§ "WE, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal Subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to return to Your Majesty our humble Thanks for the gracious Speech which Your Majesty has commanded to be made to both Houses of Parliament.
§ "WE thank Your Majesty for assuring us, that Your Majesty has great Satisfaction in recurring again to the Advice and Assistance of Your Majesty's Parliament.
§ "WE humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us, that Difficulties which arose in regard to some of the Provisions of the Treaty of Paris delayed the complete Execution of the Stipulations of that Treaty, but that those Difficulties have been overcome in a satisfactory Manner, and the Intentions of the Treaty have been fully maintained.
§ "WE humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us, that an Insurrectionary Movement which took place in September last in the Swiss Canton of Neufchâtel, for the Purpose of re-establishing in that Canton the Authority of The King of Prussia as Prince of Neufchâtel, led to serious Differences between His Prussian Majesty and the Swiss Confederation, threatening at one time to disturb the general Peace of Europe.
§ "WE thank Your Majesty for informing us, that, in concert with Your Majesty's August Ally The Emperor of the French, Your Majesty is endeavouring to bring about an amicable Settlement of the Matters in dispute, and that Your Majesty entertains a confident Expectation that an honourable and satisfactory Arrangement will be concluded.
§ ''WE humbly convey to Your Majesty our humble Thanks for informing us, that in consequence of certain Discussions which took place during the Conferences at Paris, and which are recorded in the Protocols that were laid before us, Your 15 Majesty and The Emperor of the French caused Communications to be made to the Government of The King of the Two Sicilies, for the Purpose of inducing him to adopt a Course of Policy calculated to avert Dangers which might disturb that Peace which had been so recently restored to Europe.
§ "WE learn with Regret, that the Manner in which those friendly Communications were received by His Sicilian Majesty was such as to lead Your Majesty and The Emperor of the French to discontinue Diplomatic Relations with His Sicilian Majesty, and that the Missions of Your Majesty and The Emperor of the French have accordingly been withdrawn from the Court of Naples; and we thank Your Majesty for having directed that Papers relating to this Subject shall be laid before us.
§ "WE thank Your Majesty for acquainting us, that Your Majesty has been engaged in Negotiations with the Government of the United States, and also with the Government of Honduras, which Your Majesty trusts will be successful in removing all Cause of Misunderstanding with respect to Central America.
§ "WE thank Your Majesty for the Assurance that Your Majesty has concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Siam, which will be laid before us.
§ "WE assure Your Majesty that we participate in the Expression of Your Majesty's Regret that the Conduct of the Persian Government has Jed to Hostilities between Your Majesty and The Shah of Persia; and that the Persian Government, in defiance of repeated Warnings, and in violation of its Engagements, has besieged and captured the important City of Herat.
§ "WE thank Your Majesty for informing us, that a British Naval and Military Force, despatched from Bombay, has taken possession of the Island of Karrack and of the Town of Bushire, with a view to induce The Shah to accede to the just Demands of Your Majesty's Government; and we learn with Satisfaction that the 16 Military and Naval Forces employed on this Occasion have displayed their accustomed Gallantry and Spirit.
§ "WE humbly express our Regret that Acts of Violence, Insults to the British Flag, and Infraction of Treaty Rights committed by the local Chinese Authorities at Canton, and a pertinacious Refusal of Redress, have rendered it necessary for Your Majesty's Officers in China to have recourse to Measures of Force to obtain Satisfaction.
§ "WE thank Your Majesty for informing us, that those Measures had, up to the Date of the last Accounts, been taken with great Forbearance, but with signal Success as regards the Conflicts to which they had led; and we assure Your Majesty that we concur with Your Majesty in trusting that the Government of Pekin will see the Propriety of affording the Satisfaction demanded, and of faithfully fulfilling its Treaty Engagements.
§ "WE humbly thank Your Majesty for acquainting us, that Bills will be submitted to our Consideration for the Consolidation and the Amendment of important Portions of the Law; and we assure Your Majesty that we will give our earnest Attention to Matters so deeply affecting the Interests of all Classes of Your Majesty's Subjects.
§ "WE assure Your Majesty that we will take into our careful Consideration the Expediency of renewing for a further Period the Privileges of the Bank of England, the Conditions imposed on the Issue of Bank Notes in the United Kingdom, and the State of the Law relating to Joint Stock Banks.
§ "WE participate in the Gratification which it affords Your Majesty to witness the general Well-being and Contentment of Your People, and to find that, notwithstanding the Sacrifices unavoidably attendant upon such a War as that which has lately terminated, the Resources of the Country remain unimpaired, and its productive Industry continues unchecked in its Course of progressive Development.
17§ "We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us, that Your Majesty commits with Confidence the great Interests of the Country to our Wisdom and Care; and in common with Your Majesty we fervently pray that the Blessing of Almighty God may attend our Deliberations, and prosper our Councils, for the Advancement of the Welfare and Happiness of Your Majesty's loyal and faithful People."
THE EARL OF AIRLIE, who was very indistinctly heard, seconded the Address. The noble Earl was understood to say, that although the Speech from the Throne embraced a greater variety of topics then was usual in documents of that nature, yet the majority of them had been so well touched upon by the noble Earl who had preceded him that he was happy to say it would not be necessary for him to occupy much of their Lordships' time, and he trusted that in the course of the few observations he should make, nothing would fall from him calculated to interrupt the harmony of debate or to convey any reflections upon any party in their Lordships' House. For his own part, when he examined the history of the last few years, and considered the cordial support afforded to Her Majesty's Government both by the Parliament and the people, he found it difficult to realise the existence in this country of a large and powerful political party, entertaining different political views from those held by the actual Administration; for no one could fail to have remarked in the conduct of that party, not only during the progress of the late war, but also since, during the negotiations for peace, the same absence of partisanship, by the same sacrifice of party interests to the purposes of the nation, which he trusted it would always manifest; and perhaps to the unanimity of the Parliament and people of England on the great question of the day, and to the determination which they had clearly evinced to be satisfied with nothing short of the complete attainment of those objects which had been laid down as the basis of negotiations by the Treaty of Paris, to that determination and that unanimity in conjunction with the firm and dignified attitude of Austria, and the unswerving fidelity to his engagements of their Ally, the Emperor of the French, was to be mainly ascribed the satisfactory adjustment of those difficulties which had arisen respecting the frontier of 18 Bessarabia and the Isle of Serpents. He felt sure that the House and the people would partake of the satisfaction expressed by Her Majesty, that those differences had been settled in a manner which would effectually secure the free navigation of the Danube. With regard to the question at issue between the King of Prussia and the Swiss Confederation, he (the Earl of Airlie) was also sure that the House would hear with satisfaction the confident expectation entertained by Her Majesty of an honourable and satisfactory arrangement of the matters in dispute. But at the same time, and without in any way entering into the merits of the question, he (the Earl of Airlie) could not advert to this subject without expressing in the strongest manner the admiration which he felt at the gallant bearing of the Swiss people. Conscious of the perils of their situation, but undismayed by the power of Prussia, buoyed up by no vain hopes of glory, but ready to face every danger in asserting the independence of their country, resolute but calm, the Swiss had shown themselves worthy descendants of the heroes who had conquered at Granson and Morgarten. It was such men who had in every age been the true guardians of freedom, and their conduct must raise a feeling of admiration in every heart. He thought that Her Majesty's Government well deserved the thanks of Parliament for the part they had taken in preventing collision between Prussia and the Swiss Confederation. With regard to the relations which existed between this country and the King of the Two Sicilies, he was satisfied that the House would approve the course adopted by Her Majesty, as well as of the advice tendered to that Monarch. Her Majesty's Government could not countenance a course of policy which was calculated to extend danger and disturb the peace of Europe, while at the same time they were bound to abstain from anything like armed interventions. While he was upon that subject, although it was not perhaps quite regular to refer in either House of Parliament to the conduct of a foreign Sovereign—he could not refrain from saying that the conciliatory policy now adopted by the Emperor of Austria towards his Italian subjects was worthy of every regard, and he trusted that it would meet with its reward in the consolidation and strengthening of his empire. It must, no doubt, have been extremely gratifying to all of their Lordships to hear the expres- 19 sion of Her Majesty's hope that the negotiations on foot with the United States on the subject of Central America, were likely to be successful in removing all causes of dissatisfaction on that subject; and they were aware that the danger of a suspension of diplomatic relations with that country which last year seemed imminent, had been removed, Her Majesty's announcement that a treaty of friendship and commerce had been entered into with Siam would, he was sure, be received with satisfaction by their Lordships. The next subject referred to in Her Majesty's Speech was the hostilities which had been commenced against the Shah of Persia. It was not for him then to enter into a detail of the causes which had led to the adoption of those hostilities; but he might say that in the opinion of every man acquainted with the East, it was necessary for the safety of our Indian Empire that decisive steps should be taken; that it was indispensable that Herat should remain independent and should not, under any circumstances, become a dependency of Persia. He would quote the opinion of the highest military authority on this point; the Duke of Wellington writing in 1838 had said, "if the siege of Herat is to continue, I do not see that the Company can do otherwise than provide for its defence." And surely no one would contend that it was less necessary now than in 1838 to maintain the independence of Herat. Since 1838 we had annexed Scinde and the Punjaub, we had been brought into immediate contact with the Affghans, we had pushed the frontiers of our Indian Empire up to the confines of Aghanistan; we could not, if we would, abstain from taking some part in the political affairs of that country. He was satisfied also that their Lordships would partake in the sentiments expressed in the Royal Speech in admiration of the gallantry and spirit displayed by our naval and military forces in the capture of Bushire and Karrack. They had to deplore the loss of some brave men in the attack on Bushire; but considering the strength of the fortifications and the number of the men engaged in the defence, it was only surprising that the loss had not been greater. Whatever might have been the causes of the war, he hoped that the successes already obtained by our forces would induce the Shah to put an end to hostilities; for we must never forget that the safety of our Indian Empire must render us deeply interested in the affairs of Per- 20 sia. Her Majesty referring to China had next informed their Lordships that the acts of violence and insults to the British flag and the infraction of treaty rights committed by the local authorities at Canton, and the pertinacious refusal of redress had rendered it necessary to have recourse to measures of force to obtain satisfaction. Whatever doubts might be expressed in reference to the affair of the Arrow, it was notorious that within the last twelve months more than one vessel, having an unmistakeahle British register, had been seized by the Chinese authorities, and that all attempts to obtain redress had been ineffectual. The seizure of the Arrow was but the last of these insults and annoyances; and as by the stipulations of the existing treaty the Chinese were bound to admit Her Majesty's subjects into the city of Canton, which they had hitherto pertinaciously refused, he was convinced that their Lordships would agree with him that Her Majesty's officers in those seas were fully justified in the course they had taken in the matter. It was, at least, a tolerably strong presumption in favour of the justice of our cause, that of all the merchants engaged in the China trade (and of the importance of that trade their Lordships might form some estimate from the fact, that the value of our imports from China amounted last year to £9,000,000, while the value of exports to China from Great Britain and the British possessions in India amounted to nearly as large a sum), while many of these men, sufferers by the war, in consequence of the stoppage of their trade which it entailed, had loudly proclaimed the necessity and the justice of the war with China, not one had come forward to denounce it. On the contrary, they complained that successive Governments had erred on the side of too great leniency towards the Chinese, and a laxity in insisting on the rights guaranteed to us by the treaty of 1842. Hitherto the right of British subjects to enter into Canton had been waived by our authorities, but it had never been abandoned; and so long as British subjects had no access to Canton, and all business transactions between the town and the foreign factories was carried on by written correspondence, it was evident that such a state must give rise to endless misunderstandings, and that it had become necessary, considering the immense increase of our commerce, to enforce the full admission of our rights. He would not refer to the circumstances connected with the seizure 21 of the crew of the Arrow—all he would say was, that it appeared to him that the British Government had a perfect right to act as they had done under the stipulations of the treaty with China.
Her Majesty had then referred to various measures for the consolidation and amendment of the law. He was perfectly sure that this announcement would be acceptable to their Lordships, for the necessity of such reforms was obvious to all persons.
