Lords Sitting of 3 May 1855

MINUTE.
PUBLIC BILL.—2a Loan.

INDIAN OFFICERS—BOUNTIES—NAVVIES FOR THE CRIMEA.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, as I see the noble Lord the Minister for War in his place, I wish to ask him some questions which relate to subjects which have excited a great deal of interest. The first question relates to the position of the officers of the army of the East India Company as compared with that of the officers in the service of Her Majesty's army. A memorandum, dated the 25th of April, has been issued from the Horse Guards, and has appeared in the Gazette, which states—
"That in order to remove any doubt which may exist as to the rank and precedence of the officers of the Hon. East India Company's Service, it is Her Majesty's pleasure that officers of the Hon. East India Company's Service, whose commissions shall be signed by authorities duly deputed to do so by Her Majesty, shall have rank and precedence with officers of Her Majesty's regular army, according to the dates of their commissions, in all parts of Her Majesty's dominions or elsewhere."
Now, he felt great gratification at finding
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that an arrangement had been conceded which would be agreeable to the officers of the Indian service; but the officers of the Indian army have by common courtesy always held in this country the same rank and precedence, which they would have had had they been entitled to hold in England the rank they held in India, and no doubt it will be agreeable to them to have their right to such rank and precedence properly established, instead of merely holding it by courtesy; but what I wish to know is, if this memorandum relates merely to their position in society, because, if so, I should have thought that it would have more properly proceeded from the office of the Earl Marshal, or of the Lord Chamberlain, than from the War Office. I cannot help feeling that this memorandum, instead of raising hopes of further advantage to the officers of the Indian army, will rather tend to disappoint hopes which may have been entertained that the Government were prepared to go further, and to give to all officers holding brevet rank in India the same brevet rank in Her Majesty's dominions here and elsewhere. Your Lordships must be aware that, from the year 1838, for nearly ten years great wars raged in our Indian dominions, and that therefore the officers of

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the Indian service have had the opportunity of making themselves masters of the practice and science of war—an advantage which has not been enjoyed by the officers of Her Majesty's army, with the exception of those who have served in India—and there obtained the same advantages as were enjoyed by the Indian officers. I rejoice, my Lords, that some officers of Her Majesty's army now employed in the Crimea have had the advantage of witnessing operations on an extensive scale in India. General Simpson, the head of the Staff, General Pennefather, General Sir Colin Campbell, all holding high command, and enjoying to a considerable extent the confidence of those under their command, and also Colonel M'Murdo, who has been placed at the head of the Land Transport service, and Colonel Harding, the Commandant at Balaklava—who is, I believe, no relation of my noble and gallant Friend opposite—all these officers have seen service in India, and all of them acquired a knowledge of war under the late Sir Charles Napier. But there are other officers in the Indian service who have enjoyed similar opportunities of acquiring a knowledge of their profession, and who have commanded with distinction brigades which contained regiments of Her Majesty's troops, and who have obtained great distinction in the Quartermaster General's department. It does appear to me to be contrary to all reason that, when we have at our disposal officers who have acquired distinction in command where war has been carried on on a great scale, we should decline to avail ourselves of their services, and should employ in preference the services of officers who, whatever the claim to distinction they may hereafter acquire, have had no opportunity of showing their talents for war. It cannot surely be held that to appoint Indian officers to command would be an invasion of the privileges of Her Majesty's service. At a recent period, and contrary to all former rule, a regulation of the East India Company has been made, permitting officers of Her Majesty's service to hold Staff appointments of a particular description, and not less than twelve officers of that service now hold appointments which they could not formerly have held. Why, then, should there not be a reciprocity, and Indian officers be admitted to Staff appointments, from which they have been hitherto excluded, and which they would fill with great advantage to the country, as officers
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of Her Majesty's service are admitted to such appointments in India? I cannot conceal from myself, nor do I think that any of your Lordships can be blind to the fact, that a great and growing feeling of dissatisfaction exists throughout the country with regard to the conduct of the war, and that feeling is assuming proportions which are extremely alarming; and I much fear that, unless it be determined by Her Majesty's Government to place the fittest men who can be found in command of all the divisions and brigades of the army, and in situations on the Staff, I much fear, I say, that a feeling will grow up with respect to persons in authority, which will be fatal, not only to Her Majesty's Government, but which will go much further, and which will endanger the constitution of Government, by which authority has hitherto been administered in this country. I wish to ask the noble Lord another question, relating to a different subject. I see there is a memorandum, dated April 30, which, under the authority of an order in Council, raises the bounty given to men enlisting for two years to the same amount as that given to men enlisting for a longer period. Now, with regard to that memorandum, I wish to know whether it is to be understood as establishing the principle that the bounty given to men who enlist for a longer period is to be the same as that given to men who enlist for two years only; and whether there is no difference to be made between those who enlist for the longer and those for shorter periods of service? If that be so, I fear that the result will be that all persons who are desirous of enlisting will enlist for the short period, because at the end of that period they will have the option of re-engaging for a longer service, and with the certainty of receiving some further bounty. It seems to me, too, that men who enlist for the longer period settle down better to the work and become better soldiers than those who are uncertain whether they shall remain for a longer period than two years only, and I would therefore prefer enlisting men for the longer period. But of this I am quite sure—that, if the same bounty is given to men who enlist for two years as to those who enlist for a longer period, all will be desirous of enlisting for two years. I think that when this memorandum was issued, it would have been advisable to notify that, if the bounty given to men enlisting for two years was to be raised to the same amount as that given to men enlisting for

