HL Deb 24 February 1853 vol 124 cc526-44
The EARL of ELLENBOROUGH

then rose, pursuant to the notice which he had given, to put the following questions to Her Majesty's Government:— 1. Whether Her Majesty's Government have any objection to lay before the House a letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company to the Governor General of India in Council, dated in September, 1829, giving Instructions as to the Line of Operations in any future War with Ava? 2. Whether Her Majesty's Government are prepared to lay before the House any Papers explanatory of the present Objects of the War with Ava, and of the Measures whereby it is proposed to attain such Objects? The noble Earl proceeded to say that he was afraid he should find it somewhat difficult to attract their Lordships' attention to a question of Indian policy and war, after they had been occupied with matters connected with the domestic policy of this country, and which were consequently so much more attractive. He must, however, endeavour shortly to explain the position in which the British Government now stood with regard to the Court of Ava; and before he put the first question of which he had given notice, he thought it right to state under what circumstances the despatch to which it referred originated. At that time he was President of the Board of Control, and various matters came before him connected with the then recent war in Ava. He had occasion to become acquainted with the great force employed, with the great losses sustained, and with the enormous expense incurred in the conduct of that war, which, according to the statement of the then Chairman of the Court of Directors, amounted, he believed, to something like 12,000,000l. All these matters came before him; and he thought that, considering that they had obtained a very extended knowledge of the country, of its resources, and of its geography, and that the war had been one of so important a character, it was extremely desirable, and indeed necessary, that he should place all the information he possessed before the late Duke of Wellington, who was then at the head of the Government, and obtain that noble Duke's authoritative instructions with respect to the line of operations which should be adopted in the event of their being at any future time forced to make war upon Ava. Accordingly he placed before the Duke of Wellington all the information and papers bearing most materially upon the subject. The noble Duke took all these matters into deliberation, and was kind enough to communicate to him (the Earl of Ellenborough) his opinion in detail; and that opinion was conveyed to the Government of India in the despatch to which his question referred. He (the Earl of Ellenborough) was not aware whether his noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen) would consent to lay that despatch before their Lordships, and he would not further refer to it; but this he thought he was at liberty to say, that the course of operations which had been lately adopted by the Government of India was not the course which was prescribed in the Duke of Wellington's instructions. Another thing he thought he might venture to assume—recollecting all that he had read of the opinions of the late Duke of Wellington, and the many conversations he had had with that noble Duke, especially in connexion with the war in China—namely, that it was impossible the Duke of Wellington could have sanctioned and approved of the course of operations which had been adopted. He (the Earl of Ellenborough) said so on this ground—that he thought it quite impossible that the Duke of Wellington could have approved of a plan of operations which involved the necessity of employing troops along the internal waters of a great empire, at a considerable distance from their ships, without the assistance of animals, and therefore without the means of movement upon the land. He held it to be impossible that the Duke of Wellington could have approved of such a system of operations, because he knew that if the noble Duke had done so, he would have given an opinion directly inconsistent with the opinions he had so often heard from the lips of that illustrious individual. Now, he would refer for an instant to the details which had been received a few days ago with regard to the operations for the relief of Pegue, and it would at once be seen that those operations proved the impolicy of attempting to carry on a war with troops destitute of animals, and therefore without means of movement by land. A large number of troops, by the orders of General Godwin, were conveyed on board several steamers to Pegu; and in the course of two or three days he collected twenty-five carts. The general applied the animals at his disposal to drawing these carts with six days' provisions, and had then no animals whatever left to draw his guns. The army proceeded, without guns, without animals, and drove the enemy before them. In the course of three days they marched twenty-four miles. At the end of that time the general found he had done the enemy little injury, for they constantly ran away, and avoided contact with his troops; they fled from one point to another, and he had no means of following up the successes he had obtained; and the breaking down of a cart laden with beef and biscuit crippled his resources, and