§ Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD BROUGHAMthen presented a petition from the Equity Committee of the Metropolitan and Provincial Law Associa- 1348 tion, representing the opinions of no less than 1,000 solicitors and attorneys in this metropolis, complaining that little progress had been made in the way of reform in the Court of Chancery, a point in which he could not agree with them, inasmuch as he had himself introduced more than one Bill productive of very useful reforms. They prayed their Lordships to pass some measure which would amend the law, and diminish the expense and delay which now occurred in the case of administration suits in that court. They likewise prayed their Lordships to give their sanction to the Bill of which he then had to propose the second reading, and which was intended to remedy the peculiar evil of which they complained. He considered this stage as the introduction of that Bill, which, he was happy to say, had met with the concurrence of his two noble and learned Friends the Lord Chancellor and the Master of the Rolls. He should, therefore, explain the provisions of the Bill, and ask their Lordships to give their sanction to the second reading of it conditionally, or, as they said in the profession, de bene esse, in order that it might be printed and circulated during the recess, and thus have the benefit of the consideration and amendment of the profession of the law before its next stage in the progress of legislation. If the Easter recess had not been so near, he would have deferred the introduction of this Bill until his noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor had recovered from his indisposition, and returned to the woolsack; but the importance of having the Bill considered by the profession during the recess was so great, that he could not consent to postpone the introduction of it any longer. He had already stated, from the petition which he had just presented, that great difficulty existed in obtaining payments of legacies, and indeed he might also say of debts, by suit in the Court of Chancery, even in those cases which were uncontested, and in which there was no litigation, doubt, or difficulty. The impossibility of obtaining redress in such cases was the evil; the remedy for it was the Bill which he then held in his hand. He did not take to himself the credit of devising that remedy; it was due, in the first place, to an Act of the Legislature which was passed a year or two ago, called the Winding-up Act, and which had worked marvellously well; and, in the next place, to a Master in Chancery, a near and dear relative of his own (Master Brougham), 1349 who had conceived the happy idea of extending that Act, and of applying its machinery to all cases of administration suits in the Court of Chancery. He (Lord Brougham) had long known the evil of the present system; but he had never been able to grapple with it as his worthy relative had been enabled to do, through his knowledge of the duties performed in the Master's Office, acquired by his experience of them during the last eighteen or nineteen years. The main object of the Bill was to commence consent administrations in the Master's Office: to secure an immediate notice to all parties, a judicial advertisement was to be made by the Master that he had commenced the administration, and an immediate and cheap appeal was to be given to the Court, in case any party was dissatisfied. To induce solicitors to get through their work rapidly, and without the expense of copies, they were to be paid, as far as possible, one fee for the job. It would then be the solicitor's interest to spend as little as possible, and finish as soon as possible. This was already done under the Winding-up Act, and had been attempted under the new orders. Such being the case, he was about to introduce to their Lordships a scene of intolerable pressure on parties, of the most cruel injustice to individuals, of an enormous amount of property prevented from being enjoyed by the persons to whom it really belonged, and of an abuse of enormous extent in the administration of Equity, for which neither the Courts, nor the Judges, nor the Masters, nor the practitioners, were responsible, but for which the law, and the practice founded on the law, were alone answerable. It was now found that by law an executor or a trustee—for a trustee in this respect stood on the same footing with an executor—was liable for unknown debts during many years after winding all up, although he had advertised for creditors to come forward. In proof of this position, the noble and learned Lord referred to the case of "Knatchbull v. Frainhead" (3 Mylne and C, 122), decided by Lord Chancellor Cottenham; to that of "Lowe v. Castor" (1 Beavan, 426), decided by Lord Lang-dale, as Master of the Rolls; and also to that of "Hill v. Gornine" (1 Beavan. 