Lords Sitting of 9 February 1852

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILL.—1a Common Law Procedure Amendment.

BRIBERY OATHS.
LORD BROUGHAM, seeing his noble Friend the President of the Council, whose recent indisposition he, in common with all their Lordships, greatly lamented, once more in his place, would take the liberty of recommending the subject of bribery at elections to his consideration, and that of the Government. It was a subject which he had brought before Parliament at various times, and many attempts had been made by himself, as well as by others, to extirpate this grievous evil. All these Motions had failed in effect, and one which he had introduced some Sessions ago, and which had been sent to the other House of Parliament, where it was dropped, had been justly complained of, because it did not go far enough. There was no provision to compel the parties themselves to be examined. But this defect he had completely cured by the Evidence Bill of last Session; for now both the sitting Member and the unsuccessful candidate for a scat were liable to be examined on oath, subject, no doubt, to their refusal to answer any question which might criminate themselves, but also to the consequences criminatory of themselves which might result from their silence, and which would be fatal before an Election Committee. Unquestionably, however, something more than the Evidence Bill was wanted to render the law for the prevention of bribery perfect, sanguine as his hopes were of the effects of that Bill. He therefore trusted that Her Majesty's Ministers would take the subject under their consideration, as the instances which had occurred of late confirmed rather than weakened the belief in the existence of great bribery and corruption at elections. He had a very confident opinion that a Bill might now easily be formed, which, with the Evidence Act, would put a stop to these corrupt practices. The true course to be taken in order to extirpate bribery would be to exact from every Member of Parliament, on taking his seat, a solemn declaration either on oath or honour—he should prefer the latter—that he had not, by himself or his agents, directly or indirectly, given or promised money, or any other valuable thing, to, or had used,
236
or promised to use, any influence, to procure a place or pension for, any voter who had voted at his election, and that he was wholly ignorant of any gift or promise made on his behalf by any person to such voter, and that he wholly disbelieved that any such thing had been done on his behalf by any persons for him, or pretending to act for him, whether with or without his authority; and, furthermore, to bind him by a solemn promise not to pay, or cause to be paid, any thing, or to fulfil any one promise, or to do anything whatsoever to carry into execution the promise or engagement of his agents, or of any other persons authorised or unauthorised in his behalf. The same declaration would of course also be exacted from the unsuccessful candidate at the election for the seat, in case he succeeded in ousting the sitting Member. That was a declaration which he thought that no man would dare to make if he were not thoroughly and perfectly conscious, in his own mind, that he had not, either by himself or by another in his behalf, done anything, or was cognisant of anything, like bribery being done in the course of his election. If his declaration was in any particular false, he would be, as he must know, in the hands of worthless persons, and his character was gone for ever.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEcould assure his noble and learned Friend, that he should be glad if any effectual remedy could be provided against those corrupt practices at elections. The noble and learned Lord and other distinguished persons had given their attention to this subject at various times; but he feared it must, unfortunately, be admitted that no effectual remedy could be provided against them. It might be satisfactory, however, to his noble and learned Friend to know that the subject had occupied the attention of Her Majesty's Government, and a notice either had been given already, or would be given that very night, in the other House of Parliament, of their intention to bring in a measure on the subject; and he was sure the subject was taken up with a strong determination to bring it to an effectual issue.
LORD BROUGHAMwas exceedingly happy to hear the statement of his noble Friend, that notice had been given, or was about to be given, on this subject, not having been aware that such an intention existed. Much would depend upon the form of the Bill; and he hoped and trusted

237
there was sufficient virtue in the other House of Parliament, to prevent them from any longer avoiding this necessary and efficacious measure for extirpating bribery.