rendered it impossible for him to proceed. Whatever might be the coolness under fire of that officer—whatever might be the courage and discipline of his troops, he (the Earl of Ellenborough) held it to be impossible, with troops so ill-provided, to subdue an empire; and yet that was apparently the object of the Government of India. What had happened at Pegu might happen elsewhere; but let their Lordships consider with how much greater loss, if the distance from our resources was greater than on that occasion. He knew it would be in the recollection of their Lordships that we at last succeeded in obtaining success in China, and compelling the Emperor of China to submit to the terms which we dictated to him, and that we effected that object by troops possessed of very limited means of carriage. No doubt we did; but observe the difference. In the early stages of that war islands were taken, towns were taken, armies were defeated with great loss, and the enemy suffered greatly, but no impression whatever was produced on the Government of China until the whole character of the war was completely changed—until our resources were concentrated on one point, and brought to bear on the mouth of the Great Canal, so as to interrupt all the great internal communications of the empire. When that was done we undoubtedly succeeded; but had we the same means of success in the war with Ava? Was there any point on which it was possible we could concentrate our forces so as to produce the same effect? Or, even if we could do so, could we expect to produce the same result when dealing with a barbarous usurper, acting at the head of a barbarous people, as bad followed when we were dealing with the hereditary sovereign of a civilised and wealthy people? One of the great difficulties of a war like this was, that it was waged against a barbarous people, who did not act on the ordinary considerations which swayed the councils of a civilised people. The former usually acted more from passion than the latter. Undoubtedly, if we had been acting on a totally different system from that which had been followed during the present war—if we had been resting, as we ought to have done, on our own provinces in Arracan—if we had been keeping open our communication with our own provinces, and had placed an army of 7,000 or 8,000 men on the Irrawaddy, nearly at equal distances from Ava and Rangoon, with perfect means of moving all our troops, so as to be able to effect any purpose required from them in the war; no doubt, if we had done that, we should have had a better chance of success than we could possibly have in contending with the enemy under such difficulties as we had been doing. But that was not the course which had been adopted. Before he proceeded further, he begged to place before their Lordships, as far as he could, a statement of the present position of the Army in that part of India. He had taken pains to ascertain the facts, and he believed that what he was going to state was not far from the truth: He calculated that about the 4th of January General Godwin would have arrived at Prome. He would have there about 4,800 men, of whom 200 would be cavalry, with sixteen guns, of which he believed not more than ten were horsed and capable of being moved. He could not find a trace of his having any animals whatever for the purpose of moving provisions or ammunition. He regretted to be obliged to say, too, that out of the 4,800 men, one-fifth would he in the hospital, and that the men were dying six, eight, and sometimes ten a day of cholera; and no wonder. It appeared that for a long time after the troops had arrived at Prome they subsisted entirely on salt provisions, and it was only when they came to occupy the right bank of the river that they got fresh meat supplied to them. On the left bank of the river they were actually invested by the enemy; there was a continued line of six miles of stockade, by which the enemy shut them in, with a jungle of two miles and a half between them and the stockade. Behind that immense line of stockade there were three other stockades, all to be attacked by the troops before they could meet the main body of the enemy. If they deducted the 800 or 1,000 men in the hospital, and at least 500 more who must remain to protect the hospital and such stores as they had, General Godwin would not be able to move out with more than 3,500 men; and he believed, that with the exception of having animals to move his guns, he had no means whatever of moving his forces. In the event of these forces succeeding in attacking the stock-ades—which, if the enemy fought at all, must be a work attended with severe loss —how was it to be expected that forces so limited in amount, and already so seriously affected by sickness, would be able at last to march upon Ava, as was the dream of those who looked at these operations from a distance? In Arracan there were 500 men employed in making a road to the top of the pass which leads from Arracan to the Irrawady. The officer commanding these men reported that he could not make the road in less than three months, that there was a steep mountain with a stockade which it was impossible to take, and that there was not a single commissariat officer to provide supplies for his troops; and the consequence was, that that officer was actually raising supplies