§ THE EARL OF MALMESBURYSeeing my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in his place, I think it my duty to ask him a question which cannot but be of the greatest interest to the House, and notice of which I gave him in a letter I wrote to him this morning. I 485 beg to direct the attention of the noble Earl to the renewed reports, confirming almost to a certainty the accounts given in the public papers, that the Russian ships had left Sebastopol in very considerable force, (some letters say with troops on board, and others without), and that that fleet had made a diversion in two places, one at the mouth of the Danube, where it is reported that 4,000 men have been landed, and the other on the Circassian coast, where it is alleged that they have taken men out of some of the garrisons for the purposes of strengthening others; so that it would appear that, notwithstanding all that has taken place, Russia is allowed, totally unmolested, to strengthen her forces and shift her troops across the Black Sea according to her views as to the necessity of such operations. Now, my Lords, since we have begun this unfortunate war, nobody feels more than myself how highly improper it would be either to embarrass the Ministers with useless questions or to make any observations which would be indiscreet, and which might tend to affect the operations or proceedings of Her Majesty's military or naval officers at the theatre of war. I have never asked my noble Friend any question which might have a disadvantageous tendency as to what were the intentions of Her Majesty's Government with respect to their operations in those parts; but still I see no disadvantage that can result. On the contrary, I think it advantageous, and a duty which the Government owe to the country that they should inform it of facts which have actually occurred, and of the events which are passing at the present moment. My Lords, these reports have certainly created a very strong impression upon the public mind, intermingled with no very pleasant feelings. It is well known that for many months there has been a large fleet of English ships, joined to an equally large French fleet, lying within reach of Constantinople. No doubt the public expected more than they ought from those fleets; but since their arrival there events have taken place which have certainly in their nature rendered the fleets fairly liable to obloquy on the part of the public—and I need only allude to the affair of Sinope as one of those events. Of that melancholy affair nothing more need now be said; but it does appear, that, from some cause or other, our fleets have not been able to occupy that position and assume that mastery upon the Black Sea which we have been 486 led to anticipate; but, on the contrary, having made, as far as we can learn, several attempts to occupy that sea, they have been obliged to return, after a very short sojourn in the Euxine, to their anchorage at Beicos Bay. The winter is now passed; and now, my Lords, we are told that a squadron of Russian ships has come out from Sebastopol, that they have landed troops in safety on the shores of the Euxine, and that an English frigate has reported that operations of a similar character have taken place on the Circassian coast. Assuming these reports to be true, nothing can be more mortifying, after the manner in which we have put forth our pretensions to command the Black Sea, and after the manner in which notification of our intention to do so has been given to the Russian fleet at Sebastopol by an English frigate—nothing can be more mortifying than to find that we should have been unable to act with such energy as to prevent the conveyance of succours and reinforcements by the Russian fleet to any portion of their forces carrying on active operations. The question I would now ask of my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs is, whether the Government has had any information confirming these reports; and, if such reports be true, I beg to ask him whether he has any objection to state why the English and French fleets have been content to lie inactive, as it were, at Beicos Bay; and why, also, it appearing that the Russian ships have been enabled to navigate the Euxine, it has been thought dangerous or inexpedient for the English fleet to do so, whereby it has been prevented from intercepting the supplies sent to our enemies?
§ THE EARL OF CLARENDONMy Lords, I am very far from considering the question which has been put to me by my noble Friend as of a useless or improper character, and I agree with him that the people of this country ought to be informed of the great events which occur in the present juncture, although the Government are certainly not bound to give any information as to the disposition of our fleet for prospective operations; but I cannot agree with the noble Earl in thinking that our fleet is liable to be exposed to fair obloquy, or any obloquy at all, for I believe that it will turn out that since the notification to which allusion has been made by my noble Friend, the Russian fleet has not been in the Black Sea at all. According to all the information which the Government has 487 received since that time, none of the Russian fleet has entered the Black Sea, and therefore I consider that the object the Government had in view when it gave directions that the Russian fleet should be confined within Sebastopol has been fully obtained. Your Lordships will be probably aware of the situation and the condition of Sebastopol, and must be convinced of the very great advantages derived by the Russians from the possession of that important port. To a certain extent it may be said to command the Black Sea, affording extreme facilities to the Russian vessels to pass out and return without being seen; and unless, therefore, we had actually occupied the Black Sea, or rather blockaded Sebastopol in full force during the whole of the winter months, it would have been impossible to secure that no Russian ship should come out of it. Your Lordships must remember that the Russian fleet which occupies Sebastopol is a powerful and numerous one, and it could not be kept in that port except by the greater portion of the combined fleets. If, therefore, only a few vessels had been left there, the Russians might have come out in superior force and inflicted a loss upon the British and French admirals, while the effect of the whole of the fleet being employed to blockade the mouth of Sebastopol during the bad weather of the winter months—and I can tell your Lordships the weather in the Black Sea has been particularly bad this season—would have been to expose their ships to imminent danger, and to the certain wear and tear of the bad weather, while the Russians would have been lying safe and snug within the harbour, and at the approach of the time which has now come upon us, when war has been declared, their whole fleet would have been in the most effective state, while the combined fleets, from the causes I have enumerated, would