Lords Sitting of 11 May 1846

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2a. Friendly Societies.
3a. and passed. High Constables.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By the Earl of Eldon, and other noble Lords, from several places, against the Charitable Trusts Bill.—By the Bishop of Bath and Wells, from Pontesbury, and several other places, against the proposed Union of St. Asaph and Bangor, but in favour of the Appointment of a Bishop to the See of Manchester.—By the Archbishop of Canterbury, from Padstow, Harrowgate, and Westerham, for the Better Observance of, and for the Prevention of the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors on, the Sabbath.—From Guardians of the Woburn and Shard-Ion Unions, for the Adoption of a Measure making the Landlords of Cottages, where the Rents are under £6, liable for the Poor Rates.—From Tadmoor, and several other places, for the Protection of the Agricultural Interest.—By the Earl of Roseberry, from Free Synod of Lothian and Tweeddale, praying that a Bill may be passed for compensating Proprietors of Lands for the Purchase of Sites for Churches.—From Maybole and Kirkwall, in favour of the Principles of Free Trade.—From Merchants, Artificers, and others, of Ballinasloe, praying that so much of 6 and 7 Will. IV. Cap. 116, as tends to Relieve the Estates of the Landed Proprietors in Ireland from the Grand Jury Cess (Ireland) Tax, may be Amended.

RELIGIOUS OPINIONS RELIEF BILL.
The BISHOP of EXETERthen rose and said, he would now proceed to his Motion, agreeably to the notice which he laid on their Lordships' Table a few nights ago. Their Lordships would readily believe that it was with great reluctance he addressed himself to such a course of proceeding. They would also readily suppose that he had hesitated much before he could bring himself to propose to their Lordships to give the learned Judges that additional trouble which would be imposed upon them, if these questions were proposed to them at a time when, as he was well aware, they were much oppressed by the regular business of their high office. Nevertheless, when he saw what noble and learned Lords there were in that House, he was not without hope that it would not be necessary to occupy the time of the learned Judges; for if he could persuade himself that those noble and learned Lords would give their minds judicially to these questions, and not look upon them merely as upon political questions brought before them, he did not know whither he could resort for better opinions as to what the law of England was than was to be found within their own walls. He was in great hope that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack would feel himself bound particularly to regard this matter with a judicial mind; there were circumstances attending this matter which especially encouraged him in that hope, inasmuch as the Bill, for the better understanding of the operation of which he held it necessary to propose these questions, was brought in by that noble and learned Lord. It was he (the Lord Chancellor) who proposed to strike out of the Statute-book those important statutes, or parts of statutes, which had been heretofore considered as the main bulwarks of the Constitution of England—of England as an independent monarchy. In the Bill then before their Lordships' House, their Lordships were invited to repeal so much of the Act passed in the 1st of Elizabeth, intituled "An Act restoring to the Crown the ancient Jurisdiction over the Estate Ecclesiastical and Spiritual, and abolishing all Foreign Powers repugnant to the same," as made it punishable "to affirm, hold, stand with, set forth, maintain, or defend, as therein mentioned, the authority, pre-eminence, power, or jurisdiction, spiritual or ecclesiastical, of any foreign prince, prelate, person, State, or potentate, theretofore claimed, used, or

301
usurped within this realm." Their Lordships would observe that the words "theretofore claimed" must refer to the period antecedent to the reign of Queen Elizabeth. Their Lordships were therefore asked, by repealing this Act, to make it no longer punishable to assert the supremacy of the Pope, as theretofore exercised in this country. Then what was it they were asked to do? Need he remind their Lordships that, before the time of Queen Elizabeth, the Pope had claimed and exercised the power of deposing King John, and that the same Pope, Innocent III., claimed jurisdiction over his successor in these words, as quoted by Matthew Paris. "Is not the King of England (speaking of Henry III.) our vassal, or rather our slave?" Yes, this was the power which might be exercised with impunity if they passed this Bill, unless there were in the existing law some reserved vigour to protect the Constitution against the attempts made, he would not say by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, but in the Bill which that noble and learned Lord had laid on the Table, and had prevailed upon their Lordships to give a second reading to. He need not remind their Lordships that at no very remote time Paul III. had deposed King Henry VIII., and released his subjects from their allegiance; and that only just before this Act passed, Paul IV. acted with equal violence towards Queen Elizabeth, and declared that it was the height of presumption that she should claim the Crown of England without his permission. It was on this account that this Statute was passed in the first year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth; and he repeated that, unless there were some inherent rigour in the laws of England which, in spite of the Act proposed by the noble and learned Lord, would make it penal for any one to put forth the power of the Pope to its former extent, they would be no longer protected against the assertion of that power. The object of his Motion, therefore, was that their Lordships should inquire of the Judges whether there was that inherent power in the Constitution of England — whether there was sufficient power in the other laws of England, were this repealed, to reach such offences as this? He had thought it right, in proposing this Motion to their Lordships, first to submit what was not directly asserted in this Bill, or the Act which it proposed to repeal. He wished to ask "whether it was an offence against the law of England,
302
and punishable by the same, by writing, printing, teaching, preaching, express word, deed, or act, advisedly and maliciously to deny the Queen's supremacy?" He repeated that an express denial of the Queen's supremacy was not included in the Act of the 1st of Elizabeth. That Act simply asserted the Queen's supremacy, and said nothing about the denial of it; nor was it included in the Bill then before them. He would hope that the Queen's supremacy in spiritual matters, and over estates spiritual, was so clear, undeniable, and unquestionable a part of the Constitution of this land, that, to deny it, must be a grave offence, and punishable at common law; but it was absolutely necessary that the House should know whether such were the case or not before they consented to repeal the penal enactments contained in the Statute of the 1st Elizabeth. On the subject of the Royal supremacy, they had the highest legal authority for stating that it was an essential part of the monarchy of this land. He need scarcely say that Lord Coke and Sir Matthew Hale asserted it in the strongest terms, and he would, therefore, hope that the denial of that supremacy must be an offence at common law. But if he had no doubt about it, it might be fairly asked why he proposed to ask these questions of the Judges? He should be quite content if the noble and learned Lords in that House would answer those questions decisively, and say that to deny the Queen's supremacy was an offence punishable by the law of the land. If they would unanimously say that, he would not desire to occupy the time of the learned Judges by asking them these questions. But there was something very peculiar in this case. When, on a former occasion, he (the Bishop of Exeter) had addressed the House, his noble and learned Friend proposed to insert in the Bill a simple declaration of the Royal supremacy. He should have been perfectly satisfied if his noble and learned Friend had gone one step further, and had proposed that some punishment should be annexed to the denial of it. The noble and learned Lord had siad that was a thing he could not do — that it was contrary to the policy upon which the Bill proceeded to go the length of saying, that to deny the supremacy of the Queen, in all matters spiritual as well as temporal, was an offence against the law of the land. The difficulty of the Bill seemed to him (the Bishop of Exeter) to