Her Majesty had next referred to the great question of the renewal of the Bank Charter. He (the Earl of Airlie) was not himself of opinion that it was necessary to make any alteration in the banking system of this country; but if any alteration should be deemed expedient, he trusted that care would be taken to proceed on the safest and most approved principles; and that no changes would be introduced into the system of banking in Scotland, which had hitherto given general satisfaction throughout that country. With regard to that part of Her Majesty's Speech which referred to the general well being and contentment of the people, he (the Earl of Airlie) was happy to find that that representation was fully borne out by the Returns which related to the extent of our commercial relations with other countries. A comparative statement of the exports and imports of the years 1853, 1854, and 1855, showed a general and marked improvement in the progress of the country, notwithstanding the sacrifice unavoidably attendant on the late war; and he was satisfied that the prosperity of the country was proved beyond dispute. He begged leave, in conclusion, to second the Motion.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, I entirely concur with the observation of the noble Lord, whose speech in addressing the House for the first time I have heard with great pleasure, that this is not the proper opportunity for discussing in detail the topics contained in Her Majesty's Speech, involving as it does so many subjects of great importance, and requiring the most mature deliberation—upon that ground I quite concur with the noble Earl that it is not desirable to enter into their consideration upon the present occasion. There are various subjects, both foreign and domestic, adverted to in the Speech now before your Lordships, upon which great differences of opinion exist, and on which much discussion must take place. But for many reasons, and especially considering the importance and mul- 22 tiplicity of the questions involved, I have to repeat that I concur with the noble Earl in thinking that this is an inconvenient period for entering into the consideration of any one of them, or even of raising a miscellaneous discussion of the different subjects introduced to our notice. It has of late years been the practice—the laudable practice—of Parliament that, except on some extraordinary occasions, the Address to the Crown in answer to the Speech from the Throne at the commencement of the Session should pass, at least in this House, without a division, and be, in point of fact, the unanimous and respectful expression of the deference with which we receive the first communication of the Session from the Queen. But, on the other hand, it should be the practice that the Ministers of the Crown should bring forward in the Speeches from the Throne a statement of the most material circumstances of public importance which have occurred since Parliament separated, and that they should intimate generally the most material measures which it is their intention to bring under the consideration of Parliament. Holding these views, I confess, my Lords, I can only entertain a hope that, with regard to the future, Her Majesty's Government may intend to perform something more than they have set forth in the programme now before your Lordships, for a more meagre bill of fare for the coming Session, and a more vague and shadowy portraiture of the measures to which our attention is to be directed, I never recollect to have seen than is contained in the few paragraphs of the Speech that are devoted to domestic affairs and future events. There are two questions of this nature to which the Speech particularly refers—one the general subject of the amendment of the law, which hag been brought before Parliament on various occasions by Members of both Houses not connected with the Government; and the other that most important and difficult question, on which I carefully abstain from expressing an opinion, the renewal of the Bank Charter Act. With regard to the first of these questions, I shall only say that I shall rejoice to see the Government entering into an open and honourable rivalry in the spirit of law reformers with those noble, honourable and learned persons who, though unconnected with office, have in this, and the other House of Parliament, so zealously and, to a great extent, so successfully, for many years 23 devoted their attention to this subject. I may venture to express a hope that, among the many difficulties which obviously stand in the way of any great improvement of our complicated system of law, one at least may not be found—that difference of opinion between high legal authorities, both in this and the other House of Parliament, has prevented the success of former attempts at amendment. With regard to the second of these questions—the renewal of the Bank Charter—I must say that I observed, my Lords, with some surprise—and I think it is another indication of the discretion of the noble Earl who moved the Address—that, although he carefully but briefly noticed every other topic of the Speech from the Throne, he was altogether and discreetly silent with regard to this. I hope I am not unjust in attributing the noble Earl's discretion at this point to his not very well knowing what to say on it. I can imagine the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government, when instructing the noble Earl as to the points upon which it was desirable that he should dwell, informing him that the less he said with reference to the Bank Charter, and the more careful he was not to commit Her Majesty's Government on that subject, the better satisfied they would be. Not doubting, therefore, the discretion of the noble Earl for one moment, I think, however, I may assume that, like Hotspur's wife, he abstained from stating the precise course which the Government intend to pursue on this important subject, because "he could not utter what he did not know." In one of the paragraphs of the Royal Speech, Her Majesty recommends to our consideration three things; first, "the expediency of renewing for a further period the privileges of the Bank of England;" next that we should consider "the conditions imposed on the issue of bank-notes in the United Kingdom;" and, thirdly, that we should consider "the state of the law relating to Joint stock Banks." I cannot, my Lords, gather from this paragraph whether Her Majesty's Government intend to alter the law on these subjects, which I agree with the noble Earl who moved the Address, are in a very unsatisfactory state; or whether they intend to take any other course. I trust, however, that Her Majesty's Government have made up their minds, on this matter at least, as to the course which they intend to recommend to Parliament,—that they are not going again to launch this great and important ques- 24 tion into the abyss of a Select Committee, or to invite a deluge of pamphlets and correspondence from the pen of "Mercator" and his contemporaries; but I do trust that, acting upon the best judgment they can form, they will, upon their own responsibility as a Government, submit to Parliament such a measure, whether in adherence to or in alteration of the existing law, as they may deem expedient, and that the question may be settled by Parliament upon a plan deliberately submitted as the result of the careful consideration of the Government of the day. I believe, my Lords, I have now adverted to the only measures of domestic policy which are indicated by the Government in the Speech from the Throne; but there is in that Speech one paragraph which may undoubtedly lead to very important consequences, although it is less addressed to your Lordships than to the other House of Parliament, and relates to the subject to which perhaps it is scarcely proper for me to advert in this place. But, my Lords, looking to the gravity and importance of that subject, I cannot withhold the expression of my conviction that I have greatly misunderstood both what appears to me the duty, and what I think will prove to be the inclination, of the House of Commons, if the vague and meagre reference to the Estimates made in the stereotyped terms in the Speech from the Throne, that "they have been prepared with every attention to economy, and with a due regard to the efficient performance of the public service at home and abroad," will sufficiently satisfy that House, which is, as it ought to be, the guardian of the public purse. We are now at a very critical period, and the financial statement which will be made this year must involve in its consideration, in its discussion, and in its consequences, not merely the provision for a single year, but it must be the well-considered and matured plan on which the finance of the country can rest securely for many years to come. In the year 1853 a very comprehensive and able budget was submitted to Parliament; and, although I cannot concur in the extravagant amount of encomium which was bestowed upon that budget as an absolutely unsurpassed financial measure, yet it undoubtedly possessed this great merit—that it took a broad and comprehensive view of the state of our national finances. Although I dissented from some of the propositions contained in that budget—although I thought 25 it a grave injustice to maintain taxes which pressed with peculiar hardship upon particular interests—yet there was in it a degree of comprehensiveness which redeemed many of its defects; and, above all others, it laid down one principle which I hold to be of the utmost importance—namely, a positive pledge that beyond the year 1860 the income tax should not be maintained. Now, I say that Parliament will not do their duty if they are satisfied with less than the full bonâ fide redemption of that pledge. That pledge was ratified by an Act of Parliament now in force; but it was suspended during the war—generously and magnanimously suspended—and for such a period as Her Majesty's Government thought necessary after the termination of the war, in order to meet the expenses of hostilities; it was suspended by an Act which not only continued, but which very largely increased the heavy burden of the income-tax; and, for the purposes of the war, but with a strict limitation to those purposes, the public generously and magnanimously submitted to all the sacrifices which were required from them, confident in the good faith of the Government that the tax was henceforth to be a war tax—a tax of tremendous power, an instrument of vast energy and effect, exhibiting in the strongest degree to foreign countries the immensity and the power of our resources for war; but a tax which, if not limited to the purposes of war, is an instrument of dangerous facility to intrust in the hands of any Minister. Although this subject is not one for your Lordships' special consideration, and although there is no reference to the special subject in the Speech from the Throne, yet deeply as you are interested in it personally, and deeply as you are interested in it also with reference to the public welfare, I could not allow this, the first opportunity of the Session, to pass without expressing my confident hope and belief, in which I am sure your Lordships will concur, that Parliament will insist upon the full and entire accomplishment of that pledge by which in 1860 the income-tax will cease to be imposed. I will now proceed to what is to me by far the largest and by far the most unsatisfactory portion of the Royal Speech—that devoted to the subject of our foreign relations. I cannot read this portion of the speech without casting back a look of regret to those good old days when the stereotyped passage of the Royal Speech, 26 containing in a single paragraph all reference to foreign affairs, stated that His Majesty or Her Majesty was happy to inform Parliament that he or she continued to maintain the most friendly relations with all foreign powers. Now, my Lords, I will venture to say that that single paragraph would give more satisfaction to the people of this country, and would afford a better security for the peace of Europe, than all the multitudinous paragraphs in the Speech which has just been read to us, referring, I am sorry to say, in every instance, to disputes partially or not entirely settled, and to questions more or less complicated. Her Majesty is scarcely able to refer with unmitigated satisfaction to our foreign relations with any State, unless, indeed, it be to the important fact that "Her Majesty has concluded a treaty of friendship and commerce with Siam." I do not wish to speak with levity of that treaty, or of the consequences which may result from it. I believe the present King of Siam to be a man of considerable intelligence and energy, who appreciates the advantages of civilisation, and who entertains the most friendly disposition towards this country. For my own part, I should always rejoice at every extension of our commercial relations, so long as they do not tend, as sometimes they do, to place us in positions inconsistent with the prosecution of peaceful enterprise. I rejoice, therefore, to hear of the conclusion of a treaty which may promote commercial intercourse, and which may strengthen our friendly relations even with the King of Siam. Another paragraph, of a very different character, is that in which Her Majesty refers to the difficulties which had arisen with regard to some of the provisions of the treaty of Paris. Her Majesty tells us that "those difficulties have been overcome in a satisfacrory manner, and the intentions of the treaty have been fully maintained." My Lords, as we are now at peace, and as I trust in God that peace will long be maintained, I cannot but regret that the noble Earl who opened the discussion should have indulged in some expressions not very complimentary to the good faith of that potentate with whom we have lately been at war, and with whom we have now concluded peace. I have always thought and have always said that when we were engaged in hostilities we were bound to prosecute the war with the utmost energy and determination. I was not myself satisfied with the results 27 of that war. I was not satisfied with that peace which apparently affords so much satisfaction to the noble Earl opposite and to Her Majesty's Government, any more than I approved of the conduct of the war in some particulars. But let me impress upon the noble Earl, who has, I hope, a long and useful career before him, that from the time when peace was concluded no word of bitterness should be heard to drop from any Member of this House with regard to our late opponent. The difficulties which arose were certainly of a somewhat extraordinary nature, and, though the noble Earl tells us that they cast suspicion upon the good faith of Russia, the noble Earl must forgive me for saying that they reflect no very great credit on the clearsightedness and intelligence of Her Majesty's Government. I am told—but it is quite incredible, and I hope I shall be contradicted by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Clarendon), that the main difficulty arose, not upon the interpretation of some doubtful phrase, but upon the delineation of the boundary which was laid down in the map and described in the terms of the treaty; and I am told—but it is so incredible that I shall scarcely believe it until the noble Earl tells me that I have been correctly told—that it is really the fact that the map upon which the whole construction of the treaty turned, as it delineated and was the authentic record of that which was for the future to be the boundary of the two empires, was not paraphéed—that is, the signatures of the Plenipotentiaries were not affixed to it. Why, my Lords, if you enter into a contract for the purchase of a field the map delineating its boundaries is always attached to the instrument of purchase and forms part of it; and yet in a question which was to settle the boundaries of empires, in which the line of demarcation was the very point of all others to which the attention of the Plenipotentiaries ought to have been turned, it appears that there is no evidence of the authenticity of the instrument upon which bur Plenipotentiaries had to rely in support of their interpretation of the treaty. That is a circumstance not very creditable to the clearsightedness and, I may say, to the business habits of Her Majesty's Government. It was a point which ought to have been most carefully attended to; and the probability is, that if it had been attended to no difficulties would have arisen and no second Conference would have been necessary. But does it not strike your Lordships that the lan- 28 guage of Her Majesty's Government, of the leading Members of the Government, of the head of the Government in fact, when that second Conference was proposed, it was very inconsistent with the satisfaction now expressed at the results of that Conference? I recollect very well the tone and the language then employed. I do not mean by that portion of the press which appears to be at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government, I speak of the language used by the Ministers themselves—by the First Lord of the Treasury at Manchester. Then the Emperor of Russia was to be compelled to maintain good faith and to fulfil the treaty to the very letter; without allowing any question, any difference, or any discussion of its obligations, the treaty of Paris was to be carried out according to the sense in which England understood it. There were to be no more Conferences, our fleet was to be sent into the Black Sea, and we were not to be satisfied without a strict and literal fulfilment of our interpretation of the treaty. That was the noble Viscount's declaration at Manchester, and it was cheered to the echo as bold, spirited, and manly. And yet, what happened? In spite of all these fine words, which could admit of but one construction and not of any doubt, the noble Viscount, by the advice of his Allies, or it may be by something more than their advice, was compelled to refer these matters to another Conference, and, finally, he only obtained his own construction of the treaty by the cession of territory beyond that proposed in the original Conference. This may be a satisfactory arrangement, and I trust it will be; and now that peace is restored I hope there will be on all sides an adherence to the letter and spirit of the treaty, and that we shall not again hear from public men and from the public journals—who I must say do infinite mischief by their intemperance and indiscretion—any more of that violent abuse of those who were lately our adversaries, which I am convinced is a serious obstacle to the preservation of good relations with foreign States. I cannot but regret also that the noble Earl who moved the Address should have characterised as a "paltry, miserable insurrection," the misguided efforts of those Royalists in the canton of Neufchâtel who rose for the purpose of asserting the rights, as they conceived them to be, of their lawful Sovereign. Misguided they undoubtedly were—erroneous their views may have been—unfortunate they cer- 29 tainly have been—their efforts were put down; but I never yet heard any man throw a doubt on the purity of the motives or on the sense of the allegiance and loyalty by which they were guided. Whatever their misfortunes and errors may have been this is not the country in which to speak lightly of allegiance and loyalty. I certainly did entertain a hope that this matter was not only in course of being settled, but that it actually had been settled satisfactorily; and I regret to find from the Royal Speech that that is not the ease. I may be permitted to say a few words with regard to the claim of the King of Prussia, because it was at a period when I was connected with the Government that that protocol was signed in London upon which it is said the King of Prussia now founds his claim. I must beg your Lordships to look back for a single moment to what was then the condition of Europe. France was then in a most unquiet state. The famous words L'Empire c'est la paix had not then been uttered; indeed, the Empire did not then exist. The public mind in France was greatly agitated. Piedmont, Switzerland, and Belgium were looking with great alarm to the solution of the questions then pending. France was making demands upon them inconsistent, as it appeared to them, with their national honour and independence, and the state of affairs was altogether exceedingly critical. I shall ever consider it a great satisfaction that the Government with which I was connected, by their good offices and friendly mediation, and by the moderation of the parties concerned, were instrumental in settling this question in a manner not compromising the independence and honour of Switzerland, and at the same time satisfactory to the just demands of France. But precisely at that time we were called upon by the King of Prussia not to take any active steps on his behalf, nor to enforce the rights which he claimed as Prince of Neufchâtel, but to recognise the existence de jure of certain rights, not very well defined, and perhaps not very easily reconcilable with the subsequent relations of Nenfchâtel. Your Lordships will observe that these rights were confirmed to the King of Prussia—or rather to the Prince of Neufchâtel, for Prussia as a kingdom has nothing to do with the question, it only affects the interests of the Prince of Nenfchâtel, who happens to be King of Prussia also—by the treaties of 1815, 30 which it was of the utmost importance at that time to the peace of Europe to preserve from infringement. They were the treaties, too, by which the independence and neutrality of Switzerland were guaranteed. The arrangement Her Majesty's Government made with the King of Prussia was, that the great Powers of Europe on the one part should admit the existence of the rights de jure which he claimed, while he on his part entered into an engagement not to disturb the peace of Europe by any attempt to enforce those rights, bnt to place himself in the hands of the great Powers, and to leave them to settle the question, as between him and the Swiss Confederation. I cannot conceive an arrangement not only more harmless in itself as involving no ulterior consequences, but more likely to attain first, the immediate preservation of the peace of Europe, and next, the ultimate settlement of the question at issue. I do not blame the Government which have succeeded for not having taken any steps to come to a solution of this matter. I think, indeed, that when they were dealing with the affairs of other countries, the proposition made at the Paris Conferences was not an unreasonable one—namely, to take into consideration as one among the causes which it was possible might disturb the peace of Europe, this question between the King of Prussia and Switzerland. They did not do so, however; and the consequence was, that some misguided men, in the excess of their loyalty, rose for the purpose of enforcing the rights of the Prince of Neufchâtel. They were immediately put down by the determined spirit of the Swiss people—[The Earl of CLARENDON: By the people of Neufchâtel themselves.] Well, by the people of Neufchâtel, and their acts were not unnaturally treated by the Swiss Confederation as acts of hostility to their Government. Under these circumstances the King of Prussia threatened to enforce his rights, unless these persons were at once dismissed without punishment, and, indeed, without trial. To have done this without any further understanding would have been for the Swiss Confederation to make an admission which it was impossible for them to make; and consequently the only step was to have recourse to the mediation of the other Powers of Europe. Now, Great Britain having taken the lead in 1852 in inviting the correspondence of the other Powers upon the subject, and afterwards in agree- 31 ing to the protocol of that date, it would, I believe, have been more in accordance with diplomatic etiquette and ordinary usage if, on this occasion, she had followed in the same steps, had taken the initiative, and had again invited the other Powers to consider what further steps should he taken in pursuance of that protocol, and that a Conference should have been held on the subject. But the King of Prussia, it appears, had placed himself unreservedly in the hands of the Emperor of the French, and a proposition was made by His Majesty to the Swiss Confederation, which was ultimately acceded to by them. For myself, I have gathered a very distinct impression that Switzerland was on the point of accepting the mediation, or rather the settlement, offered on the part of France, when the representations made to her by the British Government induced her to change her intention. And if I am correct in the assumption—and I must adhere to it until it is contradicted—that the Swiss are encouraged in standing out and in refusing the arbitration of France by Her Majesty's Ministers, I must say that, although I may rejoice that endeavours are being made by our Government, in concert with our august Ally, to bring about a settlement of the matters in dispute, yet I cannot help feeling that if our Government had not interfered with the efforts of our august Ally this vexed question would have been much earlier adjusted. There is another point which I trust is on the eve of satisfactory solution; I mean our differences with the United States in regard to Central America. Beyond the honourable engagements that we have undertaken towards certain Indian tribes, we have few interests peculiarly our own to maintain in that quarter of the globe. It is, however, a matter of importance to a great commercial people like this, and also to the world at large, that the neutrality of what may ultimately be the line of our communication across the Isthmus of Panama should be faithfully preserved between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Our only interest in that respect is, that the route shall not fall into the hands of a Power capable of exercising a controlling influence over our commercial interests in that part of the world, and I shall view any sacrifice of the islands and territory which we may make in that region—provided they are intrusted to a Power adequate to prevent them from becoming the resort of lawless and disrepu- 32 table characters, but still not adequate to exercise a controlling influence there to the prejudice of our interests—as fully compensated for by the attainment of the other objects involved in such a general arrangement. The arrangements on this subject have, I presume, been completed with the United States Government; but I wish to know in what position we shall stand in the possible, though perhaps not very probable event of the Senate of the United States refusing to ratify the treaty. In that case shall we not have surrendered Ruatan and the adjacent territory, without securing a guarantee on the part of the United States for the neutrality of the passage across the Isthmus, or our own authority over the Mosquito district? I hope we shall be told that the two engagements stand and fall together—that we shall not be bound by the one treaty without having the equivalent advantage of the other—that the two will, in fact, form part of one general arrangement, to the whole of which the United States will be equally pledged with ourselves.