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the longer period, the bounty of men enlisting for the longer period would also be increased. I fear, however, that in dealing with this question the noble Lord has made the same mistake with regard to the bounty offered as was made in the case of the militia, and the consequences of which we all so deeply deplore. My own impression is, that, if instead of offering the limited bounty of 20 s. to the militia upon reattestation, a higher bounty had been offered, a very large number of men would have been retained in the ranks of the militia who have now returned to their homes. There is another point to which I wish to call the attention of the noble Lord. I am told that steps have been taken to engage the services of 1,000 navvies to work in the trenches, and that these navvies are to be placed under a gentleman who is to have a salary of 2,000 l. a year—that is, a salary which is superior by 76 l. only to the united salaries of a major general and and a lieutenant general, and is superior by about 200 l. to the salary of all the officers attached to the Quartermaster General's Department in the Crimea. I take it for granted that those navvies will not consent to serve for the same pay as that given to the Sappers and Miners; and it is a matter of serious consideration whether men employed in the same duties and exposed to the same danger should be paid at different rates. What I desire to know is, whether it is true that it is intended to form a corps of this description, and, if so, whether it is to be of a military or civil character? I can hardly imagine it can be of a civil character, because it must be employed under fire like the rest of the troops; but if it be of a military character, what rank is to be given to this gentleman who is to be rewarded with a salary which surpasses that of the officers on the Quartermaster General's Staff? I desire, also, to know what is the difference between the pay to be given to this body of men and the Sappers and Miners; what authority is to be given to the officers commanding them; and under what authority are the men to serve?
LORD PANMURE: My Lords, upon former occasions I have had to complain that when questions were asked notice was not given beforehand of the subject to which noble Lords intended to refer; but I am bound to state that in all cases in which questions have been addressed to me by the noble Earl opposite, I have always received the fullest information respecting
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the intended question and the nature and extent of the answer which he expected to receive. This has enabled me not only to meet the noble Earl in the same spirit evinced by him to myself, but also to give your Lordships the fullest information in my power upon the subjects to which he so ably refers. With reference to the question which the noble Earl has addressed to me on the subject of the Indian officers, I may state that the memorandum to which he adverts goes no further in its spirit than it does in its letter—namely, to confer upon those officers a social position and authority, which has hitherto been recognised by courtesy, but with respect to which some doubt previously existed. No one can rejoice more than I do at any mark of favour bestowed upon officers of the Indian army, and no one would be more unwilling than myself to say anything which tends to detract from the praise which is due to them. They have for a very long period maintained the honour of the British name throughout the vast terrritory in which that army has served, they have maintained the integrity of the Indian portion of the empire, and they have assisted in extending it; still it is my opinion, as well as that of many others, that the services and distinctions of the Indian officers have been somewhat unfairly used to put in the back ground, by comparison, the services and distinctions of the officers of the Queen's service. I think, in a military point of view, the opportunities those officers have had of practically learning the art of war in the Indian campaigns have certainly given them great advantages; but I do not hold that those advantages ought to entitle them to more than a fair consideration, and they should not he used as an argument to prevent us from giving the officers in the Queen's service the fair opportunities which that service affords of showing by his services to the country whether they are able to carry out in practice the military knowledge which they already possess in theory. I cannot see, my Lords, because the Indian officers have already carved with their swords the way to military distinction, why the same opportunities should be denied to the Queen's officers of carving with their swords the way to the same military distinctions. I have seen it stated that the officers in the Queen's service are now classed in two classes—the Peninsulars, who are said to be too old to be effective; and the Know-nothings,

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who are too young to know anything. That is not a fair mode of describing the officers of Her Majesty's army; for, reserving always the opinion that the services which are most calculated to advance the interests of the country ought to be taken advantage of, I know of no reason why well educated and well trained British officers, although they may not have seen service, should not be allowed to go into active service. I am not one of those who would adopt the course of confining the services of the officers of the Queen's army, whether belonging to the establishment or to the Indian army—for they are alike the Queen's soldiers—and I am not narrow-minded enough to think that we ought to make a distinction between the officers of the two services. Although progress in reform, in these matters is slow, it is also sure, and as an instance of the manner in which the subject is treated, I may refer to the fact that in the Act of last Session the office of Commander in Chief of the army in India was thrown open to officers of the East India Company's service. With regard to the appointment of Queen's officers to the staff in India, to which the noble Earl has alluded, I am given to understand that it has arisen more from accident than from any other cause—it happens that the staff situations in India are very numerous, and that they have been filled by officers of the Indian army, very much to the detriment of the performance of the regimental duties of that army; and it was found necessary to recall some of those officers to their regimental duties and on their recall the vacancies on the staff were filled by officers of the Queen's army. Those are the circumstances, I am told, which form the ground of the statement which the noble Earl has just made. I do not believe that the officers of the Indian army were superseded by officers in the Queen's service; but I am informed that the change was made in consequence of the number of Indian officers who held staff appointments, and that the change was necessary, in order that the regiments in India should be made the more efficient. With reference to the next question—namely, the bounty given to the recruits, that is a subject to which my attention was called by my noble Friend the Commander in Chief when the Act was first introduced. My noble Friend asked whether it was intended to sanction the principle that men enlisting under the new Act should receive
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the same bounty as the men who enlisted under the Act of 1847. After maturely considering the subject—taking into view the fact that the men enlisted under the Act of 1847 were enlisted at the age of eighteen for ten or twelve years, that they had the opportunity, after five years' service, of acquiring an addition to their pay for good conduct, and that they had the opportunity after the expiration of their first term of service, of re-engaging themselves for a second period; taking also into consideration that none of these advantages will accrue to the men who enlist at the age of twenty-four for a service of two or at the most of three years, that the men who would enlist would probably be between the ages of twenty-four and thirty-five, who, from their habits of labour, would be, even if not efficient as drilled soldiers, efficient as strong men—I did not feel myself justified in giving to those men a lower rate of bounty than we gave to a boy of eighteen years. It must be remembered, too, that none of these regulations are permanent, but may be varied according to circumstances; and if I find that that arrangement is such as to create discontent or prevent the enlistment of young men of eighteen years and upwards, I may consider whether some alteration may not be required. With regard, my Lords, to a general increase of bounty, I perfectly agree with the noble Earl that an increased bounty will, at all times, obtain an increased number of recruits, and probably before very long I may have to propose to your Lordships to increase the bounty in order to augment the army; but it is naturally my wish not to take that course until it is absolutely necessary. With regard to the question of navvies, it is under the consideration of the Government to form a corps of navvies, not for the purpose of working specially in the trenches, but for carrying on the general work of the army, which has hitherto been done by the Sappers and Miners and by the private soldiers, and the execution of which I am sorry to say has hitherto been detrimental to the health of the men. Yet this work must be done; and in order to obviate the difficulties suggested by the noble Earl on a previous night, and to carry out the views of the noble Earl of having as many fighting men as possible at our disposal, it is considered that we may attach, under the command of the engineers, a body of navvies of stout working men, who will be sent out for the purpose of working either

