Lords Sitting of 2 June 1854

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—14 Income Tax (No. 2); Church Building Acts Amendment; Industrial and Provident Societies; Divorce and Matrimonial Causes; Vaccination Act Amendment.
Reported—Consolidated Fund (£8,000,000), (No. 2).
3a Prisoners Removal.
Royal Assent—County Court Extension Acts Amendment; Boundary Survey (Ireland); Navy Pay, &c.; Manning the Navy.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BANK.
LORD MONTEAGLE: I propose to ask your Lordships to call for the production of two separate classes of papers, both tending to explain the present relations between the Government and the Bank of England. The first of these is the correspondence between Sir Robert Peel and Mr. Goulburn, acting on the part of the public, and the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank, representing that corporation. These papers are explanatory of the engagements entered into in 1844, with respect to the amount of the balances which, on the revision of the charter, was agreed to be kept at the Bank, and the conditions under which such balances was agreed to be maintained. This correspondence was public, and has been officially referred to in the other House of Parliament; it has, I believe, been already laid before the Commons, and therefore I do not anticipate any objection which can be raised to its production here. The second class of papers is of a different description, and as it is possible that its production at the present time, whilst the subjects which it involves are still unsettled and in controversy, I have called the attention of my noble Friend (Earl Granville) to the question, that if it be inconsistent with the public interest that such documents should be had before Parliament for the present, he might be enabled to state his objections to my Motion. If he does so on these grounds, I shall fully admit the force of his objection. In matters of financial, as well as of diplomatic negotiation, I am aware that whilst questions are still in controversy, it would be unwise to produce, and therefore it would be improper to call
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for this information prematurely. We have also been told that the opinions of Crown lawyers have been asked for in relation to the legality of a given mode of proceeding. We are bound to wait till that opinion is given. It is far from my wish to precipitate any disclosure on which hereafter the opinion of Parliament may require to be taken. On the contrary, if it be stated, on the responsibility of the Executive Government, that such information cannot for the present be furnished, I shall withdraw that part of my Motion, being quite willing to concede to our financial department the same confidence which we are accustomed to grant willingly to the Foreign Office. Important as the papers for which I move may be at any time, I consider them to have a peculiar value at the present moment. I shall frankly state to your Lordships my strongest reason for seeking to draw your attention to the subject. New, and, in my mind, most dangerous doctrines have been publicly broached—doctrines which ought not to be allowed to pass without refutation. It has been strongly urged that, as by a notice served on the Bank, in 1855 Parliament becomes entitled to reconsider and modify the existing Charter Act of 1844, the present opportunity should be seized, with a view of enabling us to alter the arrangements existing between the Treasury and the Bank of England. It is proposed that this should be done in order to prepare us for an experiment which I am persuaded would be attended with the utmost danger, both to public credit and to private interests. We are told that "the best remedy that we should look to is that the State should manage its own business itself, that is, by its own servants;" we are told that "no Government should think of borrowing whilst it has an unexceptionable and facile means of making money;" we are further informed that the principle involved is "that of the propriety of transacting the business of the Government through the agency of a joint stock company in preference to the agency of a public department;" and the concession to the Bank of England of the power of issuing a paper circulation is described as "an alienation from the Crown of one of its highest prerogatives." These suggestions seem to amount to no less than this, that not only should the Government sever all connections whatever with the Bank of England, and constitute a Banking Department within itself, but that to this new Government Banking Department should