Let us turn now, for a moment, to the other topics of difficulty which crowd upon us in this Speech, and which I am afraid will continue to crowd upon us as long as the noble Viscount (Viscount Palmerston) remains at the head of our affairs; because, admitting as I do, the extraordinary adroitness with which the noble Viscount comes out of the dilemmas in which he—unconsciously of course—places our foreign policy, I cannot help imagining that this very faculty of adroitness in getting out of difficulties tempts its possessor to launch us into the worst complications as frequently as possible, in order that he may have more opportunities for the exercise of his matchless skill in extricating the country from them again. In no other way can I account for it, that under his administration—whether the noble Viscount is at the head of our Foreign Affairs or at the head of our Government—we are becoming perpetually embroiled, first with one Power, and then with another. Not, indeed, that his system lands us in great wars, but in what are termed diplomatic "difficulties," from which we always emerge, somehow or other, with more or less of discredit and disadvantage. But turning now to the affairs of Naples, so far as a judgment can be formed from such means of information as are open to me, I cannot myself conceive upon what ground the Government got out of that difficulty, or 33 how they arrived at the dignified resolution to which they came. It has been much the fashion to talk of the duplicity of Russia in the late transactions. Are we quite sure, my Lords, that our own conduct on all occasions has been perfectly straightforward,—can we say that we have held the same language to different nations, or that we have kept the spirit as well as the letter of the promises we have made and the expectations we have excited? Are we quite sure that we have held out no inducements which we have kept to the ear while we have broken them to the hope? Are we sure that we have kept faith in the spirit as well as to the letter of the expectation and promises which we held out to the Sardinians? Are we quite certain that we have not obtained valuable support from a warlike and, if not a powerful, at all events a brave and noble people, by encouraging them to expect our interference, if not by action, at least by moral persuasion, for the improvement of their position in relation to the other States of Italy? Have we not given them ground to look for our active aid in relieving them from a continual menace hanging over their heads in securing their independence, and in enabling them to diminish those expenses which press so heavily on their finances? Are we quite sure that after we had reaped the advantage of their co-operation we made a return to them at the final close of the Paris Conferences, in the shape of such an amount of assistance and material support, as our words and acts had led them to calculate upon? My Lords, I greatly doubt it. I have not forgotten the language of the Sardinian Commissioner when he referred, and referred in terms of some bitterness, to the hope which his country had conceived, and which it had been induced to cherish, from the conduct of the French and British Governments. I have not forgotten the evasive answer (I use the word in no offensive sense) which the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Clarendon), after an interval of six short weeks, was compelled to give in reply to the remonstrance of the Sardinian Minister. It is true, my Lords, that at the Paris Conferences we kept the word of promise to the ear. We introduced some vague unmeaning words about the foreign occupation of the Papal States and the Legations being an "abnormal state of things," and a serious evil. We put our hands to these unmeaning words, but did we take 34 the slightest step, or press our Allies, France and Austria, to take the slightest step towards putting an end to this serious and abnormal state of affairs, and to remove that protection by foreign troops which enabled them with impunity to violate the rights and threaten the independence of Piedmont? I am well aware that Austria objected to the introduction into the Conferences of any matters alien to their immediate object. And I ask, has Austria no reason for entertaining diminished confidence in us in consequence of the equivocal course we have pursued? I have always thought that, while it was no part of our business either to interfere between Austria and her Italian subjects, to encourage her subjects to revolt or to seek to disturb her in her possessions, at the same time it was not for us to go out of our way to strengthen her position in the Italian peninsula. On the contrary, a rigid good faith requires us to abstain from all kinds of such intermeddling. But I ask the noble Earl opposite whether Austria has not by the Acts of her Allies, in the course of these negotiations, obtained a greater security than ever for the maintenance of her Italian territories? I greatly doubt whether the noble Earl can answer that question in the negative. But, my Lords, what did we do? Abstaining from entering into such arrangements as might satisfy the just expectations of Piedmont, we yet embarked in a policy of interference with the internal government of the kingdom of the two Sicilies, based on the pretext of a regard for the peace of Europe. What had the state of the kingdom of the two Sicilies to do with the peace of Europe? You tell us that communications were made to the government of the King of the Two Sicilies, "for the purpose of inducing him to adopt a course of policy calculated to avert dangers which might disturb the peace which had been so recently restored to Europe." But will the noble Earl rise up on the part of the Government and gravely tell this assembly that Her Majesty's Ministers had the slightest apprehension that the course of conduct adopted by the King of Naples towards his own subjects would occasion the smallest chance of any disturbance of the peace of Europe? It is all very well to talk of the danger of Austrian interference and of the danger of French interference; but the noble Earl knows that there was nothing to fear from any conflict of opinion between France and Austria on 35 this point. The plea of any such danger was a mere plea, without any substance in it. Your interference with Naples was partly dictated by a sense of the necessity for adhering in form to the declarations you had previously made, and by that mischievous spirit of meddling to which the noble Viscount at the head of the Government is so strongly addicted. But what were your demands upon the King of Naples? If you are on amicable and intimate terms with any Sovereign you might no doubt take the liberty to represent to him in a friendly manner that he is not pursuing a system of internal administration in his own dominions which you think calculated to advance his own interests. No doubt, in so doing, you take a great liberty. But were our relations with Naples based upon so close and equal a footing as to justify the slightest interference on our part in the management of his domestic affairs? Observe, my Lords, that I am not supporting the tyrannical measures of the King's Government, as I believe them to be; I am not defending him; I am not defending the state of things at Naples or in the Papal States, made infinitely worse in the latter case by the occupation of foreign troops; neither do I look with satisfaction upon the position of constitutional government in Spain. But what have we to do with Spain? what have we to do with Rome? or with Naples? If English subjects suffer from the acts of any of these States, you are indeed bound to interfere and defend them; but, as between a Sovereign and his own subjects, I say that, according to every principle of international law, remonstrance is going to the utmost limit to which you have a right to go, and the breaking off of friendly relations because a monarch refuses to accept your advice as to the management of his own kingdom, cannot be defended by any persons in the slightest degree acquainted with the principles of international law. On what ground, then, did you withdraw your ambassadors? I am not to be deterred by being told that, in attacking this policy, I am attacking that of the Emperor of the French. I have the profoundest respect for the Emperor of the French; I respect his great talents; I especially admire the scrupulous fidelity with which he has observed his engagements with this country, and for the desire he has uniformly shown to maintain inviolate the friendly relations between the two nations. I am not going too far even 36 when I say that at this moment he is, perhaps, the only firm friend you have in Europe; but I think the Emperor of the French, acting as he does in concert with the Government of this country, is very likely to fall into error, and that he has done so in this case. What have you done? You make a demand upon the King of Naples. He answers in a manner which you may, if you choose, consider offensive; but he only bids you to attend to your own business. Whereupon you say, "If you don't mean to govern your country as we wish it to be governed, and to follow our advice in a matter in which we have no earthly excuse for tendering advice, we will withdraw our Ministers." Now, on this subject, just recollect the language which for weeks and months was held by that portion of the press which is supposed to receive its inspiration from the noble Viscount at the head of Her Majesty's Government; and that it does so the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Clarendon) will hardly venture explicitly to deny. Was there any term of vituperation that was not used in connection with the King of Naples? We were told that the British fleet was to sail to the Bay of Naples, that it required nothing but the sight of our fleet to make the people of Naples and of Sicily revolt, that the King would thereupon become a fugitive upon the face of the earth, and that then—God knows what was to happen. And yet the Royal Speech now refers to the "friendly communications" held with the King, and the noble Earl, the Mover of the Address, expresses great surprise that His Majesty refused to take the advice tendered to him in such terms as these. In consequence of this, England and France withdrew their Ambassadors. And what was the reply of the King of Naples to that? He merely said to the Ambassadors, "I wish you good morning, Gentlemen!" Thus, two of the greatest nations in Europe threaten to withdraw their missions as a menace, and in return the Ambassadors are quietly told that they may walk down stairs. The Ambassadors submit to that indignity; they go away without the slightest excitement on the part of any human being; no additional precautions are taken by the Neapolitan Government; the King of Naples passes through the street; a miserable attempt at insurrection in Sicily is put down in an instant; a wretched attempt at assassination ends in the execution of the criminal; and that is the whole 37 result of your interference, except that, at the hands of a petty power like Naples, the Governments of England and France, the two most powerful nations of Europe, have received a well-deserved affront. I think, then, that the interference of Her Majesty's Ministers at Naples was unworthy of the policy of this country, and I think that the result is an undignified conclusion to an unjust attack.
My Lords, I regret that the topics upon which I am obliged to touch are so numerous, but I am compelled to follow, to a certain extent, each of the subjects upon which Her Majesty invites us to pronounce an opinion or to call for explanation. Passing to another point, I confess that I see with deep regret the two petty wars in which we now appear to be involved. I regret the state of our relations with Persia; I look with even more regret, and with even greater doubt as to the justification of our cause, upon what has taken place in China. Assuming, as undoubtedly I do assume, that the independence of Herat, or rather the non-occupation of Herat by Persia (if Persia is to be considered as a country in a state of dependence upon Russia) is not a subject of indifference to this country, I am certainly not prepared to defend the tortuous and devious policy pursued by that State with reference to Herat. In 1852, I, or rather my noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury), had occasion to express ourselves pretty strongly to the Court of Teheran, and we received in return from the Persian Minister the most solemn assurances—assurances which were not adhered to—that no attempt should be made upon Herat. Subsequently we felt it necessary, in consequence of the falsehood—I will use no other word—of the representations made by Persia, to suspend all diplomatic relations with the representative of that country resident here. At the same time, however, we did not on that account relax our efforts to carry out our object; and being at that time on terms of perfect amity with Russia, and the Russian Minister at Teheran co-operating cordially with ours, we did obtain in 1852 the abandonment of Herat by the Persians; and; in 1853 an agreement was entered into between the Shah and Colonel Shiel, of which, it is true, I know nothing except from the public papers; but which judging from what has there appeared, does not seem to have been very skilfully drawn up or expressed. Of what has passed between this country and Persia since that 38 time I know very little, at least from official sources, because the articles of agreement to which I have alluded have never been laid before Parliament. But, as I understand, in that agreement Persia undertook to make no attack upon or occupation of Herat; while we undertook, should there be any such attack on the part of any other Power, to use moral persuasion in order to prevent the conquest of this city. Now, if I am rightly informed, there never was any Persian attack on Herat from that time until the beginning of the year 1855, at which time our new Ally and old enemy, Dost Mahomed, advanced an Affghan army to Candahar. The ruler of Herat for the time was apprehensive that Dost Mahomed was meditating a march on Herat—and had he meditated such a march, it would have justified the interference of Persia—in the belief of a coming Affghan attack the ruler of Herat himself called for the interference of Persia to defend him; but as the Persians came a little nearer than he thought quite desirable, he suddenly turned round and asked the Affghans to defend him against the Persians and his own people. In the conflict which ensued the Affghans were signally defeated by the Persians, who having in the first instance advanced, as I have said, at the request of the Governor of Herat, followed up their successes, and made themselves masters of the city. Now, if the Affghans really intended to take possession of the city, this occupation of Herat by the Persians, however displeasing it might be to the British Government, was not under such circumstances a violation of the agreement. But observe, on the other hand, what has been the state of Persia. She, a weak, powerless, but at the same time an Oriental, and therefore an astute State, has found herself subjected to the pressure of two mighty antagonists, England and Russia. If I have been rightly informed, she offered, when it first broke out, to take part in the war in the East, and to join in an alliance offensive and defensive with England and France, by which she might secure her independence against Russia. That proposal, I believe, was declined, and she was required to maintain a strict neutrality. She did, in consequence, abstain from making any attack upon Turkey; she did, I believe, maintain that strict neutrality which consists in refraining from offending either of the two great antagonists; but at the conclusion of the war, when the predominance 39 of Russia, as indicated by the capture and abandonment of Kars, appeared to have given her the supremacy in Asia, as it undoubtedly did—at that time Persia thought that she was subjected to more danger from the hostility of Russia than she could be from the hostility of England, and she consequently took no great pains to disguise her unfriendly feelings towards this country. I will not go into that miserable business which appears to have been the immediate cause of Mr. Murray's retirement from Teheran, because that was only one of the petty affronts which Persia thought she might safely offer to the representative of this country. But I think it exceedingly natural that Russia, being at that time at war with us, should stimulate Persia to take the step she did, and should endeavour to inflame her against England. I am also persuaded, my Lords—I was never persuaded of anything more than of this—that it is at the present moment the sincere desire of Russia not to be involved in another war with this country, but to maintain friendly relations with her; and that with that view she is at the present moment exercising her whole influence to nduce Persia to comply with your desires and to act in the manner which you require. Let me take the liberty of saying, too, that I think it would be for the benefit of England and Russia, not only now but for all time, that the two countries, Affghanistan and Persia, should form an interval between their respective territories; and that it is an object to be aimed at by every statesman who talks of resisting the encroachments of Russia to maintain between India and Russia the largest possible space of independent territory, and thus to prevent any contact between the two countries, and at the same time to prevent the chance of a collision. I believe that Russia herself is deeply impressed with that truth, and that although she stimulated Persia when she herself was your enemy to resist your wishes, yet at the present moment, when that is no longer the case, she is making efforts in a very different direction. For my own part, with regard to a settlement with Persia, I believe more in the efficacy of the representations of Russia than I do in the expedition to the Persian Gulf. I say nothing against the valour, the zeal, and the promptitude displayed by that small expeditionary force. On the contrary, the signal manner in which it has succeeded reflects the 40 highest credit upon the Indian Government, and it must be satisfactory to my noble and gallant Friend near me (the Earl of Hardwicke) to reflect that Admiral Sir H. Leeke, who has conducted the naval operation in the Persian Gulf, was one of that unfortunate class of Admirals who, upon account of it being supposed that their age was not adapted for active service, or from some other cause, have been put upon the retired list by the Home Government. Sir H. Leeke, then, entered the Indian service, and it must be satisfactory to my noble Friend to see—to have seen it shown—that the step to which I have referred deprived England of some of her best Admirals, and that among those officers who were compelled to retire were many who were capable of good and meritorious service. I heard with dismay, and I heard with satisfaction, first, of the advance of troops on Cabul, and then of their retrograde movement, though I am at a loss to understand the cause of the first advance of that small body of troops. [The Earl of CLARENDON was understood to deny that such a movement had taken place.] Well, then, perhaps when the papers which have been promised to us are laid upon the table they will throw some light upon the subject, and I will now only say that I should view with great anxiety any advance on that side. The papers also, when laid before the House, will explain, I trust, on another subject in regard to which we are at present in a state of peculiar ignorance. My Lords, there is another point, one of the deepest importance in a constitutional point of view—and that is the authority by which the war with Persia was begun. I have seen, undoubtedly, the proclamation of the Governor-General of India, by which he declares war against Persia; but I have yet to learn that the Governor-General of India has any constitutional power of proclaiming war on the part of this country. I have hitherto always understood that the proclamation of war was part of the prerogative of the Crown, and that war must be declared by the Crown with certain formalities. If in this instance it had been intended to declare war it would have been the duty of the Government to call Parliament together at the earliest possible moment, and to make them acquainted with the grounds upon which Her Majesty was advised to take that step. I quite understand that wars in India, undertaken for Indian objects against Native princes, stand upon a different footing; and that a royal 41 proclamation is not required; but in Her Majesty's Speech the troops engaged in this expedition against Persia are spoken of as British troops, so that this war is by the Government of this country treated, not as an Indian war, but as a British war. I think that the people of this country are pledged by the Government to the expenses of this war beyond a given portion which is to be contributed by the East India Company. I understand, too, that whatever the opinion of the East India Company in respect of this war may be, the Company alleges that it was entered into by direction of the Government at home; that, as I said before, it is not an Indian but a British war. If this be so, then I say it is a war which ought to have been proclaimed by the British Sovereign and announced to the British Parliament at the earliest possible moment. I do not know what answer the noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon) has to give to this statement. I presume that if the war have the authority of the proclamation of the Crown he will be able to answer me; but if not, then I say the proclamation of this war was unconstitutional—nay, almost illegal. If, my Lords, that be my opinion with regard to the war with Persia, it is hardly necessary for me to say that I have looked at the Chinese war with astonishment. Who authorised that war? In this case the hostile proceedings on our part were accompanied by measures which it