COMMON LAW PROCEDURE AMENDMENT BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
The LORD CHANCELLORmoved the Second Reading of this Bill, which was one of those referred to in the Royal Speech, and was framed upon one of the reports of the Commission appointed to inquire into the Process and Practice of the Superior Courts of Common Law. Considering the circumstances under which the Bill had been presented to their Lordships, independently of the nature of the Bill itself, he did not feel it necessary to urge any reasons for the Bill beyond those which would present themselves to their Lordships' views, or wore offered by the Committee in their Report. Their Lordships were aware that the law was distinguishable into two branches: the one, that part of the law by which rights were adjudicated, and the other, that which regulated the course of proceeding, by which the questions of right were presented to the Courts for adjudication. The present Bill related to the latter department of law. It was intended to supply the defects and remedy the abuses by which the several steps in the course of litigation for the decision of rights had hitherto been accompanied. The Bill followed the whole course of a suit from its commencement to its final determination in a Court of Error, remedying the deficiencies and removing the defects which occurred at every step or stage of the proceeding. The present system of procedure had originated in a very remote period, when the course of justice was administered under very different circumstances; and though times had changed, yet, at the present day, the forms of procedure were still the same, the ancient system had remained, and the consequences were that in many instances results had followed which did not belong to it at the time the system was originally established, and which had never been contemplated by the framers of these proceedings. Originally the proceedings in our Courts of Law were not by written pleadings, as now, but were put in by counsel ore tenus. Formerly, after the
238
defendant had answered to the writ and made his appearance in the court, the plaintiff or his advocate stated his case, or (as, in technical terms, it was called) "counted" or "declared" the nature of his cause of complaint. The defendant or his counsel then made objections in point of form, or presented an answer to the plaintiff in substance. The objections made in point of form were then and at once answered by the plaintiff, and immediately decided upon by the Court. If the objection were allowed, there was an application instanter on the part of the plaintiff to amend, which was generally granted. And, on the other hand, if the objection failed, judgment was given at once against the defendant, or he had judgment of respondeat ouster, by which he was called to answer over in some better manner on the merits on some day then fixed. The objections of form having been overruled, the Court then went to the merits of the case. Those objections were numerous, and any noble Lord might read in Reeves' History of the English Law, vol. ii. page 344, not less than seven or eight such objections urged and answered in succession, in the same case, on the same day, and all overruled, and the defendant at last obliged to answer on the merits. Their Lordships could see very easily what different results would have followed had written proceedings been the practice. As a check upon these objections, however, it was provided that if a party craved time to answer to the substance of the "count" or "declaration," he thereby waived all right to take formal objections; and when the day arrived on which he was allowed to "impeach," he was compelled, when he answered or "pleaded," to meet objections taken in like manner on the part of plaintiff's counsel, and was obliged to amend or answer instanter; and a similar course was pursued when the plaintiff replied to the answer or "plea," until the parties having thus pleaded and replied to each other, the proceedings were reduced into writing, and the "issue" in which they resulted was set down for trial. Since those ancient times, the quantity of business had so increased that it would be impossible for those proceedings to be carried on in succession ore tenus; therefore the complaint or "declaration" of the plaintiff had to be reduced into writing, and the defendant had necessarily some time to consider it; and if he answered it in sub-

239
stance, or only by a formal objection, some time was also necessary for the plaintiff to reply, or to meet the formal objection; so that when the written proceedings are set down for hearing, it sometimes happens in our own time that "hearing" takes place six or twelve months afterwards. Of course this made a great difference as to formal objections, which originally had the effect of securing precision and regularity, without any delay, expense, or injustice to the opposite party; whereas now the most frivolous objections could be taken, and the cause, to a considerable degree, delayed and obstructed, or often indeed ultimately decided upon a point irrelevant to the merits of the matter in issue. Similar observations applied to the ulterior proceedings. And their Lordships would perceive how differently formal objections were considered in ancient times to what they were in the present day. Formerly all causes were tried at Westminster Hall. Then came first the statutes of "assizes," which allowed them to be tried in the county once, and afterwards twice, a year; and then the statutes of nisi prius, (reign of Edward I.), on which all causes were tried twice a year; but still the same form was continued as if the cause had been tried in Westminster Hall. When, therefore, the "issue" was "made up," a writ went down from the Court to the sheriff of the county, directing him to summon a jury to attend the court at a certain period, at which it was supposed or feigned that the cause would be tried; but as it was known it could not be tried at that time, the jury, of course, did not appear; and then there was another writ to the sheriff, called a distringas, stating that the jury had (contrary to the fact) made a default, and directing him to "distrain" them by a certain penalty, and to have their bodies at Westminster at a certain other day, "unless before" (nisi prius) the justices of the king should come into the county and the place where assizes were held to try the causes; and all this because the ancient process, no longer applicable, is notwithstanding retained. Supposing, however, the parties got to issue, and the cause came down to be tried, as according to the present course of proceeding—if there were too many parties joined as plaintiffs, or too few, the plaintiff was nonsuited, that is, defeated and lost his cause for the time, notwithstanding that the debt was undoubtedly due, for the cause of action had accrued to some of the
