HL Deb 27 May 1856 vol 142 cc673-97

THE EARL OF ELGIN moved— That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Copies of any Despatches from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General of Canada, or the Lieutenant Governors of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward's Island, on the Military Establishment to be maintained in those Colonies, of a later date than the Despatch of Earl Grey to the Earl of Elgin, of the 14th of March 1851; and the Copy of the Report of the Commissioners appointed by Letters Patent Under the Great Seal of the Province of Canada, dated the 27th of October 1854, to investigate and report upon the best Means of re-organising the Militia of Canada and providing an efficient economical System of Public Defence, and to report upon an improved System of Police for the better Preservation of the Public Peace; and a Copy of any Act or Acts passed by the Parliament of Canada in pursuance of this Recommendation. The noble Earl said that he did not know whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to grant these returns or not; but in either case he thought it would be only respectful to the House that he should briefly state the grounds upon which he submitted the Motion to their Lordships. He had thought it right a few weeks ago to call the attention of the noble Secretary for War to certain rumours which were then current respecting an alleged intention on the part of the Government to make a very considerable addition to the military force maintained in the British North American colonies, and to make that addition with certain unusual accompaniments of parade and ostentation. He believed that some of the reports then very extensively circulated by the press went the length of stating that a certain portion of the magnificent fleet, at that time assembled at Spithead, was to be employed to convey 10,000 men from the Crimea to Quebec or Halifax. Having had some experience of the state of feeling in America, he thought that if rumours of this kind were transported across the Atlantic without a single word of denial, qualification, or explanation, they might produce very uneasy feelings both in the British provinces and in the United States; and they might perhaps have the effect of inducing the Congress of the United States—which, he hoped he might say without offence, sometimes acted rather upon impulse in such matters—to adopt, as it had done in a corresponding case, countervailing measures of precaution or of menace, which might still further complicate the relations subsisting between the two countries. Since that time he had received an American newspaper, in which the reports to which he referred were republished, with such comments as they might fairly expect. These reports commenced with the following extract from The Times:— We believe we may state with certainty that General Eyre's Division of 10,000 men is to go direct from Balaklava to Canada. Such a measure will, no doubt, be variously interpreted. We are not in the secret, and can only discuss it as any Canadian or American politician might do. It will of course be set down by some people at once as a threat, or at least a measure of precaution; indeed, we do not see how, just now. it can escape the latter character, as the Canadians themselves show no sign of disaffection, and in the present temper of the British people on colonial affairs it is doubtful whether we should take the trouble to coerce them if they did. If it be, then a measure of precaution, the citizens of the United States, as they have just voted a million of money for war steamers, will not be surprised at our sending 10,000 men to the support of our loyal fellow subjects. Canada was stripped of all her disposable forces for the service of this war, and as our republican neighbours have taken the opportunity of making a disturbance, it is a matter of course that, as soon as our forces are released, a portion of them should return to the colony. For our part, we much prefer this solution to another which may suggest itself—namely, that we are to make a rule of maintaining a large force in Canada. The colonists don't want it themselves. Indeed, they asked permission to raise a regiment for the war in the Crimea, and thought themselves not very respectfully used when the offer was declined. We trust, indeed, that we are giving up the absurdity of an immense and costly army, in the most unavailable and unimprovable form, spread in small detachments over half-a-hundred colonies. There were some passages of that extract in which he most cordially concurred, but at the same time it must be admitted that the article was not written in a very conciliatory spirit towards the United States, The American journal to which he referred also contained the following extract from another metropolitan newspaper (the Morning Chronicle:— No one is deceived by this declaration. Were nothing meant, it would have been as well to have done nothing. But, first to send a fleet, then munitions of war, and then an army, has certainly no very great appearance of pacific intentions. He thought these reports, when they were brought together in such a shape, presented a somewhat formidable appearance, and justified the course he had taken in bringing the subject under the consideration of the Government, and inviting them to give some explanation of their intentions. He took the liberty of adverting to this point, because it was of great importance, in their discussions with America, that they should bear in mind the fact, that Great Britain and the United States possessed in the highest perfection the advantages of a free press. It was, therefore, impossible in either country to prevent the measures of Government from being criticised, and their motives, real or supposed, genuine or putative, from being canvassed and scrutinised. Moreover, the presses of both countries, being vastly influential within their own respective spheres, and also—he said it to their honour—eminently patriotic, were apt in these international discussions, like the knights in the legend, to look a little too exclusively to their own side of the shield. This imposed upon men who were earnestly desirous to preserve peace between the two countries and to promote the interests of both or either—and, he believed, it would be very difficult to promote the real interests of one without promoting the interests of both, so intimately connected together and so dependent upon each other were they—this imposed upon public men the duty of striving to remove any causes of possible misunderstanding, and that they should not shrink from suggesting means of conciliation, although occasionally the attempt to discharge those duties might expose them to misrepresentation and reproach. It was with these views and feelings, and not with any intention of causing embarrassment to the Government, that, three or four days ago, he had asked the noble Earl below him whether a letter which had appeared in the American journals, purporting to be a copy of one written by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in this country, in reply to a request from the Government of Costa Rica for a supply of arms, was genuine or not. He knew that this letter, under the circumstances of the war now raging between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, in which a numher of citizens of the United States were