stated, that the Bill which he now laid on the table was the one he had pledged himself to bring in, when he refused to put clauses in the County Courts Extension Bill, giving the County Courts original jurisdiction in equity. He had then stated, that it would be fit to apply the principle of the new Orders respecting claims to the County Courts, with a power of appeal on matters of law and equity, and also a power of removal by application to the Judge in Chancery, as there is a removal by certiorari 1350 in the Common Law jurisdiction of these Courts, the application being then made to the Common Law Judges. The Bill which he now presented was formed upon these principles, and it contained a process of examining both parties to a suit orally, instead of by bill, and cross bill, and answers. The jurisdiction was confined to personal property. The limits to that jurisdiction could not be presented, from the nature of such processes; but the power of removal would prevent it from being extended inconveniently. If any one objected to this measure, he begged that the statement of the solicitors, some years ago, might be well considered. All the most eminent practitioners—Messrs. Gregory and Falconer, Sharpe, Tooke, &c. &c.—had then signed a petition, in which they distinctly stated, that they never could advise any client to go into the Court of Chancery for so small a sum as 1,000l The denial of justice which this showed, was most frightful. It was well known, indeed, that if a cause of no complication, a matter only just beyond being set down as a short cause, were to-morrow begun, it would be two years and a half before it could be heard. So that the delay was as grievous as the expense. The Bill he now presented would both lessen incalculably the expense of such processes, and, by relieving the Court of Chancery from its present pressure, prevent delay also. He moved that it be read a First Time.
§ Bill read 1a.