§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHMy Lords, I informed the noble Earl (Earl Granville) that I wished to ask him to-day whether he has any objection to lay upon the table certain returns which I think it is very desirable we should possess. The first to which I allude is a copy of any Order issued by the Governor General in Council for the purpose of providing carriage for the army in the North-Western Provinces after the first of February in this year.
The next is a, return of all the carriage in the possession of the Commissariat in those Provinces and in the Punjab, according to the last accounts; and the third is, a copy of any Order issued by the late Governor General in Council, or by the Governor General acting with the powers of Governor General in Council, for the purpose of reducing the number of Commissariat animals in the North-West Provinces and the Punjab. I ask for these returns because I feel that in point of fact in the campaign now entered, upon everything depends upon carriage. If the force now before Delhi had had sufficient carriage it would have been there on the 26th of May. It would then have found in occupation of the city not more than 5,000 men; and carrying with it, as it might have done, two 18-pounders, it would have knocked down a sufficient portion of the wall to have enabled it to make its entry and occupy that place; and even if it had not had two 18-pounders I cannot but think that English soldiers are capable of getting up a wall which English ladies are, it appears, capable of descending. There is no doubt, therefore, that had the force arrived at that time, sufficiently provided, it would have obtained full success, and many of the deplorable calamities which have taken 786 place in India from that period to the date of the last accounts would have been prevented. My Lords, this is not the way in which war used to be carried on in India. I recollect—I was a boy at that time—hearing with admiration what General Gillespie did when a similar mutiny, terminating in the destruction of all the officers of a Native regiment, occurred at Vellore. He was then quartered at Arcot, nine miles distant, and in one hour and a quarter after receiving the intelligence, not waiting for 18-pounders, he burst open the gates with his gallopers—entered with his gallant troops, sabred all the mutineers, and there was an end of that mutiny. That was the way in which we carried on war in India when we were forming an empire—that is not the way in which we maintain one: those were the days of the red hand—these are the days of red tape. Well, from the want of carriage, that force arrived before Delhi on the 8th June—fourteen days too late—and there were then at least 10,000 men in the city. Sir H. Barnard had to fight for his encamping ground; but he beat the enemy and took all his guns. There are men whose genius has inspired them, and who, flushed with victory, have followed up their advantages until all has been gained. It has not been the fate of Sir H. Barnard, however, to accomplish that. What is now the position of Sir H. Barnard for want of carriage? It may be said that I am arguing after the event, and that the necessity for carriage could not have been foreseen. Sir Charles Napier, nine years ago, foresaw all this; and it is the quality of such men as he was to foresee events of great moment and to provide for their occurrence; others wait till the events have happened, and then take means, not always successful, to remedy them. The first class are the men by whom empires are won; the others are those by whom empires are endangered or lost. But what is the position of Sir H. Barnard before Delhi? He has again and again repulsed the enemy in their attacks on his position; but he has done no more. He says that he is waiting for reinforcements; but there are no reinforcements to go to him unless you evacuate the Punjab, and he has no artillery necessary for bombarding. No doubt, a premature attack, which must necessarily have failed, would have been most disastrous to our influence in India; and I rejoice that it has not taken place. Sir H. Barnard is in a position very similar to that in which the Duke of 787 Wellington stood on the frontiers of Portugal after the battle of Talavera, when he said that if he could keep his army intact there was no danger of the French conquering Spain. So of Sir H. Barnard;—so long as he keeps his forces intact, the Native States will remain faithful; but if he suffers a repulse, the native princes will not he able to resist the pressure of their own people. But I am of opinion that Sir H. Barnard cannot remain where he is—the climate forbids it. When the heavy rains set in he will be cut off from Mecrut, from Umballah, and from the Punjab; he will be imprisoned in a very narrow slip of land, and he will be in a situation—I will not say of peril, but in a situation which can only end in ruin and destruction. If he cannot attack Delhi with a certain expectation of success, he ought to retire in time to Mecrut, and thence to Umballa, and unite with the troops in the Punjab; and I trust he may be able to strike some great blow while in motion, so as to leave n formidable impression of the British forces, and then place himself with his back to the hills, where Europeans can live, and there await the arrival of the grand army which should move up the Indus and the Sutlej. But all these difficulties and dangers would have been avoided if the army had had that carriage in the first instance which ought to have been prepared early in February, and which in former times it always possessed. I wish also to