engaged, had produced a great effect in the States, and he, therefore, thought it most important that an opportunity should he afforded to the noble Earl of giving to the public a true version of the transaction. He did not intend to comment upon the reply which was given by the noble Earl to his inquiry; but he believed the noble Earl's statement that, in point of fact, no arms had been sent to Costa Rica afforded very general satisfaction. He (the Earl of Elgin) might be permitted to say that, having seen a great deal of the people of the United States during his residence in America, and having had numerous opportunities of intercourse, official and non-official, with the leading men of that country, and speaking moreover in the interest of those North American colonies, which would be the first and perhaps the greatest sufferers if hostilities were to break out between the two Powers, he deeply regretted and deplored the extent to which an impression was gaining ground in this country, that an unfriendly feeling existed among the citizens of the United States towards Great Britain—he deeply regretted the suspicion and distrust which that feeling—a feeling which he believed was totally erroneous—was imparting to the political relations of the two countries. There was, no doubt, a disposition among certain classes of persons in the United States—classes composed in a much larger proportion of foreigners than of natives—to view the proceedings of this country with unfounded jealousy, and to put an unjust construction upon the motives by which it was influenced; but he entertained a firm conviction that the better classes in the United States, were animated with the most kindly feelings towards this country, and that the people generally were desirous that friendly relations should be maintained with us, and conscious that any interruption of those relations would entail upon both countries the most serious calamities, without being accompanied by any compensatory advantages. He believed there never was a time, since the Declaration of Independence, when the substantial interests which bind the two countries together were so manifold and so important, and when the differences between them were so trifling and puerile as at the present moment. He believed that, were it not for the point of national honour, which they believe to be engaged because the Government tells them it is so, the people of this country would not take much interest in any of the pending questions, and would not care whether they were settled one way or the other. He deeply deplored the continuance of angry discussions between the Governments of the two countries: because he was confident that if the British people were once brought to believe that a collision with the United States was sooner or later inevitable, and if the Congress of the United States coutinueed its military and naval preparations in order to be prepared against such a contingency, it would be impossible much longer to maintain peace between the two countries. He also deprecated the continuance of these angry discussions for another reason—because he thought that, with reference to the disputes now pending between the two Governments, we had been led in our controversial zeal to assume positions diametrically opposed to those which a consideration of our real and permanent interests would have induced us to occupy. It was our interest, for instance, that the neutrality laws of the United States should receive the widest interpretation, that that disposition which existed in some portions of the population of the United States to carry on war on their own account should be checked, and that the Government of the United States should be led to recognise the obligations which it owed in this respect to the other Governments of the world. But in our late controversy with the United States we had been led to contend for the narrowest interpretation of their neutrality laws, we had been led to maintain the right of persons resident in the United States to enter into the service of foreign belligerents at their will, and that it was not a fair subject for remonstrance that diplomatic agents of a foreign Power should make themselves, directly or indirectly, parties to such proceedings. This view of the case had been most ably put in the last despatch of the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary to Mr. Marcy. The noble Earl said— In Great Britain the law not only prohibits recruiting or enlisting within the British dominions for the service of any foreign State, without the permission of the Sovereign, but it goes further and prohibits any subject of Her Majesty from so enlisting, even elsewhere, without the Royal permission. The policy of Great Britian hence appears to be to prevent British subjects from entering at all into the service of foreign States without the permission of the Crown. The law of the United States appears to be different. Her Majesty's Government understood, and that understanding is confirmed by Mr. Buchanan's note of the 6th of July, that the law of the United States only forbids enlistments, recruiting, and contracts or engagements within the United States, and hiring or retaining persons to quit the United States with intent to be enlisted elsewhere; but it does not forbid citizens of the United States, who may have used their natural right of quitting the United States, to enlist into the service of a foreign State when they have left their own country. The sovereign power of the United States might, if it had chosen to do so, have followed its citizens with a prohibitory enactment beyond the territory of the United States; but it has not thought fit to do so, and the just and inevitable conclusion is, that what it might have forbidden, but has not forbidden, it has designedly allowed; that is to say, in other words, that it is the policy of the United States to prevent foreign enlistments within the United States, but that it is not the policy of the United States to forbid the citizens of the United States to enlist, when out of the United States, into the service of foreign States, if they should choose to do so. That was a most temperate statement of the case, but such an argument would have come more naturally from an American than from a British Minister. Their Lordships would remember, moreover. the lowered tone and the bated breath with which the noble Earl had read a portion of a despatch from Mr. Marcy in the course of the late discussion on the maritime code. The noble Earl on that occasion read the following quotation:— It is not apprehended that there will be any attempt to violate the laws; but should the just expectation of the President be disappointed, he will not fail in his duty to use all the power with which he is invested to enforce obedience to them. Considerations of interest and the obligations of duty alike give assurance that the citizens of the United States will not compromise the neutrality of their country by participating in the contest in which the principal Powers of Europe are now unhappily engaged. He could quite understand that the noble Earl, when he was reading this passage, felt that a British Minister was placed in a very false position by being obliged to employ all his ingenuity to weaken and extenuate the force of the valuable pledge which had been given by the American Government. Then with reference to the Central American