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be entrusted the executive public functions of paying the dividends and the various services, civil and military, and the far more delicate duties of issuing a paper currency, and thus acting on the monetary system in its relations with the whole commercial transactions of the British community. I must confess that I view such a proposition with indescribable alarm. I am not aware that history can furnish us with one single instance in which such interference on the part of any Government, at any time or in any country, has been unattended with results the most calamitous—results fatal to the Government which tried the experiment, and to the community whose interests were affected by it. Even in the exercise of one of the obvious and legitimate duties and functions of a State, the coining of precious metals as a circulating medium, it is well known to your Lordships that temptations have often been held out to the rulers of States which they have not been able to withstand. It can be shown that innumerable instances have occurred in which those possessed of authority, when unprincipled and lavish, have made the depreciation of the coin a source of wide-spread calamity, danger, and fraud. Whilst this has been the case, almost universally, throughout the Continent of Europe, it is a just cause of national pride that in this country, since the reign of Elizabeth, England has exhibited a noble example of good faith by adhering to the legal standard of value. If the danger of violating this principle is great in the case of coined money, how much greater and more imminent would it be if the Government should ever be induced to undertake the fatal responsibility of becoming bankers and issuers of paper money? Let us not deceive ourselves into a belief that our free Government would afford us any protection whatever against the probable abuse of such a power. I am not one who doubts the invaluable blessings of free institutions, but I venture nevertheless to suggest as a possibility that a free Government might furnish the most active and dangerous agency for forcing on the Treasury to rash and fatal resolves, if it should unadvisedly undertake the functions of a bank of issue. I believe a Government in such a position would be driven onward to the very measures which wisdom and experience would most strongly deprecate and condemn. Events in our own time lead to this conclusion. It is notorious that when great commercial
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difficulties have arisen, examples are shown where a pressure from without has compelled the Government of the day to depart from the principles by which they ought to have been guided, and to sacrifice their highest practical duties to some temporary expediency, or to the conciliating of some exigent but partial interest. But the Government might also be influenced by other motives more peculiarly acting on themselves. Many banking and commercial cases of crisis have sprung from political events in which the State, as a State, is directly involved. Such was the case at the time of the Scottish rebellion of 1745. It was again the case, at the outbreak of the war of the French Revolution in 1792 and 1793. It was the case still more strikingly in 1797 at the fatal period of the Bank restriction. These successive dangers and calamities were far more directly connected with political events, than with any acts of the Bank of England. It may be said, and perhaps said with truth, that the Bank had in 1797 by its subserviency made itself a culpable instrument in the hands of Mr. Pitt; but it should also, in justice, be recollected, that the Bank soon perceived the dangers and difficulties which beset its path, and entreated to be relieved from the disgraceful restriction of cash payments. The Government of the day, however, fully appreciated the potency of the instrument it had been permitted to wield; Mr. Pitt was reluctant to surrender the power he had gained, and the Bank restriction was continued. But how much more facile, how much more certain, would such events have been had Mr. Pitt been the banker, as well as the Minister of the State! I therefore must repeat that to permit, or to encourage a Government to issue, and to dispense the circulating medium, could not fail to be productive of incalculable danger. Far is it from me to suggest that it may not be expedient on the part of the Treasury to revise from time to time its money engagements with the Bank of England for the transaction of the public business. If the terms demanded by the Bank can be proved to be exorbitant, let that be discussed as a money question, and let the Government refuse to pay more than is justly claimable. But beware of applying, in the place of a just economy, a new and a dangerous principle, by the establishment of a State bank, a measure dangerous in itself, and which seems, at

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the present time, to be threatened rather as an instrument of vengeance against the Bank, than as a remedy for any proved abuse. Do not expose to risk both public and private credit, because you are offended with the Bank for dealing with you less favourably than you think you have a right to expect. Dangerous as such a step must be in any country, it is in England that its consequences will ever be the most destructive. It is in the richest and most commercial communities, that the greatest amount of transactions will be carried on by the means of credit. It is in such countries, likewise, that the State is frequently deeply indebted; these are the very circunstances that make any tampering with the currency and the standard of value most fatal in its results; and the power and the responsibility of a Government acting as bankers can only be exercised, as a measure of relief, by the sacrifice of all other classes. Yet this, I am astonished to think, has been advocated by persons who can scarcely have considered, or who fail in comprehending, the inevitable consequences of the measure they recommend.
