.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: The noble Lord is mistaken in supposing there is any difference in the pay of the privates—the only difference is in the allowance to the officers on the East India Establishment. With respect to the camp followers, the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Clanricarde) will, perhaps, by this time be satisfied of the necessity of attaching them to the expedition. Among those camp followers there are people called cooks, who, according to our notions, are certainly a necessary class of persons, and water-carriers who may be said to be invaluable. I should observe, also, that camp followers contribute considerably to the efficiency of a regiment, inasmuch as all these duties must be performed by the soldiers if not performed by them. From what fell from the noble Baron, I understand that, with true English feeling, he is about to supply the troops going to China with more to eat. Now, from considerable experience of hot climates, I can assure him that that is the very worst thing he can do; that in such climates the less a man eats the better, and that what the noble Baron proposes will be the greatest mistake he ever committed. I can assure the noble Baron that, if he ever went to India, it would be quite impossible for him to take that indulgence in the way of living which I dare say he takes now without the slightest harm. Passing from this, it appears to me that the Government are pursuing a course which is within the strict letter of the regulations; but, at the same time, I venture to represent that these officers will have to incur a great expense in fitting themselves out for this war. They will be required to prepare not for garrison duty only, but for actual warfare—a warfare, too, in which many things will be necessary which may be dispensed with in a European contest. If, therefore, any indulgence can be extended to them consistent with the interests of the service, and not leading to the establishment of an inconvenient precedent, it would be most desirable that such indulgence should be granted. Before sitting down I wish to call the attention of the noble Earl the President of the Council to an expression

  2393
  which fell from him last night with reference rather to France than to China, and which surely must have escaped him inadvertently. The noble Earl stated that the relations between this country and France were never of a more friendly character, and he expressed great satisfaction that French troops would again co-operate with our own in China. Now, I imagine the word "troops" must have been used inaccurately, and that the noble Earl only alluded to a marine force. But, my Lords, I most deeply regret that there is to be any co-operation whatever. We know nothing of any quarrel which the Emperor of the French has with the Emperor of China. We know that we have none with the Emperor of China. Our quarrel is at present confined to the Cantonese and to Commissioner Yeh; and nothing could be so inconvenient, so inconsistent with justice and with policy, as to extend that quarrel to the Emperor of China, and to light up a war in all the other ports as well as in that of Canton. My Lords, I deprecate the intervention of France at this moment. Why should she take advantage of the difficulty in which we are placing China in order to obtain for herself terms to which she is not entitled? There is no pretence for such intervention, and I can hardly imagine expressions which I should think too strong to apply to the conduct of our Government if we were to take advantage of a disposition on the part of France thus to interfere for her own purposes in order to obtain the assistance (of most questionable value) which would be afforded by the presence of a French squadron in the Chinese waters. We desire peace; we desire the re-establishment of friendly relations; we do not desire to extort new terms from the Emperor of China; we desire only to stand where we were, and to relieve ourselves from the difficulties in which Governor Bowring has plunged us. There is one other point, upon which I feel very strongly, and upon which I must venture to offer what can only be a suggestion to Her Majesty's Government, because I have not that knowledge of the facts which they possess, and which may lead them, possibly, to a different conclusion. I regret the accidental absence of the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, because what I am about to say relates perhaps more particularly to his department. We have now a force at Bushire which is amply sufficient for the protection of that place. A force of about the same
  2394
  strength has been despatched from Bombay, and has not yet arrived. Those troops, I imagine, were not intended to strengthen the garrison in Bushire, already sufficient, but to conduct some new operation. Whatever was the course of proceeding determined on, the force in question is obviously not required at Bushire. There, as I understood the noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon), no movement was to take place on either side until the ratification of the treaty. That new force therefore cannot move at Bushire, and can do nothing whatever. Now, I beg to suggest to the Government that they should instantly send positive orders to Bushire to despatch one European regiment and two native regiments of that force to China. The presence of those troops may be absolutely required for the protection of Singapore and Hong Kong. I feel satisfied that without the assistance of Native troops, the efforts, however gallant they may be, if the European troops we are sending will be of little or no avail, and that great risk will be encountered with little chance of success. These orders—absolute orders, leaving no discretion whatever to the officer in command, for I feel perfectly satisfied that if the least discretion were left to him he would keep the troops with him—would arrive at Bushire hence, I trust, in a month, and in a month from that time these troops would be at Singapore and Hong Kong. On the other hand the troops we are now sending out will not arrive in China for three months and a half, and the gain in these six weeks may be invaluable for the protection of our interests. There may be circumstances with which I am unacquainted which may render inexpedient this movement. I venture only to suggest it to the Government as a measure which, in my opinion, should be instantly adopted.
  LORD PANMURE: I have to thank the noble Earl for his suggestion. In all these matters he has given many valuable hints, some of which I have availed myself of, and I am sure that the counsel he tenders is offered with no other desire than that of being useful. With reference to the rations of the troops, alluded to by the noble Earl, I will just state that the object is not to increase the quantity served out to the troops to eat and drink, but to diversify their food so as to conduce more completely to their health and efficiency.
  EARL GREY: I confess that I have listened with some alarm to the conversation which has taken place this evening. When

  2395
  first it was announced that this force was to be sent out we were told that it was to protect the lives and property of British subjects in China. It now appears that a very large force is going to be sent, and that this force (if I correctly understand what has been said) is to be equipped in a manner which shall enable them to undertake operations of some importance on shore. Now, I do hope and trust we are not going to embark in that most dangerous and fatal measure—an invasion of the great empire of China. I hope that Her Majesty's Government, in pursuing the measures which they are now taking, have some clear and definite object before them—because, as far as we are yet informed, no such object appears to be in view. After all, my Lords, what do we want with China? Our interest in China is simply to carry on our trade. If we are to embark in a war, every blow which we inflict on China will recoil upon ourselves. We cannot destroy property in China, we cannot burn towns there and lay waste, or cause others to lay waste, any portion of territory, without, by such a destruction of Chinese property, rendering them worse customers of ours and less able to supply us with the goods we want from them. We were told at first that British lives and British property only were to be protected. For my own part, I confess that, with a very large naval force, and a certain amount of military force also, I cannot conceive how British property can be in any danger. Hong Kong is an island very easily defended, for the Chinese are totally incapable of competing with us at sea; Singapore is in the same position; and, at the four ports, I trust that, if prudential measures are adopted, anything like a struggle will be avoided. Of this, however, I am quite certain, that if we are to attempt anything like an invasion of China, we are at the beginning of a system which, once entered upon, it will be very difficult to put a stop to, and which will be most fatal to the true interests of this country.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I really think that in my noble Friend's very earnest and conscientious wish to preserve peace he sometimes overlooks the most obvious means of arriving at that end. I cannot imagine any of your Lordships will believe that the Plenipotentiary whom Her Majesty's Government have determined to send out to re-establish satisfactory relations between the two countries is less likely to accomplish that object if backed up by a considerable
  2396
  naval and military force. As to my affording any intimation with regard to the instructions which will be given to the commanders of this force, I am sure my noble Friend will, upon reflection, be the last to press me to make any such disclosure.
  House adjourned at half-past Six o'clock, till To-morrow, Twelve o'clock.