might have been supposed were unknown in civilised warfare. What then was my astonishment to hear it stated in Her Majesty's Speech, and in the speech of the noble Mover of the Address, that those proceedings are characterised by great forbearance? My Lords, I do not say that the Chinese have not violated the treaty into which they have entered; but what I do say is, that I think it exceedingly doubtful whether the lorcha was properly and duly under the protection of the flag of this country; and if it was not, then your whole case falls to the ground. Sir John Bowring admits that the time for which the Arrow was authorised to carry the British flag had expired; but, he adds, the Chinese did not know that such was the case. I have very great doubt as to the legal validity of the colonial register on which Sir John Bowring relies. I think there is infinite dangers in committing to local authorities, at very great distances, unlimited power of granting British protection, and thus enabling people enjoying it to claim the interference of the 42 whole British power. But my belief is that the validity of the colonial register is very doubtful, inasmuch as I think that it is repugnant to the law of England; and there is nothing more clear in colonial affairs than this, that colonial acts must not be repugnant to the general law of England. I believe it will be found that these colonial registries confer the rights of British vessels upon vessels not owned by British subjects, but by persons who being foreigners have, by the payment of large sums of money, been enabled to become possessed of land in Hong-Kong, but who by thus becoming residents in a British colony cannot by the general mercantile law claim for their vessel the protection of the British flag; and my opinion is that it is not competent to a colonial registry to confer upon any one a protection repugnant to the Law of England. But, my Lord, suppose the regulation as to colonial registry to be quite correct, and suppose the Chinese to be ten times more in the wrong than they were—as wrong as wrong could be—suppose the insults to us to have been repeated over and over again; still the course pursued by our representative there is one which I should have expected to hear censured instead of vindicated by the Government of this country. There is no doubt whatever as to this—that the Arrow was in Chinese waters—although I know I may be told that the power of the consul extends over those waters—there was a man on board that vessel chargeable—and, I believe, fairly so—with the commission of acts of piracy; that man was arrested, and with him the remainder of the crew. On the demand of the consul, however, the Chinese offered to restore the crew, retaining the man who had been guilty of piracy. Now, I say that in this case, whatever may have been the inadequacy of the reparation, it was a case in which the British representative ought to have received the men, although he might express disapprobation at the proceedings; and he ought not to have rejected such an amende without applying to his Government for instructions. Instead of adopting that course, he takes upon himself to enter upon hostilities of the most aggravated character. He not only destroys their forts, but he goes still further in that course of forbearance so much lauded by the Government. In time of peace, that is to say with no war legally proclaimed—without, I believe, giving any notice of his intention—upon his own authority— 43 without the sanction of the Crown he orders the Admiral on that station to do—what? You took great credit for sparing Odessa. You were told that Odessa was full of food and military stores; you were at war with a mighty empire; this country was taxed to the utmost; but you said in the heat of war that, on grounds of humanity, you would not destroy a commercial town. You justified a magnanimity—which in that case you carried too far, by saying that such a bombardment would be repugnant to the principles of all civilized nations. But now in the time of peace, without the sanction of the Crown, the British representative takes upon himself, not only to destroy forts, but to bombard a peaceful commercial town, with an indiscriminate slaughter of unoffending citizens—a town with which you have no relations but commercial relations—a town which could have given no support to your enemies—a town the destruction of which was not only an act of singular cruelty towards the unoffending inhabitants, but was also destructive to your own commercial and pecuniary interests. And we are told that such a bombardment is an act of signal forbearance! My Lords, I look upon that transaction with pain, and with no expectation of the benefits which we are informed will result from it. At all events, if such benefits do result it is probable that they have been the real object from the first, and that you have gone to war on false pretences. But I doubt whether you will gain the anticipated advantages. I doubt whether the literal fulfilment of the Treaty of Pekin will tend to augment our trade with Canton, which has increased so largely within the last few years. It may be desirable to overcome the repugnance of the Chinese to the admission of foreigners into their empire; but I doubt whether the best means for gaining admission into the interior of the country is the bombardment of a large town and the massacre of its unoffending inhabitants. My Lords, I have now gone through the topics which are adverted to in the Speech. I believe the Address is so framed as not to pledge your Lordships to any particular measures; and it is not my intention, nor do I think that it is upon general grounds advisable, to move an Amendment which might interfere with the unanimity with which the House would otherwise pass the Address. While I rejoice, however, in the prosperity of the country which is announced in the Speech, and which, with some exceptions, I believe to be a correct 44 representation of the case, I cannot but see in the foreign policy of this country, which I regret to find occupies so large a space in the Speech, another unfortunate repetition of that meddling spirit and uncalled-for interference with foreign countries which has so often characterised the previous proceedings of the noble Viscount at the head of the Government; which cannot raise our character or procure us friends in foreign countries, and which will interfere by its perpetual disturbance of our commercial relations with that which I trust will long be the growing and increasing prosperity of this great country. My Lords, I cannot approve the course which has been pursued by the Government in its foreign policy; but I forbear from embodying the opinions which I have expressed in any Amendment, because they may be—and I trust that they will be—modified by the papers which I presume Her Majesty's Government will shortly lay before Parliament.
§ THE EARL OF CLARENDONMy Lords, I cannot but express my regret that the noble Earl opposite should so far have departed from the practice which he so much eulogised, of abstaining from entering into a discussion of points brought forward in Her Majesty's Speech with regard to our foreign policy; and that, in the absence of the information which will shortly be laid before your Lordships, he should have entered into so long and so strong a vituperation of Her Majesty's Government. I think that the object of the noble Earl would have been better served, that he would more closely have adhered to that practice of Parliament which he praised, and that he would greatly have consulted the convenience of all your Lordships if he had waited until the papers in question were in your hands; for I am sure it is impossible that anybody could have listened to his speech without feeling the want of the information which those papers would have contained. My Lords, before I proceed to offer some observations upon what has fallen from the noble Earl in the same order in which he has noticed the principal topics of the Speech, I must express my entire agreement with him upon the propriety and importance of not permitting one word of disrespect or bitterness to fall from us against that great Power with which we were so recently at war. I am quite certain that such was not the intention of my noble Friend who moved the Address, and I am persuaded that no Member of your Lord- 45 ships House will so far forget what is due to the dignity and to the interests of the country as to fall into such an error. My Lords, with respect to the differences which took place in the execution of the Treaty of Paris, your Lordships are aware that there are two Bolgrads, but that only one of them was marked on the map used by the Congress. The Russian Plenipotentiary requested that the Bolgrad which was on the map should be retained by Russia, because it was the chef lieu or capital of the Bulgarian colonies, and the line which was drawn out for the boundary was a mere deflection to meet the wishes of the Russian Plenipotentiary, and did not in any way interfere with the objects which the Conference had in view—and, in fact, of so little consequence did it appear, that to have refused compliance with that which was but a natural wish on the part of the Russian Plenipotentiary would have been nothing less than a gratuitous discourtesy. No more was heard upon the subject until the Boundary Commissioners arrived upon the ground, and then the Russian Commissioners claimed the right to draw the line south of another Bolgrad, or New Bolgrad, which had never been heard of before, because that was, they said, the capital of the colony. Now, not only was this Bolgrad not known to the Congress, but it was evident that it would give to Russia an important strategical position which was never contemplated, and that it would have defeated the objects of the treaty, by bringing Russia into communication with the Danube. Still Russia persisted in her claim to that as the Bolgrad which had been ceded by the Congress. The admission of this claim to the new Bolgrad, however, would have been a distinct concession to Russia which three of the contracting parties to the Treaty of Paris determined that they would not make, because it would give her an important strategical position, would bring her into connection with the Danube, and would cut off the ceded portion of Moldavia from Moldavia proper, and the Russian Government was informed that if the Bolgrad of the map had been conceded on the representation of Russia, that it was the chef lieu of the colony, and it turned out not to be so, she could not be allowed to profit by the error into which, by no fault of its own, the Congress had been led. A great deal of correspondence took place on the subject, which might, it is said, have been avoided, if we 46 had at once agreed to the reassembling of the Conference. But Her Majesty's Government objected to referring the matter to a Conference, for the simple reason that a Conference could not have settled the question; it could only have increased the difficulty and have rendered more notorious, and perhaps irreconcilable, the differences which existed between the Powers. In this state of things, therefore, three of the contracting Powers having determined not to make a further concession to Russia, it appeared that the only way of settling the matter was, if I may so express it, by an "arrangement out of court." The Emperor of the French accordingly proposed a plan which was agreed to by the several parties, and which by no means involves the concessions which the noble Earl appears to imagine; because by it both the towns of Bolgrad remain to Moldavia, and Russia is not brought nearer to the Danube, or essentially nearer to the Pruth. She obtains, however, a small addition to her Bessarabian territory, and she obtains, also, a small town which will hereafter be the capital of her Bulgarian colony. The Treaty of Paris was moreover improved on one very important point of arrangement. The territory ceded by Russia was altogether ceded to Moldavia; but as Moldavia has no ships and no force to maintain order at the mouths of the Danube, the Porte attached great importance to the islands in the Delta of the Danube and to Serpents Island being Turkish instead of Moldavian. That was agreed to. The protocols which explain the acts of the Conference which met at Paris, accompanied by a map showing the alterations, I have laid upon your Lordships' table this evening; but we do not propose to lay upon the table any other papers on the subject, because it has not been the custom—and I think it wise to adhere to precedent in such a case—not to produce correspondence relating to differences with foreign countries which have been amicably settled, and when the production of them, without any good end in view, might give rise again to feelings of ill-will which I rejoice to think have been completely allayed by a conclusion satisfactory to all parties.
I next come to the question of Neufchâtel. I agree with the noble Earl opposite that the men who embarked in that reckless enterprise on the 4th of September—an enterprise which contained within itself no one single element of success— 47 were influenced by honest motives, and were stimulated only by feelings of loyalty and allegiance. I do not wish to enter into any details upon this subject, because, as your Lordships are aware from the announcement made by Her Majesty, negotiations are now going on with a view to the amicable settlement of the question at issue, and I should deeply regret if, upon a matter which coneerns more the amour propre than the material interests of the parties engaged, any imprudent expression of opinion were to mar the success of those negotiations. I must, however, take leave to say that the protocol of London of 1852, so far from answering the description given of it by the noble Earl, settled no question whatever. It was at most but a suspension of the question. By it the King of Prussia simply renounced resorting to means of coercion for the purpose of asserting his rights, upon condition that the other parties to the protocol should endeavour to obtain the recognition of those rights. The protocol did not pretend to settle the question, and, indeed, the longer the de facto Government in Neufchâtel lasted the more difficult it became to the King of Prussia to assert his rights by himself, and the more difficult also it became to the other Powers, on the supposition that they wished to assist him, to adopt measures with that view. That was another reason why the Conference has not been brought together again. The Conference could have reassembled only for the purpose of authorising the King of Prussia to coerce the Swiss. Means were taken to ascertain whether there was any method by which the Swiss people could be induced, by negotiation, to recognise the King of Prussia and restore him to the enjoyment of his rights. There were found to be none, and therefore the Conference was not called together again. I have now to give to the charge—if I may call it so—which the noble Earl has brought against Her Majesty's Government of having encouraged the Swiss to refuse the mediation of France and the offers which they were disposed to accept, the most direct and unqualified denial. We thought that a peremptory demand for the release of the prisoners would amount to an unjustifiable interference with a matter of which the Swiss Government ought to be the sole judges. The Royalists had lived for years under a Government which they termed illegitimate, but which was, at least, the de facto 48 Government, and, having enjoyed its protection for so long a period, they had no right all at once to stir up insurrection, and by bloodshed and civil war endeavour to destroy the existing state of things. It was impossible we could deny that the acts of these men ought to be submitted to judicial decision, and therefore we did not call upon the Confederation to set the prisoners unconditionally at liberty. But, at the same time, we offered to join our good offices to those of the Emperor of the French, to induce the King of Prussia to agree to a settlement of the question in the sense desired by the Confederation. The King of Prussia made known to the Emperor of the French the terms on which he was willing to treat. Those terms were not communicated to us: but we did not advise the Confederation to refuse them; we simply abstained from giving to the Federal Government any assurance upon a matter of which we were ignorant. We put it to the Swiss Government whether their interests would not be served by the liberation of the prisoners; but at the same time, although we offered to unite our efforts with those of the Emperor of the French in order to bring about a settlement of the question, we did not pledge ourselves to that of which we knew nothing.
The noble Earl has condemned in unqualified terms the course pursued by the Paris Congress with respect to Italy, and has stated, greatly to my surprise, that we are chargeable with having failed to fulfil the hopes we had excited, and the promises we made to Sardinia. It would appear, according to the noble Earl, that for joining her forces to those of the Allies in the war against Russia, we had held out expectations to Sardinia of certain advantages in Italy. Now, my Lords, I can conscientiously say that I have heard that statement for the first time this evening. No promise of the kind was ever made to Sardinia. Your Lordships have before you the despatches and papers connected with the treaty entered into three years ago with the Sardinian Government. No offer was made to Sardinia; no terms were asked by her; nothing was required from us except that amount of pecuniary assistance which was necessary to enable Sardinia to bring her army into the field. But I think, my Lords, that the Members of the Congress at Paris were justified in holding the language they did. If the great Powers of Europe represented at Paris had neglected that opportunity of calling attention to the 49 state of Italy and more especially to the system of Government existing at Naples, they would, in my opinion, have been justly liable to censure. I entirely agree with the noble Earl in what he has said, as to the inexpediency and danger of one or more States interfering in the internal affairs of another; but I am convinced that if ever an exception to that rule was justifiable it was in the case of Naples. For the interest of humanity, for the welfare of the Neapolitans, in support of the monarchical principles, in order to prevent revolution, it was the duty of the Powers represented at Paris to protest against the system of Government established in Southern Italy. The Governments of France and England acting in concert, determined to make simultaneous representations to the Government of Naples, recommending the adoption of such acts of grace and amnesty as should betoken a change in the spirit of the Government. An answer was returned to these representations, couched, as the noble Earl has remarked, in not very courteous terms. We were told, in effect, to mind our own business. But no notice was taken of that communication; we hoped that reflection might induce the King of Naples to reconsider his decision and to adopt a system of government more consistent with humanity and more in harmony with the spirit of the age. And, in fact, we received a second communication from the Government of Naples, apologizing for the terms in which our advice had been rejected in the first, but giving no expectation whatever that it would be acted upon. The English and French Governments then thought that the time had arrived for making a public protest against the existing state of things in Naples, and accordingly the English and French missions were simultaneously withdrawn. Now, my Lords, nobody, I think, can say that the two Governments were not acting within the strictest limits of their legitimate rights. Nobody can say that England and France were not at liberty to protest against such a system of government as that pursued in Naples, and not to encourage by the presence of their Ministers a policy so fraught with danger. I believe that many subjects of the King of Naples regretted that the Ministers were withdrawn in the manner described by the noble Earl; I believe that many would have greatly preferred a naval demonstration; but we had every reason to think 50 that a naval demonstration would have produced an insurrection. It is impossible to say what the result of a great popular movement might have been; but we desired no such movement. We wished for a change of system, not for a change of dynasty, desiring that the King's subjects should be better affected towards him, we abstained from any measures that might have incited them to revolt. The noble Earl, I think, has rather under-valued the importance of what has since occurred. The remonstrance of the French and English Governments has not been so entirely without effect as the noble Earl seems to think. At any rate, English and French subjects have been treated ever since with the greatest care and courtesy; there have been moreover various acts of amnesty, and those acts, it is said, will be extended to all who ask for them and promise to obey the laws. Moreover, there has been a convention signed between the King of Naples and the Argentine Republic by which all political prisoners who, of their own free will, wish to go to South America will be enabled to settle down there in the possession of land as colonists. I am not attaching much importance to these symptoms of improvement, but there is one thing to which I do attach importance, and that is, I have reason to believe that every one of the great Powers of Europe has come in aid of the course that has been pursued by the Government of England and that of France, and has, each in its own way, and in the manner it thought most likely to be effectual, entreated and advised the King of Naples to change his system. Much time may, of course, elapse before the King of Naples admits that he is amenable to any human tribunal, but he cannot always stand alone in thinking himself right, and that all the rest of mankind are wrong in the judgment which they pass upon his acts.
