Lords Sitting of 15 July 1844

MINUTES.
BILLS. Public — 1a. Butter and Cheese; Actions for Gaming Discontinuance; Assessed Taxes Compositions, etc.; Detached Parts of Counties; Law Courts (Ireland).
2a. Customs Duties (Isle of Man).
Reported.—Three-and-a-Half per Cents. Exemption; Vagrants Removal; Prisons (Scotland); Turnpike Acts Continuance.
3a. and passed: — Bank of England Charter; County Rates; Militia Ballots Suspension; Stock in Trade; Charitable Loan Societies (Ireland); Turnpike Acts Continuance.
Private.—1a. London and Croydon Railway; Bishop of Down, Connor, and Dromore's Estate.
Reported. — Werrington, etc. Curacy, or Hele's Estate (Marchioness of Lothian's); Leeds Vicarage (Dr. Hook's); Market Harborough and Coventry Road.
3a. and passed:—Coventry Improvement and Cemetery; Southampton Improvement; Birkenhead Docks.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By Earl of Roden, from Edinburgh, and 2 other places, for Legalizing Marriages solemnized by Presbyterian and Dissenting Ministers in Ireland.—From Cashel, and 3 other places, for the Extension of Scriptural Education in Ireland.—By the Duke of Richmond, Bishop of London, Earls of Roden, Galloway, and Mounteashel, and Lords Kenyon, and Lyttleton, from Searva, and an immense number of other places, against, and by the Bishop of Norwich, the Lord Chancellor, Marquess of Normanby, Earls Radnor, and Clarendon, and Lords Redesdale, Cottenham, Brougham, Teynham, and Melbourne, from Framlingham, and a great number of other places, in favour of the Dissenters Chapels Bill.—From Dundee, respecting the Sanatory Condition of the People—From Lincoln, and other places, respecting the Bank of England Charter Bill.—From Jedburgh, and Edinburgh, for Alteration of certain Clauses, and from Inverness, for the Insertion of a Clause in the Prisons (Scotland) Bill.

MR. MAZZINI.
The Earl of Radnorsaid, their Lordships would recollect that on Tuesday last he had presented a petition from Mr. Joseph Mazzini, in which the petitioner averred that he understood that statements highly injurious to his character had been disseminated, and as he was apprehensive that similar statements might be made before the Secret Committee appointed to examine into the Opening and Detaining of Letters at the Post Office, he prayed their Lordships that he might have a full opportunity of being heard, to refute any charges that might be alleged against him, either before the Committee, or in such other manner as their Lordships might deem proper. It was his opinion that that petition should be referred to the Secret Committee. But, as some objection was made at the time, he had deferred his Motion, and he should now move that the petition be so referred. He should make no further observation now; but if the noble Duke opposed the Motion, he should reserve to himself the right of stating his opinions at length.
The Duke of Wellingtonsaid, the Motion of the noble Earl was—
"That this Petition be referred to the Secret Committee appointed to inquire into matters concerning certain proceedings in the Post Office."
He could not see what the matters alleged in the petition had to do with the subject into which the Committee was to inquire. The Committee was specifically appointed—
"To inquire into the state of the Law in respect to the Detaining and Opening of Letters at the General Post Office, and into the Mode under which the authority given for such Detaining and Opening has been exercised, and to report their opinion and observations thereupon to the House."

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Now, it did not appear how it was possible, under this order or form of inquiry relative to the state of the law, that this gentleman's character could be affected. He complained in his former petition to this House that his letters had been opened; and a Secret Committee was appointed to inquire into the law under which that power was exercised. But he never heard that any reference was made to this Gentleman's individual character, or to the character of any other individual; and, whether his character had been affected or not, it was not for a Committee of that House, sitting for another purpose, to clear it. Under these circumstances, it appeared to him that this Motion was premature. It would be proper to wait till the Committee had made their Report. That would be the time, if this Gentleman's character were affected in any way by the Report, to call for an opportunity of explaining and justifying his conduct.
The Earl of Radnorsaid, it was very true, that under the Order for the Committee, no reference was made to matters of this nature, but it was equally true that there was nothing in the Order to exclude them. It should be observed, that the whole of this investigation originated in a petition which he presented a fortnight ago from Mr. Mazzini, and which was referred to the Committee. He fully admitted, that it was not the mere grievance of Mr. Mazzini, or of anybody else, that ought to be brought before the Committee. It was a general question—a question of the utmost public importance. But still it was very natural for Mr. Mazzini to feel the reports which had been, to his (the Earl of Radnor's) certain knowledge, circulated against him, and to be most anxious to meet and to repel them. In his opinion, under all the circumstances, nothing could be more fair than to refer the petition to the Committee.
The Duke of Wellingtonrepeated his observation, that the petition was premature. The subject to which it related had nothing to do with the matter into which the Committee was appointed to inquire.
The Earl of Radnorthen withdrew his Motion.

JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL—EXPLANATION.
Lord Brougham,on presenting some petitions, took the opportunity of calling the attention
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of the House to a published statement of which he had reason to complain. The statement was to the effect that "Lord Brougham had been compelled to give up, though he did so with a bad grace, his pet scheme of a new judgeship, as also the objectionable Clauses in the Bill relating to the new jurisdiction in reference to divorce, which latter he had given up in obedience to the Lord Chancellor; and that, after having given up his chances of the judgeship, he (Lord Brougham) seemed to take no longer any interest in the measure, which he had fairly deserted, the objectionable Clauses being expunged, while he was away from the House, by the Lord Chancellor." He had never read a more scandalous and unjustifiable statement, especially after the explanations he had given a week before. It was known that before quitting his place he had requested his noble and learned Friend to expunge the Clauses referred to, as he had been requested by a right rev. Prelate to postpone them for fuller consideration; but, so far from giving them up, he had expressly stated to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, that he thought a more satisfactory measure would probably be the result of delay, inasmuch as the delay would end in taking away the power of divorce a mensa et thoro also from Doctors' Commons. As to the reason imputed to him for giving up the Clauses, namely, because he was not to have the Judgeship, nothing could be more scandalous, false, and audacious; for he had explained in his place before giving up the Bill, that he never had a thought of being a candidate for the Judgeship. This he had stated in the House a week before this most scandalous and audacious libel appeared.
The Lord Chancellorconfirmed the noble and learned Lord's statement respecting the withdrawal of the Clauses, and said, that the noble and learned Lord had declared in the House that he would not accept the judgeship.

BIRKENHEAD DOCKS BILL.
On the Motion of the Earl of Stradbroke, this Bill was read a third time.
The Marquess of Salisburyfelt it necessary to state, that in this case gross fraud, almost amounting to perjury, had been committed by the supporters of the Bill. There had been already a Liverpool Dock Bill passed, so that no inconvenience

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would result from the rejection of this measure. The complaint he had to make was, in substance, that whereas it had been agreed on between the agents for the Bill, and for an opposing body (the shipowners of Liverpool) to insert certain Clauses, these Clauses had been materially altered without the knowledge of that body, who only became acquainted with the fact through accident, when it was alleged by the agents for the Bill upon oath, that they had known of it, and that the Admiralty had compelled the alteration of the Clauses, the former of which statements was declared false by the agents for the shipowners and the other allegations was equally denied by the Admiralty.
The Earl of Haddington: We heard nothing of the Bill.
The Marquess of Salisburythen proceeded to propose that a Clause be inserted, securing to the shipowners what had been originally agreed upon. The coasting trade, the only other interest affected, would not (he could state) oppose the Clause; but, even should it lead to the entire defeat of the Bill, it would be only a just punishment on its supporters for the deceptive course they had adopted.
Lord Brougham, in the name of justice itself, protested against the accusation of perjury, so cruelly urged against a professional man in a place where he could not be heard.
The Marquess of Salisbury: I said, "almost perjury."
Lord Broughamwould rather meet the heavier charge then. The facts alleged only amounted to this — that what the agent for the Bill had stated, had been contradicted by another witness on one point; and who could venture to say which of them spoke the truth? As to the answer of the Admiralty, why, it confirmed the statement of the agent for the Bill, which was only that "the Admiralty had not objected to the Bill," as how could they, if they had not heard of it? Now, he knew nothing of the merits of the subject. All he knew was, that the gentleman accused had been introduced to him that morning by Mr. Wilberforce, who knew him well, as a man of high character: and he certainly should not thus be attacked without any greater ground than had been stated by a noble Marquess evidently inflamed with zeal on the opposite side.
The Earl of Wicklowsaid, the agent for the Bill had written that the Admiralty had "insisted" on the insertion of the Clauses as they stood. Was not that statement utterly falsified by the answer of the Admiralty, that they had not heard at all of the Bill?
Lord Monteaglesaid, the Bill was in itself an important one, and deserved the best attention of the House. The Committee had heard counsel upon all the Clauses of the Bill, and had given their opinion upon it. The object of the measure was to extend the dock monopoly of Liverpool, for the benefit of the county generally, and especially of the trade with Ireland. If the large revenues of the Liverpool monopoly were applied to defeat this Bill, they would be abused. It was a question of a public grievance. The Clause complained of, was not a Clause drawn up by the promoters of the Bill for their own advantage, but had been recommended by the Admiralty.
The Earl of Haddingtonagreed with the noble Lord in respect to the importance of the Bill, which, in the opinion of the Admiralty, was a good and useful Bill. It was the duty of the Admiralty, when such a Bill was brought before Parliament, to see that the shores and coasts were not interfered with, and that the navigation should not be injured; and he believed that the navigation of the Mersey would not be injured by it. He had looked at all the Clauses of the Bill in respect to the coasting trade. If the seven days had been part of the Clause the Admiralty, as far as he knew, would not have objected to it. He thought that the gentleman alluded to had been borne rather hard upon; but, except so far as concerned the public interests, the Admiralty had had nothing to do with the matter.
The Marquess of Lansdownesaid, although he could not withhold that confidence which the House always placed in their Committees from the Committee in this case, yet it was a Bill of such importance, affecting the public interests, that their Lordships ought to endeavour to form a judgment for themselves; and, having inquired into the case, he gave his hearty concurrence in the decision of the Committee. It appeared to him, that no interest, and certainly not the coasting trade, was affected by any alteration made in the Bill; the trade was not only not in-

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jured, but was advanced and improved by it. He should vote for the Bill as it stood.
The Earl of Stradbrokecomplained of the remarks which had been made by the noble Marquess upon a Gentleman who was not present to defend himself, and which were not borne out by the documents, if fairly read.
The Marquess of Salisburyvindicated his construction of the document. He was ready to go into evidence at the Bar, but he would not persevere against the opinion of their Lordships.
The question was then put and carried in the affirmative, and the Bill passed.