To adopt such a measure on the ground of any money saving which it might produce. seems to me not merely a blind and mistaken, but a pitiful economy. We should sacrifice much more in our safety and our credit, than we could gain on the ways and means of the year. A saving even of many annual thousands on the interest of deficiency bills, would be far from justifying the adoption of a fatal principle. We are not driven to add to our resources by seeking to engross the profits of moneychangers. Adam Smith has in my mind conclusively disposed of this argument in the following observations, which not only state the principle at stake very accurately, but display a most deep philosophical knowledge of our people and our institutions:—
"A revenue of this kind has even by some people been thought not below the attention of so great an empire as that of Great Britain. Government, it is pretended, could borrow this capital at 3 per cent interest; and by taking the management of the Bank into its own bands, might make a clear profit of 269,500 l. a year. The orderly, vigilant, and parsimonious administration of such aristocracies as those of Venice or Amsterdam is extremely proper, it appears from experience, for the management of a mercantile project of this kind. But whether such a Government as that of England, which, whatever may be its virtues, has never been famous for economy—which in time of peace has generally conducted itself with a slothful and negligent pro-
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fusion that in perhaps natural to monarchies, and in time of war has constantly acted with all the thoughtless extravagance that democracies are apt to fall into—could be safely trusted with the management of such a project, must at least be a good deal more doubtful."
It has been the fashion of some of those persons on whose false reasoning I have taken the liberty of animadverting, to urge that because this country is, of all nations in the world, that which is most deeply engaged in vast and varied financial transactions, it should therefore, and on that account, create a State bank for itself. My Lords, I hold, on the contrary, that it is for that very reason it should employ an agency safer and more independent than its own. No Government should undertake a task that can be as well accomplished by private agency, and in a simpler and inure natural manner. Still less should a Government venture upon functions which it is ill fitted to execute, in substitution for a commercial body, acting upon sound commercial principles. It has been on this ground, I presume, that the House of Commons has recently declined to permit the Ordnance to become manufacturers of small arms for Her Majesty's land forces. Whether the principle has been rightly applied in that particular instance, it is wholly immaterial that I should stop to inquire. But if it be contrary to public interest that the Government should manufacture Minié rifles, sabres, pistols, or muskets, it must surely be infinitely more disadvantageous that the Lords of the Treasury should appear in the commercial world as bankers, and undertake to perform duties heretofore safely executed by others, and I believe executed on economical terms. People are apt, for the purpose of their argument, to dwell on their estimate of what the Bank receives from us, rather than on the duties which the Bank is called on to perform; and this ignorance is carried to such an extent, that I have lately seen the amount struck off from the payments to the Bank on former settlements with Parliament, gravely set forth as the amount of their present emoluments. The author of the Wealth of Nations is more accurate land more just, in describing the functions of the Bank. He observes:—
"The stability of the Bank of England is equal to that of the British Government. All that it has advanced to the public must be lost before its creditors can sustain any loss. It acts riot only as an ordinary bank, but as a great engine of State. It receives and pays the greater part of the annuities which are due to the public; it cir-

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culates Exchequer bills, and it advances to Government the annual amount of land and malt taxes, which are frequently nut paid up till some years afterwards In these different operations its duty to the public may sometimes have obliged it, without any fault of its directors, to overstock the market with paper money."
Against this latter danger it has been the object of our modern legislation to guard, but it is precisely to this danger that a Government bank would be most exposed. Over-issue followed by a restriction on cash payments would be the natural consequences of the establishment of a Government bank circulating its notes. The other privileges, such as that of the legal tender clause, though sources of profit I admit, have been conceded to the Bank of England less for its own benefit than for the benefit of the public. Take as another example, its exclusive power of issue in die metropolitan districts. What was the great principle on which almost all persons were agreed in 1844, however much they might differ on other points. It was on the expediency of approximating. as nearly as might be, to one central bank of issue, having the power of acting on an unfavourable state of foreign exchanges, and nut liable to be defeated by any rash or selfish proceedings on the part of competing establishments. It was felt impossible to apply this sound principle universally, or at once. But it was sought to approximate towards it. If the Government were now to set up a second and a rival bank of issue, how could that great principle be maintained. We should run the risk of undoing all that we have previously effected, and should lay down a principle the very reverse of that contained in the wiser and sounder parts of the Act of 1844. The same great writer (Adam Smith), whom I have already quoted, and to whom I allude with confidence and respect, estimates no insignificant portion of our public credit to have been the consequence of our connection with the Bank of England. Comparing the state of the unfunded debt of France with that of England, he attributes much of the difference of value between these French and English securities (which he states to have been no less than 60 per cent), not to our good faith only, bat to the useful agency and the independence of the Bank of England.