on his own credit. Such was the state of the force employed to make the road by which animals were to get to the valley of the Irrawaddy. That road was perfectly well known to us. A regiment of Madras troops came back to India by it. We were in possession of the most minute details respecting it; and the fact was, that there would not have been the slightest difficulty in throw- ing troops over and occupying that pass on the very first day of the war; but, now that we had allowed the pass to be so strongly fortified, it would be a matter of great difficulty to take it; and, even if we were prepared to send out animals to make the Army moveable through that pass, there were no troops to escort them. At Rangoon there might be about 2,000 men, 500 or 600 at Pegu, besides 1,100 to sweep the country—that was to say, there were about3,500 men left below—and, in consequence of the unfortunate measure of the occupation of Pegu, he did not think it possible, while that measure was adhered to, that one man could be sent from the lower part of the river as a reinforcement. Fortunately for this country, the Burmese had been very hasty in their attack upon Pegu. Had they only waited until the force at Rangoon had been reduced to the strength of a mere garrison, it was impossible that they should not have been able to take it. It could not have been relieved by an adequate force. In consequence of the necessity of relieving Pegu, there had been a delay of three or four weeks at a most important period of the campaign, and there would be an increased loss of life, owing to the greater strength of the enemy's works near Prome, and to their having occupied the old position of Danabew, so celebrated in the former war, Now, when such was the state of things with respect to the operations in the present war, when the Army was in such a position as that to which he had called their Lordships' attention—when it was remembered that it had scarcely moved at all in order to inflict any serious loss upon the enemy: this was the moment which had been selected to declare the annexation of the province of Pegu, which we did not occupy, and of intimating our intention, if our proposals were not acceded to, of moving upon Ava! That was a very grandiloquent proclamation; but, unfortunately, there did not exist a force sufficient to enable us to carry it into execution. If General Godwin and the Government had confined their attention in the present campaign to the possession of the province of Pegu, and had attacked from the rear the Burmese who occupied the passes leading into Arracan, so as to complete the communication between our provinces and the Irrawaddy, he would not say that in the following campaign it would not have been a perfectly feasible measure, and that we could not have performed the operation of subjugating that Power if it were thought to be necessary. It was not for him (the Earl of Ellenborough), who knew the strength of the Indian Army and the resources of the country, to say that any measure which was ordered by the Government here was incapable of being executed there; but with a view to success in all military operations, time, previous preparation, and much consideration were required, and no army whatever could effect great purposes in war which was not perfectly provided with the means of moving; and of these the Army to which he was now referring had literally none. And here he begged to ask whether it was advisable that we should annex the province of Pegu at all? If the annexation of Pegu were possible, could we continue to maintain such a possession? Let it be remembered that there was no frontier, no range of mountains, not the slightest line of demarcation. Even if it were possible for us to obtain possession of the country by treaty with the King of Ava, could we look forward to being able to maintain it without further conflict? He believed it was impossible for us in that case to avoid further conflict. And to what would that lead us? To the occupation of the whole of that kingdom, and thus place us upon the internal frontier of China, as well as to a considerable extent upon that of the King of Siam. Was it desirable to expend in that way the resources of our Indian empire? We had made of late years many annexations to the empire of India—he would not trouble the House by going into the detail of these acquisitions—but he had no hesitation in saying that some of these had produced the greatest possible advantage to us in a military point of view; but even the military advantages would be denied us in the case of Ava. In India these advantages were attended by this additional recommendation—that however large might be the force in the new provinces, that force was still in India, and still continued to produce its moral effect on the inhabitants of that country. Again, in the case of the extended dominion of India, all the troops in the various provinces could be easily available for the protection of any one province that might require their services; but from Ava it would be impossible to withdraw the troops which would be found necessary to keep possession of it. Ava was out of India, and was altogether unconnected with it. This was the first time the Government had desired to extend the empire into wholly new regions. We could not occupy Ava without a large extension