240
plaintiffs; and, on the other hand, in certain actions, if there were too many defendants sued, the plaintiff failed as against all, although he had an unquestionable claim against some. These anomalies had been brought about by the alteration of circumstances in the course of time. Now, it appeared that in 1846 146,000 writs were issued; of which only 2 per cent ever came to trial, only 5 per cent went so far as "declaration;" so that not more than 7 per cent arrived beyond the writ. This showed that nearly all the writs issued were settled before the time arrived for "appearance;" and that all the rest of them had been commenced for undisputed debts or claims. There were provisions in the Bill for reducing the cost of proceedings in cases of this class; and their Lordships would see, that, considering the very small proportion which went to trial, it was desirable to render the expenses in the prior stages of proceeding as small as possible. The present Bill, as he had already observed, travelled through every stage of the suit. It first provided that when a writ was issued it should have an endorsement stating precisely what is claimed for debt, and how much for costs. This would give the defendant an opportunity of knowing whether there was anything in the amount of the debt claimed to which he objected. If the defendant did not "appear" to the writ within eight days, judgment would be "signed" upon the writ without the expense of a "declaration," or of "interlocutory judgment," or "final judgment," according to the nature of the action. He thought that their Lordships would agree with him in thinking that the "declaration" gave little or no material information to the defendant in ordinary actions. It did indeed state whether the action was brought for goods sold or delivered, or on a bill of exchange. But if the causes belonged to the class he was referring to—those of ordinary debts and claims which the defendant did not dispute—there was no occasion why the cause should proceed to "declaration," with "plea" and interlocutory judgment, because the writ would give the defendant due notice what the claim was, putting him upon his guard if he meant to defend; and if he did not appear in court within eight days to defend, "final judgment" would be "signed;" and the result would be, that the costs would be reduced at least one fourth of what they would at present amount to,

241
where the cause travelled in the course described. With regard to formal and technical objections, they were altogether abolished. Many of them were connected with matters no longer material. For instance, originally the jury in every case came from the vicinity (visne) of the parties and of the transaction in question, and therefore every material fact alleged in the declaration was required to be accompanied with an averment, not only of time, but of place, in order that the Court might see what, the "venue" must be, that is, the place whence the jury must come which should try that matter of fact, if denied, and put in issue. But now that juries came from the county at large, this of course was immaterial; yet it very frequently gave rise to objections. Numerous other objections could be taken in a form called "special demurrers," which would be altogether abolished. Very early statutes had been passed (after the original oral course of pleading was abandoned, and the present system adopted), requiring that formal objections should be stated specifically by way of "special demurrer," as distinguished from those legal objections which went to the merits of the case. These "special demurrers" often remained many months upon the paper, awaiting a hearing; the present Bill abolished altogether all grounds of "special demurrer," that is to say, such objections as were only formal. Besides these, however, there were occasionally slips made in the pleading, which really were material—omissions of some important allegation, perhaps essential to the maintenance of the action or of the defence. The opposite party could at present pass that by and proceed to the trial; and when the other side has succeeded, move an "arrest of judgment," upon a declaration, or for judgment non obstante veredicto (notwithstanding verdict), and thus deprive the party who succeeded at the trial of all the benefit of his success; or even might delay still longer, and sue out a writ of error after judgment had been given upon the verdict, and reverse all the proceedings in a superior tribunal. The Bill required that all these objections should be taken at an earlier stage, if at all, and would allow of no writ of error to reverse a judgment, except where the objection had been taken in the Court below. Thus their Lordships would see that the Bill travelled through the whole course of a suit—from the "writ of summons" to the "writ of error," dispensing altogether with numbers of forms,
242
abolishing many statements, and simplifying all. Although it could not be expected that a Bill thus extensive in its operation could be rendered so perfect as to be free from objection, yet he believed it would remove much of the odium now resting upon proceedings at law, and would go as far as law could go to secure to a party success in an honest suit—so far, at least, as to protect him from technical objections. He would not travel through all the clauses of the measure (some of which might possibly be considered capable of improvement in the Committee), but, persuaded it was one their Lordships would ultimately pass, he would merely move that the Bill he read a second time.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."
