The Earl of Mintosaid, that in rising, in pursuance of the notice which he had given a few nights ago, he wished to assure their Lordships that it was with great reluctance he was induced to bring before the House and the public the state of the Navy at the present moment. If he had been less unfortunate in obtaining the information which he had sought from his noble Friend opposite on a former occasion, or if he had heard anything from any noble Lord on the other side of the House to induce him to think that Her Majesty's Government were about to increase the Naval Force of the country, he should certainly not have thought of troubling their Lordships on the subject at present. He was quite aware of the objections and the inconvenience of dealing with such a subject under the existing circumstances of the country; he was aware of the state of feverish feeling that prevailed on the other side of the water, and he well knew how desirable it was that nothing should occur in this country that would be calculated to increase that excitement, for no man valued more than he did the maintenance of peace, or attached more importance to the continuance of the best understanding with France—he held that to be one of the most important objects the Government of this country could keep in view, and as no man, he would venture to say, had laboured with more assiduity to maintain that good understanding, and few had contributed more to extend it, so their Lordships might be assured that nothing should drop from him—at least intentionally—which could in any way be calculated to give just umbrage or offence to any of the members of the French Government, or to any individual of the French people. But all the good understanding which we would cultivate must, be on terms of perfect equality, and not be based upon anything like submission, or sacrifice of the interest or the honour of this country. In calling the attention of their Lordships to the state of the Navy of this country at the present moment, he wished to say that he, for one, was no advocate for very large naval establishments during the time of peace; but when he stated that, he was sure their Lordships would go with him in thinking that there was a limit even to the 1726 most penurious economy, and that there were bounds to the confidence with which we might venture to calculate upon the continuance of peace, or upon the forbearance of foreign countries from hostilities, considering how entirely the safety and the interests of the country depended upon the protection afforded by our Navy, he hardly expected to hear any of their Lordships maintain that there could be any time of such profound peace, or at which the country could be so secure, as to render it advisable to reduce the Navy to the very low state to which it had now been brought. Confidence in the duration of peace had sometimes been disappointed, even when the circumstances of the country were such that there was no reason to anticipate any interruption of our friendly relations. Their Lordshipe would all recollect a celebrated speech of Mr. Pitt in 1792, in which he stated—and his opinion went very far to carry out the measure then in contemplation—that there was a sure prospect of the duration of peace under the then circumstances of the country:—he said it was, of course, impossible to speak with absolute certainty in such cases, but that as far as it was possible for human foresight to anticipate, he thought we might count with perfect confidence upon a long and uninterrupted peace. This was in 1792, not twelve months before the breaking out of the longest and bloodiest war in which this country had ever been engaged. At the end of 1791—in the same feeling of security, and in the belief of the impossibility of any interruption of peace—it was thought proper to reduce the Navy, not, indeed, to the extent to which it had now been reduced, but to dismantle some ships and to reduce the armament that had been prepared in the early part of 1791. These, and many other instances, might be brought forward, at least as arguments for the maintenance of the Navy in such a state as would enable us to rely upon it in the event of any unforeseen interruption of peace—even in circumstances comparatively favourable; but he would ask whether the circumstances of the times now were entirely such as to leave no ground whatever for apprehension and anxiety? He had hitherto been speaking of what would be right at a time of profound and secure peace; but he asked their Lordships to cast their eyes around, and say whether there were not circumstances occurring in various parts of the world to cause a sentiment of anxiety and uneasiness as to the interruption of peace? 1727 He did not wish to allude more particularly to circumstances to which it was impossible to refer without some degree of anxiety, but he merely said that there were questions raised which justified such a feeling. He would remind their Lordships that there were questions now pending between us and the United States of America, on which strong national feelings existed; there was also in France, on the part of a considerable portion of the people, a feeling of no amicable character towards this country, and there were questions pending between us and that country, which might materially affect the interests of both nations. Upon the events which were now taking place on the coast of Africa he did not wish to dwell: but it was impossible to look at them without at least some slight degree of apprehension:—he trusted there was no reason to fear any interruption of the existing peace: his own opinion was that it would not be interrupted; but still he said, that the state of affairs was not such in which they ought to be left, or such as would justify the Government in leaving the country entirely without defence. If anything were wanting to confirm this view, it was to be found in the present state of things in France, independently of the state of feelings of the Government or of the people. He therefore thought that without entering more particularly into details, he had said enough to show that the aspect of affairs in all parts of the world was such as to require at least some degree of preparation on the part of this country. But if he looked with some degree of uneasiness upon the state of affairs abroad, he owned his alarm was greatly increased by the tone that was adopted and the language that was made use of by Her Majesty's Government; because, whenever this subject had been mentioned, he was unable to collect from any quarter that there was the slightest intention of increasing the forces or improving the resources of the country, or placing the Navy in such a state as would enable us to contend with honour in any contest we might be brought into if a contest should unhappily become unavoidable. He was sure there was no one of their Lordships who would not agree with him, that the degree of respect, and esteem, and friendship which we could hope to obtain from other countries, must depend, more or less, upon the strength and preparation which we could exhibit. No man could suppose that a great and powerful state, fully prepared, would be liable to the same 1728 accidents or the same treatment to which a weaker country might be subject. This country ought to possess such a fleet, and in such a state of preparation as would avert many of the dangers to which we might be exposed if we were not prepared. He should now state shortly to their Lordships the present amount of our Naval Force, which he certainly thought totally inadequate to the wants of the country, even in a state of profound peace, but still more so under the circumstances to which he had alluded. The whole Navy of England at the present moment, in line-of-battle ships, consisted of nine ships-of-the-line. Of these nine ships-of-the-line, two were on a very distant station — the East Indies; one, was also on a very distant station—the West Indies; one, as he understood, was under orders to sail for another distant station—the Pacific. He had heard a short time ago that there were at home three ships of the line, one at each of the home ports, and that one, also a flag-ship, was the ship of the Rear Admiral commanding at Cork; and the ninth ship was the Mediterranean fleet, for that fleet consisted of one sail of the