I have trespassed much longer on your Lordships' time and attention than I could have wished, or anticipated; but having seen the opinions, which I have endeavoured to refute, sedulously pressed upon
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public attention, and not without an appearance of claiming an official authority, I have not thought it unwise to call your attention to the principle at stake. I do not anticipate, On the part of this House, or of the Government, the expression of an adverse opinion, or even of one differing from my own. I rather expect an assent to principles which I trust are now very generally recognised, and supported by authority and experience. If there existed any intention, however remote, to interfere with the present Charter of the Bank, twelve months previous notice is required to be given, and, according to former precedents, this step would scarcely be hazarded, without an antecedent Parliamentary inquiry. As no such intention has at present been announced, I cannot apprehend any real or imminent danger or just cause for alarm, however active may be the agency by which this wild project is recommended. I now conclude, by moving—
"That there be laid before this House, Copy oldie Agreement entered into between The Right Honourable Henry Goulburn, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Bank of England, respecting the Allowances made to the Bank for Public Services:"
And also—
"Copies of all Correspondence which may have taken place between the Government and the Bank in 1854, respecting the Advances required on Deficiency Bills and the State of the Public Balances."
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, the noble Lord having in his statement referred to him as the Peer whose duty it was to answer a question of this sort, he begged to offer a few remarks to their Lordships. He stated the other day the disadvantage he felt in being placed in answering questions of this kind from die noble Lord, whose past and present official position rendered him so intimately acquainted with all the details of the business of the Treasury. He did not complain of this in the slightest degree. The noble Lord, as a Peer of Parliament, had a perfect right to criticise the acts of any Government or of any noble Lord as he might think proper, but he (Earl Granville) felt that he had some ground for claiming from their Lordships more than their usual indulgence. But the difficulty he had to encounter was completely doubled when the noble Lord, not satisfied with going into what was past and what was present, night after night dived into the future. The speech of the noble Lord reminded him of a story he had heard some time

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since relating to a learned Judge on the Irish bench. It appeared that the learned Judge was complained against for frequently annoying counsel by interrupting their statements to the jury. On one occasion Mr. Curran was pleading before this learned personage, and was describing to the jury in very forcible terms how his own feelings had been annoyed when, coming through a neighbouring market, he saw a butcher in the act of killing a pig, when the pig, badly wounded, escaped from the butcher, who, with his weapon uplifted, rushed out of the door, when a child suddenly passed by—" And the man killed the child?" said the Judge. "No, my Lord," replied Curran; "your Lordship sometimes jumps too readily to a conclusion; it was not the child, it was the pig." Really, it appeared to him that the noble Lord jumped to a conclusion in a somewhat similar way. About a month ago the noble Lord made a severe attack not only upon the past policy of the Government, but also upon its future policy, and that before the Government had availed themselves of their undoubted right to make an exposition of their views, through the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the other House of Parliament. Since then—and he (Earl Granville) presumed because the noble Lord-had seen that in another place the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated that he was taking the opinion of the law officers of the Crown upon a point in dispute between him and the Bank of England—the noble Lord gave notice of the present Motion, by which he would urge their Lordships to order a correspondence to be produced which was of a perfectly private character, and that before the opinion of the law officers was known or even given, and therefore before, of course, the Chancellor of the Exchequer could adopt an opinion, whether in agreement with or in hostility to the Bank of England. The noble Lord began by saying that the first paper for which he moved had already been presented to the House of Commons. If it was thought necessary to reprint the document, of course there could be no objection. He was sure, from what the noble Lord had stated, he did not expect the Government to lay the other papers on the table. But then, said the noble Lord, "I think it necessary to state very shortly the Parliamentary grounds on which I found this Motion;" and then, for twenty-five minutes by the clock, the noble Lord took occasion to enter into the question
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whether the Government was about to embark in the dangerous experiment—which he, however, presumed they had no intention of doing—of issuing paper money without any condition and entirely on their own responsibility. He had given an answer to the Motion of the noble Lord, and the answer which he had to give to the speech of the noble Lord was, that he was perfectly ignorant of the plan, if any existed, to which the noble Lord had referred, and he believed his Colleagues behind him were equally ignorant of it.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, the answer which the Motion of his noble Friend had elicited from the noble Earl must be highly satisfactory to all persons in Parliament and out of it who took an interest in the important question to which his noble Friend had referred. He thought that from the noble Earl's speech it might be concluded that there was no intention whatever on the part of the Government to disturb the present excellent arrangement by which the Bank of England exercised the functions given to it by Act of Parliament, and that the scheme which had been very much ventilated and agitated out of Parliament had no sanction from the Government. He thought his noble Friend had done good service in bringing out that avowal, because undoubtedly there was—he would not say strong, he would not say grave—but there was some slight ground upon which a fabric was very speedily and very skilfully raised, with a view of showing that it would be a great advantage if the Government were to absorb what were termed the enormous profits of the Bank. He was of opinion that such a scheme would be most dangerous to the country, and most disadvantageous to all parties. But if these propositions were allowed to be agitated without any contradiction being given to them, supported, as it was alleged, by high official authority on the subject, there was no doubt they might spread throughout the country, and inflict great inconvenience, if not great danger, on the best interests of the State. He had a right to say that there was no intention on the part of the Government to alter the present state of the arrangements between the Government and the Bank of England.