303
rest upon the extolling of the Pope's supremacy. What that extolling might be he did not profess to say. The Pope's supremacy was different in kind as well as in degree from the Royal supremacy of the Crown. The Pope's supremacy was claimed over all persons—and not only in all causes, but in all things whether external or internal. The Royal supremacy claimed jurisdiction with respect to matters in foro exteriori; that was the only jurisdiction which the Crown of England claimed. The extolling of the Pope's supremacy went directly to oppose the supremacy of the Crown. But it went much further. The Pope claimed to affect the conscience—to have jurisdiction in foro interiori—a claim which was never made by the Sovereign of England. Such a claim was contrary to the articles of our religion. The Queen claimed nothing in foro interiori; she left that to the conscience of the individual. But the Pope's claims in that respect were of such a formidable character, that our ancestors had felt it necessary to set aside all extolling of the Pope's jurisdiction, even including his jurisdiction in foro interiori. Let them remember that it was by means of the power of the Pope addressing his mandate to the consciences of his subjects abroad, that he was enabled to exercise the power of deposing sovereigns: it was by absolving them from their oaths of allegiance, by declaring foreign princes excommunicated, that the Pope assumed the power of deposing those sovereigns. It was therefore necessary for any State that wished to be free from danger of papal usurpation and papal interference to have itself protected from the setting forth publicly and by authority the right of the Pope to interfere with the consciences of its subjects; and that was done by the Act of Parliament which it was now proposed to repeal. The object of that Act was to prohibit a setting forth of the Pope's authority in such general terms as should prevent the extolling of his supremacy in any way. To prove the importance of that enactment let him quote the opinions of modern Roman Catholic authors of the highest authority and the greatest moderation. The first he would quote was not of the first moderation, but he was of the highest eminence—Dr. Milner. On this subject that author said—
"What, after all, is that deposing power, with the mention of which we are all so much stunned, and the assertion of which is supposed to be so heavy a charge against our earliest divines? What
304
did they say, except what all Protestants have said, that a manifest grievous persecution of the community for conscience' sake is an intolerable act of tyranny? The whole difference is, that the Catholics of those times, instead of deciding for themselves upon so important and conscientious a business, as Protestants claimed a right to do, only judged the case lawful when an impartial and equitable arbiter, the ecclesiastical superior, decided that it is so, as Cardinal Allen argues."
Thus they saw upon what this deposing power rested—it was in the power of the Pope to dispense with oaths of allegiance. That was the statement of Dr. Milner. He would now give the statement of a man than whom a more liberal man never belonged to any communion whatever—he meant Dr. O'Connor. That learned divine said—
"There is but one difference in this respect between the genuine doctrine of Catholics and Protestants, and that is explained by an historical fact applying to the obligation of an oath. If oaths were to be immutably and eternally binding, there never could have been a revolution in England without perjury; for all magistrates and officers of the army and navy had taken the oath of allegiance to James II. But there is a time when oaths cease to be binding, and when that time comes the Protestant declares himself dispensed from their obligation. That time did come, when James's tyrannical Government rendered that Government intolerable to the English people, and then the officers of the army and navy declared themselves dispensed from the obligation of their oaths. Now, in similar circumstances a Catholic officer would pause. 'True,' he would say, 'it appears to me that I am now acquitted from all obligation of allegiance; but perhaps I judge too favourably in my own cause, and I will submit it to the judgment of the Church whether I am, under these circumstances, absolved from my allegiance, or not.' The Church then only pronounces us absolved from our oaths;" (but the whole mischief is, that the Church has authority to pronounce them so absolved from their oaths), "when their obligation has ceased."
That was the statement of a Roman Catholic authority; and thus their Lordships would see the danger lay in the power of absolving, and that power, he contended, could not be set forth at length publicly in writing, &c., as he had before mentioned, without imminent danger to our constitutional freedom. But it might be said, that unless they accepted the jurisdiction of the Pope in foro interiori they could not give toleration to the Roman Catholic religion. That, he admitted, was a great difficulty. He admitted that the Roman Catholics could not exercise their religion with freedom unless they did submit to the supremacy of the Pope; but their Lordships would see there was a wide difference between internally entertaining that doctrine and extolling it, putting forth, and main-

305
taining it to the world. Let those who were in communion with the Pope believe, if they chose, in his supremacy, and in their consciences act up to that doctrine and its dictates; but let them not feel themselves at liberty to set them forth to the world. Such a doctrine—such an opinion was immoral, and being immoral, it was, he hoped, illegal too. While he said that, he also felt himself bound to declare that those noble Lords in communion with that Church, whom he was now addressing, would reject everything like a notion of their being released from their allegiance; and he hoped they would see that he was not applying to them or to individuals like them, any part of the observations he was then making. He contended, then, that if it were indeed agreeable to the law of England, the Act of Elizabeth being repealed, that the supremacy of the Pope might be set forth, extolled, and maintained to the world in writing, &c., it would be, under such circumstances, absolutely necessary that they should have some substitute for the law so repealed. Were they told that any practical evil had arisen from the existence of that Statute? Was the Roman Catholic interfered with in the exercise of his religion by reason of it? Nothing of the kind. It was not pretended that it produced any such effect. But they were told that it put the Roman Catholics in an invidious position, making an invidious distinction between them and the members of other religions. If they deemed that a painful position, he was sorry for it, and was ready to give way to them in any manner that would not trench upon the constitutional securities of our Protestant Church; but they would despise him if he were to give away in compliment that which he regarded as a security for the free enjoyment of the constitution of this land. The right rev. Prelate then entered into an explanation of the difference between the Pope's briefs and bulls — describing the one as those mandates which had passed under the Papal privy seal, and the latter as those which passed under the great seal of the Pope; and afterwards went on say that the sending of a bull, such as he had described, into England, savoured of high treason, and therefore he was not surprised to find that such men as Lord Burleigh and Sir Nicholas Bacon should have caused the enactment of such a law as the Statute of Queen Elizabeth, which it was now pro-
306
posed to repeal. Those who introduced this Bill had given no reason for it; they had not even the courage to say that it was "expedient" to pass it—nothing was heard even of that fatal word, which of late years had been the bane of this country; and he must ask whether there was any other great constitutional act embodied in the statutes of the realm without any preamble stating the reason why it was enacted? He asked, then, should the constitution of the land be completely changed, and the supremacy of the Crown be vitally affected by this Bill, without saying why and wherefore, and without condescending to say that it was fit to do so? It was only two years ago, that the noble and learned Lord (the Lord Chancellor) himself struck out of the Bill then before the House the very clauses he now introduced. The Bill introduced to Parliament by the noble and learned Lord opposite, and passed into a law two years ago, originally proposed that those Acts of Parliament to which he had referred, should be repealed. Well, what was done? He remembered hearing the noble Lord opposite (Lord Beaumont) make his propositions in his usually fair way, declaring distinctly what he wished and what he meant; but he (the Bishop of Exeter) had the satisfaction to find afterwards that certain portions of the Bill did not pass. And why did they not pass? Because his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack (the Lord Chancellor) struck those exceptionable parts out. He (the Bishop of Exeter) now held in his hand the Bill that actually passed, "as proposed to be amended by the Lord Chancellor on report;" and the amendments consisted in striking out those very parts which his noble and learned Friend now, with his own hand inserted, without giving a reason why. It was for these reasons that he (the Bishop of Exeter) thought it necessary to appeal from the noble and learned Lord, the advocate of the Government Bill in this House, to the same noble Lord sitting as Lord High Chancellor, together with the other noble and learned Lords, as Judges, whom he saw here, and who, he was persuaded, would give their minds to the deliberate and judicial consideration of this great question. The right rev. Prelate concluded by moving that the following questions be proposed to the Judges:—
"1. Whether, independently of so much of the Act passed in the first year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, intituled 'An Act restoring to the Crown the ancient Jurisdiction over the Estate