DISSENTERS CHAPELS BILL.
The Order of the Day being read,
The Lord Chancellorrose to move the consideration of the Amendments made by the Commons to the Bill, and said that, in performing the duty which he had to discharge on that occasion it would be necessary for him to occupy but a very few minutes of their Lordships' time; indeed, under ordinary circumstances, he should merely have mentioned what the Amendments were which had been made by the other House, and prayed their Lordships' concurrence in them; but in consequence of certain intimations which had been thrown out in different quarters, and of what had passed in that House on a former night, and the intimation given by a noble Lord, for whom he entertained the greatest respect, he felt it his duty to call their Lordships' attention to the progress of the Bill, and the position in which it actually stood at present. When the Bill was submitted to their Lordships for a second reading, it met with a warm and active opposition from his right rev. Friend the Metropolitan, and also from another right rev. Prelate, whose opposition however, was founded upon what he conceived to be a misapprehension of the law relating to Charitable Trusts, which misapprehension was exposed, replied to, and satisfactorily answered by his noble and learned Friend near him. The consequence of this was, that their Lordships agreed to the second reading without a division, those noble Lords and right rev. Prelates who had opposed the Bill by their speeches, not venturing to divide the House, because he presumed they were of opinion that if they had taken that course it would have shown, in a marked manner, that their Lordships approved of the principle of the
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Bill. Afterwards, in its progress through its subsequent stages, the Bill met with no further opposition, and it was passed with unanimity, and went down to the other House, carrying with it the entire concurrence of their Lordships. Some noble Lords observed that there had been a division on the third reading—then the case was still stronger than he had supposed it to be, because on the third reading there had been a division which showed the strong opinion of a great majority of their Lordships in favour of the justice and policy of the measure. The Bill then went down to the other House of Parliament, where, according to report, it was actively opposed; but upon the second reading, when a division took place, the opinion of that House, which was the opinion of the people, was marked in the strongest manner by a division, showing a majority in the proportion of three to one in its favour. The opponents of the measure, however, were not discomfited. They again rallied on two successive occasions, when the House again divided, and on both occasions, in the same marked manner, a majority declared in favour of the principle of the measure. Such was the history of the progress of the Bill through both Houses of Parliament. The House of Commons, however, when the Bill went into Committee, had thought it right to make certain Amendments, which had since come up to their Lordships' House for consideration, and to which it was his duty presently to call their attention. Now, in what position did the matter stand? Their Lordships had declared, in a marked and emphatic manner, their approbation of the principle of the Bill; that principle and that opinion had been re-echoed in a decisive manner by the other House; and now the only question, he apprehended, was, both Houses having approved of the principle of the Bill, whether their Lordships were of opinion that the measure was a better one in its original shape, as approved of by them, or whether they would adopt the Amendments, or some of them, which had been made by the Commons. There could be no other question for their consideration, to that point alone they must direct their attention. Was the Bill better calculated to accomplish the object to which it was directed in its original shape, or had it been improved by the Amendments made in it by the other House of Parliament? If their Lordships thought the Bill was better in the shape in which they originally

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passed it, than in the shape in which it was returned to them, they would disagree to the Amendments, and call for a conference with the other House. If, on the other hand, they approved of the Amendments, they would adopt them, and in that shape the Bill would become law. The question, therefore, he apprehended, for their Lordships' consideration was, what was the nature and character of those Amendments, and did they, or did they not, improve the Bill? But he had un-understood that a very extraordinary course, was now intended to be pursued ["Order, order."]—He was not speaking from mere surmise or conjecture; for the noble Lord to whom he referred just now, and for whose opinion and character he entertained a most profound respect, had told their Lordships that he intended to move that the Amendments of the Commons be taken into consideration that day three months. The effect of such a Motion as that which he had alluded to would be, that their Lordships should not at all consider the Amendments of the Commons, that, whereas the principle of the Bill had been agreed upon by both Houses of Parliament, their Lordships would pass the slight upon the Commons House of saying that the alterations they made in the Bill should not be taken into consideration. There might be cases in which it would be proper for their Lordships to take such a course, as, for instance, in case a Bill went down from their Lordships to the Commons, and the Commons, although they acceded to the principle of the Bill, yet made an alteration in it which would interfere with their Lordships' privileges—then perhaps it would be a proper course to take not to consider their Amendments. There was still another case in which such a course might be adopted, namely, if a Bill were of a very complicated nature, and it was sent back from the Commons containing a great number of very complicated amendments, of a description which required great caution and great deliberation, and the period at which it was sent up to their Lordships was a period of the Session at which they could not possibly afford time to give the Amendments that deliberate consideration which they required, then, in such a case, it might be proper to adopt such a course; but he knew no other case in which such a mode of dealing with a Bill of this description could be justified, and he hoped that, after due deliberation and reflection, no noble Lord would adopt such a
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course, particularly as the Bill had been already discussed in both Houses. He thought that, under these circumstances, they ought not to declare that they would not take the Amendments of the Commons into their consideration. It was true that something like a reason was assigned by the noble Lord for the course which he proposed to take; but it was founded on the assumption of a fact which had no existence; the reason was, that something had passed on the third reading of the Bill, of which the noble Lord did not approve; but he had not shown to the House what it was which took place on the third reading, which ought to induce the House not to consider the Amendments made in the House of Commons. He believed, however, that the noble Lord alluded to the adoption of an Amendment by his noble and learned Friend near him (Lord Cottenham.) It was true his noble and learned Friend had, on the third reading, proposed an Amendment, but it was an Amendment in direct accordance with the principle of the Bill. He gave notice of that Amendment—he (the Lord Chancellor) had time to consider it, and he approved of it, after giving it a full consideration. On the third reading of the Bill, his noble and learned Friend stated the motive and the object of that Amendment, it was regularly put from the Woolsack, and it was agreed to by their Lordships without opposition. That was the whole history of the matter, and nothing could be more regular or fair than that transaction; it was upon this he understood the noble Lord to be about to found his extraordinary Motion. Having said thus much with respect to the mode of proceeding with the Bill before them, he would now call the attention of their Lordships to the Amendments which had been made in it by the other House of Parliament, and in doing so he feared he might have some difficulty in distinctly conveying to their Lordships the nature and character of the Amendments, as they had not the Bill before them. As the Bill was not in their hands, there would be some difficulty from the refined character of some of the Amendments, to describe them distinctly to their Lordships. The first Amendment to which he should direct their attention was suggested by the General Baptists. The principle of that class of Dissenters was adult baptism. In their trust deeds they inserted no other point of their creed but that; and if the wording of the second Clause had remained as sent down from

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their Lordships, it was feared that they would not fall within the protection of the Bill, in respect of their other religious opinions, in consequence of that peculiarity. In consequence of that they applied to Parliament in order to obtain the benefit of the protection which the Bill afforded to other Dissenters, and the alteration which was agreed to in order to place them in that position, was the first alteration made. The next alteration to which he should call their attention was introduced for the advantage of the Wesleyan Methodists. As the Bill stood originally, the words were "the mode of worship mentioned on the face of the deed;" but the Wesleyan Methodists said that those words would not apply to them, as they did not set forth any "mode" of worship on the face of the deeds, but "a mode of regulating" their worship, and that four volumes of Wesley's Sermons were referred to by them for that purpose, so that in order to extend the advantages of the Bill to them, the words in the Bill providing that the mode of worship should be set forth on the face of the deed were changed, and a provision was made to the effect, that the mode of worship should be either set forth on the face of the deed, or referred to in some other document or instrument. That was the alteration, and he was sure that both of them would receive the approbation of the House. The next alteration which had been made was in reference to the words in the Act describing meetinghouses to be affected by this Bill. In the Bill, as it stood before the alteration, the words were "such meeting-houses," but it was said that such words might leave the Bill open to a construction different from that which was contemplated, and the words were changed from "any such meeting-house" to "meeting-house for the worship of God," to give generality to the provisions of the Bill. Another alteration was with respect to the period of twenty-five years. It was said that no declaration had been made as to when the period of twenty-five years was to be dated from, and that therefore it would be impossible to say when the commencement of the period or its termination was to be ascertained; but that was altered, for it was now provided that the period should be twenty-five years previously to the commencement of the suit calling a title in question. Previously the Socinians, and Arians, and Unitarians, if the period of twenty-five years passed were afforded no opportunity or power of altering their opinions and becoming ortho-
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dox—they were afforded no locus penitentiæ in that respect; but that had also been altered. Another Amendment was as affecting right and title, by putting in the words "judgment and decree," in order to meet the case more fully, and the next was substituting "proceedings by information," as regarded suits affecting private concerns. Those were the principal Amendments. He considered some of them unnecessary, and some of them material and important; but they were all in the spirit of the Bill, and he advised their Lordships to adopt it, and not to reject these Amendments. It would be very inconvenient for a trivial change to send the measure back to the other House of Parliament, and raise a new discussion; and he would, therefore, advise their Lordships to adopt the Amendments and pass the Bill. After what he had said in the outset they would not expect him to make any remarks on the principle of the Bill. That principle had already been decided upon, and was not again raised by the Amendments before their Lordships: and he should think he was acting an improper part if he went out of the course which the very nature of the proceeding before them suggested. It had, however, been alleged, that those who had introduced this Bill had introduced it for the purpose of giving encouragement to Unitarians. Nothing could be more foreign to their intention. The Bill was meant to afford relief to the whole body of Dissenters—it might in that operation at one period affect the interests of one class, and at another period of a different class, but its intention was to relieve all classes, to prevent the occurrence of expensive litigation, and to apply to the Dissenting Church, if he might so express himself, the principle that was applied to property in other matters, and allow that property which was given to them to be disposed of, according to the wish of those who left it, for charitable purposes, instead of putting it into the pockets of lawyers. He regretted very much that the right rev. Prelates opposite were so warmly opposed to the Bill; he had, however, been consoled by the reflection that there were right rev. prelates who had supported this Bill with their votes and their opinions; and with respect to those who had been absent, he could not forbear stating that a right rev. Prelate of great learning and varied attainments, who came from the same university as himself, but from whom he differed in political opinions—a right rev. Prelate who not very long since had given so splendid