of our military force—even if we confined ourselves to the occupation of Pegu without a considerable addition of force. Without this it would he impossible to diminish the number of officers in the regular regiments by appointing them, as we did now, to political and civil offices. It would be necessary, therefore, to add several regiments for the purpose of procuring more officers to fill these different situations. Already, during the present war, no fewer than twenty-two officers had been taken from their regiments and placed in political employments. At least four European and eight Native regiments would be absolutely necessary, even if we confined ourselves to the occupation of Pegu; but we must go further—we must occupy the whole kingdom of Ava; and, he had told their Lordships with what countries they would, in that case come into contact, and how great the danger that some apparent or pretended necessity would be found of going yet further. There was another consideration which their Lordships ought not to dismiss from their minds—that was, the manner in which they would carry on the government of Ava. In the case of the previous annexations which had taken place in India, they could bring from any part of the country persons conversant with the habits and language of the people; but the language of Ava was different from any known in India, and how could they conduct the government of a conquered country with anything like satisfaction to themselves, when they could not find a single individual to assist them able to speak its language? When he looked at the magnitude of the operations in which we were now engaged, at the annexation of a province which we did not really occupy, at the threat to occupy an empire and dethrone a sovereign, if our demands were not acceded to; when he looked at the expenditure which had already been incurred in the war—not less at the present time, he apprehended, and from the commencement of the war, than 130,000l. a month—remembering the expense of the war in China, he might even say 150,000l. a month—when he considered that we had already detached from India fifteen regiments, besides artillery—that we occupied the whole steam force of India, besides a portion of that belonging to Her Majesty; when he looked forward to the prospect of more extended operations being necessary to carry into effect the great object to which we had now pledged our honour by that unfortunate proclamation; when he remembered that the original causes or pretexts that had been put forward in its justification were two little injuries inflicted on British subjects, the details of which were adopted according to the statement of the parties complaining, without any inquiry whatever by impartial persons—two little insults, as they were called, inflicted upon those persons, who went to the Governor of Rangoon with a letter from the Governor General of India—the first provoked by the recklessness with which they acceded to the proposition to go two and a half miles in the middle of the day to the Governor of Rangoon—a circumstance which would at all times be certain to call forth disrespect—and the second provoked and rendered necessary by persisting in going to the Governor when he had distinctly told them that he would not receive the Mission at all; when he considered that the whole amount of the original damage was said to be 900l.; when he remembered that we had seized a ship of 900 tons burden, which was surely equal in value to the amount of the damage; when he considered how the presence of five of our ships in their river might have been considered by the Burmese as an injury and an insult, at least equal to that which we said we received; when he remembered all these things, he confessed it was most painful to contemplate the great and lamentable consequences which had arisen from a cause so small. Let their Lordships remember that this was not the first occasion on which differences had arisen with the Burmese Government from supposed injuries to British subjects, and supposed disrespect to the British flag; but on former occasions the good sense of the Government had so acted as to prevent the collision which had taken place in the present instance. It was well known that on this occasion the King of Ava did not desire war, and that he had made no preparation for it—that, whatever injury or insult had been inflicted on us, the notion of acting hostilely towards us never entered his head. When he remembered this—and remembered also that on former occasions our disputes with that Government had been settled in an amicable manner, so as to avoid hostilities, he confessed it was with deep regret that he had seen on this occasion a course pur- sued which had involved us in a great war. We had become involved in it from causes apparently the most trifling, and which might so easily have been settled by some measure of a much less violent description. His noble Friend and the Government, he was aware, were not answerable for the proclamation which had been issued; but they as well as the country must, he feared, abide by it. He desired, however, to learn from his noble Friend what were his views of our position with respect to that war, and in what manner he thought this country could extricate itself from the difficulties in which it had been placed.

