Lords Sitting of 12 February 1844

MINUTES.
Sat first.—Lord Oriel.
BILLS. Public.—1a. Administration of Justice; Ecclesiastical Courts.
3a. and passed:—Teachers of Schools.
Private.—2a. Sang's Naturalization.

SCINDE—VOTE OF THANKS TO THE ARMY.
The Earl of Riponsaid: In rising to move the Thanks of the House to Major-general Sir Charles Napier, and the Officers and Men under his command employed in the operations in Scinde, I will take especial care to abstain from saying anything which may lead to any difference of opinion. It is your Lordships' practice on occasions of this kind to pursue that course, and it seems to me to be recommended by prudence and justice. I may, however, be permitted, before I make the motion, to state to 'our Lordships, as briefly as I can, and in a general way, the grounds upon which I think the conduct of that gallant officer, and the army under his command, are most deserving of your Lordships' gratitude; and I would take the liberty very shortly of detailing to your Lordships the course of those operations which have shed so much lustre on the character of that distinguished man. It appears that in the early part of last year,

491
Major-general Sir C. Napier, who was in command of Her Majesty's forces in Scinde, was called upon by the Governor-general to engage in certain negotiations with the Ameers of Scinde, and in the course of those proceedings he received information upon which he thought he was justified in relying (I pass no opinion whatever upon that), but he received information which led him to believe that those princes with whom he was negotiating, were not acting in good faith, but were collecting troops and resorting to means of resistance, from which he inferred that it might become impossible to bring those negotiations to a satisfactory issue without at least having at hand a military force to support his proceedings. Accordingly he felt it to be his duty, under the circumstances I have stated, to move from the immediate position he had taken up on the Indus, at Sukkur, and to march to the town of Khyrpore, in order to cause the dispersion of those forces which the representations on his part to the Ameers had failed in producing. When he arrived there the Ameers and their forces had retired from the town; but he was led to believe, from the information which reached him, that the dispersion of their forces had not taken place, and he therefore felt that a necessity might arise for some further demonstration of force. The Ameers who had retired from Khyrpore appeared to have taken the direction of the Desert, and Sir Charles Napier, feeling the necessity of securing his line of operations, whether he should have to advance towards Hyderabad, or to retire upon Sukkur, if that should be the step to which he should be obliged to have recourse, felt it indispensable to show to the Ameers that in the Desert they were not secure from his operations, and that they could not from thence embarrass his future movements. He accordingly determined to move on to the fort of Emaum Ghur. The probability of a want of supplies in this retreat through the Desert was obvious, and there was great reason to apprehend that there might also be a deficiency of water. Nevertheless, being of a spirit not to be daunted by difficulties, determined to effect that march; but being at the same time a man of great sagacity, prudence, and foresight in his profession, and seeing something mysterious in the proceedings of the Ameers with respect to their forces, and feeling that it was necessary to guard against any consequences that might follow, he placed the main portion of the force under his com-
492
mand in an advanced position on the road towards Hyderabad, the capital of Scinde, from whence he might advance in that direction or retire upon Sukkur, or support his detached operation upon Emaum Ghur. These measures he undertook with all that spirit and energy that seemed characteristic of his family. He succeeded in capturing the fort of Emaum Ghur, and effected every object that he had in view by this decisive movement; thus proving to the Ameers that the Desert might be traversed by our troops; whilst at the same time he secured by his movement his left flank, and gave protection to his front and rear; and I believe I am not saying too much when I state that that operation was one of the most brilliant of the kind ever performed. He felt, however, that the state of things rendered it imperative on him to advance still further towards the capital, Hyderabad, which was a difficult operation, and not easy to be effected by the small force under his command, particularly as he had information which satisfied him that the Ameers had collected in considerable force, which might possibly place his advance in sonic jeopardy. However, he advanced to a place called Sukhurunda, at some distance from Hyderabad, where he halted a few days, and in the meantime learnt at length, after the negotiations had been conducted to a point which gave reason to hope for an amicable termination, that on the 15th of February an attack had been made by a large body of Beloochees upon the residence of Major Outram, which was within a short distance of Hyderabad, between that city and the left bank of the Indus. I cannot proceed to enter upon that without calling your Lordships' attention to the circumstances of that attack—not the circumstances that produced it—that is quite another question—as to the conduct of Major Outram, and those gallant men who were posted within that residence, and had to defend it against a most vigorous well-conducted attack by a large body of troops. The force under Major Outram consisted of a single company. The residence was a building surrounded by a wall, but accessible on all sides. The attack was made by 8,000 Beloochees, who were deficient certainly in discipline and military tactics, but not in spirit or courage, and they made a most vigorous attack, supported by cannon. Major Outram had a very small force with which to resist that attack, and unfortunately it happened that he had not