question. No doubt it was the real interest of this country that the independence of the Central America States should be preserved, and that no one great Power should obtain an overweening influence in that territory, which was destined probably to become the highway of the commerce of the world. It was with this view and intention that the Bulwer-Clayton Treaty was entered into, and it was in pursuance of this view that a very valuable assurance was obtained from Mr. Abbott Lawrence on behalf of the United States, in a despatch from that gentleman to Lord Palmerston, dated November the 8th, 1849—to the effect that the American Government had no ulterior objects to serve, and that they had no intention whatever of occupying or colonising that territory. In our zeal, however, to maintain certain rights in Central America—which he felt bound to say he believed to be entirely worthless—we had been led to put a most restrictive interpretation on that treaty, and to extend to the utmost the limits within which the parties to it might exercise powers of protectorate or quasi-sovereignty in that territory. He very greatly feared that the able arguments which we had employed in this discussion would be turned against us with effect in yet more serious discussions which might arise between us and the United States; but, in the meantime, all the friends of both countries must agree in earnestly desiring that the present controversy should be put an end to at the earliest moment. But a few days ago an American gentleman of great eminence had expressed to him his conviction that if Lord Clarendon and Mr. Marcy were half an hour together in some room they would settle the whole question in a manner most satisfactory to all parties. Now that the noble Earl was released from the overpowering labours which had been lately pressing on him, he hoped he would turn his great abilities and powers of conciliation to this important subject, and by putting an end to the dissensions between America and England add another to the many claims which he had established upon the gratitude of his country. To revert, however, to the question of the transmission of troops to Canada. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for War, in reply to the inquiries which he had addressed to him on a former evening stated, that the reports to which he had called attention were exaggerated, that the addition which was to be made to the military force in the North American provinces was not so great as it was represented to be; and, above all, that it was not intended for aggressive purposes in America. That declaration was most explicit and emphatic, and must have given great satisfaction to all persons whose confidence in the discretion of the Government was of that somewhat qualified nature which rendered such an assurance desirable. He himself was not one of that number, for it had never occurred to him to suppose that it was even possible that the Government would be guilty of the imprudence of undertaking an aggressive movement in America. He confessed, however, that judging from past experience and a little influenced also by those reports, he had felt at the time when he put the question some little anxiety upon another point, which was not wholly removed by the answer which he had received. He had thought it just possible that Her Majesty's Government, conscious that they had at their disposal one of the most powerful fleets and one of the best appointed armies which this country ever possessed, might have conceived the opinion that something in the nature of a demonstration of force, something which their admirers might vaunt as a display of vigour, might be serviceable to them in the negotiations which they were then carrying on with the United States. He was glad to say, however, that a statement more recently made by the noble Lord at the head of the Government, in answer to an inquiry addressed to him in another place, went far to remove the apprehensions which in common with others he had entertained on this point. That statement, however, and the inquiry which led to it, went very far to justify the observations which he had already made, and to illustrate the advantage which a Government enjoyed, from the opportunities of explanation, of self-vindication—perhaps he might say, of reflection and reconsideration which were afforded to it—when Parliament was sitting. That illustration, in the present case, was the more complete and the more instructive because it contrasted in a very marked manner with what had occurred in a case almost exactly similar not many months ago. Their Lordships could not have forgotten the circumstances attending an addition made some short time ago to our naval force on the West India station. At that time Parliament was not sitting; no Member of either House could rise in his place to ask the Ministry to explain the motives of their proceeding, or to undertake the still more thankless office of warning them of its too probable consequences. The result was that the public, both in America and England, were constrained to put upon that proceeding the construction which was put upon it by the press of this country—and more particularly by that portion of the press which was supposed, universally supposed in America, whether rightly or wrongly, to enjoy, to a certain extent, the confidence of Her Majesty's Government. Their Lordships could hardly have forgotten the tone in which the people of the United States were reminded that as their community comprised many lawless individuals whom their Executive was either unwilling or unable to restrain, it became necessary for our Government to take measures to guard against the possible remissness of the Government of the United States. It was a very significant fact, however, that the pretext for these warnings was furnished, not by the proceedings of native-born Americans, but by the idle ravings and the wild projects of apostate subjects of the Queen of England—of men who had fled to the United States to seek a refuge from real or fancied oppression, and whose acts were a scandal and a reproach rather to the country of their birth than of their adoption. He did not pretend to say that the intentions imputed to the Government were correct. On the contrary, he thought it probable, nay, he was confident—and he should be glad to be informed now that his confidence was not misplaced—that if the Government had had the opportunity of explanation which the sitting of Parliament afforded, they would have been able to explain away what appeared offensive in this proceeding. He admitted, moreover, that the proceeding might have been attended with some appearance of temporary success; but, if the Government had been careful in watching the signs of the times, if they had watched the proceedings of the American Congress with due attention, they must have learnt by this time to appreciate the cost at which such successes are achieved. They put arms into the hands of a party in the United States, small in number and contemptible in influence and character, but noisy and active, who found in denouncing the so-called overbearing policy of Great Britain a theme of perpetual declamation; and they also furnished with arguments, unhappily for America and England, as well as for the peace of the world and all those transcendant interests of freedom, civilisation, and progress which were bound up in a good