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in the trenches or in the camp, as circumstances may require, while the army is engaged in the siege. No definite sum has been fixed upon as the amount of payment to these individuals; but it is utterly impossible to expect that men will come from civil employments, either in the capacity of labourers or of directors, for the usual pay given to the officers and men in Her Majesty's service. I have only this to say, that I shall endeavour, if I think it for the public service that such a corps should be formed, to obtain proper men at the lowest possible remuneration; and I shall not recommend the adoption of any such corps unless I am convinced that the benefit likely to result from its adoption will be so great as to counterpoise the inconvenience that I cannot but see may arise from employing individuals with the army at a higher rate of pay than that paid to the officers and men belonging to Her Majesty's service. This corps on being formed will be under the command of Major General Jones as commanding engineer, all the arrangements would be directed entirely by him, the men being at the same time under the immediate control of their own superintendents.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, that the appointment of Her Majesty's officers on the staff of the Indian army was not an exceptional case, but was in consequence of the adoption of a new principle; there must, however, have been sufficient authority to warrant that alteration of the rule. No doubt the paucity of officers in the Indian army might have been the cause of the alteration, but it certainly involved altogether a new principle.

EMBARKATION OF TROOPS TO THE CRIMEA.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY rose for the purpose of repeating the question which he put to the noble Lord the Secretary for War, on a previous evening. The noble Lord on that occasion complained that the notice of the question he (the Marquess of Salisbury) intended to put was not sufficiently explicit. He could assure the noble Lord that it was not from any want of courtesy that he did not enter more into detail. The whole matter was comprised in the very smallest compass, as it was simply reminding the noble Lord of what must have passed through his own office. With regard to what occurred the other night, their Lordships must be convinced
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of one fact, namely, that the noble Baron knew nothing of the circumstances of the case. On that occasion the noble Baron laid the whole blame of the transaction on the Quartermaster General. Whether that was just or not it was not for him to say; but he thought after that imputation by the noble Lord, the country had a right to know on whom the blame ought to rest, and who were the parties by whom a body of troops were despatched for foreign service. He had always understood that, when the Minister for War had received Her Majesty's Commands for such a purpose, he communicated with the Commander in Chief at the Horse Guards, and that after conferring together, they made an application to the Admiralty for the transport of those troops; and that on receiving the necessary information from the Admiralty, the Quartermaster-General was then directed to take measures for their removal. It was essentially necessary to know who was to blame in this matter, and why the Guards were sent to Portsmouth for embarkation before the ship Alma was ready to receive them. The blame of this transaction had been shifted from one quarter to another until it was impossible to find to whom it should attach. He hoped, therefore, the noble Baron would be able to give their Lordships some information on the subject.
LORD PANMUREsaid, nothing had been further from his intention than to contradict anything which the noble Marquess had stated. What he had said was, that he had heard for the first time from the noble Marquess that the events to which he had called attention had taken place. If the noble Marquess had given him notice of his intention to call attention to those events, he would have prepared himself to give an explanation of them, and would have entered into the details of the facts the other night; but all the notice he had received was, that the noble Marquess intended to put a question with regard to the embarkation of the Guards on board the Alma. The noble Marquess asked what were the regulations for the embarkation of troops for foreign service? Formerly the Secretary at War determined what regiments were to be sent abroad; and it then rested with the Commander in Chief to make the arrangements with the Admiralty and the other authorities as to the embarkation of the troops that might be required. Now, however, it was different, and when it was settled what troops were

