HL Deb 12 March 1855 vol 137 cc384-406
EARL GRANVILLE,

in moving the second reading of this Bill, said, the necessity for it had arisen in consequence of the separation which had taken place between the War and the Colonial Departments. Its object was to remove the illegality of three Secretaries of State and Under Secretaries sitting in the House of Commons at the same time.

Moved. That the Bill be now read 2a.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH

said, that of course he should not object to the Bill, inasmuch as he had himself, on the separation of the offices, suggested that it would be necessary to pass a Bill to this effect.

EARL GREY

My Lords, I understand that this Bill has been rendered necessary by the recent consolidation of the old War Office and the new department of the Secretary of State for War. Although I cannot say I do not entertain serious doubts whether, even as a temporary measure, that was, as a whole, the best measure which could have been adopted—although it falls extremely short of that general reform of the military departments which I am convinced is necessary, and the urgent necessity of which is more and more proved by every day's experience, and by the new disclosures of mismanagement which have taken place; and although this measure cannot, therefore, be accepted as effecting all the necessary general improvements in the military departments, still I feel that it is not proposed with that view by the Government. Shortly after the appointment of my noble Friend the Secretary of State for War (Lord Panmure) to his present office, he said, among other things, that the attention of Her Majesty's Government should be called to the subject of the constitution of the military departments. He promised that he would bring forward a measure to consolidate under one Minister, at all events, the civil business of the army; but at the same time he said that he could not turn his attention to this subject until he had given it to the more pressing one of providing for the immediate wants of the army in the Crimea, and of applying remedies to the evils that had arisen; and I thought that this was most fair on the part of my noble Friend; and, as the subject was one requiring great consideration, it would have been very improper to have pressed him to bring forward with any undue haste a measure of such importance. Although, however, I am of opinion that even in the first attempts something more than the measure before your Lordships might have been adopted and accomplished without much difficulty, still I have no fault to find with my noble Friend, and will wait with patience for the larger measure that he has promised, and which I have no doubt in due time he will propose to this House, if it should be one requiring Parliamentary interference, or, if it should not, will advise Her Majesty of Her own accord to adopt.