540), decided by the same Judge. In all these cases he contended that unknown debts, though advertised, were saddled on executors after a lapse of many years. Now, under the old state of the law, under 1350 which executors could keep money in their hands, and defer the payment of legacies and debts almost as long as they pleased, the trade of an executor might not be a bad one; but under the existing state of the law, the trade was nearly ruined—so much so, that one of his learned Friends, in the course of a cause before him, had said that it was a marvel that any man in his senses should now become an executor. Such being the case, it was clear that an executor, if he were in his senses, and had proved the will of his testator, had only one safe course to pursue, and that was to go into the Court of Chancery for his quietus. Their Lordships might, perhaps, suppose that, under such circumstances, all executors did go there for such quietus. No such thing. His relative, Master Brougham, had procured the true proportion of such executors as did so, by inquiries which he instituted at the Stamp Office. The probate returns showed that of persons possessed of personal estates in value between 500l. and 1,000l., from 4,000 to 5,000 persons died in a year; of persons possessed of personal property between 1,000l. and 6,000l., 5,000 to 6,000; of persons possessed of personal property between 6,000l. and 12,000l., 1,000 to 1,500; and of persons possessed of personal property between 12,000l. and upwards, 800 to 1,000. Rejecting all cases where the personal estate was sworn to be under 500l., and assuming that half the rest came to the Court of Chancery, they ought to have 5,000 to 6,000 administrations in a year; but, from the Chancery return, the actual number appeared to be not 600. Nine-tenths of the cases were therefore kept out of the court by the delays and enormous and intolerable expense of its proceedings. Now, if their Lordships were not alarmed at the proposal, he would introduce them into the Court of Chancery, a place of which it had been said that if a man once got into it he would never get out of it. And here he would confine himself to the progress of a case where there was no litigation, and in which everything was done by consent. In the simplest administration suit there were two or three sets of parties, and therefore as many office copies of bill, with no real litigation. Then there were close copies; then the answers in draught; then the engrossment; then a special commission to swear; then a special messenger to take the answer to London, as it was not allowed to be sent 1351 by post; then office copies; then close copies; then counsel's opinion on evidence; then interrogatories to prove will—if any land—although not disputed; then a special commission to examine witnesses; then evidence taken in secret, no one questioning the will; then special messenger to London; and then office copies again. Sometimes there was an original will brought from the Probate Court at York to London, at an expense of 20l., no one disputing it, or even looking at it when brought up; and then the cause was heard, and so entirely was the decision a matter of course that the Vice Chancellor of England had disposed, to his knowledge, of sixty within the hour. Thus, the learned Judge was not one minute in hearing and making up his mind on each of these cases. So rapid was the disposal of the cases, that the officer of the court was unable to keep up with the pace of the learned Judge, and asked for time to enter them, or for a note from the parties. Then came the formal decree, "with the usual directions." Now, on the subject of this formal decree, he had a curious circumstance to give their Lordships. In a case before the Vice Chancellor, a learned counsel moved for "the formal decree, with the usual directions;" and what did their Lordships think was the reply of that learned and excellent Judge? Nothing less than this: "Yes, let the usual decree go forth for the destruction of this estate in due course of law." There must be "something rotten in the state of Denmark" when a learned Judge, who was no vilipender of the proceedings of his own court, could confess that the decree which was to go forth was synonymous with saying, "Let the estate be destroyed." He had now gone through the different stages of expense and delay up to this point. The cost was from 200l. to 300l., and rarely under 100l., and still no part of the real work was yet begun. The whole was nugatory up to that point—not to those who received the fees, but to the parties interested. The first effective step was the Master's advertisement for creditors. Yes, when all this misery was endured, the unhappy suitor was only in the vestibule, and not in the jaws of the Pandemonium of Chancery; and yet there had been expense enough to wear down any man of small property. He was now exposed to every form of misery. His were the woes of care and illness, and an old age of want; of anxious fear, of 1352 hunger, of poverty; of toil that brought no gain; of premature death: then there was the slumber of the Court of Chancery to be encountered, and the maddening feeling which fired the brain of him who expected justice to be done, where injustice was inflicted, and who expected to receive right where wrong was sanctioned.