line. He asked their Lordships whether, under any circumstances, that was a fit state of things? Could they conceive any state of things such as to make it tolerable that the Mediterranean fleet should be reduced to one ship of the line, and the power of reinforcing it also to one ship, unless we called upon the guard ships, and left ourselves destitute of defence for the coasts of the country? He did feel strongly that this was a condition he thought the Navy of England ought never to be reduced to, and that it was a state of insecurity in which this country ought never to have been placed. In consequence of the misunderstanding which had occurred between France and Morocco, and the deep interest which we had on the shores of the latter country, he understood that a reinforcement had been sent to the Mediterranean fleet, consisting of two sail of the line—the one a 90-gun ship, and the other a first-rate; the one being the flag-ship which had been stationed at Cork, and was a disposable ship, and the other the flag-ship from Devonport. These two ships which had been sent out to the Mediterranean, with some inconsiderable frigates, in addition to the one already there, amounted to the great number of three ships-of-the-line. But we were left to supply any further demands that might 1729 arise in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, or for service upon our own coast—we were left with only two ships-of-the-line on the shore of England. He did complain of this state of things, and the more particularly as it was totally unnecessary: only the other day the Queen arrived from the Mediterranean, not having completed her full time service, with her present officers and men: she arrived when all these events were known, almost at the time of dispatching the reinforcements, and she was paid off without the slightest reason, or at least, what was equivalent, she was substituted for another ship, which was paid off, and made to replace the guard-ship at the Nore: what ground there was for such a proceeding he could not imagine, it seemed to have been done without the slightest reason, and he could look upon it as nothing more than a wanton sacrifice of the security and honour of the country. He did not wish to refer to the force on foot at the time when his noble Friend succeeded to the Admiralty, except because he wished to show that there was a force on foot sufficient to admit of a large reduction, with a view to a proper and just economy, and yet to leave a powerful and sufficient fleet in commission. There were at that time in commission twenty-six sail-of-the-line, of which seventeen were in the Mediterranean. There would, therefore, have been no difficulty in maintaining a sufficient force, and their Lordships would recollect that it was much more easy to keep up a fleet when formed, than to raise one suddenly when it was required. He was unwilling to allude to former discussions in that House when he sat on the Benches opposite, and he should only do so as far as it was necessary to enforce his own argument, that the present force was absolutely insufficient, and had been considered so by the best authorities, and by the most eminent Members of the present Government. It would be in the recollection of their Lordships that great complaints were made of the want of a sufficient Naval Force in 1838 and 1839. On that occasion, his defence was, not that a Naval Force was unnecessary, not that he was indifferent to the amount of Naval Force belonging to other nations; but his answer was, "I will show you that you have a large force—as large a force as you can desire." He accordingly showed that there were then in commission no less than eighteen ships-of-the-line (double the number at present in commission), at a time of profound peace, and when there was 1730 not the slightest apprehension of its disturbance. [The Earl of Haddington: That was in 1840.] In 1838. It was not his business to defend himself at present, or to show that the Naval Establishment which he maintained was sufficient or not; but he alluded to these matters in order to invoke the authority of noble Lords on the opposite side that the present Naval Force was much too low. When he was told that the number of ships at sea in 1838 was not sufficient, he showed that there were eighteen sail-of-the-line, whereas there were now but nine, and that every description of force was much larger than at present. Another noble Friend of his, whose opinion on those matters was entitled to the greatest weight, either in that or the following year, 1839, complained that, although the existing force might be sufficient for service abroad, still it was not sufficient, as to a reserve of ships, for the defence of the country, or for any emrgency which might arise. He alluded to Lord Melville. But he had at that time six sail-of-the-line in the home ports, and two at Lisbon, which was in the home command, so that he had eight ships-of-the-line disposable for any service. Bearing in mind that these complaints had been made not by persons who would act upon any factious motives, but by such authorities as the one to which he had alluded, and the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Wellington), who had never given utterance to a factious opinion in that House—recollecting that such authorities had pronounced the force he had mentioned inadequate to the ordinary service of the country, he desired their Lordships to compare that with the force now existing, and to say whether it was not right and reasonable that when, instead of eighteen ships-of-the-line, as in 1838, there were now only nine, he should express his great regret and apprehension at such a deplorable reduction of the Naval Force of the country. He had heard that it had been stated in another place, that although our fleet was extremely weak at present—although there were no ships in commission, yet there were many in a state of readiness, and which could be speedily sent to sea, if any demand should arise for their services. Now, he knew something of these matters, let it not be supposed that he at all countenanced the opinion which prevailed some where, there was any reluctance on the part of seamen of this country to enter into the service of the Royal Navy. It was not so. They would always run with 1731 eagerness to that service in preference to any other, and it was natural that they should do so; because there was no other service in which their condition was so good. But you could not make two men out of one. If we wanted a number of men to fit out a fleet, he asked whether it would be possible, even resorting to the assistance of the press-gang, to procure them in sufficient time. If we required 10,000 or 15,000 men fit out a large force, and were able to procure them at a moment's notice, it must follow that they must be walking about the streets out of employment. To increase the Navy to any considerable amount—if we wished to recruit good men and seamen — must be an operation of considerable time, and to effect it they must wait for the arrival of ships from abroad; although, as he admitted, to a certain degree, men would run to the service. It had been said there, he believed, or in another place, that war could not come upon us by surprise—that we should have time to prepare for it. On one side that might be so, one party might have notice and time to prepare; but, he said, of all the nations in the world we ought to be the last to rely upon such preliminary notice, because if we asked Denmark or Spain, they would tell us that war had proceeded unexpectedly from this country, and therefore if any country should unfortunately have a hostile feeling towards us, they might adopt a similar mode of procedure. There was only one point more, connected with this part of the question, to which he wished to allude. It might be said, "Oh, its all very well; you had a great many ships, but they were wretchedly manned, and good for nothing." If he was told in answer to this Motion that the ships detatched for the service of the country at the time to which he had referred were not adequately manned, or did not perform the service creditably, he should have no difficulty in satisfying their Lordships that that charge was unfounded; and convincing them, by higher authorities than any that could be produced