say a few words as to the state of Calcutta. We have not indeed sufficient information to enable us to judge of the necessity for the extreme measures which the Governor General has adopted. He has disarmed all the Native troops, although but a few days before he had gone to Barrackpore to thank a Native regiment for having offered to march against the mutineers. Your Lordships know enough of Calcutta to be aware of the perilous position in which such a measure must place that city. Even the Governor General's body guard, which every one thought was as fully to be relied on as Her Majesty's Guards, has been apparently disarmed, for no exception has been stated. Your Lordships will remember, too, that to disband a regiment is to punish it only—but to disarm it is to dishonour it. And what is to be clone with the men? Are they to be kept there, or are they to be sent into the country? If the latter is done, it will have the same result as disbanding them, but with the addition of exasperating them by dishonour. It is stated that the Euro- 788 peans at Calcutta have made an offer to form a volunteer corps, which, however, has been declined. I do not hear that steps were taken to arm the vessels, to make use of the marine force in any way, or, indeed, that any measures of precaution were adopted to provide against this outbreak; and we are informed that in a moment the town of Calcutta was thrown for protection upon its merchants and clerks, walking about under umbrellas, with revolvers in their pockets. How are you to provide a guard for the Mint or the Treasury? Such a state of things cannot last. It is impossible for any power to attempt to govern a country without the aid of its inhabitants, or to defend a city if the population are opposed to you: if you do so it is conquest, not government. What has been the conduct of the Indian Government in this crisis? The measures adopted by the Indian Government are such as to shake confidence in its duration. I regret that any necessity should have arisen for any measures whatever; but that they should be in absolute contradiction to the current of all the measures which had been adopted during the previous two or three weeks is what I cannot understand. My Lords, I am willing, and always shall be, to give to the Government of India all the material support which it is possible for this country to afford, and move than Her Majesty's Ministers appear to be willing to accept; but, looking at the want of carriage which has paralyzed the operations of the army, at the constant change from actual alarm to excessive self-reliance, and at the oscillation from day to day between measures of totally different tendencies, it is perfectly impossible for me, and I think it must be impossible for any one, to place confidence in that Government. The Noble Earl concluded by moving:
§
That there be laid before this House,
1. Copy of any Order given by the Governor General of India in Council, or by the late Commander in Chief in India, since the 1st February 1857, for providing Carriage for the Troops at the several Stations in the North-west Provinces and the Punjab:
2. Copy of the last Return of the Number and Description of Commissariat Animals at the several Stations in the North-west Provinces and the Punjab:
3. Copy of any Order given by the late Governor General in India in Council, or by the late Commander in Chief when assuming the Powers of Governor General in Council, for reducing the Number of Commissariat Animals heretofore kept at the several Stations in the North-west Provinces and the Punjab.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, with 789 regard to the papers which the noble Earl has requested me to present to the House I have no objection to do so, although I do not think much practical good will result from their production. Her Majesty's Government are certainly anxious to give any information that any of your Lordships may think necessary with regard to the present state of affairs in India. The noble Earl has gone very much into military details with respect to the war now going on in India. I do not think that your Lordships wish me to follow the noble Earl in those details; I think that I, who have no pretension to any great military knowledge, would simply be making myself ridiculous by attempting to do so; and I must say that I attach even less importance than I was inclined to attach to the observations of the noble Earl on this subject a few days ago, when he went into military details to which it was utterly impossible for me or any one of your Lordships, or indeed any person whatever, to give an answer; for I find that some of the principal statements then made by the noble Earl, have since, by the communications made by persons not in England, but on the spot, received a most distinct and positive negative. And I do think it is most extraordinary that the noble Earl, who speaks with all that authority to which his knowledge and experience entitle him, should be so anxious to criticise the conduct of the Government in India, as to come down here night after night for the purpose of entering into discussions on those very points on which we have no information, and on which it is impossible for the noble Earl himself to have any reliable information. The noble Earl has this evening come down with that intention, although on this very evening we expect to receive by mail more ample information; and if it does not throw the whole of the light that might be given, it will, at all events, throw some light on this question. The noble Earl has studied military questions, and I, therefore, who am an ordinary