Lords Sitting of 19 March 1855

MINUTES.
Took the Oaths.—The Earl of Portarlington.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2a Despatch of Business, Court of Chancery.
Reported—Commons Inclosure.

RECALL OF THE EARL OF LUCAN—
REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF BALAKLAVA.
Copy of a Letter from Major General The Earl of Lucan (dated 5th March, 1855), to the Adjutant General, repeating his Application for a Court-martial on his Conduct on the Day of the Action of Bala-

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klava on the 25th October last; and the Adjutant General's Answer to Major General The Earl of Lucan, dated 12th March 1855—Laid before the House (pursuant to Address of Monday last).
THE EARL OF LUCAN:* I rise, my Lords, in pursuance of notice, to move for a copy of Lord Raglan's report of the Battle of Balaklava. I consider it due to your Lordships and to myself not to forego this, the first opportunity which has occurred to me, to make a statement of what was my conduct on the day of that battle, and at the same time to show what has happened since in reference to it. Up to the present moment I have most scrupulously abstained from saying one word in this House upon this subject in my own vindication, however prejudicial to me such silence was likely to be, as it has proved. Having applied for a court martial, considering such a court the most competent from its composition to entertain and dispose satisfactorily of charges of so exclusively a professional character, as long as I could hope to have such a tribunal I considered it best became me to be silent in this House; but my applications for such a trial, however earnestly made, have been as resolutely refused. I have, therefore, I feel, no other course open to me than to present myself before your Lordships, confidently hoping that you will kindly indulge me with your attention, and give to my statement a fair and impartial consideration.
I am assured that a military investigation has been so refused, on the ground of there being no precedent. My Lords, I believe that it is equally unprecedented that an officer of high rank should be summarily recalled from an army in the field, and that charges should for the first time, at the end of four months, be brought against him (he being left in the meantime in the command of his division) without his being allowed an opportunity of meeting and refuting them. When I seek to clear my character by a statement here, this House is warned by the Minister of War not to allow itself to be made an arena for the discussion of military discipline, and your Lordships are told to be cautious not to trench on the prerogative. There is no noble Peer in this House more inclined than myself to respect the prerogative. I freely admit that Her Majesty has, and should have, the power to call to and recall from the army any officer she shall think fit. But, I tell the Minister of War, that where he, as the adviser of the
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Crown, advises the exercise of the prerogative, he must not allow himself to found a recall on charges professionally disparaging and disgraceful without giving the party an opportunity of denying them. As, in the case of a private individual, any one of your Lordships might dismiss from your employment any person you thought fit, but you would not be allowed to make charges of a disgraceful nature against him without his having the opportunity of disproving them. I cannot suppose that in this House, however much your Lordships may be disposed to respect precedent, or however much your Lordships may be again disposed to hold the prerogative sacred, you will prefer either precedent or prerogative to justice.
It will be necessary, I fear, to trouble your Lordships at some length, and in the statement I am about to make it shall be my endeavour, as it is my wish, whilst exculpating myself, not to inculpate others. It is my wish to make my statement as clear as possible, and to do so I shall have to take your Lordships to the Battle of Balaklava.
At about eleven o'clock of the 24th of October that excellent soldier, Sir Colin Campbell, I cannot allow myself to mention in this House the name of that officer with whom I was acting in concert for four months without stating that a more gallant or useful soldier there is not in the army, informed me that a spy, had come in, and that he wished me to see him. Having examined this spy together, we considered his news so important that Sir Colin Campbell at once wrote a report to Lord Raglan, and I had it conveyed to his Lordship by my aide-de-camp, who happened on that day to be my son. The spy had stated that 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry were marching against our position at Balaklava from the east and south-east. My aide-de-camp told me that he had delivered the letter to General Airey, who made no reply; and that he subsequently met Lord Raglan, who only said that if there was anything new it was to be reported to him.
It was the habit of the cavalry at this time to be always mounted an hour before daylight. I proceeded to fort No. 3 on the plan, a copy of which is in the hands of many of your Lordships. This was the extreme fort of the position. At dawn I perceived that heavy columns of infantry were advancing from the direction of the Tchernaya River and Kamara Range. I immediately placed my cavalry in position,

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and posted my horse-battery on the right of No. 3 fort. The Russians immediately opened fire, and attacked Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 forts, occupied by Turks. No. 1 was only taken after a very respectable resistance. I am anxious to say so, because I consider that they got less credit than they deserved. The other three were all evacuated, and with the forts the enemy took nine English guns.
After the evacuation of these forts by the Turks (having previously arranged with Sir Colin Campbell to do so), I threw my cavalry back to give his guns in position clear range, and took post in line facing to the east, between forts 4 and 5. My cavalry were then well placed to take in flank any Russian forces marching against Balaklava, when, to my great discomfiture, I received from Lord Raglan an order which I shall number 1. It was as follows—
"Cavalry to take ground to left of second line of redoubts occupied by Turks."
This order was immediately obeyed, and the cavalry were placed en masse facing the north, looking into Inkerman valley. Very shortly after order No. 2 reached me, desiring that eight squadrons of heavy dragoons should move towards Balaklava to support the Turks, who were said to be wavering. The heavy dragoons had already proceeded some distance, when I perceived through the orchard that a body of Russian cavalry was cooling over the hill. I rode at speed, and just succeeded in joining the leading squadrons of Greys and Enniskillen dragoons as they were rounding the orchard, and had only time to wheel them into line, and to order an immediate charge under General Scarlett. The enemy was advancing in a dense column, with their flanks protected by two wings; these, so soon as they found that they outflanked my four squadrons, wheeled about inwards and totally enveloped them; on which I attacked them with the 5th Dragoon Guards in the rear and in flank with the 4th Dragoon Guards, when the whole mass of the enemy, amounting to at least 3,500 men, was repulsed and routed by eight small squadrons of about 700 men—only one-fifth of their number.
I should do little justice to this gallant heavy brigade and their gallant general if I did not take this opportunity of stating how much I considered they had distinguished themselves. I believe there never was an action in which English cavalry distinguished themselves more, and I do
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not think that there is a disposition in this country to attribute sufficient importance to this heavy dragoon charge and to do it full justice. The French, than whom there are certainly no better soldiers, nor officers who more perfectly understand the art of war, do full justice to it, and pronounce it a brilliant feat of arms, and one adding lustre to our British cavalry. I know it has been imputed to me that I did not pursue the routed enemy with my light cavalry as I should have done. To this I will not allow myself to say any more than that they had been placed in a position by Lord Raglan, that they were altogether out of my reach, and that to me they were unavailable.
After this charge the cavalry were dismounted, and the wounded and prisoners were being removed, when an aide-de-camp of the Commander in Chief brought me order No. 3. I wish your Lordships to observe that the heavy cavalry were at this moment standing on the ground occupied by the Russian cavalry in the plan. No. 3 order was to this effect—
"Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by the infantry, which have been ordered. Advance on two fronts."
It is necessary here to observe that the copy given in Lord Raglan's letter of the 6th of December is incorrect, and materially so. In the original, which I hold in my hand, and which your Lordships can see, there is a full stop after the word "ordered," and the word "Advance" is written with a large A, therefore making two distinct sentences. In Lord Raglan's copy the two sentences are made one by the omission of the stop, and by a small a being substituted for a large one. Therefore, whilst in the original, the order was for the cavalry to advance, in the copy it applied to the infantry. I do not wish to impute anything to Lord Raglan on account of this difference, as it is possible that the error was in the copy with which I furnished his Lordship. The cavalry were in consequence immediately mounted, and moved to the positions in the centre valley and on the ridge, as shown in the plan. No infantry had at this time arrived from the heights of Sebastopol. I remained myself between my two brigades, anxiously waiting their arrival. When they did arrive, instead of being formed for an attack, or to support an attack, they were, the greater part of them, sitting or lying down with their arms piled.

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From thirty to forty minutes had elapsed and the whole of the infantry had not arrived, when Captain Nolan galloped up to me with No. 4 order, in my opinion a fresh order, quite independent of any previous order, and having no connection with No. 3 or any other order. Indeed, I do positively affirm, that neither by my Lord Raglan, or General Airey, or any other person whatsoever, did I ever hear or suppose that any connection whatever existed, or was intended to exist, between this new order No. 4 and No. 3 the preceding one, or that they had the slightest reference to each other. No. 4 order is as follows—
"Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate."
Your Lordships should be told, that when Lord Raglan gave this order, he was upon very high ground, and a quarter of a mile to my rear, from whence he could well see the whole position of the enemy; and you should be again told, that his Lordship at this time fancied, and he was not the only man who laboured under the same false impression (for I could produce half a dozen persons to testify to it), that the enemy were carrying away our guns from numbers 1, 2, and 3 redoubts, and therefore sent this order. I had, perhaps, better read from my letter to Lord Raglan of the 30th November how I acted on the receipt of number 4 order.
The extract is as follows—
" After carefully reading this order, I hesitated and urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it. The aide-de-camp, in a most authoritative tone, stated that they were Lord Raglan's orders that the cavalry should attack immediately. I asked, 'Where, and what to do?' neither enemy nor guns being in sight. He replied in a most disrespectful but significant manner, pointing to the further end of the valley, 'There, my Lord, is your enemy; there are your guns!' So distinct, in my opinion, was your written instruction, and so positive and urgent were the orders delivered by the aide-de-camp, that I felt it was imperative on me to obey, and I informed Lord Cardigan that he was to advance, and to the objections he made, and in which I entirely agreed, I replied that the order was from your Lordship. Having decided, against my conviction, to make the movement, I did all in my power to render it as little perilous as possible. I formed the brigade in two lines, and led to its support two regiments of heavy cavalry, the Scots Grey and Royals, and only halted them when they had reached the point from which they could protect the retreat of the light cavalry in the event of their being pursued by the enemy, and when, having already lost many officers and men by the
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fire from the batteries and fort, any further advance would have exposed them to destruction."
My Lords, this I think is the time to show your Lordships what an aide-de-camp is. In page 59 of the Queen's Regulations, which cannot be violated with impunity, under the head of aides-de-camp, it is ordered, "all orders sent by aides-de-camp are to be delivered in the plainest terms, and are to be obeyed with the same readiness as if delivered personally by the general officers to whom such aides-de-camp are attached." I ask any military man, I ask the noble Duke near me (the Duke of Richmond), who was aide-de-camp to that great man, the late Duke of Wellington, whether an aide-de-camp is not the organ of his general? And whether a general officer who took upon himself to disobey an order brought by an aide-de-camp, verbal or written, would not risk the loss of his commission? If this were not so, why could not an orderly dragoon convey orders as well as an aide-de-camp? An aide-de-camp is chosen because he is an officer of education and intelligence, he is, therefore, supposed to deliver an order more correctly, and is considered as being in the confidence of his general. Shall I be told that Captain Nolan was not in General Airey's confidence? Why, he told me himself that he had given to Captain Nolan his instructions verbally, and it was only when that officer was turning his horse away, that he detained him, and committed the instructions to writing. I would ask any reasonable man, after this, whether any mistake was or could be committed by Captain Nolan? And how could I, at the time, or can now, doubt but that Captain Nolan was instructed to deliver to me the positive order to attack which he did?
My Lords, I must direct your attention to this. In the order it is stated, "French cavalry is on your left," evidently for the purpose of informing me where the French cavalry were, an admission that they were out of my sight if not out of my reach, and again informing me that it was a combined movement in which they were to join and assist me. I felt, ordered as I was to advance immediately without an opportunity of sending to ask for further instructions, that I could not fail to perform my part of this combined movement, and so leave the brunt of the affair to be borne by the French cavalry alone.
Under these circumstances my course was clear to me; and I considered it a positive duty to order Lord Cardigan to

