TYNEMOUTH ELECTION. (Hansard, 27 June 1853)

§ The EARL of ABERDEEN
moved, that the House agree with the Commons in the Address to Her Majesty for a Commission to inquire into corrupt practices at elections at Tynemouth.

LORD BROUGHAM
said, he had gone through the entire evidence in this case also, and although it was not so strong by a great deal as the Barnstaple case, yet he thought there was sufficient to warrant the conclusion arrived at by the Committee. The remark which he made upon a former occasion, that it was rather bard to punish one party by unseating him for what other persons had done without his knowledge or consent, did not apply to the case of Tyne-mouth, because, though the Committee reported that they had no evidence of the hon. Member himself having had any participation in or knowledge of the corrupt practices which prevailed at the last election, yet, when the hon. Member was called, under the late Act, to prove, not only 790 his ignorance of those practices, but that they were contrary to his express orders and intentions, he clearly enough proved the first part, but he said not one word of the second part. The silence of the hon. Member upon the latter point, coupled with the abstinence of his learned counsel from putting the question to him when called partly for that purpose, naturally led one to believe that in this case there were better grounds than usual for coming to the conclusion that, notwithstanding his ignorance of, and want of participation in, the corrupt practices which prevailed at the last election for Tyne-mouth, those practices were not altogether contrary to the orders and intentions of the Gentleman who had been unseated. The hon. Member, when examined before the Committee, showed himself very anxious to exonerate the Duke of Northumberland from all participation in the election proceedings, and from the charge of using his influence in the election. No doubt that would be satisfactory to the noble Duke and to the House; but he might be permitted to observe, that, according to his view of the constitution of Parliament, the hon. Member was wrong in his impression that it was unlawful for a Peer to take part in a canvass for votes at an election, or to use his influence—of course, as a private individual—in an election. He knew that this was a vexata questio, some holding that it was contrary to the duty of a Peer to interfere at all in elections, while others maintained that a Peer was no more precluded than any other person from such interference. Those who spoke against the interference of Peers in elections, said it was a breach of the privileges of the Lower House; but when they considered that the Resolution of the Commons upon the subject applied equally to the Lord Lieutenants of counties, and that, nevertheless, it was the everyday practice of those functionaries not merely to interfere in elections, but to get themselves returned as Members of the House of Commons, and to sit and vote in that House—which was as effectual and substantial an interference with elections as it was well possible to make—it appeared to him that very much of the binding authority of the Resolution of the Commons was taken away from it. The Duke of Norfolk—be alluded to the grandfather of the present duke—used to tender his vote regularly at every election, and although his Grace went perhaps a little too far, yet he was un- 791 doubtedly right, in his opinion, that there was no law to prevent a Peer using his influence in an election.

LORD CAMPBELL
said, that as his noble and learned Friend had broached a question of great constitutional importance, and one which he had frequently and deliberately considered, he thought himself bound to express his opinion upon it. The question was, whether a Peer had any right to vote for a representative in the Commons House of Parliament? He was clearly of opinion that a Peer had no such right or power. He placed no importance at all upon the Resolution of the House of Commons. That House could not make laws. It might declare what the law was; but it could not, by any Resolution it might pass, alter the constitution of the country; and the case of Lord Lieutenants showed that the Resolution against Peers, by itself, had no weight. But, irrespective of that Resolution—by immemorial usage, by authority, and by reason—he was clearly of opinion that not one of their Lordships who sat there by hereditary right, or by grant of the Crown, had any right to interfere in any election of a representative of the people. That was the House of Peers, the other was the Commons House of Parliament; and it was for the commons to send their representatives there to act for them, to grant the supplies, and to give their opinion upon Acts of Parliament and the general legislation of the country. Their Lordships legislated in that House by hereditary right; but, having that right, they should be contented with it, and not send forth a groundless claim to be represented in the other House. He cordially assented to the Motion before the House.

LORD BROUGHAM
hoped that his noble and learned Friend would not believe that he entertained the notion that a Peer had a right to vote in the election of a Member of the House of Commons. He never dreamt of such a thing. He mentioned the case of the Duke of Norfolk to show the difference of opinion which existed upon the subject; and all he wished to protest against was, the presumed validity of the Resolution of the House of Commons that it was a breach of privilege for a Peer to interfere in an election.

The EARL of GLENGALL
asked how it was that Irish Peers could sit for English boroughs and counties, according to the views which had been laid down?

The MARQUESS of CLANRICARDE
opposed the Motion of the noble Earl, though, 792 after what had been said, he had no doubt it would be carried. He looked upon this as one of the weakest cases in which such a Motion had been made. There was only one case of bribery proved before the Committee. The rest was all treating, and that of a nature not very grave, the most important case being a breakfast given to about sixty persons, at 2s. a head. That was, no doubt, a very illegal proceeding, and the Committee did perfectly right in declaring the election void; but at the same time it might fairly be questioned whether the circumstances were such as would warrant a commission of inquiry. He was of opinion that this case would be found, upon examination, a very mild one, and one that did not justify their Lordships in agreeing to the Motion. It was true as 1,9001. had been spent, but very litttle of that had gone in corrupt practices. Upwards of 1,000l. had been paid to lawyers; and the expenses were spread over a space of time from April 1851 to July 1852. He thought it was his duty to divide against the address being granted; and although he sincerely hoped these corrupt practices would be put an end to, he did not think that would be attained by such proceedings as these, by proceeding against particular places when the practices alluded to were so universal.

LORD BROUGHAM
believed, that the case was a weak one; but the Committee of the House of Commons having come to a resolution to the effect that they believed corrupt practices had prevailed extensively, he could not say that they were so destitute of support from the evidence as to justify this House in refusing its concurrence to the address. Treating undoubtedly, was the gist of the charge; but under the form of treating bribery was manifestly included.

§ LORD REDESDALE
said, it was to be distinctly understood from the Act of Parliament that the House should reserve for itself the same jurisdiction as in the cases of the Bills which came up to them from the other House of Parliament. This, however, was not a Bill for disfranchisement, but for an address to enable the Crown to issue a commission of inquiry, and the House ought to feel itself competent to decide that a case was made out which should justify an inquiry so contrary to the ordinary forms of law as those instituted under commissions of this kind, before they agreed to the reports of the Committees of the other House. Now, 793 was a case made out in the present instance? The noble and learned Lord opposite was obliged to go to cases of treating, which were especially excluded from the Act, and the only point which had been made out was one single case of bribery with respect to one individual alone. Now, he thought their Lordships would be proceeding too hastily if they accepted the report of a Committee of the House of Commons to the effect that they believed corrupt practices extensively prevailed, as binding upon their Lordships on all occasions, if they could produce no better evidence in support of that Resolution than the evidence now before the House. He quite agreed with the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Clanricarde), and thought their Lordships would act too hastily if they agreed to the address. With regard to the other question, the Reform Bill certainly gave power to all possessors of certain property to vote at elections for Members of the House of Commons; but he, for one, was not at all disposed to exercise that right.

§ The EARL of ABERDEEN
said, that there was sufficient in the evidence to justify the conclusions of the Committee of the House of Commons; and though he might have said there was only one case of bribery, it was true that cases of treating might be considered as bribery where articles were given which were saleable. Constituted as the Committee was, they must have had the conviction very strong in their minds that corrupt practices had extensively prevailed; and it was to be considered further that their Lordships had not heard the evidence, and therefore could not form an idea of its character, and of the mode in which it was given, which in all cases was much of the substance of evidence. On the whole, he must agree to the Motion for the address, and he hoped their Lordships would assent to it.