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an example of eloquence in that House—that right rev, prelate had manifested his attachment to this Bill by leaving his proxy in his (the Lord Chancellor's) hands. The chief opposition to the Bill, however, had proceeded, he was sorry to say, from the Dissenting body—from those who not so very long since complained of being made the victims of persecution—who had obtained from the Legislature all they could get, and now desired to withhold from their brethren that toleration which they had demanded and obtained for themselves. Some of their Lordships might remember a remarkable speech of a wise, eloquent, and philosophical statesman, Mr. Burke, that speech was delivered on an occasion like the present one—he did not dare to quote the whole of the eloquent passage to which he alluded, it was too warm for the temperament of that House; but he would repeat the last sentence—
"If," said he, "instead of busying themselves in the depths of the Divine Counsels, they would turn to the mild moderation of the Gospel, they would there read their own condemnation—'O thou unworthy servant, did I not forgive thee, because thou desiredst me? Shouldst not thou have extended to thy fellow servant that which I have extended to thee?' "
He had said as much as he had felt that he ought to do. He had had great temptation to enter into the principle of the measure in consequence of the petitions on the Table, which explained the hardship that would be done to individuals if this measure was not passed; but he abstained, because he considered that he would be infringing upon the principle he had laid down if he took that excursive course, and he should therefore conclude with earnestly exhorting their Lordships to adopt these Amendments. The noble Lord then moved, to agree to the first Amendment made by the Commons to the Bill.
The Bishop of Londoncould assure their Lordships that he felt all the difficulty and embarrassment of a person who rose to address their Lordships upon a question of so much importance, after the opinion which had been expressed by so grave an authority as his noble and learned Friend. He felt that difficulty considerably increased by the difficult situation in which he stood, because he readily admitted that the course which he intended to pursue, in compliance with the prayer of many petitions which he had lately had the honour of laying upon their Lordships'
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Table, was one which had not been usually pursued, except in cases of extreme urgency; nor should he have felt warranted in assuming an attitude of hostility to the measure had he not felt that the emergency which called him forth was of a most unusual character. He was no indiscriminate panegyrist of all the measures which their Lordships in their legislative wisdom might think fit to carry into a law, as being stamped with all the attributes of consummate wisdom; but an experience of twenty years had confirmed him in the opinion that it was not usual for their Lordships to pass a measure which contravened the plainest dictates and was opposed to the maxims of common sense. He wished to speak in the softest language of the measure before their Lordships, brought forward as it was by such high authority; but he ventured to say that the measure before their Lordships, which he trusted they would save themselves from the reproach of passing, was not founded on the maxims of reason and common sense. It set aside for the future those rules upon which all the Courts of Equity had hitherto interpreted the law of Charitable Trusts—all the rules which his noble and learned Friend had declared in one of the most luminous judgments ever delivered from the Chancery Bench to be drawn from the plainest maxims of justice and of common sense. He, therefore, felt justified in saying that a Bill which was in direct opposition to these rules was contrary to the principles of common sense; and he, therefore, felt justified in taking the course which he was about to pursue. He felt that any noble Lord was justified in such an emergency in having recourse to any proceeding which would defeat the final success of a measure which he believed to be injurious to the character of their Lordships' House, to the interests of the country, and still more to the interests of Eternal Truth. He admitted if that were not the case he should not be justified in taking that unusual course which his noble and learned Friend had denounced in such eloquent terms as would have made him, if he had not felt supported by the consciousness that he stood forth as a minister of the truth, desist from taking this course. He admitted that he was precluded by the usage of their Lordships' House, and indeed by the obvious nature of the case, from entering at large into the

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principle of the measure itself, which might be fairly considered as having been settled, so far as their Lordships were concerned, when the Bill was passed and sent down to the House of Commons, But if the Amendments made by the Commons were such as to considerably affect the principle of the Bill, it would be wholly impossible for him to do justice to the case he had taken in hand without making some passing allusion to the main principle of the Bill, and in this he should be justified by the example of his noble and learned Friend himself, who, towards the conclusion of his eloquent and forcible address, entered upon the principle of the Bill, and stated with great emphasis and perspicuity what the principle of the Bill was. He must say—and he hoped he might be permitted to say so without incurring the presumption of vanity—that the arguments which had been urged by himself and others on the second reading of the Bill had not, to this hour, or in any other place, received a satisfactory answer. He almost felt the impropriety of alluding to any former arguments which had been used by himself, but he must be allowed to notice one somewhat curious allusion which had been made to the speech which he had then addressed to their Lordships. It was reported, and he believed, correctly reported, that another Lord, whose character stood deservedly high in the estimation of their Lordships, was pleased to allude in complimentary terms to his (the Bishop of London's) arguments, and finished by saying the arguments were so strong that it was highly creditable to the House to pass the Bill in spite of them. He feared that many of their Lordships, judging from the reception which had been given to the announcement of the course which he intended to pursue, would consider his offer somewhat pertinacious. He admitted it was pertinacious; and he held that in such a case pertinacity became a virtue, and he felt himself justified in availing himself of all the forms which their Lordships' House would permit him to avail himself of, he would not say absolutely to defeat the measure, but to postpone the consideration of the question which it involved, the great interests which it touched—interests not merely pecuniary, but the interests of truth and justice—in order that their Lordships might have further time for inquiry and deliberation.
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It was not the least remarkable feature of this important measure, that touching as it did the established rules of law and equity, it was brought into their Lordships' House without any previous inquiry, that it was not known at the time that there was any suit pending. No Select Committee had been appointed to inquire into the real nature of the evil which it was intended to remedy, and of the remedy which ought to be applied. The Bill was carried to the House of Commons, where the most indubitable evidence was given of the haste in which it was concocted by the important alterations which were then introduced, by which the character of the measure was materially changed. He therefore desired to afford a longer time for consideration to those who had framed the measure, who might, after due inquiry and deliberation, propose some measure to their Lordships which might obviate what he admitted to be, in some cases, a substantial injustice, without doing that which was of far greater importance than any act of individual injustice—injustice to the eternal principles of truth, and the principles of equity and justice. Now, the first Clause was returned from the House of Commons unamended, and there was good reason why it needed no Amendment, because the Clause was in itself superfluous. It did nothing more than in fact enact what was the law at the present moment without any such enactment. It was held unanimously in Lady Hewley's case, that since the repeal of the acts which made it penal to teach Unitarian doctrines, Unitarians were now the objects of charity just as much as though no such penal act had ever existed as a part of the law of the land. Therefore the first Clause was in itself superfluous and supererogatory. Now with respect to the second Clause, on which the whole pith of the matter depended; but perhaps he might be first allowed to say a few words on the third Clause. It was exceedingly important and contained in itself the essence of injustice, and he thought the persons most interested in the measure, and whom he should shortly mention more particularly, had great reason to complain of the third Clause. That Clause did not exist in the Bill as it originally stood. It went through Committee. There was a reservation of all suits pending on the 1st of March last—a very proper reservation, and one

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usually introduced where gross acts of injustice were intended to be prevented. On the third reading he was called by official duties from London, and a Clause was then introduced by the noble and learned Lord opposite, entirely altering that Clause, and putting a bar to all suits then pending. The real object of that Clause was to bar the relators in a most important suit—that great suit in Ireland, which might be not inaptly termed the Lady Hewley's case of Ireland, the Eustace-street chapel, where an income of 2,600 l. had been left for the diffusion of Trinitarian doctrines, but which was then used for the promotion of Unitarian or Arian doctrines. The relators ought to have been heard before their claim was barred by such a Clause, because they were in such a condition that the Clause ought not to have passed without their being heard. The relators in that case had all but obtained the judgment in their favour. That eminent and learned person who was so conversant with the rules of equity, the Lord High Chancellor of Ireland, had eventually given judgment in favour of the relators—he had taken great pains to make himself master of the case, and intimated in the plainest terms that he would give judgment for the relators. The 18th of March or April was appointed for that purpose, and when the relators went into court they found judgment put off. In the meantime this Bill was brought forward at the last moment, in their Lordships' House. It was sent down to the House of Commons. It was ordered to be printed on the 10th of May, and was printed and delivered on the 14th May, and the relators never heard there was such a Clause until the 14th of May, when the second reading was fixed in the House of Commons. Looking to the fact that the Lord Chancellor of Ireland had declared that the law and equity of the case were with the relators, and that nothing remained but for him to give his final judgment in detail, these parties had a right to complain, because if they had had the good fortune to bring their suits a year or two before, the decision would have been given in their favour. Their Lordships had now barred the parties, when they had all but received a judgment. And it would have been but a very little stretch of injustice to have made the Bill retrospective, and annulled the decision in Lady Hewley's case, and
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given back to the parties the property they they had so long been in the enjoyment of, but which they had been deprived of on principles based on common sense and common justice, as his noble and learned Friend had justly said. Now, with regard to the second Clause, which was really the most objectionable part of the Bill, and was contrary to all the maxims of law and equity on which charitable trusts had been hitherto administered by those eminent judges who had for centuries adorned the Bench. As the Clause was sent down from their Lordships, it was enacted that the usage of the last twenty-five years should be conclusive evidence of the intention of the founder. This was found to be so unreasonable that the House of Commons had altered it. He was very far from considering that an improvement, and would rather the Bill had remained as it originally stood, making the twenty-five years conclusive evidence, than that the Legislature should say that such and such doctrines may be properly taught in certain places—doctrines of the most vital and essential importance. He should prefer some such provision as this, that no action or suit shall be brought against any person or persons whatsoever for any doctrine or doctrines whatever. He was aware that such a Clause would open the door to enormities of doctrine the most fearful, because meeting-houses might be in possession of Socialists, Chartists, Atheists, and blasphemers; but it might not have been difficult in such a case for them to retrace their steps; at all events parties would not then step in and declare that Unitarian doctrines, doctrines which were contrary to the fundamental truths of religion, on which all their hopes of salvation rested, might be properly performed in any place of worship within Her Majesty's dominions. He knew it might be said the word "properly" meant no more than that they might be taught without subjecting persons to penal consequences, but common sense understood the word properly in a different light, and he would have preferred the original Clause. But now with respect to the possession of these trusts by persons who might properly teach any doctrine which had for twenty-five years been taught in any chapel. Let their Lordships suppose the case of a Unitarian Minister who might for more than five and twenty years have taught