on the other side, that they were adequately manned for any service; but unless that was stated in answer to his complaint of the present deplorable state of the navy, he should not, as he was anxious to save their Lordships' time, enter into the particulars of that part of the case. He should now go to the second part of the Motion of which he had given notice. That was only a consequence of the low state of our Navy, and he feared the low tone of the language 1732 used by the Government—he alluded to the transactions which had taken place at Tahiti. His noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs admitted that a gross outrage had been committed on the person of the British Consul, but he had endeavoured to draw a distinction which he wished he had not attempted—his noble Friend endeavoured to draw a distinction between Mr. Pritchard, as Consul, when his flag was flying, and Mr. Pritchard when his flag was hauled down. This might have been mentioned as a kind suggestion to M. Guizot, as a ground for him to take when discussing the matter; but he (Lord Minto) must protest against Mr. Pritchard being viewed in any other light than as British Consul down to the day he left the island. It was true the Sovereign to whom Mr. Pritchard was accredited was deposed, and, therefore, there was nobody to whom his credentials were available; but that Government had been deposed by an usurpation not recognised by the Government of France, and certainly not by us—a mere usurpation by the captain of a French ship, who, acting on his own authority, deposed the Queen and seized the country in the name of France. Under these circumstances Mr. Pritchard must necessarily have ceased to exercise his functions; but as far as he could acquire a character from his pretensions or his employment by the Government of this country, he maintained that the distinction relied upon by his noble Friend was not entitled to the slightest weight, because there was no man in England who must not feel that the deposition of Queen Pomare, although it suspended Mr. Pritchard's functions, did not deprive him of his character of a British functionary, any more than it took away his character of a British subject. He wished now to call their Lordships' attention to some dates connected with these transactions. He would not enter into details, but it appeared that the invasion by the French Admiral, and the establishment of the French protectorate, took place in the month of September, 1842. In March, 1843, Captain Toup Nicolas, in the Vindictive, returning from service in China, arrived with Mr. Pritchard on board at Tahiti, and restored Queen Pomare to authority. In the same month March, 1843, his noble Friend was in communication with M. Guizot, acquiescing most courteously in all the arrangements of the French Government, and in the occupation or protection of Tahiti, and receiving from M. Guizot in return, as- 1733 surances of consideration and courtesy, both for British residents in the island and for the Queen, so far as was consistent with the degree of authority which it was considered necessary to maintain. In consesequence of the view taken of the matter at home, orders appeared to have been sent out to the Admiral in the Pacific, desiring him to refrain from further interruption of the proceedings of the French, and to do no more than was necessary for the protection of British interests. Those directions must have been sent out nearly at that time, from the time when they arrived, and from the change of measures that was observable. But when there was time for our Government to order the withdrawal of the Vindictive, one of the finest ships in the service, and one fully capable of protecting our interests, there surely was time for the French Government to instruct its officers to confine themselves within those limits usually observed between two nations of peace, and to observe that courtesy which might be mutually expected. In March, 1844, a new act of violence was committed by the French. Now, he could not explain—giving, as he did, full credit to M. Guizot for his intention to avoid everything like discourtesy towards us — why, when we found time to give orders for the disposal of our vessels within six months, he should suffer a whole year to elapse without sending out any instructions sufficient to restrain the outrageous proceedings which had unhappily occurred, and which the French Government found so much difficulty in defending. He asked again, if the knowledge of such attacks having been made, the restoration of Queen Pomare, and her subsequent deposition, was not sufficient to suggest the expediency of sending out some protective force to that quarter or to have retained the Vindictive at Tahiti instead of withdrawing her, and not to trust our honour and interest to the chance visit of some small frigate, in which at last the Queen was actually forced to take refuge. He felt confident, that if a force sufficient to ensure respect had been maintained there, the transaction to which he had alluded would never have occurred. As he said before, he was perfectly satisfied that the French Government, and the French King especially, desired to maintain the best understanding with this country: but there was one thing wanting to his sense of security—he was not satisfied as to the durability of the existing French Government, he could not at all events, 1734 have such confidence in its durability as to prevent his taking, if he had the power, those precautionary steps which any Government in our position was bound to take. That the present Government of France would be durable he sincerely hoped; but not a week passed that did not furnish some grounds of anxiety on that point. He owned, too, he had not confidence in the resolution of any French Government to persevere in its own views, when it found itself opposed to the clamour of French faction. In making these observations he trusted he was saying nothing offensive to the French Government. He would now allude to the French force in the Mediterranean. They had a fleet on foot of eight sail-of-the-line, and they had four more in a state of forward equipment; so that they might soon have twelve sail of the line at sea; while, instead of the British Navy being in the condition in which it was when the late Government quitted office, the present Government have left our own shores completely defenceless, so that there was nothing to prevent the French from sweeping the Mediterranean — sweeping the Channel, and cutting off all our trade to the West Indies. God forbid he should talk of such a state of things as probable, but he talked of it as possible, at a time when the state of affairs abroad forbade us to live in blind security. Seeing, as he had done, our Navy dwindle from day to day, until it almost disappeared, he felt it his duty to call the attention of their Lordships and the public to its state, in the hope that even now his noble Friend opposite would take some steps for restoring it to that state of efficiency from which it should never have been displaced. Even at this moment he could not look at a newspaper without seeing that the progress was rapid towards reduction. It was only the other day that he saw that the Vindictive, one of the most powerful frigates, and as strong as a line-of-battle-ship, just arrived from the Pacific, was ordered to be paid off, instead of being employed, at a time when undoubtedly this country ought to have a powerful force on the coast of Africa. It must be months before a ship could be equipped to replace her. He saw another also announced to be paid off. It did appear to him as if his noble Friend was infatuated on this point, and that the very thought of ships being in service was embarrassing to his mind. He trusted that he should hear something from noble Lords opposite to satisfy the public that the Navy 1735 should no longer be left in its present inefficient state. The noble Earl then moved for—
A Return of Her Majesty's Ships of War (other than those reserved for Harbour Duty), in Commission, on the 31st of July, 1844; And also, a Return of Her Majesty's Ships of War present at Tahiti, from the 1st of September 1842 to the latest Period to which Advices have been received; specifying the Date of the Arrival there and Departure from thence of each ship.
