INDIAN ARMY.—MOTION FOR PAPERS. (Hansard, 27 July 1857)

THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE

said, that in calling attention to the events which had taken place in India, and in moving for papers relating to the Indian army, nothing could be further from his intention than to add to the embarrassment which the Government must now labour under with regard to Indian affairs. As far as he knew, the measures which had been taken by them were well calculated to meet for the moment the disasters which had taken place. He placed reliance on their energies, and full reliance on those of his noble Friend and relative the Governor General. He was sure that whatever was required by his noble Friend, and whatever the Government asked for from Parliament, would be accorded. Upon them rested the responsibility of dealing with the subject as it stood; nor was it his wish to add to their responsibility or to the difficulties in which they were involved. Their Lordships had, however, a duty to perform, far higher than that of putting down the mutiny. That that revolt would be extinguished before very long—whether in weeks or months—he had not the slightest doubt; nor could any rational man doubt that the power of the British army and the authority of this country would soon be completely re-established in India. But the real difficulty of governing India would not have ended, but have commenced, when the present mutiny should have been put down. It would be necessary for them to reconstruct their army in India. They might reconstruct it with the same materials, more or less, as they might deem right; but in his humble 421 opinion it would not only be necessary to do that, but entirely to revise and recast the machinery by which our Indian territories were governed. It was absurd to suppose that the present machinery could go on. If anything were wanting to prove that, it would be found in some of the incidents which had recently occurred. Could anything be more ridiculous than to see, in the emergency in which he was afraid we were still involved with regard to India, the Minister of the Crown come down to Parliament for the purpose of gravely informing Parliament that it had pleased certain gentlemen sitting in Leadenhall Street, who were not responsible to the Crown or to Parliament for their conduct, to consent to the sending out of 4,000 men to provide for the necessities of the Indian service? No doubt, the Minister added that even if that consent had been refused, those troops would still have been sent out; but such a course would have been in defiance of the law. Was it rational to expect that such a state of things, which could only lead to embarrassment, could be of any possible use to the executive Government of the Crown? He did not want to pursue that subject any further, but he might add that the position in which the Board of Control stood to the Court of Directors was most objectionable. When any difference arose between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control the Board of Control could not legally send out any instructions, however proper, to the Governor General or to Her Majesty's servants in India without applying for a mandamus, compelling the Court of Directors to forward it. Of course the law would not be regarded for a moment if it really stood in the way of the public service. What a farce, then, it was to permit such a law to continue! Nobody could defend it for a minute, and a new state of things ought at once to be introduced. He was not, and never had been, insensible to the merits and glories, for such he would call them, of the East India Company, when the East India Company really existed. Its career was wholly without example, and such as its members, and our country might well be proud of. But that Company had virtually ceased to exist since 1833, when it was put upon an entirely different footing. We had had in the course of this year melancholy proofs that the government of India had been in a disgraceful state for the last twenty-five years. The disgraceful state of the Indian 422 tribunals had been brought before Parliament, and not denied but acknowledged by Her Majesty's Government. No man could deny that the state of the Indian finances was deplorable, and he would venture to say that there never was such a wretched exhibition of the finances of any country as the annual statement of the finances of India, which showed a permanent deficiency without any plan for, or prospect of supplying the ways and means necessary to remedy that state of things. And to put the finishing stroke to the picture, let them consider the humiliating and absurd condition of our Indian army quite apart from the mutiny; and whatever that mutiny might have arisen from—whether from greased cartridges or not—it was evident that the bad state of the soldiery was of long standing, and ought not to have been overlooked as it had been. Let their Lordships consider for a moment what had been the general utility of the Indian army to the empire. If their Lordships read in history of a powerful monarch who had, in addition to his own native country, a vast territory containing upwards of 100,000,000 men, and with almost every resource within it that could make it great and powerful, and that when that monarch went to war he was unable to derive from that vast territory, governed by his lieutenants, consuls, governors, or call them what you would, one man, one gun, £1 of money, or one pound of gunpowder in support of his war, what idea would their Lordships form of the government of that country and that territory? But that was the case during the late war with Russia, so far as India was concerned. We could not bring a single soldier of India to aid in that war. One might have supposed that the Government who possessed that vast territory would have been able by its army to inspire feelings of respect at least, if not of terror, throughout Europe and Asia. But we could not draw the slightest support from that country. It was even with feelings of apprehension