Vestibulum ante ipsum primisque in faucibus Orci,Luctus, et ultrices posuêre cubilia Curæ:Pallentesque habitant Morbi, tristisque Senectus,Et Metus, et malesuada Fames, et turpis Egestas,Terribiles visu formæ: Letumque, Laborque:Turn consanguineus Leti Sopor, et mala mentisGaudia,—Ferreique Eumenidum thalami, et Discordia demensVipereum crinem vittis innexa cruentis.These horrors were studded thickly on the threshold before the unhappy suitor entered into the Court of Chancery. He had, however, described to their Lordships the means wisely devised for their removal, furnished by long experience, not attended with the establishment of a new court, or the introduction of a novel jurisdiction. The whole plan was perfectly safe—it was the application of a remedy which in another case had been found to work marvellously well—it was the application of the powers of the "Winding-up Act" to those cases he had described. The cost at present was 200l. or 300l. to get to the threshold—to get into the vestibule—primisque in faucibus Orci. How much would be the expense under his proposed Act? Just 5s. He must ask their Lordships to give a favourable reception to this plan. He had taken the average costs of suits before actually beginning the work at 200l., and he proposed to have 5s. substituted for 200l. In addition to the entire saving of all costs up to the decree, a large saving would also be effected in the subsequent costs, as in further directions, petitions during progress of inquiry, supplemental and revivor suits, from deaths and other abatements, &c. He wanted now to show their Lordships what the effect of this measure would be, by giving them an illustration from the Master's Office, and by taking for the purpose three actual suits, and comparing the admirable manner with which the Winding-up Act had been found to work, with the practice under the present system—the proceedings under the Winding-up Act being precisely similar to the proceedings that would take place under this proposed 1353 Bill. The noble and learned Lord then read to the House the following examples of the costs in administration suits:—In "Say v. Creed," which was an amicable suit, yet took three years and a half to complete, the costs to the hearing were 150l. 4s. 7d.; and subsequent to it, 647l.; forming a total of 797l. 4s. 7d. In "Rainnult v. Gillow," which was also an amicable suit, and took four years to complete, the costs to the hearing were 300l., and subsequent 1,400l.; the sale of the estates was 600l., making a total of 2,300l., or 1,700l. independent of the sale of the estates. These costs were occasioned by constant petitions to the Court; but all this would in future be done by the Master at once. In the case of "Clarke v. Clarke," which was a hostile suit, and took six years before it was completed, the costs to the hearing were 150l., and the subsequent costs of proceeding against a fraudulent executor for an account were 900l.; making a total of 1,050l. In the case of "Gateley v. Carter," which was an amicable suit, and in which there was only one defendant, the costs to the bearing were 80l., and the subsequent costs 390l., making a total of 470l. An anonymous case, which was a hostile suit, had already taken up fifteen years, and was yet unfinished. The Bill was filed by a creditor against an executor and others, for 1,000l., on an estate worth 20,000l., devised among four families. There had been three supplemental bills and three bills of revivor in the course of the suit. The cost of getting before the Master in all the suits exceeded 1,500l. By giving a power to proceed as under the Winding-up Act, notwithstanding deaths, the suit would have been finished in a year, at one-third the cost of merely getting into the Master's Office. The ceremony of going through the Court afforded no protection whatever. When parties preferred going at once to the Master, it was most oppressive to force them to pay 100l. to 300l. for an order which no court could refuse to make. Under this Act, if any party should object, he might file a bill. If any objection should be taken to the primary jurisdiction, that it was trusting too much to the Master, the answer was, that under the Winding-up Act he now adjudicated on larger sums and on more difficult questions than generally went before the Court itself, and in one-tenth of the time. He would now show to their Lordships the effects of the Winding-up Act on a great concern, and 1354 the value of applying its machinery to other cases. A banking company was sent in Michaelmas term, 1848, into the Court, under a winding-up order. The debts and liabilities investigated and found before Christmas amounted to 522,348l. 10s. 9d.; on the 10th of April, 1849, by sums paid off, the debts were reduced to 272,088l. 6s. 9d.; and on the 31st of December, 1849, to 173,777l. 17s. 6d. Thus, in fourteen months, this vast amount of debts, claims, and liabilities, affecting nearly 600 persons, had been examined and adjudicated upon; some appeals had been heard and decided, and the concern cleared to the extent of 348,570l. out of 522,348l.; and of the remainder nearly half was now disposed of, and the whole would probably be finished in a few months. This case, supposing it could have been worked as a partnership suit in the common way, would have lasted a century at least in the court, and have cost 100,000l. But it could never have been worked, for he could give an instance and a proof of what he said. In the case of "Walworth v. Holt"—" The Imperial Banking Company," a suit was instituted in 