The EARL of ABERDEEN

My Lords, my noble Friend asks us, in the first place, whether we have any objection to lay before the House a letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company to the Governor General of India in Council, dated in September, 1829, giving instructions as to the line of operations in any future war with Ava. Now, although I believe it has scarcely ever been customary to produce any despatch from the Secret Committee, I am not disposed to withhold the despatch which is now asked for, because although it may be a document possessing some historical interest, I think that despatch is one of little practical utility. That despatch was written twenty-five years ago, on a supposed event which might take place—namely, the renewal of a war with Ava. Now, your Lordships will see that in the lapse of time many events may have happened to render completely inappropriate any line of conduct prescribed in a despatch of so old a date; and therefore, although, as I have said, it may be matter of interest to your Lordships to possess the opinions of the illustrious man referred to by my noble Friend, dressed up as they are in the language of my noble Friend who has just spoken, I still must consider it a matter of mere historical curiosity, and not one of practical utility. I have however, no objection to produce the despatch. My noble Friend has also asked whether Her Majesty's Government are prepared to lay before the House any papers explanatory of the present objects of the war with Ava, and of the measures whereby it is proposed to attain such objects. These papers Her Majesty's Government are prepared to lay before the House, and from them I believe my noble Friend will obtain all the information he requires. I believe that the papers already upon the table bring down the operations to the end of March; and those which are about to be produced will include the latest papers which refer to the annexation of the province of Pegu, and the proclamation to which my noble Friend has referred. My noble Friend has another Motion upon the paper, to which he has not adverted—namely, to move for an account of the expense already incurred in the war with Ava, and an estimate of the probable expense to be incurred in the current year. That, of course, will be complied with, so far as it is in the power of the Government to do so. My noble Friend has entered into a very full and minute criticism of the objects of the war, and of the detailed conduct of the operations which have taken place. Your Lordships are aware that Her Majesty's present Government are strangers to the whole of the policy and execution of that war up to the present time. Her Majesty's late Government, I apprehend, gave their general approbation to that policy and to the conduct of the war. I am not disposed to dissent from that policy, or to withhold the approbation which the late Government expressed. My noble Friend has animadverted upon the annexation of the province of Pegu. My Lords, I have great reliance upon the discretion, judgment, and experience of my noble Friend the present Governor General of India, and I believe that he would not have adopted a step of that description without very mature consideration and a perfect conviction that he was acting in accordance with his duty. That annexation, like many other of our proceedings in India, has been reluctantly adopted, and has been made from the necessity of obtaining adequate redress for the injuries we have received, and compensation for the expenditure incurred. Ever since I had a seat in this House, I remember that every Governor General who has left this country for India has gone out with professions of a most pacific policy, and a desire to abstain from anything like war or aggrandisement of territory; yet I believe that there has not been a single Governor General who has not found himself more or less engaged in war. In the present instance I have no doubt that my noble Friend the Governor General has been led by the necessities of the case to extend the sphere of the warlike operations in which he has become engaged; for, as your Lordships know very well, an enterprise, whatever may be its primary objects and intentions, necessarily undergoes great changes and modifications in the course of its progress. My noble Friend opposite has also referred to the various military operations of General Godwin, and to the different movements of his army. I am unable to form a judgment of the propriety, wisdom, or military skill displayed by the officers and men engaged in that war. I make no such pretensions. I know perfectly well the ability and power of military criticism possessed by my noble Friend opposite, and very likely there may be some reason for the criticism with which he has favoured your Lordships. Upon that I confess I have no opinion; but I believe that my noble Friend the Governor General is fully as well able to form a just opinion of those proceedings as my noble Friend opposite, and, therefore, having complete reliance upon his judgment, and knowing the opportunities he possesses on the subject, I do not feel inclined to come to any different opinion from that which he has expressed. As I said before, Her Majesty's present Government do not feel called upon to engage in any manner in discussing the propriety of the measures which were adopted last year under the late Government; but I may say in general terms that, I acquiesce in the opinion which has been expressed by the late Government upon the subject, and in the communications which they made to the Governor General of India.

The EARL of DERBY