493
received a supply of ammunition which he expected; nevertheless, he was not a man to yield; he was well known as a bold and resolute soldier, and Sir C. Napier speaks of his conduct in defence of that position in terms of well merited eulogy, which justly applied not only to him, but to all those who served under him in resisting that attack. Notwithstanding the difficulty under which Major Outram and his little garrison laboured from the want of ammunition, nothing could exceed the cool courage with which they managed the little that was at their disposal; the consequence of which was, that their loss was comparatively trifling, although the enemy came close to them under cover of houses, gardens, and plantations, so as to be able to make an attack on three sides of the building; but they defended it successfully till their ammunition was exhausted, and although they were compelled to abandon the building from their incapacity of maintaining it, they succeeded in effecting their retreat to the river, and their loss was not above ten or a dozen men. The defence of that building was a remarkable proof of what skill and resolution can do in defending a post against very superior numbers, and I believe that history nowhere shows a more remarkable instance of how that work may effectually be done. When Sir C. Napier heard what had taken place, and that Major Outram had been compelled to retire from the residency, he felt a necessity imposed upon him of taking further military steps—he felt that it was incumbent upon him to move forward and attack the enemy in the position which they had occupied. He accordingly advanced with his comparatively trifling force of 2,800 men, but whose discipline and courage he well knew and understood, and knew and understood also how much he could rely upon it. He moved forward to attack them. He found them in a position of great strength, evidently showing that they knew very well how to use the means of defence at their disposal, and that they were not ignorant of the first principles of military strategy and skill in the position they took up, for it was defended in front by a deep ditch or water course, and both flanks were protected by jungle, and on their right flank they had the additional protection given by a village. This most formidable position was defended by twenty-two or twenty-three thousand men, and a force of not less than 10,000 men was collecting in his rear. Sir C.
494
Napier had to attack it in front; he could not commence the attack in any other way; the jungle rendered that mode of attack necessary. The moment he saw their position, he also saw, with that acuteness of military eye-sight—if I may use the expression—which was characteristic of him, how the attack was to be conducted. He placed his troops en echellon, and advanced from his right to storm the ditch and breast-works. The enemy received him with stout resistance; they evidently knew how to use the arms they had; but he tells you that their very resistance proved the inferiority of the sword and shield and matchlock to the musket and bayonet; and, after a severe struggle, the enemy was completely routed with considerable loss, and their ammunition, guns, and baggage of every description fell into the conqueror's hands. I will not trouble your Lordships by going any further into the details of this battle, but it was distinguished, on the part of all who were engaged in it, by that coolness, discipline, courage, and energy which have been so frequently displayed, not only by Her Majesty's European troops, but by the native troops of the East India Company, on the well-fought fields of Asia; the success of that glorious action proved what unbounded confidence might be placed in every emergency, on the boldness and devoted valour of those troops. This battle, decisive as it was in its immediate effect, was, however, not so decisive as to cause the dispersion of the whole of the enemy's forces; and that is rather a remarkable circumstance, for it rarely happens in Indian warfare that an army once defeated is able again to bring itself together—a native army I mean, not the native troops in our service; but, generally speaking, a native army, if once defeated, is seldom able to bring itself together to fight a second battle. But in this instance, it happened that one of the Ameers had a body of troops untouched under his command, and he was joined by a number of fugitives who had escaped from the battle of Meeanee; and the Ameer showed by his movements a determination to continue hostilities. Sir Charles Napier, therefore, found it necessary to proceed to the attack of the Ameer of Meerpore; and for that purpose he advanced, two or three weeks after the battle of Meeanee, towards the Ameer's position, near Hyderabad. The Ameer had under his command 20,000 men; the force of Sir C. Napier had been

495
increased to 5,000. Had the Ameer's force joined the army that assembled at Meeanee, Sir C. Napier would have bad a force of between 40,000 and 50,000 men opposed to him; but this junction he prevented by the promptitude and decision of his movements. The Ameer's troops were admirably placed. In front there were two nullahs, or wide ditches; of which the rear was defended by ramparts or breastworks. Sir C. Napier, in his despatches, stated that he found it difficult to arrange his plan of attack on this position, because the left flank was not accurately defined. He therefore determined to make his attack on their right, and to make it in the first instance by a portion of his cavalry and artillery, supported by Her Majesty's 22nd Infantry, and coming up in the face of their position, the left of his line appears to have outflanked the right of the Ameer's army; finding which, they proceeded to draw troops from their left, in order to meet the attack which had turned their right. Sir Charles therefore concluded, with his usual acuteness, that their right flank was their weakest point, and that they were defended more thoroughly by artificial means on their left than on their right; and, consequently, he determined to make his great attack on their right flank. He advanced with most perfect order, the troops behaving with the greatest steadiness, not returning the fire till they came within a distance when it was likely to tell most effectually on the enemy. He ordered his cavalry to get round the right flank, which they did by a brilliant and successful manœuvre; and then the enemy being thrown into confusion, he pushed his right flank forward and forced the nullah, and the consequence was the defeat of the enemy with great loss. That is a summary, I fear very imperfectly given—and as I cannot pretend to any knowledge on such subjects, I hope I shall be excused if it is so—of the two actions in which Sir Charles Napier gave such decisive proofs of his bravery and skill. It cannot be said, however, that they were not attended with considerable loss; for although there were but 2,800 of our troops engaged in one, and about 5,000 in another, our total loss was not less than 500 killed and wounded, which shows the desperate resistance of the enemy; and many of those who fell were officers of the greatest distinction, whose loss every one must lament, though they would be ready, if living, to render to them
496
the meed of approbation which we shall, I trust, readily give to those who survive them. It is not necessary for me to trouble your Lordships with details of the individual gallantry of the officers. Their services are inscribed by Sir C. Napier in his despatches, and his notice of their services is worth all the eloquence, if I had any, that it would be possible for me to bestow upon them. They require not the fugitive words of praise that could fall from me, for their merits are best set forth in the despatches of Major-general Sir C. Napier, which will form part of the military history of this country. I may, however, say a word or two with respect to the other portions of the army, which will be last mentioned in the vote I am about to propose, and that is the non-commissioned officers and privates. It is needless for me indeed to say anything with reference to that portion of the army which is composed of Her Majesty's European troops. There are some of your Lordships, perhaps, present, who know what they are as soldiers, and can readily believe and understand the spirit with which they fight, and the discipline which they maintain in action. But other portions, namely the native troops belonging to the East India Company, must, I think, upon occasions of this kind, be looked upon in a peculiar light. They are not mercenaries, but voluntary soldiers; they are not Englishmen, though they are British subjects, but they have, in many respects, the hearts of Englishmen. They are as brave as any troops in the world, and are capable of admirable discipline; they are patient of fatigue, they are willing to sacrifice, and do sacrifice, over and over again, their natural habits and their prejudices, to move from their own country to places of which they know nothing, beyond the seas; and show as much courage and spirit, and discipline, when fighting in another climate, as if they were fighting in their own homes, on the continent of India. I say, they have the same qualities that constitute a great army in any part of the world; and they have manifested upon occasions without number, that which is one of the finest qualifications which can distinguish a soldier—namely, unvaried fidelity. But for the fidelity of that noble army we might not unfrequently have been placed in difficulties from which the exertions of our own troops would hardly have relieved us; and your Lordships, if you agree with me, as I am sure you will, in tendering the Thanks of this House to that body of