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advance with the light cavalry brigade, and to lead the heavy cavalry brigade to its support.
Your Lordships are so well acquainted with the details of this charge, and so fully appreciate the extraordinary valour and gallantry displayed by the light cavalry on that occasion, and also the steadiness and bravery of the heavy brigade, more particularly the Scots Grey and Royals, the two regiments most exposed, that I would only add, that the brilliancy of the charge and the gallantry displayed by the whole of the cavalry, were never surpassed at any former period. Your Lordships should be told that the infantry, which I was informed was coming to support me, was composed of two divisions, the 1st commanded by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, mid the 4th by an officer whose death the army and the country so much deplore, both my seniors, and therefore both my commanding officers. In the evening of the action, I saw Lord Raglan; his first remark to me was, "You have lost the light brigade." I at once denied that I had lost the light brigade, as I had only carried out the orders conveyed to me, written and verbal, by Captain Nolan. He then said that I was a lieutenant general, and should, therefore, have exercised my discretion, and not approving of the charge, should not have made it. He subsequently said that I had not moved sufficiently in advance in the previous movement; but he never attempted to show then, or has he ever allowed me to suppose since, until the present time, that he ever intended that. No. 4 order was at all to be connected with the preceding order.
The day but one after the battle of Balaklava, General Airey called upon me in my tent. The moment he entered, I said, "General Airey, this is a most serious matter. You may depend upon it, it will create a great deal of talk and dissatisfaction at home." He replied, "These sort of things will happen in war; it is nothing to Chillianwallah." I said, "I know nothing about Chillianwallah; but I tell you, General Airey, that this is a most serious affair; and, what is more, I tell you that I do not intend to bear the smallest particle of responsibility. I gave the order to charge under what I considered a most imperious necessity, and I will not bear the blame." General Airey then tried to convince me that the order was not imperative; and after some conversation
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with him upon other matters, and when he was leaving my tent, I said to him, "Now be careful, General Airey, that no responsibility is placed upon me in this light cavalry affair, as I will not bear any." His reply was, "You may rest satisfied, Lord Lucan, you will be pleased with Lord Raglan's report."
Perhaps I had better here call your Lordships' attention to the fact, that throughout the whole of this conversation General Airey, though he had signed the two orders numbers 3 and 4, which I received from Lord Raglan, never gave me any reason whatever to suppose that there was any connection between the two. Had the last order had any reference to the preceding one, would he not naturally have said so? But he did no such thing on this the first occasion, nor has he ever on any subsequent occasion.
Now, my Lords, I could not anticipate that so much injustice would be done me by Lord Raglan; or, that all the injustice which I have experienced at home would have been done me. In my simplicity, I even omitted to send a copy of the order to England for my justification before my friends and the public,—who, let me observe, do not appear always to deal very fairly with the absent. There is a French saying—"Que les absens ont toujours tort:" it would, perhaps, be more properly said—"Que ceux qui se taisent ont toujours tort." I did nothing until Lord Raglan's report of the battle of Balaklava reached the Crimea on the 28th November. The mention made that I had acted under a misconception of orders, from its injustice as I felt, exceedingly hurt and grieved me. Articles in newspapers, and letters from my friends, calling for explanations, impressed upon me the necessity of a public explanation of my conduct and of facts. I, in consequence, on the following day after the arrival of the mail, called upon Lord Burghersh. I said to him," I come to you more as the nephew of Lord Raglan than as his aide-de-camp, as it is my wish to make a communication to his Lordship, and I do not wish to give him the least pain or offence." I expatiated at some length on Lord Raglan's charging me with a misconception of orders, and said that the British public, as shown by the newspapers, and my friends in their letters, were calling upon me for a justification, which I could not withhold. I then asked Lord Burghersh to propose to Lord Raglan to receive me, that I might talk

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over with him in a friendly way, how I might act to do myself justice in a manner the least annoying and offensive to him. Lord Burghersh called on me the next day, and said, that if I desired it, Lord Raglan would, of course, see me; but that he was very much engaged with writing. I replied—
"I can believe that Lord Raglan would rather not have any conversation with me on this subject, and having thought the matter over, it has occurred to me that it would not be objectionable to Lord Raglan if I were to write a letter to him explaining facts, and to request him to send it to England, there to receive the same publicity as his report."
Lord Burghersh brightened up, and said—
"Lord Raglan can have no objection to that, if that is all you require. From what fell from you yesterday, I thought you would require more."
I answered—
"I require nothing more on earth than that the English public should know the facts of the case."
And I added—
"If in my letter there should be anything offensive or displeasing to Lord Raglan, if he will be good enough to point it out, I shall have much pleasure in altering it."
Now, my Lords, I don't think that this was an unfriendly or a disrespectful communication to make to my Commander in Chief. I wrote the letter that very night, as the post was leaving on the 1st or 2nd of December. I had it delivered early next morning, and really believed that it had been sent by that post; when, on the 4th of December, General Airey's aide-de-camp called upon me, as he said, to talk to me about the hutting of the cavalry, and concluded with the expression of a wish that I would call upon General Airey, who was ill, to talk upon the subject. I did so the following day. General Airey, after talking to me in a rambling manlier about the hutting of the cavalry, produced my letter, and said-
"The real object of my wishing to see you is with respect to this letter."
I replied—
"That letter! I believed it to have been half way on its road to England by this time."
He said—
"No, Lord Raglan thinks that the letter is very unnecessary. You have received the thanks of Her Majesty, and the thanks of the Minister of War (printed copies of which he held in his hand); surely you ought to be satisfied."
I answered—
"General Airey, I don't know why I am to be s o particularly grateful. I think that both Her
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Majesty and the Minister of War have said quite as much as Lord Raglan's report would have warranted; but if you put the question to me, whether I am charmed with this report of Lord Raglan, I say, I think that his Lordship was exceedingly scanty in my praise. I wanted nothing more than justice; but when I recollect, that with seven hundred men I routed three or four thousand, and under the most disadvantageous circumstances repelled their attack, I do not see in that report anything with which to be much enamoured. I have only touched upon this subject in consequence of your having broached it, as, had you not done so, I never should have expressed my dissatisfaction to yourself or any soul living."
General Airey said—
"Lord Raglan is very much annoyed by this letter, and declares that no power on earth shall induce him to change his report."
I replied—
"I have not the least wish that he should change his report, nor have I in my letter expressed such a wish. It would, I consider, be unreasonable in me to ask him to do so; for I cannot but suppose that he made that report, believing it to be true. I have no right, therefore, to ask him to change it. I only ask him to carry out what I understood to be agreed upon, namely, that my statement of facts should be sent to England."
General Airey, no very unskilful diplomatist, then thought he would take a higher tone, and resort to menace. He said—
"Lord Raglan will be so much annoyed that he will send to England for another general officer to command the cavalry."
I replied, that I should much regret it, but that I could not help it. Further, that my letter had been written by agreement with Lord Burghersh, and that in that letter Lord Raglan was not asked to change his report.
Upon that General Airey again altogether altered his tone, saying—
"Oh! if you don't ask Lord Raglan to change his report, he can have no objection, I should think, to forward your statement."
And upon this we parted. On the 9th of the month, General Airey wrote to me, saying that Lord Raglan wished very much that I should have some conversation with him (General Airey). I went to him immediately. He began, with my letter in his hand, saying—
"Lord Raglan does not like this letter at all; he says that you have charged him with injustice, and he cannot allow any officer in the army to say such a thing of him."
I replied—
"I did not know that I had, and asked him to point it out to me."
After beating about for some time, he put

