HL Deb 12 March 1857 vol 144 cc2196-209
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH,

in rising to move an Address for certain Returns relative to the execution by the British Authorities of the Supplemental Treaty with China, said it appeared to him that when we are so strict with the Chinese Government as to the execution of the treaty obligations on their part, it behaved us to look to our own performance of it, and to see if we have been strictly correct in our adherence to the obligations which the treaty imposed on us. Those obligations were imposed upon us with a view of preventing illicit trade. There were three Articles which bore upon it. The 12th Article declared, that as a fair and regular tariff was established, smuggling would cease. Now, as regarded goods to which that Article could be applied, no doubt it was reasonable to expect that, when a fair and reasonable tariff was established, smuggling should cease—that is to say, as to goods on which duties were levied. But the Article could not reasonably apply to goods of which the import was prohibited, and upon which, therefore, no duties were imposed. That was the case with opium. The Article appeared to have been drawn under the idea that the import of opium into China would be permitted, and that duties would be imposed upon it; but that was not the case. The Article ran thus— The most peremptory proclamation to all English merchants has been already issued on this subject by the British Plenipotentiary, who will also instruct the different consuls to strictly watch over and carefully scrutinize the conduct of all persons, being British subjects, trading under his superintendence. In any possible instance of smuggling transactions coming to the consul's knowledge, he will instantly apprize the Chinese authorities of the fact. It was desirable that the country should know whether the consuls had so "strictly watched over and carefully scrutinized" the conduct of persons trading under their supervision, and what were the cases (if any) in which the consuls had "apprised the Chinese authorities of instances of smuggling which had come to their knowledge." The 14th Article provided that— An English officer will be appointed at Hong Kong, one part of whose duty will be to examine the registers and passes of all Chinese vessels that may repair to that port to buy or sell goods; and should such officer at any time find that any Chinese merchant vessel has not a pass, or register, from one of the five ports, she is to be considered as an unauthorized or smuggling vessel, and is not to be allowed to trade, whilst a report of the circumstance is to be made to the Chinese authorities. It was plain what the object of this Article was, for it was said at the conclusion— By this it is to be hoped that piracy and illegal traffic will be prevented. It was, therefore, material that Parliament should understand whether we, on our part, had performed the obligations imposed by that Article. Then the 16th Article was— It is agreed that the Custom House officers at the five ports shall make a monthly return to Canton, of the passes granted to vessels proceeding to Hong Kong, together with the nature of their cargoes; and a copy of these returns will be embodied in one return, and communicated once a month to the proper English officer at Hong Kong. The said English officer will, on his part, make a similar return or communication to the Chinese authorities at Canton, showing the names of Chinese vessels arrived at Hong Kong, or departed from that port, with the nature of their cargoes; and the Canton authorities will apprize the Custom Houses at the five ports. The same object was declared at the end, in the expression of the same hope— In order that by these arrangements and precautions, all clandestine and illegal trade, under the cover of passes, may be averted. It was, therefore, desirable that we should ascertain whether under this Article our officers, appointed specially under this treaty at Hong Kong to carry this treaty into effect, had performed the duty which the Article of the treaty imposed. Their Lordships would, however, have observed that the object of the Article was to prevent all illegal trade under cover of passes. But observe in what terms our Plenipotentiary, Sir John Bowring, spoke of the treaty in a Report to the Secretary for the Colonies, which had been referred to in the recent debate— I beg to submit some observations which have been submitted to me by the Colonial Treasurer, and which are well worthy of attention; for while, on the one hand, it is no doubt desirable that the privilege of hoisting the British flag should not be conceded without proper securities, it is very desirable that Chinamen settled in this colony should be able to appreciate