With respect to the negotiations with the United States and Honduras, I think the noble Earl has rather over-stated the difficulties which may lie in the way of a thorough settlement of the matters in dispute. There is no reason to doubt that the objects of the treaties into which we have entered will be realised, and that they will fulfil all those points to which the noble Earl has directed your attention. Your Lordships will find that all those engagements which we are bound in honour to maintain will be maintained, while all 51 the rights of territory which Honduras possesses will be secured to that State. These two treaties are in no way connected with each other. The treaty with the United States has merely reference to the dispute that has arisen with respect to the protection of the Mosquito territory. With reference to Ruatan, which was supposed to belong to Honduras, we have made that island over in such a way as that it shall be under the sovereignty of Honduras. There is now a proposal for the construction of a railroad over these territories, and this, I believe, will be found to be the best practical mode of establishing a communication between the two oceans. On both sides of the Isthmus there are magnificent harbours, and Her Majesty's Government thought that, as all the maritime Powers of the world would have an interest in this means of communication, they would certainly take exception to any arrangement by which an island, which lies almost at the entrance of the line of communication should be left in the hands of any one Power. It has been placed under the sovereignty of Honduras, which is placed under an obligation not to give it up to any other Power. I believe, therefore, that these treaties will be found fully to answer the purposes which the Governments of England and the United States had in view, and that they will have the effect of preventing any future misunderstandings between the two countries on this question. I will only further add that I agree with the noble Earl opposite that we have no interest whatever in Central America beyond that of possessing a free transit across the Isthmus, and I cannot see any reason why upon that question there should in future arise any difficulty between us and the United States.
Before I enter upon the question of the Persian war, and make any observations on what has fallen from the noble Earl in reference to that subject, I shall endeavour to give some explanation as to the causes which led to the breaking off of diplomatic relations with that country, and at the same time express my satisfaction at what has been said by the noble Earl with reference to the imputed causes which led to the suspension of those relations. I would particularly ask your Lordships to wait a few days for the papers that will be laid on the table on this subject, and in the mean time to dismiss from your minds all that has been said and written on the subject, more particularly with reference to 52 the supposed connection of a lady with the rupture of our relations. That lady was the wife of a person who had been long under the protection of the British mission, and as such had been acknowledged by the Persian Government; but when, in order to induce him to abandon that protection and to place himself in the power of his bitter and unrelenting enemy, the Prime Minister of Persia, his wife was taken away from him, Mr. Murray most properly protested against the unjust and arbitrary act. It was admitted that the man had a right to British protection, and yet the Persian Government claimed the right to imprison and persecute his wife. Mr. Murray would have failed in his duty if he had not remonstrated against this arbitrary conduct; but when I tell you that I have received from Mr. Murray the most solemn assurance, and that he has given me his honour as a gentleman that he was influenced by no improper motives in the steps he has taken, your Lordships will agree with me in placing reliance upon Mr. Murray's word, that there is not the shadow of foundation for the calumnious charges that have been made against him. In the absence of that gentleman, a servant of the Crown who has been unjustly maligned, I feel it to be my duty to take the earliest opportunity of vindicating his reputation from the aspersions that have been cast upon it. Mr. Murray was compelled to suspend his relations with the Government of the Shah. Having received no explanation he left Teheran; and he was perfectly justified in so doing, for, had he remained he would have been in the position of an unprotected traveller, liable to insult every day. There would have been great excitement against him—there is good reason to believe that the populace were incited to molest him. Had he rehoisted his flag without having obtained the redress he sought, the act would have been attributed to fear, and that would have brought upon him an accumulation of insults, and he would in the end have been forced to abandon the place without having secured his object—that of reparation for the injury which had been done. Mr. Murray very properly thought that the Queen's representative should not be exposed to the ignominious alternative, and he exercised a wise discretion in leaving Teheran. But I hope your Lordships will bear in mind that this rupture was not the cause of the war. I should certainly have expected that time 53 and reflection, the recollection of the many interests Persia has in being on terms of friendship with England, as well as of the many good offices for which she is in our debt, and the knowledge that we were no longer at war with Russia, for that has been the secret of her hostile feelings towards us, would have led to an honourable settlement of the differences between us. But the case assumed a different aspect when Persia exhibited a determination to get possession of Herat. On that subject we did not fail to make our representations to the Persian Government. On the 11th of July, 1856, I wrote a letter to the Sedr Azim, demanding reparation for the breach of engagements respecting Herat, and the withdrawal of the Persian troops from that city. The following is the letter—
Foreign Office, July 11, 1856.The undersigned, &c., has the honour to recall to the recollection of the Sedr Azim the articles of agreement respecting Herat, which were concluded in the month of January, 1853, between his Excellency and Lieutenant Colonel Shiel, then Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of the Shah.By those articles the Persian Government engaged not to send on any account troops to Herat, unless when foreign troops invaded Herat, that is (troops), from the direction of Cabul or Candahar, or other foreign country. In the event, too, of troops being sent in that case the Persian Government engaged that the said troops were not to enter the city of Herat; and whenever the foreign troops returned towards their own territory the Persian troops were immediately and without delay to return to the Persian soil. The Persian Government also engaged not to interfere in any way whatsoever in the internal affairs of Herat, such as in taking possession, or occupying, or assuming the sovereignty, or in governing, unless in so far as it interfered during the lifetime of Yar Mahommed Khan. The Persian Government also engaged to abandon the pretensions and demand for the coinage and the Khtohek, or any other mark whatsoever of the people of Herat, being subjects or under the Government of Persia.The British Government have been informed that since the beginning of the present year Persian troops have not only invaded the territory of Herat, but have laid siege to the city of Herat, and have interfered in the internal affairs of Herat, and that the movements of troops in different parts of Persia indicate a determination on the part of the Persian Government to persist in its aggression on Herat, and in its disregard of solemn engagements contracted with the British Government.Such conduct on the part of Persia is considered by the British Government to constitute an act of open hostility against Great Britain; and the object of the undersigned in now addressing the Sedr Azim is to make known to the, Persian Government that, unless reparation is promptly made by it for this breach of engagement and for 54 this act of hostility, and unless the Persian troops are forthwith withdrawn from the city and territory of Herat, the British Government will adopt such measures as a regard for its own honour and its own interests may prescribe; and will hold itself absolved from any responsibility for the consequences of those measures, however disastrous to Persia they may prove.The undersigned, &c.CLARENDON.My Lords, to this letter I received a most vague and unsatisfactory answer. It was, in fact, a mere letter of pretences; not even alluding to the subject of Herat, but stating that the disagreement between the Persian Government and Mr. Murray was merely a personal dispute, which might be arranged by the Persian Ambassador who was about to proceed to Paris. Her Majesty's Government then thought it proper that a more detailed communication should be addressed to the Persian Government, and on the 10th of October I addressed the following letter to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs:—The undersigned, &c., had the honour to receive on the 25th of September the letter which the Sedr Azim, Prime Minister of His Majesty the Shah of Persia, addressed to him on the 17th of August, having reference to the letter which the undersigned addressed to the Sedr Azim on the 11th of July, on the subject of the proceedings of the Persian Government in regard to Herat, but containing no answer to that letter.Her Majesty's Government had hoped that the letter of the undersigned would have elicited from the Persian Government a distinct assurance that that Government would at once desist from the enterprise which it had undertaken against Herat in violation of solemn engagements entered into with the British Government in former times, and in defiance of the often-expressed determination of the British Government not to tolerate any interference on the part of Persia with the States of Affghanistan, and not to allow the extension of the authority or the territory of Persia in that quarter. Her Majesty's Government had hoped that such assurance would have been given, and would have been followed up by the immediate withdrawal of the Persian armies from Affghan territory, and by complete reparation for the insults which had been offered to the British Government in the person of the Queen's Envoy, and which had led to the withdrawal of the British Mission from Persia.If all this had been done Her Majesty's Government would have been enabled to replace, on a friendly footing, its relations with the Court of the Shah.Her Majesty's Government have been disappointed in these hopes and expectations. The redress demanded in the communication made by the British Ambassador at Constantinople to the Persian chargé d'affaires in that city, in the month of June last, for the insult offered to the British Mission, has not been afforded; the reparation required in, the note of the undersigned of July 11 for the disregard shown by Persia of her engagements as to Herat has not been given; but, in- 55 stead of this, vain excuses and pretexts of delay have been put forward, and Her Majesty's Government have been told to expect satisfaction from the result of a negotiation, the conduct of which the Persian Government pretends to have confided to an Ambassador some time since appointed by the Shah to the Court of France.But, in the meanwhile, the Persian Government has not been content even to let the questions in dispute remain without further aggravation. The insults which occasioned the withdrawal of the British Mission from Teheran have since that period been followed up by other insults to the British Government, which of themselves call for ample reparation.The insults to which the undersigned here more particularly refers are the prohibition of intercourse by subjects of the Shah with Her Majesty's Consul at Teheran; the violation of the engagement to pay to Seyd Abdoolah, a British subject, an allowance which he was to receive as a commutation for a portion of his claims on the Government of Persia; the attempt on the part of the Sedr Azim to possess himself of the water long since assigned to the British Mission for its use at its summer encampment; the interception of the supplies of water ordinarily assigned to the British Mission in Teheran; the refusal to enforce the punishment of parties who committed a violent assault on one of the servants of the British Consul; the refusal to recognise the right of property of Her Majesty's Government in the British Consular residence; the expulsion from Asterabad of a person in the employment of the British Mission; the publication in the public paper under the control of the Government of Persia of injurious statements as regards the British Government; and, lastly, the direct incentive held out to fanaticism to irritate against British subjects the conduct pursued at a former time, when the city of Teheran witnessed the massacre of the representative of a foreign State by an infuriated mob.All these transactions are publicly known throughout the Persian capital, and until the redress demanded for them shall have been given, and shall have been made as publicly known, it will be impossible for a British Mission to reside with security, still less with honour, at the Court of the Shah.But even these transactions are of less account than the wanton disregard by the Persian Government of its engagement to abstain from any interference in the internal affairs of Herat, and from any attempt to occupy, or take possession, or assume the sovereignty or government of that province.There are indications, indeed, that before the British Mission retired from Teheran intrigues were on foot to promote the views of aggrandizement which Persia has continually entertained in the direction of Herat. Persian forces were collected on the frontier of that State; and, as if more distinctly to evince the hostility of Persia towards Great Britain, even at this early stage of these transactions the Persian Government selected for the command of those forces an officer, high in rank and nearly connected with the Royal Family, who had then lately rendered himself notorious by grossly indecent language applied by him to the Sovereign of England at a public entertainment given to members of the Royal Family by the Vizier of Teheran.56From that period the operations of the Persian forces have been pushed forward with unabated perseverance against the city and in various quarters of the territory of Herat; language of defiance against Great Britain has been openly held by the Persian Government, and demonstrations have been made of the intention of the Persian Government rather to engage in conflict with Great Britain than to concede the just demands of the British Government, the Persian Government appearing to wish to display to the Persian people its indifference for the friendship of England, and its conviction that Persia has nothing to fear from the just resentment of Great Britain.But the British Government can no longer passively submit to the insults and wrongs which it has received from the Government of Persia. An expedition destined for Persia is now about to leave the British territories, and, whatever may result to Persia from this measure, which her Government has wantonly provoked, the responsibility thereof will rest on the evil counsellors of the Shah, who have led His Majesty to countenance insult and injury towards Great Britain, and to violate the solemn engagements of an international compact.Every Government of this country has felt the importance of maintaining the independence of Herat. That city, as many of their Lordships are no doubt aware, is situated upon the immediate confines of Persia, in a plain of such unparalleled fertility that the late Shah was able to maintain there an army of 40,000 men during his unsuccessful siege of the place, which lasted a twelvemonth. The value of the position is enhanced by the fact that the surrounding territory to the west, to the south, and to the east, is comparatively barren. The climate is salubrious, water is abundant, and the town is surrounded by a bank of clay thirty yards high, and which is of such singular tenacity, that it cannot be breached by artillery. Herat would, therefore, be a most valuable and important base of military operations; a commander in possession of the town is completely master of his own position, and can always advance or retreat at his pleasure. I will not enter into any discussion as to the probability of an invasion of India, although if timely precautions are not taken, that is a subject which will hereafter press itself more and more upon our attention. Now we sometimes hear a phrase used in reference to America, about a nation being impelled forward by its destiny. I believe the whole Russian people, as well as the Government, entertain the belief that they are destined to extend by conquest the territorial limits of the empire; and when we look at the rise and progress of our Indian Empire, I must 57 say that other nations are entitled to say the same of us. But, as the noble Earl has said, I also believe that there is no disposition whatever on the part of the Russian Government to go to war with us on the subject of territory in the part of the world to which I am referring. Our communications with the Russian Government have been frank and friendly. I think, however, that it is for the interest both of Russia and England that between their respective territories a neutral country should exist, such as Afghanistan, but that will not be the case if Persia is in possession of Herat, for she will only have to avail, herself of the feuds or the cupidity of the Affghan chiefs in order to obtain complete command of Affghanistan. I have no doubt that all these grave considerations were fully weighed by my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury), when, in more than one able despatch, he instructed Sir Justin Sheil to desire that the city and territory of Herat should be evacuated by the Persian troops. Sir Justin Sheil executed those instructions with great ability and judgment, and, indeed, went beyond them. I say, then, that by the efforts we have constantly made, and by the anxiety we manifested on the subject in 1852, we publicly proclaimed to Persia, Affghanistan, and India the supreme value which we attach to the independence of Herat. Remember, my Lords, that the position we occupy in the East differs from that of Russia. She has been able to make her power felt, and to punish Persia for the violation of treaties or other misdeeds. Our position is entirely dependent upon our character, upon our prestige, and upon our supposed resolution to maintain our rights and to defend our interests at every risk. If, therefore, we permit Persia to violate with impunity the solemn engagements into which she has entered with us, and to inflict upon us by our own avowal a great injury, we shall lose our prestige, and the respect we have hitherto inspired. It is for the purpose of maintaining that prestige, which constitutes the moral force by which we hold our Indian empire, that Her Majesty's Government have been most reluctantly compelled to go to war with Persia. Having said so much as to the causes of this war, I may inform your Lordships, without breach of duty, that the Persian Ambassador, who has lately arrived at Paris, has solicited an interview with Lord Cowley, which took place two days ago. He expressed to Lord Cowley 58 the earnest desire of his Government to renew friendly relations with this country, and he exhibited to him his full powers to enter into negotiations. Her Majesty's Government have not hesitated to say that we shall be prepared to enter into negotiations, and we have transmitted to Lord Cowley the conditions on which we are prepared to treat; and if the powers of the Persian Ambassador be such as I believe they are, there is every reason to expect that those negotiations will be brought to a favourable termination. Her Majesty's Government have no wish to humiliate the Shah and no intention to injure Persia; all we are anxious for is to secure the fulfilment of the engagements which that Power has entered into with us; but we require a sufficient guarantee that, when the peace is concluded, it shall be placed on a sound and permanent footing.My Lord, I must express my entire dissent from all that has fallen from the noble Earl with respect to the Chinese war, and I exceedingly regret the expression of such opinions by a person in the high position of the noble Earl. There is not the slightest doubt that the lorcha was to all intents and purposes a British vessel when seized by the Chinese. She was owned indeed by a Chinese of Hongkong, but had an English master on board, and carried the British flag. The noble Earl has expressed a strong opinion that her register was an illegal one; but the colonial ordinance, under which these registers are granted, was sanctioned by an Order in Council, and there is no reason whatever for saying that it is not in accordance with the law of these realms. The register of this particular lorcha, it is true, had expired four or five days before the attack made upon her, but that did not at all render her a Chinese vessel, or give the Chinese police any right to board her, and to take away her crew as they did. The colonial ordinance provides completely for the position in which she was placed. These are its terms:—
And be it further enacted and ordained, that any colonial register granted under this ordinance shall be in force and effect for one year from the date of such register, and no longer, and that such register be renewable by endorsement on the same, under the hand of the governor, lieutenant-governor, or officer administering the Government, on the payment of a fee of ten dollars, provided always that such register be deposited in the office of the Colonial Secretary one week be- 59 fore the expiration of the year for which the register has been granted, or if the registered ship or vessel be at sea, then on her return to the waters of the colony.This was exactly the position of the Arrow; she was then at sea. This ordinance is dated March 3, 1855. It was ratified by an order in Council, and it was communicated to and recognised by the Imperial Commissioner. There could be no doubt as to the nationality of the vessel. As the same denotes, a lorcha is not a Chinese but a Portuguese vessel; and, in accordance with the colonial regulations, she had her name painted on her stern in large Roman and Chinese characters. This lorcha, then, was considered to be a British vessel by the British authorities at Canton, the Imperial Commissioner, moreover, allowed in his correspondence that he was aware that she had been in possession of a British register from the time of her launch; and she had a British flag flying when she was boarded by the Chinese authorities at Canton. Their professed object was to search for a man who, as they say, was suspected of piracy—the noble Earl said "Guilty of piracy," but he did not state why he said so—but however that might be, the police, in order to make sure of one man, carried off twelve out of the crew of fourteen. The master of the vessel made his complaint to the consul, who forwarded it to the Chinese authorities; but they took no notice whatever of it, except to threaten the master with violence if he did not desist from it. Application was made to the Commissioner, but this also, like every other application, was treated with contempt. Subsequently, however, the Commissioner sent back a portion of the crew; but in such a way that the British consul very properly refused to receive them—for if he had accepted anything short of his claim, his forbearance would only have been attributed to fear, and would have given rise to further insults. The British authorities were not disposed to treat matters with a high hand, but they could not have demanded less than they did without giving another triumph to the Chinese and laying the foundation for future insults. It was absolutely necessary that they should insist upon an apology and a restoration of the men, to be dealt with according to the terms of the treaty. When the affair was handed over to the Admiral all that he did at first was to take possession of a junk belonging to the Chinese Government; and before we 60 sent an approval of even that, we took the advice of the law officers of the Crown as to whether the Chinese Government had violated the treaty, and whether there was any impropriety in the Admiral taking possession of the junk. The Queen's Advocate was very decided on that matter, and in that sense we wrote to Sir John Bowring and to the Admiral. The Imperial Commissioner was still determined to make no apology, and to give no redress, and he refused to hold any direct intercourse with the Admiral or the Plenipotentiary. The Admiral then proceeded to further measures, but not in the inhuman way described by the noble Earl, there was no bombardment of the town and no indiscriminate slaughter. The Admiral destroyed one of the forts, and then made fresh representations, and waited a day or two to give time for reflection. Still finding the Commissioner determined, he went on until all the fortifications belonging to the Chinese Government were destroyed; but as for that destruction of Canton city and the indiscriminate slaughter of its inhabitants of which the noble Earl opposite talks, Her Majesty's Government know of none; and the noble Earl is as much misinformed on this as he appeared to be on several other points on which he touched in the course of his speech. It is the persistence of the Chinese in the system of exclusion, the non-observance of that part of the treaty which we ought long ago to have insisted upon, and which, indeed, we only suspended for a specified time, which lies at the root of the evil. It embarrasses the transaction of all business, and obliges the merchants to carry on their affairs by means of native agents, who are not always honest; and so long as this system of non-access is persisted in there never will be any improvement in the social, moral, or even commercial position of foreigners in this part of the empire. Our exclusion from Canton, too, places in danger our relations with the other four ports, for it is made a matter of reproach by the inhabitants of Canton who frequent those ports against the inhabitants of them that they do not exclude foreigners; and upon more than one occasion this has led to disturbance. Our commercial relations with the Chinese, and the mode of transacting business at the four ports is most favourable as compared with Canton. There is one remarkable feature in recent events. We have the satisfaction of knowing that the factories, which are not 61 always agreed, are unanimously of opinion, without distinction of nationality, that in this matter the British Government has only done that which was necessary and for the interests of all. Everybody felt that sooner or later this must come, and now that it has come all are agreed that we have taken the best course. The American commander has taken the same course as ourselves in avenging an insult offered to the United States' flag, and I see by a letter I received from Washington this morning that the news of what has occurred had been received there with great approbation. I can only hope that, in the present as in the former war, by asserting our treaty rights, and, above all, by standing by our flag, which is our only protection in that country, we shall not only successfully settle the present dispute, but shall lay the foundation of a great extension of our trade with China.