said, his noble Friend near him (the Earl of Ellenborough) who had introduced the subject to their Lordships with his usual ability and vigour, and the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Aberdeen), had both reminded him that Her Majesty's present Government were not responsible for the course of policy which had been pursued with reference to the proceedings in Ava, nor for the operations that had taken place. He readily admitted to the noble Earl opposite, while he rejoiced that he did not differ in opinion from the late Government, that for that policy and course of proceeding the noble Earl and his Colleagues were in no respect responsible; but that he (the Earl of Derby) and his Colleagues were alone distinctly and directly responsible for that policy. They were not responsible, indeed, for the commencement of those operations, nor for the original cause of the war, since it had taken place previously to their accession to office; but he had no hesitation in entering into an examination of the representations which his noble Friend the Governor General had sent home of the necessity of his first proceedings, in sanctioning the course which he had felt it necessary to adopt, and in coming to the conclusion that, reluctantly as he had been compelled to undertake hostile operations against Ava, the amount of insult, if not the extent of the individual injury done to British subjects, was such, that if it were felt necessary to maintain the prestige of the British character in India, and to guard ourselves from future insult and injury, they must not be allowed to pass unnoticed and unredressed. His noble Friend had stated very truly that this was not the first offence which had been offered by the Burmese. It was not because a loss had been sustained by a British merchant to the extent of 900l. that we had been compelled to demand of the Governor of Rangoon first, and of the King of Ava afterwards, a thorough indemnification and reparation for the insult and injury which had been inflicted upon a British subject; but it was because, from the year 1826, a succession of insults and encroachments had gradually deprived us of all the benefits which had resulted from the last war with Burmah, had driven our Minister from that post which he had been directed to hold, had gradually deprived us of all the privileges to which we were entitled, and had succeeded in thwarting the operations of our commerce—because each successive insult had been tamely acquiesced in, perhaps from necessity, by the Government of the day—it was the continued succession of those injuries and insults which had at length made it incumbent upon the Governor General not to pass them over. Without discussing the merits of this particular case, he did not hesitate to say, that when the papers should be produced they would completely bear out the assertion that, unwillingly as the Governor General had had recourse to hostilities, it was impossible for him to have avoided them, and that, having entered upon them, it was necessary to carry them vigorously forward. At the commencement of these hostilities the troops, with very little difficulty and delay, occupied successively the forts of Rangoon and Martaban, and a further advance was made upon Pegu. Our troops were regarded by the populace, not as enemies, but as deliverers, come to rescue them from an oppressive yoke. Our soldiers were received as guests and friends, and every necessary was supplied to them in the markets, and perfect tranquillity was restored from the moment we took possession of the town. The period then arrived at which it was necessary for the Governor General to come to a determination as to how far he should consider that sufficient reparation had been taken from the King of Ava—not given by him—and whether any and what further operations should be undertaken. The Governor General, in a despatch which he presumed would be one of the papers the noble Earl proposed to lay on the table of the House, entered very largely into the various measures which it might be practicable for him to pursue in order to obtain sufficient reparation for the past, and security for the future. There were three courses, if he recollected rightly, which appeared to be open to the Governor General, the nature of which he transmitted for the opinion and advice of Her Majesty's Home Government. The first was, withdrawing from the advanced position which we then occupied, and doing nothing more than taking possession of Martaban and Rangoon, thereby occupying the forts at the entrance of the two great rivers, the Irawaddy and the Thaleain, and thus exercising a great and important influence over the commerce of the country. To that course of proceeding several objections manifestly presented themselves. In the first place, according to the feeling of all Indian nations, a retreat from a position once occupied was never regarded as a proof of moderation, but as an evidence of fear and of inability to hold our own. Consequently our previous successes, followed by a retreat, would have led to the opinion that we were incapable of protecting our own people when insulted. A second objection was, that by such a course the inhabitants of the town and neighbourhood of Pegu, who had welcomed us as deliverers, would be, when deserted by us, immediately exposed to the sanguinary vengeance of the King of Ava. The third objection was, that the occupation of those forts of Martaban and Rangoon would require as large an amount of military force as the occupation of the whole province, and for placing garrisons in the more advanced portion of it. That then, was the first course which was open. The second course was the annexation of Pegu up to the town of Prome, without seeking to have that annexation confirmed or assented to by any treaty on the part of the King of Ava. The third course was that of annexing that which we had already occu- pied, insisting on the confirmation of that annexation by a treaty with the King of Ava, and, failing such treaty, then to proceed to ulterior measures, even amounting to an advance upon the town of Ava itself, or to Amerapoora. His noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough) seemed to be of opinion, that for the operations of that campaign no fitting provisions had been made; that no proper force had been brought together; and, above all, that there were no means of transport provided for the forces. All he (the Earl of Derby) could say was, that in the despatch to which he had referred, the Governor General distinctly