I wish, however, to take the present opportunity of calling your Lordships' attention to this—If it is acknowledged by Her Majesty's Government that the present constitution of the military departments is unsatisfactory, and that they, as they have stated, intend at an early period to bring forward some plan to place these departments on a more satisfactory footing, then it does appear to me to follow, as a matter of course, that it is highly inexpedient, while these departments continue in their present state, to adopt any measure of a large character, involving a large expenditure, which has not reference to the immediate wants arising from the war. With regard to the war, no one objects to Her Majesty's Government, though the departments are imperfectly constituted, proposing without a moment's delay whatever measures may be necessary for the war; but when they bring forward plans of an extensive character and involving a heavy expenditure—plans which are not to take effect during the present war, but which have reference to the permanent wants of the country—then the case appears to me to be greatly altered; and with regard to such a plan I cannot help saying that a large expenditure of this kind, in the present state of the military departments, ought to be avoided. It is on this ground that I have felt sonic alarm at some of the Votes proposed in the Ordnance Estimates which have been laid before the other House, and that alarm has been increased by the manner in which I am informed these Votes have been explained. I find that it is proposed to take a Vote of 1,000,000l. for new works at home in the course of the present year, and this Vote is in addition to a Vote of 560,000l. granted for the same purpose last year—so that in two years these Votes amount to nearly 1,600,000l. My Lords, this appears to me to be a large sum, especially as it does not represent the whole of the expenditure for this purpose, because a considerable number of the works to be undertaken will not be finished during the present year and with the present grants, but the large grants now taken are only for the purpose of commencing them; and in future years large grants will have to be made, or the money now granted will probably have been thrown away. The subject, therefore, is one of considerable importance. We are told that these Votes are taken with a view to a permanent system of defence; they are not for providing against any particular danger in any one year rather than another, but to enable the country to maintain its proper position of defence. Therefore I say they come within the description of works which, in my opinion, it is inexpedient at the present moment to proceed with. It appears that the main bulk of these works consist of new barracks and fortifications. It has been explained that it is intended to put an end in a great measure to the system of dividing the troops into small bodies, and to build barracks at particular places capable of containing large numbers. I entirely approve this alteration; it is one I have long thought ought to be adopted; for I know that it is injurious to the army to employ the troops as police, and that the division of them into comparatively small detachments in the manufacturing districts prevents them from being brought under that discipline which is necessary—for it is impossible in these busy hives of industry to obtain ground sufficient for the purpose of military instruction; in many parts, I believe, places cannot be obtained where ball practice can be carried on without taking the troops to a considerable distance, and there are many other inconveniences. Besides, I think that, in point of policy, it is inexpedient to confide the preservation of the peace to the troops—that it should be entirely confided to the police. We know that in this city since the establishment of the metropolitan police, some twenty-eight years ago, though we have gone through times of no ordinary agitation, yet we may congratulate ourselves that in no one instance has it been necessary to employ the troops, though in former times this necessity was continually recurring. The troops may in one or two instances have been kept in readiness to support the police; but they have never been employed. The duty of maintaining the peace having been satisfactorily performed in this city by the police, I think that other great towns and counties may reasonably be expected to perform similar duties for themselves, and that the troops ought only to be kept in situations where, in cases of serious disturbances, they might be brought forward to support the police; and, with the facilities afforded by railroads, this can be done without interfering with the concentration of the troops. I have stated thus much to show that I should be the last to make objections to the principle of these alterations; but I say that at this moment it is not necessary that measures of this kind should be brought forward. In the first place, these new barracks cannot be finish- ed in time to be serviceable for the present war, unless, unfortunately, it continues longer than I think it likely. The Estimates, moreover, contain a vote for the erection of barracks, capable of holding 50,000 men. Now, considering how large a proportion of the army is abroad, and that the real want of barracks is chiefly confined to those troops getting ready to be employed abroad, I cannot help thinking that, in addition to the existing, temporary barracks capable of holding so large a number of men will meet the exigency of the present case. The other object of the Votes to which I have alluded is that of the fortification of our principal ports. Though this is a matter most proper to be attended to, it is most desirable to prevent the infliction of any serious blow on our ports by small expeditions; but if ever there was a time when such an attack was the least to be apprehended, it certainly is the present; because we are now acting in strict alliance with one of the great maritime Powers of Europe; and with respect to the other, Russia, with which we are at war, we have ample means of defending ourselves from any attack by her inferior forces. There is, therefore, no immediate necessity for additional fortifications; and in case of such works of defence being required, earthworks can be thrown up with great rapidity, for we know to our cost that even after our troops had sat down before Sebastopol, the Russians had succeeded in throwing up earthworks which have foiled all our endeavours, and I believe that at this moment Sebastopol is stronger than when the siege operations commenced. I blush to say that Russia has shown a superiority to ourselves in many points of military organisation; and with