The Earl of Haddingtonsaid, that the noble Earl who had just spoken, had at the commencement of his speech taken care to impress on their Lordships the deep sense he entertained of the responsibility of bringing forward questions of a nature like the present at an inconvenient moment. The noble Earl admitted that he was aware of the inconvenience of discussing this matter at the present moment; and yet, with remarkably inconsistency, he proceeded to remark on what he called the deplorably weak state of the naval defence of this country. He (the Earl of Haddington) was also fully aware of the inconvenience at the present time of discussions of a nature like that raised by the noble Earl; and he should therefore feel it to be his duty to abstain from any observations that might add to that inconvenience, and he should therefore only ouch on such parts of the noble Earl's speech, as might be necessary for his own defence and that of the Government. The noble Earl said, that he was not friendly to large naval establishments in times of peace; but that the making such reductions as might be necessary was different from a truckless submission. He (the Earl of Haddington), not being conscious of any truckling submission, was anxious to know to what the noble Earl alluded; but the noble Earl did not proceed to particularize or give any proof of his charge, but merely said that nothing could justify the reduction of the Navy to its present amount. He (the Earl of Haddington) had a return of the number of ships in commission for the three years ending on the 1st of July, 1839, 1840, and 1844, and the result was, that, though undoubtedly the number of ships in commission in 1840 was larger by three than the number in 1844, yet the number in commission on the 1st of July, 1844, was larger by three than the number in July, 1839. He was aware that the number of line-of-battle ships in those periods bore no comparison. On the 1st 1736 of July, 1844, the number of line-of-battle ships in commission was ten, and the Malabar being paid off, there were now only nine; but at the period to which the noble Earl had alluded as being the time when we had a great fleet in the Mediterranean, a state of hostilities was existing; Acre was being bombarded, and there were sixteen or nineteen line-of-battle ships in the Mediterranean for the purpose of carrying on hostilities. But that state of things had passed away, and a state of profound peace had succeeded, therefore, to keep up now anything approaching to the amount of line-of-battle ships which were maintained at the time to which the noble Earl alluded, would have been an extravagance which no Government would have been justified in indulging in. The noble Earl said, that in 1838 there were eighteen line-of-battle ships in commission; but the document which he (the Earl of Haddington) had shown what the number was in 1839, but not in 1838. Of these eighteen, three were guard-ships, which were then manned as fifth-rates; and this reduced the eighteen to fifteen. And how were they manned? Why they formed that undermanned class of line-of-battle ships in which the noble Earl appeared to delight. That the line-of-battle ships in the Mediterranean were greatly undermanned, appeared from the statement of an eminent and gallant naval Officer in the other House. A statement had been made elsewhere, which he regretted, because he did not like the possibility of such an event being hinted at; but, nevertheless, the House of Commons had been informed by Sir C. Napier, that had we then gone to war with France, he did not hesitate to say that France would have beaten us, because of the undermanning of our fleet. That then was the state of the eighteen line-of-battle ships. Whatever might be said of the number now, they were at least well manned. In looking at the Navy Estimates for 1838, he found the number of seamen and marines voted for the service of the years 1837–38, was 22,700, besides a supplementary vote of 465 men, making a total of about 23,000. Now, when out of these his noble Friend had manned his eighteen line-of-battle ships, he could not conceive how he could have manned the remaining ships in the other parts of the world. The number of seamen and marines for the present year was 36,000. This, give him leave to say, was a large peace establishment. The Government had thought 1737 it their duty, especially after all the financial difficulties, to have no greater Naval Force afloat than was necessary for the safety of the country, and for the feeding of the foreign stations with the necessary means of defence; and the wants of those stations were, to his certain knowledge, anxiously looked to. The cessation of the Chinese war had enabled the Government to withdraw a number of vessels from China; but many of the ships sent there had not yet come home; and the necessity of sending reliefs to the foreign stations, and the double expense of bringing some ships home and sending others out, had crippled the means of supplying ships of-the-line which we might otherwise have. When the noble Earl spoke of only nine sail-of-the-line being kept up by the present Government, he seemed to wish it to be inferred that that was the maximum; amount of Navy intended to be maintained in this country in time of peace. Such was by no means the case: it was, however, the number justified by the present state of our affairs. He certainly agreed in a great deal that had fallen from the noble Earl on the subject of the line-of-battle ships, and taking a general view of the matter, he thought that there always ought to be a proportionate number of line-of-battle ships disposable; but he protested against the noble Lord holding out the idea that it was the opinion of this Government that the navy should never be more than nine sail-of-the-line in the time of peace. This was a most unfair inference to draw. The noble Earl repeated the complaint he had made the other night, that there was but one line-of-battle ship in the Mediterranean. To this he would repeat the answer he had made that night, that when they were at peace with France (he was speaking now of the time when the Estimates were framed), and when there was a probability of the continuance of that peace; it was by no means necessary in apportioning their own force for the Mediterranean, that they should consider what amount of naval force France thought it necessary to maintain there; and, as respected the French force, it must be borne in mind, that Toulon, one of their principal ports, was in the Mediterranean; and that their possession of Algiers rendered it necessary that they should keep up a sufficient fleet to maintain their possession there; and moreover it was natural to suppose, that the French might occasionally choose to exercise their fleet in the 1738 Mediterranean, and we had no right to quarrel with them for doing so. The question was, had the British Government failed to protect British interests? and he was not aware that they had left British interests unprotected. He complained of the noble Earl coming down to that House with an inconvenient speech—inconvenient not to him (the Earl of Haddington), but inconvenient as respected the foreign relations of the country, and without having made out the slightest Parliamentary case. Regarding the noble Earl's Motion, coupled with his speech, as