HL Deb 02 April 1844 vol 73 cc1742-3
Lord Campbell

rose to present to their Lordships a Bill of some importance as connected with the administration of justice, which had been prepared, not by himself, but by an hon. Friend in the other House of Parliament, where it was intended to have been brought in, but as it affected the judicial jurisdiction of their Lordships, it was found that in the House of Lords only could it properly be introduced. The object of the Bill was to remove a great objection which, as the law now stood, might be taken against the administration of justice in this country respecting Appeals and Writs of Error. Their Lordships would be aware that the right of Appeal was given both in civil and criminal cases; respecting the decision in an Appeal in one of the latter class of cases, he had that night presented a petition in which the Appeal had been against a conviction for bigamy. In civil cases the parties prosecuting the Appeal entered into recognizances of double the amount in dispute, and the execution of the judgment was suspended until the decision on the Writ of Error was given. There was, consequently, in civil cases, no difficulty. But in criminal cases much doubt existed as to what should be done with the party convicted while the Appeal was pending—that was, whether or not the sentence should be carried into effect pending the Appeal. As an instance of the inconvenience and injustice which might be inflicted by carrying the sentence into effect, notwithstanding an Appeal against the conviction, suppose the case of a man sentenced to transportation, he might be sent abroad before the Appeal was decided, though it might be ultimately found that the conviction was wrong, and the party undeserving of punishment; while on the other hand, if the sentence were unconditionally suspended until the superior court had decided, every criminal would appeal in the hope of delaying or escaping the punishment due to his offence. To remedy this, the Bill he was about to submit provided that upon the defendant giving security to the satisfaction of the Court, and in such sum as the Court might direct, that any fine that might be imposed should be paid, and that the defendant should be forthcoming to undergo any sentence which might be pronounced upon him, that sentence should be suspended until the Court of Appeal should have decided upon the merits of the case. He did not propose that this alteration in the law should be retrospective, and therefore he had inserted a Clause providing that the Bill should not come into operation until the 1st of August next.

Bill read a first time.