CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.

HL Deb 31 March 1843 vol 68 cc218-73

Lord Campbell

I rise, my Lords, in hopes of being the humble instrument in warding off" a great calamity from my native country. The Church of Scotland, from apprehensions and delusions prevailing, is in great jeopardy: and it appears to me that much good may be effected by the expression of an opinion by your Lordships; by which the apprehensions may be removed, and the delusions dispelled. Various petitions have been presented, praying your Lordships to take into your serious consideration the present condition of the Scotch Church. An opinion has been expressed on the part of the executive government, and the matter has been discussed in the other House of Parliament; and humble a Member as I am in this House, unless I come forward, I am afraid that no opportunity will be presented for expressing your Lordships' opinion before the crisis arrives. I hope, therefore, I may be excused and not thought guilty of presumption in presenting myself before your Lordships. I have an hereditary affection for that church; I was brought up at the feet of one of its most venerable pastors, and the respect and reverence with which he inspired me will never be effaced. It has seemed to me that the most advisable course would be to present certain resolutions and ask your Lordships solemnly to express the opinion of this House. I think that legislation at this moment cannot be properly applied, and it would be most disingenuous in me to express any other opinion. During the late Government, as often as I had the honour to be consulted by my noble Friend at the head of it, I advised him not to undertake any legislation, because it would only lead to still greater confusion, while the Church seemed to set the State at defiance, and while no assurances were given that any measures would be accepted as satisfactory. I deeply deplore that my conviction up to this hour remains unaltered, the same difficulties continue to present themselves. I am bound to say that I entirely approve of the determination of Government, in the present posture of affairs, not to interfere; but at the same time I think that great benefit may result from the expression of an opinion by your Lordships respecting the claims which the Church of Scotland has made, and the controversy that has thereupon arisen. I have, therefore, laid upon the Table five resolutions, to which I shall have the honour to ask your Lordships assent. I have heard it said that this mode of proceeding is objectionable, because it seeks prematurely to bind the Legislature; such an objection I consider wholly futile. This mode of proceeding makes no such attempt; it merely expresses the present opinion of one branch of the Legislature. It is founded upon various precedents, and there can be no doubt that it is a constitutional course. During the American war there were different occasions on which resolutions were moved to express the opinion of Parliament on the policy of the contest, and on the principles on which it ought to be brought to a termination. The same mode was adopted during the French war; and more recently both Houses have discussed resolutions respecting the abolition of the slave-trade, respecting the abolition of slavery in the colonies, and respecting the Roman Catholic claims. A resolution was adopted by the House of Commons, that in the following Session it would be expedient to proceed to legislate for the relief of our Roman Catholic fellow subjects. Again, with regard to the food of the people, Parliament has continually pursued the same plan. On repeated occasions resolutions have been passed on the Corn-laws, both as to what the House of Commons thought ought to be done, or ought to be refused. On a future occasion, when any bill shall be proposed respecting the Church of Scotland, it will be perfectly open to your Lordships to discuss the subject, and either to adhere to your opinion or to alter it. The first resolution I have to propose respects the inviolability of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and of all its rights, privileges, and immunities. Whatever opinion your Lordships might individually form upon the subject, it is utterly impossible for any noble Lord to dispute that the Church of Scotland ought to continue to be governed by Kirk Sessions. Presbyteries, Synods, and General Assemblies. After a long and violent struggle, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that Church was established. The great object of the Scottish nation when fighting for that church was attained, and our efforts were crowned with success. At the Revolution, the establishment, or rather the preservation of the Presbyterian Church was made a condition by Scotland of agreeing to that great measure: and that agreement was the foundation upon which the present illustrious family was called to the throne of these kingdoms. When the Union was discussed in the reign of Queen Anne, the Scottish nation would not allow the commissioners even to treat on the affairs of the church, which they were forbidden to bring into discussion. The Act of Security was involved in the Act of Union, and it was upon the condition that the Presbyterian Church should ever be respected and preserved that Scotland consented to forego her existence as a separate and independent kingdom. By Act of Parliament the first proceeding on the accession of a new Sovereign is to sign a declaration to maintain and uphold the Church of Scotland, with all its rights, privileges, and