that they ventured to draw two of their own European regiments from India to aid in the war against Russia: so that in point of fact, when they were engaged in that war, so far from India being an auxiliary to us in Europe, and helping to defend Her Majesty's empire and honour, India was an impediment and a drain upon their resources. That fact primâ facie called for the consideration of every British statesman and of Parliament. There were a 423 great many instances in history, with which several of their Lordships were as conversant or more so than himself, of great armies having deserted their standard, their Sovereign, and their country; armies had at times gone over to the enemy, or had revolted against the lawful authority for another dynasty; they had risen up against foreign conquerors on behalf of their country, when they thought that their revolt would be successful. But was there anything in the pages of history in the slightest degree, he would not say parallel, but even analogous to the existing state of things in India, in which 80,000 men had melted away from our command within the space of one fortnight, without any object, or purpose, or ostensible cause whatever? He defied any rational man to show that the mutineers had any definite joint object in the step which they had taken. Why, many of these men had already passed twelve or fourteen or more years' service towards obtaining pensions for their lives. Let their Lordships recollect that this army was raised, not by conscription, but by voluntary enlistment; admission into its ranks was regarded as a prize by the natives of the country; and yet, of this army, without any cause—for he defied any one to say that there was any religious grievance in the matter, so far as the great body of the men were concerned (supposing the Hindoos had been subjected to greased cartridges, the Mahomedans would not have felt that to be a grievance, and of course the Hindoo soldier of all things had no desire to put himself in subjection to a Mahomedan instead of a Christian conqueror)—of this army, he said, 80,000 men had, without any assignable reason, passed away from our command. Was not the primary cause of that defection evident? Was it not owing to the way in which that army had been mismanaged? It was mismanagement that had brought that army into its present mutinous condition, and that had made these men almost like a pack of schoolboys, excited, God knew why, and God knew by whom! but certainly without any definite object or great leader, to revolt. They had risen up against us; some of them had committed horrible and barbarous murders, while others showed great personal attachment to their officers; but had gone from our standard, some to their homes, and others it was impossible to say whither. To what was that owing but to the mat-organization of that army? Now, that was especially 424 a matter in which the Court of Directors, above every other body, had the power of interfering. That army was directly officered by the East India Company. There was always a military committee of the East India Directors sitting, and, many of the gentlemen who served in that Direction had been in that army. They ought to have the greatest interest in it, and of all the branches of the East India Government they ought to be held the most responsible for the present state of things. But what was most reprehensible was the fact which has now come to light, that nothing had been done to avert that evil which, when it did happen, those who knew anything at all about the Indian army said they were not surprised at. I am not a prophet after the event. He was in a position, if necessary, to show their Lordships a letter written by an officer of fourteen years' experience in India—not an officer in high civil employment, but one who has lived with his regiment, and who made himself acquainted with the feelings of his soldiers and of the army in general in India. That letter was written more than a year and a half ago. It referred to a series of observations which he had made in previous letters upon the state of the army; and ended by saying, "For my part I believe that we are upon the brink of a general military outbreak." But was that all? Did not the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough), in a most able and instructive speech, delivered by him about ten days ago, clearly state to their Lordships that he was informed while in India that the army in Bengal was in a state of insubordination? Was it not a matter of history that that army required particular care? And yet not one step had been taken to effect an improvement. Various causes had been assigned for this mutiny. Among others, it was said that, during the late war with Russia, foreign emissaries were employed in India in the endeavour to spread disaffection among the native soldiers. Whether that were true or not he could not say, but he believed that no power could stir up revolt among our troops if they were properly managed. That hypothesis, therefore, wholly failed to account for what had happened. There were various other causes assigned with which their Lordships were familiar. Among these was the way in which troops were constantly detached to perform duties in which the police ought to be employed. Changes, too, were made 425 in regard to their pensions which were not sufficiently explained to the men. It was also well-known that the spoliation of the native chiefs and the annexation of their territories to ours had had great effect in producing a bad state of feeling in the army. The natives of India, it should be remembered, had formerly been went to look upon us, not only as a most powerful, but as a most just people. A gallant friend of his, who had served in India, told him that he was in the habit of associating with the soldiers of his regiment and of ascertaining their feelings, and that he never found anything so difficult to answer as the questions they put to him touching the reason why the King of Oude was deposed and his territory annexed to the British