STATE OF THE NAVY.

HL Deb 05 July 1844 vol 76 cc389-95

The Earl of Minto

rose to put to the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty the question of which he had given notice, as to the intentions of the Government with respect to sending any force to the coast of Morocco or elsewhere, or what measures the Government had in contemplation on that subject. He felt the extreme importance of the contest which apparently was likely to arise in the empire of Morocco. He understood that our mediation had been, or was likely to be, declined, and he must say that however deeply he regretted this, he was not at all surprised at it, because he did not think that we had placed ourselves in such a position as to afford to a weaker state that assurance of assistance and support which it might have felt, if it had seen any symptoms of preparation on the part of this country. Their Lordships were aware that some important points of our possessions were dependent almost entirely for their supplies upon the empire of Morocco, and it could not be a matter of indifference to that House that the independence of that state should be put in any hazard. There were, moreover, positions on that coast which it would be most injurious and dangerous for the interests of this country if they should be transferred to any other hands, and there were also points not immediately forming a portion of the territory of Morocco, which in the event of a war between France and Spain and Morocco, would be placed in considerable jeopardy,—he meant the island of Majorca and the other Balearic Islands. All those of their Lordships who had paid attention to this subject must feel the same anxiety that he did, that nothing should occur to endanger our amicable relations with the empire of Morocco, or its entire independence from the control of any Foreign Powers. He should have felt little uneasiness if he had perceived that Her Majesty's Government had placed themselves in a position to be ready to second the negotiations with that display of strength which, on the highest authority among them, it was so desirable for this state to be always able to show—he repeated that he would have had less apprehension if he had found anywhere the appearance that Her Majesty's Government had retained the means of sending forth a sufficient force to strengthen the negotiations; but, unhappily, he found the naval force of this country so reduced, that he declared he knew not where the noble Lord could turn to find such a reinforcement, for our naval force in those seas as would be at all calculated to produce any impression. This was not his own opinion; he was anxious to deliver to their Lordships, in stating the necessity that our negotiations should be backed by a respectable force. He should quote the highest authority in that House on the subject, from the strictures that had been addressed to himself (Lord Minto) in one of the numerous attacks which he had so frequently experienced when he held office. It was the authority of the noble Duke opposite, who had always been the most fair, generous, and candid of all the assailants whom he had had to encounter. In a discussion on our commercial relations which had taken place in that House, towards the close of the Session of 1838, the noble Duke said— Now, he confessed that he could not view the state of our commercial relations, and of our position in the world generally, in connexion with these commercial pursuits, with any degree of unmixed satisfaction. On the contrary, he did deplore the state in which they found themselves placed in many parts of the world, particularly as had been described in the course of the evening by his noble Friend (Lord Strangford). What he attributed that state of our commercial relations to in a great degree was, the extreme weakness and tottering condition of our naval establishments. He did not now mean to complain of the distribution of our naval establishments; though at the same time, he by no means meant to unsay what he had said in respect to the expeditions to Spain, which he could not approve of; but he repeated his expression that he considered our naval establishments to be in too weak and tottering a condition to answer the purpose for which they were intended, which was to give protection to the commercial interest of the country in all parts of the world; for the commerce of England did extend to all parts of the world. And afterwards, when our interference and good offices were exercised in the case of the misunderstanding between France and Mexico, the noble Duke asked— When the Minister who was concerned in carrying on the negotiations on the part of the French Government with respect to the claim for 120,000l., the subject of this war, placed himself for protection on board one of the vessels composing the French fleet, in the harbour of Santo Sacrificio, how could the representative of the English Crown upon the spot treat with the French Minister at all, if he had not some force at his back? He did not at all wish to threaten, but what he desired was, to have amicable intercourse with the representative of France. But to have that he must be on an equal footing with him. Now, at the time to which the noble Duke then referred, we had eighteen sail-of-the-line in commission, and a large force in every part of the world. There was no station on which we had not a force adequate to all the demands which could arise, and at home we had a reserved force of four or five ships of the line, disposable for any service. What was the state of the case now? Not only were there questions pending with respect to Morocco, but also that question with America relating to the Oregon boundaries, and with respect to Texas, and other questions, in which the interests of this country were materially concerned. All these, one might think, might suggest the necessity of having a respectable naval force at our command. But how stood the case? He was sure their Lordships were not prepared to hear what he was about to state, as to the amount of the naval force of this country at the present moment. The present Government had succeeded to a fleet of six-and-twenty ships-of-the-line, a force more than adequate to the then altered circumstances of the country. A reduction was then made to a degree that had never been known or dreamt of. At the present moment there was not in commission, he believed, one ship-of-the-line, other than those employed to bear the flags of the admirals commanding. There might, perhaps, be one. We had in all nine ships-of-the-line in commission, of which there were two in the East Indies, at a distance; one in the West Indies, also at a distance; three guard-ships, bearing the flags of the port-admirals in the different ports of this country. Then there was in the Mediterranean fleet one ship-of-the-line, and one flag ship, and finally there was the Albion, which had been recently employed—he did not know whether she now was—as the flag ship at Cork. Here then, we had for the Navy of England nine ships-of-the line, and this at a time when none of their Lordships would deny that the state of affairs abroad was such as necessarily to cause the greatest anxiety. He did not say he had any immediate fear of war, but there were questions pending, the settlement of which depended upon the respect and estimation in which this country was held; and that respect and estimation would be governed in no small degree by the strength which we were enabled to exhibit. He knew not what answer would be given to his questions. He hoped his noble Friend would be able to say that he had resources at command of which he (Lord Minto) knew nothing, and that the Government were about to send a force to the Mediterranean which would more than balance the French fleet—that we were not to leave the Mediterranean entirely to France, but that we were still to retain some power there. It would be no answer to him to say that there were demands for the employment of Her Majesty's ships in other parts of the world, and that there was great pressure on the Admiralty—he had never seen the day when there could be the slightest difficulty in meeting any demands that could arise; and, as he had said, when the attacks were directed agsinst him, if there was any defect, it was the fault of the individual presiding over the Admiralty. The noble Lord ought to show that there was a British fleet prepared, whenever it should be required. Nor could the noble Lord tell them that though the number of ships of the line was reduced, there was an increase in the number of vessels of smaller rates: for how stood the facts? On looking at the amount of the force at the two periods, he found that at the former date it was larger than at present, and therefore the ships of the line, of which the country had been relieved, were not counterbalanced by an extraordinary equipment of vessels of another sort. So that his noble Friend could not say that he had felt called on to reduce the number of ships of the line in consequence of the demand on the Admiralty for an increased number of smaller vessels. Let it be supposed that it should be thought necessary to support our negotiations in the manner described by the noble Duke, and that a respectable force should be sent to the Mediterranean, in order that the British flag should be supported, where was that force to be found? From three flag-ships and three guard-ships? He besought their Lordships to remember all that used to be said of the necessity of having a reserve at home and of the danger of leaving our shores at home unprotected save by four or five guard ships. He was sure that this increasing reduction of our naval force was not called for by the country. On the contrary, he believed that the country saw with great regret the Mediterranean without a British fleet. The circumstances under which this reduction occurred were peculiarly unfortunate. In addition to those questions he had referred to as existing on the other side of the Atlantic, and those which were arising on the shores of the Mediterranean, there had been, as he was informed, a considerable increase of the French fleet in commission; and he for one did not see without some degree of anxiety that the command of that portion of the fleet which was destined for Morocco had been given to the Prince de Joinville. He would refrain from saying anything of the character or conduct of that Prince, but with the knowledge their Lordships had of the opinions, sentiments, and feelings which had been recently expressed in that country, he felt assured that they would participate in the regret which he felt that the Prince should have been selected for such a service. In conclusion he begged to ask whether it was the intention of the Government to adopt any measures for sending to Morocco, or elsewhere such a naval force as would be sufficient for the protection of British interests?