stated the amount of force which he would require for the different operations, and added, that he had already given directions for levying a sufficient force to be applied to either of the three contingencies which Her Majesty's Government should determine upon having recourse to; that it would not be necessary in the first instance to levy the whole of that force, but that he should, in the first instance, levy sufficient to secure the annexation and occupation of the province of Pegu, and that he had taken steps for the further levy of forces, and for the supply of elephants and the proper means of transport of the larger expedition, should the Home Government think it necessary to direct an advance upon Amerapoora. Her Majesty's late Government received that despatch, containing the views entertained by the Governor General and his Council, and the arguments pro and con, about the 17th or 18th of August last; and, inasmuch as it was stated that no military operations could be taken before the latter end of October or November, there was ample time to receive instructions from home. He the more dwelt upon this, because he had seen it industriously circulated, in the Indian newspapers especially, that for any apparent inaction or delay, which some persons were disposed to charge upon the military authorities. Her Majesty's late Government and the Court of Directors and the Secret Committee were mainly and exclusively responsible; that active measures had been pressed upon them by the Indian Government, but that they had been positively prohibited, That was not only not true, but was directly the reverse of true. The three causes to which he had alluded were submitted candidly and impartially to the Government by the Governor General. The first of the courses, the mere occupation of Martaban and Rangoon, was rejected as inadmissible. Between the other two, he considered the various reasons, and desired the explicit instructions of the Government. The despatch in question, he had already stated, had been received about the 18th of August, and, as the Government then had, fortunately for them, the means of referring to the advice and counsel of that great authority to whom his noble Friend had referred in terms of eulogy, which he could only share with every man in this kingdom—they took the opportunity of consulting with that illustrious man as to the course of proceeding which he would advise, and of submitting to his consideration and judgment the whole of the papers, with the suggested plan of operations, which had been transmitted by the Indian Government. That period was within three weeks of the lamented death of that illustrious man; and he believed that his memorandum upon this very subject was almost the last document which had been prepared by him upon any public matter. It was addressed to him (the Earl of Derby) upon the 24th of August, and contained an explanation of the policy which he recommended to be pursued. He was sure, after the statement which his noble Friend had made, and his reference to the high authority of the Duke of Wellington in 1829, that their Lordships would not think he was improperly trespassing on their time and attention if he read to them that which had been given to him in the form of a memorandum by the noble and gallant Duke—now, alas! no more. In the first place his noble Friend had commented very strongly upon the insufficient cause and origin of the war, and had contended that it had been unjustly and improperly engaged in. The very first paragraph of the illustrious Duke's letter said—"It appears to me that the war could not be averted." It then went on— That the operations fixed upon were judicious; have been ably carried into execution, with great gallantry, by the officers and troops; and that a commencement has been made to require from and enable the Government to consider of the means to be adopted for the restoration of peace, and the terms on which peace should be restored. I concur with the Governor General in thinking that it will be absolutely necessary to retain possession of all that has fallen into the hands of the British troops; that is, Rangoon, Martaban, and even Bassein, Pegu, and the whole province so called. My opinion is, that it will be necessary to continue the preparations for carrying on the operations of the war till the Sovereign of Ava shall be convinced of the necessity of signing a treaty, by the provisions of which all these dominions will be ceded to the British Government, or till the State of Ava shall be destroyed. A mere military possession of these districts would be but an inglorious and little secure result of these successful operations. I confess that I am inclined to expect that the means adopted to cut off from Ava the supplies of corn usually received by import by sea will have the effect of producing efforts to obtain peace by negotiation; but, if not, the British Government ought to be in a state of military preparation to advance upon Ava, to enforce the abandonment of the capital, and even of Amerapoora. It may be relied upon that the natives of the East are not better prepared than we are to abandon their dwellings in the winter, and to live in the jungles and mountains. The Government suspected of intending to take such a course would be abandoned by all its followers. At all events, the military possession and tenure of provinces and possessions upon the sea coast would be considered in a very different light, the Government of Ava being there seated in strength, as under existing circumstances; or being driven out and weakened towards Amerapoora, or further on in the mountains, as is supposed in the printed papers. I conceive, therefore, that it will be necessary to assemble the large force proposed, even though it should be determined to insist upon the cession of all the maritime possessions of the State of Ava. These must be ceded by the stipulations of a treaty of peace, or the State must be destroyed. If, after all, the sovereign should treat for peace in order to save his State, he must be made to pay the expenses