immunities: several of your Lordships who happened to be present on the auspicious occasion when her present Majesty commenced her reign, must remember that it was her earliest act. But it is not merely because the Church of Scotland is established by law, and that its inviolability is guarded by solemn international treaties, that your Lordships must be inclined to support it. The great majority of your Lordships belong to another communion, which you no doubt, abstractedly, consider preferable; but at the same time your Lordships will not fail to recollect that the Presbyterian establishment has suited the wishes, habits, and inclinations of the people of Scotland. When you consider the benefits it has conferred upon that country, I am sure that none of your Lordships will be disposed to encroach upon its rights or privileges, or to do anything that might endanger its security. There can be no doubt that that church has had the best practical effect upon the morals, and character, of the people of Scotland. Your Lordships have only to call to mind the state of Scotland in the 17th century, when there was an attempt perseveringly made to force episcopacy on the inhabitants, to feel convinced of the advantages the Scotch Church has produced. During a long period nothing but confusion, insurrection, and misery prevailed there; but when this great boon was granted, the aspect of affairs was entirely changed, the storm subsided, the winds fell, the clouds dispersed, and sunshine reappeared. During the 18th century, there never was a country which made more rapid advances in industry, civilization, manufactures, commerce, agriculture, science, and literature, than my native land, and I believe that its prosperity is very much to be ascribed to the ministration of the clergy of the Established Church. The clergy, who are men of education and refinement, mix familiarly with the lower orders; sinecures and pluralities are unknown among them and they devote themselves exclusively and fervently to the discharge of their sacred duties. There is every reason to think that no established church has more effectually answered the purpose of an establishment than the Church of Scotland. For that reason it has attracted the respect and reverence of all? who have regarded the manner in which it has discharged its duties and influenced the public welfare. I am sure that there is no Member of your Lordships House who will not be disposed to show it every mark of favour and respect. The venerable head of the Church of England, a pastor of whom any church might be proud, since he displays and exercises so unostentatiously but so effectually all the Christian virtues, has evinced no narrow-minded zeal, no spirit of bigotry, no desire to unchurch a nation, no wish to deny that the Church of Scotland is truly a church of Christ. I hold in my hand an extract of a letter from him which thus speaks of the Church of Scotland, and as it has been printed, I am guilty of no breach of confidence in reading it:— I have always felt that any interference on my part in the concerns of the Scottish Church would be liable to misconstruction, and have therefore taken no part in discussions relating to them; but my earnest desire for the restoration of harmony in a church, which has so many claims to respect, will, I am certain, excuse me in your eyes, for expressing this sentiment to you, The Lord Bishop of London, a Prelate most vigorously zealous in the cause of true religion has expressed himself in similar terms. The noble and learned Lord, lately upon the Woolsack, (Lord Cottenham) when giving judgment on the first Auchterarder case, expressed himself as follows:— Having now discharged the duty of delivering my opinion upon the matter in contest, I may, before I conclude, be permitted to express the high respect I have always felt for the clergy of Scotland. Much has been said in their praise, I am satisfied they deserve it all, and that the parochial duties are in general performed in a manner the most exemplary and beneficial for the inhabitants. My noble and learned Friend who joined in giving judgment on the occasion, and who presided on the Woolsack for some years, expressed himself more warmly: with great distinction, Lord Brougham said— I have the most profound veneration for that establishment, and it is hereditary in me, as well as personal; I am myself sprung from some of the most venerable and most learned Members of that establishment—sprung directly from them, as well as knit to them by collateral connection. I cannot be indifferent to its welfare, or deaf to its claims, or in the slightest degree prepared to treat it with any other than the most affectionate reverence. In short, all who have had occasion to state their sentiments on this subject have joined in the same opinion. The noble Earl who sits on the opposite bench, now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has always avowed his devoted attachment to that church, and has exerted himself to rescue it from its difficulties. My noble Friend at the head of the late Government, though he did not think it right to legislate on the subject, always spoke of the Church of Scotland in the most respectful terms; and there is present a noble Duke, (the Duke of Argyle) lineally descended from those who were the founders of the Church of Scotland, and who bled in its cause, and that noble Duke as might be expected, has ever shown the most earnest zeal in its defence and support A noble Friend of mine, a noble Marquess (the Marquess of Breadalbane) only detained