307
Ecclesiastical and Spiritual, and abolishing all Foreign Powers repugnant to the same,' as makes it punishable to affirm, hold, stand with, set forth, maintain, or defend, as therein is mentioned, the authority, pre-eminence, power, or jurisdiction, spiritual or ecclesiastical, of any foreign prince, prelate, person, state, or potentate, theretofore claimed, used, or usurped within this realm, or to put in use or execute anything for the extolling, advancement, setting forth, maintenance, or defence of any such pretended or usurped jurisdiction, power, pre-eminence, and authority, or any part thereof; and of an Act passed in the fifth year of the said Queen, intituled 'An Act for the Assurance of the Queen's Royal Power over all Estates and Subjects within her dominions,' it is an offence against the law of England, and punishable by the same, by writing, printing, teaching, express words, deed, or act, advisedly and maliciously to deny the Queen's supremacy, or to affirm, maintain, and defend any such pretended or usurped power, jurisdiction, or authority of the Pope, or any other foreign prince, prelate, person, state, or potentate, within this realm?
"2. Whether, independently of so much of the said Act of the first year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth as is above recited, and also of the said Act passed in the fifth year of the said Queen's reign, and also of an Act passed in the 13th year of the said Queen's reign, intituled 'An Act against the bringing in and putting in execution of Bulls, Writings, or Instruments, and other superstitious Things, from the see of Rome,' it is an offence against the law of England, and punishable as such, to bring in or put in execution any such bulls, writings, or instruments from the see of Rome."
The LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that perhaps he might, in the first instance, be permitted to allude to the observation made by his right rev. Friend, with respect to some supposed inconsistency on his part in reference to the present measure; and he was quite sure that when he called to their recollection what passed on the occasion to which his right rev. Friend referred, thir Lordships would at once acquit him of the charge preferred against him by the right rev. Prelate. The noble Lord to whom allusion had been made, introduced to the House the Bill of which the right rev. Prelate had spoken. That Bill had not been previously communicated to him (the Lord Chancellor). He had no opportunity, at least no adequate opportunity, of considering its effect; but upon perusing the Bill, and referring to the particular Acts of Parliament to which it alluded, he saw at once that it was perfectly clear that every man of liberal mind and feelings must assent to a great portion of that Bill, but that with respect to other parts of the Bill doubts might be entertained. Inquiry was necessary, and therefore the course which he pursued was this: to those parts of the Bill to which he felt no reasonable
308
objections could be entertained, he at once assented; but he informed that noble and learned Lord, that if he would intrust the Bill to him he would refer the other parts of the measure to the Commission sitting for the purpose of inquiring into the Criminal Law—that he should request them to consider the subject, and to make a report upon it—and he would afterwards proceed acccording to the views he should entertain with respect to that report. It was for this reason, and for this reason alone, that those parts of the Bill had been struck out. Not that he formed or expressed any opinion on the subject; but he said, at once, that it was of so much importance, and involved considerations of so great magnitude, that the noble and learned Lord ought not then to call upon him (the Lord Chancellor) to pronounce any decided opinion upon it. He pursued the course which he had suggested, and recommended those Acts to the consideration of the Criminal Law Commission. That Commission made a report upon the subject, and it was in pursuance of their report that he brought in the Bill which was now under their Lordships' consideration. Having made his statement, he was quite sure the House would acquit him of any inconsistency with respect to the course he was pursuing. He would now proceed to observe, that he did feel most anxious that this measure, if it passed, should pass with the general concurrence of their Lordships. He felt most anxious, if it passed, that it should pass with the particular concurrence of the right reverend bench, and, if possible, with the concurrence of his right rev. Friend himself. He (the Lord Chancellor) had been most anxious upon the subject; and he had therefore excluded from the Bill all that in his judgment might give rise to any difference of opinion, He laid it upon their Table some time since, and had suffered a long period to elapse before he brought it before them for a second reading; he paused for the purpose of receiving suggestions from noble Lords, from right rev. Prelates, and from other quarters, and he had received suggestions and assistance from a right rev. Prelate, a friend of his, for whom he entertained the greatest possible respect, on account of his learning, his acuteness, and the excellence of his character. He had adopted very many of these suggestions, and the amendments which he should in consequence propose, he should introduce when their Lordships were disposed to go into Committee upon