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doctrines which were applicable and proper to that denomination of persons, and that at the expiration of that time he should see reason to alter his opinions, and that many of his congregation were ready to go round with him, and take their stand by him; he would not be prepared to prove that the orthodox doctrines of the Church had been preached for the preceding twenty-five years, and, therefore, if the case were ultimately brought before a Court of Equity, and he preached anti-Trinitarian doctrines, he could not be ousted from the chapel, and they would leave things precisely as they were, with this difficulty superadded—that, having rejected the best interests, they were now prepared to receive the worst. They must reject the arguments, the evidence, and the testimony of cotemporaneous authorities, and the usages of hundreds of years, and have recourse to the oral testimony of the congregation, many of whom were, perhaps, persons incompetent to decide the matter. Nay, it was not impossible that some of the congregation might say, "We recollect such and such doctrines being preached during the last twenty-five years," and others of them might say, "It is no such thing; we never heard such and such doctrines preached." How was a Court of Equity to decide in such a case to what party the chapel should belong? He contended that the Clause did not answer the purpose for which it was intended which the former Clause had in view when it was sent down to the other House. Therefore, he said the Clause was so far worse than the former, inasmuch as it refused the best evidence, and took the worst. He would call their Lordships' attention to the feeling expressed by a living luminous authority, the authority of a right hon. Gentleman who now occupied the highest seat of judgment in Ireland, Lord Chancellor Sugden, in one of his memorable judgments in 1842:—
"I shall admit evidence, or if not furnished, I will, if necessary, look for evidence in history, in records, and Acts of Parliament, in the knowledge of the times, in the writings of men of different persuasions on ecclesiastical subjects. I will seek from all these sources for evidence, to ascertain what, at the time of the execution of the deed, was the meaning of the word "Christian," and the meaning of the words "Protestant Dissenters," and that not for the purpose of putting a construction on those words which would do any violence
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to the deed, but, if I can, to enable me to put a construction on them that shall be at once consistent with the deed, and in accordance with the intentions of the founders."
This was the view of the case which had been taken by this learned authority, and this was the view which seemed to him emphatically to include the very essence of the principles of evidence and equity. It was now his duty to point out to their Lordships one or two instances of hardship which must arise from the adoption of the amended Clause. He had hitherto touched on one or two imaginative cases; he would now put one or two real cases, because he had always observed that examples which were submitted to the eyes found readier acceptance than those which were transmitted to the mind through the ears. He had stated that the words taken from the judgment of Sir Edward Sugden seemed to him to contain the essential principle which ought to regulate the judges in the administration of the law respecting Chapel Trusts. He need hardly remind their Lordships of the opinion which had been laid down by a still greater authority than that which he had quoted—namely, the late Lord Eldon, whose rule of Equity was this:—
"If it appears to have been the founder's intention, although not expressed, that a particular doctrine should be preached, it is not in the power of the congregation or the trustees to alter the designed objects of the institution."
He now would mention to their Lordships a case bearing on the question. A new meeting-house was opened at Chester in October, 1700, when a sermon was preached on the occasion by a very eminent dissenting minister, Mr. Matthew Henry—was printed in 1728, with a preface by Dr. Watts. The preacher said,
"Those that build altars for maintaining and propagating any heresy spoil the acceptableness of the altars they build, and it will be construed to be done in transgression against the Lord."
He then stated the agreement in doctrine between the Presbyterians and the Established Church. They knew that he regarded Unitarianism as a heresy. That same chapel was now occupied by Unitarians, and the pulpit was held by an ultra-Socinian—he used the term ultra-Socinian because Socinians properly so called held that our blessed Lord and Saviour was an object of worship, whereas the anti-

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Socinians denied this. By the second Clause of the Bill, ash had been amended and come down to their Lordships, it would be enacted that those very doctrines which the reverend person who had preached on the occasion referred to had denounced from the pulpit as a heresy, and as therefore unacceptable to God,—those very doctrines might be and were preached in this chapel. He implored their Lordships to bear in mind, that by the evidence which the Bill admitted it would be utterly impossible to oust the Unitarians from any property, however unjustly they might have usurped it. Another case was one which had occurred at Stannington, in Yorkshire, where a chapel had been endowed—endowed, their Lordships would observe, by the will of an individual, named Richard Spooner, "for the maintenance of a minister approved by certain persons for honesty of life, soundness in doctrine, and his diligence in preaching." What, now, was to be the test of the soundness of doctrine? Why, the usage of the last five and twenty years. What the testator meant by the words "soundness of doctrine" was clear from the preamble of the will, a document in which a man must be supposed to speak the words of truth. The preamble ran thus:—
"I desire, in the name of Jesus Christ, to bequeath my soul unto the hands of God who gave it, hoping assuredly to be saved by the death and precious blood-shedding of Jesus Christ my Redeemer, and by no other merits."
This chapel was soon in the hands of the Unitarians. Was it conceivable that the founder had any such intention by his will? And yet, by this Clause, this will could not be admitted as evidence of his intents, but the usage of the last twenty-five years was to be an absolute bar to the fulfilment of them, and would determine that a denial of the fundamental truths, in the belief of which he placed his hope of salvation may "properly be preached" in the chapel which he founded, and a soul-destroying heresy propagated by means of the pious offerings made by a sincere believer to the service of the God of Truth. Now, this was a question in stating which he hoped he should not be considered as trenching on the principle of the Bill; but it went to show still more strongly the points of view in which these two clauses were to be regarded as to what doctrines might be permitted to be preached. He should not shrink from
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the position which he had thought it his duty to take on a former occasion—that the only doctrines which could properly be preached in this or that chapel were the doctrines for the promulgation of which such chapel was originally founded. He knew it had been argued with great apparent accuracy and reason, that they had no right to arrive at a conclusion as to what would have been the intention on the part of the founder if he were in the land of the living, because had he lived in the present time he might have seen that the opinions which he formerly entertained were not properly applicable. Looking to what had been said by the Mover and Seconder of the Bill in the other House, he believed that many persons had been carried away who had thought the measure was fraught with injustice. Nothing which had been urged by his right hon. Friend in another place, of whom it was impossible to speak but in terms of respect and affection, had tended to shake the strength of the position which he (the Bishop of London) had taken. It would be recollected, that what he had said was, that at the time when these chapels of the English Presbyterians were founded — namely, from 1689 (the Toleration Act) to 1700—during the whole of that time the Presbyterians were zealous and ever-eager maintainers of Trinitarian doctrines—they believed them to be indispensable to salvation. Those who denied the doctrine of the Trinity they branded as heretics, not to be regarded as Christians, denouncing them as infidels and blasphemers. He would adduce an authority which had been adduced on the other side of the question; but he should easily show that his (the Bishop of London's) was the scale in which authority must prevail. Dr. Calamy writing in the year 1717, said of the Protestant Dissenters—he begged attention to this, because it was an important feature in the discussions in another House. Dr. Calamy said:—
"Candidates for the ministry are solemnly ordained, after making a public confession of that faith in which they engage to make it their business to instruct others."
Dr. Priestly stated, that
"Among the Dissenters called Presbyterians a particular confession of faith was formerly required of all candidates for the ministry, their soundness in which was then deemed essential."