a condemnation of the conduct of the Government, he proposed that their Lordships should meet it with a negative. The noble Earl had next endeavoured to show, but had not succeeded, that the safety of this country was hazarded by not having a larger number of line-of-battle ships afloat. The noble Earl had not succeeded in proving this, or in showing the probability or possibility of a war occurring—say with France, for instance—without "coming events casting their shadows before." Surely the noble Earl could not intend to say, that we should always maintain such a Naval Force afloat as would enable us to carry on a war at once. The two or three additional ships insisted on by the noble Earl, would not enable us to meet such a case. He could tell their Lordships, that if there should arise any probable prospect of such an event, this country was amply supplied with overwhelming means of meeting such a necessity, in a very short space of time. Then, if that were so, the Government were not paltering with the safety of the country. We betide them if they ever did! The noble Earl had made out no case; and, considering his Motion as a call upon their Lordships to join in a condemnation of the Government with respect to the state of our Naval Force, he must resist the Motion. He repeated that we were prepared with overwhelming means for meeting any crisis that might arise. We had thirty what were called advanced ships in ordinary, with all their stores and rigging and fixtures ready; and if there were men for those thirty ships, they could be at sea in an incredibly short space of tune. Nothing had to be done but to put the stores and rigging in the ships, and to man and commission them, and they could be at once away at sea. He knew well that ships of the line were not to be manned in a day; but in the event of any necessity arising, it was not to be supposed but that there 1739 would be sufficient intimation beforehand, to enable the country to man as many ships as should be wanted. In respect to the steam power of the country, our preparations had been very great indeed. The Government had not neglected to avail themselves of that new element of defence and of destruction. They were going on not only building new steamers, but also producing the means by which, when necessity arose, we could build more; great progress had been made in the steam factory at Portsmouth, and money had been voted to do the same thing at Plymouth. These, together with the dockyard at Woolwich, added most materially to the means of the country, as far as this branch of the defensive service was concerned. He repeated, that although he did not deny that the number of our line-of-battle ships was quite as few as it was fit that we should have, yet he trusted he had made out a case to show that their Lordships need not tremble for the safety of the country, if such a crisis as had been anticipated should arise. As the noble Earl had said nothing as to any other ships but line-of-battle ships, he (the Earl of Haddington) would spare their Lordships any observations on any others. But the noble Earl had proceeded to comment upon the events that had occurred at Tahiti. He had said truly, that in September 1842, the French had established what was called a Protectorate in those islands; and the noble Earl's object in bringing at that moment the question of Tahiti—the somewhat delicate question of Tahiti—under discussion, was to show that the Government, and especially the department with which he (the Earl of Haddington) was concerned, were to blame for not having had a sufficient force there to prevent the French from so establishing the Protectorate. [The Earl of Minto: I never said that.] Then, what were they to have done? [The Earl of Minto made an observation which was inaudible.] But they had not consulted our Consul, when they established the Protectorate. That was a thing which burst on the world by surprise. There had been nothing to call the attention of this country to Tahiti, before the French went there and established the Protectorate, more than to any other part of the Pacific. He must remind their Lordships, that the distances were enormous in that part of the world—that the Pacific Ocean covered nearly one-half of the globe. The Talbot frigate went to Tahiti, and stayed there till February, 1843. The Vindictive 1740 arrived on the 25th of February, with Mr. Pritchard on board. He had come from Van Diemen's Land, and was going on to Valparaiso, but Captain Nicolas, understanding from Mr. Pritchard what had occurred at Tahiti, he very properly took him on board, and took him there. The Vindictive was there from February to August. The Admiral relieved the Vindictive on the 6th of August; and the Dublin, a ship of fifty guns, arrived at Tahiti on the 3rd of September, and remained there till January, 1844. The fact was, speaking generally, that Tahiti had never been without a British force adequate to the protection of British interests. The noble Earl said, that had the Vindictive been there, these events would not have happened. But the Dublin was there when the French took possession of the sovereignty. Under the eyes of the captain of the Dublin, Dupetit Thouars did that which was disavowed by his Sovereign, and for doing which he was recalled. And he begged to remind the noble Earl, that when the servants of a Sovereign did that which was disapproved of by the Sovereign, that Sovereign was the person to visit punishment upon them, and not the servants of another power, whose interference might have embarked the civilised world in a war, the end of which it would be in vain to calculate. He apprehended that nothing could be more proper than the conduct of Captain Tucker, who commanded the Dublin. He acted with great prudence. He did not interfere at all, except by protesting against the steps that were taken. He did nothing by which he could run the risk of involving his country in war; and if the noble Earl meant to say, that the captain of the other vessel, had he been there, would have adopted a different course, and by hostilities have prevented the circumstances which occurred — [The Earl of Minto: I did not say by hostilities.] How then could he have prevented them? [The Earl of Minto said, he would have prevented the outrage on the person of Mr. Pritchard.] He did not wish to enter into the question further than to declare his belief of the impossibility of the captain preventing the outrage. He was, however, travelling out of the record as far as his department was concerned. What he had to maintain was, that we had all along had forces in the Pacific sufficient to watch over British interests, and not to interfere with the proceedings of Foreign Powers, except so far as British interests were involved. 1741 He maintained that this duty had been performed, and that British interests had not suffered, except by this violent outrage, upon which subject, considering all the circumstances, he did not mean to say a word. Upon the same ground that he had objected to the first part of the Returns moved for by the noble Earl, he should object to the rest; and, if he had detained them too long on the subject, he trusted their Lordships would attribute it to his natural wish to defend his department, and the Government generally, from the attack which had been made upon it.
