Lords Sitting of 26 July 1850

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2a Highway Rates; Turnpike Acts Continuance, &c.; Canterbury Settlement Lands.
3a Militia Pay; Court of Exchequer (Ireland); Stock in Trade.

BREACH OF PRIVILEGE—LIVERPOOL WATERWORKS BILL.
LORD BEAUMONTsaid, that the Motion which he had to submit to the House was, that the petitioners be called to the bar and be reprimanded and admonished for their conduct by the Lord Chancellor.
LORD BROUGHAMthought this was the best course that could be taken, more especially as they had given evidence before the Committee since they had been in custody in the fairest manner.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEwas fally prepared to concur in the Motion of his noble Friend. He wished it, however, to be understood by all parties, that the I lenient course which that House was induced to take on the present occasion did not arise from their considering the offence to be one of a minor character. But the peculiar circumstances of the case, and the position of life of the parties which might not enable them to appreciate the enormity of the offence they had committed,
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had induced the House to take a merciful view of the subject.
The EARL of HARROWBYsaid, he had received a letter from the Secretary of the Guardian Society at Liverpool, denying that any members of that society had had anything to do with the obtaining fictitious signatures to petitions. He knew this society to be composed of a most respectable body of men.
LORD BEAUMONTwished it to be publicly known that the inquiry into the conduct of the parties who had employed these men was still going on, and that the Committee expected eventually to discover those who had employed them, and were the really guilty persons. In case this fraud were clearly traced to them, they would be severely punished.
Order of the Day for taking into Consideration the Petition of Joseph Byrne, Joseph Hinde, and Duncan M'Arthur, Prisoners in Newgate, stating their deep Regret for having committed a Breach of the Privileges of this House, and praying the merciful Clemency of the House, read. The Yeoman Usher informed the House, That the said Joseph Byrne, Joseph Hinde, and Duncan M'Arthur were in Attendance: Then it was moved, by Lord Beaumont, That Joseph Byrne, Joseph Hinde, and Duncan M'Arthur be brought to the Bar of this Douse, and reprimanded by the Lord Chancellor, and discharged.
Agreed to.
Then the said Joseph Byrne, Joseph Hinde, and Duncan M'Arthur were brought to the Bar, and reprimanded by the Lord Chancellor for their Offences.
"Ordered—That Joseph Byrne, Joseph Hinde, and Duncan M'Arthur be discharged out of the Prison of Newgate, and that this Order shall be a sufficient Warrant in that Behalf.
"Ordered—That the Speech made by The Lord Chancellor in reprimanding the said Joseph Byrne, Joseph Hinde, and Duncan M'Arthur, be entered on the Journals of the House,"

COUNTY COURT EXTENSION BILL— EXPLANATION.
LORD BROUGHAMpresented petitions from Warrington, the Society for the Protection of Trade at Leicester, and other places, in favour of the concurrent jurisdiction of the Superior Courts with the County Courts on actions between 20 l. and 50 l. The noble and learned Lord said, that he would take that opportunity, in consequence of the petitions which he had presented, and of several letters which he had received from town and country

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from various parties respecting this important Act, of rectifying a very great delusion which some persons, who he believed knew better, had set forth in charging him with gross inconsistency as an amender of the law, and as President of the Law Amendment Society, of which many noble Lords and Judges of the land were members, in his inducing that House to make certain alterations in the measure he had alluded to. The inconsistency complained of was the very reverse of the fact; for it was his refusal to be inconsistent which induced him to propose that the Bill should be in the same form and words as that which he had brought forward in 1833, that was seventeen years ago. That measure was, unfortunately, lost by a majority of one in that House; and his (Lord Brougham's) Amendment only restored the Bill sent up recently from the other House to the form of his Bill of 1833.