LORD LYNDHURSTsaid, no reasonable person could object to the Bill. It was the result of many months of labour on the part of persons very deeply informed upon the subject, and who had done everything in their power to render the Bill as perfect as possible. He did not rise to object to the Bill being read a second time, because every objection he had was to matters of detail, which could be considered in Committee. But there was one circumstance which he wished to present, which had always pressed upon his mind, and to which he had never been able to discover any satisfactory answer. The County Courts had now been established for several years, and their jurisdiction had been extended so far as 50 l. He understood that upwards of 5,000 causes of between 20 l. and 50 l. had been tried or decided within the last five months, which was at the rate of 12,000 per annum; and he was informed in every quarter that the decisions of these Courts had given entire satisfaction. Now, he could not understand why, if these Courts had jurisdiction in certain cases up to 50 l., and their machinery was found adequate to the administration of justice therein, there should not be in the Superior Courts of Law, with reference to the same classes of cases, the same simple machinery adopted (presided over by the fifteen Judges), within a certain limit at least, say to the extent of 200 l. or 300 l. If the machinery now adopted in the County Courts were good for causes of 50 l., he could not see why the same system could not be adopted for causes of greater value of the same class.
LORD BROUGHAMagreed that the Bill should be read a second time, and

243
then discuss the details in Committee—although he anticipated objections to it of three classes: that it did not go far enough; that it went too far; and that it went in the wrong direction. His own objection to it was rather of the former character, that it did not go far enough; though he admitted that, so far as it went, it was in the right direction. These objections, however, as his noble and learned Friend had observed, should be considered in Committee. He concurred with his noble and learned Friend as to the excellent working of the County Courts system, and as to the propriety of extending their jurisdiction.
LORD LYNDHURSTexplained that he did not say anything about their jurisdiction; but he had suggested that if their machinery was deemed adequate to causes of a certain description, the same machinery might be applied in the Superior Courts, under the presiding care of the Judges, to cases of a similar character, though of a larger amount.
LORD BROUGHAMadmitted that he had misunderstood what fell from his noble and learned Friend. He thought that if the suggestion of his noble and learned Friend were adopted, it would be of benefit both to the suitors and to the Courts of Common Law. This was a time when large and liberal amendments of the law were expected by the country, and ought to be granted. His Lordship then proceeded to read to the House an extract from a letter which he had just received from his noble and learned Friend Lord Denman, on the subject of the Bill of which he and the Lord Chancellor had spoken the other night. His noble Friend said—
"The present crisis could not fail to excite considerations of the highest importance. There is every appearance of an attempt to establish order on the basis of absolute power, and to teach mankind the lesson that the will of one man may be safely intrusted with the interests of all. But, if there be any truth in moral reasoning or long experience, it is clear that, without the basis of law, no solid fabric of order can be reared, nor can any security be given for the rights which even the best men and the best designed decrees may intend to confer. It appears to be the peculiar vocation of England to exhibit to the nations of the world a steady Government, and a peaceful, because contented, people, and that content must not be looked for (since it cannot and ought not to exist), where a press is free, and the people moderately enlightened, while a single grievance is wilfully maintained after exposure."
