HL Deb 14 August 1846 vol 88 cc705-7
LORD BROUGHAM

subsequently referred to the delay which had taken place in passing several of his Law Bills, which he had carried through that House, and which were now in the House of Commons, and he begged to explain, in answer to the numerous inquiries which had been made of him, that it was in consequence of the changes which had recently taken place in the Government, that the necessity had been found to exist of postponing several of the Bills, in order to have a full discussion, until next Session. The delay in going forward with the Bill containing the digest of the Criminal Code, resulted from the Commissioners having suspended their other labours, and applied themselves solely to the alteration of that part of the digest referring to penal enactments and penalties for religious opinions, and which would necessitate the omission of 200 sections. This obstacle would speedily be removed; and next Session he looked forward with confidence to being able to proceed with it, and, by it to confer the greatest boon on this country which legislation on the state of the law had ever granted—what, in fact, it was the duty of every Government to give to its subjects, viz. in a clear and distinct view, knowledge of those laws, especially on criminal matters, with which they were bound to comply, and by which they were ruled.

The JOINT STOCK BANKS (SCOTLAND AND IRELAND) BILL was read a Third Time and passed.

House adjourned.

Protest against the Third Reading of the Scottish Joint Stock Banks Bill:

DISSENTIENT— 1. Because the Bill is inconsistent with those free and liberal principles of trade by which Her Majesty's Ministers are understood to be governed, inasmuch as, under the pretence of removing a monopoly disadvantageous to the public, it covers the monopoly with a protection that fixes it more firmly than ever. While it professes to open the door to an equal dispensation of chartered privileges to all Scottish banks that may petition for them, it bars it, at the same time, against any bank but such as may choose to submit to vexatious conditions, calculated to create in the public mind invidious distinctions between them and the old chartered banks, who by this Bill are to be exempt from such conditions. 2. Because the legislative interference with the management of joint-stock companies, which this Bill provides, is erroneous in principle: but even if it were sound, the inconsistency of its application is conspicuous, as it imposes rigid rules and restrictions on one class of banks, whose constitution and unlimited responsibility offer to the public the most perfect security; while it exempts from all such interference another class of banks less securely constituted, and in which the probabilities of mismanagement are as great, if not greater. 3. Because the confining of certain privileges to one class of banks in Edinburgh, while the banks in other large towns are by this Bill to be debarred from the attainment of such privileges on equal terms with their competitors, is disadvantageous to the public; for the exclusive privilege of receiving deposits of public money, trust funds, railway deposits, &c., greatly increases the trading power of the chartered establishments; and the large sums which are thus directed to these banks, in place of being permitted to flow in their natural channels, enable them to change the rate of discount, when the existing state of commercial affairs does not warrant such a step, and the relations depending between other banks and the public are thus liable to be disturbed, and speculation encouraged. 4. Because this Bill takes away all discretionary power of granting charters of incorporation to banks, founded on such equitable principles as circumstances may at the time suggest, and as was done in the case of the Commercial and of the National banks of Scotland; and because it limits the power of Her Majesty to the granting of charters according to the specific provisions of this Bill only—that is, upon terms and conditions which no bank in Scotland is likely to accept; consequently this Bill, if passed into a law, will become an Act for no apparent object of public advantage; but in reality an Act for preserving to the five chartered banks of Edinburgh their existing monopoly. RADNOR.