from the House on the occasion by circumstances he could not control, has proved himself its fearless champion. When such is the character of this church, and such are the feelings with which it is regarded by noble Lords both spiritual and lay, who do not belong to its communion, would it not he a very great calamity if the national establishment should be destroyed? It would be a great calamity undoubtedly for Scotland, and there would be great danger be apprehended that if the Church of Scotland were overturned, the Church of England might be less secure than happily it is now. I have always looked with the greatest respect to the Church of England, which deservedly possesses the affectionate regards and veneration of the vast majority of the people of this country. It is adapted to their habits, it meets their wishes, and I believe, in a most excellent manner, it answers the ends for which it is established. But there is great danger to be apprehended should the Established Church of Scotland be upset. With the religious, the civil institutions of the country are united and were the Church destroyed, the constitution under which we live might share the fate of the Scotch establishment. To ward off such a calamity I am sure there will be every disposition to comply with the request which the Church has made, and to grant her all which can tend to her permanent welfare, and so far as is consistent with subordination and the good order of society. To a certain extent, it seems to me, that without danger yon may comply with the wishes of that establishment. I have read with great care the letter of Sir James Graham to the Moderator of the general assembly, and I hold it to be as has already been stated by a very high authority is a very statesmanlike production; but there is one passage in it, to which reference has been frequently made, and which, I think, shows that the right hon. Baronet was mistaken with regard to the state of the law as it now exits. Sir James Graham represents that, according to the existing law, when a presentee is presented to a living, although he might be unexceptionable in point of literature, and morals, orthodoxy, objections might be made to him on the ground that he was not suitable to the parish, and that the Presbytery may, if they think fit, give effect to that objection. Now it is very possible that such a change of the law as that may be very desirable—on that head I offer no opinion; but assuredly this is not now the law. My noble and learned Friend whose opinions I have already quoted, said it was not the law, and I conceive, I can scarcely have much higher authority. I will with your Lordships permission read what Sir James Graham says upon that subject: — The licentiate, when presented, is taken on trials by the Presbytery; his qualifications are tested; if he be not fit and suitable to the congregation, objections are stated; reasons are heard, of which the Presbytery alone may judge; and although presentation is a civil right, examination belongs exclusively to the church court. It is open to the Presbytery acting as judges, with the sense of their moral responsibility attaching on them, either to give effect to objections on cause shown, or to overrule them; making in both cases a judicial deliverance. I think Sir James Graham mistook the law when he penned that sentence. When the first Auchterarder case was decided, my noble and learned Friend, who was then on the Woolsack (Lord Cottenham) expressed himself in these terms:— There is no allusion in any of these statutes to any authority intervening in the settlement of a minister between the presentation by the patron and the admission by the Presbytery if the presentee be a qualified person, which qualification is clearly personal, and of which, indeed, the Church was to judge, but 'was bound and astricted' to receive and admit any person presented who should be Qualified. My noble and learned Friend thus clearly expressed his opinion, that the qualification is personal, that it is not a question of suitableness in regard to a particular parish, but whether the presentee be qualified in learning, morals, and doctrine. Then my noble and learned Friend behind me (Lord Brougham) who governed in that judgment, gave his opinion in these words: — Supposing we admit it to be desirable that a harmonious settlement should always take place, that is a totally different consideration from the question of right. The law is not so. The word 'qualified' does not mean that; it does not comprise the qualification of popular favour. The word 'qualified' means something else. It means a qualification in literature, life, and morals, to be judged of by the Presbytery. I presume, that my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack concurs in these opinions. With regard to the qualifications in literature, morals, and orthodoxy, the Presbytery is to judge absolutely and exclusively. From their judgment there is no appeal whatsoever to any civil court, but with regard to the fitness of the individual for the particular parish, as the law now stands, I contend that they have no jurisdiction. Now, I should for one be well pleased to see that jurisdiction conferred. De facto, to a certain degree, it has existed and been acted upon. Your Lordships are aware that the practice for the last 130 years has been, that when the presentation has been made to the Presbytery, the person presented is appointed to preach before the congregation. A day is then named to ascertain whether the parishioners approved of "the call," as it is