EARL GRANVILLEthought that the noble Marquess, notwithstanding his pledge, had jumped as rapidly to his conclusions as the learned Judge or the noble Lord. The noble Lord had given an elaborate descrip-

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tion of a plan for separating the Bank of England from the Government, which, he said, would lead to disastrous consequences, and he (Earl Granville) merely replied that he was totally ignorant of any such plan being in existence, or approved of by the Government. Upon this the noble Maquess jumped up and said that he was satisfied, from this formal declaration on the part of the Government, that they had not the slightest intention ever to disturb, in a greater or less degree, the existing arrangements between the Government and the Bank. Now, he (Earl Granville) begged to limit himself to the statement he had already made, and to leave unfettered the action of the Government in respect to any future arrangements that might be made for the public advantage.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, that, whatever might be the intentions of the Government at any future period, the clear terms used by the noble Earl gave him a right to conclude that at the present moment the noble Earl was not aware of any intention on the part of the Government to alter the existing arrangements between the Government and the Bank.
LORD MONTEAGLEsaid, that he had not imputed to the Government the intention of altering the arrangements between them and the Bank, for he was perfectly convinced they never could have entertained such an intention; he had merely said that it had been imputed to the Government that they had some such intention, and his object was to show to those who urged upon the Government to take a step of that kind the inconvenience and danger of the course they recommended.
The noble Lord having withdrawn the latter portion of his Motion, the Motion was agreed to.

THE WAR WITH RUSSIA—BLOCKADE OF THE WHITE SEA—QUESTION.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEwished to put a question to Her Majesty's Government, arising out of a Report of what took place last night in another place, and relating, in his opinion, to a matter of the very greatest political and national importance. He had read that afternoon, to his great surprise, that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had publicly stated that the Government had come to the determination that there was to be this year no blockade of the port of Archangel. It seemed to hint that, if
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they really had any chance of bringing the war in which they were engaged to a speedy and satisfactory termination, it must be mainly by the force of the fleets and the pressure which we could apply by their means to all parts of the Russian empire, and not by merely military operations, however brilliant. The question of blockade, then, was almost the most important that the attention of the Government could be directed to. On the 22nd of last month it was declared that information, though not official, had been received that an effective blockade had been established in the Baltic; but he was informed that letters had arrived from St. Petersburgh and Riga, stating, that up to the 25th ultimo there were free ingress and egress there for vessels. However, it had been announced by the Government that there was to be an efficient blockade in the Black Sea and Baltic; but the blockade of Archangel was a matter of quite as much importance and comparatively easy of execution. It was generally understood that three of our ships of war had recently sailed to the White Sea, and he considered that they had gone to establish the blockade of Archangel, because three ships of war were amply sufficient for the purpose, the Russians having no force there, and the entrance to the port being extremely narrow. It was true that there was another port of Russian commerce in the White Sea—the port of Onega—but that was only used for the export of timber; whereas, from Archangel was exported all the produce of the northern provinces of Russia, and of a wonderfully fertile territory. It would be easy, then, in this quarter to apply a very important pressure so as to cause the Russian population to manifest to their Government that they felt in a very sensible manlier the inconveniences of the present war. He was told about a fortnight ago that information had been sent to Dutch merchants at Amsterdam of the determination of our Government not to blockade Archangel; but he did not believe that any such determination had been come to by the Government or had been announced. But this was certain, because it was known to the whole commercial world, that a great many ships had been chartered by Dutch merchants for Archangel to bring away Russian produce. This, then, would be carrying on war not against Russia, but against British merchants, for while Russian merchants would thus be able to dispose of their produce, and we should be