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to go abroad, the Secretary for War signifies to the Transport Board the number of troops that were to embark and the time of the embarkation, the Transport Board provided tonnage for those troops by the day named; the embarkation is then carried on by the officer of the Quartermaster General's department in conjunction with the officers of the Transport Board. With respect to the Alma, on the 20th of March the Admiralty had notified to the War Department that the Alma would be ready about the 5th of April to receive 1,420 men. The Alma was fitted at Liverpool, and 420 men of the 18th, 71st, and 50th regiments were embarked there; she then went to Portsmouth to embark the Guards. She had been surveyed by the officer attached to the Transport department at Liverpool, and reported to be fitted to carry 1,420 men, and she had also been passed by Colonel Scott, the inspecting officer at Liverpool, as fitted to carry that number. When she went round to Portsmouth she was reported by the officer there to be incapable of carrying that number, and he believed this report arose from the fact that, while at Liverpool they had calculated that a certain number of men would be constantly on deck and upon watch, they had not taken that circumstance into consideration at Portsmouth. The authorities therefore determined that the vessel could not carry more than 1,048 men. In consequence of this report, the detachments of the 18th, 71st, and 50th regiments were disembarked at Portsmouth, were marched into barracks, and remained at the depot waiting for further orders. His noble Friend (Viscount Hardinge) reminded him that the commanding officer at Liverpool had written to say that the ship was capable of carrying 1,420 men. After some delay—which he thought had been somewhat exaggerated—in landing the detachments and embarking the Guards, the vessel sailed. The whole of the statements concerning the Alma were considerably exaggerated. A statement had been made that a large portion of the baggage of the troops which had disembarked were carried in the Alma to the Crimea. He had found upon inquiry, that nothing belonging to those troops was carried off except a couple of articles belonging to two officers, and he was sure that if these officers had taken the slightest pains to look after them both of those articles would have been rescued. There had been some mistake with regard to the embarkation of the
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baggage belonging, not to the detachment of the Guards which then embarked, but to the Guards already in the Crimea. With regard to the orders and the counter orders which had been issued, he had to state, that two of these counter orders had arisen from the fact that a storm had taken place at Portsmouth, which had prevented the Alma from being brought into a position proper for the embarkation of the troops, but due notice of this circumstance had been given to the troops before they had left London. He had received communications from officers who sailed in the vessel, to the effect that, whether as regarded their accommodation or that of the men, none of them had ever experienced more comfort in a transport, nor had the health of the men ever been a subject of less anxiety than while they had been on board the Alma. With regard to another question of the noble Marquess he begged to state that he (Lord Panmure) had fallen into a mistake the other night; it was his impression that every regiment which had embarked from this country had embarked with the Minie rifles. He was happy to state that all the men who embarked for the East, whether in regiments or detachments, were as far as possible, trained to the use of the Minie rifle; but as it was desirable to carry on the usual drill on board the vessel which could be better done with the old arm, they were armed with the smooth-bore musket, which they exchanged at Constantinople for the Minie rifle, which was kept in store there for that purpose. He thought this a sufficient explanation of the circumstances; and he had further to say, that the result of the inquiries he had made convinced him that the Quartermaster General was free from all personal blame in the matter, and that if any confusion had taken place it lay between the district officers at Liverpool and at Portsmouth, who had reported differently as to the capacity of the ship, and the number of men she could properly carry. There was a desire to send the men on board as quickly as possible, and if an error had been made, it was on the right side, namely, to adopt that arrangement which enables the troops to be conveyed with the greatest comfort and the greatest possible consideration for their sanitary condition. The result was, that there had been no complaint of overcrowding, and, indeed, none could arise in this case.
THE EARL OF HARDWICKEhad heard a statement made by the noble Lord which

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could not fail to raise in the minds of their Lordships various reflections as to the conduct and the present state of the War Department in general, and as to this embarkation in particular. It struck him as being very curious to see the noble Lord, who must be considered a civilian, entering into an explanation of the details of all the different branches of the War Administration, when a distinguished general—the Commander in Chief of the army—was sitting at the noble Lord's right hand and acting as his tutor by telling him what to say upon the subject. This was a bit of machinery which he ventured to say would not work. If he understood the noble Lord rightly, he stated that the system now was, for the Secretary for War, when he wished to send troops abroad, to write to the Transport Board, and then the Transport Board communicated with the Admiralty; and then the Secretary for War informed the Commander in Chief, and then the embarkation took place; whereas, under the old system, as he was informed, a simple communication took place between the Commander in Chief and the Admiralty.
LORD PANMUREsaid, he had been informed by his noble Friend (Earl Grey) that the mode formerly adopted was, that when a regiment was required to be sent abroad, the Secretary for the Colonies informed the Admiralty of the fact, and the Admiralty provided the proper amount of transport service.
EARL GREYsaid, perhaps he might be allowed to state, in corroboration of his noble Friend's remarks, that the usual course was for the Secretary for War to state to the Admiralty that such and such regiments were about to be sent abroad on such and such a day, and that department provided the necessary amount of transport.
EARL MINTOwas understood to corroborate the observations made by the noble Lord the Secretary for War (Lord Panmure).
THE EARL OF HARDWICKEhad misunderstood the observations of his noble Friend (Lord Panmure). It appeared now that no alteration had been made in the mode of communication. With regard to the Alma, it appeared that considerable difference of opinion had prevailed, for, whereas at Liverpool she was considered capable of carrying 1,400 men, it had been thought at Portsmouth that she could only carry 1,000. The public naturally hoped that
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some clear definition would be given as to how many men could be sent out in proportion to the tonnage, and as to whether the men should be under the deck or not under deck. He remembered having once seen 4,000 men embarked in a ship of 2,000 tons, and sent from Constantinople to Samos. They were not permitted to move from their places. It appeared to him that the various opinions entertained at the various ports of embarkation would very materially damage the means of conveyance. It was absolutely necessary that some distinct arrangements should be made with regard to the embarkation of I troops.