THE EXHIBITION OF THE INDUSTRY OF ALL NATIONS, HYDE PARK.
LORD BROUGHAMsaid, he rose to discharge a most important public duty, which he felt some difficulty in performing, in consequence of the severe indisposition under which he was labouring, and which was caused by his attention during the whole of the morning to the judicial business of the House. It was within the knowledge of their Lordships that from an early period of the present Session he had stood forward as the antagonist of those who, from the most praiseworthy, but, as he thought, the most mistaken, motives, had undertaken the structure of an immense building in Hyde Park for what was called the Exposition of 1851. But, if he had deemed that a matter of importance, its importance had shrunk into insignificance when compared with that of the question which had unhappily, but incidentally, arisen out of it. He now proceeded to entreat the attention of their Lordships, as members of the highest court in the country, which superintended and controlled all others, to the course—which he must call the ill-advised and inauspicious course—which had been recently taken with regard to the structure in Hyde Park, by the first law officer of the Crown, acting by the command of the Ministers of the Crown, in a matter which he would now proceed to describe to the House. This was one of the most important subjects to which he had ever addressed his own attention, or to which he
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had ever called the attention of their Lordships, since he had enjoyed the honour of a seat in their assembly. It would be for their Lordships to judge, after they had heard the statement of facts which he was about to make, and his comments upon one or two of those facts, and after they had heard the law relating to the great constitutional question involved in them—it would be for their Lordships, he said, to judge whether he had given an exaggerated opinion of the importance of this discussion. He held in his hand the petition of a vast number of persons residing in the vicinity of Hyde Park, whose property—for of their comforts he said nothing—and whose public rights and convenience, would be materially impaired by this structure. These petitioners represented certain facts, which he would forthwith state to their Lordships. They stated that they had prepared an information for the purpose of filing it in the High Court of Chancery to stay, by injunction, the erection of any further structure, or the progress of any further operations in Hyde Park, which was so far the property of the public as to be withdrawn by right from the power of the Crown, or of any servant of the Crown, without the authority of the Legislature, interposed in the form of a special Act of Parliament. The petitioners stated their case in detail, and with full reference to various statutes relating to the illegality of these operations, corroborating their statement by the opinion of three of the most able and learned counsel who now adorned the Bar, namely, Sir Fitzroy Kelly, Mr. Rolt, and Mr. Cairnes. These three learned gentlemen had considered the case of the petitioners maturely, they had then answered it, and they had given a most lucid and able opinion upon it, first separately, and afterwards collectively. They had stated without hesitation that the structure to be erected, and the course of dealing with Hyde Park now adopted, were both illegal, and they recommended that immediate application should be made to the Court of Chancery for an injunction to stay such proceedings. As it was an application not made by individuals for any infraction on their own particular individual rights, but for rights which they enjoyed in common with the public at large, it became necessary that they should make application for an injunction by an information filed in the name of Her Majesty's Attorney General. Such an information, in