497
men, will be doing but justice to those who have a claim on your gratitude. These men may not know accurately what passes in Europe—they may not accurately know what position your Lordships occupy in the eyes of Europe and the world, or what your functions are in the Government of England; still they will respect and appreciate your thanks; and you may depend upon it when they look at their standards, on which may be inscribed the names of the victories they have achieved, and when they feel on their breasts the medals which Her Majesty and the East India Company have bestowed, they will appreciate with equal gratitude and thanks the honour which your Lordships will confer on them by agreeing to the motion which I am about to propose to your Lordships—
"That the Thanks of this House be given to Major-general Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., for the remarkable skill, energy, and gallantry displayed by him in the recent military operations in Scinde, particularly in the two decisive battles of Meanee and Hyderabad."
My next Resolution is—
"That the Thanks of this House be given to the several Officers of the Army, both European and Native, serving under Major-general Sir Charles Napier, for their unwearied zeal and conspicuous gallantry."
The next Resolution is—
"That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the brave and meritorious conduct displayed by the Non-commissioned Officers and Private soldiers, both European and Native, engaged in the operations in Scinde; and that this Resolution be signified to them by the commanders of the several corps."
And lastly—
"That the said Resolutions be transmitted by the Lord Chancellor to the Governor-general of India; and that his Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein."
Lord Aucklandsaid: He trusted he should stand excused before their Lordships if he rose for the purpose of seconding the Resolutions of his noble Friend. He could add but little to what had fallen from him, but it would be a gratification to him to be allowed to say that he cordially, and without qualification, concurred in the Vote of Thanks which he had proposed. No man could be more alive than he was to the excellence of which our Indian army under the direction of its British officers had attained. Thus organised, there was no army that possessed more of the
498
best qualities of soldiers than that army. He would not dilate upon the encomiums which his noble Friend had passed on the British soldiers and the native troops. He should but idly detain their Lordships if he were to follow his noble Friend in the details which he had given. He would but say, that manifold as had been the instances in the history of India, in which by discipline, and under good direction, a small British force had vanquished numbers infinitely greater than itself, he firmly believed that, not even excepting the battles of Plassy or Assaye, or any of the great contests of India, had the difficulties been greater, nor had they been met, in any one instance, by more conspicuous decision and judgment and energy than by Sir Charles Napier and the troops under his command. [Cheers.] He felt that the gratitude of his country was due to that distinguished officer. He felt that England might well be proud of possessing such an officer. [The Duke of Wellington: "Hear, hear!"] He thought India might well be proud of having brought forward in the service of the country (in succession to many others first distinguished in Indian warfare) such a general. He would not further detain their Lordships. He could only say he entirely concurred with his noble Friend in the view he had taken of this question, and he was glad he had confined his motion entirely to the military part of these operations, and that in a vote which it was most desirable should be unanimous in grace and gratitude, nothing should arise to give cause to any difference of opinion.
The Duke of Wellington: I can assure your Lordships, that it is not my intention, in addressing your Lordships for a few moments, to say anything which may occasion any difference of opinion. And I hope I may congratulate my noble Friend upon having proposed a motion to your Lordships which will be unanimously agreed to. But, my Lords, I cannot listen to such a motion as this, impressed as I am with a strong sense of the importance and the merits of the services which have been brought under your Lordships' attention, without expressing my cordial assent in the expressions of approbation stated by my noble Friends, and in the motion submitted by the noble Earl to your Lordships. My Lords, I must say, that after giving the fullest consideration to these operations, I have never known any instance of an officer who has shown in a higher degree, that he