LOAN BILL.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY moved the second reading of the Loan (16,000,000 l.) Bill, and gave notice of his intention to move the suspension of the Standing Orders, so as to pass it through its remaining stages on the morrow.
LORD MONTEAGLEknew the necessity of not impeding the passing of such a measure, but there were some portions of the Bill which called for remark, and he hoped that an opportunity would be afforded on the morrow to have a discussion on it.
LORD RAVENSWORTHsaid, that he must ask for the usual indulgence of their Lordships in rising to address them for the first time. He could not avoid, on this Bill being presented to the House, expressing his concern at the circumstances which had arisen which rendered the presentation and acceptance of the Bill before their Lordships almost imperative—he alluded to the failure of the negotiations at Vienna—which he and the country considered as the evidence of an indefinite prolongation of the war. He had hoped, as it was the evident interest of all parties, that some arrangement might have been entered into for the pacification of Europe, and he could not now avoid expressing his great concern that this expectation had been disappointed. As it was, however, with war in, prospect, it had become our duty to direct our attention to the means of carrying it on with vigour. He found that two burdens of no inconsiderable extent were to be entailed upon the country, and of these the present Bill for raising by loan 16,000,000 l. formed an important item. The Estimates for the present year for carrying on the navy amounted to more than 16,000,000 l.;

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almost an equal sum was required for the army; the Ordnance Estimates were between 7,000,000 l. and 8,000,000 l., while 3,000,000 l. more were devoted to other military purposes; the expenditure in the whole amounting to 44,000,000 l. The present Loan Bill had passed the ordeal in another place, which might be considered more directly the guardian of the public expenditure, and it might perhaps be thought presumptuous in him to offer any remarks on it. He did not, however, intend to offer any direct opposition to the Bill, but at the same time he must say that it was of a nature to excite some discussion and criticism. Out of doors it was asked by those who were engaged in the trade and commerce of the country, why had not the Chancellor of the Exchequer come into the money market for the full amount required—that was, for some 20,000,000 l. or 21,000,000 l. of deficiency—instead of coupling the loan with other devices, and laying on additional taxes direct and indirect. He did not go the full length with those who would have the whole raised by loan, but he went so far as to think that this additional taxation was an earnest of the apprehension of the Government that the war would be indefinitely prolonged. If there had been any reason for believing that the war would have ceased in six or twelve months, then he should have concurred with those who considered it unwise to resort to this mode of indirect taxation by levying additional duty on articles which entered so largely into the consumption of the working classes, and which would tend to disturb those fiscal arrangements which had been made with the general consent of the people. If, on the other hand, there was reason—and he feared that there was too much—to apprehend that war would be prolonged much beyond twelve months, then he agreed with the policy which included articles of general consumption in the means for raising the required amount to carry on the war, as it was necessary, in such case, to attempt to restore to some extent the indirect taxation which had been too hastily abandoned. If, therefore, they were to regard the proposition of the Government as an indication that the war would not be concluded within a short time, he was willing to agree to their proposal. Such he knew were the feelings of the mercantile classes, and he did not hesitate to give his sanction to and express his opinion upon them. He must confess that
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the prospects before us were somewhat disheartening, and express the concern of this country and of the whole of Europe that the negotiations for peace had been brought to a close; and he only hoped that those mistakes which had arisen in carrying on the war on the part of the Government, and the profuse expenditure of the public money without adequate results, would also be brought to a close. He considered that up to this moment Her Majesty's Government had not taken all the steps which they might have taken, and ought to have taken, towards bringing the war to a successful termination. He could not help reverting to this time last year, when, in the Estimates brought before their Lordships, the expense of carrying troops as far as Malta was contemplated, and, at the same time, the expense of the return of those troops was also estimated. He could not help recollecting that the noble Lord, one of the most distinguished Members of Her Majesty's Government, in another place, whom he could only describe as the unsuccessful negotiator of the interests of this country at Vienna, seemed last year to entertain a trifling opinion of the war in which they were about to engage, and declared that it was so far from being an objection to the reform measure which he introduced that he considered it rather favourable, at the same time that they were entering upon a war with the most colossal Power in Europe, to engage also in a civil war at home for the question of reform in Parliament. These considerations would now press on his mind, because he had seen what the Government had attempted, and also that they were not even at present fully aware of the importance of having recourse to all their resources for the purpose of putting an end to the war. Although the Government had called on Parliament and on the people for these large supplies, they had as yet neglected to avail themselves of other means in their power of distressing the enemy. That question had been brought before the House of Commons, and it had been mentioned in their Lordships' House, but he could not consider that it had had a fair consideration or deliberation by the limited number of noble Lords who had attended on that occasion. His belief was, that in addition to those resources in our own country which we had drawn upon, we should have directed our attention to the stoppage of the commerce of Russia. He trusted that an opportunity would be afforded

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for entering fully into that subject, and he would put a notice on their Lordships' books when he would draw attention to the question of vigorously arresting Russian commerce. Having now shadowed out some of the main objections entertained to this loan, and in doing so discharged what he felt to be a duty, he would not trespass further on the attention of their Lordships, but would conclude by thanking them for the indulgence which they had extended to him.
Bill read 2a; Committee negatived; and Bill to be read 3a To-morrow.