§ EARL GREYMy Lords, The noble Earl opposite, began his speech by referring to the general desire felt by your Lordships that the Address in answer to Her Majesty's Speech at the opening of the Session should be agreed to by an unanimous vote of the House. I concur in that desire, but there are occasions (and this I think is one of them) when this wish ought to yield to higher considerations. There is a passage in the reply which has been proposed to the Royal Speech to which I cannot assent, and on which I intend, therefore, to move an Amendment. I allude to the part of the Address which refers to the war with Persia. I could have wished to have made some remarks on the answer made by my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) to the noble Earl opposite both as to the affairs of Naples and the rupture with China, which I regard as by no means satisfactory; but as no Amendment has been moved on these points, and I do not intend myself to move one, I shall confine my observations strictly to the paragraph in the Address which I feel compelled to object to because it expresses opinions which, I for one, do not entertain. The Address which was moved with very great ability and very well seconded by my noble Friends on the Bench above seems to me to be so framed as to pledge the House to an opinion in a manner which is not usual on these occasions. We are made to assure Her Majesty that we share in her regret that the conduct of the Persian Government has led to the hostilities between the Shah and our 62 own country; and reference is made to the justice of our demands. Now, this plainly assumes that the entire blame of the war rests upon Persia; whereas, although I have no wish to commit your Lordships' House prematurely to an opinion one way or the other, I believe that this war has not been brought on by Persia and that on the part of this country it is neither just nor politic. The Address is also defective from the absence of any allusion in it to the important constitutional question raised by the noble Earl opposite, with regard to the carrying on of hostilities without Ministers having recommended the Sovereign to take the earliest opportunity of appealing to Her Parliament for its advice and support. My Lords, I must in the first place endeavour to prove to your Lordships that we are already in possession of information sufficient to convince us that the war in which the country has been involved is not one which we ought hastily to imply our approbation. The Governor General of India issued to the world, on the 1st of November last, a proclamation in which he expressly states that he acts under the immediate directions of Her Majesty's Government, and which sets forth both the grounds of the war and our vindication for entering into it. We are therefore furnished with authentic information as to the causes and origin of the war, and I am prepared to maintain, without knowing what may be the reply of Persia, that, even on the showing of our own Government, the war is indefensible. It is said that an agreement between this country and the Shah has been violated; but I hold that the mere breach of an engagement between nations without reference to the nature of that engagement or to the circumstances of the case, does not necessarily justify a declaration of war. The nature of the engagement, the magnitude of the interests involved, and the possibility or impossibility of obtaining redress by milder means must be considered before we can judge whether it is right to have recourse to the last alternative, the sword. Otherwise a free course is left to the encroachments of great States upon their weaker neighbours. It has often been made a reproach against Russia that she has a habit of inveigling her weaker neighbours into imprudent treaties, and then, when their stipulations are broken through, with making that a pretext first for war, and subsequently for their conquest. But the encroachments of Russia have never 63 been considered to be justified by being carried on by this insidious policy; on the contrary, it has always been regarded as rendering her spirit of aggrandisement not less but more dangerous, and has always been cited as a proof of her ambitious designs. Similar reproaches have been cast upon England for making entangling treaties with the native rulers of India, and then making the infraction of these treaties the ground for warfare and the ultimate absorption of their territory. This charge has always been indignantly denied, I wish I could say I thought always with success; but be this as it may, there is no question we have always denied having acted upon such a principle. I trust, therefore, that I shall not hear the doctrine laid down in this House that any violation of a treaty between us and Persia is a sufficient warrant for war, irrespective of the nature of that treaty and the attendant circumstances. The whole discussion must turn upon the nature of the agreement. Its substance was, that Persia engaged not to invade Herat, unless it were attacked by others, Now, I want to know what principle of the law of nations authorises one country to take upon itself to dictate to another independent nation what course it shall pursue in its relations with other States? Persia might have a legitimate cause of quarrel with her neighbour. I saw it stated at a public meeting the other day by a zealous missionary who has laboured long and faithfully in those countries, that the original ground of dispute between Persia and Herat some years ago was, that the people of the latter place, with the connivance of their Government, persisted in making plundering excursions into the Persian territory for the purpose of carrying off its inhabitants and selling them as slaves. If that be so, nobody can doubt that such outrages constitute the most valid ground for war. I am quite ignorant of the facts of the case on this point; but it may be that good cause for war against Herat has been given to Persia; and I totally deny that we have any right to dictate to independent States in what manner they shall vindicate their rights, and punish the invasion of them by their neighbours. But, even supposing Persia to be in the wrong in her quarrel with Herat, who, I ask, gave us the authority to regulate and prescribe the relations between the barbarous or semi-barbarous people of Central Asia? It is asserted 64 that in one instance the advance of Persia upon Herat, of which we so much complain, actually took place at the instigation of the ruler of Herat himself. If the ruler of Herat thought it his interest to invite the protection of Persia against any attack with which he was threatened, and Persia thought proper to comply with such an application, the law of nations gives us no title whatever to interfere. Looking at the question as one of policy only, I maintain that it is not good policy on the part of this country to attempt to regulate the relations with each other of these half-civilised tribes. I know, indeed, that it has been held by no mean authority that it is our business to watch over the politics of Asia, in order to check the rise of any Power likely to endanger our Indian dominion; but setting aside all questions as to our right to act on this principle, I contend that its practical adoption is altogether unwise and inexpedient. Whatever might have formerly been the position of our Indian Empire, undoubtedly we have nothing to fear for it now from any other Asiatic Power. Its resources are so great, modern inventions and improvements in the weapons and arts of war have made the superiority of civilised over barbarous or semi-civilised nations so enormous that even if all the independent States of Asia united were to attack us we need not have the slightest apprehension for the result. The late Duke of Wellington did not express too high an opinion of our superiority to any native army in the field when he stated, in explanation of his opinion that the difficulties of Oriental warfare consisted almost entirely in the difficulty of keeping up the communications and of obtaining constant supplies—that 5,000 British troops could defeat any Asiatic force, no matter how numerous, that might be brought into the field against them, and could, if adequately supplied, march triumphantly from one end of Asia to the other. England, we may rest assured, has no occasion to fear any Asiatic Power; but we are told that we must watch over Central Asia, lest Russia should make through it a road to our Indian Empire. Now, I think this is quite as much of a chimera as the other. If there is one lesson to be learnt more than another from the late war, it is that, however powerful Russia may be for self-defence, whatever credit she deserves for defending a fortress at the extremity of her empire for nearly a year against the 65 united power of four nations, her strength for offensive warfare is very limited. If Russia, having accumulated her resources during a long peace, which had been sedulously devoted to the task of creating a powerful army and of collecting an almost unexampled amount of stores and materials for war, was able to do so little in offensive operations against Turkey before the Allies came to the assistance of the Sultan—if she could bring so small a force under the walls of Silistria, which may be said to be almost at her own door—what reason is there to believe that she could bring to our frontier in India any force with which it would not be an act of insanity to undertake a campaign against our forces? If we could not supply our army with proper necessaries at a distance of 1,500 miles, all of which, with the exception of some seven miles, we were able to traverse with our ships—if we found this too hard a task for us in the first year of the late war with all our immense resources in ships and steamers—do you think it possible that Russia could provide for 100,000 or 150,000 men (and I believe that even this number would be insufficient for the purpose) to march entirely by land almost as great a distance as separates us from the Crimea? Could she convey that force, with the requisite artillery and supplies, to the frontiers of our Indian Empire? I think a moment's reflection by any man who will allow his reason fair play, and who will not give way to this bugbear of Russian power, will satisfy him that such an invasion is impossible. But then I know what is the answer to this. We are told it is not Russia directly that we have to fear, but it is Russia wielding the power of Persia and of other Asiatic countries between our territory and hers. My Lords, before Russia can bring these countries into a condition in which she can use them for her own purposes, she has to achieve a task even more difficult than that which we have accomplished in the creation of our great Indian Empire. She has to bring into order and subservience the tribes of Asia—the most insubordinate, the most lawless, the fiercest people on the face of the earth, and so divided from each other by all sorts of animosities springing out of religion and race, that to make an alliance with one of them is infallibly to make an enemy of another. She has, I say, to bring all these various tribes into order. She has to discipline and to 66 organise countries which do not possess the first elements of union and organisation; all this she must do before she can wield the tribes of Central Asia to our damage. Why, even if she could command a succession of such men as Clive and Warren Hastings, this would be the work of generations; and, in my opinion, there is no true wisdom in incurring great immediate evils in order to provide against dangers so remote. But grant that the danger is all that is supposed. Grant that you have that reason to fear Russia in India which some people of active imaginations suppose. In that case I assert still more strongly that the policy upon which you have acted is altogether erroneous. If you are afraid that Russia will wield against you the power of Central Asia, what is the first thing you ought to endeavour to secure? Why, you should first of all cultivate the friendship of Persia; and you should endeavour to make Persia so strong and powerful that it would not be likely to fall under Russian ascendancy. Now, let any man tell me whether the war which we have now commenced is not calculated in every way to play the game of Russia, not of England, and to create a state of things in Persia favourable to those designs which you so gratuitously impute to the Czar? You want to be on good terms with Persia. Are you taking a course likely to conduce to this object when you arrogantly claim a right which you would never dream of insisting on in the case of any European Power—when you say that Persia shall not pursue, without your permission, that policy which she thinks fit with regard to her near neighbours? Is it likely to promote good feeling between England and Persia when, without any proper proclamation of war, you invade her country, slaughter her troops while defending their own homes, and take possession of a peaceable town? I say that those proceedings of the English Government at Bushire will not be forgotten for many generations, and that by what you have done you have alienated Persia from you probably for ever. Again, you want to keep down Russian ascendancy in Persia. Are you now taking such steps as are likely to accomplish your object? We know that, partly by intimidation, partly by corruption, Russia is able to exercise an immense influence in Persia; but we also know that there is not a single Persian, from the Monarch who sits on the throne down to his meanest subject, who does not 67 in his heart fear and detest Russia as the enemy of his country and of his religion. We know that that is the feeling prevailing among the Persians, and therefore, unless you drive them to seek for support against you, they will most undoubtedly resist, so far as they can, the ascendancy of Russia, which Russia, while this feeling operates, will not find it easy under the jealous eyes of Europe to establish. But if you make war against Persia—if you, with your gigantic power, attack a country too weak to defend itself—what resource has she? She must, willingly or unwillingly, throw herself into the arms of Russia; and thus you are accomplishing, by the very means you are now pursuing, that which you believe to be the aim of the Russian Government and people. If Persia is compelled, either directly or indirectly, to admit Russian ascendancy—if she is driven to employ Russian officers to command her troops, and to avail herself of Russian skill and discipline—she will undoubtedly very Soon be in the position of the horse in the fable, who applied to man to assist him against the stag. Again I say, then, that it is for our interest to make Persia Strong and powerful. Does it conduce to that object when you lay waste her territory, slaughter her soldiers, and destroy the small amount of regular force which she possesses? But then, I am told, we are doing all this for the sake of Herat; and my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary has given us a description of the advantages and resources possessed by that city. I have little doubt, my Lords, that Herat does possess great natural advantages; but to what account are these advantages turned? and what claim has Herat upon us? We all know that, in spite of all its advantages, its inhabitants are poor and miserable. That among all the ill-governed States of Asia—that among all the people who are most disorderly—Herat and its inhabitants enjoy an unenviable pre-eminence. When Herat was attacked by Persia on a previous occasion, it was saved by the extraordinary gallantry of Major Eldred Pottinger, and no sooner Was the city saved, than its inhabitants turned upon theft brave defender, and treated him With the greatest contumely, going so far even as to threaten him with violence, and finally compelled him to leave the town which he had saved. Upon every occasion, the Government of Herat have utterly disregarded the wishes of the British Govern- 68 ment. It Would seem to be our object to ensure the continuance of Herat as a petty, turbulent and ill-governed State, since we insist that it shall remain independent, and that it shall not be taken possession of either by Persia or by the Chief who rules the rest of Affghanistan. We tell Persia that we will go to war with her if she attacks Herat, and we promise her to try and prevent Dost Mahomed from annexing it to his territories. Now, I confess, my Lords, that this appears to me a most extraordinary policy, since our real interest is to create in those countries some great and powerful State—which is impossible while Herat remains independent. But, my Lords, this involves a larger question as to what ought to be our general policy in Asia, and I must endeavour to show you that we have been acting on views altogether false, and that, in endeavouring to regulate the political relations of the tribes of Central Asia with each other, and to maintain that distribution of power and territory among