The LORD CHANCELLORwas not
244
exactly aware what the course of procedure in the County Courts was after the "declaration" or "plaint." If his noble and learned Friend was acquainted with it, and was prepared to recommend to the House to adopt it as a course of proceeding for the Superior Courts, his recommendation would go a great way with the public and the profession; but as at present advised, he (the Lord Chancellor) thought that the course of procedure laid down by the Bill was essential to the due administration of justice, and fitted to the nature of the litigation which took place in the important commercial and trading interests of the country; and he did not believe that the procedure of the County Courts was properly applicable to the suits in the Superior Courts. He should be glad, however, that the public should have the assurance of his noble and learned Friend's judgment as to whether or not he thought that the County Court course of proceeding was fitted to be adopted for administration of all suits; but until he heard from his noble and learned Friend the deliberate declaration of his judgment to that effect, he should not believe that his noble and learned Friend really entertained any such opinion.
On Question, agreed to. Bill read 2a accordingly.

FOREIGN REFUGEES IN ENGLAND.
VISCOUNT STRANGFORDsaid, he held in his hand some very important documents, which had been laid on the table of their Lordships' House, relating to the proceedings of certain foreign refugees in this country. [Parliamentary Papers, No. [1433] Session 1852.] These documents contained a series of remonstrances from the Ministers of Foreign Powers, protesting against the practices and designs of certain persons who had been driven from their own countries, and were alleged to be abusing the hospitality and protection of this country. The first of these documents was a remonstrance from the French Ambassador, which bore date so far back as the 29th of October last; and the noble Lord the late Foreign Secretary had not left office until the 22nd of December last. He wished, therefore, to know whether, during the long period that had elapsed since the receipt of the protest in question, any answer had been returned to the French Ambassador; next, if such answer had been given, what was its nature and tendency; and, thirdly, why such

245
answer, if sent, had been omitted from the papers that had been laid before Parliament? If no answer had yet been returned by Her Majesty's Government, all he could say, was, that he would most heartily rejoice if it should fall to the lot of the noble Earl the present Foreign Secretary to have to return it.
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he hoped their Lordships would not consider him wanting in courtesy to the noble Viscount if he refrained from alluding to the introductory remarks with which he had prefaced his questions, especially with regard to his predecessor in office. With regard to the question, whether Lord Palmerston gave any answer to the remonstrances which these despatches contained, he had to state to the House that no answers were sent by that noble Lord. But he (Earl Granville) had every reason to believe that if the noble Viscount had remained in office, his answer would not have been discordant with that which he had himself given.
The EARL of ELLENBOROUGHasked if any conversations had taken place? By the statement that no answer had been given, he presumed the noble Earl meant that no "official" answer had been sent—that was, none in writing; but he could hardly think it possible that there had not been some personal communication between the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Ministers in this country, by which the sentiments of the noble Viscount were conveyed to those Ministers.
EARL GRANVILLEreplied, that such a conversation as that referred to by the noble Earl might not have occurred, he was not now in a position to state; but the noble Viscount, according to the usage in going out of office, had given him a long interview, in the course of which he explained to him, in that remarkably clear and lucid manner for which he was more distinguished than any public man he had ever met, the state of our relations with all foreign countries. The noble Viscount alluded to this question as a point which he (Earl Granville) would have to consider and give an answer upon; but he gave him no information of any conversation between himself and the Minister of any Foreign Court on the subject.
A NOBLE LORDinquired whether any despatch had been subsequently received from our Ambassador at Vienna on the subject of the refugees?