499
possessess all the qualities and qualifications to enable him to conduct great operations. He has maintained the utmost discretion and prudence in the formation of his plans, the utmost activity in all the preparations to ensure his success, and finally the utmost zeal and gallantry and science in carrying them into execution. My Lords, my noble Friend has alluded to Emaun Ghur, which was one of the most glorious feats of which I have ever perused the despatches, and it was completely successful. The march was commenced at the very beginning of the hot season, through the desert, with heavy guns—with heavy artillery, which were transported in a most extraordinary manner, and which enabled him to take possession of the place, and deprive his enemy of that retreat, in case they should ever again attempt to get possession of it. After his return from the operations which he had effected, he collected all the troops which he had immediately at his command, and made all the preparations which he could make for the future events which might occur which might render it necessary for him to engage his enemy. My Lords, it proved that he had collected but few troops; but, however, he had confidence in them and in himself, and they felt confidence in him, and he made a most extraordinary attack, which completely succeeded, and gained a complete victory, having obtained possession of all the enemy's guns, their ammunition, and their baggage. Having gained one victory, he again found himself in a position likely to be attacked by a greatly superior force. He secured for himself not only the fortress of Hyderabad, but also a fortress on the Indus behind him. He then brought up the reinforcements from Sukkur, and he had a stronger army than that with which he fought and won the battle of Meeanee. My Lords, I must do him the justice to say, that the movements to effect a junction with his reinforcements manifested all the discretion and all the abilities of an officer to be entrusted with the highest description of operations. When he was joined by his reinforcements, he immediately advanced on the enemy, and, as had been stated by his noble Friend, he attacked them, and the result was another most brilliant victory. After an action in which he displayed all the qualities of an excellent general officer, and
500
showed to the troops under his command all the qualities of the bravest soldier—my Lords, after this victory, he pursued the enemy to his capital of Meerpoore, on the borders of the desert, of which he took possession; and he afterwards entered the desert, with the view of taking possession of another post there, which might have been likely to have afforded an asylum to some enemy thereafter—a post called Omercote. I mention the fact, because in the course of these operations, a circumstance occurred which manifested the confidence which the officers and men hail in their commander, and which showed the reason of his successes. Having determined to make an attack upon Omercote, he found that the river Indus was rising in his rear, and that he might experience a difficulty to keep up a communication with Hyderabad; yet he determined, and actually sent an order, that the operations should be stopped; he countermanded the operations, and directed the troops to fall back upon Meerpoor. At this juncture it was thought necessary to apply to him for further orders; and an officer there, one of his aides-de-camp, rode through the desert, in that hot season of the year, a distance of not less than forty miles, to let him know in what state the operations of the siege were, and to take his fresh orders upon the subject. Having received those orders, which enabled the operations of the siege to be continued, this officer rode back the forty miles, making eighty miles in one day in that climate. The operations of the siege were renewed, and the place was taken. I mention this circumstance, because it shows the remarkable fact of the confidence reposed in Sir C. Napier by those who served under his command, and the zealous desire of those with whom he was connected to carry out his views. My Lords, I cannot state a more simple fact to show the spirit which animated all under his command. I hope that I have said nothing to interrupt the unanimity of your Lordships. [Cheers.] There is only one other fact I will mention, to induce your Lordships to pronounce your approbation of this service. It happens to me to know that Sir Chas. Napier, on the morning of the second battle, received from the Governor-general his approbation of the conduct of the troops at the battle of Meeanee, and the announcement that the rewards for their

501
services would follow; and this was, I believe, a great inducement to the exertions of the troops, which were afterwards crowned with such success. With these few remarks, my Lords, I cordially support the resolutions of my noble Friend.
Resolutions agreed to nem con.

RECENT AFFAIRS IN SPAIN.
The Earl of Clarendonsaid, that in rising to put to my noble Friend, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the questions of which I gave him notice, I must, in the first place, assure him, that I am not influenced by party motives, nor by any desire of causing the slightest embarrassment to the Government; but the events which have recently occurred in Spain, and still more those which are impending, are to my mind of a character too serious to be permitted to pass unobserved, and in silence. I am convinced that they received the anxious attention of my noble Friend, and that the House and the public will be desirous of receiving any information upon them, which he may not think it inconsistent with his public duty to communicate, for Spain must always occupy an important place in the general policy of Europe, and the prosperity, and, above all, the independence of that country must always be deeply interesting to the people of England. In fact, the British Statesman would greatly fail in his duty, who neglected every means in his power to secure the independence of Spain, and to resist all attacks upon it, be they open, or be they insidious, and come from what quarter they may. These are, I know, the principles of my noble Friend, which, upon more than one occasion, I have had the satisfaction of hearing him declare in this House, and I trust he may prove to your Lordships, that by them he has been guided, and that we are in no way responsible for, but on the contrary have done what was possible to avert the deplorable state of anarchy into which Spain has now fallen. A state of things, which must be equally alarming to those who wish well to liberal institutions, or who are anxious to maintain the dignity and security of thrones, for the throne and the constitutions of Spain are now in equal danger; both have been alike degraded, and in fact set aside, and in their place has existed a military despotism of the worst and most ferocious description, which, under a reign of terror, has for months past been rioting in acts of violence and illegality, and have trampled upon the laws, and outraged the
502
feelings of the Spanish people. The present state of things cannot last; no nation will long submit to such tyranny as now exists in Spain; a fierce re-action will come, but leading as that must do to a chronic state of civil war, with all its evil consequences and dangerous example, other Governments may think themselves justified in interfering to put a stop to it, an intimation indeed of such a design under certain contingencies has been already given—this, on the other hand, may give rise to serious discussions among the powers of Europe; and it is therefore essential, not only as regards Spain, but the present peace of Europe, as well as the peculiar interests of Great Britain, that tranquillity and regular government should be restored; and if I know any thing of Spain, I can affirm that that can only be effected, through the institutions which the Spanish people have for the last ten years been struggling to obtain, but which are now in the utmost danger of being abolished. I will not go the length of saying, that any interference on the part of this country could have prevented the lamentable state of things which now exists in Spain, but, at the same time, I unhesitatingly affirm, that foreign interference, not the less effectual for being disguised, has caused it, and for this the Spaniards themselves are mainly to blame, for there are among them certain classes who unfortunately do not scruple to accept any assistance from any quarter against their political rivals, however dangerous that assistance may be to the national interests. It is to this readiness to place themselves under the yoke of foreign influence; that many of the disasters which have befallen Spain are to be attributed, and among them the overthrow of the Regency. I will very briefly recapitulate the occurrences which preceded that event, as it is necessary, in order to render the present state of things intelligible. No sooner was General Espartero raised to the highest dignity of the State, and it was seen that his government would be conducted upon principles strictly constitutional and national, than the destruction of his power was resolved upon by those classes of persons to whom I have just alluded, the plots and intrigues for that object, originated and were matured at Paris; they were known to, and not discountenanced by the French Government, the insurrection in the Basque Provinces; in the name of the Ex-Queen Regent, and the attack on the palace, for the purpose of