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able to get all that we wanted from Holland, the English merchants would be the only parties debarred from the advantages of the trade. He had heard it said, that it would be hard to prevent the people of Holland from getting' their usual supply of rye from the northern ports of Russia; but if we did not do so, we should be giving to Russia an advantage which no belligerent ever before gave to another. Be-ides that, by so acting we should be giving to Holland and Germany a direct inducement for desiring, not a cessation of the war, but its continuance. This was certainly a very mistaken policy. This country must make the war felt by its inconveniences, for it was by that means only we should eventually, put a stop to it; for he had no hesitation in affirming as a certainty that, when the Russian population felt the war to be such an evil as it was in the power of this country to make it to them, they would find means to enforce peace upon their Government much sooner than it would ever be established by feats of arms, however brilliant. He trusted, therefore, that he should be told that there was no determination whatever on the part of the Government not to blockade Archangel, but that the utmost power of the country would be brought to bear to damage and impede in every possible way the trade of Russia. He had doubts whether it would not he wise to prohibit altogether the entrance into this country of Russian produce, such as tallow and hemp, which he understood was easily distinguished from the corresponding produce of other countries. This would cause a pressure on the Russian population which they would feel very sensibly.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: Your Lordships will feel that there is considerable inconvenience in putting questions of this kind without sufficient previous notice; and the inconvenience is greatly inereasel when the question put has referem e to what passed in the other House of Parliament. I have a right somewhat to complain that my noble Friend should have put the question under the peculiar circumstances of the case. I hold in my hand a note addressed to me by him, and dated "four o'clock," which, from accident, was not delivered to me until I arrived in this House. Under these circumstances, I informed my noble Friend that I had been unable to communicate with my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty the other House, and consequently had not
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been able to ascertain what had really fallen from him. I am, therefore, totally unable to answer my noble Friend's question as to what statement was made in the other House, except from my knowledge of the policy and determination of the Government. I do not complain of the question being put to me by my noble Friend on the ground of inconvenience to the Government, because, as I have often said, there are, in matters of this importance, higher and greater interests than the convenience of the Government. It is of great importance that the public should be accurately informed of the real state of the case, and they are liable to be prejudiced in forming an opinion from the fact of a question being put to the Government to which circumstances render it impossible to give a distinct and categorical answer. I have not had any opportunity of communicating with my right hon. Friend, but I have no doubt that what he said was that Archangel was not at present blockaded. In all probability, the person who put the question to my right hon. Friend was ignorant of the usual course pursued in cases of blockade, or was actuated by the desire of having his name placed in the newspapers as having put a question to the Government on the subject, or he might have answered the question himself, because no blockade is instituted unless a notification has appeared in the Gazette, and therefore the hon. Member might have spared himself the trouble of putting a question to my right hon. Friend. My right hon. Friend, I have no doubt, stated that Archangel was not blockaded, and, although I have not been able to learn from himself the extent to which his answer went, he may have added that it had been determined in conjunction with the French Government, for reasons which I cannot, consistently with my duty, explain, not at present to blockade Archangel. How long that determination may continue is a different matter, and I am sure that I shall be excused from giving an answer upon that point. The question has been maturely considered, and, after that mature and careful consideration, Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Franc arrived at a mutual decision not at present to institute the blockade of Archangel; and I trust that my noble Friend will feel assured that that mutual decision was not arrived at upon light grounds. With regard to the future, I can only say that, if it should be determined to institute a

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blockade, a notification will appear in the proper form in the Gazette. I may also add, that my noble Friend may rely that no blockade will be instituted by the present Government, or, I hope, by any Government, other than an effective blockade, and that there is not the slightest intention, on the part of the Government, of instituting what are commonly called mere paper blockades.