them which is most in accordance with our notions of what is for our own interest, we have undertaken a task which it is impossible for us to accomplish, and which it is worse than useless for us to attempt. It is impossible to maintain any stable political system, because these countries are in a state of continual change, and have been so from time immemorial. New chiefs keep rising into power, and old dynasties disappearing—now one State and now another, under some able and energetic ruler, acquires wide dominion, and becomes formidable to its neighbours; and again, when the able founder of a great power is followed by an incapable successor, its decay is as rapid as its rise. The political relations of these countries with each other are also perpetually fluctuating, and the bitter enemies to-day become the allies of to-morrow. In such a state of things it is Vain to attempt to regulate the political affairs of those countries, with a view of creating and maintaining some permanent arrangement favourable to British interests; and if you do attempt this, after spending time, labour, treasure, and sometimes unhappily blood also, in bringing about some political combination, which appears desirable from the state of things at the moment, you are surprised to find that when a few short years are gone by the aspect of affairs is entirely changed, and that the arrangement you have toiled to effect is become, 69 under altered circumstances, the very one you think it right to make no less strenuous efforts to defeat. A very strong instance of what I am saying is afforded by the very country the affairs of which we are now discussing. At the beginning of the century Sir John Malcolm was sent by Lord Wellesley to the Court of Persia on a mission which was attended with very considerable expense, and which threw a serious burden on the finances of India, the ostensible object of which was to induce the Shah of Persia to march an army upon Herat. How, then, can the Persians think your policy consistent in now protesting Herat, or that you can have any right to do so, when they know that some fifty years ago you spent large sums of money and bribed all her courtiers, in order to induce them to do the very thing which you are now making war upon them for attempting? In like manner it appears that our close ally in what is now taking place is Dost Mahomed. Why, my Lords, it is only seven or eight years ago that we committed the fatal error, the Affghan war—and I am bound to take my full share of the blame, as I was at that time a Member of the Administration—We went to war in order to depose Dost Mahommed, and to substitute for him a prince whom we supposed to be more favourable to our views. With these facts before us the conclusion is irresistible, that it is most unwise policy to make such costly Sacrifices, which are almost certain to prove fruitless, for the purpose of maintaining, either With respect to Herat or to the other States of Central Asia, those political arrangements which we may imagine to be best calculated to secure the safety of India from attack; but I say further that these sacrifices are much worse than fruitless, and that we Are pursuing a policy Which, in Central Asia as in Persia, is calculated to defeat the very object you have in view. Among all the tribes of Central Asia there exists great jealousy of the British rule. These tribes are not ignorant of the history of the rise of our Indian Empire; they know that every State which has been brought in contact with the British Government has gradually been absorbed by it, and they naturally fear that the same fate may await themselves. It is impossible, my Lords, to enter into diplomatic relations with these people, or to take part in the quarrels which divide them, without increasing those feelings of jealousy and suspicion. It is im- 70 possible for us to take part in their continual disputes and struggles for power with each other, to support one and oppose another, without irritating all alike. One of the most distinguished of the many eminent men the Indian service has produced, has most truly and wisely said, that he had never known a close alliance between a civilised and a barbarous State which did not in less than three years end in mutual hatred between them. I cannot doubt the truth of this observation, and the obvious Conclusion to be drawn from it is that the only method of keeping upon good terms With the independent States of Asia is for the Government of India to have as little dealing with them as possible. If you make treaties with them, they are so short-sighted as to their real interest, and so faithless, that they will infallibly sooner or later violate their engagements, and then you are placed in the position which the noble Earl has stated to be that in which you have found yourselves with regard td Persia, when you must be prepared to be asked if you are willing to injure the prestige of England in the East by not resenting a breach of faith. If we have diplomatic dealings with these people, we are sure to find ourselves in the position of being Compelled to make Choice between submitting to open insult, by having solemn stipulations made with us shamefully broken, or else of engaging in costly and hazardous military operations in a poor and difficult country, at an immense distance from the seat of our power. I think that no danger threatens our Indian Empire which is so great as Would be a further extension of frontier, more especially an extension of it to the north and north-west; We have acquired in this direction the best frontier for the purposes of defence we Could possibly possess, and are in such a position that our armies collected in a fertile district could be brought at once to crush any invading enemy as soon as the heads of his columns emerged from passes of great difficulty. But if you persevere in a system of seeking to regulate the distribution of power among the tribes of Central Asia, and of making our influence felt—to use a favourite phrase with many—you are certain to be drawn into quarrels in which you will be compelled to support your diplomacy by the sword, and the wars in which you will engage will end, as all your Indian wars have ended, in the acquisition of additional territory. You will, then, if you go further, acquire a poor and 71 difficult country, inhabited by men far different from the timid Hindoos, bold, active, and energetic, loving their independence, trained to arms from their earliest infancy, and so poor that it would be utterly impossible to obtain from them the means of paying any portion of the expenses of the war. You will acquire a territory, from which, when once obtained, it will be extremely difficult to withdraw, and which you cannot maintain without great expense and danger. The subject, however, is too extensive for me to go fully into it at this moment. I do not now wish to carry these observations further than is necessary for the purpose of showing that if the policy of this war is not clearly bad, it is at all events far too questionable to be at once approved. I must now say a few words upon the question of its justice; because, whatever may be the policy, I think that the first question which we should always consider is the justice of a war. Surely, my Lords, we are all agreed that war is almost the greatest scourge which can afflict mankind, and that therefore an awful responsibility presses upon that nation which engages in it without necessity. I believe also that I am following the highest authorities, when I say that a case of necessity for war can only be made out from circumstances which directly or indirectly resolve themselves into considerations of self-defence; and that it is for self-defence alone that any nation is justified in making the awful appeal to arms. There is no question that on the face of it we are the aggressors in this case, because we invaded the Persian territory. I grant that an apparently aggressive war may sometimes turn out upon inquiry to be strictly one of self-defence; but, in order to make it so, you must be able to show that you attack your enemy in order to anticipate an attack with which you yourselves are threatened, or at least to avert some great and certain danger. Now, when I examine the proclamation of the Governor General of India, I do not see it stated there that Persia meditated any attack upon Great Britain, or upon any British possession whatever. The proclamation is equally silent with regard to any great peril or certain danger which the war is intended to avert. I maintain, therefore, upon these grounds that we are engaged in a war which is not consistent either with a wise view of our real interests or with the higher principles of justice. You have, moreover, entered upon this war without 72 affording Parliament at the proper time any opportunity whatever of expressing an opinion upon it. I find that the proclamation was dated on the 1st of November, and that the expedition sailed from Bombay on the 13th of the same month; and, as both those measures were ordered from home, it is obvious that the order to invade Persia must have been sent from this country not later than the middle of September. I say, then, that when Her Majesty's Government determined on making war with Persia and sent out those orders, it was their bounden duty at the same time to advise the Crown to call Parliament together and to appeal in the usual form to Parliament for support. Since we have had a Parliamentary government I challenge you to produce any one instance in which this country has engaged in war without the Ministers of the Crown having thought it their duty, so soon as war was resolved upon, to communicate that important determination to Parliament. No doubt the prerogative of making peace and war rests with the Crown, and I think that it ought to rest there; but, if the prerogative of the Crown is undoubted, the privilege and duty of Parliament to exercise its judgment on the manner in which that prerogative is exercised by the advisers of the Crown is equally unquestioned; and it has always hitherto been held to be the duty of the servants of the Crown to take care that Parliament should have the earliest opportunity of expressing its judgment upon the matter. I know what the answer will be. I know that I shall be told that this is an Indian war, and that the rule has never been considered to apply to India, will be proved by innumerable precedents. My Lords, I might now demur to the doctrine that our practice now ought to be regulated by precedents drawn from a period when the relations between the Government of India and the Home Government were much less intimate than they are at present. But it is unnecessary for me to go into this question, because I maintain that there can be no doubt whatever that this is not an Indian war, but a British war; and for these reasons:—The original agreement, the violation of which is made the ground for your taking up arms, was entered into not by any envoy of the Governor General of India, but by an envoy accredited by the Queen to the Shah of Persia. Again, when that agreement was alleged to be violated, the communications demanding redress were not 73 carried on through the civil servants of the East India Company acting under the direction of the Governor General, but they were carried on partly by the diplomatic servants of the Crown, and mainly by letters which were actually signed by Her Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I ask, then, is this an Indian war, when the Secretary of State himself signs the letters applying for redress to the Minister of Persia, and ultimately informs him that war will be declared, and when the orders for commencing it were sent out from this country? But, my Lords, that is not all; for this is not a war which affects merely the interests of our Indian Empire. Far from it. This is a war to which the other Powers of Europe are by no means indifferent, and which may seriously affect our relations with more than one of them. More than all, this is a war no small portion of the burdens of which will fall upon the people of this country. If this war continues, do you suppose that India can be called upon to pay all the expenses? It would be utterly unjust to attempt to make her do so, and if you did it would be impossible for you to succeed in the attempt. Then, when you are invading Persia in this manner, am I to be told that Her Majesty's Ministers escape the responsibility because there has been no formal proclamation of war on the part of the Crown? On the contrary, I say that their abstaining from making that formal proclamation of war is an additional reason for condemning the course which they have pursued; because, when they really determined to make war upon Persia, they ought in common honesty and fairness to have taken the ordinary course, and to have made a proclamation of war in the usual way. It is possible that by neglecting to proclaim the war you have involved yourselves in great difficulties. If you are not in a state of proclaimed war with Persia, do you enjoy all the rights of a belligerent with regard to other Powers? Do you even possess those powers over your own subjects which a state of war gives? Can you restrain English merchants from exporting powder and arms, and the munitions of war, to Persia, as you could have done if a proclamation of war had issued? I am not lawyer enough to answer these questions; but they may be raised and may have to be dealt with; and at all events you do not avoid your constitutional responsibility for having engaged in a war without applying for the consent of Parliament, 74 because you have omitted the usual form of proclamation. The war is one not for Indian, but for British purposes. It ought, therefore, to have been communicated at the first possible moment to Parliament; and if Parliament is to maintain that control which it has hitherto exercised over the advisers of the Crown—if Parliament is not prepared to abandon its right of being consulted upon measures which may impose heavy burdens upon the people—if you are not to set aside as obsolete and of no value the traditions and practices of a century and a half of Parliamentary government—I say that you should declare that Her Majesty's Government, by the course they are pursuing, have justly incurred the censure of Parliament. You cannot pass by these proceedings without some serious notice, unless you are prepared to give up the high position you have hitherto held in the State, and to lower the dignity and authority of this House. It is with these views that I am now about to move an Amendment to the Address. I do not, strong as my opinion is with respect to the impolicy and injustice of the war, ask you to condemn it. I think that, as a fitting mark of respect to the Crown, we should abstain from pronouncing any opinion upon the policy of the war until the papers have been laid before us; but, while I do not ask you to condemn the war, I cannot consent to words which by implication approve it. I therefore call upon the House simply to express its sorrow at the breaking out of hostilities with Persia; but I also convey in my Amendment, though in terms of the utmost moderation and of the greatest respect to Her Majesty, that censure upon the proceedings of the Government which I think is due to our character and to the authority of Parliament. I propose to leave out the two short paragraphs which begin with the words, "We share with your Majesty in the regret that the conduct of the Persian Government has led to hostilities between your Majesty and the Shah of Persia." I do not seek to alter the paragraph which refers to the naval and military operations, because, however I may regret that the expedition has been sent, I would do justice to the men who composed it. I propose to insert, in place of the passage I have referred to, the following words—
Humbly to inform Her Majesty that, while we deeply deplore the occurrence of circumstances which have led to hostilities between Her Majesty and the Shah of Persia, we also feel it to be our 75 duty very respectfully to express our regret that when Her Majesty's servants advised Her Majesty to give orders for the invasion of Persia by a British force they did not at the same time advise Her Majesty to call Her Parliament together, so that parliament might have learnt without delay that the nation was about to be involved in war, and might have had an opportunity of humbly submitting to Her Majesty any advice it might have judged such an occasion to require.I have framed and moved this Amendment without communicating with any one Member of your Lordships' House, I know not whether I shall or shall not receive any support. I shall not be disappointed if all support is withheld front me; but I have so strong a sense of the inexpediency of passing the Address in the shape in which it has been moved that, however painful it may be to, stand alone, I think I am but discharging an important and imperative duty in proposing the Amendment which I have read to your Lordships.