termed, and those who do approve of it sign the "call," which is presented to the Presbytery, and upon that "call" the Presbytery proceeds; and if the presentee is in other respects qualified, he is inducted. That has been to a certain extent the practice; but it turns out that looking at the act of Parliament, and to precedents, this practice is not founded on the law and statutes of the country; and the law really is, that provided there be no objection taken to the presentee, in point of literature, morals, and orthodoxy, the Presbytery is bound and astricted to admit the presentee. While I assert this to be now the law, I, for one, should be extremely desirous to see by law the parish vested with some control, that some guard should be devised against the abuses of patronage, and that some plan should be framed whereby the presentee should be ascertained to be "suitable" to the parish to which he is appointed. And I must add, that when the Church of Scotland shall show a becoming respect for the law,—shall lay aside the threatening attitude it has now assumed, and be contented to come to the Legislature for an alteration of the law, to enable it more effectually to obtain the objects for which it was instituted, I shall for one be most zealous to support it. I do not mean to say that the Veto law as passed by the General Assembly, could enable the Church to gain its object. I was not in the slightest degree consulted before that Veto law was passed. I heard nothing of it until it was brought before the General Assembly; and, considering that it was brought forward by Lord Moncrief, I certainly for a moment was led away, and supposed that it was well adapted to gain the object the clergy had in view. Even if such a measure were pressed, I believe there is no chance of its passing the two Houses of Parliament; and if it were adopted, I candidly confess I think it would not answer the purposes of those who proposed it. What is that Veto law?—It requires when the presentee is presented by the patron, that he preach twice before the congregation, to whom he may be an entire stranger, and who may never even have heard his name before. After he has preached and gone through other offices, all those who are heads of families in the parish in communion with the Church, and none others—the male heads of families—are to meet in the parish vestry, and if a bare majority disapprove of him (the presentee), and they simply say so, without assigning any reason for their dissent, the dissent of that bare majority is actually binding upon the Presbytery, and the Presbytery is bound to refuse him, although it may have the highest opinion of his talent, learning, disposition, piety, and suitability for the parish. This, my Lords, is not reasonable. It does not at all give security to the parish against having a minister intruded upon them whom they may dislike, because it is not a majority of the congregation who are to decide. The female sex are entirely excluded, and it is only the male sex who happen to be the heads of families in the parish, who are to give an opinion. The Presbytery is therefore deprived of exercising any judgment; and there might, under the operation of the act be, without any reason for the disapproval being assigned, a capricious rejection of a candidate who might really be qualified, and who, if tried, might be acceptable to the congregation generally, although, perhaps, not so to the majority of male heads of families. Under the act of 1690, by which the patrons were deprived for a time, and their light of presenting was vested in the Kirk session and the heritors, the person named was to be presented to the parishioners, who were bound to assign reasons for disapproval, upon which reasons assigned the Presbytery proceeded to admit or reject him. But the mode of rejection without reason that was contained in the provisions of the Veto Act is wholly unprecedented, and might lead to the strangest consequences. It is giving the heads of families the power to act in the spirit of the old epigram:— Non amo te, Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare; Hoc tantum possum dicere, non amo te. I do not love thee, Dr. Fell, The reason why I cannot tell; But this at least; I know full well, I do not love thee, Dr. Fell. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Aberdeen), when he brought forward his motion on this subject, expressed his fears of the great danger there was of conferring too large powers on the Church. I am afraid that we shall always be exposed to one of two evils—either of giving too much power to the Church, or of giving too great a power to the people. The Presbytery ought not only to look to the personal qua- lification of the presentee as it is now restricted to do, but also to see whether the presentee be suitable to the parish to which he is appointed. I have no objection to let that point be decided by the Presbytery. I am not afraid that in the face of the country, and subject to public opinion, there is any reason to apprehend any great abuse of such a power, therefore my third resolution will be merely expressing an opinion on the part of your Lordships'. That, with a view to heal the unhappy divisions which now exist in the Church of Scotland, and to give contentment to the said Church, this House is of opinion, that the demands of the said Church, contained in the papers laid before this House, should he conceded by the Legislature, as far as the same can be safely conceded consistently with the permanent welfare of the said Church, and the existence