LORD BEAUMONTthought that, on the principle laid down by the noble Duke, that no blockade could be instituted unless a notification had previously appeared in the Gazette, it would be impossible to carry on war. He maintained that if any Admiral, instructed to carry on a war, found it conducive to the success of any operation to blockade any particular port, he had a perfect right to do so, although the port might be so situated that it would take a month or two months before a notice could appear in the Gazette. [The EARL of ABERDEEN: Hear, hear!] He was glad to perceive that he had not been mistaken, hut he had certainly understood the noble Mike to say that a notice must appear in the Gazette before a port was blockaded. He must own, that having heard that it was not the intention of the Government to order at present the blockade of Archangel, he deeply regretted such an announcement. He did not ask—indeed he was not entitled to ask—the reasons for such a resolution, but he regretted that any reasons existed to prevent the Government adopting every method for annoying the enemy. To confine the war to one point, and to leave the rest of Russia the power of carrying on its trade, was not calculated to procure a speedy peace, and to act upon such a system was injurious to the country, and also, in his opinion, to the cause of humanity. To procure the advantage of a speedy peace the war ought to be carried on effectively and energetically, and there ought not to be polite notes exchanged between Admirals commanding ships and governors of cities, saying that such and such parts of a city would be spared and that such and such prisoners would be given up. It ought to be left to the judgment of the Admirals in what manner they should carry out the instructions they received, but those instructions ought to be to do as much harm as possible to the enemy.
THE EARL OF ABERDEEN: The noble Lord has, I think, entirely misapprehended what fell from my noble Friend (the Duke
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of Newcastle) with regard to the validity of a blockade. The case is this, that there is no doubt that any Admiral may establish a blockade in any part of the world in which he may find himself carrying on war; but what is essential is, that, as soon as any blockade comes to the knowledge of the Government, they are hound to insert due notification of it in the Gazette, or, if they fail to do so, they render themselves liable to demands for indemnity on the part of those persons who may have suffered loss, or who have been put to inconvenience through ignorance of the existence of such a blockade. With regard to the apprehensions of the noble Lord as to the manner in which the war is to be carried on, he may set himself at rest—he may depend that no war was ever undertaken which was carried on with niece vigour or with more determination than this will be, as far as our power admits of it, without, however, acting upon any such horrible notions as firing upon all parts of a town, even upon the hospitals—without any such proceedings nothing will be left undone by the Government to arrive at that conclusion which will best be produced by the vigorous conduct of the war.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: Perhaps, as it is most desirable that it should not appear to the public that different answers are given to the same question in this and in the other House of Parliament, the noble Earl will permit me to say a few words before proceeding to another subject. I stated, when I answered the question of my noble Friend, that I had not been able to have any communication with my right hon. Friend who made the statement in the other House on die subject to which the question referred; but I have since been in communication with my right hon. Friend, and I find that what I have already stated this evening was in entire conformity with the facts of the case. My right hon. Friend did not say that it had been determined that there should be no blockade of Archangel, but what he stated was, that it was decided that for the present there should be no blockade; that that determination had been arrived at after communication with the French Government, and that no alteration would be come to except by the same means.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT—QUESTION.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGIIsaid,

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he wished to put a question to the noble Earl at the head of the Government relating to a subject which had been brought under their Lordships' consideration by a noble Earl (Earl Grey) on a previous occasion—it was the subject of the constitution of the various military departments to which was intrusted the conduct of the war. There had been for some time reports which had appeared under circumstances which entitled them to great consideration—indeed, to belief—that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government, after considering the subject, to propose that the office of Secretary of State for War should be separated from the department of the Colonies. If that announcement were true—and he trusted it might prove so—it was to him a subject of great gratification, and he could congratulate the country on a measure which might materially influence the conduct of this war. He would also venture to congratulate the noble Duke now at the head of the two departments—indeed, to offer him double congratulations—in the first place, that he would be able for the future to devote his whole and undivided attention to what was the most important subject that could be committed to any man—the conduct of a war; and, in the second place, that he would escape the annoyance of being connected with the Colonial Department. Upon that subject he must say that, although there should be one Member of the Government to whom solely would