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In Lady Hewley's case, his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack said:—
"It is stated by the witness, and there is no contradictory evidence, that the Trinitarians of that day were believers in the trinity and in the doctrine of original sin, as contained in the Articles of the Church of England."
"I am justified, I think, in coming to the conclusion that the great body of the Presbyterians were in their opinions Trinitarians."
Then as to the Catholic spirit which distinguished the case, he would refer to the opinions of Mr. Baron Alderson and Mr. Justice Patteson, in the Hewley case, who said:—
"We were much pressed with quotations on this point by the learned and ingenious gentlemen who argued for the defendants, but they have failed to satisfy us even as to the probability of any such catholic intention as that for which they contend having been entertained by Lady Hewley. Such a view may have been entertained by a few speculative divines of great benevolence of feeling, but was never very generally received."
He felt reluctant to trouble their Lordships further, and nothing but the extreme urgency of the case, which involved a sacred and important principle, would induce him to do so; but there was another point on which he was bound to touch as it was one of considerable delicacy and difficulty. In the second Clause, as the Bill went down to the other House, were these words—"such meeting-houses," as described in the first Clause. In the other House, at which period of the proceedings he was not able to ascertain—it was not done in the early periods of the discussion—these words were changed to "meeting houses for the worship of God." Hitherto, if the words "worship of God" occurred in the statute book, they had been always and must always be interpreted to mean, the worship of God as defined by the Articles of the Church. He defied any noble Lord to show an example in which it was not the case. But a legal question might arise on the words "chapel for the worship of God." Persons who had left these chapels for Trinitarians, would have them occupied by Unitarians, and if the parties brought actions to oust them, they might say, "That is not what you call the worship of God," and the question would come before a legal tribunal for the judges to decide upon. It would very probably come before their Lordships by appeal, and they
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would be called upon to decide what was the "worship of God." He contended that the object of this Bill was to perpetuate and promote the views of the Unitarians; because all other Dissenters repudiated the Bill. His noble and learned Friend had said, that it was likely that two or three suits would be brought. He said, that under this Bill thair Lordships would be called upon to decide what constituted the worship of God, without reference to the intentions of the testators; and, they must then throw open the door so widely as not only to admit Unitarians, but Jews and Mahomedans. He did no more than state the law as it had been interpreted by others. If his view of the law were wrong he should be glad to be corrected, but he believed his view of the law was the same as was entertained by some of the most eminent men in this country. He had alluded more than once to other persons who were deeply interested in the fate of this measure. Although he was no doubt dismayed by the array which he saw against him, comprehending, not only the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, but also many of those who had achieved a seat in this House by the use of those great and eminent talents which had conferred so much benefit on the country, and had shed so brilliant a lustre on themselves—although he saw such an array marshalled against him, he felt that out of doors there was a vast majority of the legal profession most hostile against this measure, and not a few of the most distinguished judges of the land, both in equity and law, amongst them. He spoke this of his own knowledge. As to the rest of the community, when the noble and learned Lord described the other House as the representatives of the community, it was intended to be inferred that they had spoken the opinions of the whole people. But was he to be told that the House of Commons (which he wished to speak of with all due respect) was the representative of the religious feelings of the public? Was it possible by the constitution of that House that it could be so? He would not even say, that their Lordships were the representatives of the religious feelings of this country, although they no doubt had some of the elements in this House to give them a title to the character. No such value could be placed upon the opinion of the

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House of Commons upon this subject, for this was a measure which was conceived in haste—imperfectly put together, and inconsistently amended in the House of Commons. On the merits of such a measure he denied that the House of Commons had decided in a manner as could show that they had been the faithful representatives of the religious feeling of the community. He should rather say that the thousands and thousands of pious men who had signed the almost countless petitions which had been laid on the Table of this House were better interpreters of the feelings of the community. These were chiefly from the middle and lower classes, amongst which Christianity was to be more generally found. If every religious denomination were considered except that one for whose benefit that Bill was proposed, it would be found that the latter would not number 2 per cent. in the whole community. When he had first come into this House the public mind was greatly agitated by the probable fate of the Roman Catholic question, but he had never remembered that the public mind had been more agitated than by this question, considering the short time which had elapsed since it was first made known. He did not scruple to say that their Lordships would do just the contrary than rise in the public esteem if they passed this measure, which, in his opinion, contravened every principle of truth, justice, equity, and religion. With regard to himself he trusted that he did but justice to the cause he advocated, and that he had not treated this question more in a polemical point of view than was absolutely necessary, considering the peculiar nature of the case. He felt that he had rather discussed this question upon the principle of equity and justice, upon which he thought it completely infringed. At the same time he felt a sincere conviction that, by passing this measure, they would be inflicting a great injury upon religious truth. He hoped they would not think that he had offered anything like a factious spirit of opposition to this Bill. He would not have followed this course except from the deepest conviction of a duty which he felt incumbent upon him. He had been the organ through which expression of opinion had been made known to their Lordships for many thousands of their fellow Christians. He had in no one instance sought to procure peti-
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tions against this Bill, and in his own diocese he had never even intimated a wish that such petitions should be multiplied. If he had broached a wish to that effect, he believed that every petition which had been presented would have been multiplied tenfold. He wished the subject to be discussed upon its own merits. He did feel it to be a duty incumbent on him to pay some respect to that deep religious feeling which pervaded the great body of the community. He believed that that feeling would be greatly outraged, and the fundamental principles of equity and justice would be violated, if this measure were passed into a law. It might be asked, if this was a proper time to moot this question? He did not think it was. He approved of neither the Bill nor the Amendments. In some respects it had been entirely improved by some of those Amendments, but in other respects they worsened the Bill. He was therefore decidedly opposed to the passing of the measure, and would move that the Commons' Amendments be considered that day three months.
The question having been put,
The Bishop of Durhamspoke briefly in support of the measure, but was very indistinctly heard. He could not at all see, in the measure before them, the dangers apprehended by his right rev. Brother. He was sure the introducers of the Bill had had no intention of favouring one body of Dissenters more than another; he believed them to have intended equal protection for all alike—that all alike should have that justice awarded them which all alike, Churchmen and Dissenters were entitled to. Most undoubtedly he himself had no sympathy with the doctrines of the Dissenters; least of all with those to whom his right rev. Brother had more especially referred; but though he had no sympathy with the doctrines of Dissenters, he had very great sympathy with the rights of conscience and the rights of property. As to the legal doubts which had been suggested, he must confess that upon such matters he must rely with more confidence upon the opinions of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, and the other noble and learned Lords who had filled that and other high judicial offices, than upon that of his right rev. Brother, however much he might prefer his interpretation of a text of Scripture. The right rev. Prelate concluded with express-

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ing his intention to give the measure his support.
Lord Broughamwas anxious to say a few words with respect to what had fallen from the right rev. Prelate, who moved the Amendment, as to the nature of the Amendments introduced into the Bill by the other House. He agreed with his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, that the present discussion should be confined to the consideration of the Commons' Amendments, and that they could enter into the other topics of the Bill without great irregularity. The principle of the Bill had been adopted and sanctioned by the unanimous feeling of the House, on the first occasion—so far, at least, that no division took place upon it, and it was carried by very large majorities through its subsequent stages; and in the other House it met with proportionate success from the representatives of the people. They had now only to agree or disagree with the Commons' Amendments; and it was entirely inconsistent with the rules and practices of that House—it was entirely inconsistent with the original proposition—to adopt the right rev. Prelate's Amendment, and hang up for three months the consideration of the whole matter. He regretted that one part of the speech of the right rev. Prelate did not agree with that spirit of candour and fairness which pervaded other parts of it. He regretted that the right rev. Prelate had not pursued the same spirit throughout with which he commenced. The right rev. Prelate said that he objected to some of the Commons' Amendments, but that there were some of which he approved, and which greatly improved the Bill. The right rev. Prelate said, that some of these Amendments tended to improve the Bill, while others tended towards making it worse; instead, however, of agreeing to the consideration of both these classes of Amendments, when he could vote in favour of those he approved, and against those to which he was hostile, the right rev. Prelate proposed that they should not be considered at all for three months. But what would follow this? Why the House of Commons would demand a conference. If the Commons should then inform that House that it did not persist in its Amendments, the result would be, the Bill would pass in the shape in which it was sent down. If, however, the Commons did persist in its Amendments, then, no doubt, the adoption
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of the Amendment of the right rev. Prelate would have the effect of destroying the Bill. The right rev. Prelate said, that he wished that the Bill had come back from the other House with all its imperfections on its head. The right rev. Prelate intimated that he should have liked the Bill the better if it had not been improved—that was because it would furnish him with better arguments against the measure. Now he thought that such a wish savoured much more of those Courts with which he (Lord Brougham) was formerly connected, than with those over which the right rev. Prelate presided—it savoured much more of the proceedings of the secular Courts of Common Law, where an acute and intelligent advocate was all the better pleased to see his adversaries' case treated badly, because it gave him the better chance of gaining the verdict. He would now pass to another objection of the right rev. Prelate, namely, that it was altogether in favour of Unitarians, and of the Unitarians alone. But how did that appear? Because the right rev. Prelate said, that the Unitarians stood in the proportion of two to ninety-eight to the other Dissenters, and the whole of the latter were against the Bill. Now, he distinctly denied this, as he had presented several petitions in favour of the Bill—not certainly so numerous as those presented by the right rev. Prelate against it, but still he had presented a great number of such petitions, as well as his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, his noble and learned Friend near him (Lord Cottenham), and his noble Friend (the Marquess of Lansdowne); and those petitions were not merely from Unitarians, but from great numbers of orthodox Dissenters, from Churchmen and Catholics. He held in his hand a letter which he had just received from a friend of his, who was a sound orthodox Dissenter—he meant Mr. Baines, of Leeds, a most respectable man, and possessing great influence among the Dissenters, and who was formerly the proprietor of a local newspaper of great influence in the West Riding of Yorkshire, but who had now retired into private life, carrying with him the strongest feelings of respect and regard, not only of Dissenters, but of Churchmen. That Gentleman said, that the Dissenters' Chapels Bill was a wise and healing measure, and as valuable to orthodox Dissenters as to Unitarians, and that we should all feel grateful to the Govern-