METROPOLITAN DRAINAGE, &c.
THE EARL OF CARNARVON, in presenting a petition from the Metropolitan Sanitary Association for inquiring into the meaning and intention of the Metropolis Water Act, took occasion to call the attention of their Lordships to the subject to which the petition referred. The noble Earl, who was very indistinctly heard, was understood to commence by alluding to the differences of opinion which prevailed among authorities on this question as to the best mode of carrying out a proper system of drainage and of water supply for the Metropolis. The rival theories extant on this important subject had been long debated, and, while the protracted controversy continued, the most serious inconvenience and injury resulted to the public from the unsettled state of the question. In fact, this was another example of the truth of the old adage, "Delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi." Large sums were expended in remedying partial evils, which would be sufficient, if judiciously applied, to provide a perfect system of drainage and an adequate supply of water. The Metropolitan Commissioners of Sewers proposed to expend 3,000,000 l. in the construction of a main line of drainage for the whole metropolis, while a rival plan for accomplishing the same object was stated as likely to cost only 1,000,000 l. Again, the great Victoria Sewer, which had been intended as the commencement of a vast trunk drainage for that portion of the metropolis which lies south of the Thames, the cost of which had been estimated at about 14,000 l., but which in reality had exceeded 33,000 l., was at this moment in ruins, and the estimated repairs amounted to 15,000 l. It was clearly worth while to ascertain whether this 15,000 l. was to be expended upon a system good or faulty in its principles.
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There was considerable difficulty in finding a competent tribunal to decide this question. Two modes of doing so were, first, either by appointing a commission of scientific and professional men, or, secondly by a select committee of their Lordships' House. If the first of these courses were adopted, it might be difficult to obtain the services of gentlemen whose opinions would carry sufficient weight with them, and who at the same time were not already pledged to any particular view of the subject. On the other hand, a Committee of their Lordships' House, if appointed, should give up all à priori or abstract reasonings on the matter, and content themselves with inquiring into the comparative failure, or success of the respective systems which had been tried. The question was one affecting the well-being of all classes alike, whether rich or poor; and it derived additional urgency from the circumstance that the epidemic which visited the metropolis last year allowed a shorter interval between the premonitory symptoms and the crisis of the disorder than was the case at former periods of its occurrence, and it was most desirable that adequate precautions should be taken beforehand in order to mitigate the severity of cholera, should it unfortunately reappear among us. At present the sanitary condition of some of the largest squares of the metropolis was very defective, and even the walls of the building in which their Lordships were then assembled were sapped by rotten sewers and festering heaps of abomination. He felt satisfied that no effective reform could be hoped for unless the whole management of the drainage of the metropolis was confided to some central controlling body.
Petition to lie on the table.

CONFERENCES AT VIENNA.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, before the House adjourns, I wish to take this opportunity of apologising to the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) for having quitted the House on a previous evening. My absence gave rise to some remarks upon his part with which I certainly have no fault to find, because it is my business to be here to answer any questions and attend to any matters which may arise in connection with the department over which I have the honour to preside. I left the House on the evening referred to because there was a great deal of business at the Foreign Office waiting

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my return, and also because I thought that the noble Marquess near me (the Marquess of Lansdowne) had stated that Her Majesty's Government would lose no time in giving that information to the House which your Lordships have required on the subject of the late negotiations at Vienna, and that no statement would consequently be expected from me on that night. I trust, however, that your Lordships will not be under the very erroneous impression that Her Majesty's Government had any intention to withhold the fullest information on this important subject which they could give to the House; and for myself, I trust that I have always shown a readiness to answer any question that might be put to me, so far as I was able to do so without detriment to the public service. I consider it a duty imperative and incumbent upon me, in a time of so much intense and natural anxiety to be correctly informed with respect to those important matters, to afford to your Lordships all the information in my power; but I have too often experienced your Lordships' indulgence in these matters to believe that even now you would wish me to divulge anything which I believed at the present moment would be prejudicial to the interests of the country. As a proof, my Lords, of the spirit in which the negotiations at Vienna were carried on, and the desire of the Governments of France and England to do nothing that should offend either the honour or dignity of Russia, I may state—as indeed I mentioned the other evening in answer to a question put to me by my noble Friend—that the plenipotentiaries of Russia were invited themselves to take the initiative, and to propose the measures which they thought would best carry out the principle of the third basis of the negotiations, to which they had already given their assent. The Russian plenipotentiaries acknowledged, as they could not fail to do, the spirit which had induced this course; but, somewhat to the surprise of their colleagues, they announced that they were without instructions upon that important subject, and that it was necessary for them to refer to St. Petersburg. The time necessary was given them; but in the meantime the Allied Powers declined to alter the order in which the Four Points were originally placed, and refused to discuss the fourth point, upon which it was possible some concessions might be made, until the third point was disposed of. When the Conference
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was again called together to receive the answer which had arrived from St. Petersburg, the Russian plenipotentiaries announced that they had no proposal whatever to make; and the allied plenipotentiaries then submitted to them a scheme which, I should think, Russia, without any hurt to her dignity, but with very much addition to her honour as a first-class European Power, might have accepted, if she had been inclined to prove to the world that her policy was as pacific as she had always affirmed it to be, or to remove the uneasiness of Europe by giving guarantees against future acts of aggression which she declared she did not contemplate. The Russian plenipotentiaries asked forty-eight hours to consider these plans, and at the end of that time absolutely rejected them, as well as of another plan put forward by the French plenipotentiary, and agreed to by us, for excluding all vessels of war from the Black Sea, and rendering it a sea for commercial purposes alone. The Conferences were then suspended—they were not actually broken off—and no time for another meeting was then appointed. My noble Friend (Lord John Russell) left Vienna on the 23rd of last month; M. Drouyn de Lhuys stayed two or three days longer. Lord Westmoreland and M. Drouyn de Lhuys were invited by Count Buol, on the part of the Russian plenipotentiaries, to attend another Conference, in order to receive propositions from them. M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Westmoreland agreed to attend this Conference; and Her Majesty's Government have the form of the proposal then made by the Russian plenipotentiaries, but have not yet received the protocols which contain the discussions which have taken place. But we have seen quite enough to enable us to concur in the opinions of the allied plenipotentiaries, that the proposals of the Russian Government were not of a character to promote or accomplish the objects contemplated by the third basis of the negotiations. This, my Lords, is the present state of affairs; and although we shall certainly not object to these Conferences meeting again, provided there is anything of a real and substantial character in the proposals put forward, yet we think that, after they have been suspended, their meeting again without any real or specific object might give the erroneous notion that the negotiations were being carried on, while, in fact, that was not the case. The protocols shall be laid upon the table of