all our improvements in arms and boasted progress of civilisation, I cannot help thinking that we have reason to blush at the way in which we have in many points been exceeded by a comparatively barbarous nation. At all events I am fully persuaded that in the erection of fortifications and earthworks, when the exigency arises, we shall not be found inferior to Russia, and that not many days—I believe I might say not many hours—would be required to render any one of our great ports safe from any attack that might be contemplated against it. I am persuaded that if need should arise, the heads which contrived and the hands which executed our great system of railways, if they were employed for such a purpose, would not be long in creating earthworks for the defence of our maritime cities to which the earthworks of Sebastopol would be but a joke. I say, then, that these works are not urgently necessary; and not being so, the argument I wish to submit to your Lordships is, that it would be injudicious to proceed with them during the present war. When the attention of the Government and of their officers is necessarily absorbed in the prosecution of the great contest in which we are now engaged, it stands to reason that it is quite impossible that a great plan for re-distributing our troops during peace, and for fortifying our coasts, can be considered at the present moment with the deliberation and care that are demanded; and remember that mature deliberation is required before such a plan as this, involving a large outlay of public money, is carried into effect. Many questions have to be settled, not only as to the most convenient position in which to establish your troops, but also as to the best manner of providing accommodation for them; and so likewise with regard to your fortifications. The experience of the present war is sufficient to show, that in spending large sums upon fortifications, it is not safe to blindly follow the beaten track, without inquiring what alteration may be requisite in the former system as the result of the progress of modern science and invention. Well, even if these subjects were to be considered by an authority in which there was every reason to place implicit confidence, it is not in time of war that they can be satisfactorily dealt with. But the authorities by whom such plans would have to be considered are such as I do not conceive to be entitled to that confidence. The Government have determined to remodel the civil departments of the army. They have done this under the pressure of the general opinion—an opinion unanimously entertained, I believe, from one end of the country to the other—that under the existing organisation of those departments our military affairs have not been well conducted, and that there has been a want of judgment shown before the war in applying the money voted by Parliament for keeping up the services of the country against the outbreak of hostilities, and also since the war in the appropriation of the larger grants that have been recently made. I believe it is likewise acknowledged that no small proportion of this mismanagement, which I may say is justly attributed to our military departments, is more particularly due to the Ordnance Department. I have no hesitation in saying, from what I know of the manner in which that department has been conducted, under every successive Administration since the peace to the present period, that the impression which prevails on this point is entirely well founded. The manner in which the enormous grants, made during the last forty years for fortifications and for barracks, have been expended gives the utmost ground for distrust. Take the case of fortifications. It would ill become me, a non-professional man, to express a decided opinion on the works of this kind which have been undertaken; but this I know, that as to the works that have been devised for our defence at home I find a very general concurrence of belief among those who are most capable of forming an opinion on such a subject, and on whose judgment I place the greatest reliance, that these works have been injudiciously planned and expensively executed. It is well known that they are objects of derision to all foreign professional men; and in some cases mistakes have been pointed out which a nonprofessional man, though he might not, perhaps, at first discover them, could hardly fail to see, when his attention is once called to them, are very manifest defects. I will mention one instance. Some time ago, I was examining one of the new batteries that have been constructed at Plymouth, which has been erected at considerable cost, and which seemed to me extremely formidable. I was told that it certainly looked very well, but that a foreign engineer who saw it had expressed the opinion that it was "a regular shell-trap"—that the battery was placed at the foot of a high perpendicular precipice, and so situated that every shot and shell fired at it, and missing the men, if it struck the rock behind them, must infallibly bring down large fragments of it upon them, and in a few minutes kill every artillery man at the guns. Such was the opinion of a very eminent foreign engineer as to this fortification, and certainly when I heard the remark it appeared to me to be very well founded. This battery has been erected, I believe, within a very few years, and in many others of our recent works of defence similar errors may be detected. Then as to barracks, with regard to which a non-professional man may form a judgment with more confidence than he can respecting fortifications; from the little that I know about buildings I must say I cannot resist the conclusion that the barracks which have been provided for the English army by the Board of Ordnance have been injudiciously contrived in point of accommodation, and enormously costly in proportion to the extent of accommodation they afford. Even in the present Estimates there is good reason to believe that the same thing is the case. The Cambridge barracks, I believe, are estimated to cost somewhat more than 18,600l., and are intended to accommodate 500 men and forty-four officers, or altogether 544 persons. This gives a cost of about 70l. per head. Now, a cottage—not, indeed, of the first class, but with two or three very comfortable rooms—may be built for less than 70l.; and two rooms in a cottage of that kind, I am sure, would furnish better accommodation for five or six men than you will give to every one of your soldiers at this extravagant rate. Again, the amount which I have named is only the estimated expense of these barracks, and your Lordships may be aware that there is very seldom a case in which the original estimate is not exceeded by the actual cost.