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his finger on the word "unmerited." I said that really I considered that a very strained construction to put upon that word; moreover, that I had proposed to Lord Burghersh to remove or change anything that might be displeasing to Lord Raglan, and, that after ten days it was strange he should then make such an objection. General Airey, again, as on the former occasion, adopted the fortiter, and said that Lord Raglan was dissatisfied with the state of the cavalry. I said that I was not satisfied with it myself, but begged to know whether I was to consider this as the opinion of the Commander in Chief, communicated to me by the Quartermaster General of the army? And also, whether I was to consider that his Lordship was dissatisfied with me as their commander? He denied having intended to say this, and an angry discussion ensued, after which he reverted to the suaviter, and said—
"As you have expressed your readiness to Lord Burghersh to remove or alter anything Lord Raglan might dislike in the letter, and as he has not expressed any wish that you should do so, he cannot now object to forward it."
We then parted with the understanding, as I conceived, that the difficulty about the word "unmerited" was explained away, and that my statement was to go. My Lords, I heard no more of this letter, and supposed it had gone to England by the next post. It does not, however, appear to have been forwarded till the 18th of December, but to have been detained those eighteen clays in Lord Raglan's possession.
I must here observe that there has been nothing approaching to a quarrel between myself and Lord Raglan, and that all our communications were as friendly since, as they had been previously, and as much so as between his Lordship and the other divisional officers. My Lords, I consider that this is the time to call your attention to Lord Raglan's letter of the 16th of December, the existence of which I had no knowledge of till it was forwarded to me by the Minister of War, so lately as the 5th instant. I shall read it in extenso, and comment on it as I go on; and I will make this engagement with your Lordships, to refute every sentence, and every word that it contains. It commences—
"My Lord Duke—I regret to be under the necessity of forwarding to your Grace the copy of a letter which has been addressed to me by Lieutenant General the Earl of Lucan. When I received it, I placed it in the hands of Brigadier General Airey, the Quartermaster General, and requested him to suggest to his Lordship to with
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draw the communication, considering it would not lead to his advantage in the slightest degree."
My Lords, I have told your Lordships what did pass between me and General Airey. No doubt he did wish me to suppress my letter, and endeavoured to induce sue to do so; but that he did ask me to withdraw it, I boldly and solemnly assert not to be the fact. Lord Raglan continues—
"But Lord Lucan having declined to take the step I recommended, I have but one course to pursue, that of laying the letter before your Grace, and submitting to you such observations upon it as I am bound in justice to myself to put you in possession of. Lieutenant General the Earl of Lucan complains that in my despatch to your Grace of the 28th of October, I stated that from some misconception of the instruction to advance the lieutenant general considered he was bound to attack at all hazards. His Lordship conceives this statement to be a grave charge, and an imputation reflecting seriously on his professional character, and he deems it incumbent upon him to state those facts which he cannot doubt must clear him from what he respectfully submits is altogether unmerited. I have referred to my despatch, and, far from being willing to recall one word of it, I am prepared to declare that not only did the lieutenant general misconceive the written instructions that were sent to him, but that there was nothing in that instruction which called upon him to attack at all hazards."
My Lords, Lord Raglan is endeavouring to fasten upon me an expression that I considered myself bound to attack at all hazards, words used exclusively by his Lordship, though undoubtedly the aide-de-camp did give me an order to attack immediately. Lord Raglan proceeds—
"There was nothing in that instruction which called upon him to attack at all hazards, or to undertake the operation which led to such a brilliant display of gallantry on the part of the light brigade, and, unhappily, at the same time occasioned such lamentable casualties in every regiment composing it. In his Lordship's letter he is wholly silent with respect to a previous order which had been sent him."
And for this reason. I received four orders totally distinct, having no reference to each other; and therefore why was I in the discussion of number 4, to discuss number 3, more than either of the other previous orders? And I defy any person to trace the least connection between the two last.
Again—
"The previous order was in the following words:—The cavalry to advance, and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by infantry, which have been ordered to advance on two fronts."
I have already shown your Lordships this to be a misquotation of the order; and

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that it was the cavalry and not the infantry that were ordered to advance on two fronts.
It was a fact, that the Duke of Cambridge, commanding the first division, received no order to give the cavalry any support. Nor did Sir George Cathcart, for that gallant officer told one of my aides-de-camp that he was unable to give any assistance, not having received any authority to do so. Under these circumstances I did all I could do. I placed my division in the position which Lord Raglan's aide-de-camp told me to take, and there waited for the co-operation of the infantry, but which was never given. From thirty to forty minutes elapsed between the receipt of the two orders. If the former order had been badly carried out, Lord Raglan was in a position to see it, and had only to send an aide-de-camp to point out my error. The cavalry were ordered to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. Did any opportunity occur, which I neglected? Was I to create the opportunity myself? Or, was I to do more than to profit by the opportunities created by others? As to recovering the heights, I declare that there was not a single Russian on the heights to the westward of No. 3 redoubt; for, after the heavy dragoon charge in the morning, the enemy evacuated 6, 5, and 4, forts. Indeed, No. 4 was subsequently occupied by Sir George Cathcart. If, as I contend, there were no Russians until you came to No. 3 fort, and they were all either in that fort or beyond it, I should wish to ask any military man how I was to execute this order. Is it to be supposed that Lord Raglan intended the cavalry to attack the fort? Or, is it not more reasonable to suppose that the infantry were to attack the fort, and that the cavalry were to wait for the opportunity of cutting off the retreat of the enemy when the assault had proved successful? I ask, will this order admit of any other construction? I am very certain that had I acted otherwise than I did, I should have been charged, and justly charged, with imprudence and incapacity.
In fine, as I have already said, there were no heights occupied by Russians to recover; but there were three forts, and I know that it was intended that the infantry should attack and retake them; and it was the wish of Sir George Cathcart to make the attempt; but it was not attempted, because it was considered that they could not be held, and that it was not
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worth the loss of life that must necessarily attend their assault. I think I have shown that thus far there is not a single sentence in Lord Raglan's letter that I have not refuted and shivered. Lord Raglan proceeds—
"So little had he sought to do as he had been directed that he had no men in advance of his main body."
The fact is, Lord Cardigan's brigade was so much in advance that I received a communication from his Lordship through his aide-de-camp objecting to stand where he was, because the position was so much in advance, and he expected the batteries on the left to open upon him.
"He made no attempt to regain the heights."
I have already stated that firstly, there were no heights, but forts to regain, and secondly, that I had not the promised co-operation of the infantry. Lord Raglan continues—
"and was so little informed of the position of the enemy that be asked Captain Nolan what and where he was to attack, as neither enemy nor guns were in sight."
Now, if your Lordships will only read my letter, you will readily understand the tone and manner in which these questions were put. I was sensible of the absurdity and uselessness of the order; and when he persisted in his orders to attack, I said,
"Attack, Sir!—Attack what, and where? What guns are we to recover "
Captain Nolan painted to the further end of the valley, and said—
"There, my Lord, are your guns and your enemy."
I have already stated the erroneous impression which prevailed, that the Russians were at that moment taking our guns from forts 1, 2, and 3, and the spot pointed at by Captain Nolan was in the direction they would have been taken. Now, the guns were not moved at all that day, and to use a popular word just now, the whole was a misconception. The letter proceeds—
"This is the lieutenant general's own admission. The result of his inattention to the first order was, that it never occurred to him that the second was connected with and the repetition of the first. He viewed it only as a positive order to attack at all hazards. (The word 'attack,' be it observed, was not made use of in General Airey's note)."
But, my Lords, the order to attack the enemy immediately from Lord Raglan was delivered to me by Captain Nolan. And again, is it not trifling to pretend that there was no order to attack when I was

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desired to advance rapidly to the front, to follow the enemy, and to try to prevent the enemy from carrying away the guns? I ask any military man, whether such an order means anything but attack? Could it be pretended that we were to advance slowly under a cross fire of batteries; and having reached the enemy were not to attack them, but to halt with our hands in our pockets? The idea is too puerile and absurd. But to proceed; I was told that in carrying out this operation, a troop of horse artillery may accompany. Your Lordships will observe, that the word "may" is here introduced. I therefore considered so much of the order discretionary, and did not take the troop. When I inform your Lordships that the artillery would have had to proceed up a long valley, much of it ploughed land, under a cross fire of batteries, and without a chance of ever bringing their guns usefully into action, your Lordships will, I think, consider that I exercised a wise discretion. Had the troop of horse artillery accompanied me, the horses must have been killed and the guns lost. The letter proceeds—
"He was informed that the French cavalry was on the left and he did not invite their co-operation."
This is a most extraordinary charge. They were out of sight on the other side of the ridge of the Inkerman valley, and much nearer to Lord Raglan and General Canrobert than to me. I knew not what was the force of French cavalry, how commanded or what orders they had received. Moreover, my advance was to be immediate, and I could not have communicated with the French cavalry in less than a quarter of an hour. My Lords, you might be inclined to suppose that we had not the co-operation of the French cavalry; when, on the contrary, we had it, and it was most useful to us. Three squadrons of French chasseurs most gallantly attacked a Russian battery in flank and reverse, silenced several of its guns, and thus rendered the greatest service to my heavy brigade. It is next said—
"He had the whole of the cavalry at his disposal; he mentions having brought up only two regiments in support."
It is true that in my letter of the 30th of November, I only mentioned two regiments; but it is equally true that the whole of the five regiments were brought up at proper intervals, and I am inclined to think that they had all casualties. Lord Raglan may well, after such a lapse of
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time, have forgotten how the troops were employed, but from his position he must have known it at the time. The letter proceeds—
"He omits all other precautions form the want of due consideration, &c."
Now I cannot help thinking that I took every precaution in my power, and I should like to know what precautions Lord Raglan expected of me which I did not take. And it is added, "from want of due consideration." It must, I think, my Lords, be very evident that I did not jump into this business, but that, on the contrary, I gave it the fullest consideration. Then it is stated that I acted on the supposition that the enemy were not in such numbers as they really were. Now, my Lords, considering that I had been in the field since six o'clock in the morning, and always, more or less, in the face of the enemy, I should be glad to know why it was supposed that I did not know something of their force. My Lords, I believe I have now answered every charge contained in Lord Raglan's letter. I pledged myself to refute every accusation, I said that I would not leave a word unanswered. I believe I have fully fulfilled the undertaking I gave, have not left two words together, but have torn the letter to rags and tatters.
I must now notice the letter of the Commander in Chief. When I find myself obliged, in my own defence, to mention any communication from such a quarter, I shall not fail to show that respect which I have accorded to my Commander in Chief ever since I because connected with the service. I must premise that the letter placed on the table of your Lordships' House, contains a paragraphs more, and not an unimportant one, than the letter originally enclosed to me. This paragraphs states—
"It is to be regretted that the lieutenant general, acting upon a misconception of a written order, did not show that order to Lord Cardigan."
Of course, my Lords, if the Commander in Chief pronounces it to be the duty of a lieutenant general to show his orders to his two major generals, however novel such a doctrine is to me, it must be my guide in future. But I certainly never conceived it to be the duty of a divisional general to do so. And there was no more reason to show the order to Lord Cardigan, than to General Scarlett, because it was not intended to be an operation of one, but of both brigades; and for which reason I