of subordination and good government in the country; and, therefore, when any measures for correcting the alleged abuses of patronage in Scotland, and insuring the appointment and admission of ministers properly qualified for the parishes in which they are to officiate and to edify the congregations to whom they are to minister in holy things, shall be constitutionally brought before this House, as a branch of the Legislature, this House will favourably entertain the same, and anxiously endeavour that the end of such measures may be attained, I believe that such a measure ought to content the Church of Scotland, because the powers of the parishioners and of the Presbytery will thereby be considerably enlarged, above what they had been in past times. Beyond that concession I think your Lordships cannot safely go. You may acquire popularity for a moment; but further concession, I believe, would ultimately lead to the subversion of the Church. It has been demanded, on the part of the Church, that patronage should be abolished. In the petition from the General Assembly, it is stated that patronage is a grievance and that it ought to be abolished. That demand seems to me to be highly unreasonable, and in my opinion highly inexpedient. Patronage is mentioned in the most ancient documents treating of the constitution of the Church. It is spoken of in the Regem Magestatem a hook of almost unknown antiquity; and it is there laid down that the patron shall present a qualified person to the living, and that the qualified person so presented must be admitted to the living. So the law continued to the time of the Reformation. At that time a reservation of patronage was made an express condition of the Established Church. By the act passed in 1592, there was a solemn engagement on the part of the Church, that the right of patronage should be preserved, and that the Presbytery should admit qualified persons, who may be presented to them. In 1649, the right of patronage was abolished, but that was when monarchy was subverted. It would he vain to refer to that as a precedent. We might as well quote the acts collected by Scobell, which were passed in England when the King was driven from the throne. But whatever may be considered the effect of what was done in 1649, upon the restoration of the monarchy, patronage was restored. Lay patrons were invested by law with the right of presentation, and it so continued till the year 1690, when the patronage was transferred to the heritors and Kirk session, who were to present, but the Presbytery was to judge of objections assigned. I believe that was the worst system that was ever projected. It led to great confusion and great discontent. According to the act of 1690, the advowson was to be purchased at a certain price, and the individual who was then the patron, lost his right. This lasted from 1690 to 1711. But how often did the Church put that law in force? In three instances only was the advowson purchased from the patron. There was every reason to believe, that in the interval I have mentioned, many mischiefs arose, and so in the present day no doubt the returning to that law would give rise to many serious evils. In 1711, the act of 1690 was repealed, and the patrons were restored to their rights. It is idle after a period of 130 years, during which time that act has been acquiesced in, to pretend to say that it is not the law. It was an act passed by Lords and Commons, and one which received the royal assent, and has been from that time to the present the law of the land. And upon the whole, I believe, it has worked well, and has been the means of providing the parishes of Scotland with a succession of clergymen eminent for piety, learning, morality, and zeal. There are about one-third of the livings of Scotland vested in the Crown. I believe that the patronage of the Crown has been exceedingly well exercised. I can speak of my own knowledge, that while the present Prime Minister was Home Secretary, he gave the greatest satisfaction by his appointments when any livings became vacant. I have, on all occasions, borne testimony to the fact, and, I believe, that his system of filling up the livings still gave satisfaction to the country and to the Church. So also when Lord John Russell was Secretary of Stele, the manner in which the Crown patronage was exercised gave great satisfaction; and I believe that the lay patrons, with some few exceptions, have bestowed their patronage from conscientious motives, and not from corruption. The crime of simony, indeed, is a vice wholly unknown in Scotland. There may have been presentees more or less worthy; but I believe, upon the whole, that the power of patronage has been very reasonably and very beneficially exercised. At all events, I am sure that the present Ministers of the Church of Scotland have no reason to object to the existing system. Those Ministers I believe to be very exemplary for their piety, learning, zeal, and orthodoxy. But how did they get their appointments? Was it not by patronage? And they themselves having been inducted under the system of patronage, I think it is scarcely reasonable that they should contend that that system should be abolished. There is nothing in these controversies that has distressed me more than the manner in which the illustrious name of Dr. Robertson has been spoken of by the opponents of the right of patronage. What had that eminent man done? He considered that the law of patronage worked well; he saw that piety and morality were promoted in Scotland by these who were appointed by means