309
the Bill. There was one satisfaction which he received from the speech of his right rev. Friend (the Bishop of Exeter). It was this; that he had directed his attention and objection only to two points in the Bill. All the rest of the Bill he might therefore consider as having met with his right rev. Friend's assent, if not with his approbation. [The Bishop of EXETER was understood to say, "Not entirely."] There were only two points in the Bill—namely, those which related to the Acts of the 1st of Elizabeth and the 13th of Elizabeth, to which the right rev. Prelate had referred.
The BISHOP of EXETERintimated, that there might be other parts to which he should object, if the Bill went into Committee.
The LORD CHANCELLORhad referred to what passed on a former occasion, and then, as well as now, he had thought that he might assume that the right rev. Prelate confined his objection to the Acts alluded to. He knew that on a former occasion the right rev. Prelate stated that he (the Lord Chancellor) had, in opening this case to their Lordships, dwelt most upon statutes, subjects, and points in respect to which no difference of opinion could be entertained—that upon the points to which there was no opposition he had most enlarged, but that he had purposely passed lightly over those two Acts which his right rev. Friend considered so material — that he (the Lord Chancellor) did not pursue a magnanimous course in that respect, and hoped that those two Acts would have been forgotten in the mass of Acts to which the Bill referred. That was the observation made by his right rev. Friend, and therefore he had assumed that his right rev. Friend had no very decided objection to any other parts of the Bill. Now, with respect to the 1st of Elizabeth—the Act of Supremacy, as it was generally called — that Act of Parliament expressed in the fullest and most comprehensive terms the authority of the Sovereign of this country in all spiritual and ecclesiastical matters. Nothing could be more comprehensive, nothing could be more distinct and decisive, than the terms in which that was expressed: no person reading it could entertain any doubt upon the subject. The Act afterwards proceeded to impose an oath, calling upon persons filling certain offices to declare their adherence to the doctrine so stated in the Act of Parliament. In a subsequent part of the Act—and here he would
310
state that he was desirous only that the ground upon which he proceeded should be distinctly understood—certain severe penalties were imposed, not upon persons who should deny the supremacy of the Sovereign, but upon persons who should maintain and defend the spiritual ecclesiastical authority of any foreign prince, prelate, or potentate. Now, it was perfectly clear, that the abrogation of these penalties would not affect the rest of that Act. What was the state of the Roman Catholics in this country — not in England alone, but in these realms? The Act of Parliament subjected to the penalties of high treason, to the penalties of misprision of treason, and the forfeiture of all personal property, the individual who maintained or defended the spiritual or ecclesiastical authority of any foreign prince or prelate? Was it not a matter of public notoriety? Did any person doubt for one moment that every Roman Catholic in this Empire, and all over the world, looked upon the Pope as his spiritual and ecclesiastical head? Was it not a fundamental principle of their religion? Could we entertain any doubt upon the subject? If any doubt were entertained upon the subject, he would refer to the speeches of the right rev. Prelates who addressed their Lordships' House when this Act of Elizabeth was in progress through Parliament. It was by them stated in precise and distinct terms. There were two of their speeches now remaining, the speech of the Archbishop of York and the speech of the Bishop of Chester, in which they stated this in most distinct and positive terms. But, more than this, if they looked to the canons of the Romish Church, they found this doctrine stated in the strongest terms. No doubt could be entertained with respect to it. Every Roman Catholic clergyman took an oath that he would conform to those canons, and admitted their validity to the fullest extent. They might take it, therefore, as part of the fundamental and essential doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, that they regard the Pope as their superior, as the person who had ecclesiastical and spiritual jurisdiction over them. But it did not rest there. Their Lordships had themselves legislatively acknowledged it. He now referred to the oath which, by the Act of Elizabeth, was imposed upon persons holding certain offices—they were to swear that "no foreign prince, prelate, or potentate, hath, or ought to have, any ecclesiastical or spiritual dominion in these realms."

311
These were the terms of the oath—that oath was in force until of late years. Their Lordships themselves had altered that oath—they had altered it out of deference to persons professing the Roman Catholic religion. They found it impossible to impose such an oath upon their fellow countrymen; and accordingly they struck out the words "ecclesiastical and spiritual," and inserted in the place of them "civil and temporal." After this, did it not appear clear the law and the Legislature of this country had by this change sanctioned the doctrine, that persons professing the Roman Catholic religion looked up to the Pope as their ecclesiastical and spiritual superior? Did not their Lordships themselves allow it? By this alteration in the oath had they not permitted and sanctioned it? When they had allowed the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion in this country, and when they knew that this was a fundamental principle of that religion, how could they say, consistently with themselves, that when the professors of that religion faithfully discharged their duty by maintaining and defending this foreign ecclesiastical and spiritual authority, they would subject these persons to the penalties of high treason and the penalties of premunire, and that they would take from them all their personal estate and all their personal possessions? Now, this was an inconsistency which he was most anxious to remove by the introduction of those clauses in the Bill. It was impossible they could retain those penalties. They had gone too far. They should not have taken the steps which they had already taken, if they were not prepared to follow them up with this final step, in order to be consistent with themselves. Then it was said, "But this will lead to a great deal of mischief, because we do not know exactly what is the meaning of the term 'spiritual.'" And then it was said that it might involve the absolving of subjects from their oaths of allegiance; to which he gave this short and distinct answer—that if any person in this country circulated or inculcated immoral principles, he was amenable to the law, and liable to be punished by the common law of the country. The common law was sufficient to reach cases of that description; and when such cases came into the courts of justice, they would be properly commented upon by those who presided over those tribunals. It had been said elsewhere, that if they repealed this law and the penalties, they would abro-
312
gate and abolish the supremacy of the Sovereign. [The Bishop of EXETER: No, no!] He was glad to hear that this objection was not to be repeated to-night, although, on a former night, they heard many of that description. But he might say that the supremacy of the Sovereign of these realms rested upon too solid a foundation to be so shaken. It did not depend upon the Act of Parliament he had referred to—it was a part of the common law of the land. His right rev. Friend had admitted it; and he (the Lord Chancellor) was prepared to show, if the proposition were repeated in this House, that it had been recognised by repeated acts of the Legislature; that it had been laid down by the Judges in all ages and in all times. In the case of "Cowdry,"—so we understood the noble and learned Lord—Lord Cooke summed up the whole subject in a masterly manner, and showed that by ancient and continued decisions, by Acts of Parliament, by long practice and usage, it was acknowledged and established beyond the possibility of a doubt that the supremacy of the Crown in ecclesiastical matters was part of the common law of the land. There could be no danger, therefore, in repealing those penalties, severe as they were. There could be no danger to the supremacy itself. He would call their Lordships' attention to what the Acts were to which he referred, and how absolutely necessary it was, if they were not repealed, that they should at all events be amended; and that their Lordships ought to go into Committer upon the Bill, in order that they should consider them. The Irish Act, to which this Bill referred, was still in force in all its intensity. By that Act the party who maintained the spiritual supremacy of the Pope, forfeited, for his first offence, all his personal property; and for his second offence he was liable to be punished for a premunire; and their Lordships were well aware what the infliction of that punishment was: it deprived the party of all his property, made him a prisoner for life, and deprived him of all the benefit of law; so much so that, as he had stated on a former occasion, it was doubtful whether a person who was subjected to a premunire might not be killed by any man with impunity. For the third offence, the party was guilty of high treason. So that they tolerated the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion; they knew that it was an essential and a fundamental part of that religion that its professors should