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placed myself in the rear of the one, and in advance of the other. I cannot understand how it could be possibly my duty to discuss an order with one of my major generals, unless it was to throw upon another a responsibility which ought solely to attach to myself. The noble Viscount proceeds—
"And that influenced by the authoritative tone and disrespectful manner of the aide-de-camp, he did not decide upon his own judgment."
With the greatest respect, I ask the Commander in Chief why he supposes that I allowed myself to be influenced in any way, except by a sense of duty, in carrying out the orders I received? I do not know where the noble Viscount has been informed, but I ask the noble Viscount to tell me how I showed myself to be influenced by the tone or conduct of the aide-de-camp? I altogether deny that I was influenced by anything said or done by that aide-de-camp. I was influenced by a sense of duty which imposed upon me the necessity of carrying out what I considered to be an imperative order; and, therefore, I say to impute to me that I allowed my feelings or temper to influence my conduct is not doing me justice. The letter proceeds—
"Supported by the concurrence of his major general, that the charge ought not to be made."
I deny that it was necessary to ask the concurrence of anybody, or that a divisional general should consult with his brigadier. I consider a lieutenant general to be unfit to be at the head of a division if he does not feel himself fully qualified and fully able to carry out the instructions of his Commander in Chief. I never could conceive it to be the duty of a divisional general to consult with his brigadier, and I should most reluctantly adopt such a course. I have since my return heard strange things in the way of private criticism. I have been told, "you should have had moral courage enough to disobey your general." I say to you, my Lords, I had not the moral courage to show myself insubordinate, and to hold my opinion as superior to, and overruling that of the Commander in Chief. Then I have been told, it is asked why I did not head the light cavalry charge? Because, had I done so, I could not have commanded the cavalry division. It seems to be imagined that I was unexposed in the affair. All I can say is, that my aide-de-camp was killed, I was myself wounded, my horse was hit by two balls, another staff officer
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had his forage cap shot off his head, and another had a ball in his horse. Of five, four were either hit themselves or their horses.
The reason of my recall is stated by the late Minister of War to have been, that I placed myself towards my general in a position which made it most advisable that I should be recalled. I could only have placed myself in that position by my letter of the 30th of November. To the noble Duke that letter must latterly have appeared to have been very uncourteous and insubordinate. Perhaps the noble Duke did not always think it so. Perhaps at one time he thought it calm and temperate. If he did, I believe he only entertained what is at the present moment the universal opinion; and it is on account of that letter so considered, and so universally approved of, that I am, ostensibly at least, recalled from my command.
It has been thought that I had had a quarrel with Lord Raglan, when, in fact, I never had a word of difference with his Lordship. Lord Raglan never found fault with a single act of mine, or said that I could do anything better. Subsequently to my letter, he very kindly appointed officers to my staff at my nomination. I have not only been in communication with Lord Raglan in respect to my division, but on subjects quite foreign to my command, such as transport, ambulance, and other matters.
And I therefore think, that when the noble Duke conceived it to be expedient, or necessary to recall me from my command in consequence of any supposed bad feeling between Lord Raglan and myself, the noble Duke acted under a misconception.
Your Lordships will, I think, be surprised that this recall, unexpected as it was by me, came as unexpectedly on Lord Raglan. I have been assured that his Lordship has said that he never recommended it, that he could not account for it, and that he knew nothing about it. My authority is General Estcourt. He told me, when I was putting my foot on board the ship to come to England, that Lord Raglan was quite as much astonished as myself; for although he did not deny that he had made observations in support of his report; he had said or done nothing to occasion what had happened, and it was altogether unexpected by him.
Your Lordships should be told how I obtained my command. So soon as I

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heard that troops would be embarked for active service in the East, I did, as I have done before, I wrote to the Commander in Chief, and offered my services. Not expecting much cavalry to be sent, I asked the Commander in Chief to appoint me to the command of a brigade of infantry, and stated that, having been in that branch of the service, I believed myself to be qualified; and that having served a campaign in Bulgaria, and being accustomed to foreign armies, and to live with foreign officers, I thought my services might be acceptable and useful. The noble Viscount, in the kindest manner, and, as I believed, of his own accord (for which I have always felt that I owed him personal obligation) wrote to say that the Government having decided upon sending out a division of cavalry, he offered sue the command of it. I very soon embarked, and I arrived in the East, previously to the arrival of any part of my division. Unlike many of my brother officers, I was blest with continued good health, and the consequence was, that from the time the cavalry landed, till the noble Duke so summarily recalled me, I was never absent one hour, one moment from my duties, and I believe I am not overstating it, when I say, that there was no divisional general in that army who studied the care and welfare of his division, and exerted himself more incessantly for those objects than I did.
If I can say that I was always at my post, and always zealous in the discharge of my duties, I can also say that I have not been altogether an unsuccessful general. During the time that I was at the head of the cavalry, our piquets and outposts were never surprised; the flanks and rear of our army were never disturbed by the enemy's cavalry; nor was our baggage, nor were our communications inconvenienced by attacks from the Cossacks. I assert boldly, that on every occasion all was done by the cavalry under my command that my orders justified and that my small numbers rendered possible; and I had the good fortune to command and carry out all the details of the heavy dragoon charge. I cannot, therefore, be told that I have proved myself an unsuccessful general. What did Sir Colin Campbell—in concert with whom, as I have already said, I had been serving for four months—say to me:—"I shall always remember this: that whilst others have been croaking, grumbling, and dissatisfied, you have always laughed at every diffi-
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culty." This observation, my Lords, coming from a soldier like Sir Colin Campbell, is very flattering. I know, also, that the adjutant general of the army has said—"When they recall that officer they recall the man who, when others were skulking and running away, has never once flinched from his duty, but was always at his post."
It is contended by some that I need not have obeyed this order, that I ought to have had moral courage enough to have disobeyed it. Is this the opinion of military men, and of the highest authorities in the Crimea—English or French? I say, it is not; but that the order was imperative and absolute, leaving me no choice whatever how to act. There was not a commanding officer of the ten regiments of my division who did not consider the order one necessary to be obeyed. It is generally admitted that, had I disobeyed this order, I should for ever have been held responsible for the loss of the guns, which it was erroneously imagined were being removed. That such would have been the censure thrown upon me, that I could not have shown myself to my division; that my existence would have become intolerable, and I must have destroyed myself. These are the opinions of every officer in the army whose opinion is worth having. I have been giving you, my Lords, the opinions of living officers; I will now give you the opinion of an officer who, unfortunately for the army and for the country, is now lost to us. I mean Sir George Cathcart. I will read your Lordships his opinion of that cavalry charge, and of my conduct in respect to it.
It is well to observe that I never saw Sir George Cathcart from the time that the army reached Balaklava until his death. This is a letter which Sir George Cathcart never could have anticipated that I should see. I only became informed of its existence by accident. It was written to Lady Cathcart by her husband, and taken from his body after he fell; and the bullet which killed him had passed through this letter. It was written on the 2nd of November, three days before the battle of Inkerman, and eight after that of Balaklava. The extract to which I wish to call your Lordships' attention says—
"I have another opportunity of writing to you. You will read about the affair at Balaklava, in which the light cavalry brigade suffered so severely. It was a most gallant but unfortunate

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affair. Neither Lord Lucan nor Lord Cardigan were to blame, but on the contrary, for they obeyed orders. But those who gave the orders are much to blame for ordering the impossible. I was sent for with my division to set matters to rights, and did so as soon as we could arrive, but we had six miles to march."
Without wishing, my Lords, de me faire trop valoir, I may, I believe, say, that so long as I held the command of the cavalry division I discharged my duty. I have, however, been summarily recalled, and in a way, and in language not to allow me to console myself with the idea that my recall was a fair exercise of the prerogative, but that it was a recall in disgrace. In the noble Duke's letters he does not allow himself to say one word in palliation of the recall. I defy your Lordships to put your fingers upon one sentence in the letter containing a word of comfort. You might have endeavoured to have softened this recall (to the Duke of Newcastle), but you were afraid to offer one word of consolation.
My Lords, with such letters of recall, and under the circumstances in which I unhappily find myself, it is impossible but that I should consider myself recalled in disgrace. I have positively felt my position to be such, that I have not been able to allow myself the honour and satisfaction of waiting upon the Queen at a levee, fearing that my presence might be embarrassing to Her Majesty, and I cannot be insensible, that whilst every officer of any rank, on his return from the Crimea, has been specially honoured by Her Majesty, I have been considered, and, in my opinion, most naturally so considered, as, under the circumstances, unfitted for such an honour.
I fear, my Lords, I have troubled your Lordships at too great length, but I felt, to do myself justice, that I could not compress more what I had to state. Before I conclude, to the Government I say: You have wronged, grievously wronged, as zealous a soldier as Her Majesty has in the army. If my statement has, as I cannot doubt it has, made any impression on you, give it your attention; and if you are in any way doubtful that you have done an injustice, I ask you this, and no more: reconsider my case, and give me a court-martial and a fair trial.
The noble Earl concluded by moving—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, for a Copy of the Report of Field Marshal Lord Raglan of the Action of Balaklava, and also a Copy of the Report of Lieu-
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tenant General the Earl of Lucan to Field Marshal Lord Raglan of that Action."
THE EARL OF CARDIGAN: My Lords, I regret that I feel myself called upon to address your Lordships on this occasion, because I came down with the firm determination and wish not to mix myself up in this question; and I deeply regret that I should be called upon to make any remark, or to take any part in the proceedings. My Lords, I only rise to correct a statement made with respect to myself. When the noble Earl, in his address, said that I sent my aide-de-camp to the lieutenant general, to state that the force of the enemy was so numerous in the front of the Light Brigade that I felt it difficult to hold my ground—["No!"]—yes, those were his very words, I sent no such message whatever. In the message I sent I said, that as I perceived a movement was going to be made, I begged to point out that the hills on both sides of the valley leading down to the valley at right angles with it, in which was the Russian battery, with the cavalry behind it,—that these hills were occupied by Russian riflemen and artillery. I sent this message; and when the lieutenant general came in front and ordered me to attack the battery in the valley, behind which was placed the large force of Russian cavalry—which had been perfectly perceptible to myself and to the whole of the Light Brigade for at least twenty minutes—my reply was, "Certainly, Sir; but before I go I must be allowed to point out that the hills on both sides of the valley leading to the battery are covered with Russian artillery and riflemen." The answer I received was, "I cannot help that, they are Lord Raglan's positive orders." I immediately obeyed orders; and so true was the report I had made with regard to the Russian artillery and riflemen that we had not advanced twenty yards before Captain Nolan, who was galloping about in front at about the distance of 100 yards from the Light Brigade, and in no way leading the charge, was killed by a shell from one of those flank batteries which I had pointed out. I have nothing further to say. I only wished to remove any misconception as to my having said that the Light Brigade was not safe in the position in which they were placed.
LORD PANMURE: I am sure your Lordships will agree with me in thinking that a more painful discussion than the present has never been brought before this House, and that you have never seen a