LORD LYNDHURST

called the noble Earl's attention to an error that he had made in his calculation of the cost per head of the barracks in question. It would not amount to more than 30l., instead of 70l.

EARL GREY

I beg pardon; I have given your Lordships the wrong figure. 37,000l. is the estimated cost of these barracks, making, in fact, just 71l. per man. The item of 18,600l. is the cost of providing barrack accommodation for forty-five officers, or at the rate of upwards of 400l. for each. Another item in the same Estimates is 1,200l. for finding barrack accommodation for a field-officer at Shoeburyness. Why, a good farm-house for the accommodation of a farmer and his family can be built for 800l., but in this instance 50 per cent more than that sum is to be spent in erecting quarters for a single field-officer. These remarks occur to me on the most cursory inspection of these Estimates, but I rely more upon the notorious fact, which I never found a single officer in the army who did not confirm—namely, that the barrack accommodation provided for our troops by the Ordnance Department is both indifferent in kind and exceedingly costly. That being so, is it expedient that you should incur this heavy outlay before it can be fully considered by authorities on whom perfect reliance can be placed? Observe this is an expense not necessary for temporary purposes, but is part of a large plan for the permanent benefit of the country; and what I ask you to do is to suspend its execution until it can be maturely weighed at a more convenient moment and by a more competent authority. If the Ordnance Department were to continue in the state in which it has hitherto stood, it would be objectionable to proceed with such a scheme as this; but just look at the time at which it is proposed to carry it out. Why, you have practically no Master General of the Ordnance at present. I am told that the Secretary of State for the War Department means to contrive some plan by which all the strictly civil business shall be brought immediately under his own cognisance and control. But who is responsible for these Estimates? Of course, my noble Friend the Minister of War cannot be, for they were framed before he took office, and, with the multitude of more urgent matters which have claimed his attention, it is impossible for him to have given proper consideration to them. So far as I can see, the only person responsible is the Clerk of the Ordnance, and, with all possible respect for the Gentleman who now fills that office, I must say that so large an expenditure ought not to be undertaken until some one of the higher and more responsible servants of the Crown is enabled to state to Parliament that he has satisfied himself that the plan which we are now about to commence is a judicious one, and that he can with confidence recommend to Parliament the expenditure required. The fact that there is no such person at present responsible for this expenditure is one reason against its being incurred; but, in addition to that, surely the war in which we are at present engaged is of itself a sufficient load, without adding to its pressure by commencing arrangements which are not needed for the war. I am informed, according to the best calculations which can be made by persons whom I believe to be able to form a good opinion from the documents now accessible to the public, that it will be necessary in the present year, either by new taxes or by a loan, to raise, in addition to the revenue which is raised under existing taxation, a sum of not less than from 15,000,000l. to 20,000,000l. If this be so—if the necessary charges of the war are to be so heavy—it is very desirable not to augment them. Be it observed, moreover, that you cannot withdraw from the labour and capital embarked in the productive industry of the country without diminishing the reuenue of the country, and sooner or later every class in the community must suffer from such a diminution. Every unnecessary work that you undertake now increases the competition of the Government with the farmer and manufacturer in the market for money and labour. If, indeed, the wants of the country are so great as we are led to believe, you will not be able to meet them without having recourse to a loan. Sooner or later, in some shape or other, you will have to borrow money. You did so last year, though you denied the fact; and probably you will have to do it again to a much larger extent to meet the expenses of this year. It is proverbial in private life, and I believe it is quite as true with regard to public matters, that borrowed money is always the most extravagantly expended. So will it be now. If these plans are commenced in the present state of excitement they will not be properly considered, your money will be ill-spent, and very likely for objects which you will find out by and by are entirely useless. I must say that the Estimates laid before Parliament bear marks of what I cannot help regarding as nothing but reckless extravagance. I do not grudge anything that is necessary for the effective conduct of the war; but so far as I can judge from all the information which is accessible to me, I feel persuaded that, in addition to what is necessary and useful, the country is at the present moment throwing away money by thousands and hundreds of thousands from want of due consideration and care in the manner of applying it. I deeply regret to see such traces of extravagance in the proceedings of the Executive Government; and I more deeply regret not to see that extravagance checked in that quarter where, by the constitution, a check ought to be applied. On the contrary, I firmly believe that the more wild and the more extravagant the votes of money proposed by the Government, the more popular they would be at the present moment with the House of Commons and the country; and I regret that Her Majesty's Government have availed themselves of that disposition to propose Votes which under present circumstances would have been much more fittingly postponed. We are told upon very high authority that it has been the mistake of the Government and the Parliament of this country to have acted with regard to these matters rather by fits and starts than upon any settled policy, and in particular it has been pointed out, that at the end of the last war the country very foolishly sold for a very inadequate sum a large number of barracks which had been built during the war. I perfectly concur in that accusation. I believe that it has been the fault of the Government to have acted rather too much in matters of this kind without any settled policy, and it is upon that account that I object to the extravagance which is now about to be recommenced, because I know that it is sure to be followed by a reaction in the opposite direction. That is exactly what happened during the last war. Those barracks which I have mentioned were sold because enormous sums had been spent in so lavish and improvident a manner during the war that the country was disgusted, and at its termination rushed hastily into precipitate measures for injudicious economy. Something of the same sort will occur again. I have been long enough in Parliament to have noticed that hot and cold fits succeed each other upon these subjects. I have seen some of each, and I am confident that the more rein you now give to extravagance, the more certain it is that Parliament will in turn run into the opposite fault, and be guilty of undue parsimony. It is because I wish to see the establishments of the country kept up, as they ought to be, to a proper state of efficiency during peace as well as during war—it is upon this ground that I so strongly deprecate what appears to me that reckless extravagance which is now being indulged in. I do earnestly hope, though the House of Commons has already voted the money, that my noble Friend (Lord Panmure), who is not responsible for these Estimates, will take care that no expenditure is incurred without the utmost consideration; and I cannot help giving him this piece of counsel—that in applying for assistance and advice he will not confine himself to the narrow field of a seniority corps. Let not the only authorities whom my noble Friend consults be the engineer officers—men promoted by seniority alone, and wedded too much, I am afraid, to routine; but let him go to those men whose talents have raised them to distinction in civil life. After all, the same principles of physical science apply to fortifications and to railroads; and it is a profound knowledge and a successful application of these principles that have enabled our Stephensons and Brunels to fill this country with those great works which will be the wonder of succeeding ages. From such men as these, and from our great builders, my noble Friend will get far more trustworthy opinions than he could obtain within the narrow limits of a seniority service. I hope I need not apologise to your Lordships for having taken this opportunity for submitting these matters to your consideration; but I felt that the discussion upon a Bill involving so many changes and so many new arrangements, occasioned by the war in which we are at present engaged, was not an unfitting season for the remarks which I had to make.