The Earl of Haddington

said, their Lordships had heard the question of the noble Earl, and the speech with which he had thought it prudent and becoming to preface it. The practice of making long speeches, and of entering into general discussion when only a particular question was put, was a very inconvenient one, and was one to which the noble Earl was somewhat prone. It was not only an inconvenient practice, but also an unfair one, because if he had been informed that the noble Earl was going to put a question as to the distribution of the whole naval force of the country, he would have thought it necessary to refresh his memory a little as to the details. He had never been more surprised in his life than at the long speech de omnibus rebus, which had fallen from the noble Earl; and as the noble Earl in some of his remarks had diverged into diplomacy, he thought he had some reason to complain, that he had not waited for the arrival of the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs before entering into them. He was not going to answer the speech of the noble Earl, but his question, which bore more particularly on the noble Earl's charge, that there was only one ship-of-the-line left in the Mediterranean. At the time that resolution was taken, there was not the slightest appearance of anything requiring a British force in that part of the world, and it formed no part of the policy of the British Government that because the French had an exercising squadron in that part of the world, we were, therefore to have a countervailing one. The French had not themselves at that time the least expectation that they would be called upon to send a force to the coast of Morocco. But the noble Earl should also please to remember that the Mediterranean was not a distant sea—that it was not a difficult thing to send vessels there—that the Government had sent such a force there as they thought the circumstances required—and that, if it was necessary to add to it, it was in their power to do so. With respect to the "elsewhere" alluded to in the noble Earl's question, we had such a force on every station as, after the most minute deliberation and attention to British interests all over the world, the Government had thought it right and proper to send there. The noble Earl had alluded to the Oregon question and the Pacific. To the noble Earl's remarks on these points he made the same reply. They had also increased the force on the coast of Africa. The noble Earl might shake his head, but there was no reason for his doing so. It was the intention of Her Majesty's Government still further to strengthen the force on the coast of Africa. What had prevented them hitherto from carrying that intention into effect was the necessity Her Majesty's Government had been placed under of having a force in Ireland—a necessity which he hoped would be temporary only. Some vessels had been sent, and more would be sent very shortly. He would only add, that he thought the desponding speech the noble Earl had made was not a very prudent one to come from a Peer in his place in Parliament. There could be no doubt that if circumstances should call for the application of an adequate naval force in any part of the world, the means would not be wanting, and that the time would not be long before the required force would be ready. At the same time, with regard to Morocco, there was every reason to hope, that the issue which they all so much deprecated would not take place.

The Earl of Minto

said, he was far from being satisfied with the answer he had received. He was told that the Government would do what they thought proper. He knew they could only do what was possible; and out of nine ships of the line, three being necessary here, and three necessary in the East and West Indies, and another necessarily in the Pacific, it was impossible to extract such a fleet as would be adequate to support the credit and character of the British flag.