of that law, and not being willing to yield to any fanatical feelings, he stood by the law of the land, and reconciled the people to its enactments. In all this what is there, my Lords, to condemn? I then ask you, what reason is there why your Lordships should hesitate to express an opinion against the unreasonable demands which are now made. We are told that, among the Dissenters, the system of election of pastors works very well. I believe it does so. But we are now called upon to legislate or make provision for an endowed Church, where there are manses, glebes, and stipends, provided by the State. I have not heard it suggested what is to be substituted for the present law of patronage. The act of 1690 I am sure would be rejected by your Lordships without hesitation; for if it disqualified Roman Catholics and Jews from being patrons, it lets in Episcopalians, who in former days were looked upon as little better than Papists. An illustrious an- cestor of a noble Duke, who sits on the cross bench, said in his dying moments that he hated "popery, prelacy, and all superstition whatever." Then, too, the Presbyterian Dissenters would be admitted, who are sometimes in very ill odour. Indeed, the Presbyterian Dissenters were lately now more odious to the Church of Scotland than the Episcopalians. Then as to the kirk sessions—no one can tell how that is to be regulated. Besides, if you were to return to the act of 1690, it would work worse now than it did between the years 1690 and 1711, because property is now much more subdivided. Not, perhaps, so much so in the south of Scotland, where the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Buccleuch) possesses a principality and is the sole inheritor of a good many counties. [A noble Lord, "parishes you mean"]; but in other parishes, where property has been very much subdivided, the adoption of that act would introduce the system of a popular election; and that is a system which I do not think your Lordships would be inclined to adopt. Is it, I would ask, one which would meet with your Lordships' approbation? Were it to be established, I fear you would witness all the evils which have been experienced, and which we now deplore in this country in the election of Members of Parliament. There would be bribery and intimidation, and all the arts resorted to which now are practised at popular parliamentary elections, every parish in turn, and the whole Country in the end, would be demoralised, and the sacred office of a minister of the Gospel be desecrated in the struggle. I humbly apprehend that the present system, subject to the extension of the powers of the Presbytery which I have mentioned, and which I am perfectly willing to concede, is the best that can be established. The Church of Scotland has at length intimated that the abolition of patronage is not a sine quâ non. The clergy do not absolutely insist upon it, though they earnestly wish it; but now I come to what is a sine quâ non, and that is with respect to the jurisdiction of the spiritual courts. They say that no civil court whatsoever shall question any decree made by the Church courts, and that the Church courts shall be allowed to define their own jurisdiction, and act without any responsibility. Your Lordships are aware that the Church of Scotland has a legislative power within certain limits, beyond what even the two Houses of the Legislature possess: for the Church of Scotland has the power to make an act which does not require the sanction of the Crown, or of the state in any respect. If then your Lordships should couple this legislative power with the claim of exclusive jurisdiction they now set up, namely, that their courts shall never be questioned in respect to anything they do—see what a tyrannical body you would be establishing. This sine quâ non, I believe with all rational men, is wholly inadmissible. Looking at the votes of the other House of Parliament, we see that there was on a division a minority of 73, that were for entering into a committee to consider the present state of the Church of Scotland; now, my firm belief is, that out of those 73 persons there would not be found three who would join in saying that this claim, on the part of the Church of Scotland, should for one instant be admitted. In order to shew that I do not overstate the claim of the Church of Scotland, I will advert to one instance only. In their petition, the General Assembly mention, as matters of grievance, the two decisions of your Lordships' House in the Auchterarder case. They do not say that your Lordships decided contrary to law, but they say that the law, as declared by your Lordships, cannot be endured. Now, what was the first Auchterarder case? The Earl of Kinnoul, being the patron of the living, presented a gentleman of the name of Young. The Veto-law was acted upon by the heritors, and a majority of the heads of families in communion of the Church, without assigning any reason whatsoever, vetoed Mr. Young, and the Presbytery, without any reason having been assigned, were obliged to give effect to that veto, although it was probable they felt that Mr. Young was a most unexceptionable man in morals, learning, piety, and zeal. But upon the sole ground that because he was vetoed by the heads of the parish, they refused to take Mr. Young upon his "trials." They did not consider whether he was qualified or not. They considered that the rejection by the heads of families was imperative upon them, and they refused to take him upon his "trials." An action was brought in the Court of Session, simply because