understanding between these two kindred nations, that class of persons in the United States who found, or imagined they could find, their account in the maintenance of expensive military and naval establishments; and those who achieved such successes were therefore, unconsciously no doubt, but not the less surely, conspiring to call into existence the material force of that New World which might yet be destined to realise the prediction of a celebrated statesmen of this country, in a sense little meant by its author. But the reply of the noble Lord (Lord Panmure) to the question put to him the other night raised a question of domestic policy of great importance, on which the returns for which he had moved might throw considerable light. The noble Lord said, that the addition to be made to the military force stationed in British North America, was intended only to replace the amount removed thence since the commencement of the war. It might be inferred from that statement that the reduction of force in the North American colonies of late years had been the result of accidental or temporary circumstances; whereas, the returns he now moved for, would show that it had been the result of a policy deliberately adopted and steadily and consistently carried out, and would have taken effect even if the late war had not occurred. The object of that policy was twofold. In the first place, its object was to relieve the mother country of a portion of the expense hitherto borne for the military protection of those colonies. In the second place, it was to call forth in the colonies a certain amount of military spirit and material force, which should be available in peace, for the preservation of internal tranquillity, and in war be of assistance to the mother country. He did not make the present Motion with any intention whatever of occasioning embarrassment to the Government or placing any obstacles in their way, in making such a disposition of the military force which on grounds of general policy they might think it necessary to maintain as a peace establishment, as they deemed most advantageous and conducive to the interests of the country. What the amount of that force should be, and how economy and efficiency might be reconciled in its composition and distribution—these were, no doubt, important questions well deserving consideration, but which he did not propose to raise on the present occasion. Least of all was it his intention, in inviting their Lordships to accede to his Motion, to say one single syllable calculated to raise a doubt among our fellow-subjects in the colonies as to the deep interest this country took in their welfare, or as to its readiness to support them with the whole might of the empire against aggression or wrong; but he did think it very important at the present time more especially, and in the existing state of our relations with the United States, to call their Lordships' attention to the elements of strength which this country possessed in the devoted loyalty and perpetually increasing resources of the great colonies with which he had been for many years connected—to the power and consistency they were of late assuming under the influence of a wise administration of colonial affairs by successive Governments; and to implore their Lordships to interpose their high authority, if necessary—though he did not assume that it would be—to prevent the adoption of measures which might have a tendency to arrest the work now in progress, which promised, if perseveringly carried out, to render those colonies in time to come a support instead of a burden to the empire. He knew how prone individuals were to exaggerate the importance of subjects to which their attention had been long directed, and he was sensible that in pressing this matter on their Lordships' consideration he might seem to be yielding to that infirmity; but he could not help thinking that the subject was one really deserving the attention of the Parliament of this country. England possessed some forty-five colonies. Whether that was an advantage or an evil was not now the question, but he believed it rested with the country to render the possession of those colonies either the one or the other. But that the colonies existed was certain, and no less certain was it that their existence imposed on this country certain obligations and responsibilities, of which it could not, if it would, divest itself. Among them, perhaps the most onerous, the most delicate, and the most difficult of adjustment was this very question of the military protection of the colonies. He made bold to say, after an experience of thirteen years in the colonial service, that, until a very recent period, this country dealt with this question on a principle which involved the monstrous absurdity that, in proportion as the colonies increased in wealth and extent, the burdens incurred by the mother country in their behalf should increase. However, with regard to colonial administration, he believed that the example of our North American colonies was very apt to prove contagious. It was hardly seven years ago since their Lordships were told on high authority that the constitutional system given to those colonies was unworkable, and that the attempt to carry it out would tend to abet treason, discourage loyalty, and sacrifice the interests of the colonies to faction. Well, that system was now in full and healthy operation, and was spreading itself over the whole colonial empire; and he ventured to say that, in every colony where it had been faithfully applied and carried out, it had produced an abundant return of loyalty and attachment to the mother country, and of prosperity, happiness and contentment, among the inhabitants of the colony. But on this question of military protection, the example of the North American colonies was calculated to be especially instructive, because owing to the contiguity of the United States it had presented difficulties there which it could not carry with it elsewhere. Therefore, their Lordships might be sure, that if in those colonies the difficulties had been surmounted, the same difficulties elsewhere would not be insuperable, and perhaps not formidable. He did not presume to speak on these subjects with anything like authority, but perhaps he might be listened to when, as a witness, he detailed simply the result of his own experience in Canada. When he went there in 1846 he found some 8,000 troops stationed in that colony alone. They were scattered in small detachments all over the colony, and, as a matter of course, the whole duties of police devolved on them. Under these circumstances, it was quite impossible to induce the local Legislature to do anything towards the establishment of a local force; and the military force was viewed with mixed feelings by the colonists—with favour on account of the expense incurred by the mother country, and with great and not unfounded jealousy, because it was supposed to be maintained for imperial, distinct from colonial interests, and that its influence was used for the support of that party which had the favour of the Home Government for the time. Consequently there was little disposition on the part of the local administration to do anything to relieve the mother country from any portion of the burden on this account, and he found that it was actually the practice to charge with duties articles purchased by the money of this country