the advantages of their position in the substantial benefits it confers. And what was it which the Colonial Treasurer had said which Sir John Bowring submitted as "well worthy of consideration"? If anything has been, and will be, pre-eminently beneficial to this colony, it is that very system of granting colonial registers, particularly to respectable Chinese settled here, or, as the ordinance says, 'Chinese Crown lessees, entitled to hold colonial registers,' since it has already added to, and still tends to increase, the coasting trade in goods, the manufacture of Great Britain, or the produce of India—such as cotton, opium, &c. These "passes" are required to be granted at the five ports to Chinese vessels, and to be investigated by the British authorities at Hong Kong, under treaties for the prevention of illegal trade. And the registers, as appeared by the report of the Colonial Treasurer, had the effect—and it was clear from the report of the Plenipotentiary that it had the object—of encouraging the illicit trade in opium. Observe, that opium was not to be treated as merely one of the articles of traffic; it was the great article of traffic. Without it our export trade to China from this country or its dependencies would not, in any material degree, have increased. It was through the enormous increase of the trade in opium that we were able to derive such a great export trade. He did not wish the returns to extend over more than five or six years; but that he would leave to the convenience of his noble Friend. As it appeared their Lordships were not to have many more opportunities for assembling before the "penal dissolution," he wished to say a few words as to the position in which we now stood as to the expedition to China. It was now known that it was the intention of the Government to send from this country to China an expedition which (as far as could be ascertained) was to consist of some vessels of war with four regiments of infantry and four batteries of artillery. Now, when the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs received, on the 3rd of January, the despatch which gave him an account of the entry of the British troops into Canton, the pillage of Commissioner Yeh's palace, the destruction of the forts, the shelling of the city, the destruction of private and public vessels, he was in possession of facts which should have satisfied his mind that there existed a state of war—at all events, with the authorities and people of the province of Canton—and he knew at the same time that Sir John Bowring had advanced claims, under the Supplemental Treaty of 1843, to which the strongest resistance would be offered by the Chinese authorities. The noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon) could not have expected that the means at the disposal of Sir John Bowring at that tinre would have compelled the Chinese authorities to concede that demand; so that he must have known that we were at the commencement of a long and serious contest. And by the mail of the 10th of January, and not by the mail of the 10th of March, the intentions of the Government should have been communicated to India, and the requisite preparations ordered by way of providing an adequate Native Indian force to support the troops intended to be sent from this country. In military operations time was of the utmost importance, and had the most decisive influence on success. If preparations for the expedition had been made on the receipt of this despatch of the 3rd of January, and if by the mail of the 10th of January orders had been sent to India for the preparation there of an adequate force for the support of the troops sent from home, it might have been possible, with great exertions, for the force to arrive at Singapore in the second week of April, in time for the season most favourable to such operations. But if it was only by the 10th of March that the orders had been sent out to India for the preparation there of an adequate Native force to co-operate with our British troops, those orders could be of no avail. At the time when they would arrive in India there would be no vessels at Madras, and very few, indeed, at Calcutta; they would have sailed for their various destinations, and there would be no means of conveying; troops to any considerable extent. The demand would be for 20,000 tons of shipping, and with that demand it would be impossible to comply. Even if it were possible, and if the vessels ventured to enter the Bay of Bengal, they would be met by the monsoon, which would disable and perhaps destroy the expedition, and if it ever arrived at Hong Kong it would be in a scattered, disordered, and disabled condition; so that any expedition depending on their co-operation must fail. But let their Lordships consider, further, the