civilian, do not choose to expose myself by speaking on military details. About a year ago, during a conversation which I had with Mr. Macaulay, he pointed out to me a passage with which perhaps I ought not to trouble your Lordships, but I really think it does apply in some degree to discussions of this detailed character in this House upon facts with which you are not well acquainted. The passage occurs in the speech delivered by 790 Lucius Æmilius to the Roman Senate, at a moment when military operations were being carried on abroad. The speaker says, there are many men among us who know how to lead an army into Macedonia, who can point out where camps are to be located, and which are the places that ought to be guarded; who know exactly the moment and by what means Macedonia is to be entered; who know where the granaries are to be placed, and by what land or sea transport the commissariat is to be supplied; who know when they ought to come hand to hand with the enemy, and when it would be better to remain quiet; who not only settle what is to be done, but when anything else is done without their advice complain of that person who ordered it to be done to the Government. He then says,—
Hæe magna impedimenta res gerentibus sunt. Neque enim omnes tam firmi et constantis animi contra adversum rumorem esse possunt, quam Fabius fuit; qui suum imperium minui per vani-tatem populi maluit, quam sccunda fama male rempublicam genere.He then goes on to say that he is not one of those who think that Governors General are not to be admonished, and he adds,—though I think the noble Earl will not agree with this sentiment,—"But I think that he who carries all things by his own opinion is rather a proud man than a wise one." And he goes on in that strain. I do think that, when the noble Earl states that he is ready to give all material support to the Governor of India at a great crisis like this, if he took a wise and judicious view of what that public spirit, which he possesses in an eminent degree, requires, he would feel that some little moral support was not entirely out of the question. The noble Earl has himself been accused, in a very interesting historical account, which many of your Lordships may have read, of vacillation, of giving contradictory orders, and of I know not what else, when a most important crisis occurred during his Governor Generalship of India. I am sure the noble Earl does not admit the justice of those criticisms. If he thinks that they were unjust—and it should be remembered that they were not made till eight or nine years after the event, and when he was in this country, and able therefore at once to confute his accuser—I ask him whether he considers it is just, in his place, and with his authority, in this House, to speak on facts with which he really is most imperfectly 791 acquainted, and to throw discredit upon those who are displaying their utmost energies in a most important crisis. I do not wish to defend any person in this House merely because he is employed by the Government; but this very morning I received several communications from persons not, perhaps, so eloquent as the noble Earl, but who certainly have had as much experience of the affairs of India, and whose opinion is entitled to as much weight as that of the noble Earl. They are perfectly indignant at the aspersions which he threw upon the Government of India last night, and say that, according to the very best accounts which they have received, everybody has been astonished, not only by the energy and industry, but by the singular calmness and real courage which Lord Canning has shown on this occasion. I have seen a quantity of telegraphic messages which were sent by Lord Canning in every direction on the very first day on which information reached him of the mutiny. The proof of the pudding is in the eating of it. The troops are pouring in, according to the last mail, and I have no doubt that that intelligence will be fully confirmed by the next mail. It is said that people in India wore greatly surprised how the European forces could have been collected so rapidly, and that the moral effect of their arrival was beginning to be strongly shown. My Lords, I thought it right to make these remarks. The noble Earl comes down here day after day and makes statements as to the stale of affairs on India which I am sure cannot be well founded. It is utterly impossible that he should know the whole of the facts, and therefore I do trust that your Lordships will calmly consider those matters, and that you will not be led away by any unnecessary alarm. I think it is of the utmost importance that there should not go out by each mail to the Natives of India something which may induce them to suppose that one of the most powerful parties in this country is treating the Indian Government with contempt, and affecting a disbelief in its ability to meet the present state of things in India.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHThe observations which have been referred to by the noble Earl were certainly made a very long time ago; but the principles of war have always been the same, because they are founded on common sense. If Lucius Æmilius were now, instead of the noble Baron, Secretary for War, I feel sure 792 that he would agree with me on those two points that I have already mentioned,—viz., that no army can move efficiently without the means of carriage, and that time is everything in war. Now, all I said with respect to the proceedings before Delhi rested upon those two principles. The noble Earl has referred to what is supposed to have been the course of my conduct in India.
