HL Deb 26 February 1857 vol 144 cc1307-10

LORD CAMPBELL moved that a Select Committee be appointed to consider whether the Privilege now enjoyed by Reports of the Proceedings of Courts of Justice may be safely and properly extended to Reports of the proceedings of the Two Houses of Parliament, and of any and what other Assemblies or Public Meetings, under any and what Conditions or Restrictions. The noble and learned Lord said, that, Considering the importance of the subject that was to engage their Lordships' attention that evening, he would have postponed his Motion had it not been that it would be the last opportunity he would have of bringing it forward before he left town for circuit. He regarded the subject with which he proposed to deal as one of considerable public importance, affecting as it did the liberty of the press and the protection of private character. He did not anticipate any opposition to the Motion, and he need not, therefore, trespass at any length upon their Lordships' time. The Resolution would not pledge them to the adoption of any particular measure, and would merely involve an expression of opinion on their parts that that was a fit subject for inquiry. Their Lordships were, no doubt, aware that the Court of Queen's Bench had lately had to decide a case which involved an important question, whether a true account of the proceedings of what was called a public meeting could be justified, although it might reflect on the character of a private individual. The Court of Queen's Bench had unanimously decided that for the publication of such an account there was no such privilege, Their deci- sion had been made a subject of public comment, and had been severely criticised; and the Judges had been told that they ought to have determined that a true account of the proceedings at a public meeting was privileged, however much it might have reflected on any private person; that it was enough, in such a case, to give a remedy against the individual who had uttered the calumny at the meeting, and that the journalist, who had been the means of circulating it all over the world, should be allowed to escape with perfect impunity. That doctrine was said to be founded on the rule laid down in Lord Northampton's case, reported by Lord Coke. Now, no man was infallible, and their Lordships had, on a recent memorable occasion, given a decision in opposition to the authority of Lord Coke, although, no doubt, his authority was very high. But it appeared that in the case of Lord Northampton the language used was a mere extra-judicial dictum of some of the Judges sitting in the Star Chamber, expressing no such unqualified opinion as was supposed. It referred only to oral slander, and at the utmost amounted only to saying that if a man repeated a verbal accusation against another, and at the same time stated the authority on which he related it, he was not liable to an action. But even that dictum had been practically overturned by the luminous judgment pronounced by his noble and learned Friend on the cross benches (Lord Wensleydale) in the case of "M'Pherson v. Daniel," (10 B. & C.) in the course of which his noble and learned Friend had laid down, with the concurrence of the other Judges, this position—that the case of Lord Northampton only authorized the repetition of oral slander under peculiar circumstances, and on privileged occasions. It was not to be supposed that slander once spoken could be published in all the journals and spread all over the world wantonly and maliciously. It would, indeed, be a subject of just alarm if all the proceedings of public meetings were to be privileged. In the first place, what were public meetings? Mr. Ernest Jones's meetings were public meetings; and was it to be held that all that was uttered at those meetings could be printed and published with impunity? If such a doctrine were laid down, sedition would be protected by law; and there would be no safety for private character, because it would be the easiest thing in the world for a man to get up a public meeting for the purpose of calumniating his neighbour, and leave the country after making sure of the publication of the calumny all over the world by means of reports in the public newspapers. It seemed to him, therefore, that it would be wholly insupportable to provide that whatever was spoken at a public meeting might be printed and published. But then there was a point worthy of consideration—whether some privilege ought to be extended to journalists who were honestly employed in the performance of a public duty and who were thereby conferring an advantage on the community. Could this nation exist at the present day, he would ask, unless reports of the proceedings in their Lordships' House and in the other House of Parliament appeared in the public journals? And would their Lordships themselves be satisfied if such reports were not published? But, as the law at present stood, there was no protection to journalists who gave faithful reports of the debates in that or the other House of Parliament. Opon that point he could quote the high authority of his predecessor Lord Denman, who, when examined before their Lordships' Committee of 1843, stated that "he could not help entertaining a strong opinion that no faithful report of the debates that might be made ought to expose the publisher to an action or to a criminal proceeding;" and he added that, "as the law then stood, the fairness of a report was nothing like a justification, but that he was strongly of opinion that it ought to be." Upon that authority, he (Lord Campbell) had introduced a clause into the Bill which he had brought in the same year, a clause which would have given effect to that opinion of Lord Denman; but that clause had, unfortunately, miscarried—a result which had since been greatly regretted by many. He trusted, however, that their Lordships would think the time had arrived when the privilege now enjoyed in the case of reports of the proceedings in courts of justice might be extended with perfect safety to faithful reports of proceedings in the two Houses of Parliament. And, surely, that proposal was a perfectly reasonable one; because, upon the same principle, that faithful reports of the proceedings in courts of justice were privileged, faithful reports of the debates in Parliament might be protected; namely, that it was for the public benefit that such reports should be published. Whether it might be possible to go further was a fair matter of inquiry—the subject was full of difficulty, and he would not venture to propose any Bill without having the assistance of a Select Committee. Although it would be too much to say, that the privilege should be extended to reports of all public assemblies, yet there were other bodies besides Parliament in whose proceedings the public took interest—such as Convocation, for instance. It might not be very likely that the members of Convocation Would use slanderous expressions, or make any statements reflecting on private character; yet he had heard some right rev. Prelates in that House use very strong language which might, if reported, have laid the foundation for an action of slander, and it might be that the privilege should be extended to reports of proceedings in Convocation. The privilege might also be extended to reports of proceedings of county meetings and town-councils in boroughs. It would be unsafe to extend the privilege without some limitation, but it might be given to reports which were published bonâ fide for the public good, leaving that plea to be decided by the jury. The course of appointing a Select Committee was that which was adopted in 1843, and he hoped the same course would be agreed to upon the present occasion. The noble and learned Lord concluded by moving the appointment of a Select Committee.

LORD WENSLEYDALE

was understood to express his acquiescence in the statements of the noble and learned Lord as to the existing law. It was not lawful to repeat a slander which another person had uttered. His Lordship also expressed his approval of the object of the Motion, and his conviction of the expediency of effecting an alteration in the present state of the law.

Motion agreed to.

Select Committee named.

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