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which the Attorney General was necessarily made the nominal party, proceeded on the relation of individuals; and they were relators to the Attorney General, and in reality were the real plaintiffs in the suit. In all such cases the substantial party was the relator. He had the whole management of it—-he gave orders to the solicitor—-he attended consultations—he was responsible for the costs. The Attorney General, on behalf of the Crown, or rather on behalf of the public represented by the Crown, was only a formal party, but still a party absolutely necessary to the proceedings. He did not intend by any means to assert that the Attorney General might not by law, at any moment he thought fit, interfere in the suit, and become, instead of the formal, the substantial party. Par from it. He would come to that point presently. This, however, he wished their Lordships distinctly to understand, that the information could only be filed with the assent of the Attorney General. His assent to the proceeding was absolutely as necessary as the assent of the Crown to the issuing out a writ of right. If a subject were disseised of his land, or dispossessed of his right, or ruined by the oppression of any servant of the Crown, by and with the authority of the Crown, he had a remedy provided for him in a petition of right. The Sovereign could only be sued by a petition of right, and the fiat of the Secretary of State was necessary to endorse it, and without it the subject could not recover any land of which he had been unjustly disseised, any title of which he had been illegally deprived, any right of which be had been violently deprived. Such a fiat had never been refused. Now in this case, Mr. Attorney General had been applied to, and had refused his concurrence: and unfortunately there were no means provided by the constitution to compel him to give it. "Sic volo" was, on his part, a sufficient answer. The constitution could not compel him to file an information. An Act of Parliament was necessary, or the orders of his Sovereign, which he might disobey or not, as he pleased. It had been thought decorous, and not inexpedient, that Mr. Attorney, before the petitioners approached either that or the other House of Parliament, should have before him the opinions of the three able and experienced counsel taken by the relators. They were laid before Mr. Attorney; and Mr. Attorney, having taken due time to consider
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them, gave a renewed refusal to the relators; and, what was more, gave also his reasons for that refusal. He had already told their Lordships that the opinions of the three eminent lawyers who had been consulted were distinct, and clear, and unhesitating; that not only was there probable cause for their proceeding to obtain an injunction; that not only was there fair ground of doubt as to the legality of the proceedings in Hyde Park—and such doubt was sufficient to justify them in calling on Mr. Attorney to further their suit into the Court of Chancery—but also, that the facts of the case, and the law applying to the facts of the case, made it indisputable that the merits of the suit were with the relators, and that the encroachment on Hyde Park was contrary to law. Let their Lordships now consider the reasons given by Mr. Attorney for his refusal. But before he proceeded to read those reasons, he must be permitted to say, that if any supposed that beheld light the opinion of that able and learned man, or that be entertained any personal prejudice against him, they showed the grossest ignorance of all that was passing in his mind, and of all his former communications with Mr. Attorney from his boyhood, and of all the reverence which he entertained for his illustrious father, who was one of the dearest and most valued friends he ever had in the world. He (Lord Brougham) had always been on terms of uninterrupted private friendship with Mr. Attorney; and whatever remarks he now made upon his conduct were extorted from him by a sense of public duty, and were more painful for him to make than they would be for Mr. Attorney to bear. His Lordship then read the following reasons given by the Attorney General for refusing to file this information:—
"I have in this matter a duty of a judicial nature to perform. The object of the information is to call in question the exercise of the discretion of the Woods and Forests in the management of a part of the property of the Crown. The information states that what the Commissioners of Woods and Forests are about to do is illegal, and injurious to the public. The information states no facts which, in my opinion, establish either of these propositions. But, even if there were a question as to the legality, the Attorney General is bound to judge whether it is for the interest of the public to litigate the question. Cases may be conceived, and indeed not unfrequently arise, in which the letter of the law had been violated, and in which the Court has, nevertheless, required the Attorney General to consider whether lie would allow an information to proceed complaining of such violation, even where the Attorney General