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gallant officer, whose courage, be it remarked, has never been accused, placed in such a position as that in which we have witnessed the noble and gallant Earl placed to-night. The noble and gallant Earl has gone into detail as to his services in the East, and has given the history of certain great and gallant actions in which he was engaged with great minuteness, which may have been extremely interesting, but, at the same time, your Lordships will perceive this is a subject into which it is impossible for me, or for any Minister, to follow him; it is a subject upon which I cannot presume to have an opinion. I must say I am somewhat surprised at the course which the noble Earl has taken, not only in making statements which it is impossible for me to contradict or even in any way to modify, but also in making statements impugning the discretionary power of his Commander in Chief, and the orders and counter-orders given to him upon that eventful day in the valley of Balaklava. No one can regret more deeply than I do the issue of what has been called the "misconception" of an order by the noble and gallant Earl. The disastrous effects which attended that misconception were lamented throughout the length and breadth of England; but I cannot say that the charge of the Light Cavalry, which will never be effaced from the history of the British army, was altogether vain, because it has carried into the heart of the enemy a terror of the British cavalry that I am quite convinced will be of great and good service upon future occasions, for the very appearance of those squadrons in some future well-fought field may perhaps pnt to flight the squadrons of Russia even without the necessity of a collision. I had anticipated that the noble and gallant Earl—for gallant I admit him to be in every sense of the word—would have dwelt upon that part of his case upon which he has on former occasions laid so much stress—namely, his demand for inquiry at the hands of a court-martial. But the noble and gallant Earl has simply referred to that point in the latter part of his speech; he has contented himself with a vindication of his military conduct, and with laying before your Lordships what he terms the injustice of the report to which he has referred; but he has altogether omitted to touch upon any of the doubts which I am sure must have arisen in his mind as to the legality of his claim to a court-martial and the expediency and propriety
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of granting such an inquiry. With reference to the recall of the noble and gallant Earl, I have simply to refer to the statement in your Lordships' hands. He states that it might have been more courteously worded, and expressed with more deference to his feelings as a soldier; but I refer you to the document itself, and I think it sufficiently sets forth that that recall was in no way connected with any doubt as to the gallantry of his conduct in the field. Differences had arisen between the noble and gallant Earl and his Commander in Chief with regard to the term used by the Commander in Chief in the despatch wherein he attributes the unfortunate result of the cavalry charge to a misconception of his orders by the noble and gallant Earl; and it was quite evident to Her Majesty's Government that, although personal civilities and courtesies might have continued, the confidence which ought to exist between the Commander in Chief and an officer commanding a division in his army had, to a certain extent, been shaken. It therefore appeared to the Government and to my noble Friend the Commander of the army—and I entirely coincide in that opinion—that it was for the benefit of the public service and for the advantage of the army itself that one or other of those officers should be recalled, and, with all deference, I think your Lordships will agree that the Lieutenant General commanding the cavalry was the person to whom the recall ought to have been directed. The noble and gallant Earl says that he is entitled to a military inquiry into his conduct upon this eventful occasion. Now, if this had been a question confined to the noble and gallant Earl, there might have been less difficulty in coming to a decision upon it; but your Lordships will perceive that in this, as in all other military matters, a precedent set in the case of the noble and gallant Earl must be followed throughout the army—what is law for him must also be law for the meanest private; and the question arises whether there are grounds in the complaint of the noble and gallant Earl which would justify him in calling for inquiry, any more than a man in the ranks who may have been censured by his superior officer, and who would claim a right to have that censure revised by a military court. There is no law which can guide this case, except that law by which all armies are governed—either the Mutiny Act, or the Articles of War, or the custom

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of war. I have looked with care into the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War—I have reviewed under the most competent advice all the customs of war in cases similar to the present, and I cannot find in the one or in the other any ground whatever for granting the inquiry before a military court which the noble and gallant Earl has demanded. There are cases under the Mutiny Act in which a soldier has an option of being tried by a court-martial or of submitting to certain punishments, such as forfeiture of pay or imprisonment; but these cases are specifically laid down in the Act of Parliament, and they are specifically recorded in the Articles of War for the information of the soldier, and among none of them can the case of the noble and gallant Earl be ranked. But it may be said that the peculiar circumstances of this case ought to make it an exception to the gene-rule. I cannot see any ground for their so doing. And here let me draw a distinction with respect to a word which has been frequently used by the noble and gallant Earl. He says that certain charges have been brought against him by Lord Raglan in his despatch. Now, no charge, in the technical sense of the word, has been brought against him, and I will presently show your Lordships that, in the technical meaning of the phrase, no charge could be brought against him by Lord Raglan. His conduct has been described by Lord Raglan as a misconception of orders which led to unfortunate results. Has not such conduct as that been attributed to officers and general officers in former days over and over again? During the Peninsular campaign did the Duke of Wellington never say that, owing to the misconception of one order, or the non-fulfilment of another order by officers, certain great operations had miscarried? And did the Duke of Wellington ever dream of bringing those officers to a court-martial for such errors, or did those officers ever demand a court-martial in consequence of such observations having been made in his despatches by the Commander in Chief? If you are to recognise the right of every officer to be tried by a court-martial who may make the claim on the ground of his feelings having been injured by remarks made by his superior officer, there would be an end at once to all discipline in the army, to all the power of the Commander in Chief, and to all his control over his troops. But suppose we were to recognise the right of the noble and gallant Earl to an inquiry, by whom
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are the charges against him to be framed? Are they to be framed by Lord Raglan himself? [The Earl of LUCAN: Hear!] The noble Lord who expresses his assent, knows little or nothing of military law—["Hear!"]—if the noble Earl (the Earl of Lucan) assents to that proposition he knows little or nothing of military law, or he would be perfectly aware that the first maxim of military law is, that any officer or soldier who shall have been guilty of any crime for which he may be brought to a court-martial, if he shall have been employed upon any duty before the court-martial takes place, such employment absolves him from the crime he has committed. The person who would have had to frame the charges against him has condoned his offence, and could not, therefore, proceed to make those charges against the individual whom he had so employed. While I admit that the noble and gallant Earl is competent to perform gallant and glorious actions in the field, I will not yield to him in the technicalities of military law, and I think he will find that I am putting a proper interpretation upon them. If then, my Lords, Lord Raglan cannot frame these charges, is the Judge Advocate General to frame them? If I am right I believe that that learned functionary, had he been ordered to frame them, would have said, at the very outset, "These charges will never hold water. The crime or act has been condoned by the general officer in command of the army. It is impossible, in such a case, that the sentence of the court-martial could be confirmed, or that the carrying out of any such sentence could be recommended." Upon these grounds, therefore, I say that even if it were expedient, it would be impossible to grant a court-martial in this case. But I rest the whole facts of the case with regard to a court-martial upon the question of discipline. I resisted the demand of the noble and gallant Earl on the question of discipline from the very beginning, for I believe that to grant a military inquiry in this case would be to strike at the root of the whole discipline of the army. My Lords, let us look at what happened last year. A military Commission sat upon the promotion of officers in the army. What can be so great an offence in the eyes of an officer as to see himself passed over in a promotion? That military Commission, however, recommended that promotions for merit should be made by selection, and that officers of noted and