§ The Duke of WellingtonThe noble Earl opposite having adverted to some observations of mine some years ago, on the state of the Navy at the time, notwithstanding that I am quite satisfied with the defence which my noble Friend has made of his department, I must trouble your Lordships for a very few moments, in order to show you the difference between the state of things now and at the period when I made those observations. My Lords, at that period this country was engaged in a state of warfare in North America, which required, imperatively required, the assistance of a considerable fleet; also in China, also in India, and even in the Persian Gulf. Though, my Lords, I was not exactly in the service of the Government at that period, I was very much in the habit of communication with a noble Friend of mine, then at the head of the army, now, unfortunately, no more; and when he asked my opinion on any subject, I never failed to communicate it to him freely. I certainly did frequently advise my noble Friend, and consulted with him in respect of the operations of our fleets and armies at that period in all parts of the world; and, my Lords, that of which I complained then was, that being at war—engaged in extensive war—as I have stated, in three quarters of the globe, those wars were carried on with a peace establishment; the consequence of which was that the usual peace services were starved. Now, I am not going to enter into details of the number of men in the different ships, and so on; they are naval details, into which I am not competent to enter, nor will I enter into them. But we all know the number of men voted for the service; that is the criterion of the strength of the Navy—it is, in fact, the provision by the Government and the Parliament for the Naval Service of the year; and, 1742 I believe, if we compare the number of men voted in this year of peace, they will be found equal to any number of men voted at any period previous in time of peace, even considering as a period of peace the period of time extending from the year 1837 down to 1839 and 1840, during which this country was engaged in great operations in America, China, India, and the Persian Gulf. Under these circumstances, I think the noble Earl did not do me justice, when he compared the state of things with which I found fault in 1837, 1838, and 1839, with what exists at the present moment. The state of things was quite different; and, as far as I understand the condition of the Navy at the present moment, I believe that ample means exist everywhere of performing the services which ought to be performed by Her Majesty's Navy; that is, giving protection to Her Majesty's subjects in whatever quarter of the world their commerce or other concerns may carry them. I believe the noble Earl does not contend that that protection has not in any case been given. When I say given everywhere, I do not mean to advert to contingencies, so wholly out of all ordinary and reasonable calculation, as that recent transaction in the Pacific, out of the way events, carried on under circumstances protested against by this country, and disavowed by the Government of France. My Lords, those who have been guilty of those eccentricities will be responsible for them to somebody; and I conclude, as a matter of course, that that responsibility will be carried into execution, and that they will be required to account for their conduct. The noble Lord surely could not expect that large fleets were to be kept up in every corner of the world to meet such improbable contingencies as these, or that when they did occur, our officers were to be expected to begin hostilities against a national flag on account of the eccentricities of a particular individual. I will venture to say, and I have no doubt it will be found so when the matter comes to be examined into, that our fleet in the Pacific was, at the period at which these events occurred, sufficient to give full protection to Her Majesty's subjects in that quarter, under all ordinary circumstances. Whether it was sufficient at Tahiti, or any other part of those seas, is a question for the officer in command on the spot. I don't intend, my Lords, to go further into that question. 1743 Whether the gentleman who has been referred to was our Consul or not, at the time these events occurred, or whether he merited or did not merit what has happened to him, these are questions I am not going to enter into on this occasion. My noble Friend has stated what is true—that a great outrage was committed. I entertain no doubt that satisfaction will be given for that outrage, and I am sure that it is better that there should have been no naval contest there, than that there should have been any attempt made by the naval officer on the spot by a contest to prevent what has happened.
The Marquess of Clanricardethought that however weak the Navy might be, its weakness could not be greater than the answer which had been made by the noble Earl opposite to the Motion before the House. The noble Earl said, that no Parliamentary ground had been shown for the Motion; as if to make up for this alleged deficiency, the noble Earl had himself shown that there was full ground for the Motion. The noble Earl having said that the present Naval Force was proposed to Parliament at a time when we were at "profound peace" with the world, himself gave their Lordships to understand, that since the time the estimate was proposed, circumstances had changed in this respect. [The Earl of Haddington: No, no.] He was glad to hear the noble Earl say "no;" but certainly the noble Earl had said, in what seemed to him a very marked way, that the estimates were prepared when the country was "in profound peace" with the world—a manner so marked as to leave it to be implied, that since that time circumstances had occurred to threaten that "profound peace;" and, at all events, it appeared to him (the Marquess of Clanricarde) perfectly certain that, in the existing state of things, we had not a sufficient force afloat to have the effect of maintaining peace, by presenting that ready front for war, which on many occasions had prevented the having recourse to war itself. The noble Earl scarcely denied that the present Naval Force was too low; he had shown no reason at all why the line-of-battle ships had been reduced to nine; why one of these ships had been paid off. All he did say was, that nine fully-manned ships were better than a larger number under manned. Now as to the noble Earl's imputation against the system 1744 pursued by his noble Friend in respect of the manning of ships, it was generally cousidered that the so-called undermanned ships, in the time of his noble Friend's Administration, had performed their duty in the most efficient manner possible. He had been informed, on very excellent authority, that our ships at that time were more strongly manned than were Lord Nelson's when he won the battle of Trafalgar. He had been told that the ships now, very many of them, were overmanned — so much so as even to endanger the health of the crews. He (the Marquess of Clanricarde) was very sorry to hear the manner in which the noble Earl referred to the affairs at Tahiti. He spoke of them as a delicate matter. What necessity was there for any delicacy in speaking of them? The facts were notorious to all the world—the agent of our Sovereign had been insulted. The Prime Minister in another place when he spoke of the matter took a proper tone, and so did the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs the other night—they did not talk of it as a delicate affair. He (the Marquess of Clanricarde) could not for a moment hesitate to suppose that a proper reparation would be made, and he did not think they ought to be told not to speak on the subject because it was a delicate affair. His noble Friend was told too that he made his speech at an inconvenient moment. Why inconvenient? Inconvenient to the noble Earl it might be; but if because the establishment was too low, it was his noble Friend's duty to make his views known to Parliament, without waiting until the indefinite period, when Government might think fit to consider the discussion convenient. Was he to wait till all the mischief was done, and then say he was checked, because it was inconvenient that the smallness of our force should be known? If on the other hand, the Navy was in a strong and efficient state, surely there could be no inconvenience from making the fact known. The noble Earl said the Vindictive was at Tahiti from February to August, 1843, and that she was immediately succeeded by the Dublin; but then the Dublin also left the station in January, while these occurrences did not take place until March. Dates were important, because they showed that there was ample time to send out orders to the Captain of the Dublin, in consequence of the tone taken by the French officers at 1745 Tahiti, and he firmly believed that had the Dublin been there at that time, these occurrences would never have taken place. His noble Friend had referred to 1838, because in that year, we being at peace, he was attacked for having an insufficient force in the Mediterranean. At that time an opinion was pronounced by the noble Duke which fully applied to the present time. He observed, that we were not to compare our Navy with its state in former times, but with the increased force of other Powers; and also to bear in mind that our commerce was not only tripled, but that it was extended to ten times its former amount; and that there was no part of the earth, from the North Pole to the South, in which our commerce did not require the protection of a Naval Force. He (the Marquess of Clanricarde) maintained that the Navy did not now sufficiently afford protection to our commerce. Had it been so, Tahiti would not have been trusted to a mere ketch—the Basilisk. He entirely agreed in the hope of the noble Lord, that there would be no real disturbance. No one could deplore it more than he should; but to say that what was going on on the coast of Morocco ought not to be narrowly watched, was to suppose a degree of infatuation which he could not believe possible. A fleet had been despatched to that quarter, which circumstance sufficiently showed that the Government thought it necessary to be prepared against any contingency that might arise. He repeated, that the best way of avoiding war was to be prepared for it. Government could not control affairs on distant stations, but by being prepared, they diminished the chances of war.