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ment who introduced it, and to the enlightened statesmen on both sides who supported it. It was a common thing in arguing this case to say that, supposing that there was a deed, the merely holding for twenty-five years ought not to be considered. There might be in the enacting part, if he might so term it, of the deed, expressions and provisions, as clear as language could make it, as to the designs of the party; and he might be asked, after this, was it to be borne that the endowment should go to the Unitarians. But it should be recollected that, on the other side, there might be a deed as clear as could be drawn, and which created an endowment, on certain conditions, in favour of the Unitarians, and from which the Trinitarians were excluded; yet, by this Bill, twenty-five years possession by the Trinitarians would exclude the Unitarians from interfering under the deed. Therefore he said that the Trinitarians would profit under it fully as much as would be the case on the other side. The right rev. Prelate said, that nothing could be clearer than that, in many cases, the deed was in favour of Trinitarians; and that, notwithstanding this, the Unitarians would be allowed to hold under this Bill, in spite of the deed. They were told that this was a senseless and mischievous Bill, because it created a difference between the event and the intention of the founder. But this was an argument against every statute of limitation, against every act to secure quiet possession, and against all suits to secure quiet possession, and was applicable not only to cases of trust but to property. He would put a case which occurred every day—a case by which the Law of Limitation was just as liable to the charge of being turned against the intentions of the devisor of property, and therefore, according to the right rev. Prelate was as contrary to common sense and reason as this measure was. He would suppose the case of a person, whose intentions were to be gathered, not by uncertain and doubtful evidence, but obtainable within the four corners of the instrument itself. Supposing the will said that the maker of it, John Thompson, having a great and just hatred against all persons of the name of Jackson—left a certain estate to — Thompson, on the express condition that he should not marry any one of the name of Jackson—on the express condition that he should not take the
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name of Jackson—on the express condition that he should not form any connection whatever with the hated family of the Jacksons, and that he should take especial care that none of that name or family should derive any profit, with the knowledge and consent of the devisee, out of that estate. Now what could be clearer than the intention of the party in such a case. It might happen, that by some means, or by some collusion between the devisee and the family of the Jacksons, this estate might get into the possession of the hated family; and if it did now get into such possession—not for sixty years as formerly, but for twenty years in some cases, and for thirty in others—the possession could not be questioned, notwithstanding the express terms of the will. His noble and learned Friend in this Bill took the medium period of twenty-five years' possession to secure the title. The law of the land allowed an estate to be retained in the possession of a family which was expressly excluded from possessing it by the terms of the will of the person who might be called the founder of the estate, and to remain in the hands of those whom he had expressly declared should never enjoy a farthing derivable from it, provided they could only obtain undisputed possession of it for a certain limited period. The argument of the right rev. Prelate on this point was against all the present rights of holding property, and if admitted would affect the titles of many estates, He was also surprised at the expressions used by the right rev. Prelate as to the words in the second Clause, namely, the expression "the worship of God." If the right rev. Prelate would look to the preamble of the Bill as it passed through the Committee of that House, he would find the same expression standing; consequently the same reason for objecting to it was as applicable when in their Lordships' Committee as it then was. He denied that it was of express advantage to one sect more than another; but it would be for the benefit of all. It would have the effect of preventing litigation and jarring, and the ruinous expenses which must attend suits on such subjects, and which, in many instances, would be so great as completely to abstract the funds set aside for the purposes of education or religious worship. The Bill merely said that if a party or sect had had possession for twenty-five years, no one should dis-

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pute the title of the party holding; and this was the same as the law with regard to private property, which allowed possession of an estate for thirty years, in some cases, and twenty years in others to be considered as a good title, and to prevent any adverse interference. He should only once more express his intention of giving his hearty and cordial support to this Bill.
The Bishop of Norwichsaid, that his intention in the first instance was to oppose the Bill, relying on the testimony of persons in whom he placed implicit credit, knowing them to be religious men. He had determined to oppose the Bill because he had been informed that it was not a Bill for the Dissenters generally, but a Bill designed for the exclusive benefit of Socinians and Unitarians. On looking into the measure he found that he had been misled. This was no question of theology and doctrine, but one of equity and justice. He found that others had been misled like himself, and had in consequence signed petitions against the Bill, acting on the same erroneous opinions upon which he, in the first instance, had been disposed to give it his opposition, and who, on discovering their error, deeply regretted the course they had been induced to take. Did he, then, persevere? No; for his pertinacity would be, not like that of the right rev. Prelate, a virtue, but a culpable perseverance in opposition to his conviction. Many petitions had, undoubtedly, been presented to their Lordships' House against the measure, but he had never known a case in which so many petitions of a contrary character had been presented within the same time. He had glanced over many of these petitions against the measure, and had found that although numerous, they had comparatively few signatures. For instance, last week he had presented a petition from certain Baptists of one of the most populous towns in England, with only eleven signatures. That very evening he had presented a petition in favour of the Bill (as we understood), signed by Baptists and orthodox Dissenters throughout the country, and by churchmen also, to the number of 150, which showed that the feeling of Dissenters and Churchmen were not only not against the Bill, but that there were many, very many of them anxious for it. He quite agreed with the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack,
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that it never could be his intention to support Socinian and Unitarian doctrines. It would be a libel on Her Majesty's Government—on the noble Duke in that House and on the right hon. Baronet in another place, as well as on every member of the Cabinet — to suppose that they could ever have advised the introduction of a Bill so utterly regardless of the true interests of religion and of that Established Church which it was their duty to protect. He therefore determined no longer to oppose the Bill; but, on looking more closely into it, he found himself rather in a dilemma, for he was unwilling to allow his name to be in any degree associated with Unitarians and Dissenters. But then came this difficulty; with what consistency could he oppose if? How did he hold his own preferment? Did he not derive it entirely from those who advocated doctrines to which he was opposed? In another place it was said that the tears of Protestant saints would flow in rivers if this Bill should pass; but would not the tears of Roman Catholic saints flow in equal abundance on viewing the question on another side? He was well aware that he held his preferment by Act of Parliament. The Act of Parliament regulated this, and ensured him perpetual possession of the preferment he held. With that he was satisfied. But there came another question. The Methodists did not depend on an Act of Parliament. Their founder, John Wesley, was an ordained churchman, and was at all times, from the beginning of his ministerial career to the end, friendly to the Church. It was a fatal policy when, in those days, we rejected him and made him our enemy. Almost his last prayer was, that his followers should not depart from the Church. They had, however, departed; and what would they say, if we now were to insist on their emoluments, their foundations, and all the money they had expended on their schools and chapels? He should rejoice if we could do so; but the Methodists, and their Lordships too, he apprehended, would stigmatise such a step as an act of injustice. This, he repeated, was no question of theology and doctrine; but he would maintain it to be a religious question. It was religion in its most essential quality, because it was a question of equity and justice, and it was not for man to put asunder what God had joined together. It was for this reason

807
that he was most anxious to support this Bill, and he should deem himself swerving from his duty as a Member of the Legislature, and inflicting an injury on the cause of justice, if he did otherwise than give it his unqualified support. There was a principle, but too often forgotten in theological and doctrinal strife, which taught us to do unto others as we would be done by. It was on this principle that he would ever yield to Unitarians those rights which they held: for he had yet to learn that the Legislature of this country was accustomed to draw a difference between religious tenets, and on that account to deprive men of their rights and liberties. On this account he would support the Bill. They were enjoined to lay aside all self-interest, all prejudices, and all partial affections. His interest would lead him to oppose the Bill; because he knew that he should thereby be more akin to the feelings of a great body of his fellow-countrymen. His prejudices would induce him to oppose it; for he would frankly acknowledge that there was no sect of Dissenters, no religious tenets, to which he was more hostile than those of the Unitarians and Socinians. His prejudices were therefore against it. His partial affections were alike opposed to it, because he should, by opposing the Bill, have the gratification of being associated with those with whom he wished to agree. He felt himself compelled, however, to lay all these feelings aside, and administer impartial justice to all. He expressed his gratitude to the noble and learned Lord for introducing the Bill, and promised him his cordial assistance and support.
The Earl of Roden,not having had an opportunity on the former discussion of offering his opinion with regard to this measure, begged to address a few observations to their Lordships. He was sorry to find the Government originating a measure which in his opinion, tended more to wound the religious feelings of the people of England than any measure that had been introduced for a number of years. The great majority of the people of this country were opposed to this measure, and he entirely coincided with the objections to the Bill stated by the Petitioners, whose petitions covered their Lordships' Table. They stated that they conceived the Bill to be unjust, because it gave property to individuals to which by law they were now not entitled, and which
808
had been left by pious individuals for certain objects directly contrary to those to which the Bill would consign it. Their Lordships had now an opportunity of reconsidering the measure, and he trusted that no taunts which might have been offered with respect to the unfairness of throwing out the Bill in its present stage would have any effect on the minds of those noble Lords who had opposed the Bill in its previous stages first brought before them. He trusted that the observations which had been made on the other side of the House on the course which his right rev. Friend (the Bishop of London) had adopted with respect to the postponement of these Amendments, would not be of force enough to induce their Lordships to dissent from that course, and place on the Statute Book that which would be a blot upon it. Though the course adopted by his right rev. Friend might be an unusual course, yet it was by no means an isolated mode by which Bills were defeated in Parliament, and he thought that noble Lords opposite would be disposed to bow to the authority in its favour which he could bring forward, and which would show that when noble Lords opposite were in office a little time ago, they pursued exactly the same course when they felt it their duty to do so. In 1834, their Lordships would remember the Justices' of Peace Bill was introduced into their Lordships' House when a noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord Brougham) filled the Woolsack. The noble and learned Lord moved that the Commons' Amendments on that Bill be considered that day six months, and their Lordships adopted that course, and the Bill was consequently lost. Another instance, to the authority of which he thought noble Lords opposite would bow, occurred in 1836 with respect to the Irish Church Bill, which made so much noise in Parliament and out of doors. Their Lordships would remember that it came up to them containing a certain Clause called the "Appropriation Clause." Their Lordships made Amendments on that measure, with which it returned to the Commons, when Lord John Russell moved that the Lords' Amendments be taken into consideration that day three months. That Motion was agreed to and the Bill was lost in consequence. Both in their Lordships' House, therefore, and in the other House that course had been adopted by the noble Lords opposite