503
carrying off the Queen were known of in Paris long before they occurred in Spain—then came the studied insults offered to the person and authority of the Regent by the French ambassador, M. de Salvandy; these were followed by the revolt at Barcelona, and the reward conferred upon the French consul, M. Lesseps, by return of telegraph, when the mere fact of the revolt, and nothing of the conduct of the consul could be known at Paris. I must also remind your Lordships of the official apology insisted upon by the French Government from that of Spain for having wrongfully accused the consul, or rather for not having accused him rightly, and the obstinate refusal of the French Government to withdraw the consul, although repeatedly and respectfully informed that his residence at Barcelona, after the part he was known to have taken in the insurrection, was most injurious to the authority of the Spanish Government—these facts are notorious, and they establish beyond all doubt the hostility of the French Government to General Espartero; but the enemies of the Regent finding that their objects could not be effected by insurrection or violence, had recourse to parliamentary manœuvres, and by well-directed intrigues in the Cortes, the action of the Government was at length paralysed, and the formation of a Ministry that could command a majority, was rendered impracticable. When the Regent was thus deprived of constitutional power, a fresh revolt was determined upon, the leaders of this then quitted Paris, with the knowledge and sanction of the French Government, and they received every assistance from the French authorities on their journey to the frontier. The Regent's generals were inactive or unskilful; his soldiers were ill-paid, and seduced by the money and the promises offered them by his rival—the moment for striking a decisive blow was lost—reverse ensued, and the cry against the Regent spread like an epidemic over the land, thus without an attempt to found any charge against him; without an accusation against his honour or his devoted attachment to the Sovereign and the institutions of Spain; and without a thought or a care by what individual or what system he should be replaced—never, I believe, in the annals of history, was there a more wicked and objectless Revolution. General Espartero fell, and your Lordships will remember that the news of his overthrow was received here by people of all parties with un-
504
mingled regret, but at Paris with marks of the liveliest satisfaction. I am convinced, however, that the French Government, in the course they pursued towards General Espartero, committed a great error—an error which, to my humble judgment, is quite incomprehensible, considering the profound sagacity that directs the policy of France, for the smallest degree of foresight, the smallest amount of knowledge of the Spanish character, and of the state of things in Spain, would have sufficed to show the danger of overthrowing the Regency. I will go even further and affirm, that there was no sovereign or government in Europe, desirous of upholding the monarchical principle, and preventing the degradation of crowned heads, that was not directly interested in the maintenance of General Espartero's power; the furious elements of discord, that his absence has let loose, abundantly prove what must have been the difficulties of his position, and entitle him to the highest credit, to that credit in short, which was so warmly, though not more warmly than justly, bestowed upon him by my noble Friend, and the right hon. Baronet at the head of Her Majesty's Government, for having so long, and in despite of foreign and domestic intrigues, governed the country in peace, and without one single infraction of the constitution or the laws. Most difficult also would have been the position of the Queen, even under the most favourable circumstances, of the country being handed over to her in a state of repose at the age fixed by the law for attaining her majority, but how immeasurably have all her difficulties been increased by her being forced prematurely to ascend the throne amidst bloodshed and civil war? The victim of the selfish band of conspirators into whose hands she has fallen, and already the unconscious instrument of violating the institutions and the laws, as well as the customs and the prejudices of the people, she nominally governs to an extent which her father in all the plenitude of his despotism would hardly have dared to contemplate. Such, however, are the auspices under which the reign of this youthful Sovereign has; yet nothing has occurred which might not easily have been foreseen, and quite as easily have been prevented. I know full well how much it is the practice in Spain unduly to blame foreign governments, and upon what light evidence disasters are directly attributed to their intervention. I know it has bean said and believed in

