PUBLIC REVENUE AND CONSOLIDATED FUND CHARGES BILL—

HL Deb 30 June 1854 vol 134 cc931-5

THE MASTERS OF THE COURTS OF COMMON LAW—QUESTION.

LORD CAMPBELL

wished to put a question to his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack upon a subject of some importance. He was informed on very good authority that there was a proposal on the part of the Government, which was to be carried into effect by the Consolidated Fund Charges Bill, that certain officers who were employed in the administra- tion of justice, and who had high judicial functions assigned to them—he meant the —Masters of the Courts of Common Law—instead of having their annual salaries appointed and secured by Act of Parliament, should be placed upon the annual Votes of the House of Commons—that their salaries should be included among those Votes by time Government, and be subject to variations, from time to time, according to the prevailing notion of that House with respect to liberality or economy. Now, so far as the present holders of those offices were concerned—considering the tenure by wince they held their appointments—a clause might as well be introduced into the Bill to deprive their Lordships of the estates which they had inherited from their ancestors; and he could hardly suppose that anything so atrocious—for so he would venture to describe a provision of that kind —could be in contemplation. He was told, however, that it was in contemplation, with respect to all future appointments, that whenever the present incumbents should resign or die, their successors should be placed upon this footing. He thought that this would be a most imprudent course, and entirely opposed to the principles which had Hitherto guided both Houses of Parliament with respect to the payment of judicial officers. It was proposed that these persons, holding judicial offices, should depend on the proposal of the Government, year by year, and on the manner in which that proposal might be received by the House of Commons. These offices were now filled by men of great learning, of great integrity, and of high honour; but he would venture to say that if this arrangement should be carried out, no man, who could earn his daily bread in any other way, would deign to accept them. At present, although the remuneration was extremely moderate, barristers and solicitors of large practice, of great learning, and of great experience, were willing to accept them, because they knew that the remuneration, although small, was certain. But if they could not know but that in the following session of Parliament, instead of receiving 1,000l. a year, their salaries might be reduced to 500l. or 50l., they would not accept office, and it would be impossible to find men of adequate learning or adequate character for the discharge of the important duties which devolved upon them. He was the more snrprised to be told that this was in contemplation, because a noble Friend of his, whom he did not now see in his place (the Marquess of Clanricarde), having put a question the other night with respect to the Irish officers, he had understood his noble and learned Friend to say, that it was not in the contemplation of the Government to touch those officers, because, being in the nature of judicial officers, they ought to have fixed salaries, independent of the Government, and during their incumbencies independent of Parliament. Now, however, they were told that the Masters of the Courts of Common Law in England were to be degraded from their present position of holding their offices at fixed salaries, during good behaviour, to be placed on an entieely new footing, and to be dependent on an annual Vote of the House of Commons. He thought that such a course would be very reprehensible. It might be a very sound principle to proceed on, that the whole of the public revenue should be paid into the Exchequer, and that any expenses or allowances for collecting it should be paid out of the Exchequer; but it had been held by successive Governments that the administration of justice was not a fit subject for taxation, mid that the fees which were now imposed ought to go, and only to go, to pay the expenses of the officers of the respective courts; and although, if there was any surplus, it was paid into the Consolidated Fund, it was only for the purpose of indemnifying that fund, which was liable for any deficiency. He denied, therefore, that these fees were obtained by way of revenue, or that the officers of the courts of justice were at all like officers of Customs or Excise, or came at all within the scope of the measure. He trusted, therefore, that his noble and learned Friend, who took so warm an interest in all that concerned the administration of justice, would be able to assure him that no such thing was intended.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

said, that, with respect to the present holders of offices, there was an express exception introduced into the Bill to prevent all possible controversy, and to make it perfectly clear that the Bill did not apply to them, nor affect their vested interests. With respect to the future holders of office, the way in which the Masters of the Courts of Common Law were at present paid was by fees, which were collected, and any surplus was paid into the Exchequer, while any deficiency was made good from the Consolidated Fund. He had been asked a question the other night, by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Clanricarde), with respect to the Masters of the Court of Chancery in Ireland. It never was intended to include those officers in the Bill, and he so answered. With respect to the Masters of the Courts of Common Law in England and Ireland, the provision was, that they should be paid by Votes of Parliament, and not out of the Consolidated Fund; but it was not intended to include in that provision any officers exercising a judical function.

LORD CAMPBELL

said, the Masters of the superior courts of Common Law did exercise judicial functions; and if the principle laid clown by his noble and learned Friend was that upon which this Bill had been framed, they ought most undoubtedly to be excepted from its operation. But he was not at all satisfied with the statement of his noble and learned Friend, that there was a clause excepting the present holders of those offices; because he was perfectly satisfied that if they placed those functionaries upon the chances of such annual provision as might be made for them from year to year, at the proposal of the Government by a Vote of the House of Commons, they would not have men of such distinction, and learning, and character, as they had now.

LORD MONTEAGLE

said, the principle involved was one of great importance, and one to which their Lordships' attention might he very properly directed, although the Bill which had been alluded to was not yet before the House. The Bill contained a schedule, which had been so carelessly prepared that not only were the salaries of the Masters in Chancery and of the other judicial persons to whom his noble and learned Friend had alluded included in it, and made dependent, for all time to come, upon the annual Vote of Parliament, but even the salary of the Master of the Rolls, himself one of the highest judicial functionaries in the land, was put upon the same footing. This was a proposal so extraordinary, that he could only account for it as having been a mistake. It would behove their Lordships to look very carefully at the schedule of this Bill, when it should be brought before them, and to consider seriously the principle upon which they ought to act. If they were to preserve any remains of fees in connection with the administration of justice, there was no reason why they should continue to do an objectionable thing in the most objectionable way. He trusted that they should not find put into this schedule any one officer of a judicial character. If it were otherwise, it would not be enough to say that they did not affect existing interests, because the principle would be permanent—and the principle was most objectionable, which made judicial officers dependent on the annual Vote of Parliament.

LORD BROUGHAM

entirely agreed with his noble Friends, and would never cease to condemn the impropriety of any judicial or quasi-judicial functionary being dependent upon fees, or upon the Executive Government, or even upon the Executive Government together with the Commons House of Parliament. It went against their independence, and struck at the very root of our judicial system, which required that those who administered the law should be entirely independent—independent of the Crown upon the one hand, and of the House of Commons and the will of the people on the other. He knew it might be an unpopular doctrine that any class of public officers should be independent of the people; but it was for the benefit of the people themselves that the independence of the Judges should be maintained; and even with respect to officers whose functions were not judicial, but merely ministerial—he thought they ought to be so paid as that there should be a certainty with respect to their salaries, because it was of the greatest moment that such offices should be filled by competent and respectable persons; and they could not get such persons if their salaries were subjected to an annual Vote of Parliament.