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the House without delay, and your Lordships will see in those protocols not simply a record of the conclusions which have been come to, but the report of the discussions which took place, and of the opinions expressed by the plenipotentiaries of each Power present during the Conference. I think your Lordships will not consider the statement which I have had the honour to make either satisfactory or conclusive, unless I am able to inform the House of the course which the Government of Austria intends to take in these matters. It is upon this particular point that I am at present anxious to observe that prudent reserve for which upon previous occasions I have received your indulgence whenever I have thought that the circumstances of the case really demanded it. My reasons for this are, that when the sittings of the Conference were suspended, Count Buol expressly stated that he considered that the means for arriving at a basis of negotiations were not exhausted, and that it would be the special duty of Austria to endeavour to discover some mode of attaining that end consistently with the engagement which she had entered into with other Powers. My Lords, whether any proposal that may be thus framed will be likely to be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government I am sure I cannot venture to say; but on a question of such magnitude, as whether it may be possible to conclude a safe and honourable peace, I am persuaded that your Lordships will feel that any proposition that may be made to us should receive a patient and unprejudiced consideration from Her Majesty's Government—and the more so, as that consideration is at the same time quite compatible with the vigorous prosecution of military operations—and also that the consideration of those subjects, or the prospects of peace which may be possible, should not be in any way endangered by premature discussions or announcements.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I should regret, as much as any of your Lordships, that the noble Earl should disclose anything which it would be prejudicial to the public interests to disclose prematurely:—nevertheless, I must be permitted to say that the statement which he has just made to your Lordships appears to me to be of a very unsatisfactory nature. Undoubtedly, before discussions can take place in this House upon the present state of public affairs, it will be necessary that we should have before us
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the papers which have been promised, and which I am glad to find are not alone to I contain the mere decisions and opinions of the various Powers that were present at the Conferences, but also the arguments and grounds upon which those Powers based their respective conclusions. Undoubtedly, from such a collection of documents we may gain considerable light, not only as to what is past, but also on what is of still more importance—our prospects for the future. But I must say that, although I concur with the noble Earl that no prospect, however slight, of obtaining a safe and honourable peace should be sacrificed by this country, yet I have heard from him, almost with feelings of regret, that after an extent of forbearance has been shown on the part of the allied Powers in limiting their demands upon Russia to an extent the good policy of which may be open to serious question, the propositions of the Allies having been totally rejected, and no counter propositions—at least, none of a reasonable character—having been offered by the enemy—I must repeat, that I learn with regret that fresh propositions and fresh negotiations are still in prospect, because I fear that they can have no other object but that of wasting time and prejudicing the cause of the Western Powers. I must say, that I think the propositions which have been made by the Allied Powers to Russia are even now below those which the requirements of the case demand; and that the concessions which were made to her, even if they had been accepted, would have rendered useless—if not worse than useless—the great expenditure of blood and treasure to which England and France have been put since the commencement of the war. I sincerely hope that the Government of Austria is in earnest in its endeavour to bring about a safe and honourable peace—I hope it is in earnest in its desire to fulfil its engagements to support by active assistance the endeavours of the Allies to obtain a satisfactory peace, and that, in the event of peace being obtained, it intends faithfully to perform obligations the hope of inducing Austria to contract which has cost England and France so much of precious time and valuable advantage in their military operations. My Lords, we are now in the second year of this war, and throughout the whole of its progress we have been told over and over again that, although it was quite true that Her Majesty's late Government and the

