HL Deb 09 February 1857 vol 144 cc329-32
LORD BROUGHAM,

in presenting a Bill for giving a remedy against frivolous and vexatious law proceedings, said, their Lordships would be well aware that he should again, as he had done repeatedly—and, he grieved to say, without any success—make another attempt to recommend to their adoption that which in other countries had been found so beneficial and so effectual in preventing unnecessary litigation—he meant the system of courts of reconcilement. He knew that on that subject he had the misfortune not to have entirely on his side his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack. The Bill he was now about to introduce beside the provisions for the establishment of courts of reconcilement, such as he had twice before laid before the House, the enabling parties to go before the Judge without any legal advisers, state their case, and hear his opinion, it had now added a provision of great importance, on which he ventured to hope there would be no difference of opinion, as its absolute necessity could not for one moment be questioned—namely, to prevent, if that were possible, but at all events to mitigate, that most grievous abuse by which, as the law now stood, any person, not having a farthing in the world to pay in case he was defeated, might bring an action of the most frivolous and vexatious nature against any other person, and put him to the expense of £200 or £300; and by which, in the event of a verdict being found for the defendant, its effect was entirely destroyed and the defendant left utterly remediless, by the plaintiff taking the benefit of the Insolvent Act. He found from inquiry of the learned Insolvent Commissioners, whom he had seen within the last twenty-four hours, that the course of the court there, under strict construction of the Act of Parliament, prevented them taking into consideration the offence of a plaintiff in having brought a frivolous and vexatious action, and only left them at liberty to consider the opposite case of a frivolous and vexatious defence. His noble and learned Friend, the Lord Chief Justice, had he been at that moment in the House, would have recollected a case which happened in their early days in the Court of King's Bench. On that occasion a learned counsel, at the very head of his profession, who held a brief for the plaintiff, did what was called opening a nonsuit, for so it plainly proved. He made a statement containing a flagrant attack on the character of the defendant. When the moment arrived for calling his witnesses, and one had been examined, Lord Ellenborough asked if he could carry the case no further; whereupon he turned towards his junior and his attorney in a mock consultation, and then turning towards the Court, said he was afraid he could not carry the case further. Lord Ellenborough, the Judge, took occasion to remark on what he considered the culpable conduct of the learned counsel in lending himself to the plaintiff or his attorney who were trying an action with so disgraceful an object; but the plaintiff accomplished his object nevertheless, for it was not in the power of the Court to prevent that; the defendant's counsel was left without the opportunity of urging one word in defence of his client; the speech of the counsel for the plaintiff, containing the most bitter attack against a mercantile man's character, went forth throughout the country on the wings of the press, without the possibility of a remedy, for the report, which was held to be a perfectly fair one of what had taken place on the trial, came not within the operation of the law of libel, indeed it could not be prevented even by the restriction sometimes suffered to exist as to exparti proceedings, for this was not such. Now, in the case referred to, the defendant not only had his character slandered, but probably obtained no costs for the plaintiff. The measure he was about to recommend proposed to remedy the evil which he had briefly described. In addition to the provisions for reconcilement, which he took from his rejected Bill of 1851—rejected by their Lordships—he had included clauses with the view of giving a remedy against actions of that description. Great care ought to be taken not to obstruct the access of the poor man to courts of justice, and therefore he gave a discretionary power to Judges —to thsse of the County Courts as well as to those in the superior courts—upon hearing the parties—regard being had to the nature of the action and also to the circumstances of the plaintiff—to make, if they thought fit, an order staying proceedings until security were found for the costs. As the law now stood, such a power hardly existed. A man might be a bankrupt, and not worth a farthing, and, whether he brought his action for either his own benefit or that of his assignees, certifying when it is brought for his own benefit, the practice of the Court now was in no event to call upon him to find security. At present the practice was to stay proceedings only in the case of the plaintiff being abroad, or being about to quit the country. In general, Bills were presented to their Lordships without any statement of the purport, a first reading being always given as a matter of course by the courtesy of the House. But he had deviated repeatedly from this practice in presenting to their Lordships Bills for the amendment of the law, because it was highly expedient that their object should go forth to the profession and the public, in order to its being well considered by those whom it concerned before proceeding farther in their Lordships' House. He took this course on the present occasion. The proposed system of reconcilement, he was convinced, would have a most beneficial effect, if carried one step farther, in relieving the community from the great grievances which formed a large part of the subject matters of deliberation brought before the recent Mercantile Law Conference, over which he had had the honour to preside. There was no one subject on which that Conference—including as it did delegates from all the great towns of England and Scotland as well as those representing the metropolis—was more completely agreed than in complaining of the evils from which mercantile men were now suffering, than the lack of proper tribunals before which their causes might be speedily decided. Liverpool with 400,000 inhabitants and millions of capital in trade, and constant disputes arising out of the transactions, had no facility whatever in bringing such disputes to trial and settlement. Five circuits only in the year brought the Judges to that neighbourhood. But making the circuits of the Judges more frequent would not remedy all the evil; what was wanted was the establishment of local tribunals, in which mercantile or profess- sional men should act as assessors to the Judge. If this local jurisdiction with such addition were given to the great towns, it would give that kind of satisfaction which those desired, who were the most anxious for the establishment of tribunals of commerce, such as were found beneficial in other countries. He did not call upon their Lordships to adopt the measures propounded by these great mercantile bodies who were represented at the Conference, even when all of them were agreed in the proposition. But on one thing their authority must needs be decisive, he might say decisive without appeal—he meant the existence of the evil. For they were those on whom the defects of the law pressed, those who experienced its mischiefs. His Lordship them moved that his Bill—a Bill to prevent vexatious litigation—be now read a first time.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read 1a.