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had already in his discretion allowed the information to be filed, and where, if the information had proceeded, the Court could have done no other than enforce the strict right. The discretion of the Attorney General is interposed to prevent this mischief; and his exercise of that discretion is purely an exercise of a judicial function, and as such I have exercised it to the best of my ability. In the present ease the sense of what is for the interest of the public, with relation to what the Commissioners of Woods and Forests propose to do, has been unequivocally expressed by a vote of the House of Commons. It would, in my opinion, be an improper measure on the part of the Attorney General if, in the exercise of his discretion, and acting on behalf of the public, he were to sanction a proceeding directly at variance with that vote. If any private right were affected by my decision it would be a different matter; but I have the satisfaction of knowing that no private right of any individual or individuals can be withdrawn from the consideration of any court, or in any manner affected by my refusal to sanction this information."
Let their Lordships remark—First of all, Mr. Attorney said that he was performing a duty of a judicial nature in examining the discretion exercised by the Woods and Forests in the management of Hyde Park. Next, he said that it was his duty and his right to withhold his sanction if he thought that it was clear that it was not for the interest of the public that he should give it; and, last of all, he said that the House of Commons had come to a decided vote upon the question, and that it would be improper for him to sanction a proceeding directly at variance with that vote. Now, he (Lord Brougham) did not dispute the right of Mr. Attorney to withhold his assent. He had himself known cases where he (Lord Brougham) as Lord Chancellor, had himself said that the Attorney General should not have allowed the information to be filed. But those were cases which rarely occurred—they were cases in which some sinister motive was evidently at work, in which some oppression was practised under pretext of law—in which the cause of complaint was either flimsy or groundless—in which there was no wrong done, no matter in dispute; and in such cases there could be no doubt that the plaintiff ought not to be helped by the Attorney General into court. But was there any analogy between this case and those which he had thus, as it wore, hypothetically described? Did the relators act in a spirit of oppression? Did they ask for this information to give any third parties annoyance? The assent of the Attorney General should not have been withheld, but should have been given as a matter of course, as it always was in a writ of error. In a writ of error the per-
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mission of the Attorney General was always required; and he well recollected a case where, if it would have been decorous to withhold that fiat, it certainly would have been withheld. He referred to the case of Mr. O'Connell, in which the judgment, after argument on the writ of error, had been arrested, and the prisoners had all been set free. Many thought at the time that the sueing out of that writ of error was a desperate case. He believed that the Attorney General of that day was of opinion that there was no cause for it. Nevertheless, ex debito justitice, and not ex gratia, he granted it. Next, Mr. Attorney declared that it would be an improper exercise of discretion on his part to sanction a proceeding directly at variance with a vote of the House of Commons. He thought that Mr. Attorney could not have had before him, when he wrote that sentence, the record of the vote of that House—
"That the report respecting the proposed Exhibition in Hyde Park in 1851 be submitted to a Select Committee of this House for the purpose of examination and due consideration of the same; and that the report of the said Select Committee be laid upon the table of the House, and that the sanction by this House be given to such report before any further proceedings on the part of the Commissioners with regard to the said Exhibition should be proceeded with or adopted by them."
To this an Amendment was moved—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that Her Majesty would be graciously pleased to give directions that no building should be erected in Hyde Park for the purpose of the Exhibition proposed to be held in this country in the year 1851."
A discussion took place as to whether the words first proposed should stand part of the question, and the numbers were—Ayes 166; Noes 47. The original Motion then became the question on which the House had to decide, and on a division it was negatived by 166 to 46. This was what the Attorney General called a solemn decision of the House of Commons in favour of the proceeding of the Commissioners. Now, he would deal with this vote not in form but substance, and admit that it was a vote in favour of the proposed building in Hyde Park. But was it a vote in favour of the legality of the proceeding? Nothing of the kind. The legal point was reserved by the judge, if he might so call his noble Friend at the head of the Government, who directed the jury of 200 and odd persons by whom the verdict was found. As the Attorney General had referred to what had passed in the House of

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Commons, he (Lord Brougham) supposed he might be allowed to follow his example. He found then, that Lord J. Russell expressed himself, on the occasion in question, in the following terms:—
"The question before the House was not a question of law, but the question was whether the House should offer any advice to the Crown in regard to the selection of Hyde Park as the site for the proposed Exhibition from a wish to take care of the rights of the public, or whether the House should refrain from offering; my such advice. Now, he thought the House might keep such a question as that entirely free from any question of law. If any private rights should be infringed upon, let the parties make any application they please to a court of law."
It was impossible to state in plainer language the wish of the noble Lord at the head of the Government that the question of law should be withdrawn from the consideration of the House of Commons on the distinct understanding that it should be dealt with and decided by a court of law. Supposing, however, that the House of Commons had taken on itself to decide the legal question, would it not be a monstrous thing for the Attorney General to defer to it? A vote of the House of Commons was, of all authorities, the very least and lowest for deciding a question of right either between the public and the Crown, or between private parties. A vote of the House of Lords would be entitled to greater weight; hut unless their Lordships were sitting in their judicial capacity, they would not presume to decide a question of right between parties. This was a grave constitutional question. If the Attorney General, without better reasons than those assigned in this case, and because he may be desirous to prevent that which would be displeasing to some people under whom he: held office, took on himself to obstruct and frustrate the due administration of justice on a most important question, it was time we should look about us. If a public officer by merely saying, "I will not allow this to be tried," could oust the public of all remedy in course of law or equity, could it be said that this country was governed by law? Could it he said that this was a free country? In the present case we had the public represented by the relators on the one hand; and the Woods and Forests, together with Lord J. Russell, and some Lords of the Treasury, on the other. It is I proposed to file an information against Lord J. Russell and the Woods and Forests—the mere creatures of the Treasury—for malversation, when the Attorney General
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stepped in and said, "I will prevent you from proceeding by refusing my name." This was a greater power than any Judge could exercise. No Judge could keep an information out of the Court of Chancery, or an indictment out of the Queen's Bench. Admitted, the Attorney General had the power to do what he had done, but it was a power to be exercised only under extraordinary circumstances. The Attorney General might, if he chose, enter a nolle prosequi in every case of felony and misdemeanour; but would he feel justified in interposing to prevent the prosecution of a man for felony, on the ground that the House of Commons had passed a vote approving of his conduct, and because a strong feeling in his favour prevailed in certain quarters? If an Attorney General were to take such a course, he would merit impeachment. It might be said, why not impeach the Attorney General for his conduct in the case under consideration? He had lived long enough to know that, of all threats, the threat of impeachment was that for which Ministers of the Crown, their servants, friends, and allies cared, not only the least, hut absolutely and exactly nothing at all. The only way to deal with these parties was to make their conduct the subject of discussion in the two Houses of Parliament, and to call on them for explanation. He called on whoever might be disposed to answer him to show a single instance previous to the present in which a complaint from the inhabitants of this great capital against the Crown had been stifled in its progress to a judicial determination by the fiat of an Attorney General. Recollect, Lord J. Russell told the House of Commons not to vote an address to Her Majesty, because, said he, the House had nothing to do with legal questions—they must be decided by a court; of law; and when the public, comforted by this assurance, set about taking their case into a court of law, they are stopped by I the noble Lord's Attorney General. In this way, it might be said, the Attorney General played into the hands of the First Lord of the Treasury. The noble Lord recommended the people to go to a court of law; but when they got there, his Attorney General slammed the door in their faces. It was said that the Crown would protect the interests of the public; but in the present instance the public was opposed to the Crown. It was easy to imagine the Queen addressing her subjects and saying, "I am your foster mother, your tender