The Earl of Haddingtonsaid, that his use of the word "delicate" did not apply to the outrage on Mr. Pritchard, but to the holding of an argument in Parliament on a subject which must necessarily form the subject of discussion between the two Governments. The noble Marquess said, that British commerce was endangered. He challenged him to show where it was not protected. Did he suppose it was only to be protected by line-of-battle ships?
§ The Earl of Hardwickesaid, that the statement of his noble Friend (the Earl of 1746 Haddington) was a statement of facts, and he was of opinion that this statement was a full answer to the noble Earl opposite. The Motion of the noble Earl would not elicit anything that was not printed already. The noble Marquess had just referred to the year 1838, but the number of men then voted was 23,000, while the number voted for the present year was nearly the largest that had been voted by Parliament in these recent years, and he could see no reason for coming down to Parliament and asking for a war-establishment, merely on account of the caprice and eccentricities of individuals in a distant part of the world, whose conduct had been disavowed as soon as known by the Government whose subjects they were. He thought his noble Friend had given ample reasons why the Naval Force should not have been larger than it was. He would not enter into the question of manning ships; many members of his profession thought that ships ought not to be short-manned; that was a very natural opinion in naval men, nor was he surprised that the noble Earl should have introduced this subject to their Lordships. The noble Earl was himself so severely hammered by the public at large, and in that House, that it was almost absolutely necessary for him to take the course he had taken in order to set himself right and appease his wounded feelings. As yet he had not heard one single soul out of doors talk of the slightest necessity for any inquiry upon this question, while it was notorious that such had been the depression of the Naval Service at the period when the noble Earl opposite was at the Admiralty, and the deficiency of the means of equipping and fitting out a fleet, that the state of public opinion absolutely compelled those who were in opposition both in that and the other House of Parliament, to bring under discussion those subjects which he admitted were always more or less inconvenient. At a very early period, when first the friends of the noble Earl took the Government of the country into their hands, they had shown the greatest anxiety to cut down the whole naval expenditure to the very lowest point, he would not say unfairly, for the purpose of inducing the public to think them a most deserving and economical Administration. Then the most extensive changes took place in the arrangements and economy of the Naval Service, and from that period downwards there had been a difficulty in meeting the views of many persons in this country with 1747 regard to the speedy equipment of a Naval Force. His noble Friend at the head of the Admiralty had stated that we had large means at command of equipping a great naval force, but there was some difficulty in immediately finding men—of all things the most important. His noble Friend was not to blame, the public opinion on that subject had changed, and he had only been compelled to adapt his opinions to the wishes and desires of the House of Commons. He had got the largest number of men that had been voted during a time of peace, and after those who were responsible for the due administration of public affairs declared that in the present state of our relations with foreign countries that force was deficient, he did not think it necessary to go to Parliament for an increase merely because there had been unfortunately some capricious or choleric exhibitions on the part of some French officers at Tahiti, for which no doubt proper reparation would be made. Putting aside this part of the question, which had been entirely answered by his noble Friend and the noble Duke, he would venture, as a naval officer to make one observation, which he felt, though with great diffidence, ought to put an end to debates of this kind. To be prepared at all times for any emergency that might arise, without materially increasing the expense, they must fall back on that system which noble Lords opposite overthrew. That system was to have an efficient force of able-bodied seamen at all times ready at command. An effective, efficient force of 10,000 or 20,000 men was formerly always kept under command of the Admiralty instead of under the Board of Customs, for the protection of the revenue; and at any moment they might be turned into any of our ships on the shortest possible notice. Such a system always enabled them to meet any emergency that could occur. Such an occasion presented itself when we were obliged to send a force to Portugal, and the equipment of a large force of line-of-battle ships was completed in so very short a space as to excite the greatest surprise in the public mind. But that system had been overthrown by Governments of more recent years, for what purpose he could not understand, and they could not be re-established after being so long quietly acquiesced in without calling for an increase of the Naval Force to an inconvenient extent. Unquestionably, with a force of 36,000 men, when the exchanges had taken place, it might be possible to increase the 1748 number of ships. He had always felt that, in addition to a disposable force such as he had described, there should be at all times a considerable disposable force of ships, to enable the Government under any particular circumstances that might suddenly arise to send out immediately ships to any foreign station. The noble Earl (the Earl of Minto) had been himself in that dilemma, and not being able to send ships from home, he was obliged to shift them from one station to another. [The Earl of Minto: No, no.] Surely the noble Earl had not forgotten the pamphlets of Captain Crawford and the "Flag Officer," drawing attention to the defenceless state of our shores, when he was at the Admiralty? He felt quite certain that the present discussion would tend to nothing but to draw public attention for a very short time to what passed in that House. His noble Friends, who were perfectly aware of all the circumstances and necessities of the State, would at all times be perfectly prepared to meet any exigency that might arise; and at the present moment he felt confident that at no period of late years had the Naval Service been in a more completely effective state—never had the home yards been better supplied, or the necessary equipments of all descriptions of ships more easily available, while the ships afloat were confessedly on all hands most efficiently and effectively manned.
The Earl of Mintoreplied. He must express his regret that such a statement had been made, as that of the noble Earl, even upon the high authority of Sir Charles Napier, that the Mediterranean Fleet had been in such a deplorable condition, that had any collision with the French taken place, the result must have been very disastrous to our arms.
The Earl of Haddingtondenied that he had referred to Sir Charles Napier as a "high authority"—he had merely quoted the statement of the gallant Commodore.