§ EARL GRANVILLEI did not express any opinion on that subject. I merely stated that it had been commented upon.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHWhen I landed in India I found that a great military' disaster had occurred, and that things were, in fact, precisely in that position in which I take them now to be—that is to say, one-half of the people were in a state of panic, while the other half were in a state of the most absurd self-confidence. I took my own line between the two, as that course seemed to me the best to meet the danger; and I must say, whatever may be the authorities from history to which the noble Earl has referred, I am consoled, in the midst of all that has been said with respect to my conduct in India upon military subjects, by what the Duke of Wellington said here, that whether I gave an order to stand still or to advance or to retreat I gave the right order under the circumstances shown to me at the time.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEI do not wish to pronounce a summary judgment upon any Governor General of India, past, or present. I do not wish to give a history of any order which the noble Earl opposite may or may not have given to General Pollock, under any particular circumstances; but I think with the noble Earl (Earl Granville), that the noble Earl opposite has not acted in this matter in a manner which becomes a member of the British senate. The noble Earl has not only not given his moral support to the Government, but concluded his speech this evening—a speech in which he displayed his powers to the utmost, and which we know was prepared, for he gave us notice of it—by saying that he has no confidence in the Indian Government. Why does not the noble Earl move for a change in that Government? If we had a more numerous attendance of peers, or if we could have anticipated the delivery of such a speech as we have heard tonight, I would undoubtedly have moved, as an Amendment to the Motion before your Lordships, that this House has confidence 793 in, and is ready to support the Government of India. This I would have done, because if it is to go out to India and to the world that the generals and civilians to whom the management of affairs is intrusted have not the confidence of those in this country who set themselves up as great authorities on Indian subjects, great mischief is likely to ensue. The noble Earl ventures upon a discussion of details about which he confesses that he knows very little, and which he founds merely upon a telegraphic report that a certain regiment had been disarmed instead of disbanded. For all that we are aware of to the contrary, there might have been very sufficient reasons for disarming this regiment, and the noble Earl was himself compelled to admit that the nature of the emergency may have rendered such a step advisable. If the noble Earl can place no reliance on those by whom affairs are conducted in this great crisis, it is, unquestionably, his right and his duty to say so. But it is neither his duty nor his right to throw distrust on the Government of India without testing the real feeling of your Lordships on that subject. It is only due to those who occupy positions of great responsibility in India, that nothing should be done to weaken their power and authority as long as they hold difficult official situations. My Lords, I have myself given notice of a question connected with the Indian Government which I wish to put to Her Majesty's Government, but it is not one that can impair the power of the Government in India. At the present moment, the Indian Government is crippled by a set of perfectly absurd regulations. Those regulations relate to the civil service of the East India Company. Provision is made by an Act of Parliament for sending out, upon certain reports from the Governor General, individuals to supply vacancies in the civil service to a limited extent; and regulations are made by the Boad of Control, by which the Indian Government is bound and fettered. I cannot exactly say what those regulations and instructions are; but it is well known that the civil service has long been inadequate to supply the wants of its own branch of the administration, and that it has been necessary to supplement it by drawing away a great number of officers from their regiments, in order to place them in civil employment. No doubt, many of these officers have been spoilt for military duties by having been thus turned into civilians. Still, a certain proportion 794 of them would surely be found useful in the present emergency, if restored to their regiments. I therefore wish to have an assurance that, if these officers are sent back to the army, the Governor General shall not he prevented by any network of foolish regulations, from supplying their places in the civil departments by any class of men whom he can find in the country. There is a large available population of Europeans, East Indians, natives of India, who are well qualified for employment under the Government; and the Governor General ought to be at liberty, irrespective of any regulations as to covenanted or uncovenanted service, to appoint these men, at least provisionally, to any civil situation in which he may think they would prove useful. My Lords, I will only add that if Parliament have not confidence in our present Indian administrators, the sooner it substitutes for them persons in whom it has. confidence, the better it will be both for this country and for India.