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general merit should be promoted out of their turns, and over the heads of other officers who were their seniors. This, too, was to be done without any other reason being given than the merit of the individual officers promoted. Now, if all the officers over whose heads other officers were promoted for merit were to complain of being passed over, and were to claim an inquiry into their merit as compared with those promoted out of their turns, I apprehend that it would be impossible to carry out the recommendations of the Commission. I think that the more your Lordships look into the present case the more you will be convinced that, without imputing to the noble Earl anything whatever that could touch his reputation as a soldier, either in point of courage in person, or of conduct in the field, or upon any other matter except on those points of misunderstanding which have arisen between him and Lord Raglan, the Government could not have adopted any other course than that of recalling the noble and gallant Earl from his command in the Crimea; and that they can, without casting any reflection on the noble Earl, refuse the inquiry for which he asks. I am afraid I can hold out to the noble Earl no expectation of our reconsidering the determination to which we have arrived: and I am afraid I can give no answer to the ex parte statement which he has made of the events which have attended the campaign in which he has been engaged. I only hope and trust, after the appeal which the noble and gallant Earl has addressed to your Lordships—after the opportunity which your Lordships have kindly given him of stating, in his own vindication, all the acts of his public career—that here this unfortunate and unhappy controversy will rest; and I do hope that when this ex parte statement of the noble and gallant Earl goes forth to the Crimea, it will not add to the anxieties of the gallant general to whom we are all so deeply indebted for the exertions he is making for his country in the field of battle, nor render the position he occupies still more painful than it must have been from all that has passed in this country during the last few months.
VISCOUNT HARDINGE: As the noble and gallant Earl alluded to me in the latter part of his address, I trust your Lordships will allow me a few words in explanation. I may say, first of all, that I perfectly concur in the remark of my noble Friend behind me, the Minister of War, that the
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statements which we have heard from the noble and gallant Earl must be considered to have been made ex parte, inasmuch as we have heard from the noble Earl an account of conversations which have passed between himself, General Airey, Lord Burghersh, and Lord Raglan. It is perfectly impossible for me, or for any other Peer in this House, to be able to answer on the instant such statements as the noble and gallant Earl has made to the House. I have the highest confidence in the honour and integrity of my noble Friend (Lord Raglan), and I should be the last person to believe that my noble and gallant Friend (the Earl of Lucan) would wilfully misrepresent anything that has occurred. I am, therefore, placed in this painful position, that I am called upon to hear the explanation of the noble Earl of what has passed between him and Lord Raglan and General Airey; while at the same time it is impossible for me to suppose that Lord Raglan, upon those terms of friendship which the noble and gallant Earl has represented, could have sat down to pen such a despatch as that of the 16th of December, in which he states, respecting the noble Earl—
"I have referred to my despatch, and, far from being willing to alter one word of it, I am prepared to declare that not only did the lieutenant general misconceive the written instruction that was sent him, but that there was nothing in that instruction which called on him to attack at all hazards, or to undertake the operation which led to such a brilliant display of gallantry on the part of the Light Brigade, and, unhappily, at the same time, occasioned such lamentable casualties in every regiment composing it."
The despatch goes on in the same strain to state very minutely what the impressions of the noble Lord were. Lord Raglan says that—
"The noble Earl was so little informed of the position of the enemy that he asked Captain Nolan 'where and what he was to attack, as neither enemy nor guns were in sight. This, your Grace will observe, is the lieutenant general's own admission."
The noble and gallant Earl has stated in his explanation, that he obeyed the orders of Captain Nolan; but it was his duty to have obeyed the written order of Lord Raglan, and to have paid no attention to what Captain Nolan said. There can be no doubt from the following passage that Lord Raglan considered his order discretionary, and not imperative. Lord Raglan writes—and I believe it is an important point for the consideration of your Lordships—
"The noble Earl viewed it only as a positive order to attack at all hazards (the word 'attack,'

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be it observed, was not made use of in General Airey's note) an unknown enemy, whose position, numbers, and composition he was wholly unacquainted with, and whom, in consequence of a previous order, he had taken no steps whatever to watch. I undoubtedly had no intention that he should make such an attack—there was nothing in the instruction to require it—and therefore I conceive I was fully justified in stating to your Grace what was the exact truth—that the charge arose from the misconception of an order for the advance, which Lord Lucan considered obliged him to attack at all hazards."
I trust your Lordships will pay particular attention to the words of this despatch, which was written some time after he had received the letter of the noble and gallant Earl. Is it likely that a man of the strict honour and veracity of Lord Raglan would have persisted in stating in such strong and unmistakable terms, that he never meant his order to be considered as an imperative order of attack, if the fact were not so? I am, therefore, of opinion that Lord Raglan is speaking the exact truth, and that he never meant that an attack should be made at all hazards. On the contrary, I have every reason to believe that he meant to place a discretionary power in the hands of the noble and gallant Earl, He says—
"I entertain no wish to disparage the Earl of Lucan in your opinion, or to cast a slur upon his professional reputation, but, having been accused by his Lordship of having stated of him what was unmerited in my despatch, I have felt obliged to enter into the subject, and trouble your Grace at more length than I could have wished in vindication of a report to your Grace in which I had strictly confined myself to that which I knew to be true. I had indulged in no observations whatever, or in any expressions which could be viewed either as harsh or in any way grating to the feelings of his Lordship."
I cannot say that I have read the private correspondence of Lord Raglan, either to the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle) or to my noble Friend behind me (Lord Panmure), but this I can say, that, in all the correspondence of Lord Raglan which I have seen, upon no occasion has my noble Friend indulged in a single reflection in which the credit or honour of the noble and gallant Earl has been called in question. Now, what is the statement of the noble and gallant Earl? He says—
"After carefully reading this order, I hesitated and urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it. The aide-de-camp, in a most authoritative tone, stated that they were Lord Raglan's orders that the cavalry should attack immediately. I asked him 'where and what to do?' as neither enemy nor guns were within eight. He replied, in a most disrespectful but
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significant manner, pointing to the further end of the valley, 'There, my Lord, is your enemy; there are your guns.'"
The noble Earl then says that he decided against his own conviction, he being a lieutenant general, upon making the attack, and he observes—
"I did all in my power to make it as little perilous as possible."
He then goes on to say—
"I considered at the time—I am still of the same opinion—that I followed the only course open to me. As a lieutenant general, doubtless, I have discretionary power; but to take upon myself to disobey an order written by my Commander in Chief; within a few minutes of its delivery, and given from an elevated position commanding an entire view of all the batteries and the position of the enemy, would have been nothing less than direct disobedience of orders, without any other reason than that I preferred my own opinion to that of my general, and, in this instance, must have exposed me and the cavalry to aspersions against which it might have been difficult to defend ourselves."
Surely, when the noble Earl talks of possible aspersions, it shows that his decision to attack was taken, not upon any impression which he had of Lord Raglan's order, but upon the fear which he entertained of aspersions from his officers and soldiers. He then goes on—
"I did not dare to disobey your Lordship, and it is the opinion of every officer of rank in this army, to whom I had shown the written order, that it was not possible for me to do so."
The noble Earl also referred to my letter, in which I state:—
"It is to be regretted that the lieutenant general, acting upon a misconception of a written order, did not show that order to Lord Cardigan, and that, influenced by the authoritative tone and disrespectful manner of the aide-de-camp, he did not decide upon his own judgment, supported by the concurrence of his major general, that the charge ought not to be made.
Surely, my Lords, I am justified in making that assertion, because at the time the letter was written I had seen Lord Cardigan, and had his opinion, and not only did he think the charge ought not to have been made—that it was useless and worse than useless—but that he had never read the order, that he had never been consulted, and when two men of the same age and of the rame rank—[The Earl of LUCAN: No, not the rame rank]—or nearly the same rank—I do not wish to hurt the feelings of the noble Earl with respect to his rank, but both are in the Army List as major generals; and when I asked Lord Cardigan, "If you had received an order

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written by Lord Raglan, and signed by General Airey, should you not, before you made the attack, have considered you had discretion to send it to Lord Lucan," he answered, that he considered the order left the lieutenant general full discretion, and that he thought it the duty of an officer in command not to obey implicitly, on such an occasion as that, an order which would imperil his men, but to exercise his discretion. I must say that I think on all occasions a cavalry officer has a right to exercise his discretion much more than an officer of infantry, because cavalry have from the rapidity of their movements far more opportunities of making efforts and changing the disposition of their force as the occasion may suddenly arise. Under those circumstances, I conceive that the noble Earl had a perfect right, considering the wording of the order, to exercise his discretion upon it. That is my opinion, and I take it that it would be that of any man who saw the terms used by Lord Raglan in the despatch which the noble Earl has contravened. I do not mean to say the noble Earl may not be right in the disposition of his troops. I will not enter into a discussion upon that; but I say that the whole statement of the noble Earl is ex parte as far as it goes; and although I do not blame the noble Earl for anything that has been said, either in the course of this debate, or upon any former occasion, I say that, from the tone of Lord Raglan's despatch, there appeared to be a difference of opinion between him and the Earl of Lucan, upon professional grounds, so strong that it would not be advisable for them to continue in the same position, because they would not act well together. I was asked my opinion, and I said that it was not advisable that a commander in chief and an officer so high in rank as a lieutenant general commanding a division, should be upon such terms, and therefore I gave my advice to my noble Friend behind me (the Duke of Newcastle), who acted accordingly. I can only say, my Lords, with regard to the general merits of the question, I should be extremely happy if the noble Earl could have a court-martial by which his conduct might be examined; but I am bound to observe that, in the records of the army, there is no instance in which an officer in the position of the noble Earl has claimed a court-martial. I believe he cannot do so on legal grounds; as to doing so as a matter of favour, it is equally impossible on that ground. When the lieute-
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nant general arrived in this country it was my duty to consult the Judge Advocate General, and the strongest opinion was given by that officer that it was impossible that the noble Earl could claim a court-martial; first, for the reason given by my noble Friend behind, that the acts which he was supposed to have committed were overlooked at the time; and, secondly, because it was impossible to frame any charge against the noble Earl. My noble Friend took the objection that the noble Earl had served since. I recollect the case of a soldier in the 40th Regiment, in the Peninsula; he was about to be punished, but while under sentence was allowed to go into action, and was afterwards, having performed his duty and been exposed to danger, most severely punished. Upon that occasion the officer was brought to a court-martial and cashiered, the charge against him being that he had, contrary to the Mutiny Act, used the services of a man and afterwards punished him for an offence committed before such service was rendered. I therefore concur with the Judge Advocate general that the subsequent services of the noble Earl would disqualify him from having his conduct investigated by a court-martial, and I do not believe there is any precedent for it. At the same time, I must say that, personally, I, for one, greatly lament the step taken of recalling the noble Earl, the more especially as I had a material part in recommending him to Her Majesty's Government for the appointment; but I believe Lord Raglan is perfectly incapable of making a statement in such strong terms as that which has been alluded to unless he believed every word of it.
THE DUKE OF RICHMOND: I think your Lordships will concur with me in expressing great regret that the noble and gallant Earl should have brought this subject before the House. No doubt it is natural for my noble Friend to wish to stand well before the people of England, but I submit that my noble Friend ought not, because he is a peer, to be in a position to demand that which would not be granted to any one else. If your Lordships in this House interfere with the discipline of the army, there are men sitting not very far from you who will follow your example, and the consequence will be, the army will be placed under democratic power. My Lords, I am not going into the discussion of those points which have already been touched upon, but I regret to hear particular acts, accusations, and private conver-