and imported into the colony for the use of the troops maintained there. He sometimes mentioned this fact to Americans, but with all their appetite for the marvellous, they thought it so extraordinary that he could hardly get any of them to believe it. In 1846, the number of troops in Canada amounted to 8,000 men, who were scattered over the country, while at present there were only 1,880, who were concentrated in two or three garrisons; and the consequence was, that the responsibility of maintaining the internal tranquillity of the province devolved upon the inhabitants and upon the authorities in different localities. A commission of four most able men, at the head of which was Sir Allan M'Nab, had been occupied in preparing a plan for the establishment of a local force; and their report, and the Act of Parliament that had been founded upon it, formed part of the papers for which he had moved; because he was anxious that it should be generally known that measures of economy in matters of military protection had been carried out in such a way as to increase, and not impair, the defensive strength of the colony. Those measures of concentration were carried out, he was bound to say, under the instructions of the Secretaries of state, under whom he was serving, the noble Earl below him (Earl Grey), and the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle); but at the same time, notwithstanding those instructions, he had felt that a considerable amount of responsibility rested upon himself personally, because he was well aware that if any injury had happened to British interests, or if there had been any disturbance of the internal tranquillity of the colony, the blame would have been laid upon the local governor; for it would have been said that it was his duty to have foreseen the danger and to have forewarned the Home Government of the danger which attended carrying their instructions into execution. That weight of responsibility fell upon him more heavily on account of the crisis through which Canada had then lately passed, and because the very eminent man who preceded him (Lord Metcalfe) held views with respect to the condition of the colony and the state of feeling which existed among the colonists, which, if they were sound opinions, would have rendered any material reduction of the military force in the colony an act of insanity on the part of the Government of this country. Now, he entertained the highest possible respect for that distinguished personage, but he could not assent to his views as to the feeling of the colonists. He believed, and had always believed, that the utmost reliance could be placed upon the loyalty and good feeling of the people of Canada, and therefore he had no doubt as to the propriety of carrying out the instructions of the Secretary of State, and of adopting the policy of placing the protection of the colony to a considerable extent in the hands of the colonists themselves. That was a policy which was not only, he thought, a just policy, but it was actually essential to the development of a sound moral condition among the colonists themselves. What he had said referred chiefly to a state of peace. He was prepared to admit that in a state of war the responsibility of a country with regard to her colonies was much more extensive; and that was one good reason, even if there were no other, why England should always, if possible, keep out of war. In a despatch which he had written to the Secretary of State at the close of his administration he had expressed his views upon the subject, and he would trouble their Lordships with a short extract from it, because it entirely expressed his present views. In that despatch he said:— Although I hold that so long as the colonists have no voice in the Imperial councils, they are entitled to look to the Imperial authorities for protection against hostilities which they have no share in provoking, and that it is therefore fitting that Imperial garrisons should be maintained at certain important military stations, such as Quebec, as a pledge that this protection, when the contingency occurs, will not be invoked in vain, I am confident that nothing will more effectually tend to the security of the empire, or to the establishment of a high standard of national and manly morals among the colonists, than the assumption by themselves of some portion of the responsibility in respect of self-defence and the preservation of internal tranquillity, which has heretofore been cast upon the mother country. He could only now say, in conclusion, that if the intention of the Government in sending troops to the North American colonies was to man the garrisons there, in order to give to the colonists the pledge and the assurance that if future protection were required, it should not be wanting, he not only should not oppose it, but, on the contrary, he would be prepared to defend the measure to the utmost. If, upon the other hand, these troops were sent out for purely Imperial objects, in consideration of the convenience or the salubrity of the North American colonies, or for some motive of economy to conveniently maintain a portion of our standing army in those colonies, provided that it was done on the understanding that the charge should be borne on account of the general interests of the empire, neither would he then oppose such a course; but he should be disposed to the very utmost of his ability to protest against and to oppose any policy which would tend to reverse the work which had been in operation during the last few years. He would do so, because he thought that it would be unjust towards the mother country, and also because, although it might be a boon to the colonies, in the first instance, it would be a boon followed by a speedy reaction, and would put an argument in the hands of those who were disposed to denounce our colonies as burdens. The noble Earl concluded by moving the Address.

THE EARL OF CLARENDON

My Lords, I am anxious to make some observations on the early part of the speech of the noble Earl, but they shall be very few, because I am deeply convinced of the inconvenience, and possibly the danger, of such a discussion at the present moment. Indeed, so deeply convinced am I of this that I shall refrain from making even a single observation on several remarks which fell from the noble Earl, and which I had heard with regret; but, still, I am so anxious that there should be no mistake as to the feelings of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the United States, or as to the policy which they have pursued, and which they will continue to pursue, that I must address a few words to your Lordships. And, my Lords, I will, in the first place, say that, as far as I myself am concerned—and I speak also in the name of all the Members of Her Majesty's Government—I do not believe there can be the slightest doubt of my and their desire to maintain unimpaired the closest, the most cordial, and the most sincere relations with the United States. I believe no men can be more convinced than we are that it is both our interest and our duty to maintain those friendly relations with the American Government and people; and, as far as I am concerned, having filled the office of Foreign Secretary for some years, I can conscientiously affirm that neither by word nor by deed has anything been done which would create a just feeling of irritation between the two countries.