313
maintain and defend the spiritual authority of the Pope; that it was incumbent upon them to do so; that it was a fundamental principle of that religion; and yet, if they did what their Lordships themselves sanctioned, they said that the parties should be punished in this severe manner. Was it possible to maintain such a state of the law? He had said that these penalties were in force in Ireland under the Irish Act, which it was one of the objects of the present Bill to repeal. With respect to England, they had already repealed the two severest penalties, those of premunire and high treason; but they had declared that every person offending in this particular should, upon conviction, forfeit his whole personal estate, all his leasehold property—all his personal estate of whatever description. His right rev. Friend said, "What a monstrous thing it is to introduce a Bill without a preamble! You have not pointed out the necessity for repealing these Acts." Why, the thing spoke for itself; and he exhorted their Lordships not to repeal one of these Acts of Parliament, unless they were satisfied, on reading them, that they ought no longer to remain upon the Statute-book. Was it necessary for him to point out the necessity of repealing an inconsistent, an unjust, and a cruel law? Was it necessary to have a preamble for that purpose? He exhorted them to strike out of this Bill every Act of Parliament with respect to which they entertained a doubt. Every one that failed to carry conviction to their minds, he begged of them to strike out. The right rev. Prelate had asked what he intended to do? And he had told him that he would adopt this course, for fear anybody should imagine that they were impairing or striking a blow at the supremacy of the Crown by repealing these Acts. He proposed to introduce a proviso that the repeal of a clause in the Act of Elizabeth should not affect any other provision of the Act, nor call in question nor affect the undoubted supremacy of the Crown, as founded upon the ancient common law of the country. He had thought that that would have satisfied all doubts and hesitation on the part of his right rev. Friend; but his right rev. Friend said, "No, that won't do; you must inflict a penalty and a punishment." Then he (the Lord Chancellor) said that that would be perfectly inconsistent with the view he took of the subject. If it was legal and proper to do these things to which he had alluded—if it was
314
a fundamental part of the Roman Catholic religion to entertain those opinions, and parties entertaining those opinions were bound to maintain and defend them, how could they be justly subjected to punishment for that? His right rev. Friend wished to know if, after repealing these laws, there were any other punishment left for the offence, and if there were no other punishment, then he (the Lord Chancellor) presumed that the right rev. Prelate would strike out the clause altogether. It was upon that point that he was at issue with him. He (the Lord Chancellor) said that it was no crime in the Roman Catholic to maintain and defend the supremacy of the Pope; but that if he did it for mischievous purposes and circulating immoral doctrines and opinions, he was liable to punishment by the common law; but if he merely maintained and defended, as he was bound to do, the spiritual authority of his superior, then he said that he was guilty of no offence against the laws of his country. The right rev. Prelate had asked his opinion and that of the learned Judges as to the right of the Roman Catholics to maintain and defend the supremacy of the Pope in spiritual matters. He said that it was no offence at common law for them to do so; but, on the other hand, he said that if any person improperly, wantonly, or seditiously, called in question the supremacy of the Crown of England—and that, it was to be observed, included the temporal as well as the spiritual power of the Crown—if any person from any improper motive or purpose, or in any improper manner, questioned that supremacy, then that person would be liable to a prosecution at common law; and there could be no doubt if the learned Judges were consulted they would so determine. The next question to which it was necessary that he should invite their Lordships' attention, had reference to the 13th of Queen Elizabeth. By that Act the importation of bulls, or any writings, for any purpose, from the court of Rome, made the persons bringing them into this country liable to the penalties of high treason. That Act still formed part of the statute law of the realm. Whether that Act ought to be repealed, amended, varied, or altered, was a fitting subject for consideration in Committee, rather than for discussion in the present stage of the Bill. Whenever that question might be disposed of, there was one circumstance which he hoped that noble Lords would bear in mind, namely, the notoriety of the fact that bulls, re-

315
scripts, and other writings, were constantly passing into this country from Rome. The disciples of that church received those documents in spite of its being considered by the law of England, that their doing so was high treason; and that sort of intercourse had gone on and still went on regularly between the Roman Catholic inhabitants of this country and the see of Rome. He appealed to noble Lords who knew this matter much better than he did to confirm this statement. The fact had, indeed, been so stated to him by a noble Lord who was conversant with this subject. It had been so proved at their Lordships' bar on a recent occasion. In the Sussex Peerage case a dignitary of the Romish church had appeared at their Lordships' bar, and from his evidence it was clear that communications were constantly carried on with the court of Rome. And they winked and connived at it! Was that a proper state of the law? They knew it was taking place every day; they winked and connived at it, and they did not dare to prosecute it. What a state of law was that! How degrading that the law should be in that state! They were bound to tolerate it—they must suffer it; in consistency even with their own legislation they ought to sanction it. They ought not to say that the law should be a dead letter. But then it was said, that if they repealed that Act of Parliament they would open the door to the introduction of bulls for political purposes, directed against the Crown, or directed against the Government, or against the temporal interests of private individuals; and then the right rev. Prelate had stated former occasions upon which a temporal and supreme authority had been assumed by the Pope; he had referred to the case, when, in accordance with the demands of Napoleon, the Pope had released from their allegiance the subjects of Louis XVIII.; when a number of Catholic bishops of France were in one day deprived of their sees: he had also made allusion to Pope Gregory VII. attempting to depose Henry IV. of France, and absolving his subjects from their allegiance. He had also alluded to Pius V., whose conduct had led to the Act alluded to by the right rev. Prelate. Now in all the cases referred to, he felt as much and equal indignation with the right rev. Prelate at this insolent assumption of power. He was quite sure that their Lordships must concur in the sentiment of the right rev. Prelate, that nothing could be more injurious to the
316
public interests and welfare than that a power should be permitted to be assumed by any foreign prelate or priest to interfere in the affairs of another country. This, he said, did indeed excite his indignation. And when he said this, he remembered that the Roman Catholic church never retraced its steps—never abandoned that course which it had once entered upon—never consented to undo that which it had once done. They all knew that Gregory VII. and Pius V. had been canonized, and that these acts of theirs were made the subject of eulogy. They all knew that a part of the ceremony of their annual commemoration was to peruse the memorials of these individuals, to extol their character, and to celebrate the very acts which he referred to. They all knew that the canons of that church never varied—that that church never receded from any position it had laid down. They all knew that the power of deposing monarchs and absolving subjects from allegiance formed a portion of the body of the canons of the Romish church, and they all knew that every member of the Roman Catholic church, and every priest, whether regular or secular, swore to the truth, undoubtingly, of those laws; and all these facts, he said, were calculated to excite his indignation. But, then, did they apply to the present case? It was sufficient for him to say, that the common law was sufficient to protect them from any such encroachments. He laid down this position—that if any person introduced a bull directed against the Crown, directed against the Government, or directed against the temporal interests of any individual, the common law was strong enough to meet and punish all such persons. The common law was strong enough for all these purposes. For instance, as to the cases referred to by the right reverend Prelate, upon bulls of excommunication. According to the Act of Edward I., the bringing in of such bulls to be put into effect against any individual, would subject the parties to the penalties of high treason; and Lord Coke, in commenting upon this case—namely, upon the excommunication of Pius V., observed, that if a person were guilty of high treason for introducing such a bull against a private individual, à fortiori they must be considered guilty of the crime when the bull was directed against the Sovereign. By the Statute of Richard II., passed long before the Act so often referred to, the introduction and publication of any bull di-