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sations brought forward in this House. I think my noble Friend ought not to have lent the weight of his high character to the attacks which have been so unjustly made upon Lord Raglan—the man who landed the British army in the Crimea, who stormed the heights of Alma, who fought the battles of Balaklava and Inkerman, and who has done, more than any other man, that for which every other man in this country who wishes for peace must feel deeply grateful—he has promoted and cemented more than any other man the firm alliance and brotherly feeling which is reciprocated between this country and our brave and gallant ally. My Lords, I know that my noble Friend did not wish to attack Lord Raglan, and no doubt he did not wish to attack Colonel Estcourt or Colonel Airey—officers with whom I have no personal acquaintance—but, I ask is it right or is it just to allow these men to be lowered in the opinion of the army by detailing those conversations? My noble Friend, with respect to Colonel Airey, said he began in a sort of threatening tone, and then assumed a more diplomatic manner. I say that telling such things is not the way to teach the officers or the men of the British army their duty, but it is the way to teach them to look down on men holding high and responsible situations. I go not into the question as to whether or not my noble Friend misunderstood the order. He appealed to me, and, reading from the Queen's regulations, asked whether an officer is not bound to obey the order of an aide-de-camp? No man can doubt for a moment that he is so bound to obey it, but I can tell my noble Friend what a most gallant general officer did in the Peninsular war—Major General Crawfurd, who commanded the Light Division. One of the aides-de-camp, who brought him a written order, behaved pretty much as I am afraid this officer did to the noble Earl —gave him his advice when to attack and where to attack. General Crawfurd's answer was,—"When General Crawfurd asks the opinion of Colonel A., he will have the goodness to give it, but not till then." Now, that is the way in which I should have acted in this instance. My noble Friend says that he received a further order from Captain Nolan, besides the written order. Now, if that is the case—if my noble Friend acted upon the verbal order—what, in Heaven's name, was the use of sending the written order at all? The written order ought to have
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been the one attended to, and my noble Friend ought to have disregarded what the aide-de-camp said. Captain Nolan was no doubt a very brave and gallant officer, and it is far from my intention to say anything against him, but he was a man, who had written a book upon the capabilities of cavalry, which contained the most fantastic notions as to cavalry being always able to destroy formed infantry; and it was not to be supposed that he would shrink from the opportunity of proving them to be true. If I had been in the position of the noble and gallant Earl I should have said to that gentleman immediately, "When I ask for your advice, give it to me; in the meantime, go back to your general and report." As my noble Friend has appealed to me, I have no hesitation in saying, as far as I can understand the matter, I should have looked to the written order, and that in advancing the cavalry I should not have read that order as he did, as an order to attack at all hazards.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I should not have risen to address your Lordships on this occasion, but for the purpose of expressing a hope which I am sure is shared by many of your Lordships, that after this, in many respects painful, though perhaps unavoidable debate, we may be spared the continuance, or, at all events, a repetition of it. I am not at all prepared to say that there may not be, as the noble Lords the Minister for War and the Commander in Chief have stated, that there are legal and technical, as well as substantial difficulties arising out of the exigencies of the public service, which might render it impossible, or, at all events, inexpedient to grant the court-martial or the military inquiry for which my noble and gallant Friend asks. But, then, I cannot refrain from saying that if it were impossible so to grant that inquiry—if it were impossible to afford to my noble and gallant Friend an opportunity of vindicating himself from the charges (I do not use the term in the technical sense) made against him, and from the imputations cast on his professional character, and which seriously affect him in the opinion of the army—perhaps of his Sovereign—and in the opinion of the country at large—if it were impossible to do this, then, I think, it was most unfortunate that that second letter of Lord Raglan, containing these serious charges and imputations, was ever placed officially by a Minister of the Crown in the hands of your

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Lordships, as indicating the reasons of my noble and gallant Friend's recall. If my noble and gallant Friend had merely complained of the expression as to his misconception of these orders, and if he had appealed to a Minister of the Crown for a court-martial, or an inquiry of any description, to investigate whether, in point of fact, he had misconceived those instructions or not, I should then say that my noble and gallant Friend, however hard his case might be, had no ground to stand upon. But when an officer high in command finds himself charged by his superior with the heavy crime of disobeying a positive order, and finds that that charge is officially declared by the Minister to be the reason why he is recalled and brought back to this country—I will not say in disgrace, but with his professional character to a certain degree affected—then I say that his case is one of extreme hardship; and it is one as to which I am quite sure every man in this House, military or non-military, must deeply sympathise with my noble and gallant Friend. Upon one point I differ from my noble and gallant Friend the noble Duke behind me (the Duke of Richmond). I cannot blame my noble and gallant Friend for that, having urged, entreated, and besought for some means of vindicating his professional character before that which no doubt would be the fittest tribunal to investigate such a question—namely, a tribunal composed of military officers—he should have availed himself of his seat in this House to make that plain, straightforward, unvarnished, manly statement which your Lordships have heard to-night. I am not about to depart from the wish I expressed in the outset, and to set the example of neglecting the suggestion I then threw out, by entering upon any discussion as to the merits of the question, or the degree of responsibility resting on my noble and gallant Friend from the first or second order received by him. I must, however, be permitted to say that my noble and gallant Friend appears to me to have been placed in a most unfortunate dilemma, and I do not see what possible exercise of discretion, what possible judgment or knowledge of his profession could have saved him from one of the horns of that dilemma. The noble Viscount the Commander in Chief (Viscount Hardinge) has insisted a good deal upon this point—that, holding the high position of lieutenant general in the army, it was the duty of my noble and
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gallant Friend to exercise a large discretion with regard to the order he had received, more especially as it concerned an advance of cavalry. Now, my noble and gallant Friend upon a previous occasion, when he received the first order to advance the cavalry and occupy the heights, did exercise a discretion so far as regarded the extent to which he should advance the force under his command; and then we find in a subsequent letter of Lord Raglan, that upon the fact of his having so exercised his discretion is founded a charge of disobedience to a positive order. In the second instance, my noble and gallant Friend, receiving (in consequence, as Lord Raglan says, of his having disobeyed the first order) a peremptory command from Lord Raglan, naturally conceives that no discretion is left to him, and executes that peremptory order, upon which he is told that he ought, as lieutenant general, to have exercised discretion, and to have disobeyed the order, although it was brought by Lord Raglan's own aide-de-camp. Now, I will not say whether my noble and gallant Friend was justified in the whole course he took upon the one occasion or the other; but I will ask, with the charge hanging over him of having unduly exercised his discretion in the first instance and of not obeying his orders, what would have been said of him if he had abstained from obeying a second order addressed to him consequent upon his non-compliance with the first order, and had again acted according to his discretion? I do not wish to say a single word which may be considered as disrespectful to Lord Raglan, or to express any opinion with respect to matters which seem to require a judgment peculiarly military; but it does appear to me that my noble and gallant Friend, by the opposite charges made against him, has been placed in a position of extraordinary difficulty; and, although there may be one man in 10,000—certainly not more—who would venture to incur the moral responsibility of such a double disobedience of orders, I think it cannot be made a charge against my noble and gallant Friend, that he conceived himself bound by such positive orders to take a certain course marked out, even though he might not think that course a judicious one. I may be permitted also to say, with regard to the responsibility attaching to my noble and gallant Friend as lieutenant general, that, on the one hand, he is charged with not having assumed a pro-

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per degree of responsibility, and, on the other hand, the noble Viscount the Commander in chief says, my noble and gallant Friend ought to have consulted with the Earl of Cardigan as major general, because they were nearly of the same rank—forgetting that my noble and gallant Friend had the local rank of lieutenant general, commanding the division, and that Lord Cardigan, as well as Major General Scarlett, were major generals of brigades, acting under the orders, and, consequently, not approaching to the rank, of my noble and gallant Friend. I beg your Lordships' pardon for having gone so far into the question as I have gone; but I will repeat my hope that, after the defence of his conduct made by the noble and gallant Earl this evening—after a statement entered into by him which I am sure must have gone straight to the heart and the feelings of every man among your Lordships, as I think it will throughout the country generally—this will be the last occasion on which we shall hear in this House discussions upon questions which undoubtedly, if habitually brought before this House, cannot but give rise to much serious inconvenience. My noble and gallant Friend will have the satisfaction of knowing that, at all events, he has had the opportunity of making his own defence, clear and unequivocal as that statement was, before your Lordships and the country; and whatever opinions may be formed as to the responsibility attaching to him—if there be any responsibility—with regard to that brilliant but unfortunate charge of the Light Cavalry at Balaklava, he need be under no apprehension that his countrymen are likely to forget the important military services rendered by him or are likely to forget that on that day he had the merit of ordering another almost equally brilliant and more successful charge of the Heavy Brigade, under the command of my old and valued Friend Brigadier General Scarlett—a charge which covered with glory the troops engaged in it and which must reflect the utmost credit upon the general who directed it. My noble and gallant Friend has, besides, the satisfaction of knowing that he has come before your Lordships and the country with the full consciousness that he has a good case; that he is anxious to have his conduct investigated in the closest and most searching manner by military and professional men; that if he is deprived of such an inquiry it does
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not rest at all with him, since he has sought, courted, and entreated the fullest investigation into every part of his conduct; and, satisfied with that knowledge, I trust he will from this time permit the subject to drop in this House, and will throw himself and his character (and I am sure he may safely do so) upon the justice and the good feeling of his countrymen.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: My Lords, I will not, any more than the noble Earl who has just sat down, enter into the merits of the question between the noble and gallant Earl and Lord Raglan, for I feel strongly that there is no Member of your Lordships' House who is in a position either to confirm or refute the assertions which have been made by the noble and gallant Earl in bringing his case under your consideration. I feel, my Lords, that if I were to attempt to make any vindication of the conduct of the Commander in Chief of the army in the Crimea, I am so imperfectly informed—as all your Lordships necessarily are—with regard to the facts now, for the first time, brought under our notice, that I should find myself most inadequate to the discharge of such a task, without doing injustice to that noble Lord. At the same time, I am bound to say that the noble Earl who has just spoken (the Earl of Derby) has done injustice to Lord Raglan on one point, for I do not understand his Lordship to make any complaint of his first order for the cavalry to advance not having been obeyed by the noble Earl (the Earl of Lucan). All I understand Lord Raglan to say is, that he sent the subsequent order in consequence of seeing that the first had not been obeyed. I will not, however, enter upon that subject; and, as I am not about to discuss the case as between the noble and gallant Earl (the Earl of Lucan) and Lord Raglan, still less will I enter into the question whether or not there should be a court-martial. This point is one with regard to which I feel myself bound to defer to the military authorities, and to the legal authorities conversant with military law. I am bound to accept the decision on this part of the case as stated by my noble Friends near me, and to believe that they have advised the Crown in the course which has been taken on sufficient data—on data, let me add, which have been strengthened by the opinion of the noble Duke (the Duke of Richmond). At the same time, my Lords, I cannot help regretting, for the sake of the army, that