dominions. There were many Oudeans in our army, and he was informed that recent events in their native country had been viewed by them with deep dissatisfaction. But the principal cause of the disaffection was undoubtedly the manner in which the army was officered. No doubt the Court of Directors chose for the service young Englishmen possessed of the average qualities of their countrymen. The fault lay in the system of employment and promotion when those officers reached India. Among the various valuable suggestions for the improvement of the Indian army, made by the late Sir Charles Napier in his evidence before their Lordships' Committee, was one for requiring young cadets, before going out to India, to pass some time in the army in England in order to acquire a knowledge of their regimental duties. The reason why this was not carried out was because it was only after a certain period of service in India that a person became eligible for those civil situations for which every young officer was looking out. The object of the parents of a cadet and of those who gave him his appointment was that he should hurry out as quickly as possible and qualify himself for a civil situation at the earliest moment. What was the effect of thus draughting the officers of the army into the diplomatic and civil services? Sir Charles Napier gave an account of his visit to a battalion of 800 men to which there were only two European officers. One of them was a young ensign not then released from drill; and if anything had happened to his senior, this boy, who could not pretend to drill a company, or perhaps not even to march a guard, would have been placed at the head of 800 men, and in command of many old 426 native officers who thoroughly understood their duty. How could we expect to find regiments in a proper stale of discipline or organization under such a system? He had lately seen a friend of his whose son was an officer in one of the Indian regiments, and on expressing sympathy with what he thought must be the natural feelings of the father at the danger in which his son was placed his friend coolly replied:—"Oh, I am not at all alarmed, my son has not been near his regiment for twelve years." On his hinting that the son, being a captain, would in the present crisis be ordered to join his regiment, the father added, "Oh, no, there is no danger of that; my son is engaged in an important civil employment collecting the revenue, and he cannot be removed from where he is." Was it surprising if an army so conducted could not be relied on in time of trouble? This state of things appeared to have been entirely ignored by the Court of Directors. In Lord Dalhousie's Minute of the 28th of February, 1856, which was laid on their Lordships' table in April or May last, there was this extraordinary passage:— If large improvements have been made under the various departments of civil administration during the last eight years, the military branch of the service has received its full measure of attention and amendment. The position of the native soldier in India has long been such as to leave hardly any circumstances of his condition in need of improvement. Then followed forty-eight paragraphs, relating not to the native but to the European soldier, or to the military establishments. They were told that the military branch of the Government had received its full measure of "attention and improvement;" and yet a few months later they had 30,000 men, the majority of whom had been long in the service, leaving their standard without any ostensible cause! This subject, however, had not escaped the attention of the present Governor General. Lord Canning assumed the Government of India in March, 1856, and it soon became evident to him that all was not right; for as early as April the 5th in the same year his Lordship wrote home to the Court of Directors that, "Your Hon. Court will observe that, in October, 1855, the late Governor General recorded a Minute in consequence of the strong representations of the late Commander in Chief as to the paucity of officers for the demands of the public service." So little did the Directors know whether the Bengal army required supervision that they ordered 427 increased employment upon civil service for officers of that army. The Governor General having to provide for the government of the country, enormously increased in population, with the same civil force that existed many years ago, was authorised to take from the regiments every field-officer if he chose, and a large proportion of captains and lieutenants. What was this but a wilful and monstrous exposure of the army to the risk of insubordination? The Directors said,— That the want is pressing we fully admit. It has been necessarily occasioned by the requisitions for staff and civil services, and for local and irregular corps, which could only be effectually met by transferring to them officers of the very class and description who are most urgently required for regimental duties, and who are best qualified to command the respect and to conciliate the affections of every class of the native soldiery. These considerations would have induced us to determine to allow two additional captains to every regular Native regiment in our service; but in the actual condition of the finances we must confine ourselves to sanctioning your appointment of one additional captain and one additional lieutenant to every regiment of native infantry and cavalry of the regular formation in the three Presidencies, and of two additional captains and two additional lieutenants to each European regiment; to have effect from the expiration of one month from the date of your receipt of this despatch. What a system of Government! It appeared by the paper he held in his hand that at the time the Directors were adding to the number of the officers of regiments they were reducing the number of soldiers. Such management of an army was never exhibited by any Government before. It was not surprising that the recent calamity should have occurred under such management. He