My noble Friend has alluded to the two points of difference between the United States and Great Britain under two heads—namely, the recruiting question, and the question of Central America. With regard to the recruitment, that question entirely arose from proposals made to us, in the first instance, by persons desirous of entering into the Queen's service. We did not even contemplate accepting any of those offers without due reference to the neutrality laws of the United States, which, I entirely agree with the noble Earl, it is as much our interest and duty to uphold as it can be those of the United States themselves. It is our duty, indeed, not to violate or infringe upon the laws of any other country; but we have an interest—a British interest—in the neutrality laws of the United States being maintained. The maintenance, therefore, of those laws was our first thought, as they constituted the principal part of our instructions; and the moment we ascertained that the recruitment could not be carried on without the danger—not on the part of our own agents, but of persons who assumed to be our agents—of violating the neutrality laws of the United States, we agreed to relinquish the whole scheme. Your Lordships have seen from the papers which have been laid on the table that there is nothing which could be expected from one nation towards another—from one Government towards another—from one gentleman towards another—that we have not done, or offered to do, in order to afford reparation to the United States for any offence—however unintentional on our part, real or imaginary—which they can conceive has been committed. My Lords, the last despatch that was written on this subject, which was a resumé of the whole matter, in answer to the long despatch of Mr. Marcy, can hardly yet have reached the United States, and therefore upon the question of the recruitment I am exceedingly anxious not to say any more at present. But, as far as I have been able to ascertain what are the impressions which that despatch has produced in this country, I think the general opinion is, that we have offered a complete satisfaction to the Government of the United States, and that the only thing which we certainly have not done has been to recall Mr. Crampton and the Consuls, because we do not think they have merited that censure and that punishment. There would have been no shortcoming on the part of Her Majesty's Government if we had seen reason to adopt a contrary course, and no hesitation to deal severely with any agent who should so far have forgotten his duty and been unmindful of his instructions as to violate the laws of the United States; but being convinced that that had not been done, and having in our possession the means of proving to the United States that it was not done, I think nobody will require of us to sacrifice our agents and to purchase a conciliation with the United States by doing that which would be both shabby and dishonourable.

With regard to the Central American question, your Lordships know what were the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. I think it impossible that language could be more clear or more precise in its meaning than the language employed in that instrument. The treaty sets forth that there should not be in future any colonisation, any occupation, any fortifying or strengthening of places not already in the possession of either country. I do not see how there can be two interpretations of its terms. It was prospective, and it was intended for a specific object—first, the construction of a canal, and then its maintenance free for the use of the world, prohibiting any encroachment on the part of the United States and Great Britian, which were the contracting and guaranteeing parties; but all its provisions were prospective, and there is certainly nothing in it which implies that we were to give up Honduras and Ruatan, or to evacuate or alter our position in any respect from what it was before the conclusion of the treaty. It is impossible that the very able man—Sir Henry Bulwer—who negotiated the treaty on the part of Great Britian, could have taken upon himself, without instructions—even without the knowledge of his Government—to abandon any portion of British territory or British interests; and so far from having done anything of that sort, he made a stringent proviso, which was acknowledged by Mr. Clayton, that the treaty should not touch Honduras, or affect any of its dependencies. When Mr. Buchanan came over to this country, we heard for the first time that there was an entirely new interpretation to be put upon the treaty. It was no longer to be looked upon as a prospective arrangement, but one for the evacuation of British territory; and we were told that we were to blame, and were the cause—I will not say of a quarrel between the two countries, but—of irritation and complaint on the part of the United States, because we had not fulfilled the engagements of the treaty by evacuating all the territory we possessed in Central America. I told Mr. Buchanan—what was the perfect truth—that that was the first time I had heard such an interpretation put upon the treaty. He replied that in his country there was no doubt upon the subject. I then said that—however clear the terms of the treaty might appear to me—to call in a third party, an impartial judge, to determine what should be the interpretation of the treaty, would be the fairest course to pursue between Governments as between individuals. I also added, that we certainly had no wish to possess territory in Central America; that we did not desire to extend our influence in that part of the world; that we were perfectly ready to enter into such engagements as would satisfy the United States, and even our own people at home upon that score; that it was therefore indifferent to us who was called in to arbitrate; that we should be prepared to abide by the decision, whatever it was; but that to do what was not contemplated by the treaty, because we were told that a certain interpretation was put upon it which we could not admit, was not a course which one Government should propose to another, and to which certainly no independent Government would submit. I therefore proposed—what is by no means uncommon in such cases—that the matter should be referred to arbitration. To that proposal, although it has been so long before the Government of the United States, we have as yet received no answer. My Lords, upon this question also I do not wish to enter farther, because I am convinced that, when the subject really comes to be considered in the United States—when the public opinion of that country is brought to bear upon it as it is upon all other political questions—when the American people are made acquainted with our assurances as to having no desire to extend our territory or our influence in Central America, and as to our sincere wish to enter into engagements sufficient to satisfy every reasonable man, our offer of accommodation will not be refused.

My Lords, I have only to say, in conclusion, that I have heard with the greatest satisfaction from the noble Earl, who is a far better judge of these matters than I can be, that among all classes in the United States there exist the most friendly feelings towards this country. I say I heard that statement with the greatest satisfaction, because by certain public men in the Senate and in Congress—by certain official men—there have been language held and acts performed which, if held and done by any Member of this House—not to say any Member of Her Majesty's Government—would be justly denounced both by your Lordships and the people out of doors as the language and acts of a man who desired to embroil the two countries in hostilities. Therefore it is that I heard with peculiar satisfaction from the noble Earl of the friendly feelings entertained by the great mass of American citizens towards this country. I think the people of the United States can have no doubt of the existence of similar feelings here. I believe there never has been in England any hostile feeling towards the United States; and notwithstanding the clouds that have appeared on the horizon, the manner in which the recruitment and Central American questions have been treated by the press of that country has produced no real—certainly no lasting—feeling of irritation here. I believe that the people of England are as anxious as the noble Earl can be that all these disputes should be brought to an end. I can assure the noble Earl that, as far as it depends upon me, they shall be brought to an end. Nothing shall be wanting on the part of Her Majesty's Government to bring them to a close: and, if the information be correct which the noble Earl received the other day, that Mr. Marcy and I might settle our differences in half an hour, I can only say that I am ready to meet him for that purpose on some island halfway between the two continents.