serious injury to British interests which would result from this delay—to what danger would the British residents at Hong Kong be exposed, in the midst of a vast Chinese population. And consider the great encouragement given to the Chinese by the delay to bring forward that boasted power of England on which, it was to be feared, we were apt too proudly to rely. Let their Lordships again consider the period of the year to which operations would now be postponed—the most unhealthy season of the year, which was so fatal to our army, and almost to our navy, in the late war, and which would now, it was to be feared, again be fatal to us. He (the Earl of Ellenborough) knew not whether the papers which professed to speak with the authority of the Government gave any information which was to be relied on; but if it was true, it was intended to place on board the vessels far more troops than they ought to carry, considering the climate for which they were destined, and the length of the voyage. He knew the consequences by experience of any error on that point. He recollected how the 98th Regiment had been sent out during the last China war in vessels so crowded that when they arrived the entire regiment was in a state unfit for service. Nor could any regiment be so when it landed, after having been detained a long time in a crowded ship. He recollected the period at which the voyage was to be performed. The vessels would pass the Cape in the middle of July, and would be exposed to great risks. He would recommend to the Government to provide for vessels which would be navigating the Chinese seas in the height of summer, not the mere ordinary awnings, but double thick ones, which would keep out both sun and rain, for the heat was intense and the rains heavy. He also recommended greater care for the ventilation of the vessels between decks. Again, he recommended, that as in the present state of feeling among the Chinese it would be idle to expect—except, perhaps, as to a few of the islands—that we should be able to obtain fresh meat—and, if not, the health of the troops would be seriously affected, unless some substitute were provided—care should be taken to procure and to test supplies of preserved meats. In the Rio de la Plata, where there were vast herds of cattle, but a hostile population, it had been found impossible to obtain supplies, and the preserved meats had been found extremely useful. The noble Earl went on to say that he looked with dismay to the probable result of operations by European troops in China without an adequate force of Native troops, for duties under the sun must be performed by the Native troops, and if such duties were forced on European troops the result would be a great degree of inefficiency. The troops could not arrive before the end of June or beginning of July. No ships could remain at the mouth of the Canton rivers after the early part of September; therefore the season of operations north of Canton was so narrow that it would be impracticable to carry them on. But what description of vessels was it proposed to send? They were vessels of great size and deep draught of water: such as might be very well in the Crimea, where troops had simply to be landed at Balaklava, and there left; but if these vessels took troops to Hong Kong, how could they be moved to any other port? It would be impossible to move them in these vessels. Such vessels as the Himalaya, the Shannon, and the Retribution, would be of no use. They could not go up the Canton river; there were shifting shoals; and these large vessels, from their size, would be more difficult to manage than smaller ships. They could never get within reach of the enemy—indeed, as to the mouth of the Pei-ho river, some of them could not come within sight of land; the men, therefore, would have to be shifted to smaller vessels, and put on shore without anything to cover them. He looked with apprehension to the result of the operations under these circumstances. Had orders been sent out to India by the 10th January a fleet of small steamers might have been prepared for the operations, but now none of them could be obtained. It was to be hoped that the noble Lord opposite (Lord Panmure) would take the trouble of reading the orders sent from this country during the last China war, and the despatches sent to England. The noble Lord would acquire information which would be of great use to him. All the despatches of which he (the Earl of Ellenborough) had cognizance were written with the approbation, if not from the dictation of, the Duke of Wellington and Sir George Cockburn, and he had had frequent communication with them as to the mode of conducting operations. Again, at the earliest possible period, orders ought to have been given in India for the preparation of