LORD PANMURE

My Lords, my noble Friend need have made no apology for having addressed your Lordships with so much ability on these subjects to which he has called your attention. I have listened to his address with the interest with which I always listen to everything that falls from my noble Friend, and more especially because I believe there is no individual in this House, or in the other House of Parliament, who has for so many years, with so much zeal and assiduity, turned his attention to the matters which formed the subject of his speech. My Lords, with respect to the matter now immediately under consideration, I understand that my noble Friend does not question the principle on which it is founded; and with regard to the principal part of the speech of my noble Friend, it will be answered in one short piece of information which I am enabled to give him—namely, that with reference to the construction of either new barracks or of new works, all that can be suspended, until I can lay before your Lordships' House a plan for reorganising these departments, has been ordered to be suspended. I think, my Lords, it would have been somewhat rash to have done otherwise—and in this point I quite agree with the views of my noble Friend—that it would have been rash with the establishments and with the system which all have condemned, and which Government is about to reform, to rush into the expenditure of the vast sums voted by the House of Commons on principles which might admit of considerable condemnation. With respect to some of the points on which my noble Friend has touched, I cannot say that I altogether concur in his views. My noble Friend has condemned the plans of some of these works on the ground that this is not the time at which they should be undertaken. My Lords, the first to which he drew attention were the fortifications which are about to be erected for the defence of some of our considerable ports. Now, my Lords, I cannot agree with my noble Friend that this is not the time to undertake these works. I must say, if I yielded to that argument, I should inevitably be told, when the emergency should arise, that it was too late to think of them then. My Lords, I think this is the time to engage in useful works of defence, to take advantage of the willing disposition of the country to carry out works in this direction; for, as my noble Friend observes, I am well aware that the time will come when there will be a reaction, and when, consequently, however desirable it may be to erect these defences, and however much my noble Friend may then concur in the propriety of erecting them, we shall be refused the money by Parliament, and it will no longer be in our power to construct them. I consider that, so far as these fortifications go, we are moving in the right direction; and I quite agree that it will rest upon any Government who undertakes these works of defence to be responsible for their being erected in the most approved manner, according to the newest and most approved principles of fortification, by the best and most competent persons, and with the utmost economy that may be consistent with rendering them effectual for their purpose. Then, my Lords, with reference to barracks, my noble Friend states that the principle of collecting troops in large barracks, instead of scattering them up and down the country in small bodies, is one which he advocates. I entirely approve of that principle also; and I believe that if steps which have been now taken to erect barracks of this description at Aldershot had been taken ten or fifteen years ago we should not now have had to complain of the inadequacy of our troops to undertake a campaign, or of the little acquaintance which they appear to have with the habits and duties of a camp. It seems a large sum. About 250,000l. is about to be expended on the barracks at Aldershot for 10,000 men; but when my noble Friend says that we are to rely entirely on the authority of the Clerk of the Ordnance for the plans of these barracks, I beg to say that I have inquired as to the manner in which these plans have been made, and I find that an engineer officer of very considerable eminence and reputation was intrusted with a mission to Belgium to inspect the large barracks erected at Beverloo, which I believe is the most complete establishment of the kind in Europe, and, before the plans for the barracks at Aldershot were adopted, to see all that had been done there, to mark all that existed there, and, by the information which he was thus enabled to gather, to frame the plans for the barracks at Aldershot. Now, my Lords, what is the object for which these barracks are proposed to be erected? It is to assemble a force of 10,000 men at one particular point, at which point opportunities would be afforded for exercising a body of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, in all the evolutions of field exercise; for encamping men by turns, and seeing that they learn the duties and habits of a campaign; and so giving to these large bodies of troops during the time of peace or of war the preparation such as they can receive at home for the practice of war abroad. This is a