1840, was heard before the Lord Chancellor, and further proceeding was found impracticable. A private Act was obtained, at great expense, to enable the court to appoint a receiver, who was, however, neither to make calls nor to distribute assets. The receiver collocted and kept the assets, which neither he nor the Court could distribute. On the 18th of January, 1850, an order was made under the new Act for the Master to wind up the concern. He had already taken an account, and ascertained the debts to be 110,000l., and the affair would be wound up in a few months. The noble and learned Lord, after giving another instance of the favourable working of the Winding-up Act, declared that he thought that he had now made out an irresistible case for extending the beneficial consequences of the admirable system contained in it. If it were said that all which he required might be done by order under the 3rd and 4th of Victoria, c. 94 (the Five Years Act), the answer was that nothing but an Act of Parliament could enable the Master to examine parties viva Voce, or make a proceeding of this kind lis pendens, or bind estates without waiting for ecclesiastical administration in the present form, or make infants wards of court, or give the force of the Queen's writ or subpoena under 1355 the Great Seal to any other process, or stay creditors suing at law after administration had begun, or enable the Court or Master to make solicitors personally pay costs. He likewise contended that the expense of any such scheme as sending parties to the Master by an order of Court on affidavit, would be as great as on a petition, and nearly as great as on a Bill. Above all, he insisted that a grave and important change like this—by far the largest practical reform ever attempted in Chancery—ought to have the importance, publicity, and indisputable force of an Act of Parliament. There was one point on which he had already touched, and on which he was desirous to give some further explanation. The solicitor, he had told their Lordships, was to be paid by the job; and the reason was, that the solicitor was now paid on an absurd and vicious system. No one knew that better than his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack (Lord Langdale), and no one had worked harder to remove it. A man who brought to the service of his client talent, skill, and indefatigable industry, obtained by an expensive education and matured by long experience, ought to be properly and liberally remunerated. Now, the vicious nature of the principle on which payment was made to him was this, that he was not allowed by the rules of the courts to make charges except in a particular manner. He knew more about the charges made in the courts of common law than he did about those made in the courts of equity; but, certainly, it did appear to him that the charges in the latter were more absurd than those in the former. Because a solicitor could not charge for certain exertions of his skill and labour, he was compelled, in order that he might exist by his profession, to subject his client to many tedious and dilatory processes, which were not only expensive but also very dangerous to that client, as they exposed him to the risk of being turned round by the Court, or by a skilful or it might be an unscrupulous adversary. From all such processes the suitor ought to be relieved, as they were of no use, but of considerable detriment to him, the suitor. Of the absurdity of the system which allowed some and prevented other charges from being made, the noble and learned Lord gave some amusing instances. They were not allowed to charge the money they advanced to get up evidence for their clients—that evidence upon which perhaps the whole fortune of the suit depended. Formerly 1356 they were allowed nothing for their attendance on consultations, than which nothing could be more useful for the progress of a cause, or for the avoidance of blunders in its management. That rule, he believed, was altered now, and he was glad of it; but formerly no Master could allow such a charge in the taxation of a bill of costs. What was the consequence of all this shortsighted inquiry? The attorney, to pay himself adequately, was compelled to draw up a long brief, to the damnification of his client in every way. First, his counsel received a long and confused, instead of a terse and intelligible brief, and, having to wade through such a brief, was to be paid proportionably. The engrossing clerks were also to be paid for copying the useless briefs; and he verily believed that, in some cases, three counsel had been employed when two would have sufficed, in order that the profits of a third brief might accrue to the solicitor. Now, it was for the interest of the attorney that his client should be put to as much expense as possible, and it was for the interest of the client that he should be put to as little. His object was, that his suit should be disposed of as speedily as possible, because the greater delay the greater was the expense, which the client must pay out of his own pocket. His relative, Master Brougham, advised that a reasonable sum should be paid to the solicitor, proportioned to the interest and the difficulty of the business which he had to transact. On that principle his learned relative was prepared to stand; and, for his own part, he (Lord Brougham) must say that he entirely concurred in its justice. There had been a great improvement made in the system of charges by a Bill which he had himself introduced some years ago. By that Bill the Taxing Master was directed