a body of followers to accompany the troops. Without native followers the troops would be useless when they arrived. Not less than 300 followers were required for every regiment in China, so that it would be necessary to provide 1,600 of them. He was not recommending anything which he did not himself observe in conducting the last Chinese war. Followers for all the detachments were prepared, and everything was done which knowledge of India and Eastern service could suggest to make the force efficient. He thought that another matter of very great importance was to take precautions to prevent the action of fire vessels against large ships in confined waters. He knew that in 1841 it was a subject of the greatest anxiety, and that the strongest precautions were taken which the experience of Sir George Cockburn could suggest. When he heard of a fire vessel coming under the bows of one of Her Majesty's ships he thought it absolutely necessary that instructions should be given to the Admiral and officers engaged in the service to take greater precautions than appeared to have been taken. It was not creditable that any fire vessel should have come into such close proximity to one of Her Majesty's ships. It was with regret that he heard the noble Lord at the head of the War Department attempt to defend the destruction of the suburbs of Canton, and it was with great satisfaction that, in looking over the papers connected with the last war, he read a despatch from Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, directing those who had the conduct of operations in no case to burn or destroy a town; declaring that it was to be a war against the Government—not a war against the people. It was said to be the intention of the Government to send a force up the Yang-tse-kiang, and to do exactly what was done in 1842; but the circumstances were altogether altered. We were not at war with the Emperor of China, but with the people of Canton; and, further than that, Nankin was no longer in possession of the Emperor but of the rebels; so that if we took possession of it we added nothing to the embarrassments of the Chinese Government, but should probably assist the Emperor by turning out the rebels. Therefore, in his opinion, nothing could be more contrary to reason than such an expedition. Our operations, whatever they might be, should be confined to Canton, for with Canton only at present had we a cause of war. He heard with very great regret that there was an intention of sending out a great Plenipotentiary—some very important person in the confidence of the Government, who was to go with some person on the part of France, and some person, probably, on the part of the United States—to exact from the Chinese Government some concessions which we had no pretence for demanding. He objected to that, not only because it was most unworthy to take advantage of a supposed period of difficulty to require concessions from the Chinese Government for which there was no pretence, but because he deprecated any conjoint operations and any conjoint negotiations. We had had enough of both. We had seen the inconvenient manner in which conjoint operations affected the character of our arms and the result of our negotiations, and he most earnestly trusted that, whatever the Government might determine on doing, they would do it by themselves; that they would exact only those terms to which they thought, as Englishmen, we were entitled, and that having obtained those terms they would retire from the conflict. The noble Earl concluded by moving— That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Return of the Number of Cases in which the Consuls in China have, under the 12th Article of the Supplementary Treaty of 1843, apprized the Chinese Authorities of any positive Instance of Smuggling Transactions coming to their Knowledge: Also, Copy of any Instruction to the Consuls in China issued by the British Plenipotentiary, under the said 12th Article, directing them to strictly watch over and carefully scrutinize the Conduct of all Persons, being British Subjects, trading under their Superintendence: Also, Copies of any Letters from the said Consuls reporting the Measures adopted by them for carrying out any such Instruction: Also, Copies of any Reports made by any British Officer at Hong Kong, under the 14th Article of the said Supplementary Treaty, to the Chinese Authorities, of any Chinese Vessels repairing to Hong Kong to buy or sell Goods without having a Pass or Register from One of the Five Ports: And also, Copy of any Return or Communication made to the Chinese Authorities at Canton, under the 16th Article of the said Supplementary Treaty, showing the names of Chinese Vessels arrived at Hong Kong, or departed from that Port, with the Nature of their Cargoes.