809
when in office which they now condemned when out of office. The noble Lords on those occasions, no doubt, acted according to their judgment for the benefit of the country. He only claimed for his right rev. Friend the same forbearance on this occasion which they met with from Parliament on the occasions he had mentioned. He thought his right rev. Friend did very right in moving the postponement of these Amendments, in order that the whole measure might come under the consideration of Parliament again. All the Dissenters except the Unitarians were in accordance with the Members of the Church of England in approving of the object of his right rev. Friend on this Motion. His right rev. Friend stood forth on the present occasion not merely as a partisan but as the champion of that truth which was the best feature of religion. Therefore, he could not agree that his right rev. Friend had taken a course which he was not called upon to take. He (the Earl of Roden) had read many pamphlets and speeches upon this measure, and he had heard many arguments in favour of it; he had listened also both to noble and learned Lords and learned persons elsewhere in favour of it; but while he acknowledged the talent with which arguments of the greatest force were urged upon him, yet he must say he often found the talent so great that it made the worse appear the better reason, so that he was obliged to put it all aside and use his common sense to direct him to what should be the proper course. The result of the measure would be to take property left by pious persons to Dissenters of orthodox faith, or to Members of the Presbyterian Church, for the purpose of upholding Christian truth, whenever such property might have fallen into the hands of individuals opposed to those tenets, and if twenty-five years had elapsed from the time they came into possession of the Chapels, to hand it over to them, and entitle them to it, wrongfully obtained and wrongfully kept as it had been. He conceived this to be unjust, and he need only refer, in proof of it, to a case which particularly regarded the Presbyterian Church, the Members of which, he thought, would be the greatest sufferers, and which had been already referred to by the right rev. Prelate—he meant the two suits which were going on in Chancery, in order to recover meeting-houses in Dublin, and
810
the judgment upon which had been arrested until the Bill then before their Lordships had become law. Then, he would ask, why the Amendments which relieved the Wesleyans and Baptists should not also apply to the Presbyterians? It was gross injustice that they should be relieved, and that the Presbyterian Church should be left under the evil power of this measure. A Petition he had presented that evening from the Presbyterian Church of Ireland stated their objections to the measure, among others, to be, that it went to change the law of religious property in frustration of the original intention of the founder, and that it would be a fruitful source of litigation; and the Petitioners prayed that hefore their Lordships passed the Bill it might be referred to a Select Committee of their Lordships, before whom the Petitioners might be allowed to state their case. Surely it was strangely opposed to the principles on which a Government calling itself a Conservative Government ought to act to bring forward a Bill of this character, for the principle of the Bill was anything but a conservative principle. Little did he think, when he sat on the opposite side of the House with the noble and learned Lord now on the Woolsack, and many noble Lords on the Ministerial side, who with him opposed the measure of spoliation to which he had already referred—he meant the measure which contained the Appropriation Clause—he should live to see the day when the noble and learned Lord and other noble Lords would introduce and advocate a measure far more spoliating and far more objectionable than that which contained the Appropriation Clause—he said, far more spoliating and far more objectionable, because, though that measure went to take property from the Church and devote it to objects which certainly were not church objects, yet those objects were not opposed to the Church; but now the House saw the noble and learned Lord and his Friends bringing forward a measure to apply property for the propagation of a dangerous fallacy in religion, and to doctrines directly opposed to the church and to the will of the testator who left the property. He lamented to have lived to see that day; but he had seen it, and if the Government carried the measure, the country would have nothing to do but to bow their heads and lament the uncertainty of man. Having said so much, he would not trespass

811
on their Lordships' time further than to return thanks for the kind manner in which their Lordships had heard him.
Lord Cottenhamsaid, he rose for the purpose of protecting Her Majesty's Government from the severe attack which the noble Earl had made upon them for their departure from Conservative principles. If he were right in the meaning which he had always attached to the word "Conservative" the present Bill was entitled to be considered as purely a Conservative measure, for its object was to do justice, by protecting property that had been in the hands of particular parties for a great length of time, and preventing its spoliation from those who were in the enjoyment of it, in order to have it transferred to others who had no earthly right to it. Such was the meaning that he attached to the word "Conservatism." The noble Earl had read to their Lordships, and he thanked him for it, the petition of the orthodox Presbyterians of the north of Ireland. The statements contained in that petition afforded an instance of the very exaggerated feeling that existed out of doors against the measure, and a greater misrepresentation of the objects of it could not well be adduced to their Lordships' House. The petition stated, what indeed had been already alleged in arguments in that House as well as out of doors, that the Bill had for its object, and would have the effect, of transferring property from those who by trust and by the gift of the donors ought to enjoy it, to others who had no right or title whatever to it. But if any noble Lord would take the trouble of reading the Bill, he would find that any such consequences had been carefully guarded against, and could not occur under it. It was expressly provided, that where, either by the trust deeds or otherwise, proof could be given of the intention of the donor, those intentions were to be carried out, and the persons entitled were to be secured in the possession of the property, the Courts of Law and Equity being open to them for redress. But if noble Lords, as well as persons out of doors, were to continue over and over again to state that such was not the intention of the Bill, that it was calculated to effect a totally different result, then it was no wonder that great misapprehensions should exist in the public mind, giving rise to the number of petitions that they had seen laid on the Table against the measure. His principal object, however, in appearing before their Lordships on that
812
occasion was to defend himself personally against an attack which had been made upon him. He had been censured—he would not say discourteously—by the right rev. Prelate. [The Bishop of London: Not censured.] The third Clause was very much censured, and I regard that as a censure on myself as its author. [The Bishop of London: I censured the Clause, but not the author of it.] If the Clause was wrong and deserving of censure in the form in which it was introduced, he considered that the censure should attach to him for having introduced it; but he had perhaps better wait until he should hear what the accusation was that was to be brought forward against him. When either the Clause itself, or the author of the Clause, or both, were attacked, it would be time enough for him to defend it; but as yet he had not been distinctly told in what the fault which was complained of consisted. ["Hear, hear," from the Lord Chancellor.] If he were wrong in waiting until the third reading of the Bill to modify the measure by a Clause which he had at first submitted for the consideration of the author of the Bill, then the fault was with the forms of the House, which he had followed, and not with him. What was the Clause against which the complaint was made? It was very short, and he thought noble Lords had not taken the trouble of reading it attentively when they expressed their opposition to it. If the purport of the Bill were taken into consideration it would be perceived that such a Clause was absolutely necessary to render the measure perfect. The right rev. Prelate would allow him to say that his objection in part arose from a misapprehension—which was not unlikely to be formed—of the proceedings in such cases in the Courts of Equity. The right rev. Prelate might not know what the mode of proceeding was with regard to relators on those occasions. He might not be aware that the information, which was the first step in the cause, was always filed by Her Majesty's Attorney General, who was empowered to file a bill for the purpose of inciting a proceeding in order to have such charitable trust funds applied for the purposes for which they were originally intended. The Attorney General named the relators, not on account of any personal interest which they had in the Bill, but for the protection of the defendants—in order that if the suit should fail and the defendants be shown to have been right, they

813
might have some party to resort to for their costs. In fact, any person able to pay might be introduced as a relator. He might be a total stranger, having nothing whatever to say to the charity, and be completely distinct from the parties who first induced the Attorney General to file the information. It was in that manner that the cases alluded to had been commenced in Ireland. The Attorney General did not claim the property for any persons or description of persons, but in the information which had been filed by him he merely complained that the parties who were then in possession of the property were not intended by the testator to have the benefit of it. The suits were continued to the last stage, but judgment had not been pronounced, and it would be very extraordinary if the decision of the Court be given—after Parliament had declared that twenty-five years' possession was to give a good title to any particular sect or profession—it would be unfair if after such a declaration by the Legislature the persons who had been in possession, and whom the Act would make the legal holders, should lose their title on account of the over zeal and too great rapacity of those who had incited the Attorney General in the first instance to commence the proceedings. Why should such parties be placed in a better position than all other congregations, merely because they had been more zealous at the commencement? or why were those in possession to be deprived of their title solely on account of the activity that had been displayed in proceeding against them; an activity, he presumed, principally to be attributed to the circumstance of the funds being larger than in other cases that might have been brought forward. By the third Clause of the Bill the defendant would be obliged in these cases to pay all the costs, at the discretion of the Court; and it was on those terms only that the suit was to be stayed. Was that, he would ask, an unfair provision to introduce? Was it a course altogether without precedent? There were what were called qui tam actions, in which the person inciting the proceedings had a direct interest, as he was entitled to a share in the plunder when a verdict was obtained; but had their Lordships never interfered in qui tam actions? He did not think he was taxing their Lordships' memory too much when he asked that question. He did not say they were wrong in interfering to put a stop to these actions, but they allowed the
814
informer his costs when the proceedings were stayed; whereas the relators in the actions then under the consideration of the House would not be able to get their costs, unless, indeed, they succeeded in the proceedings, when their own costs might be paid; though even then they would have no participation in the profits of the suit. But had not their Lordships heard also of qui tam actions against clergymen for not residing on their livings, and if it was considered proper to stop such actions, was it not equally just to put a termination to other actions? The law protected all judgments that had been actually pronounced. If a judgment had been pronounced twenty years ago, and a property enjoyed since then under it, nobody should say that that judgment ought now to be set aside. But the case was different when a suit was still pending, and he could not conceive how any party could, after the Parliament had pronounced its decision, declaring the impropriety of such suits, call upon the Court to pronounce judgment on them. But were their Lordships aware that the suit was in the power of the Attorney General up to the time that judgment was pronounced, and that he might say to the Court that he would not call for its decision, and was it probable, after the Legislature had declared its opinion that this sort of property should be protected, that the Attorney General, having discretion in the matter, would still call upon the Court, for judgment? It was not likely that he would do so, and then, if no judgment were passed, the defendants would escape the payment of costs to the relators who would be indemnified by the Clause which he had introduced. The Clause was, then, proper and necessary. It was founded on a variety of precedents. It did that which was just between all parties, and it did it according to the regular forms of the House. He did not, therefore, think that he was wrong in introducing it. It was not his intention to enter fully into the principles of the measure, as he had had an opportunity of stating his views fully respecting it on the second reading, and, besides, he was restrained by the same reason which his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack had alluded to, namely, that it was not the practice of Parliament to re-discuss the principles of a Bill that had already received the sanction of both Houses. The right rev. Prelate (the Bishop of London) felt the same difficulty, but yet he