505
Spain as well as here, that agents were sent from France to promote this senseless revolution; that the ample funds which he tinsurrectionists had at their command were supplied by France, and that arms in large quantities were furnished from the French arsenals on the frontier, but I disbelieve these stories—I am convinced that they are without foundation—I am equally convinced, however, that if the French Government had wished well to General Espartero, he would at this moment be Regent of Spain—if the French Government had announced their good-will towards him to the conspirators at Paris—if they had applied in his favour those principles upon which they united in Switzerland against Louis Buonaparte, and declared that all those Spaniards who were receiving hospitality in France should not be permitted to abuse it by conspiring against their own Government and country—if they had called into action but the smallest portion of those enormous powers of police which, when occasion requires, can be so rigorously exercised, rely upon it no revolution would have taken place in Spain. Unfortunately none of this occurred, and the result, if I am not mistaken, is rather embarrassing; the success has been too great; it has far outstripped the expectations or the intentions of those who merely desired the downfall of the Regent, but wished to reflect upon the consequences it might entail; they have seen with alarm the army officered and recruited by the adherents of Don Carlos; the Cortes prorogued without any cause being assigned, the most unpopular laws inflicted upon the country by ordinances, and the constitution as completely set at nought as if it was not the foundation and the strength of the Queen's cause. I say these things must be seen at Paris with alarm; because they cannot last beyond the fleeting popularity of the soldier at whose bidding they have been brought about; reaction must come, and with it worse confusion and greater anarchy, and shocks against which the Spanish throne must not be expected to stand. In the midst of all this disorder, however, brought about in the manner I have attempted to describe, the world is informed from the mouth of the King of the French, that a cordial understanding exists between France and England with respect to Spain, not as to general policy, but specially with respect to Spain. This announcement, however satisfactory it might have been, however much matter for rejoicing it might have afforded a
506
twelvemonth since, is at the present moment somewhat ominous. I fear it portends only, that the objects of the one Government havin gbeen more than fully accomplished, the sanction of the other Government has been required and its assistance called in for the purpose of preventing those objects from being hereafter defeated. When General Espartero was Regent—when Spain was tranquil—when there was a prospect of the Queen's ascending the throne at the age prescribed by law, and by the advice of a strong Government, and with the consent of a united Cortes, uninfluenced by foreign dictation, proceeding to select for her consort the prince best suited to the difficulties he would necessarily have to encounter, we heard nothing of this cordial understanding between the two Governments, which seems to have been reserved for times when every thing good has been marred, and every thing mischievous has been achieved. It is upon this point I would wish to ask for information from my noble Friend, if, consistently with his duty, he can afford it; namely, upon what basis this good understanding rests, and what course will henceforward be pursued with regard to Spain under this new and united policy. I heard with the sincerest satisfaction in Her Majesty's Speech, that this cordial understanding was not limited to Spain,—so in the speech of the king of the French,—and I trust my noble Friend may be able to inform their Lordships that its beneficial influence will be extended to all the various transactions in which the two countries are concerned. I am convinced that no intelligence would be more gratifying to the people of England, for they would justly regard it as the best guarantee for maintaining the peace of the world, and I believe it would not be less gratifying to the great majority of the enlightened people of France, notwithstanding the efforts of a portion of their press, and of some public men, to envenom the relations between the two countries for their own selfish purposes, and because they think they can better, and more safely exhibit their patriotism, by injurious attacks upon England, than by directing the reluctant attention of the public to matters of domestic, and therefore of less exciting interest. Whether my noble Friend will give me the information I seek or not, I must be permitted to say, that the understanding now come to between France and England is of the utmost importance, first, because