LORD PANMURE

said he felt it necessary to make a few remarks upon the military part of the question, which had been introduced by the noble Earl. It was impossible to conceal that operations in China at this season of the year were matters which must attract the most serious attention of Her Majesty's Government; but Her Majesty's Government conceived that the state of affairs at Canton was such that not only the honour of England, but the safety of British property and the support of British trade demanded that that position should be brought to as speedy a conclusion as possible. He had no hesitation in saying that the policy of the Government was, in the first instance, to use every endeavour to bring those affairs to a satisfactory conclusion in a peaceful manner, and only to have recourse to force in the last resort. It was quite true that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to send out an officer of high character and position, who could negotiate with the Chinese Government for the renewal of those treaties already existing, but, he lamented to say, never duly observed by the Chinese. It would not be the object of Her Majesty's Government to extort from the Chinese Government, even if we had force enough to do it, any terms which were not just, fair, and reasonable, and such as the justice of the people of this country would approve. But should the Chinese Emperor refuse to grant to our envoy those just and reasonable demands, it was not only the opinion of the Government, but he was certain it was the opinion of the country at large, that the honour and character of the British nation in that great empire demanded that we should not stop until we had succeeded in obtaining them. For that purpose it was intended to send immediately a force to China. The question had been considered whether that force should be sent from India or direct from this country. Under all the circumstances of the case it appeared to him to be more advisable to send troops from this country, and also more economical to operate from this country. They had at the present moment four regiments under orders for relieving and reinforcing the troops in India. Those regiments were completed to the full strength, and were now quite ready to sail. By sending those regiments to China, if upon arriving there the state of affairs should have improved, they would be sent on to their original destination, in which event the expense of their transport would fall upon the East India Company. If, however, circumstances should render necessary the continuance of those troops in China, the expense of their conveyance thither must be borne by the mother country. He had to thank the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) for the valuable suggestions he had offered; and he had the satisfaction of informing him that the transports which were to take out the troops had been so measured and fitted as that no more should be taken on board each ship than could be conveniently and safely accommodated, and every precaution had been taken to insure the comfort of the men, not only during the voyage but after their arrival, as the vessels would be used as barracks until the services of the troops were required on shore, so that the men would not be exposed to the ravages of disease by being quartered in Chinese villages or in tents on land. He also proposed to send out, to arrive long in advance of the troops, the head of the commissariat department, the head of the medical department, and the head of the store department, to make preparations, and secure supplies, that the troops might be supplied with fresh meat, which was so absolutely necessary for their health. Orders had also been given to convey to China a sufficient quantity of salt provisions and preserved meats, of vegetables, flour, biscuit, and everything necessary for the well-being of the troops. There certainly was no intention of directing any demonstration either in the direction of the Pei-ho or against the four friendly ports of China, with which we were not, as the noble Earl had truly observed, in a state of war, and he hoped we never should be so. The whole quarrel was with the Cantonese; and none, he believed, were more anxious to see lowered the pride of the Cantonese than the inhabitants of those four ports, who had hitherto been taunted by them with allowing barbarians to enter within their walls. With regard to what fell from him on a previous evening respecting the destruction of a suburb of Canton, he did not defend such an act in the abstract, but what he did say, and what he repeated, was that he felt certain Admiral Seymour would not have resorted to such a step had it not been necessary for the defence of his position and the security of his fleet. With respect to any intended operations against Canton, he was sure that to decide upon any fixed plan of operations at a time when the conduct of affairs was to be intrusted to an officer in whom all must feel confidence would be premature, if not a work of supererogation. No doubt when the Commissioner arrived out he would survey the whole state of affairs, and his first act would of course be to endeavour to resume negotiations. If he failed in those endeavours he would direct, with a view to bring the Cantonese to reason, all those proceedings of war which would be most likely to secure that end with the least possible amount of bloodshed—such as by cutting off the supplies of the city. To give any particular orders at this distance from the scene of operations, in ignorance of what might be the state of affairs upon the arrival of the Commissioner in China, would be essentially wrong. All that the Government at home could do and would do was to make the force sent out as efficient as possible, and to take every precaution that could be adopted to maintain their health. With regard to the mode of dress and the protection of the men from the heat of the sun, the noble Earl might rest assured every precaution had been and would be taken. More could not be done, and they could only hope that those precautions would, under the Almighty Providence, be found effectual in preserving the troops from the dangers attendant upon the climate.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH

wished to know whether it was intended to carry on operations in China without the assistance of the Native troops of India? If that were so, we should certainly lose one-half our force and fail in our object.

LORD PANMURE

said that, as at present advised, it was the intention of the Government to carry on operations without the aid of the Native troops of India. Considerable difficulty had been experienced upon a former occasion from the admixture of forces. Upon the occasion of the last war in China the British and the Native Indian troops were like buckets in a well—when one was efficient the other was inefficient. During the hot season the Native Indian troops were able to do duty, while the British soldiers failed and died; but directly the cold weather set in the Indian soldiers became utterly useless, while the English recovered their health. In his opinion, however, if we maintained the command of the Canton river there would be no occasion to land the troops until the season in which they could operate with efficiency, at which time Native Indians would be completely useless. The noble Earl had complained of the large size of the vessels in which the troops were to be sent out. It was necessary to send out large vessels, because they would be required in China as barrack accommodation and as a base of operations. Smaller vessels, however, would be on the spot, including 16 gunboats, drawing five or six feet water, and country vessels would be taken up, which, being towed by small steamers, would convey troops to any point where their presence was needed. With respect to the statement that the reinforcements were to be sent out two months too late, all he (Lord Panmure) could say was, that immediately upon intelligence being received of the necessity for additional troops orders were sent to the Mauritius, and he had no doubt that troops from that place were already at Hong Kong.