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parent, in whom you may safely confide;" but he would venture to reply, "Most Gracious Sovereign, I deeply reverence your exalted position—I entirely confide in your maternal care; but, nevertheless, as long as kings are kings, and queens are queens, when I have an interest one way, and Your Majesty has an interest on the other, and I am in open and avowed conflict with your servants, who are infringing on my rights by their tortuous proceedings, I hope, Most Gracious Queen, you will forgive me for saying that I had much rather, with all possible respect for the Crown, with all loyal affection for the Royal Person, and with the most profound veneration for the Queen and Constitution, trust for the defence of my rights to myself than to Your Majesty." He had avoided all appeals to popular passions—he had avoided all declamation on popular topics, and had argued the matter strictly according to the law on the subject. But he would ask those who had turned their attention to the ill-omened proceeding which he had brought under the notice of their Lordships, what would be the construction put upon the conduct of the Attorney General? Would any one for a moment believe that the Attorney General had interfered to stop the suit because he thought the public was wrong, and the Crown right? No, it would be universally believed that the Attorney General interposed because he knew that the other party dared not appear in a court of law to defend their proceedings. It would be believed that that party preferred appealing to its majority of 166 in the other House—a majority got together not, as far as he knew, by any effort on the part of the officer endowed with what was commonly called the whip. There were other means of bringing a majority together than the Treasury whip. There were such things as Court influences, and there were those who were mutually influenced by and influenced Courts. There was the whispered something—
——"still to greatness dear,
Which often vibrates on a monarch's ear."
Those who whispered in dulcet voices to the Sovereign were apt to experience a reciprocation of harmony in their own ears. As fine writing had been described to be "right words in right places," so fine voting might be called right votes in right places. This was a definition, the accuracy of which would be admitted by the 166 who were got together without the ordinary application of the Treasury whip.
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The votes of the 166 would never efface from the minds of the people of this country the impression that the Attorney General prevented the public from prosecuting their case because he knew that their opponents dared not meet them in a court of law.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEobserved, that when the noble and learned Lord rose in his place, he was under the impression that he was about to make the Motion of which he had given notice; but he had substituted another question upon another subject, leading to a discussion totally different from that of which he had given notice. He (the Marquess of Lansdowne) was not going to argue the question, but he wished to set the noble and learned Lord right in one part of his statement. When his noble and learned Friend assumed that this proceeding on the part of the Attorney General had been directed I by Her Majesty's Government, he begged leave distinctly to state that it had been the result of no communication on their part. In these proceedings Her Majesty's Attorney General had only exercised the functions and the discretion belonging to his office, which he was relieved from arguing upon, inasmuch as his noble and learned Friend had more than once, in the course of his address, admitted them. The Attorney General was uninfluenced by any party to depart from the course which he conceived to be essential and useful to the public; and he would add, that, were he capable of being so diverted from such a course, he would not be the son of that father whose memory, in common with his noble and learned Friend, he affectionately cherished and reverenced. His noble and learned Friend had adverted to the vote of the House of Commons, and discussed the debate and speeches which took place on that occasion. He was sure that his noble and learned Friend would forgive him for saying that it was one thing to advert to a recorded vote, which they were perpetually in the habit of doing, and another thing to advert to that which he did not say they never did, but which he said they never did without feeling inconvenience, namely, the language employed in the Motions and speeches which took place when the Motions were made. The discretion entrusted to the Attorney General, and which the noble and learned Lord did not deny, was a general discretion to determine for himself whether he would be justified in thinking it fit that his name should be made use