have been very ineffective. It is for those reasons that the Black Sea has not been occupied by the whole of the fleets, as my noble Friend has remarked; but they have been constantly cruising there. The whole of the steam fleet was out there on the 18th of last month, and our steam frigates have been constantly cruising there, so as to give timely notice to the Admirals of any intention, as far as such intention could be ascertained, of the Russian fleet to come out. Both the Admirals considered that Beicos Bay was the best place where the main body of the fleet should lie to receive notice from the scouts 488 and be prepared to act accordingly. With respect to the particular question which my noble Friend has asked me with regard to the ships which, it is alleged, have gone out from Sebastopol, and conveyed troops to Varna and to Circassia, I can only repeat to him what I said the other night—namely, that we have no official knowledge at all of the fact, and such knowledge as we have induces us to believe that no such circumstance has occurred. It has been alleged that the first information which was given of these Russian ships having taken out troops was by an English ship—an English frigate, too—but what does the real fact turn out to be? Why, that the only news that has been received at Constantinople of the kind was brought by the master of a Bremen vessel, who stated that several Russian ships had gone out from Sebastopol and landed troops at the portion of the coast indicated. On the receipt of this information, Sir Edmund Lyons went to Constantinople, saw the master of the Bremen vessel, and instituted an inquiry, the result of which was, that the report turned out to be untrue, it being proved to the entire satisfaction of the officers who conducted the inquiry that the master never could have been in the position necessary to see the operations he described. But, my Lords, on the 22nd ult. Sebastopol itself was reconnoitred by an English ship of war, when it was found that the whole of the Russian fleet was in that harbour. Since that time the whole of the united fleets have gone into the Black Sea, and on the 24th they proceeded to Varna, and I have this day received letters from Admiral Dundas and Sir Edmund Lyons, in which they both express their belief that no such circumstances have occurred as have been stated.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHIf, my Lords, during the course of the war it is to be the practice to criticise minutely the whole of the details and operations of our naval and military commanders, it will be attended with the greatest inconvenience. I am quite satisfied that it will be consistent with principles of true wisdom and policy that we should place on all occasions the most favourable construction upon their actions. They must of necessity feel the deepest responsibility in the circumstances under which they are placed, and if, added to their anxiety to serve their country and merit the approbation of their Sovereign, a still deeper anxiety attaches to their minds in the knowledge that they must expect 489 upon all occasions that either in this House or otherwise in public their operations are to be minutely criticised, you will not leave them that free mind and that full exercise of their faculties which are absolutely necessary to enable them successfully to perform their most important duties. My Lords, I know this from having seen on many occasions the deep suffering of the bravest officers under the reflections cast upon them by the public press, embodied in observations which men in ordinary circumstances might have treated with the utmost contempt. Of all men, military and naval officers are the most sensitive. No one can imagine the degree of sensitiveness with which they regard all observations on their professional conduct; and I earnestly conjure your Lordships, if you desire that they should exercise all their faculties for the good of the country, to abstain to the greatest possible extent from minute criticisms of their actions, especially when you cannot by any possibility have a knowledge of all the facts of the case, or be aware of the reasons which influence them in their course of operations. My Lords, this is not merely an opinion of my own; it was the principle of that old Roman Republic—of that wise people, who understood mankind better than any other nation; who understood the minds of men; whose whole object was war; who desired nothing but conquest—and yet, although that nation to the greatest extent rewarded success, there was hardly, I believe, one occasion upon which they punished want of success—adopting the principle which I have taken the liberty of placing before your Lordships to-night—that it was expedient to leave the minds of their commanders perfectly free. You may depend upon it that the necessary consequences of failure are sufficient to deter them from doing that which they deem to be wrong, and that the rewards which accompany success will be sufficient encouragement for their exertions. Depend upon it, my Lords, no apprehensions whatever need be entertained of an English soldier or an English sailor not seeking the enemy on the first possible occasion. All we have to apprehend—and you increase that apprehension if you enter into minute criticism of their conduct—is, that they will be urged, not by their own convictions, but by the fear of your censure, to engage before they can do so with the certainty of success.
§ THE EARL OF MALMESBURYMy Lords, I agree in every word that has 490 fallen from the noble Earl with respect to the inexpediency of making minute criticisms of any kind or sort, in this House, upon the conduct of officers serving in Her Majesty's fleets or armies. But my noble Friend opposite, and your Lordships, will bear me out in saying that I did not venture upon even a shadow of criticism in that direction. I have, however, my Lords, often bad occasion to remark, that though the noble Earl who has just resumed his seat, is certainly one of the best speakers in your house, he is one of the very worst listeners. Perhaps, therefore, to that circumstance it may be ascribed that the noble Earl overlooked the statement with which I prefaced my remarks—namely, that my question had reference solely to a matter of fact, in reference to which I think I was perfectly justified in making the inquiries which I did—namely, as to whether the Russian fleet had landed troops on any part of the coast of the Black Sea. But, in doing so, I made no remarks whatever that could be termed a criticism upon the conduct of the respective admirals; and I rejoice, notwithstanding the remarks of the noble Earl, that I did venture on those inquiries, because it has given my noble Friend opposite an opportunity of proving that those gallant officers have done their duty as far as they could—that they have watched Sebastopol by every means in their power, and that apparently the events which we are told had taken place have not, in fact, occurred.