The Earl of MintoNo one could appreciate more highly than he did the great qualities of Sir Charles Napier; no one had been more ready than himself, while at the Admiralty, to employ him, and to entrust to him the discharge of any service. There was, however, a great difference between a high degree of military skill and enterprise for which that gallant Officer was so mnch distinguished, and that sober judgment in forming an opinion, and even upon a subject like this, which was purely a professional one, and he might add that 1749 good fighters were often very bad talkers. But was the Mediterranean fleet in the state in which it had been described by the noble Earl? He said that it was not. This was also the opinion of that most able and gallant officer who commanded the fleet, who had stated that he feared no consequences, and in his correspondence with him (the Earl of Minto), he expressed no doubt as to the result of any service that fleet might be called upon to perform. But had that fleet nothing to do? Had it not to perform a service of the most arduous nature, and the result of which was equally honourable to the persons engaged and to the character of the British Navy? He said that the fleet was well prepared for any service, and that the fleet was more strongly manned than any fleet which had left England during the war. If they went to a comparison of the complement of the crews of the ships engaged in the great actions during the last war, and those of the force which was in the Mediterranean, it would be found that the number of men was greater in the latter. He should, however, explain that the only ships which could be compared with those employed in the last war was the second class of the then rates, namely, the 74 and 76 gun-ships. All the other classes of-line-of-battle ships in the Navy were much larger than the same classes were during the war, but the class which he had just named was exactly the same with a class extensively employed during the war. In Lord St. Vincent's action, on the 14th of February, there were five seventy-fours, and the crews of all were borne on board each of them—that was not only the complements on the ships' books, but persons taken out of prizes, &c.—was on the average 575 men. In Lord Duncan's action, the average number of men on board this class of ships was 554. At the battle of Trafalgar the complements of the second class of the third rates—in the larger vessels 625, and in the smaller 563. The average complement, therefore, of each of the sixteen vessels of this class engaged in this action was 598. In the Mediterranean fleet under Sir R. Stopford there were seventeen ships of the line. In addition, however, to the complements of the various ships there were 775 marines, divided between the seventeen ships; this gave an average reinforcement of forty-five marines to each ship. They now came to the complement of the same class of ships as those he had referred to as having been engaged at Trafalgar. 1750 Sir Robert Stopford was ordered to increase the crews of his ships by entering men as freely as possible, and in addition every fresh ship sent out from England to join that fleet took out a number of supernumaries, which he would not take into account. The larger class of ships of this rate in the Mediterranean fleet were the Cambridge, the Revenge, and the Implacable. In the first of these vessels the complement of the crew was 598, to which, if the forty-five marines be added, the number would be 643.* The Revenge had the same number, and the Implacable had a crew of 570 men and forty-five marines, making together 615. The average number of men on board this class of ships was therefore 633, while in the great victory of Lord Nelson the average number for the same class was 625. Of the smaller class of third rates in the Mediterranean, namely, the Hastings, the Benbow, and the Edinburgh, the crews were 540 men and forty-five marines, making together 585. This was twenty-seven more men on board each of this class of ships than there were in similar ships in Lord Nelson's action. The result was that the average of all the seventy-fours in Sir R. Stopford's fleet was 610 men. In Lord Nelson's great action, 598. It appeared, then, that there was a stronger complement on board the ships in the Mediterranean fleet than there was during the war. As for the assertion that the present class of ships required more men to work them than those that were placed in the same class during the war, he could only observe, that certainly the armament was lighter as regarded the weight of the guns, and also the work in the ship was much less than before. Take, for instance, the Captain, 74, in 1797. Her weight of guns was 3,310 cwt., while in the Edinburgh, the same class-ship as the Captain, the weight of guns was 3,120 cwt., making a difference of nine tons and-a-half in favour of the modern ships, with such greatly improved armaments. This was equivalent to the weight of two guns, and of twenty-four men to work them. The weight of shot for a broadside in the old ships was 740, and in the new ships 1,230. As for reducing the number of men on board-ships in time of peace, he was not to blame for having introduced this practice, for it had always been the custom to make reductions in the peace complements of ships as com-
* The figures in the different reports are very confused.1751 pared with the war complements. For his own part he had always allowed larger peace complements than any of his predecessors. As for the present mode of manning ships, he happened to know that great inconvenience had arisen from over-crowding the crews on board the smaller line-of-battle-ships. He was satisfied that considerable inconvenience would arise from this proceeding, and he feared that the opinions of those able and distinguished officers, Sir T. Hardy, Sir R. Stopford, and Sir W. Parker, coincided with his own. He held in his hand a communication from the last named officer, pointing out the evils which would arise in persisting in this practice. [The noble Earl read the document.] He would not attempt to answer the noble Earl who spoke last, who had made a very able diversion in the debate, by making an attack upon him, at which, however, he did not feel in the slightest degree hurt. The noble Earl complained of the reductions that had been made in the Navy, and described them as being most pernicious. He (the Earl of Minto) was fully aware of this; and the last blow given to the Navy of this country was when Lord de Grey was First Lord of the Admiralty. But immediately he was appointed to the Admiralty he found the Navy Stores to have been reduced to the lowest ebb, and he instantly went to work to refill our great arsenals. He trusted that they would never see the Navy reduced to the state which it was in 1835. He would only add, that he was surprised that his Motion was resisted. He had met with the greatest difficulties in obtaining any information respecting the Navy. Whenever he had put a question on the subject he was met with the complaint that he had not given notice, and now that he had given notice he was told that it must be resisted, as it implied a censure on the Board of Admiralty. He did not think that this reluctance to give information manifested any great confidence in the state of the Navy.
The Earl of Haddingtonobserved, that he had only quoted the opinion of Sir C. Napier as to the manning the ships, not to express any concurrence in his opinion of the result. The noble Earl said that Sir C. Napier was a good fighter, but not the best person to decide a question of this kind. Now he (the Earl of Haddington) should have thought that that class of officers were the most likely to give a sound judgment on such a point. Certainly, the feeling must have been very strong to 1752 induce that gallant Officer to express such an opinion.
§ On Question, Resolved in the Negative.