to have regard to the skill and labour which the case required, and to the difficulty and importance of the work done. That rule was now enforced in the Leases Bill, brought in about two years ago; and he trusted that it would be extended to the case of all agreements and deeds. He had now gone through the principal details of his present Bill at some length; but, as the Bill was of great importance, he did not think it necessary to apologise for his prolixity. He admitted that many parts of it might be carried into effect by order; but how much must, and how much ought to be done by the Bill, their Lordships would be able to judge better when the Bill had 1357 been circulated for fire or six weeks in the town and the country. His noble and learned Friend on the woolsack and himself knew that though a more respectable and intelligent body of men than the great body of solicitors and attorneys did not exist, there were some black sheep in the fold; and every now and then the Court, in spite of the exalted eminence from which it beheld them, could detect a dark tinge in their fleeces. How much more clearly was the Master, who stood in no such exalted position, enabled to discern that the suit was brought into court and protracted by the malversation of the solicitor, or even that it should never have been brought at all, or, if brought, should have been speedily disposed of? Soon the client saw and felt the same truth too, at present there was no power to mulct the actual wrongdoer; but there was power to mulct his unhappy client, who was already suffering under the gross wrongs of his malversation. He proposed to give power to the Master to mulct any solicitor guilty of such malversation as that which he had described, and to the solicitor to appeal to the Court for the reversal of the Master's order. From his experience both as a judge and an advocate he called on their Lordships to vest in the Master the power of throwing the burden of costs on the actual wrongdoer, by whom they were unnecessarily incurred, and to save that man's client, an innocent party, from the effects of his wrongdoing. In conclusion, he had to state that he would be the first to receive, and most anxiously to consider, any suggestions that might be thrown out either in the House or out of it, with regard to any part of the Bill. The noble Lord then moved the second reading of the Bill.
§ LORD LANGDALEMy Lords, I own that it would have been satisfactory to me if my noble and learned Friend had thought it consistent with his duty to comply with the request which I made to him, to postpone his Motion for the second reading of this Bill, until the Lord Chancellor could attend; but I regret it the less in consequence of his saying that his object on this occasion is only to explain the nature of his measure, and not at all to preclude the most ample discussion of its principle and details hereafter.
If my noble and learned Friend has supposed that I entirely concur in the whole of the present Bill, he is under a mistake. There are several things in it of which I 1358 do not approve, and the consideration of which I shall postpone; but if the principle and object of this Bill be to diminish the expense and delay of suits in Chancery to the utmost extent which is practicable, consistently with justice and the caution absolutely necessary for the due administration of justice, I have no hesitation in saying that the Bill deserves the most serious consideration of your Lordships, and is entitled to my humble and very cordial support. No object can be more desirable.
Perhaps the first question is, whether, having regard to the powers now vested in the Lord Chancellor, it is necessary to have an Act of Parliament at all. It is quite incorrect to say that no improvements have been made under those powers; and my noble and learned Friend appears to me not sufficiently to appreciate either the value of the powers which on his proposition were conferred by Parliament, or the great inconveniences which are apt to arise, if they do not necessarily arise, from attempts to regulate the practice of Courts of Justice, by enactments rather than by orders.
It is to be remembered that orders and rules for the regulation of practice, are in their nature, to a great extent, tentative and experimental. It is impossible even for the greatest skill and experience, to foresee all the contingencies which may arise, and it is of the utmost importance to have ready the means of promptly making the corrections and supplying the deficiencies which sometimes are very unexpectedly discovered.
My noble and learned Friend may recollect that the Act of Parliament to which he has referred, not only gave extensive power to make orders, but also provided that the orders when made, and after being laid before both Houses of Parliament, should, after a certain time, have the force and effect of enactments—and that it was afterwards found expedient to enact that the orders so made enactments, should for all purposes be deemed and taken to be general orders of the Court of Chancery; and it cannot, I think, be doubted that if sufficient checks be imposed, and either House of Parliament is enabled to resolve that any orders shall not have effect, it must be better that such regulation should be made by order rather than by Act of Parliament.
Nevertheless, if it should appear that as the law now stands, all which it may upon due consideration be thought desirable to do, cannot be done by order, I entirely 1359 agree that the aid of an Act of Parliament ought to be sought.