step which may be adopted in this country without any one being able to charge the Government which adopts it with the intention of fostering, during times of peace, a force unnecessarily large for the wants and necessities of the country. I think, however, that the race of economy, which has been run by all Governments one after the other since the peace was proclaimed, has somewhat reduced us to the state in which we are now in, so that although we had an army with a regimental system admirably well conducted, we had no army in which the duties of the staff were known to the officers, or the duties of command known to the generals. These, my Lords, are faults which will be remedied by the sad experience of the war to a great extent, but they are faults which must not be allowed to occur again. The establishment of this camp at Aldershott, with ample ground for exercise, is one of the means by which the recurrence of these evils is sought to be avoided. Now, my Lords, with reference to the expenditure sought to be bestowed on these barracks, I can only say that on considering the subject I entirely agree with the views of my noble Friend in going beyond the limited experience of officers of the engineers and of calling in aid the skill of those great contractors and of those men who have rendered themselves famous in erecting the great buildings which are arising around us every day. I cannot see myself why these barracks, any more than any other buildings, should not be built by other than military masons; and I have yet to learn that it is more economical or more wise to employ a corps of military bricklayers and labourers merely for the purpose of doing that which the people of the country could do infinitely better and have much more experience in doing. I wish to say one word upon the subject of the reforms which it is intended to introduce into the Ordnance Department. It is not my intention to go into the subject at the present time; but what I wish to state is, that while I have given orders that no new works shall be commenced under the present system which can possibly be avoided, so I have endeavoured, as far as I can, to be in a position of bringing before you, not many days hence, the manner in which I propose to alter the organisation of the civil departments of the army. I propose, as I stated on a former occasion, to unite all the civil departments of the army under the superintendence and management of the Department of War, and I trust to lay before your Lordships a scheme effectual for that purpose, though, perhaps, it may not go in other respects quite so far as my noble Friend may think it ought. Now, my Lords, with reference to the temporary barracks which are being erected throughout the country, I did not gather from my noble Friend that he threw out any great objection against them. Hut barracks can be erected at the rate of 6,000l. for 1,000 men—or at the rate of 6l. a man—and the reason why hut barracks are immediately resorted to arises, not from the necessity of quartering the army in this country, for that purpose we have more barracks than we require; but because, as my noble Friend must recollect, we have a large force of militia embodied. It is quite true that we have legal means of quartering them. We may quarter them in billets; but I think no one can point out a more unpopular Act, or, I may say, one more oppressive on the part of a Government, than that of quartering by billets so large a force on the inhabitants of the country. The object of the Government is to relieve the people of this country as much as possible from the oppressive system of billeting. At this moment there are in Great Britain 44,000 militia embodied, of whom 10,000 are in barracks and 34,000 are actually in quarters. It is for the purpose of taking these men out of quarters that these hut barracks are being rapidly run up; and I believe they are not only being run up, but run up in such condition that if proper care be taken of them they will last for several years, and if they be not required they may be disposed of in the market when they are vacant, at an advantage to the public. I have alluded to that point of my noble Friend's speech because I wished to assure the public of this country, on the one hand, that the billeting system I should, as speedily as possible; be got rid of; and because I wished, on the other hand, to assure the commanding officers of militia, who, I know, are as deeply interested in the discipline and in the moral condition of their men as any officers of any regiments can be, that the men under their charge will speedily be released from that position in which no soldier can be bound to his regiment—namely, the position of being in billets, where no discipline nor any kind of control can be enforced. I think we were indebted to my noble Friend for having brought this subject before your Lordships' House. I shall not follow him into that part of the question in which he discussed the actual condition of the country. I have ample reasons for refraining from doing so; but otherwise I think we are under obligation to my noble Friend for having drawn public attention to the matter.