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, that all the despatches which Her Majesty's Govern-
246
ment had received on this subject were contained in the papers that had been laid before the House.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
LORD LYNDHURSThoped that their Lordships would not consider him pertinacious, if he again called their attention to the course of legislative proceedings in that House. He believed, from an inspection of the Votes of the House of Commons, that seven or eight Bills effecting great alterations, and it might be improvements, in the law, were now prepared and laid on the table of that House—Bills requiring minute discussion in their details, and therefore scarcely likely to pass into law during the present Session. He knew many parties who thought that their Lordships' House was only a House of revision and not of initiation, and that they were rather an appellate jurisdiction than a legislative, body. That doctrine was quite contrary to the principles of the constitution, and was, at any rate, novel and extraordinary. He had already stated the number of Bills which had already been introduced into the House of Commons; but, with the exception of the solitary Bill introduced by his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack, and just read a second time that evening, not one Bill for the improvement of the law had been presented to the consideration of their Lordships. Now, he wished to ask his noble and learned Friend why he had not already brought forward in that place his Bill for the improvement of Charitable Trusts? Last Session it was brought into the House at so late a period that it was as a matter of necessity thrown over when it reached the other House of Parliament, where they had no time to discuss it. He, therefore, submitted that the earliest opportunity ought to be taken to secure a discussion of that Bill in the present Session. There was another important Bill lost last Session, and requiring revival in the present—he meant the Bill for improving the Law of Patents and Inventions. That Bill went down to the other House, and met with nearly the same fate as the other Bill which he had just mentioned, partly from want of time to discuss it, and partly from a want of sufficient understanding between the Ministers in that House and the Ministers in this. The history of that Bill was rather curious. A Bill on that subject was brought in originally by his noble and learned Friend near him (Lord

247
Brougham) at the very commencement of the Session. If that Bill had passed through their Lordships' House, it would have become law early in the Session; but his noble and learned Friend thought, that from the nature and variety of the interests involved in it, it should be carried through Parliament with the sanction and under the authority of Government; and the consequence was, that his noble and learned Friend expressed his readiness to surrender his Bill into the hands of Ministers. Considerable time was consumed in the consideration of that proposal, and the result was that the proposal was not accepted; and a rival Bill, as their Lordships would recollect, was introduced by the noble Lord opposite, who was at that time Vice-President of the Board of Trade. But even that Bill was not brought in until a short time before the Easter vacation. As there were then two Bills before the House on the same subject, they were referred, as a matter of course, to the consideration of a Select Committee. That Committee did not meet till after the Easter vacation, and the result of its inquiries was, that neither the Bill of his noble and learned Friend, nor that of the noble Earl opposite, was adopted by the Committee; but a Bill was drawn up and compounded of the two Bills, reminding him of the quotation—
"The force of nature could no further go;
To make a third she joined the other two."
That Bill was, he said, adopted by the Government, and received the sanction of his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack. It was natural to suppose that when that Bill went to the other House of Parliament, it would have met, so far as the Government was concerned, with an easy progress through that House; but, to his great surprise, when it reached the Committee in the House of Commons, 40 or 50 Amendments were made to a Bill which had originated with their Lordships, and which had left them with the full sanction of his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack. The result was that the Bill was defeated, owing to the animated discussions, and to the long delay attendant upon them, to which the Bill gave rise. One of the Amendments was of a singular nature. By the Bill every patent was required to pass the Great Seal; but Her Majesty's Attorney General, without any communication with the Lord Chancellor, proposed that the use of the Great Seal
248
should be abolished in all cases of patent. What was the result of all this? That the Bill, with its Amendments, did not come up to their Lordships until the very morning of the prorogation. Those Amendements were not printed, nor were they known to a single Peer. Even his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack was unacquainted with them. The noble Earl opposite, wisely, as it seemed to him (Lord Lyndhurst), declined to move their acceptance by the House. The Privy Seal and the Great Seal were in conflict with each other on the occasion, and the whole matter terminated in the loss of the Bill. No, it did not terminate so; for their Lordships would have again to go over all the details of the Bill on the law of Patents and Inventions in consequence of the procrastination and delay of legislation in that House. He hoped, then, that his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack would not hesitate to lay at once on the table not only his Charitable Trusts Bill, but also the Bill for the Improvement of the Law of Patents and Inventions—a Bill of the utmost importance, which had given rise to such interests and such feelings in a large and valuable part of the community.