317
rected against the Sovereign or Government for any political purpose, subjected the parties to the penalties of a premunire. Was it then necessary to keep this Act of Parliament on the Statute-book? He knew it would be said, what was the use of repealing this law, when other laws relating to the same subject were still to remain in full operation? His answer to this was, that the words in the Act of Elizabeth were so comprehensive as to embrace the most innocent communications with the Court of Rome, that they had an operative effect upon intercourse between Roman Catholics and the head of the Church of Rome, to which there could exist no fair or rational objection? It was then, he thought, necessary that that Act should be repealed or modified: and the question which he had to consider, and on which he had entertained some doubt, was, whether they ought to qualify it in some way, or leave it to the common law to come into operation as the case of necessity should arise? Now he felt this—that if they attempted to draw nice distinctions, and to make nice definitions, there was great danger of their falling into error; and they might do what they never intended upon a subject that was too obscure for verbal legislation. Therefore it was that he had come to the conclusion, that it would be much better to repeal the Act entirely, and to rely upon the vigour of the common law to prevent abuses. This was the opinion that he entertained, with deference to their Lordships, and this he would submit to them when they came to consider this Bill in Committee. At the outset he had expressed his desire that the measure should pass with the general concurrence of their Lordships, and with the concurrence even of his right rev. Friend. Nothing could be of more importance than that a measure of this description should not appear to be hurried; and therefore it was, that if any of their Lordships were disposed that the Motion of his right rev. Friend should be agreed to, that the opinion of the Judges should be taken on the subject, though he did not think it at all necessary; still, for the purpose of giving satisfaction to every one, and for the purpose of removing objections, he would be content that such opinion should be taken. In that case he would not oppose the Motion of the right rev. Prelate; but he again said, he did not think it necessary, but he now left it to the wisdom of their Lordships, and upon their judgment and dis-
318
crimination he relied that the measure would be allowed to pass into a law.
LORD BROUGHAMwished to address a very few words to their Lordships, as he had been called upon by the right rev. Prelate to give an answer upon the points which had been stated by him. His opinion upon those points coincided with the answer that had been given by his noble and learned Friend. They had an undoubted right, according to the ancient practice of that House, to put questions to the learned Judges upon matters relating to legislative measures; but, then, those questions ought not to be put except in cases of doubt and difficulty. The learned Judges could not give answers in cases of doubt and difficulty without requiring a considerable time for their determination. For instance, they had put a question to the learned Judges ten months ago, and they could not receive an answer to that question until next Tuesday. If the questions were not doubtful, they ought not to be put to the learned Judges; and in this case they ought not to do so, when by putting the questions they must postpone this measure to next Session. He entirely agreed with his noble and learned Friend in the answers that he had given to the questions of the right rev. Prelate. He said that to extol, defend, or maintain the power of a foreign priest in this country, was an offence. He entirely agreed with his noble and learned Friend in the indignation he had expressed that any foreign priest should assume a temporal or even a spiritual power, not only within this realm, but in any other kingdom, except that in which that priest resided as a temporal prince; and this was an opinion on which the French monarchy had acted: they would allow the foreign priest to have no power within their realm, even though that priest called the French monarch "the eldest son of the Church." The French Sovereign happened to be a very powerful monarch, and therefore he was called "the eldest son;" but it might be doubted that if not powerful he would not be so called; but like the eldest sons of many powerful monarchies, he was not disposed to yield much to his respected parent, and had always maintained adverse rights to those claimed by the foreign priest, even in spiritual matters; for France would receive no communication from the Pope, unless authority was given to it by a rescript, or, as they termed it, by an exequatur. Now, if any one by language maintained the su-

319
premacy of the Pope for an unlawful purpose, or in seditious language, so as to be an insult and an affront to the supremacy of his lawful Sovereign—for he could imagine it could be so entertained as to amount to a serious offence, so even as to amount to a seditious libel, or even to amount to a treasonable offence—he had to give the same answer which had been given by his noble and learned Friend, there could be no doubt that the common law would reach them: but there was no punishment by ancient statute or by common law for importing bulls, or rescripts, or writings, from Rome, of a spiritual or temporal nature, provided they did not contain anything seditious, blasphemous, or immoral. They were regarded, in fact, as in the same light with any other writing not coming from Rome. Now, the bull that had given rise to the 13th Elizabeth was one of the most monssrous that had ever passed from the Court of Rome. There could be no doubt that the Act was passed by Parliament when its members saw a bull of excommunication against Queen Elizabeth, absolving her subjects from their allegiance, impudently affixed to the gate of the Bishop of London's palace, and also affixed to the gate of the palace of the King of France, who received it with the same scorn and abhorrence with which the present monarch would receive any such instrument if directed against the Sovereign of this realm. Such an act was not mere sedition—it was high treason. Whoever had affixed that document, calling upon the subjects of the Queen to renounce their allegiance, had committed an overt act of high treason. High treason consisted in the mind; and such might be regarded as an overt act of treason. Let no man, therefore, suppose that the importing bulls from Rome could be permitted, or that they would not be punished like any other writings if they were blasphemous, seditious, or immoral. Upon the points with respect to which the right rev. Prelate had asked, he said he had no doubt whatever. He did deprecate sending these questions to the Judges: it would be would be giving them needless trouble, and putting a stop to a most salutary measure. If questions were to be put to the Judges, he would have them asked, if a person ceasing to be a member of the Church of England, and becoming a member of the Church of Rome, or of any Dissenting sect, could be still subjected to the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts? This was a question which
320
he believed had been decided by his noble and learned Friend (Lord Denman) behind him.
The LORD CHANCELLORexplained. He was not to be understood as having recommended that these questions should be put to the Judges.
LORD DENMANhad heard with very great satisfaction that the right rev. Prelate was willing to accept the opinions of the noble Lords in that House who were connected with the profession of the law; as by the right rev. Prelate's doing so, it would not be necessary to withdraw the Judges from the heavy avocations that were now pressing upon them. He would take the liberty of saying on their part that if a doubt could be entertained on these points, they would sacrifice their own convenience, or even the public convenience, to resolve that doubt. He had heard with considerable surprise the right rev. Prelate express something like a doubt as to whether the Crown of England was an Imperial Crown, or whether, by the law of England in former times, there could be any interference on the part of the Pope which could affect that imperial power. As to the days of King John and the Pope, when the Pope spake of John as his vassal, it was one of which they might feel the degradation, whilst they were aware that it was contrary to the ancient laws and Constitution of England. The Statute of Elizabeth revived the Statute of Henry VIII., which declared the supremacy of the Crown as it existed from all times. So much was this the case, that he had no doubt that the Judges in the time when the Pope had the greatest authority in this kingdom, these Catholic Judges would on this very point have given the same answer which the Protestant Judges now would be prepared to give. The reign of King John was no more to be referred to than that of Charles the Second, or any other monarch. In the reign which followed that of John, persons were punished over and over again for submitting to the interference of the Pope, and giving effect to it. He would refer the right rev. Prelate to Cowdry's case, with which no doubt he was familiar; but in fact, upon going through the list of our kings at that period, numerous instances would be found under every reign to prove that the law was—that the Crown was the head of the Church in this country, and that those who supported the authority of the Pope were subject to the severest penalties—banishment for life, loss