§ THE EARL OF MALMESBURYMy Lords, I have long known the courage of the noble Marquess, but I did not expect from him the hackneyed reproof, so often given to this side of the House when we differ from Her Majesty's Government, and express something like a want of confidence in their exertions and their opinions,—namely, that we ought to bring forward a vote of censure upon the Ministry and challenge the House to a division. We should deserve small credit for public spirit if, because we entertained some misgivings as to the conduct and views of the Government, we were to press a Motion of a want of confidence in the Ministry to a division, in order to show to the country at this critical emergency that there exists a great conflict of opinion among the members of the Legislature. Moreover, by such a course, we should probably expose ourselves to aspersions like those unjustly cast upon us on a former occasion—namely, that for party objects we did not hesitate to side with the mutineers rather than with the Government. What, my Lords, is the meaning of challenging us to show a want of confidence in Her Majesty's Government?
§ THE EARL OF MALMESBURYThat distinction is very like a quibble upon I words. It is the duty of Her Majesty's Government as well as of the Indian Government to meet this emergency; but I 795 cannot believe that the noble Marquess is serious in wishing a Motion of confidence or no confidence, whether directly in Her Majesty's Government or indirectly in the Government of India, to be pressed to a division in either House of Parliament. Of all persons in the world the noble Marquess has the least right to admonish us to be careful how we criticise Indian affairs.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEWhat I said was, make what remarks you please, but don't make them in a way that can lead to no good practical result.
§ THE EARL OF MALMESBURYIf these subjects are not to be discussed—if a noble Lord is not say that personally he has no confidence in the Government of India, you might as well close the mouth of every Opposition Member of this House. Indeed, if the doctrine of the noble Marquess is to prevail, instead of separating, as it is said we are to do, soon, we might as well break up for the Session after the sitting of this very night. I confess, my Lords, that I was hardly prepared for this extreme delicacy now recommended to us on Indian affairs. For two long years has the noble Marquess assailed the ears of this House with his denunciations of almost every institution in India. He has complained of the courts of justice and their administrators, of the system of taxation, of the practice of torture, and, in short, of every conceivable grievance that could be heaped upon an oppressed people. And when the noble Marquess thinks fit to lecture us about mischievous speeches, does he not lay himself open to the retort that his own speeches for the last two years have helped to produce all the mischief in India which we are now deploring? I do not charge him with the direct responsibility for such a result. I merely say that the tone he has adopted to-night might fairly expose him to such a rejoinder. If every one who differs with the Government in opinion ought to divide the House, why, on the many occasions to which I have referred, did not the noble Marquess himself have the courage to divide?
§ THE EARL OF MALMESBURYBut the noble Marquess' Motions were merely Motions for papers, and his speeches were only paper speeches. They had no practical effect, or at least their effect, if read in India, could only be pernicious. But I say, my Lords, that these discussions are 796 of use, because their tendency is to rouse the country, which now appears to be lulled in a false security. I am sorry to see, in all the language held by Her Majesty's Ministers in both Houses, symptoms of a spirit calculated to encourage supineness and over-confidence. These are not times in which to blind the eyes of the community. It is impossible, in my opinion, to exaggerate the magnitude of the peril of this crisis, and it would be most impolitic to do anything to prevent the spirit of this country from being thoroughly roused to a sense of the position in which the Indian empire is placed. The noble Earl (Earl Granville) cannot say he was taken unawares, because he brought down a printed book wherewith to answer my noble Friend. [Earl GRANVILLE: The noble Earl gave me notice of his intention to bring the subject forward.] I have only to express a hope that the noble Earl and his colleagues may follow the advice which my noble Friend has given them in his last two or three addresses in this House. No one is able to give them such good advice, and no one can speak with so much experience upon the affairs of India. Above all, I entreat the Government not to blind their eyes to the danger of the present state of affairs in Asia, because the greatest possible danger exists, and by underrating the extent of that danger they fail to arouse that national spirit which is the best safeguard against any perils which may threaten the country.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEI did not wish to stifle discussion. I only protested against an incidental attempt to cast censure upon a person whose conduct you are avowedly not in a position to judge.