507
it may be the means of saving or destroying exist on the subject, that the individual is the institutions of Spain; and secondly, because it must involve, indeed, it probably relates chiefly to the Marriage of the Queen, and upon that I have no hesitation in affirming, depends the last remaining hope of prosperity for Spain; upon the selection of the Queen's husband depends the possibility of maintaining the internal peace, and establishing regular government. This brings me to the next question which I am desirous of putting to my noble Friend, it is respecting the right claimed by the French Government to place a Prince of the House of Bourbon upon the Spanish throne, and their determination to prevent by force, if necessary, any other than a member of that family being selected by the Spanish nation as the husband of their Queen; for the mission of the French Envoy, M. Pageot to announce this determination to Her Majesty's Government as well as to the courts of Austria and Prussia, is no more a secret than the declaration of M. Guizot to the same effect in the Chamber last year. Now if the French Government had restricted their claim to the exclusion of any individual who might be obnoxious or dangerous to France, neither Spain nor any other country would have had a right to object. A marriage, between the Queen of Spain, for instance, and the Due de Bordeaux or a member of the Buonaparte family, would have been so manifestly obnoxious that they would have been justified in preventing it; but the French Government go further; they have not only said the Queen shall not marry certain individuals, but have declared that out of one family alone—that family too, whose advent in Spain has been productive of small benefit to that unfortunate country—she shall be permitted to select a husband, but upon what right this extraordinary claim is founded or upon what pretence it is sought to defend this open denial to Spain of the character and attributes of an independent nation, I am wholly at a loss to imagine; for it seems to me that beyond that jurisdiction which the powerful may at all times exercise against the feeble, France has no more right to interfere in this matter, her own immediate interests being guarded, than in the marriage of any other sovereign of Europe. The general belief, however, is, that this claim, if not openly recognized, is at least no longer disputed by my noble Friend; indeed, so cordial an understanding is said to
508
exist on the subject that the individual is actually agreed upon between the two Governments, whom the Queen of Spain, whether she or the Cortes choose it or not, shall be compelled to accept, and that this individual is the Count Trapani, a brother of the King of Naples, a prince now but sixteen years old, brought up by the Jesuits at Rome, and destined for holy orders. But I must beg their Lordships to remember, that the court of Naples has never ceased to conspire against the cause of liberty in Spain in favour of Don Carlos, whose agents were publicly received at Naples. That the court of Naples was the only one in Europe which formally protested against the restoration by King Ferdinand of the ancient order of Succession, and that so great was the irritation of the King of Naples upon this subject, that in 1840, after the termination of the civil war, he absolutely refused to allow his own sister, Queen Maria Christina to cross his frontier when she was desirous of returning to Naples, and yet it is from a royal family, the most hostile to Spanish liberty, and the cause of the Queen, that the husband of that Queen is to be selected, at the age of sixteen, and fresh from a Jesuit college, is to be called to a position where all the advantages of a liberal education, and the utmost tact and prudence would hardly suffice for overcoming the difficulties by which he must be surrounded. Until I hear it from my noble Friend himself, I will not believe that we have come to a good understanding with France merely for the furtherance of such a design as this—a design, however, which still may, and I trust will be defeated by the Spanish people, by their proper sense of their own dignity, independence, and interests; but should this not be so, should their representatives be so far unmindful of their duty, and so far influenced by fear, or by motives even yet more unworthy, as to make a choice for the consort of their Queen, which will revive all that kingly and priestly despotism by which Spain has for centuries been enslaved, I do at least hope it will be impossible for them hereafter to plead the advice or concurrence of England in a step which must destroy the small remnant of hope still left to their suffering country. If my noble Friend admits, as I am sure he readily will, that we are interested in the wellbeing, and good government of Spain, in the developement of her resources, and above all, in her Independence; then I

509
trust he will declare, that he has been no party to a project which will prove an effectual barrier to them all. The questions which I would wish to ask my noble Friend are, whether any new line of policy has, in conjunction with France, been adopted by Her Majesty's Government with reference to Spain, and if so, in what manner it will be brought to bear upon the present state of things in that country; and secondly, whether Her Majesty's Government has recognised the right claimed by France, to insist that the choice of a husband for the Queen shall be restricted to the Princes of the House of Bourbon, and whether, in consequence of such recognition Her Majesty's Government has agreed to recommend that this choice should fall on Count Trapani, a brother of the King of Naples.
The Earl of Aberdeensaid, My noble Friend has introduced his question with observations on the state of Spain, and of our relations with that country, in a manner which would better have justified a motion rather than the question with which he concluded, because it imposes upon me the necessity of making more general observations than may be altogether convenient to the House, or useful to the country in which the noble Earl professes so great an interest. I rejoice that my noble Friend has expressed his satisfaction at the establishment of a good understanding between France and this country, and that even those who have war in their hearts—and there may be such in this country—are still obliged to confess that they concur in that satisfaction. My noble Friend has entered at considerable length into the events which have taken place in Spain in the attempts to establish a constitutional system of government in that country, and he has described the various impediments which have occurred to the success of that establishment. No one knows better than the noble Earl the history of Spanish affairs; and if he cannot, I do not think that any one, looking back to the various revolutions, and revolts, and changes, which have taken place during the last ten years, since the death of Ferdinand, can give any intelligible or consistent account of the motives of any one of them. I know that when these events take place great credit is given to foreign influence. This is plotted in Spain—the other is contrived in London. The noble Lord knows that if the overthrow of the Regent was contrived in Paris; his elevation was said to be con-
510
trived in London. The existence of Espartero and of his government was as much maintained to be the effect of English interference as the downfall, according to the noble Earl, was the effect of French intrigue and of the French government. I believe both the one and the other statement to be equally true—or rather to have no truth. I am satisfied that the English Government had nothing to do with the elevation of Espartero any more than the French government had with his overthrow. It is truly preposterous to imagine that this was so effected. I do not say that it was a most senseless and objectless revolution, but to say that it was not national, is to maintain what is contrary to the common observation of mankind. In the course of six weeks there was not a single village in Spain which did not rise in opposition to the Regent. From one part of the country to the other, including his own army, the most devoted of his followers, all were united in their desire to overthrow him, and to expel him from the government. If this were produced by a few thousand francs and a few French intriguers, it was ridiculous to suppose that all this could have been done, although I know that in Spain they are believed to be a numerous party. If it had not been general, it would have been senseless to resist the Regent: but if it were not a national revolution, let me ask how it was, when he had escaped from the troops that pursued him, and found himself safe in Cadiz, with maritime means at his disposal, Spain having thirty or forty strong places along the coast, that not to one could he go, but was obliged to embark and set sail in an English ship? He is a gallant and a brave man; if every party in the country had not abandoned him, so long as he had any hope he would have remained; but he found, whether rightly or wrongly, that the country had decided against him, and he therefore abandoned all his prospects. It is utterly impossible that this could have been effected in the manner which has been suggested. My noble Friend was himself believed by a large party in Spain, to be the author of the revolution of La Granja; and no doubt he will go down in the history of Spain as its author. I have, my Lords, long been of opinion, that we have meddled a great deal too much in the affairs of Spain. The mischief may have been little which my noble Friend did in that affair, but we have been too meddling in the course of affairs in that country. If any-