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of in a legal proceeding of that nature. In the exercise of that discretion the Attorney General must consider what the public weal and the public interest required. Whether he had acted judiciously or not in considering the opinion of so large a body as that which constituted the House of Commons to be the proper exponent of that public feeling, and that public interest, it was for the Attorney General, and not for him, to explain. He was bound to consider whether the relators of this proceeding were the exponents of the general feeling. It was for him to determine whether these relators were only individuals representing their own feelings, or whether they were representing the feelings of the public at large. He bad no doubt that, in the only place where he could explain the grounds why he acted on the opinions of these relators, he would be enabled to satisfy the other House, and, through the other House, their Lordships, on the subject. All he (the Marquess of Lansdowne) had to say was, that he did not stand there prepared, still less instructed, to explain or to defend the course pursued by the Attorney General in the exercise of the great and important functions entrusted to him by law, but to express his conviction that he would justify himself both in law, in equity, and in policy, as to his conduct in this matter, and that he would make himself right with the other House, with their Lordships' House, and with the public.
LORD BROUGHAMstated that he had only received the petition late last night, and could not, therefore, have given notice of his intention to present it; but he had informed the Attorney General of his intention to present it to-day. In what he had stated, he wished it to be understood that he had not meant to make any attack whatever upon the Attorney General.
EARL GREYfelt some difficulty in reconciling the statement of the noble and learned Lord, that he had intended no attack upon the Attorney General in the speech which he had just delivered; and he certainly thought that the petition might have been presented on Monday as well as that night, had it not been that the noble and learned Lord was anxious that his charge against the Attorney General should go forth to the world without that explanation which, had time been allowed, might have been given by some one of the Members of the Government.
Petition to lie on the table.

CIVIL LIST.
The MARQUESS of WESTMINSTERwished to know when the noble and learned Lord (Lord Brougham) intended to bring forward his Motion with respect to the Civil List? It had been on the paper some time, and had been frequently postponed. He thought he might be allowed to state that he had the strongest possible objection to the Motion. The Civil List had been settled by Parliament, in consideration of the Crown giving up its revenues. The questions which had been put to him by the noble and learned Lord on former occasions, with respect to the Board of Green Cloth, he had answered out of courtesy to the noble and learned Lord; but he felt it to be his duty to decline giving that more extended information which the noble and learned Lord sought to obtain by his Motion. He regretted the animus with which the noble Lord had brought forward his Motion. In bringing forward his Motion he had alluded to the salaries of the Foreign Ambassadors, while the noble and learned Lord must have well known at the time that they had nothing whatever to do with the Civil List.
LORD BROUGHAMsaid, that he had not yet brought forward his Motion, and thought that the observations of the noble Marquess might well be dispensed with until he had.
The MARQUESS of WESTMINSTERsaid, the noble and learned Lord had asked him, upon a recent occasion, whether any reduction had been made in the salaries of the officers of the Board of Green Cloth? He was now in a position to state that no reductions had been made.
LORD BROUGHAMstated that it was not his intention to bring forward his Motion then, but he would do so upon a future occasion.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEsaid, the matter was one of very grave importance; and when the noble Lord was disposed to bring it forward, he would take care to have the Lords summoned.