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it is not thought advisable that such a court-martial should be granted, because undoubtedly it will go forth to the public that a general commanding a division, and having a seat in this House, has advantages over every other officer in the army which he ought not to possess. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) has complained that my noble Friend the Secretary of War had furnished to Parliament the letter which contained the imputations against the noble and gallant Earl; and he went on to observe that the publication of that letter entirely changed the position in which he stood. But the noble Earl forgot how that came to pass. It occurred from the circumstance of the noble Earl (the Earl of Lucan) being a Member of this House, and coming down to the House and reading a letter which had been sent to him by Lord Raglan, containing the despatch written by me on the occasion. Undoubtedly when an ex parte statement was laid before the House by the noble and gallant Earl, then, and not till then, did my noble Friend (Lord Panmure), feeling that it gave an unfair advantage against the Commander in Chief in the Crimea, send to the noble and gallant Earl the despatch of Lord Raglan, stating his case, and leaving it to the noble and gallant Earl to produce that letter, if he thought fit, and thus put the House and the public in possession of the whole facts of the case. So far from this being a cause of complaint against my noble Friend, I think he acted in a fair and candid spirit towards the noble and gallant Earl, by enabling him to see what the case was against him before be brought it under the notice of the House, and that he did no more than was required by justice to the noble Earl at the head of the army in the Crimea in subsequently laying his Lordship's letter on the table of the House. I am ready to join the noble Earl opposite in expressing an earnest hope that this discussion may not be drawn into a precedent. I speak with all possible feeling towards the noble and gallant Earl. I sympathise with him, and can truly say I never took a more painful course in my life than in writing that despatch to which he has so often referred; but I cannot help thinking that the interference of this House in such matters is not likely to raise it in repute with the country. The noble and gallant Earl has stated that he did not know whether Lord Raglan had or had not addressed to me some documents of a charac-
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ter different from that which had appeared respecting him. I can relieve his mind of any such suspicion. There are no public documents at the War Office except those that have been produced, and, as regards any private letters sent to me by Lord Raglan, the noble Earl is well aware that in the private letter which Lord Raglan addressed to me giving an account of the battle of Balaklava, he did not refer to him in unfavourable terms, and, on other occasions, when he did refer to him, he has always done so in the kindest possible spirit. The noble and gallant Earl says I at one time considered his letter calm and temperate. I undoubtedly did consider that letter calm and temperate, and I do so still. The noble and gallant Earl has made use of a private opinion which I expressed, and that opinion I have not altered; but did I not, when I expressed that opinion, accompany it by an expression of my belief that it was of such a character that, if it came before the public in any way whatever, it could not fail to be detrimental to the public service, and that on no account ought it to be published? A complaint has been made that the recall of the noble and gallant Earl was not accompanied with any expressions of sympathy. I can only say, that if the noble and gallant Earl's feelings were hurt by the mode of communication, I have to regret that such expressions of sympathy were not employed; but, at the same time, I think it will be admitted that expressions of sympathy in official despatches like these are rather out of place. Opposed as I am to the noble and gallant Earl, I must say that I never felt anything more personally painful to me than the duty of recalling him from the Crimea; but I was compelled to discharge that duty by a sense of what I owed to the service and the country. Though I do not complain of the course which has now been taken by the noble and gallant Earl, I must say I have listened to this discussion with the greatest regret, because I do not believe it is one upon which the House can with propriety enter, and because it cannot in any way conduce to the public interests.
THE EARL OF HARDWICKEdeprecated the doctrine of the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle), that the privilege of the House should not be availed of by noble Lords, what the question at issue was a justification of the personal and professional character of a Member. He thought, on the contrary, it was a great

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advantage that a Peer should have the opportunity, under such circmstances, of proving himself worthy to sit in that House. So far, therefore, from the noble and gallant Earl being wrong, he (the Earl of Hardwicke) thought he was perfectly right in vindicating his character; for no place was so proper to do so as that House. He (the Earl of Hardwicke) did not understand the sudden squeamishness that had been exhibited on that point. The same course was constantly taken in the other House of Parliament; and the country had just seen a gallant naval officer, who, not being himself in Parliament, had procured a friend to bring his character and conduct under the investigation of the House of Commons. Of course no light cases should be brought before Parliament, but when the case involved the honour and the fitness of a man who held a high command in the fleets or army of the Crown—when the professional character of that man was traduced, and when he was refused vindication elsewhere, then Parliament was the fitting and proper place to appeal to for justice.
THE MARQUESS OF BREADALBANEthought the noble Earl took quite a mistaken view of the privileges of their Lordships' House, which were only given them for useful public purposes. When a Peer became an officer in the army or navy he was as much amenable to military law as the meanest private in that service, and to take advantage of his privilege to bring before that House questions which ought only to be submitted to the military or naval authorities, or to be decided on according to military law and usage, was not, he thought, a use of those privileges which would tend to the public advantage.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: It is not my intention to make any reply upon the general question; but I will make a reply to the noble Duke. The noble Duke has made a charge against me of betraying confidence, by referring to some private letter.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: I have made no such charge.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: Pardon me, but I heard you.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: I did not say so. I said the noble Earl had asked a question whether I had not expressed my opinion that his letter was calm and temperate. I said I had expressed that opinion, and I adhered to it; but that, as he had quoted my opinion, I
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would ask him a question whether I did not also express another opinion as to the publication of that letter.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My answer is, that the noble Duke expressed no other opinion. If the correspondence can be termed private, it is not private by my seeking. I made no private communication to the noble Duke. The noble Duke thought right to make me a private communication. I made a reply, not private again. If I recollect rightly what was written by the noble Duke was simply this: A gentleman called on my behalf on the noble Duke, and asked him when it was his intention to publish my letter of the 30th of November—a letter, which, as I have stated, was written by agreement, with and by consent of Lord Raglan; and the noble Duke, in writing to me, expressed his hope that the letter would not be published, and gave his reasons for it; but, if I mistake not, he told this gentleman that I should not publish this letter until my conduct was attacked before the public, and that when I was attacked it would be my duty to publish it.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: It is necessary I should enter now into further explanations with reference to this private communication, which the noble Earl says was none of his seeking. I say it was none of my seeking; but it does happen, very unfortunately, that the witness between us is no more. It so happened that the noble Earl and myself employed the same private solicitor; and while I held the office of Secretary for the War Department that gentleman called upon me and produced the letter, dated the 30th of November, some ten days before I received it from Lord Raglan. He desired me to read it. I asked Mr. Parkinson for what purpose he produced the letter to me, and I told him it placed me in a very difficult position. Mr. Parkinson then said he had been authorised, as the legal adviser of Lord Lucan, to publish the letter in The Times newspaper, and he felt that was not a wise or proper course to pursue; but, at the same time, he was placed in difficult circumstances—he was in the habit of endeavouring to act as the friend as well as the legal adviser of his clients, and he came to ask me what I thought of the matter. My answer was, "It is out of my power to give you any advice; if I were a private individual, being one of your clients, and on terms of friendly re-

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lationship, both with yourself and Lord Lucan, I should have no objection, but I must decline to give any advice in the position in which I stand." Mr. Parkinson said Lord Lucan had desired him to ask me whether I had received that letter from Lord Raglan? I had no hesitation in saying I had received no such letter. He asked if I were likely to receive it soon; I said I was utterly unable to say, as I had no information of the existence of any such letter. Mr. Parkinson said, under the circumstances he would wait until the next mail. I said he would do very wisely, and, as far as that, I would give my opinion. Partly owing to the circumstances which have been explained this evening, and partly because two mails in succession missed, and three mails all arrived together, it was a long while before the letter from Lord Raglan, which was in the first mail, came to hand. At the last moment before it arrived Mr. Parkinson came to me about the publication of the letter, which he said he would not publish, and I certainly now regret that I went a point beyond my duty in saying to Mr. Parkinson I would endeavour to hold him harmless with Lord Lucan. I said to him, "I think you have acted most wisely as the friend of Lord Lucan; and, under the circumstances, I will comply with your request, and write a private letter to Lord Lucan, telling him I entirely concur in the course you have taken." That letter was written in great haste, and, to the best of my belief, I have no copy of it; but I have no objection whatever to the noble Earl producing it. It was in that letter I used the expression which the gallant Earl has quoted, that his letter was in itself calm and temperate; but I went on to state generally, that any military man acting under a Commander in Chief placed himself in an improper position by volunteering a controversy with him of that description. I do not pretend to give the words, but I am sure I give the general substance and purport of that letter. It contained a simple opinion that Mr. Parkinson had acted properly; secondly, that I considered the noble Earl's letter calm and temperate; and thirdly, though it will not bear the construction put upon it by the noble Earl, that to publish the letter before he was attacked would be acting imprudently and improperly.
Motion agreed to; and Ordered accordingly.
House adjourned till To-morrow.