of the war. The necessity for providing specially for the security of the people of Pegu, discussed in the Minutes of the Members of the Council, appears to me to be disposed of; but it may be relied upon that that point will have much effect in both Houses of Parliament. It appears to me that the people of Pegu have already by their conduct acquired the right to claim protection by stipulations of treaty, if the province should be restored to the Government of Ava, however objectionable all such provisions of treaties, as leading to, and rendering necessary, interference in the internal affairs of a foreign nation. The demand of the cession would certainly be preferable to restoration with a stipulation of amnesty to the people of Pegu, of which it would be necessary for the British Government to enforce the execution. He had read this memorandum to their Lordships for the purpose of showing, that with a full knowledge of all the facts of the case—with all the papers of every description before him—with all his previous knowledge of Indian habits and manners—the Duke of Wellington came to these conclusions:—First, that war could not have been averted; next, that the operations proposed were judicious; next, that the measures adopted were performed with great gallantry and success; and, lastly, that in honour to the inhabitants of Pegu, as well as in policy, we wine bound not to stop short, but, unless the King of Ava ceded to us by treaty the territory we had already occupied, to advance for those larger operations which had been indicated by the Governor General. He ought not, perhaps, to speak of the views entertained by himself and the other Members of his Government; but he might venture to say that the advice so given by the noble and illustrious Duke—by him who had been, he understood, so ludicrously spoken of as having in his latter days been overcome with childish timidity and imbecility of mind and purpose—that the advice thus given by the noble and illustrious Duke, so clear, so vigorous, entirely confirmed the Government as to the course which it was desirable and expedient for them to take; and they accordingly transmitted those instructions to the Governor General of India—in consequence of which the annexation of Pegu took place, and in further consequence of which, unless an arrangement should be made with the Sovereign of Pegu, or unless contrary instructions were transmitted by those who were now responsible for the management of Indian affairs, a further advance into the Burmese territories would take place, with means and appliances he was quite satisfied, from his knowledge and reliance upon the Governor General, amply adequate to all the emergencies of the case. He was not prepared to' discuss with his noble Friend the questions of military tactics he had raised, or possible defects of judgment in any of the officers employed. He was not competent and not called upon to do so; but he must take the liberty of saying, that he had heard with some astonishment the statement of his noble Friend that a large portion of our Army in the district was suffering from sickness. His noble Friend might have some later information on the subject than he himself possessed; but certainly up to the moment when he quitted office it had been a source of most unfeigned satisfaction to himself and his Colleagues to receive, by each successive mail, reports of the increasing good health of the troops engaged in the service, and of the singularly small proportion of invalids in the hospitals. Upon the information he himself possessed, he had no hesitation in expressing the conviction that the forces at the present disposal of the Governor General were quite adequate for the purpose of occupying that province, which, with the good will of the great bulk of the population, had already been annexed. Whatever the disadvantages of any extension of our Indian empire, it must be admitted that this particular an- nexation would have the good effect of facilitating the communication between our provinces of Tenasserim and Arracan, and of strengthening their frontiers, especially those of the latter district. With reference to larger operations, should these be found necessary, he had the fullest confidence that the Governor General would be quite prepared with all the means and appliances for their vigorous and effective execution.

LORD WHARNCLIFFE

said, that as respected the extension of our frontier this was a most important consideration. In the proclamation of the Governor General there was no mention made of any treaty. It stated that if the King of Ava did not acquiesce in our occupation of Pegu, it would become necessary to take further proceedings, but it did not declare that there was any intention to insist on a treaty. It appeared to him, therefore, that the course taken by the Governor General did not comply in one essential point with the course recommended by the Duke of Wellington; and he should like to know whether the papers intended to be laid before the House would include the letter in which Lord Dalhousie wrote for instructions to the Home Government, as well as the instructions which were sent out. The noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen) seemed to say, in the course of the observations which he made, that he had not full information as to the views of the late Government. He (Lord Wharncliffe) was left in some doubt, therefore, whether that portion of the correspondence was to be included.

The EARL of ABERDEEN

said, that if that portion of the correspondence were omitted, the papers would be very unsatisfactory indeed, and he could assure his noble Friend that he did not mean to say that he was not in full possession of the views and intentions of the late Government: far from it.

Then it was moved by the EARL of ELLENBOROUGH— That there be laid before this House an account of the expense already incurred in the war with Ava, and an estimate of the probable expense to be incurred in the current year.

On Question, agreed to, and ordered, accordingly.

House adjourned till To-morrow.