be confided the conduct of the war, and who would solely be responsible for all details—for that, he trusted, was understood—still, he did not desire that, at the present moment, any further step should be taken. He thought they had better pause—that it would not do to break up a number of different departments in the State of very great importance, all connected with the conduct of the war, and that it was most advisable at the present moment, when they were in the presence of an enemy, to take no step which was not absolutely necessary—to make no movement in the way of change which was not dictated by clear experience and urged upon them by most important considerations. It would be for the Secretary of State who would have the sole conduct of the war to see whether there was any conflict of authority, and to communicate at once to his Colleagues, and, if necessary, to Parliament, the existence of any obstacle to the execution of those orders which he might think it necessary
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to give. He (the Earl of Ellenborough) could not doubt that he would receive the full support of his Colleagues and of Parliament, and that it would be the determination of Parliament and of the country that the responsibility of the conduct of the war should rest upon one head, as the power rested in one hand, and that no one, whatever office or position he might fill, should interfere in any manner to impede the public service. It would not do in difficult times to have men in office of whom he might express himself in these terms—"injussu interpretari qui malunt;" indeed, divided authority was as undesirable to a Minister as cordial support was the reverse. While he said that, he must at the same time express a hope that it would not be considered necessary to create any new establishment of civil clerks to carry on the duties of this new department. He had no faith in the public competition of clever young gentlemen who passed a good examination, and who on that account were placed in offices of the highest class. What the Secretary for the War Department wanted was, not an office of civil clerks, but a military staff. Every duty which he had to perform could be better performed by military officers placed under him, having entirely his confidence, selected from the various departments of the service—engineers, artillery, cavalry, and infantry—men who had served in various parts of the globe, and were acquainted with the actual duties of a war; the business could be better managed by them than by any civil clerks it would be possible to find. There would be one other advantage in carrying on the business of the new department by officers of the Army; they might be sure that they would preserve the most absolute secresy. It was a matter of honour with an officer to keep absolutely secret anything that was confided to him. He would also venture to suggest for the consideration of the Government that he thought it would be most undesirable to make any military change that could be avoided; but might it not he advisable to place under the Secretary for the War Department all the military in England, as well as the military abroad? He believed that at the present moment the disposition of time regular troops in England was within the power, nut of the Secretary for the War Department, but of the Secretary of the Home Department; and on all occasions where the Secretary for the War Department might think it necessary to send troops to

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reinforce the stations abroad, it was necessary to communicate with the Secretary for the Home Department, who was in possession of those troops. He might he under a misapprehension on this subject, but he could not but think that it would undoubtedly be most desirable that the military arm of the country, at home and abroad, should be in one hand. He could not omit to say that the Secretary of War could not but consider himself in reality, as he was officially, the head of both services, and competent to dispose of the naval as well as of the military forces of the country. If there should be a diversity of opinion or any disunion between the authorities at the head of the military and naval services, especially in a war which must be carried on. by combined operations, the greatest inconvenience and detriment to the public must ensue. He had now to refer to another matter, which concerned more the Members of the Government than the public generally. At the same time, he must say that it would be to him a subject of satisfaction, and he thought it might be conducive to their convenience, as well as to the convenience of the public, if this constitution of a war department were not to lead to the addition of any new person to the Cabinet, or to any alteration in the distribution of official duties. It might be found possible enough for a time—at least as an experiment—to discharge the duties of the Colonial Department with the duties of some other department that was not overburdened.
THE EARL OF ABERDEEN: The subject that has been adverted to by my noble Friend has for some time engaged the consideration of the Government. The emergency of time time imperatively demands such consideration; but I am not in a condition to explain to my noble Friend or to the House what is the result of the inquiry, and of the consideration that has been given to this subject. My noble Friend has suggested various measures for our adoption. We are obliged to him for furnishing us with his ideas on the subject, and, of course, whatever falls from him naturally deserves attention on the part of those for whose advantage it is uttered; but I will say this, that when the result on this subject shall be arrived at, which will be without any delay whatever, I trust it will be satisfactory to this House and to the country.
House adjourned to Friday next.