§
Amendment proposed, by leaving out the Tenth and Eleventh Paragraphs, and inserting the following Paragraph—
Humbly to inform Her Majesty, that while we deeply deplore the Occurrence, of Circumstances which have led to Hostilities between Her Majesty and the Shah of Persia, we also feel it to be our Duty very respectfully to express our Regret that when Her Majesty's Servants advised Her Majesty to give Orders for the Invasion of Persia by a British Force, they did not at the same Time advise Her Majesty to call Her Parliament together, so that Parliament might have learnt without Delay that the Nation was about to be involved in War, and might have had an Opportunity of humbly submitting to Her Majesty any Advice it might have judged such an Occasion to require.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, notwithstanding the statement made by the noble Earl (Earl Grey) of the obligation under which he finds himself to move an Amendment upon the present occasion, I cannot help thinking that he would have done well if he had listened to the appeal of the noble Earl who moved the Address in a manner which gave promise of his being an ornament to this House, supported as it was by the noble Earl who seconded the Address, and by the high authority of the noble Earl opposite, who pointed out the advantages of the system pursued for some years in both Houses of Parliament of not going too deeply into the questions touched upon in the Speech from the Throne. It appears to me that when we enter too minutely into these questions without having had an opportunity of reading the papers which will be laid before parliament, we are led into conversations 76 which it would be much better to avoid—namely, statements of facts which may be contradicted by those who are in possession of papers which have not yet been submitted to your Lordships. Following the noble Earl (Earl Grey) over the different points urged by him, I will begin with the casus belli with Persia. The noble Earl thinks that the whole casus belli depends upon a certain engagement made by the Shah with this country, and he argues that the more breach of that engagement, even if it could be proved, does pot constitute a casus belli. Now, I believe that whenever, under ordinary circumstances, one Power makes an engagement with another, the violation of it constitutes in itself a casus belli. It may become a question pf policy whether military measures should be consequent upon such a breach or not; but per se a deliberate violation of an engagement constitutes an absolute right of war. But I hold that without this engagement by the Shah at all there would have been reasonable grounds for a military demonstration against Persia on our part to anticipate schemes which we thought dangerous to our Indian Empire; and if the noble Earl had shown less impatience, and waited for the papers which will be immediately laid before your Lordships, he would have found that not only the present Government, but also the Government of the noble Earl opposite, most clearly intimated to the Shah the possible occurrence of an expedition to the Island of Karrack in case he persevered in his designs against Herat. When the papers are laid before the House, your Lordship will be satisfied that this is a correct statement. The noble Earl next strongly objected to the character of the engagement entered into with Persia; he said it was an engagement perfectly inconsistent with any which it would be possible to make in Europe. It appears to me that the noble Earl is quite wrong in this respect. Are there no engagements entered into in Europe to prevent aggressions upon other Powers? Why, Europe swarms with them. One of the most approved acts of the noble Earl behind me (the Earl of Clarendon) was the guarantee given to Sweden during the Russian war by England and France protecting her against invasion. That guarantee, however it might be disapproved by the noble Earl, was received with great applause in this country, the conclusive proof of which was that not the slightest objection was taken to it in either House of Parliament. The noble 77 Earl argued the whole of this point on abstract grounds, without reference to the actual foots of the case. But the commonsense view of the question—taken, he was glad to remark, by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby)—is that, whatever may be the desire of the Russian Government now, it was natural that during the war, anxious to make an impression both upon our finances and our arms, they should encourage Persia to take that opportunity of accomplishing those designs on Herat which it had so long attempted in vain. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) stated the reason why, in his opinion, it was a mere bugbear to talk of a Russian expedition being really dangerous to our Indian dominions. Now, my Lords, I, for one, am not inclined to attach any exaggerated importance to the probability of the Russian Government making formidable expeditions of an aggressive character a long way from their own dominions. Moreover, I believe that at the present moment—and I am more justified than most other persons in saying this—it is not the intention of the Russian Government to take any such steps, and that their anxious desire is that this matter should be arranged as speedily as possible. But this does not affect the question of future contingencies. The noble Earl adverted to the facilities that Russia has for intimidating and influencing the Eastern nations, but added that our real danger in India was not the conflict of arms, but the weakness of finance. Now, Herat is considered by all a place of the greatest importance, and, indeed, the possession of that place is regarded as a sine quâ non to any attack upon India. Supposing, then, the case of Russia using that influence which the noble Earl attributes to her, of influencing Persia to keep possession of Herat and using that power to excite troubles, I ask whether means could not be devised without resorting to a warlike expedition to foment quarrels and create alarms that would lead to a heavy depression in the financial resources of India. The noble Earl has quoted the policy of Lord Wellesley in India, for the purpose of condemning the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the present case; but is it fair to quote cases in contradistinction to the present without making the slightest allusions to the change of circumstances which has taken place during the lapse of time? I do not think it applies in the slightest degree to the present case that because Lord Wellesley thought it right, in 78 order to meet the French then in Egypt, to adopt a certain policy in his day, the present Government shall not, if they should have district of Russia, take care to prevent possible danger in that quarter. The noble Earl proceeded to point out with great force the injustice of the undertaking on which we have entered; but there is hardly any war, even the most just and necessary, except in the case of actual invasion, that can be shown to be otherwise than indirectly a case of self-defence. If we were right in assuming danger either of a direct or indirect character to our Indian possessions from the possession of Herat by another Power, that does constitute a case of self-defence, and in my opinion the state of the case fully warrants the assumption of danger to India, and therefore constitutes the justification of the war. The noble Earl says we are the aggressors. I utterly deny that. It is the Persians who are the aggressors, stimulated by a Power who had the desire at the time to create a disturbance in its favour, and notwithstanding the engagement Persia had entered into not to molest us during the war in which we were engaged. The noble Earl asks in what light the war is to be considered—whether as an Indian war or a home war? It is more an Indian war than a home war; but it is also a war bearing the character of many wars that have occurred before. The noble Earl says, that the declaration of war is unconstitutional and almost illegal, because it had not been duly proclaimed. If, however, the noble Earl will only look back and will refer to other wars that have taken place—some of them when he was a Member of the Cabinet—he will find that for a period of thirty or forty years there has been no such proclamation of wars of this character by the Home Government. Take the case of the Affghan war, or even the war with China, and he will find that no proclamations were issued by the Home Government. In fast, the best authorities do not admit that a proclamation is necessary at all—that as regards the enemy it is merely matter of courtesy, and is only called for with regard to ulterior effects on neutrals, it being considered only fair, if you are likely to inflict indirect injury on neutrals, that you should give them notice. The mere form of proclamation I believe to be altogether unnecessary, and I think we are right in following the usual precedent on this occasion, and not adopting a novel one in its place; the more so as a proclamation might 79 have led to some inconveniences and difficulties of a legal character in preventing merchants from fitting out ships from this country for the East. I am not prepared to enter into particulars, but I believe it is possible that some such inconveniences would have been felt. The gist, however, of the noble Earl's speech was, that Her Majesty's Government had declared war with Persia without asking the concurrence of Parliament, and he says, that they ought to have assembled Parliament at once to submit to them the proposal of war. [Earl GREY: No.] I am sure the noble Earl implied blame to the Government for not having called Parliament together. The noble Earl omits to notice the fact that there was a direct intimation made to Parliament by the President of the Board of Control before the end of the last Session, that such a measure as the present would be necessary if the Persian Government persevered in the policy which it threatened. The noble Earl shakes his head, as if he was not to know what passed in the other House of Parliament; but it is a fact nevertheless that the statement was made and appeared in the papers, and that through that medium information was to a considerable degree communicated to the country. If the noble Earl thinks fit to bring forward this subject again when the papers are in our hands, we shall be ready to meet him on any point which he may select; but I cannot believe that he is serious in pressing his Amendment before the papers are on your Lordships' table, and after an intimation has been made that there is a chance of negotiations being entered into and brought to a peaceful close, which negotiations would be powerfully affected by an adverse vote of this House. I think, at the same time, that it is quite impossible for noble Lords on the other side of the House to vote with the noble Earl after the intimation we have had from the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) and his friends, who place the greatest importance on the independence of Herat, that the Address should pass without amendment. It would be to the disadvantage of this House if we should show a want of unanimity on an occasion when it has been declared that respect for the Crown required that no opposition should be made to the Address.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, he had carefully guarded himself from expressing any opinion upon the justice of the question, and expressly stated that the unanimity of 80 his side of the House on the Address was not to be understood as committing them to the principle at issue.
§ EARL GRANVILLEconsidered the House pledged to nothing beyond thanking Her Majesty for giving the information.
§ EARL GREYobjected to the form in which the Address was drawn. It represented the Shah of Persia as the cause of the war, whereas he maintained that the Government had caused the war.
LORD BROUGHAMsaid, he thought it would be convenient to abstain from discussing the Persian war at present, as the papers on that subject were promised in the Royal Speech, and would shortly be laid upon the table. He hoped and trusted it would not be found, when the Eastern hostilities were more closely considered, that this country, or rather the agents of this country in the East—and especially those in China—had been picking a quarrel for the sake of getting a benefit. With regard to the affairs of Naples, he was not one of those who thought that England had either done too much or too little. He was glad that Her Majesty's Government had not gone further than they had in this matter, and he must protest against what appeared to be a too generally prevailing notion, at least out of doors, among those who were rather prone to be led away by their feelings than guided by their judgment, that it was the vocation of this country—or, as it was called in the half-English language of the day, the mission of the country—to intermeddle in the affairs of foreign nations for the purpose of redressing the grievances of subjects of foreign princes, of restraining the conduct of those princes, and of propagating constitutional government all over the world. Englishmen might lament that other countries did not enjoy the incalculable benefits of constitutional government; and they might lament; also, that other nations were ruled by princes who were capable of those acts which no one abhorred more than himself. They might feel, that though such princes might grant amnesties—either voluntarily accorded or extorted by force—those amnesties—and he referred not to the north of Italy but the south—afforded little protection for the future so long as the unhappy subjects of these princes did not enjoy the blessings of constitutional government. He was by no means convinced that this country had a 81 right to remonstrate in such cases—but certainly they had no right to go one single hair's breadth beyond remonstrance—for the purpose of encouraging nations to obtain better institutions, or of controlling sovereigns who acted under such institutions as at present unfortunately existed. He remembered the time when a neighbouring nation deemed it their vocation to plant republics all around them, and thereby involved Europe in a general war; and he maintained that England had no more right to plant Parliamentary governments all over Europe than France had in 1792, to surround herself with republics. With regard to the Royal Speech itself, it was not so much exposed as such speeches usually were to the remark that they were framed upon the principle of the gardener's motto—look at everything and touch nothing; for it touched upon a number of most important matters. He had, however, been struck by the generality of the passage respecting the Estimates, which was couched in precisely the same words that had been adopted in almost every Royal Speech he had seen; and he was sorry to see that no reference was made to the income tax. Great excitement prevailed throughout the country on the subject. He had done his duty in opposing that tax on all occasions; and in 1842 he moved a set of Resolutions, discussing it in every point of view, and declaring the necessity—if it should be adopted at all—of modifying it in such a manner as to make a distinction between income derived from capital and income derived from professions, and a further distinction in the former class between income derived from property of whatever kind held only for life and income derived from property in fee. The great statesman whose loss they daily deplored—he meant the Duke of Wellington—and his noble Friend who was then at the head of the Board of Trade (the Earl of Ripon) distinctly confessed that they had not a word to say in reply to his Resolutions, and to the arguments adduced in their support, both on moving them and when the Bill came up from the Commons. The Minister—the illustrious Duke—then leader of the Government in that House, admitted that the tax could only be justified by absolute necessity, and ought not to continue for one hour after the necessity had ceased. It might be said the necessity for the tax had not yet ceased; but he remembered that, in 1816, when, in the other House, he waged war against the impost, 82 the Estimates were brought down to the House framed in the usual way, the King's Speech having promised the utmost economy consistent with the efficiency of the public service. After six weeks' campaign, which, in junction with his lamented friend, Mr. Baring, afterwards Lord Ashburton, he had the fortune to conduct, the income tax was put an end to. The Estimates had been framed on the supposition of the continuance of the tax. But the refusal of the tax by the House of Commons took away £14,000,000 or £15,000,000, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer abandoned the war malt tax of some £3,000,000 two days after on the mere notice of Motion. A sum of £18,000,000 was thus withdrawn from the supply, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer prepared an amended set of Estimates, framed on the principle of "cutting his coat to his cloth." He (Lord Brougham) hoped that in the present instance a diminution of the amount of income tax would lead to a corresponding reduction in the Estimates. He was aware that the noble Secretary for War had already effected a considerable reduction in the expenditure, but he hoped that the diminution of the income tax would occasion still further retrenchment. Nothing in the Speech gave him greater satisfaction than the promises of the Government with respect to measures for the improvement of the law, and though he well knew how little promises and professions cost, and how constantly wise men were wont to value them proportionately little, taking them, as it were, at prime cost, yet he felt bound to say he had every confidence that these promises would now be performed. Never was there a time when such reforms were more needed in many branches of the law, both civil and criminal. Without entering now into a discussion on the convict question, he would say that some change or other must take place in the mode of dealing with prisoners. This he took as being absolutely clear, and the result of actual experience. It was not easy to say what that change should be, but a considerable increase in our police force, he believed, would at any rate be absolutely necessary. He must also call upon their Lordships to attend to the representations of the mercantile classes on the subject of the mercantile law He had lately had the honour of presiding over a conference of delegates from all the great mercantile towns in the United Kingdom, at which certain 83 changes in the law, and especially the law of debtor and creditor, were discussed. These representations were the result of the experience of men who were daily suffering under the defects of the existing law, and who were therefore the best witnesses to its evils. He would, in con-elusion, only urge upon their Lordships the wisdom and justice of immediately proceeding with the measures for the amendment of the law. There could not be a more unfounded alarm than theirs who dreaded any improvement by alteration in our laws, provided these were carefully devised and temperately carried into execution. Timely changes tended to the preservation of our institutions; and the best and surest way to avert the destruction of our laws was to amend them. Referring to the renown of the Emperor Trajan, whom one of his successors called a wall-flower, because his name was carved on the numberless structures he had founded, Lord Bacon said that he preferred the fame of Adrian, who gloried in wrestling with time to repair his ravages. But it was still better to stay those ravages than to repair them; and he (Lord Brougham) would venture to affirm that timely alterations and improvements were certain to have that happy effect, and could alone prevent the devastations of time.
THR LORD CHANCELLORsaid that, as the paragraph in the Royal Speech with regard to law reform was rather vague, it would probably be acceptable to their Lordships and to the country, if he intimated to them move in detail what measures it was the intention of the Government to introduce. The first subject to which the Government had directed their attention was the reform of the Ecclesiastical Courts—a subject of the greatest importance, and one which had been undertaken without success by every Government during the last twenty-five years. On that day week he should ask their Lordships to give a first reading to three Bills—one for the reform of testamentary jurisdiction, another to amend the laws of marriage and divorce, and a third on the subject of Church discipline. The Attorney General would also, as soon as possible—in the event of his hon. and learned Friend being re-elected to his seat—ask for leave to introduce into the other House a Bill to render criminal breaches of trust, of which there had unfortunately been so many instances of late. Some time ago, it Would be in the recollection of 84 their Lordships, a Commission was issued to inquire into the subject of the registration of the transfer of lands; that Commission had not yet reported, though he had reason to know that it had prepared the draughts of a Bill or Bills to be laid before Parliament on the subject which were founded on the recommendations to be contained in their Report, and the object of which was to give Parliamentary titles in certain cases, as was done by the Incumbered Estates Court in Ireland. In the meantime it was his intention to ask the Legislature to effect a minor reform in the same direction, to render extremely simple mortgages of land by means of registration. Their Lordships were aware that there was at work at the present moment a Commission for the consolidation of the statute law. Nobody unacquainted with the subject could comprehend half the difficulties which beset it, but the Commission had succeeded in consolidating the whole criminal law, and Bills similar to those which he had laid on the table on the last day of the previous Session would be introduced for the purpose of effecting that consolidation. He should also ask their Lordships to refer the second Report of that Commission to a Select Committee, in order to consider the proposition in that Report for the adoption of means to improve the manner and language of current legislation. The Member who introduced a Bill was generally so glad to have it passed, that he consented without difficulty to any alteration that was proposed in it; and the result was, that, when the measure became law, its various provisions were found not to dovetail together. Moreover, the language of the statutes was frequently discrepant, leading to uncertainty as to its meaning. What the Government, therefore, proposed was, that there should be an officer appointed—who should be a very able lawyer—and whose duties would be to report, when called upon, on every Bill introduced for the alteration of the law; to explain exactly what its effect was, what was its bearing on the existing law, and generally to put the whole statute in order. And further, after a Bill had gone through Committee, the House should refer it, if it thought fit, to this officer to examine and state the alterations it had undergone in passing that ordeal, and also to point out how far those alterations affected its general tenor, and how far they affected, if it did affect, the general tenor of other laws. Of course, this officer would have it in 85 his power to offer suggestions for improving the language of an Act; and it was to be hoped that the result would be to render our statutes more clear, less verbose, and more in harmony with the ordinary language of mankind. Another part of the same officer's duties would be to classify the various Acts passed within the year. His functions would, of course, be at first tentative; but, no doubt, as they became generally more defined, they would prove highly useful. Before concluding, it was right also to mention that his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary intended to introduce a measure into the other House on the subject to which a noble Lord had alluded—namely, that of secondary punishments. Having made these announcements, he trusted their Lordships would not think that the Government had been idle during the recess in the important matter of the amendment of the law.
§ Question put, Whether the words proposed to be left out shall stand part of the Motion?
§ Their Lordships divided:—Content 45; Not Content 12: Majority 33.
| List of the CONTENT. | |
| Lord Chancellor. | Llandaff |
| DUKE. | London |
| Argyll | St. David's |
| MARQUESSES. | |
| Aylesbury | BARONS. |
| Lansdowne | Belper |
| EARLS. | Broughton |
| Airlie | Camoys |
| Abingdon | Crewe |
| Besborough | Cremorne |
| Clarendon | De Tabley |
| Cork | De Mauley |
| Cowper | Dufferin |
| Granville | Foley |
| Harrowby | Glenelg |
| Shelburne | Hatherton |
| Spencer | Lilford |
| VISCOUNTS. | Lyndhurst |
| Falkland | Lyttelton |
| Sydney | Methuen |
| Torrisgton | Panmure |
| BISHOPS. | Saye and Sele |
| Bath and Wells | Stanley of Alderley |
| Chester | Truro |
| Down | Vivian |
| Gloucester | Wenlock |
| List of the NOT CONTENT. | |
| MARQUESS. | Grey |
| Bath | Leitrim |
| VISCOUNT. | BARONS. |
| Dungannon | Bateman |
| EARLS. | Cloncurry |
| Aberdeen | Lifford |
| Carnarvon | Ravensworth |
| Eglinton | Wynford. |
§ Resolved in the Affirmative.
§ Then the original Motion was agreed to; and a Committee appointed to prepare the Address. The Committee withdrew; after some time, report was made of an Address drawn by them, which being read, was agreed to; and ordered to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with white stares.
§ [For the Address, see p. 14.]
§ House adjourned to Thursday next.