LORD PANMURE

My Lords, the noble Earl who introduced this subject to the notice of your Lordships divided his address into two parts. He first spoke of the policy pursued by this country with reference to the United States of America, and then addressed himself to the notice which he had placed on the papers. With regard to the first of those points, he has been answered by my noble Friend behind me; and the duty now devolves on me of making a few remarks on the second part of his speech, which related to the troops Her Majesty's Government had recently thought it desirable to send to the North American provinces. But before doing so, I must take the liberty at once to state that this step has been taken with no desire whatever to overturn the policy to which my noble Friend has alluded, which policy was more particularly referred to by my noble Friend as having been pursued by successive Secretaries, and to which it is the object of Her Majesty's Government most strictly to adhere. I have to state that it did seem expedient to the Government to add to the force at present in the British American Provinces, and that not only on colonial but on Imperial grounds; but I may be here permitted to say to my noble Friend that I think the exaggerated accounts which have been given of the amount of the force sent to Canada were hardly the ground on which he should have assumed that the policy of several years past was about to be overturned, inasmuch as he might have ascertained that the number of troops sent thither from the Crimea amounted to five regiments, and that they were conveyed not in Her Majesty's fleet, but in the usual manner, by the transports of the British navy. The policy pursued in Canada of late years is simply this. Formerly it was the practice to maintain in the British North American Provinces a considerable body of troops, which did not only all the military service in these colonies, but also all the police duties that were involved in the maintenance of the public peace. I readily admit that the latter is not a duty in which the British army ought to be employed. I maintain that both at home and abroad the purpose of the British army is higher and more distinguished than is implied in the mere administration of police duty; and it is in following out this doctrine that we have thought it right to concentrate in British North America a body of troops which shall be exercised in military duties, and which shall chiefly garrison the important town of Quebec and one or two other stations. There the troops will present an example of military education to the people of Canada, and the Militia, which they are daily becoming more and more able to form, will receive from soldiers under the command of Such a man as Sir William Eyre a knowledge of military movements which will be to them of the greatest advantage if at any time they are unfortunately called on to defend their hearths and altars. But what, after all, is the great increase of troops which we propose to send to British America? We propose to send at this moment five regiments; the utmost strength of each regiment will be 800 men, and it is quite possible they may be reduced under that number. These are to be spread over Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, but chiefly gathered together in garrisons in Quebec and Halifax. In 1853, as appears by a return I hold in my hand, the force in Canada amounted to 4,166. The force at this moment, including the five regiments to which I have referred, will be under 4,000; and, therefore, it can hardly be said that the number of troops to be sent is either such as to damp the energies of the colonists on the one hand, or create the least alarm in the breast of any sensible citizen of the United States on the other. To show how far the policy advocated by the noble Earl has been carried out, I may observe, that there is hardly one principle he has laid down that has not been almost fully carried into execution. In the first place, the military force of the country has been gathered and concentrated upon the points to which my noble Friend has referred. A provincial militia has been formed, and to a great extent organised and drilled, and is now efficiently at work for the purpose for which it was created. Then, this country, instead of bringing home the material which it had collected from the various colonies, has made over a vast amount of supplies to the colonial Governments as an encouragement to them to take into their own hand the defence of their own land; and if we have a brigade of the British army assembled in that country, it is for nothing more than an encouragement to the Canadians to undertake for themselves their own defence, should such ever become necessary, and to show them that we are prepared, in the event of war occurring, to use every effort in our power to defend a colony that will not, I trust, soon be separated from this country. It is, in my opinion, necessary that we should maintain in Canada and the other colonies a body of troops, who should be accustomed both to foreign and colonial service. One of the most useful lessons that can be imparted to our soldiers is to teach them how to serve abroad—to let them see other countries, to learn the art of war there—to accustom them to transport by sea and land, and in this way to acquire all the duties belonging to their profession. And one of the advantages of the Colonies of this country is, that you have an opportunity of sending out troops to them, to enable them to see the operations of our army, and to tempt them to enter into the service of the mother country with readiness and zeal. I cannot omit this opportunity of alluding to the deep interest Canada has taken in the war in which we have been engaged. No part of Her Majesty's dominions at home showed a deeper interest in the success of Her Majesty's arms than the North American Colonies. Not less than £40,000 came from the North American Provinces to relieve the distress caused by the war, besides what was sent from Lower Canada to our Allies—for, not forgetting their origin, the inhabitants of that province sent £10,000 to France. I can assure my noble Friend that it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to reverse the policy we have been pursuing, and that the force sent to Canada is for Imperial purposes, coupled with those advantages to the Colonies to which I have already adverted. I believe that the army of England will not be used for mere police purposes in Canada. It will be used to garrison the extensive and valuable fortress of Quebec, which mounts about 160 guns, and where there are now, I believe, only 160 artillerymen to take care of the guns and ammunition. This force has also been sent out in order to form a nucleus for that portion of the British army which is stationed in Canada, and to afford means for that instruction in the duties of brigade which the British army so much requires, and which will, I trust, be provided for by all future Governments.