511
thing, we may have too much influence in Spain. I attribute the downfall of Espartero to the supposition, perfectly unfounded, but still believed, that he was elevated under English influence. If there is anything more strongly marked in the determination of the people of Spain, it is their spirit of resistance to foreign influence; and, though they may for a time submit, there is no doubt that they will rise against it, and resist it, and that it will ultimately be completely destroyed. My noble Friend has adverted to the cordial understanding which exists, with respect to Spain, between the English and the French Governments, referred to in the Speech of the King of the French. I can assure him that the cordial understanding has no particular reference to Spain, although in the Speech of the King of the French, Greece and Spain were mentioned as two countries with respect to which the greatest anxiety prevailed, and on which a good understanding was most immediately desirable. This good understanding was not founded upon any specific agreement or alliance, but upon a belief that the essential interests of the two countries are involved, and it depends upon mutual trust in the honour and integrity of the two Governments of England and France. I can have no difficulty in explaining to the noble Earl the basis of that understanding: it rests upon a desire to maintain Spanish independence—upon an anxiety to support the establishments and constitutional system in Spain—upon a wish, by all proper means to check every species of violence and reaction, and to develope the great national resources of that country, and to extend her prosperity and secure her happiness. Those are the objects of our good understanding with France; I know no other, and, what is more, I believe that no other exists. My noble Friend has also alluded to a subject which I think is scarcely fit for parliamentary discussion; I mean the marriage of the Queen of Spain. Upon that question also I can have no difficulty in repeating a declaration I have often made before—it is completely and exclusively a Spanish question and a Spanish interest. No doubt it may happen that the Spanish marriage is such as to engage the attention of the other powers of Europe; indeed, it cannot well take place without being a subject of some solicitude to other states; but it is a matter for the Spanish government and Spanish people to decide. And I can assure the noble Earl that this
512
country has entered into no engagement, and has come to no understanding of any description which can interfere with the complete independence of the Spanish government and nation upon the subject. I may entertain an opinion of preference for one prince over another, but I give no opinion respecting the illustrious prince adverted to by my noble Friend. I am not to choose who is a fit husband for the Queen of Spain; but I leave that to the proper authorities in the Spanish nation. Whether the Spanish authorities will prefer a prince of the House of Bourbon or not is entirely for them and not for me to consider. I believe I have now answered both the questions of the noble Earl.
The Earl of Clarendon: Does the French government mean to exclude any prince from the throne of Spain, but one of the House of Bourbon?
The Earl of Aberdeen: I have no reason to think that any recommendation of the kind has been given. The French government may propose whom it thinks proper, but I am no party to anything in the shape of exclusion. It is very likely that the French government may think that the Spanish nation would do well to select a prince of the House of Bourbon. I may be of that opinion too; and a great deal may be said upon the subject. I believe that if the Spanish nation were to vote upon the question, such might be their choice; but I do not enter into a matter which is to be left to the fair choice of the Spanish government. I think that my noble Friend was wrong in what he said of the mission of M. Pageot last year; but it is not for me to enter into that subject: it is not before the House, and it has no practical bearing upon the question which is before it. My persuasion however is, that the noble Earl is mistaken upon the subject of that mission. I think I have now answered my noble Friend's questions, and I hope to his satisfaction, though I do not agree with his description of recent events, or of the nature of those events, yet I entirely concur with him that our greatest endeavour ought to be by every means in our power to secure the independence and the prosperity of Spain. I give him full credit for an absence of all party and personal feeling. I do full justice to the motives by which he is actuated, knowing, as I do, the great interest he has always taken in the affairs of Spain.
The Earl of Clarendon: I am bound in justice to say, that I think the answers of

513
the noble Earl entirely satisfactory; and I may be allowed to express my gratification at having been the means of obtaining them. I have heard him before state the principles he has this night avowed, and I rejoice to find that he still entertains them, and is determined to uphold the independence of Spain. It is most important that we should induce that country to do what she can to develope her own resources. I rejoice to learn that there is a mutual good understanding between the Governments of England and France upon these subjects, and above all, that they intend to maintain the constitutional and representative system in Spain. That was most satisfactory. As to the part taken by the French government, I will not enter into that question now. I am ready to admit my noble Friend's version of it, and will not, on the present occasion, adduce the proofs which at the present time I think I could do, as well as give reasons for my belief in the accuracy of what I have advanced. I will not allude to it farther than to say one word on what fell from him regarding the part he has supposed I took in that detestable revolution of La Granja. He intimates, that in fact I participated in it myself; but, if I ant to be handed down, as he says, in Spanish history as a conspirator in that affair, I can only observe, that, like many other statements in the Spanish chronicles, it will be utterly without foundation. I heartily agree with him in what he remarked as to our meddling too much with the affairs of other countries, and I am glad to hear that my noble Friend means to avoid it in future.
Lord Howdenstated, that having been a good deal in France and Spain, he was able to assert that what his noble Friend had mentioned about proofs, which he did not think fit to bring forward, might be attended with injurious consequences. It was one of the worst things that could have been said in reference to the alliance which all must be anxious to preserve. The effect of what had fallen from his noble Friend might not be overcome in two or three years, and might materially counteract what had been so well stated by the noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Department.
House adjourned.