LEASEHOLD TENURE OF LAND (IRELAND) ACT AMENDMENT BILL.
LORD BEAUMONT LORD BEAUMONT moved the Third Reading of this Bill.
The LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that no doubt this Bill would settle the doubtful construction to which the Act 12 and 13 Vic. was open. But in order to make it I answer more fully the purpose for which it was intended, it would be necessary to fix

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the maximum of compensation to be given, and that he thought should be at a year and a half's rent. He would, therefore, after the third reading take the opportunity of moving that a proviso to that effect be added.
The EARL of WICKLOWsaid, that this measure had been introduced and conducted through the House in such a manner as to make it impossible for the House to give the clauses that consideration which they ought to have. It was introduced early in the Session, had been changed four times, and now, when it was on the point of passing, the Lord Chancellor said he should propose to introduce further alterations. But, apart from this, he objected to the principle of the preamble, which stated that "whereas certain doubts had arisen as to the meaning of certain clauses," because he held in his hand a report in which the Master of the Rolls stated that there could not be the slightest doubt as to the meaning of the Legislature in the Act. The fact was, it was brought forward for the purpose of forestalling an application about to be made to their Lordships' House in its judicial capacity by way of appeal against a decision given in the courts of law. He thought it would be the better plan now to withdraw the Bill, and, if it were really necessary, to reintroduce it next Session under the auspices of the Government. He moved that the Bill be read a third time that day three months.
LORD BEAUMONTsaid, if their Lordships approved of the Amendment, it would be in fact an approval of the principle of taking a man's property without paying him 6d. for it. The Act as it stood allowed such a proceeding, and although it was known that the Legislature had no such intention, persons in Ireland were found who took advantage of it. In England that would be called robbery; what did the noble Earl call it in his country?
The EARL of WICKLOWsaid, he called the Act a measure introduced by Her Majesty's Ministers, supported by their arguments, and agreed to by the House on those arguments.
LORD MONTEAGLEsaid, the existing law was so doubtful, it was impossible that it could be construed consistently with common sense. He suggested that the Amendments of the Lord Chancellor should be printed, and that the Bill should be postponed, not for three months, but until some early day next week.
LORD REDESDALEsupported the Bill as an act of justice; but thought the House ought to be careful how it proceeded with this land of legislation. When the Act itself was read a third time, a number of clauses were introduced, in spite of his opposition, on the ground that they had not been sufficiently well considered, and it was on some of the clauses so introduced that doubts had arisen.
The BISHOP of DOWN and CONNORsupported the proposal of the Earl of Wicklow for postponing the further prosecution of the Bill this Session.
The MARQUESS of WESTMEATHheld that it concerned their Lordships' honour not to postpone the Bill. An act of injustice had been done last Session, and this was intended to rectify it.
The LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that the two former Acts on the subject had been referred to him by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Lansdowne) for consideration. By the 5th section of the last of the two Acts it was expressly provided that where a change was made of a leasehold reserved rent into a fee-farm rent, compensation should be given to the landlord for that which was taken away from him by the change. There could be no doubt that it was the intention of the Legislature to give to the landlord that compensation. With regard to the mode of ascertaining the value of the landlord's interest, that was prescribed by the first of the two Acts, and there would exist no more difficulty in this case than in any other.
LORD STANLEYthought, after the Bill should have been read a third time, it would be convenient that the Amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord should be postponed to some day next week, that the parties out of doors might consider whether it would have the effect of remedying the acknowledged error in the present law.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEfelt bound, in justice to the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack, to say that he (the Marquess of Lansdowne) considered the Amendment proposed by that noble and learned Lord essential, both in law and equity, to the giving full effect to the intention of the Legislature.
Amendment withdrawn; and the said Bill was read the third time. Then an Amendment was moved by the Lord Chancellor; and a debate arising thereon, debate adjourned to Monday next.
House adjourned till To-morrow,