EARL GREY

said, he rose only to express his gratification that the noble Earl (the Earl of Elgin) had elicited the explanation which had been given by the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He (Earl Grey) thought that explanation was absolutely necessary, for he deemed it most important that the country should clearly understand the extent and objects of that increase of force in our North American Colonies, which, as they had learnt from the newspapers, was now taking place. He attached the utmost importance to the explanation which had been given upon both the grounds stated by his noble Friend. He conceived that any departure from the policy which had been acted upon for a considerable number of years by this country, of reducing the charge for colonial garrisons, would have the worst effect upon the interests of the mother country and the colonies. He thought, however, that it was still more important, at the present moment, that an assurance should be given—as he trusted they might consider it had been given—that the increase of force had no reference whatever to any recent discussion with the United States. In his opinion this was the more necessary, because on the last occasion when this subject was discussed the noble Secretary for War used a somewhat unhappy phrase in saying that the force which had been sent to Canada was not intended for "aggressive" purposes. No one supposed the United States was to be invaded by an army of 10,000 men; but considerable alarm would have been excited in his mind, after the recent discussion with America, if he had been informed that the increase of force had any reference to either aggressive or defensive purposes. It seemed to him, however, quite impossible that the discussion with the United States could lead to any serious results. He had heard with great pleasure many of the observations of the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He certainly thought that, in the first instance, Her Majesty's Government committed a great error with reference to enlistment in the United States. He did not see how it was possible that diplomatic servants of the British Crown could be employed in any manner with reference to recruiting in North America, without affording some justification for the complaints that had been made by the United States Government. Even the issuing of instruction by Mr. Crampton in reference to recruiting could not be defended; because such an act was a total evasion of the law of the United States. He thought that, even if the proceedings of Mr. Crampton and the British Consuls had been confined to making known the desire of the British Government to raise a force for the Russian war in the British provinces of North America, and to the annunciation that parties by applying at such and such places, would obtain a free passage to England for that particular purpose, it would still have been virtually an infraction of the laws of the United States, and an infringement of the neutrality of those States, we could only judge of such a case by considering what our own feelings would be under similar circumstances. He knew what would have been the feeling excited in this country if the Russian Ambassador and the Russian consuls in Prussia had been allowed to spread information that immediately beyond the frontier of Prussia a depôt had been opened, at which any persons who could find their way from Prussia would be enlisted in the Russian service, and that was a case which seemed to him to differ very slightly from what had been attempted by our agents in the United States. He also thought that, at the commencement of the discussion, the tone of the despatches of Her Majesty's Government was not so conciliatory as it ought to have been. In his opinion the manner in which the maxim "Civitas non carcer est" was quoted, and indeed the whole tone of the despatches, was anything but conciliatory to the United States. He was, however, happy to find that the latest despatch of the noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon) was written in a very different spirit, and he could not believe that there was even the possibility of a quarrel with the United States. With regard to the Central American question, he agreed with the noble Earl (the Earl of Elgin) that the interests of both parties were of the most trivial description, and, provided the national honour was maintained, he believed nobody in this country cared for anything else. He strongly approved the proposal that the questions in dispute should be referred to arbitration. Considering that every day the civilized world was declaring itself more and more generally in favour of the principle of arbitration, and that there was a general concurrence in reprobating the conduct of nations or of statesmen who, rejecting that means of arriving at a pacific solution of disputes, would plunge into the dreadful alternative of war, he could not believe that from the trumpery questions relating to Central America any real danger could arise. He trusted and believed that there were no prospects of anything like war; but though that might be the case, yet he thought it was of the utmost importance that an assurance should be given that the despatch of troops to the North American provinces had no reference whatever to the unhappy disputes which had occurred. It was unfortunately the fact that, among high-spirited nations, when measures were adopted by one party on the ground that they were precautionary or defensive, similar measures were almost invariably adopted by the opposite party, and were pushed a little further; passions became excited on both sides; and when nations were thus armed, although there might have been no real ground of quarrel in the first instance, there was great danger that the dreadful calamities of war might ensue. They knew the effect produced upon the United States by the measures which Her Majesty's Government adopted in the month of November last. The papers laid before Congress contained a despatch from Mr. Buchanan to the Secretary of State for the United States, in which he said that great jealousy and alarm would be excited in the United States by the intimation that the British Government were about to increase their naval force in the Western Hemisphere, and they knew that this feeling led the Congress to vote a very large sum of money for extending the naval force of the United States. He was persuaded, unless the good sense of the two Governments interposed, and unless the tendency to a mutual increase of armaments was checked, that—even if war should be ultimately averted, of which he would not like to speak too confidently if the process of arming once began—many of the evils, and much of the expense of war, would be incurred, and strong feelings of hostility would be excited between the two countries. It was this view of the matter which induced him to consider that the explanation which his noble Friend had elicited from Her Majesty's Government was most important, and he trusted that the country and the world would assume, after what had passed that night, that in taking these measures the Government neither intended, on the one hand, to depart from the policy of redeeming the charge of our colonial establishments; nor, on the other, that the measures themselves had the remotest reference to the differences which unfortunately existed between England and the United States.

Motion agreed to.

House adjourned to Friday next.