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY

said, he did not rise to continue the discussion on the wisdom of the policy pursued by the Government in the erection of barracks and fortifications; but upon that matter he should say, before proceeding to make some observations upon the Bill actually before them, that he entirely agreed with Her Majesty's Government in their views of the wisdom of erecting barracks at Aldershot on a large scale, and of providing every other convenience for the troops; because it was not sufficient to spend money merely in the enlistment and drilling of soldiers; if they did not give their troops every opportunity of being brigaded and disciplined as a perfect army, it was of no use enlisting them at all. It was, therefore, with great pleasure, that he had heard the announcement of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. But the Bill before the House had nothing whatever to do with that matter. It appeared to him that the first object of Her Majesty's Government in bringing forward the Bill now before them was to consult the public convenience as much as possible in the conducting of the public service in both Houses of Parliament, and to arrange so that the business of the country should be carried on in both Houses as clearly and succinctly as could be done, and with as little reference of questions from one Member of the Government to another, and from one department to another, as possible. Now, believing that to be the object of Government, and believing it to be also their Lordships' wish that such an object should be carried into effect, he begged the attention of their Lordships for a few moments, while he called it to the mistakes that had been made in the arrangement of offices under the present Government as respected that matter. In the first place, the different departments of the State were not represented in their Lordships' House in the manner in which he should wish to see them represented. For example, the departments that were represented in that House were the Foreign Office, which was doubly represented by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Clarendon) and by another noble Lord (Lord Wodehouse); the Board of Trade was represented by his noble Friend opposite (Lord Stanley of Alderley), who had been in that department some years, and who was of course competent to answer any question and make any explanation that might be demanded of him. The Post Office was also represented in their Lordships' House, and the War Department was in the hands of the noble Lord who had just sat down, his office forming a new Secretaryship of State. But there were other departments which were not represented in that House, equally important as any of the others, and equally deserving of being represented—he meant personally represented—in their Lordships' House. The Treasury had no one to represent it there, the Home Office had no one, the Colonial Office no one, the India Board no one, the Woods and Forests no one, and the Admiralty no one. Under the late Government their Lordships had the Prime Minister in their House, and as he, in fact, represented all the departments of the State, and was, or was supposed to be, cognisant of what was going forward in all of them, their Lordships might, perhaps, have been satisfied. But under the new Government the case was different. It seemed to him to be considered a mere matter of convenience, entirely for the consideration of Ministers, whether the Colonial Office should be represented there or not; and indeed, from the reply given the other night in answer to a question on this subject, it would seem that the office was at present entirely in abeyance; and he must say, he was quite astonished when, on a late occasion, the noble Lord the President of the Council stated, as a satisfactory reply to the inquiries of their Lordships, that Lord John Russell would return from Vienna as soon as he had laid, down the grounds of a negotiation. He should have thought that the groundwork of a great negotiation was not a work that could not be intrusted to the hands of an Ambassador, but must, indeed, be confided to the care of a special Plenipotentiary. That was not the way in which great negotiations were carried out in 1797 or in 1801. The work of a special English Ambassador was not the mere laying of the groundwork of a negotiation; that was laid in London at the Foreign Office, and the real business of the Plenipotentiary was the arrangement of the details of the negotiation, which could not be arranged at home. He must, therefore, say, in passing, that the reason given by the noble Earl was very unsatisfactory. He thought it was fair at all times in their Lordships' House to make a comparison between past Governments and the Government of the day. In fact, that was the only way in which the country could judge of the respective merits of the two Governments, by comparing the acts of the ceased with those of the existing Government. He begged, therefore, to draw their Lordships' attention to the way in which his noble Friend behind him (the Earl of Derby) attempted to consult the public convenience in the arrangement of offices during the time he held the office of First Lord of the Treasury. In 1852, when his noble Friend was Prime Minister, he (the Earl of Derby) represented the Treasury in their Lordships' House. The Foreign Office was there represented by a Secretary of State, the Colonial Office was represented by an Under Secretary, the Admiralty was represented by the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Duke of Northumberland); the Board of Trade was represented by the Vice President of that Board. The Post Office had its representative there, and the President of the Council was also in the House. Now, he was sure that no man could exhibit more clearness or give more satisfaction in answering questions than his noble Friend the present President of the Council; but he thought that noble Earl was taxing his energies almost beyond the power of any man, if, not being Prime Minister himself, and therefore not being personally cognisant of the affairs that were passing through the different departments and their details, he took upon himself to reply to all questions of business and detail respecting so many departments—for example, to reply to all questions respecting the Treasury, the Home Office, the Colonial Office, the India Board, the Post Office, and the Admiralty.

Now, a noble Friend of his said the other night that there were two ways of despatching public business. The one way was that of reading all despatches carefully from beginning to end, and the other was that of reading the covering despatches but throwing aside the inclosures. There were also various ways of meeting the questions that were asked in their Lordships' House. One way was to refuse any answer at all. That way of meeting a question was a very favourite one with the noble Earl who was lately Prime Minister of the country. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) would leave it to their Lordships to say whether it was a satisfactory one. Another way was to make the answer a spartan answer, as short and concise as possible, leaving out all the information asked for. A third way was to throw so much confusion into the answer as to leave the questioner a great deal more perplexed than before he asked the question. He did not know which of these different methods the noble Lord the President of the Council proposed to himself to adopt and follow; but if he was ready to give their Lordships a full and ample explanation on all those points on which their Lordships were not fully informed, and if he was to enter into all the details of the subjects to which his attention might be called in a manner and with a fulness proportioned to the importance of those subjects, with all his (the Earl of Malmesbury's) opinion of the noble Earl's abilities and talents, he thought he must be possessed of superhuman power if their Lordships found at the end of the Session that they had had much information communicated to them.

EARL FITZWILLIAM

said, he did not know in which way he was to be answered, but there was one point on which it was very desirable their Lordships should have some clear and definite idea. He wished to know whether it was the intention of the Government, at the end of the war, to give to this country during the ensuing peace, a character more military than that which it had borne during the last peace? He had heard observations made as if it were the opinion of some men of great authority in England that the successive Governments which had governed the country during the late peace of forty years had been guilty of great errors in reducing the national military establishments. From that opinion he entirely dissented. He believed that the reason why we were now capable of carrying on war (even though we had not carried it on so successfully as could have been wished) was because we had during that long period of peace husbanded the resources of the country, and had drawn them out and expended and employed them to the greatest possible advantage. His belief was that if during the last forty years, instead of maintaining, in round numbers an army of 100,000 men, we had maintained an army of 200,000 men, we should have been far less capable of conducting the existing war than we were under existing circumstances. He should therefore deeply regret if there were any opinion lurking in the minds of his noble Friends that it was desirable during peace to maintain larger establishments than those which they had maintained during the peace that was now past. He was desirous of making these few observations, because it appeared to him that it was desirable they should not adopt erroneous views upon that subject, and erroneous he was sure those views would be, if they contemplated the possibility, or the desirability rather, of making this country more military in its character than it had been during the late period of peace, and aping the establishments of the great military Powers of the Continent. That idea was, he was aware, foreign to the mind of one noble Friend of his, a Member of Her Majesty's Government, and he trusted it was also foreign to the minds of that noble Lord's colleagues.