The LORD CHANCELLORsaid, the noble and learned Lord had given the House a very amusing statement about the Patent Bill, which he dared say was all perfectly correct, but he could only say it was entirely new to him. That Bill was prepared under the noble Earl then Vice-President of the Board of Trade, and some of its provisions, at a late stage, were brought under his (the Lord Chancellor's) notice; but certainly the Bill generally had not come under his consideration. It was, however, deliberately considered, he believed, and great pains were taken with it. He had suggested the addition of one clause, which was for the purpose of authorising a Court of Law to grant an injunction where it was thought right to restrain the proceedings of parties pirating patented inventions. The Bill went down to the other House. He did not know the period when it came up again, but he knew that it was a subject of considerable inquiry and anxiety to the noble Lord (Earl Granville) and himself, and he believed it was brought up as early as it could be. But such extensive alterations had been made in it in the other House, that it was impossible for their Lordships to consider it. There were several Bills which passed that House, and went down to

249
the other House, but which, by reason of their arriving there so late, could not be considered, and therefore they did not become law. Other Bills which had passed the other House, and came up to their Lordships under like circumstances, were also lost in a similar manner. In his communication with the Government for the purpose of arranging the order of business, the course they decided to adopt was to bring in their Lordships' House all Bills which had passed the House of Commons in the previous Session, and to bring in in the House of Commons all Bills which had passed their Lordships' House in the previous Session. Under that arrangement the Patent Bill was intended to be brought into their Lordships' House. He had had a communication with his noble Friend who had charge of the Bill on that subject, and they were anxious to lay that Bill on the table as early as possible. Since then intimations had been received by the Government which led them to the conclusion that the Bill would be strenuously opposed in the House of Commons unless a Committee was previously appointed to inquire into the general subject. For that reason it was not intended to bring forward the Bill at the present moment. He believed it was found that some very influential Members of the other House—persons extremely competent to form a judgment on the subject—desired to have a Committee of the nature he had observed. Upon further communication, his noble Friend opposite, or some other Member of the Government, who should be charged with the conduct of the measure, if they saw a probability of passing it by presenting the Bill in their Lordships' House, it would be introduced, and no time would be lost in doing so. Under the arrangement before mentioned, the Charitable Trusts Bill was passed in that House. It had been discussed as fully as ever a Bill had been discussed in Committee upstairs, and therefore, having been passed through their Lordships' House, it was deemed expedient that it should be introduced in the present Session in the other House, where it either had already been, or was about to be, laid upon the table. He was unable to suggest any more convenient arrangement than that Bills which had passed through one House in the previous Session, should be initiated in the other House in the Session following.
LORD BROUGHAMsaid, that on reflection upon what had been the fate of the
250
Patent Bill in the House of Commons last Session, he was induced to hesitate before renewing his solicitations to the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack that he should bring forward his great Chancery Reform Bill in their Lordships' House. If the noble and learned Lord introduced it there, he was afraid that it would jeopardise the passing of so vitally important a measure; and he therefore now begged to renounce any desire on his part to press the initiative of that Bill in their Lordships' House of Parliament.
The EARL of ELLENBOROUGHsaid, that, in connection with this discussion, he had had forcibly called to his mind a conversation which he had many years ago on this very subject of introducing Bills of this description first in the House of Lords, with the late Lord Londonderry—than whom no man was more carefully observant of Parliamentary practice, or better acquainted with it; and he said, "I do not think we should gain much time. I never knew an instance of any Bill coming down from the House of Lords which was received with favour by the House of Commons." Now if that could be said with truth—and he believed it could—of an un-reformed House of Commons, he confessed he did not think the changes which had taken place since were very likely to improve the disposition of the House of Commons towards the favourable reception of Bills sent down by the House of Lords. The strength of their Lordships' House lay in dealing with the measures which came up from the other House; their Lordships would best consult their own usefulness by adhering to that course.
EARL GREYsaid, that from his own experience of that and the other House of Parliament, he had certainly come to the conclusion that the prospect of carrying important measures was much greater when they began in that House. He believed they would never see the work of legislation carried on at once with due deliberation, and also with the avoidance of unnecessary delay, until some arrangement had been hit upon by which measures could be considered during the one Session in the other House, and during the next Session in that House. He believed there were valid technical objections to the Bill proposed by the noble Earl opposite; but he did not think that that was inconsistent with the adoption of some arrangement—whether by Resolution or by Bill—by which it might be rendered practical for their Lordships to

251
consider in a subsequent year the measures which, in the former Session, were under the consideration of the other House.
House adjourned till To-morrow.