EARL GREY

remarked that, as far as he could perceive, no orders were given for the despatch of a large force to China from this country until after the arrival of the last mail, about a fortnight since.

LORD PANMURE

One regiment sailed about a month ago.

EARL GREY

repeated that the large expedition now preparing was not ordered until after the arrival of the last mail. Since that mail reached this country a noble Lord in that House had repeatedly asked for the production of the despatches sent from China, which could scarcely be objectionable at this distance from the scene of operations. Those despatches, however, had not been produced; and therefore he (Earl Grey) wished to know whether any intelligence had been received of so serious a character, of which the public had not been apprized, as to lead the Government to believe that a considerable increase of our military forces in China was necessary?

THE EARL OF CLARENDON

said there was no objection whatever to the production of the despatches referred to by the noble Earl. He had already stated on a former night that by those despatches the Government became for the first time acquainted with the fact that the Admiral had found it necessary to withdraw from the positions he had held in the Canton river. That was the first intimation they had received that the Admiral did not consider his positions tenable with the force then at his disposal, having regard to the threatening aspect of affairs at Hong Kong and the necessity for his stationing a portion of his force at that place. There was nothing in those despatches of which he (the Earl of Clarendon) had not already given a summary in his reply to a question which had been put upon a previous evening, but at the same time there was no objection to produce the despatches if it were desired. He would take that opportunity of stating, in consequence of an observation which had fallen from the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough), that he had made inquiry at the Colonial Office, and that nothing was known there about any passes which had been granted with reference to the fulfilment of the treaty. If the treaty had been carried out strictly according to its letter, whatever was done would be done by the harbourmasters of the different ports, and of course their proceedings would not have been made the subject of reference to this country. With regard to notices being given on the subject of smuggling transactions, he had heard from inquiry that the correspondence or understanding between the Chinese Commissioner and the British Plenipotentiary on the conclusion of the treaty had never been sent home; therefore at present there were no means of knowing what had led to that somewhat unusual Article to which the noble Earl had called attention, with respect to guarding against smuggling or to giving notice when smuggling transactions took place. There were three or four despatches which contained records of notices given to the Chinese authorities under the treaty; and he had been informed that in 1851 instructions were sent out to Sir George Bonham with reference to the numerous notices which had been given by the British Plenipotentiary and consul to the Chinese authorities about smuggling, of which no notice had been taken by the Chinese authorities. There was, in fact, no doubt whatever that the smuggling took place with the connivance of the Chinese authorities. There was not a single provision for giving notice in the case of transactions of this kind in the treaties concluded with France and the United States; consequently British subjects were really placed in a worse position than the citizens of France or the United States. He repeated, it was perfectly manifest that the smuggling was connived at and shared in by the Chinese authorities. The result was that his noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston), who was then at the head of Foreign Affairs, sent out a long despatch reviewing all that had been done, stating the terms of the treaty, and adding that if the Chinese would not collect their own revenue and assist in carrying out the terms of the treaty, it was impossible for this country to give effect to its provisions, seeing we had never had their co-operation in carrying it out. Notice was given to the Chinese authorities to that effect; but the Chinese Commissioner returned a very vague answer, intimating that he was not aware that any smuggling had taken place. That was the position in which the matter had remained since 1851, and since 1851 there had been no despatches on the subject; but he (the Earl of Clarendon) would lay on the table the despatch to which he had alluded.

Motion agreed to.

House adjourned at half-past Six o'clock till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.