did not pretend to say what remedy should be applied, but he had seen some rather wild notions put forward which he hoped would not take much hold of the public mind. He had seen it stated that the Government ought to do away with the high-caste Brahmins and Rajpoot soldiers; that they ought to maintain 60,000 European troops in India, and increase the number of irregular soldiers. But if their Lordships would read the history of the Indian army, written in 1817, by Captain Williams, they would find that the high-caste Brahmins and Rajpoots were enlisted with a particular design. They were of a superior class and of a peculiar religion, and they were encouraged to enlist because it was thought that they might counterbalance the great number of Mahomedans in our service. He did not say that they ought 428 to be continued for ever in our employment if they were not wanted, but Sir John Malcolm, a competent authority, had said of them, in a paper known to be written by him although it did not bear his name:— The Rajpoots want energy, but seldom, if ever, courage. It is remarkable of this class that, even when their animal spirits are so subdued as to cause a cessation of exertion, they show no fear of death, which they meet in every case with surprising fortitude or resignation. Such is the general character of a race of men whose numbers in the Bengal army amount to 30,000 or 40,000, and of whom we can recruit to any amount in our provinces. But this instrument of power must be managed with care and wisdom, or that which is our strength may become our danger. It was to be regretted that such opinions had not been attended to. He must remind their Lordships that the late Sir Charles Napier stated before a Committee of that House in 1852, that if he remained twenty months in India and bad the power to organize or drill them, he should not be afraid to go into action with Sepoys alone. And elsewhere he said, that, properly drilled and organized, the Native troops "would march to Moscow." He trusted then that Parliament and the country would not be too ready utterly to condemn these men. With regard to the irregular troops, he believed that they were valuable forces, but they were subject to the same influences as the Brahmins and Rajpoots, and had shown instances of desertion as extraordinary and of mutiny as striking. In the Nepaul war in 1815, under Lord Hastings, when 6,000 irregular infantry were detached from the main body, they encountered a severe service, and fought from noon until eight o'clock the next morning. They gained a great victory, but sustained a heavy loss. They afterwards made a claim for bloodmoney upon the number of men they had lost, and when it was refused they deserted in a body and went home. Then, if we had 60,000 Europeans in India, who was to pay the cost? It might be that they would be cheaper than three times that number of Native troops, but look to the drain of such a reinforcement upon the population and the regular army in this country. It was already felt as a great hardship when a regiment was kept a day longer in India than its term of service, and such a destination for so large an army could not but affect recruiting at home as well as diminish the number of men available for European purposes. 429 He had a great respect for the prolific powers of this country, but he doubted whether England, in addition to her other requirements, could send out British-born troops enough to India to keep down a population of 150,000,000 men. India, in such a case, would not be a valuable acquisition. India ought, herself, to maintain the troops she requires for foreign or internal purposes—but in order to do that the system of her Government must be altered. The truth was that British India belonged to the British Crown, and must be administered by a Minister of the Crown responsible to Parliament. There was no reason why Parliament should not exercise the same right of interference with regard to India as it did with regard to all other of Her Majesty's dominions. He had heard old Indians say that if Parliament meddled with India, party influences would prevail and India would be ruined. He never heard greater nonsense. That was nothing less than an attack upon our whole system of constitutional government. History bore testimony to the fact that when the East India Company were making their greatest struggles in India, when Clive was running his wonderful career, and when Warren Hastings, the Marquess of Wellesley, and Lord Cornwallis administered the affairs of that country, those affairs were much more under the control of Parliamentary influence than was the case at the present day. He hoped that Her Majesty's Ministers would be prepared to meet Parliament next Session with some scheme by which the administration of those territories belonging to the British Crown in India would be brought more directly under the direction of the Government of England. If, however, unhappily they should fail to take that course he felt assured that the Legislature would take the matter into its own hands, and would not suffer such practices as those to which he had adverted as prevailing in the British army in India to continue—practices owing to which those officers to whose keeping great interests were committed were withdrawn from their legitimate profession, for mere purposes of personal profit and advantage. The papers for which he asked would, he anticipated, throw light upon the discussion upon the affairs of India which must take place next year, and he therefore trusted that the Government would have no objection to their production. The noble Marquess concluded by 430 moving, That there be laid before this House Copies of the Correspondence of the Court of Directors with the Board of Control and with the Governor General of India, relating to the Amount of European Forces, either of the British or the Indian Army, to be maintained in that Country since the 1st of April, 1856, or relating to the Employment of Military Officers upon Political or other Civil Services.