815
moved an amendment that could only be justified by an opposition to the principles of the Bill. He would follow the right rev. Prelate only to one point of his opposition to the principle of the Bill, namely, the great error which was fallen into so often both in and out of Parliament, that the Bill had reference to the doctrines of different sects of Dissenters. It had nothing whatever to do with questions of doctrine or professions of faith. It dealt only with property—its sole object being to place congregations—that was, multitudes of persons assembled together for religious purposes, whether their views might be mistaken or not, under that protection, which, if their case was that of an individual instead of a multitude of individuals, the law would readily have afforded them. There never was, therefore, a greater fallacy than the allegation that the Bill involved any question of doctrine. It was merely a question whether or not twenty-five years' possession—a longer period of limitation than was generally required—should not be a good title to prevent a congregation being turned out of their chapel and their endowments. There might be grounds existing for raising a doubt whether the existing congregation held the same doctrines as the founders; but, even if such ground did exist, were they not to take into consideration the expenditure of the congregation themselves in the interim, and which in some cases very much enlarged the original endowment? He was told that in one of the suits pending in Ireland in which the property sought to be recovered did not produce more than 1,000 l. a year, no less than 15,000 l. had been subscribed from time to time by the congregation. If the suit were decided against them, how would that difficulty be got over? The right rev. Prelate objected to twenty-five years precedent, but under the existing law they might have to make out a precedent of 125 years. The right rev. Prelate had no doubt looked into Lady Hewley's case, and he would find there that not only the intention of the testator, but the practice for a great number of years, that formed the entire intervening period, had to be established. The costs of that inquiry had been before stated to their Lordships, and yet all those immense costs had been thrown away, for a new and a still more difficult suit than the former was now necessary. It was easy enough to find out who was not entitled, in comparison to the discovery
816
of who was entitled to the fund. A multitude of claimants, as numerous in fact as all the congregations of Dissenters in the country, might perhaps now rush in, and though that large fund should be able to pay the expense, it was clear that in case of a smaller fund the entire would in a very short time be swallowed up in litigation. With respect to the Amendments of the Commons, he regarded them as calculated to carry out more effectually the principle of the Bill. A right rev. Prelate, who addressed the House the other night, stated that he thought the Bill was improved by the Commons' Amendments. This showed that these Amendments were almost universally approved of, and the only question which their Lordships had now to consider was, whether they would assent to those Amendments, or insist upon their own Bill as it originally stood? The present Bill was a great and important measure—it was a measure of justice—which would prevent the spoliation of the property and possessions of those who, whether or not their Lordships might approve of their doctrines, were by law put on a footing with all other Dissenters.
Lord Broughamsaid, his noble Friend (the Earl of Roden) having observed that he (Lord Brougham) had taken a similar course against a Bill before their Lordships' House in the year 1834, which was now proposed to be taken against this Bill, he begged to say a few words in explanation of the circumstances of that case, which, it would be seen, were quite different from that now before the House. It was quite true, as his noble Friend had stated, that on one occasion in that year, namely, on the 13th of August, he had moved that certain Amendments of the Commons to a Bill before their Lordships should be taken into consideration that day six months. But what were the circumstances under which he did so? Because the Bill (the Justices of the Peace Bill) came back to this from the Lower House with two clauses inserted, one of which would actually have had the effect of doing away with every magistrate in England—obliging them as it did, without the assistance of a clerk or other assistant, to take down in full all the evidence in every case brought before them—the other, giving them power to abrogate and annul a variety of penal Acts of Parliament. Their Lordships agreed with him (Lord Brougham) that they could not

817
agree to these Clauses, and accordingly they omitted them, and sent the Bill back to the Commons. The Commons, however, were obstinate, and sent the Bill back again with the same two Clauses re-inserted. A conference then took place between the two Houses, but without leading to any accommodation of the matter, and the necessary result was, that the House of Lords came to the determination to postpone indefinitely the further consideration of the Bill. This, however, as he said before, was a widely different case from that now before their Lordships.
The Earl of Rodenexplained.
Lord Teynhamadmitted, that the Amendments made by the Commons had effected a considerable improvement in the Bill, but still he considered the whole principle and object of the measure to be so utterly faulty, unjust, and irreligious, that he, for one, could never consent to it. Some discussion had been had as to the import of the words "worship of God." He was sure that if some of the original endowers of these chapels were to see the proceedings and the nature of the "worship" which took place there, they would rather have been burned to death at Smithfield than have left their money to be applied to such purposes. The noble Lord, after some further observations, which were interrupted by general cries of "Question, question," concluded by declaring that he should cordially vote for the Amendment of the right rev. Prelate.
The Earl of Gallowayrose, amid cries of "Question," and "Divide," and assured their Lordships, that however he might otherwise be disposed, he certainly should not think of occupying their Lordships at that hour of the evening, and in the then state of the House, beyond a very few minutes, and that only by way of explanation, as he had been referred to by two noble and learned Lords. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack had, in the course of his speech, more than once alluded to the humble individual who had the honour of addressing their Lordships. But he could assure that noble and learned Lord, he had fallen into a great mistake in supposing that he (Lord Galloway) had been so presumptuous as to threaten to put himself in the fore-front of the battle going on that night in their Lordship's House. He did trust he had formed too just an estimate of his own parliamentary stature to venture on so unequal
818
a contest. It was true he had, on a former night, entered his remonstrance against a proposition volunteered by a noble and learned Lord on the opposite side of the House, that any Motion for the postponement of the Commons' Amendments would be an unworthy mode of endeavouring to defeat the Bill; and he had observed on that occasion, that such mode of procedure would, at least, be more worthy than that which he understood to have been adopted in respect of the third Clause of the Bill, by which another noble and learned Lord, who had just spoken, had introduced a material alteration affecting the rights of parties without public notice. The right rev. Prelate, who had that night opposed the further progress of this measure in so able and argumentative a speech. He so forcibly illustrated the effect of the proceeding complained of in respect of the 3rd Clause, that he (Lord Galloway) should not have thought it necessary to allude to it again, had it not been for what had just fallen from the noble and learned Lord in question, who had just challenged him to an explanation, wherefore he begged leave to read to the House a short passage which had met his eye, and which had been the origin of the remark he had made on the occasion already referred to, and which had given offence to the noble and learned Lord. It was from a Petition to the House of Commons from the Moderator of the General Synod of Ulster, and had been published. The passage ran:—
"To the 3rd Clause of this Bill Petitioner begs leave still further to object. First, because it contains a retrospective enactment, forming no part of the Bill, as originally printed before it came to your Honourable House, and one which bears the marks of its hasty origin, by actually contradicting the marginal reference to its contents, which still remains unchanged.
"Secondly, because the parties interested in pending suits were lulled into security by the original form of the Clause, and were ignorant of the alteration affecting their rights until it was printed by your Honourable House, and consequently, were thereby prevented from petitioning to be heard by counsel in the House of Lords.
"Thirdly, because it appears to Petitioner, that to give any Act of Parliament such retrospective effect, as to reverse at the request of interested parties the judgment—not indeed technically pronounced—but yet arrived at, and publicly declared, and that under the most solemn obligations, and in the highest Court of Equity in Ireland, cannot be intended

819
to prevent litigation, where litigation had already terminated."
Their Lordships and the noble and learned Lord opposite were now in possession of all to which he had alluded. He (Lord Galloway) having been absent in Scotland during the discussions on the Bill before it had gone to the Commons, and observing how great the excitement was in the country on account of it, had been really anxious to learn what urgent necessity there could be for passing such a measure in the face of so strong a demonstration of public feeling against it. He had certainly learnt nothing that night to satisfy him of either its necessity or propriety; therefore, though grieved to vote against the Government—but satisfied the Government itself could only respect or desire an honest and independent—and not a servile support,—and having conscientious objections to the Bill, he should certainly vote for the Amendment of the right rev. Prelate.
Lord Lyttelton, amid cries of "Question," said he must support the Amendment, and wished briefly to state on what grounds. He declared himself decidedly satisfied with the case of the Unitarians, thinking it had been conclusively established on historical grounds, upon which it should be left to rest. But, with all deference to legal authorities, he must say he believed the 2nd Clause would have the effect of introducing a new general principle into the construction of trusts. This was stated by Chief Justice Tindal in delivering the opinions of the judges in Lady Hewley's case; "where a doubt arises," (said the Chief Justice), "on the true sense of the words themselves, or any difficulty as to their application in surrounding circumstances, the meaning of the language may be ascertained by evidence dehors the instrument itself." Now, the language of the 2nd Clause was, that nothing should be admitted against 25 years' usage, except the express words of the deed, or of others referred to in it. Surely nothing could be more opposed than evidence on the face of a deed, and evidence dehors the deed. And the effect of the Clause was, to narrow and limit the field of evidence as to the construction of the trusts. Though, therefore, he had no objection to the introduction of a measure especially to relieve the Unitarians, he considered the present neither safe nor necessary.
Their Lordships then divided on the question, that the said Amendment be taken into consideration on this day three months:—Contents 41; Not-Contents 202: Majority 161.

List of the NOT-CONTENTS.

Lord Chancellor

Verulam

DUKES.

Warwick

Buccleuch

Wicklow

Cleveland

VISCOUNTS.

Leinster

Canning

Norfolk

Canterbury

Richmond

Gage

Wellington.

Hawarden

MARQUESSES.

Hereford

Bute

Melbourne

Camden

Melville

Clanricarde

St. Vincent

Exeter

Torrington

Lansdowne

BISHOPS.

Normanby

Durham

Winchester.

Norwich

EARLS.

LORDS.

Auckland

Abinger

Aberdeen

Bateman

Belfast

Beaumont

Besborough

Brougham

Beverley

Camoys

Cawdor

Campbell

Charlemont

Carew

Clarendon

Carrington

Courtown

Colchester

Cowper

Cottenham

Dalhousie

Colborne

Dartmouth

Crofton

Delawarr

De Freyne

Effingham

Foley

Fortescue

Forrester

Haddington

Gardner

Hardwicke

Hatherton

Harewood

Kinnaird

Harrington

Langdale

Home

Lilford

Jersey

Lurgan

Leitrim

Monteagle of Brandon

Liverpool

Montfort

Lonsdale

Polwarth

Lucan

Ravensworth

Manvers

Redesdale

Minto

Rivers

Morley

Saltoun

Morton

Sandes

Radnor

Strafford

Ripon

St. John

Rosslyn

Sudeley

Scarborough

Suffield

Shaftesbury

Templemore

Somers

Tenterden

Talbot

Wharncliffe

Then the original Motion was agreed to; and the other Amendments were also considered and agreed to.
House adjourned.