321
of life, and all sorts of severe punishments. Therefore he had not the least hesitation in answering the questions of the right rev. Prelate as both his noble and learned Friends had answered them; for he had no doubt on the subject, that no document which should proceed from Rome, either in the shape of a bull, or in any other character, could be circulated in this country with impunity, if it inculcated anything derogatory to the authority of the Crown, or tended to promote sedition or to carry into effect any of those objects with which the courts of law could deal when they were brought before them. The authority rested upon the common law of the land, which was well understood, and which no doubt would be put in force if the necessity arose.
LORD CAMPBELLbegged permission to add a few words to what had been said by his noble and learned Friends. Some persons had supposed that by the Queen's supremacy, and by the doctrine that the Queen was the head of the Church, was meant that Her Majesty might do anything she pleased in ecclesiastical matters, alter the liturgy or the Articles of the Church. But this notion was most erroneous. The Queen was, as he hoped she always would be, over all persons, and in all causes, ecclesiastical and civil, supreme: that was what was meant by the supremacy of the Sovereign of this realm, and that supremacy, by the common law of England, the Sovereign had always exercised, for the Statute of the 1st Elizabeth was only declaratory of the law of England from time immemorial. With regard to the question whether, after these penalties should be abolished, a Roman Catholic could assert the spiritual supremacy of the Pope, he should say that, undoubtedly, that would and ought to be the case, that supremacy being only the spiritual supremacy, and not implying any temporal control or power in this country, If any bull should be issued, calling upon the subjects of this country to act in any manner contrary to law, the persons importing such a document, and the persons obeying such injunctions, would be liable to punishment. He rejoiced that the Bill had been brought in, and rejoiced that it was likely to pass with so much unanimity; but, at the same time, he must say, that unless some ulterior measures were adopted, the Pope would have more authority in England than he ought to have, and than he possessed in Italy, in Spain, in France, or in Austria. He should strongly recommend the Go-
322
vernment of this country to have a concordat with His Holiness the Pope. Until such a measure was resorted to, the Roman Catholics in this country would not be under due control, nor would there be due discrimination between the authority which might be legitimately exercised by the Pope, and that species of authority which ought not to be exercised by any Sovereign in a foreign country. There was no obstacle to our communicating with the Pope as a sovereign prince. Diplomatic relations with that pontiff were not interdicted by any of our statutes, and he thought that such negociations with the Pope as a sovereign prince, and the establishment of a concordat, embracing England and Ireland, would be a highly desirable measure; and he hoped that after this Bill should have been passed, the attention of Her Majesty's Government would be turned to a subject which he considered to be of the greatest importance to the welfare of the country.
LORD BEAUMONTconsidered what had been stated by the right rev. Prelate and the noble and learned Lord, as containing serious errors in regard to the state of opinion in Europe, and as casting a stain upon the Roman Catholic faith which was not deserved. On a former occasion, he had explained to the House that there was a very great difference between the dogmas of faith and matters of discipline. He objected to conclusions being drawn from the past history of the usurpations of the Papal power and the conduct of weak monarchs, of what were the doctrines or the adopted principles of Rome. Matters of faith were held to be immutable, and were founded on the great truths of Christianity; but the manner and the means of propagating that faith changed with the change of times, or the different dispositions of the Sovereign Pontiffs. He had endeavoured on a former night to illustrate this difference, by showing the horror in which the past policy of Rome was viewed by the most enlightened Catholics of the present day; but on this occasion he would use not his own words, but he would appeal to documents which both the right rev. Prelate and his noble and learned Friend had consulted; from which alone, he maintained, the exact results of the opinions and practices of Rome could be obtained on this question. He referred the right rev. Prelate for a refutation of his error to the answers given by the faculties of divinity in the great colleges of Europe, to questions put to them in the

323
time of Mr. Pitt. He referred to the answers from Louvain, one of the most celebrated of those colleges. The first question was, whether the Pope or cardinals, or any body of individuals in the Church of Rome, had any civil authority, or jurisdiction, or pre-eminence whatever, within the realm of England? The second, could the Pope, or cardinals, or any body of individuals in the Church of Rome, depose the Sovereign of England, or absolve subjects of His Majesty from their oath of allegiance? The third, was there any tenet in the Catholic faith by which Catholics were justified in not keeping faith with heretics, or other persons differing from them in religious opinion in any transaction, either of a public or a private nature? The faculty of divinity at Louvain assembled, and it was unanimously agreed to answer the first and second queries in the negative. To the third query the answer was, that the sovereign power of the State was in civil matters subordinate to God alone, and was nowise subject to or dependent upon any other power, even though it be a spiritual power. He called the attention of his noble and learned Friend to this answer, inasmuch as it met directly his statement. It also stated that no power could deprive the Throne of these realms of its temporal rights, government, jurisdiction, or pre-eminence; and that no power, not even the Catholic Church assembled in a general council, could free the subject from his oath of allegiance, or deprive the sovereign of his rights, or restrain or weaken the bond of union between the sovereign and his people. "These things," they added, "have been done; for the justice of them let the doers answer." The answer continued in the same strain, saying, that there was no doubt whatever that the authority and power of the Church of Rome of interfering with the government of any other country did not in any way exist. And he would here beg to remind his noble and learned Friend, that it was by no concordat that this power was obtained. The Government of Austria allowed no communication whatever to take place between Rome and the clergy of the kingdom of Austria, save through the bishops; and these latter could not make a charge without submitting it to the approval of the Government. They could not publish a re-script without the consent of the State. A concordat had been agreed to with regard to Lombardy, but never as far as
324
Austria Proper was concerned. Like any other temporal power, the Court of Rome occasionally tried to usurp temporal dominion; but when the right rev. Prelate said that no alteration, no abandonment of a power once claimed by Rome could take place, he should beg to tell the right rev. Prelate that the whole discipline of Rome was matter of policy for the time being, and that it might be changed for the moment at any time. It was true that they never recalled a bull, as they repealed Acts of Parliament here; but they issued others in opposition to it, so much so as to contradict every word of the former bull, but at the same time without announcing its repeal. The error into which his noble and learned Friend had fallen was, in confounding dogmas and matters of faith, which were purely questions of religious belief, with the discipline of the Church of Rome, which was mere matter of policy; which a person might be a Catholic without conforming to, and which he was even allowed to contravene in some cases, as they would find in the history of Europe to have been the case again and again, without the parties being supposed to have abandoned the Catholic faith in so doing. In justice to his noble and learned Friend, he felt bound to state, that when he (Lord Beaumont) had introduced the original Bill to which the right rev. Prelate had alluded, his noble and learned Friend suggested that he should abandon the Bill, promising to bring forward in the next Session a complete measure, which would repeal all the objectionable statutes. He declined acceding to his noble and learned Friend's suggestion, but urged him to adopt, at least, the parts of the Bill on which, he believed, there would no discussion arise. His (Lord Beaumont's) Bill was finally carried, although in a mutilated form; but by persisting in forcing the subject on the notice of the House, he had obtained a pledge from the Government that the recommendation of the Criminal Law Commissioners should be finally adopted. His noble and learned Friend said that the Bill in that shape was very imperfect, and that a great deal more of the enactments ought to have been repealed; and he then said, he would bring in the Bill which was now before the House as soon as he could obtain sufficient information to prepare it. He would with these remarks conclude, after again begging the right rev. Prelate to recollect, when next he referred to matters like the present, not to