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLMy Lords, we do not complain that the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) has expressed a want of confidence in Her Majesty's Government, but that he has expressed an utter want of confidence in the local Government of India, with regard to the proceedings of which he can know nothing whatever. The grounds upon which the noble Earl justifies his want of confidence are directed against the abilities, the judgment, and even the industry of the Governor General of India. The noble Earl assumes that the means of moving the army will be wanting, and he says that it is a canon in military matters that you cannot move an army without the means of carriage. Why, my Lords, whoever disputed that an army cannot move without carriage? But what right had the noble 797 Earl to conclude that there had been any difficulty in finding the means of carriage? By the last mail not a word was said upon the subject—what the army was then waiting for was a siege train. But supposing there was a want of the means of carriage, the next question is, whether this great outbreak could have been foreseen. Now, what is the evidence upon this point? The noble Earl has referred to Brigadier General Hearsey. No man in India has perhaps had more experience in mutinies of the Native troops than Brigadier General Hearsey. I believe that upon one occasion during the administration of the noble Earl, and on three or four other occasions, General Hearsey has been successfully engaged in putting down mutinies of the Native troops. Yet General Hearsey says that he had not the least idea of it, and that it was utterly unknown to him that he had been sitting over a mine. Well, then, what right has the noble Earl to expect that Lord Canning should have better information as to the state of feeling among the Native troops than General Hearsey, who has been twenty years in India, and who is familiar with their language and habits? The noble Earl next complained of the disarmament of certain troops in Calcutta, and he contrasted that disarmament with a recent address made by Lord Canning to the same troops, expressing confidence in their loyalty. But, my Lords, was it not the duty of the Governor General, so long as he had a hope of the fidelity of the Native troops, to assume that they would be loyal? What has been said upon this subject by as great a man as the noble Earl? Sir Thomas Munro says you ought always to show confidence in the Native troops, and address them in the language of confidence. So far did Sir Thomas Munro carry that doctrine, that he objected to the system of always mixing European and Native troops, and said that they ought not to be mixed, in order the more strongly to show your confidence in the Native troops. Lord Canning may have been hoping against hope, and he may have had suspicions of the future fidelity of the Native troops, but he was justified, until the reverse had been shown, in expressing confidence in their fidelity and loyalty. Subsequent events and the discovery of a plot led the Governor General to doubt the fidelity of those troops. Was he to leave them with arms in their hands, to cut the throats of their officers, 798 as had been done in other places? What could he do but disarm them? Why should the noble Earl complain of that? The noble Earl says the conduct of Lord Canning is a proof of vacillation and weakness. I say it was a change of opinion arising from a change in the evidence before him. The noble Earl says that, having disarmed the Native troops, the Governor General left Calcutta to be defended by the civilians armed with umbrellas and revolvers. My Lords, that is a fancy picture, the truth being that the noble Earl knows nothing whatever about the matter. The noble Earl not only said that Lord Canning has done what he ought not to have done, but that he has failed to do what he ought to have done, and that he ought to have embodied the marines and sailors for the defence of the city. But does he know that he did not? Until the mail arrives he can know nothing about the matter. Suppose when the mail arrives it appears that Lord Canning did not resort to that step—is the noble Earl sure that it was a necessary step? It will probably appear that, owing to the fortunate diversion of the Chinese expedition, and to the arrival at Calcutta of large numbers of the European troops employed in China, the safety of Calcutta was for the time perfectly assured without calling upon the sailors and marines. I ask your Lordships whether the noble Earl is justified, upon such assumptions, in using his great authority and the influence of his character and experience in depreciating the exertions of the local Government of India. Her Majesty's Government at home are always greatly obliged by the noble Earl's suggestions and always consider them with deference to his opinions, but my noble Friend and the noble Marquess complained, and I think with justice, of the irrelevancy of the noble Earl's speech and of its tendency unjustly to disparage the local Government of India.
§ Motion agreed to.