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members of the present Ministry had clung to the hope of peace longer, perhaps, than they were reasonably justified in doing, yet, that they had, at all events, gained one great and important advantage from their singular forbearance, patience, and long-suffering—namely, that they had secured, both as to active measures and as to negotiations, the co-operation of Austria, and probably of Prussia also. Well, two years have elapsed, and, according to the statement of the noble Earl to-night, what does that co-operation amount to in the pursuit of which your vigour and enterprise were altogether checked, and for the sake of which you adopted a dilatory course of policy, which must greatly aggravate the misfortunes and calamities of war? At this moment, my Lords, Prussia is excluded altogether, and even stands in an attitude of scarcely doubtful hostility to the Allies; while, on the other hand, Austria, for whose support you have sacrificed so much, is now effectively an ally of Russia, and opposed to the policy of the Western Powers, for she still affects to entertain a hope that every means of negotiation is not yet exhausted, and she proposes by further attempts at negotiation, to continue—and no doubt with the same results—the same system of perpetual procrastination and delay which she has pursued for the last two years. My Lords, we are now in the midst of the second campaign, and it is a matter of the utmost importance—it is, in fact, the essential groundwork and basis of all our future operations—that we should precisely know in what position we stand, not only towards Prussia—for that is already pretty clear, I think—but towards Austria likewise. This knowledge must have the greatest influence, not only upon the course we should take in negotiation, but upon the military operations of our army. It must have the greatest effect upon our conduct and plans to know whether or not we are to reckon on the hostility, the neutrality, or the active and cordial co-operation of the power and resources of Austria; and every day and hour that passes without our coming to a full and distinct understanding with Austria, and without our really knowing where we are and how we stand, seriously aggravates our difficulties, enormously increases our expenditure and our risks, and gives a proportionate advantage to our common enemy, Russia. Therefore, my Lords, although I do not wish to press the noble Earl to make any statement which he may
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consider would be detrimental to the public service, yet I could not hear the explanation which he has offered us to-night, leaving, as it does, all the most important questions involved in these negotiations in just the same state of uncertainty, hesitation, and vacillation as they have presented for so long a period, without expressing my regret at listening to such an unsatisfactory statement from a British Minister. This prolonged uncertainty is almost an equal evil to the avowed hostility of Austria; and therefore, however important it may he for us to lose no substantial prospect of obtaining a satisfactory peace, I trust that Her Majesty's Government will take care, that in depriving us of the advantage of knowing what are the definitive views and policy of Austria, we shall not be kept in doubt as to their vigorous exertions for the prosecution of the war, and that they will not suffer themselves to be diverted by these protracted, and almost hopeless and illusory negotiations.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, it is not possible for Her Majesty's Government to afford the noble Earl opposite the information which he not unnaturally wishes to gain, with a due regard to the public interests. I trust, however, that they will be enabled to furnish it soon; but after what has fallen from the noble Earl I cannot refrain from saying, on the part of the Government, that, although they have had a desire—a desire which, indeed, it was their bounden duty to entertain—to secure the co-operation of Austria, nevertheless they have not been induced, from any vain hope of securing that important advantage, to delay the immediate making of those military and naval preparations which are essential to the proper conduct of the war. Undoubtedly, no expedient has been left untried in the endeavour to obtain that degree of co-operation from other Powers which we had a right to expect from them; but during the whole course of the negotiations, up to the Conferences which lately took place at Vienna, certainly not a day has been lost in the advancement of those military preparations and efforts which might bring the war to a conclusion; and while I maintain that it is our duty to avail ourselves of every fair chance of effecting so desirable a result as a great European peace, I equally hold that up to the last moment we ought to relax none of our exertions for prosecuting the war with energy and spirit. With the protocols about to be

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laid upon the table, your Lordships will receive an account of the arguments, the discussions, and all the collateral transactions by which the agreement, based upon those protocols, was accompanied. Undoubtedly, when they are laid upon the table, a good opportunity will be afforded for the consideration of the negotiations which have taken place, with reference both to the past conduct of the Government and to the future policy of this country, having in view the continuance of the war, if it should be necessary, in order to prevent the recurrence of those unfortunate misconceptions which have thrown Europe into the state in which it is now placed.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My Lords, as I ventured the other evening to express my humble opinion with regard to the propositions made to Russia in the hope of bringing about a peace, and to state my regret at the probability of a peace having been diminished by the nature of those propositions, I will not now make any observations upon that subject, But I think there is some discrepancy between the statement which my noble Friend has made to-night and that which he made in answer to me about a week ago. I then understood, both from what was stated by my noble Friend and from what passed in another place, that Her Majesty's Government and the French Government, supported by Austria, and of course by Turkey, had proposed to Russia two alternativss—one, the limitation of her fleet in the Black Sea, and the other the neutrality of that Sea. To-night my noble Friend confined himself to a statement that Russia had not accepted the propositions which had been made to her.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: I said that the plenipotentiaries of Russia had refused to accept a proposition which we thought that country might have accepted with honour to herself, as well as another proposition by which the Black Sea would have been made a neutral sea.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My noble Friend is correct in saying that ho described the plan suggested to Russia as one quite in unison with her dignity and honour; but he did not state what the first alternative was. I want to know whether it was that the Russian fleet should be limited.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: Yes.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: Then
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it is as I understood; Russia had the choice of two alternatives, and refused them both. With respect to the papers which my noble Friend proposes to lay on the table, I hope he will not confine himself entirely to the protocols drawn up at different times by the various parties, and I am encouraged in that hope by an expression used by the noble Marquess. For nearly a year we have had no official knowledge of any papers relating to this important subject, although at different times we have received information from the public prints, in which I believe many very elaborate diplomatic documents have been correctly copied. Among them are some very able ones emanating from my noble Friend, which cannot, of course, have been obtained from the Foreign Office, but were probably taken from foreign newspapers. In one of those papers my noble Friend has given his interpretation of the four points, or rather of the third point, which, as your Lordships are aware, is one that may be argued upon and explained in various ways, according to the opinions and interests of different parties. I believe I am correct in saying that a very clear statement has been published of what my noble Friend intended by the third point, and that there afterwards appeared an interpretation, if not exactly the same, yet similar in most respects, by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. It would be very satisfactory to the public, considering that no papers have been communicated to us since the beginning of last year with respect to this question, if my noble Friend would add to the different protocols as many as possible of the diplomatic documents that have passed between him and the Court of Russia, and those documents would also greatly assist your Lordships and the other House of Parliament in understanding and taking a correct view of the protocols.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: I hope, after the description my noble Friend has given of the despatch which he has attributed to me, that it was my despatch; but I have no knowledge of such a despatch ever having been published, I never saw it or heard of it, and certainly I never communicated it to any one. To the best of my belief, the intention expressed by the plenipotentiaries that sat at the Conference upon the first day of their meeting, that their proceedings should be kept secret and nothing that passed should be

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published, has been very strictly acted upon. I cannot at this moment undertake to say what papers will be laid upon the table besides the protocols, but any papers necessary for the clear understanding of them will be produced, and I think my noble Friend will learn a great deal more from those protocols than he imagines.
House adjourned till To-morrow.