325
confound the dogmas of faith with what were mere events of history; and that he by no means palliated the charge by exempting from it those members of the Roman Catholic persuasion whom chanced to be in that House, because he (Lord Beaumont) could declare positively that what the right rev. Prelate had stated to be dogmas, were by no means the doctrines of the Roman Catholic church.
The BISHOP of EXETER, in reply, said the noble Baron had thought fit to call their Lordships' attention to the answers given by certain Universities, denying that the doctrines he had referred to were the doctrines of the Church of Rome. When he (the Bishop of Exeter) last addressed their Lordships, he had brought a case subsequent to the date of these declarations, in which the Pope had actually exercised the deposing power; and he was sorry to say this was not the latest instance, for the Pope had, within the last five years, addressed an allocution to the Irish, complaining of the conduct of the Spanish Government towards the Catholic clergy of that country, in confiscating their property, and declaring of his own authority, mero motu—it was the present Pope—that all the acts of that Government were absolutely null. Then, was he to be told that this was not a point which they were to regard with some suspicion? A noble and learned Lord who had left the House (Lord Campbell) had told their Lordships that if this Bill passed the Pope would become more powerful here than in any State in Europe, and that it was necessary that something ulterior should be done. This was a strange state of things. This was a reason why the Bill should not pass till those other measures were introduced. The noble and learned Lord said, "Let us pass the Bill; and when we have passed it, it will be absolutely necessary to do what has not yet been done—enter into a concordat with the Pope." A more dangerous and a more unconstitutional policy had never been proposed. It was very true that, if this Bill did pass, this country would become more subject to the Pope than any other country in Europe. Was not this a very strong reason why they were bound to keep the security they at present had on the Statute-book. He had no hesitation in saying that he did not believe it possible to devise any law that should make the introduction of bulls, generally, free from penal consequences, without an effect injurious to the safety and
326
well-being of the community. The only way, he verily believed, was to forbid them absolutely. Sir Nicholas Bacon forbad them absolutely; and all the great statesmen of Queen Elizabeth's day held the same opinion, and had put that opinion upon record. On this account he should feel himself called upon, when they went into Committee, to oppose that part of the Bill. He acknowledged thankfully the kindness of the noble and learned Lords in giving to him, or rather to the House, their judicial opinion. He was now spared the necessity of applying to the Judges. He would not press that. But how did the case stand? It was declared by the noble and learned Lords that the law of England, if this Act were removed from the Statute-book, did not afford them any security against Papal bulls in general: they had security in that law against sedition and treason, but not against bulls generally. Why, then, he would say, it gave them no security at all; inasmuch as it was altogether impossible to frame any indictment, excepting that now in force—the absolute prohibition—to meet the case of seditious doctrines, not directly applied to England, covertly sought to be introduced. They could not meet those doctrines with any indictment whatever; and it was for this reason that countries of continental Europe, even those in community with the Pope, found it necessary to put restrictions upon the dissemination of doctrines so dangerous. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack had declared, that what they tolerated they ought to sanction. To that principle he (the Bishop of Exeter) most distinctly objected. They permitted, and so long as they could do so without imminent and manifest danger to their own Constitution, he trusted they would continue to permit, in a spirit of tolerance, the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion. But they were not to sanction that religion; they were to look upon it with dread and jealousy in all those particulars in which they knew it to be dangerous. Let those individuals who believed in the Pope's supremacy practise their religion; but let not the extolling and setting forth of that power be sanctioned and approved of. It was not necessary to the free exercise of their religion; it was no disability to the free exercise of their religion; and therefore let the setting forth of those opinions be prevented. He would remind their Lordships that the unanimous opinion of the noble and learned Lords was, that the supremacy

327
of the Crown was an essential and integral part of the Constitution of this country, and that that supremacy cannot he gainsaid with impunity. He had anticipated that answer. His argument was founded on that belief; and he was astonished at hearing the noble and learned Lord the Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench say that he (the Bishop of Exeter) had, in any expression, impeached the independence of the British Crown. He had stated that it was a free and independent Crown, free from all the interference of the Pope; and saying that, he had insisted that they were not to be brought into an acknowledgment of any supremacy but that of the Crown. The noble and learned Lords informed them that it was an offence at common law to extol the power of the Pope in a seditious manner, but that it was no offence at common law to extol the power of the Pope generally. If that were the case, then he thought it necessary to take some measure to meet the danger to which such a consideration exposed them. A similar observation had been made relative to Papal bulls: nothing in common law was opposed to them, per se; but it was for that very reason that the wise statesmen of Queen Elizabeth forbad them generally. Such had been the policy hitherto pursued; and if the noble and learned Lord pressed this measure upon the House, and by the weight of his high authority should induce their Lordships to pass it, he, as well as their Lordships—but he more especially—would be responsible to the present generation, to posterity, and to a higher tribunal than that of man, if the consequences proved to be of that disastrous nature which from his heart he (the Bishop of Exeter) believed they would be.
Motion withdrawn.
House adjourned.