My Lords, agreeing that proceedings in the Court of Chancery ought to be freed from expense and delay to the utmost extent that is consistent with the due administration of justice, I also agree that there are two stages of a suit in equity to which the most particular attention is required: 1. The stage which precedes the entrance into the Master's Office upon matters of account and inquiry; 2. The stage which comprises all the proceedings in the Master's Office. As to the first, I think I have good ground for hoping that very effectual improvement and relief may and will be obtained without any Act of Parliament being required. In cases where discovery—or, in other words, an answer is not required in the first instance—the case will be taken into the Master's Office almost immediately, and at very little expense. The proceedings in the Master's Office are attended with much more difficulty; but orders intended to effect the desired object are now in contemplation, and it is not impossible that some of the authorities given by the Winding-up Act may be made available. But when my noble and learned Friend compares the proceedings in the Master's Office under the Winding-up Act with the proceeding in a complicated Chancery suit, he will find on consideration that the proceeding in one will afford no means whatever of judging what can, or ought to be, the proceedings in the other, in respect either of time or expense. In Chancery suits there often exists a complication of disputed facts and conflicting interests, making it necessary to make extensive inquiries and decide difficult questions, the like of which cannot arise under the Winding-up Act. It is scarcely to be hoped, that in such cases great expense and delay can be got rid of. We ought to prevent them as much as we can; and so much of the evil as cannot be removed, ought clearly to be of such a nature that it ought to be attributed to the nature of the cases and not to the Court, which is charged with the duty of investigating them, and deciding upon them. And what we may hope to do, is to diminish greatly the expense and delay of winding up and settling mere administration suits in which no such conflict and complication exist.
I entirely agree, that in Chancery suits great difficulty arises from the mode in which solicitors are remunerated, and I should be glad if I could congratulate my 1360 noble and learned Friend upon his having succeeded, as he seems to flatter himself that he has, in removing that evil from any legal proceedings whatever; but I am afraid that he has not succeeded. It seems easy to say that solicitors ought to be paid according to the skill and labour which they have employed; but it is not easy to provide competent judges of the skill and labour, or to establish satisfactory rules for the guidance of such judges. Yet without these competent judges, and satisfactory rules, a direction to pay according to skill and labour is of no value. Certainly the solicitors ought to be well rewarded—so rewarded as to give the suitors a right to expect that they may find the profession well supplied with men of learning, talent, and honour; and further, rewarded in a manner that is consistent with candour and truth.
They are, as I believe, not excessively paid at this time. I do not expect much, if any, relief to the suitor from any proper diminution of the payments (which are on the whole) made to their professional agents. But the mode in which they are remunerated is extremely objectionable. Their charges are made to depend on the number of steps taken in a cause, and on the length of the copies they have to provide of documents and papers. They have in this way a direct interest to increase the number of steps in the cause, and to increase the length of all documents of which copies are required. It is surprising, and highly to the honour of the profession, that a system so faulty, and containing such temptations to do wrong, should not have led to much greater evil than it has done. In the changes which have inevitably taken place in practice, it has in process of time resulted in a system in which sometimes they are most inadequately, or perhaps not at all, paid for very valuable services actually rendered to their clients; and at other times they are allowed, and in a manner compelled, to make charges for services merely nominal, and not at all rendered. It is not because I think them even under this system too much paid on the whole, but because I think the system productive of much evil in many other ways, that I have never lost what I thought a proper opportunity of stating my opinion upon it. The solicitors themselves, I believe, are generally agreed in thinking the system very bad, but no remedy has been discovered; and the only suggestion which has reached me, is to give the solicitor a 1361 percentage upon the sum recovered in the suit. But a suit for the recovery of 100l., may often, from the nature of the inquiries to be made, and of the questions to be decided, cost much more time and trouble, and occasion far more expense, than a suit for a thousand times the amount, in which it is not necessary to make such inquiries, or decide such questions; and it would therefore not be just to adopt a suggestion, the effect of which would be, unreasonably to throw the cost of expensive suits for small sums, upon the suitors in cheap suits for large sums. Knowing the difficulty and importance of this subject, I think that my noble and learned Friend has rendered a public service by bringing it under the consideration of your Lordships.
My Lords, I understand that my noble and learned Friend does not desire that the progress to be made in this Bill by giving it a second reading, should in any way impede the making and publication of the orders which are now under the consideration of the Lord Chancellor.
LORD BROUGHAMCertainly not. Those orders may make a great part—perhaps even the whole—of this Bill unnecessary.
§ LORD LANGDALESo understanding it, and that, if necessary, a full discussion of the Bill may hereafter take place, I am ready to assent to the second reading.
§ Bill read 2a and committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday the 6th May.
§ House adjourned to Thursday the 11th of April.