EARL GRANVILLE

said, that without having adopted the silent system, or either of the other systems to which his noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury) had referred, or even that one of which a noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) had afforded a striking example in having, while at the head of the Government, with his own peculiar ability, monopolised nearly every statement and every answer which it was necessary to make in that House on behalf of his Administration—without adopting any of the systems to which his noble Friend had referred, he (Earl Granville) trusted that during the short time he had acted as the representative of the Government, inefficiently as he had performed the duties which devolved upon him, he had never shrunk from giving as clear and full a reply as he could give to every question which had been put to him. With regard to the question which had just been asked by the noble Earl, as to whether it was the intention of the Government at the close of the war to give a more military character to this country than it had before assumed, although he (Earl Gran- ville) was afraid it was somewhat premature at the present moment to consider what was to be done with the army immediately on the conclusion of a peace, yet he thought he was sufficiently well informed of the feelings and opinions of all his colleagues to know that their wish would be not to increase the military establishments of this nation; but by better arrangements to render the army we possessed more efficient for the purposes for which it might be required, at, if possible, a much smaller expense to the nation than under the present system.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH

said, he understood that the intention of the Government was to withdraw the troops from towns in which they were now stationed in small detachments, and to concentrate them in large bodies, in situations where they might be exercised in military manœuvres on an extensive scale, and he thought it was highly expedient for the efficiency of the army that it should be so; but he wished to suggest to Her Majesty's Government that it was absolutely necessary, with a view to the security of the public peace, that as a preliminary to that concentration of the troops in large masses they should establish an efficient, powerful, uniform police throughout the country. A case occurred last year in which a very large manufacturing town would have been exposed to the excesses of a riotous mob if there had not been an opportunity of obtaining immediate military assistance in consequence of the inefficiency of the police force established there; and it was therefore absolutely necessary, before withdrawing the troops from the manufacturing districts, and from those parts of the country in which it was possible—however improbable—that disturbances might occur, and placing them at a very considerable distance from these localities, that they should, either by arrangements with the several bodies which had the power of employing and increasing the police, or—which would, in his opinion, be much better—by some general Act of Parliament, provide for establishing from one end of the country to the other a uniform police force capable of protecting the public peace. As had been correctly stated by the noble Earl opposite, no occasion had occurred in this metropolis since the establishment of the metropolitan police force, when it had been necessary to call in the aid of the military, although certainly on several occasions the military had been prepared to render their assistance to the civil power. He believed that the same good results would accrue throughout the whole country from the formation of a similar force, and that if an efficient system of police were established there would be no necessity for the employment of military force in aid of the civil power throughout the country; but he considered it absolutely necessary that a uniform and efficient police should be established as a preliminary to the proposed measures of the Government. He was not surprised that objections should have been raised to the Bill which was introduced on this subject last year, for a worse measure he thought he had never read; and he could not understand how a noble Lord who was supposed to possess extraordinary administrative abilities could have proposed to Parliament a Bill which, had it passed, would have been utterly inefficient for the purposes for which it was intended—but which did not pass, because it ran directly counter to the prepossessions, prejudices, and feelings of the entire community. He trusted that any new measure that might be proposed on this subject by the noble Lord as First Lord of the Treasury would be both efficient and acceptable to the country.

LORD PANMURE

was understood to say, in case any impression should get abroad that the collecting of men at Aldershot would endanger the peace of large towns, that no troops would be withdrawn from any place where their presence was requisite, and that care would be taken still to afford ample protection to every one of Her Majesty's subjects.

THE EARL OF ELLESMERE

said, he considered that the military establishments had been reduced during the peace to a condition inconsistent with the security of the country. He thought it would have been wise and prudent, perhaps, if the Government had determined at an earlier period upon a measure of which he entirely approved—the establishment of a camp at Aldershot. He spoke upon this subject from some personal experience; for at no distant period, during the Administration of Sir Robert Peel, he felt so strongly the enfeebled condition to which some of our establishments had been reduced, and the state of insecurity in which he conceived the country to be placed, that he had privately, but earnestly suggested to a Minister of the Crown that the Commander in Chief should be enabled to concentrate 10,000 men, properly composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in some convenient place within Her Majesty's dominions, with a view to their exercise in military operations on a somewhat extensive scale. The answer he received confirmed all his previous convictions, and he rejoiced that at last so desirable an object was about to be accomplished.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read 2a accordingly; and committed to a Committee of the whole House To-morrow.

House adjourned till To-morrow.