they refused to take him upon his "trials." Without disputing the jurisdiction that, if the Presbytery found him unfit, they might reject him, the court held that the Presbytery were bound to take him on his trials. There was an appeal to your Lordships' House; and your Lordships adopted the decision of the Court of Session, and adjudged that the Presbytery were bound to take the presentee on "his trials." [The Lord Chancellor: They were parties to that decision.] They were parties to that decision, and they called upon you to establish their plea, and to set aside the judgment of the Court of Session. But your Lordships affirmed the judgment of that court. What was the next proceeding? The Presbytery was called upon to obey the order of your Lordships' House, and to take Mr. Young on his "trials." They said, "No; we will set at defiance the Court of Session, and the House of Lords, and we will adhere to the Veto-law, which the House of Lords have declared to be illegal." An action was brought against the individuals who refused to take Mr. Young on trial—who refused, without inquiry or cause assigned, to admit him to the fruits of the benefice to which he had been appointed. Mr. Young sought redress from the civil courts of his country. The question was, whether the persons who had disobeyed the law, as laid down by the Court of Session, and confirmed by the House of Lords, were so guilty of a wrong towards the individual whom they refused to induct, as to render them liable to make compensation for the loss which that individual sustained in consequence of their contumacy? The Court of Session held that they were liable. The Church party then appealed to this House. My noble and learned Friend upon the Woolsack presided: all who heard the case in this House were of opinion that the case of the plaintiff in the action was good, and the decision of the Court of Session right. All agreed that the defendants in the action were liable, and accordingly the judgment of the Court of Session was confirmed. The Church now complains of that judgment, and asserts that it is a law which the Church cannot endure. Now what is the law which the Church pronounces intolerable? Your Lordships declare that the Veto Act passed by the General Assembly was contrary to an Act of Parliament—that the Church ought not to obey the Veto Act— but ought to repeal it. The leaders of the Church set this House and the Court of Session at defiance. They say that the Court of Session ought not to have questioned what they did either upon their first or their second refusal to admit Mr. Young to the benefice to which he had been appointed. They say that the Church is wholly irresponsible. Is not this saying that their legislative power must not be questioned? Is it not saying that what they have decided in their courts, although contrary to law, and leading to injury of one of her Majesty's subjects, shall not be questioned? Is that, my Lords, to be endured? Will you assent to a law which is to make the Church courts of Scotland altogether irresponsible to the civil power? The greatest delusion exists in Scotland upon this subject, and it is my most anxious wish to assist, if possible, in dispelling the delusion. Such an irresponsibility is wholly unnecessary for the independence and usefulness of this church. It is unknown in this country—it is unknown in any Christian land. In England, when the spiritual courts exceed their jurisdiction, they are stayed in their progress and set right by the civil courts. If any dispute arise as to the extent of their jurisdiction, a prohibition is issued by the Court of Queen's Bench. And who decide the question in dispute? First the courts of Westminster-hall; and then, by writ of error or appeal, the case is brought before your Lordships' House, and you determine the limits of the jurisdiction of the two courts, spiritual and temporal. More than that, my Lords, in England, when the ecclesiastical courts are proceeding to excommunicate or to deprive upon grounds that are not within their jurisdiction, the civil courts interpose. We have a very recent instance of this in the case of a certain Dr. Free. The ecclesiastical courts were proceeding to deprive Dr. Free upon several grounds—some of them within their jurisdiction, others beyond their jurisdiction. The Court of Queen's Bench interposed. The Court of Queen's Bench said it would not interfere with the exercise of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts upon any grounds of a spiritual character upon which they sought to deprive Dr. Free; but upon those grounds which were not of a spiritual character they forbade the ecclesiastical courts by prohibition to proceed. But then it is said that all this proceeds upon the ground that the Queen, in England, is the head of the Church. Upon this point there exists in Scotland the greatest possible misapprehension. It is thought that the Sovereign, as head of the Church of England, has an absolute and undisputed sway over the affairs of the Church. Your Lordships very well know that prior to the Reformation there was an appeal from spiritual courts, to the Pope, but afterwards the appeal was given to certain commissioners appointed by the Crown. Instead of the Pope giving his sanction to canons passed in Convocation, that sanction was given by the Crown. But the Sovereign of this country cannot at all interfere with the Church as established by law. The Queen cannot alter the book of the Common Prayer. Even that prayer which we all pronounce with earnest and heartfelt devotion—the prayer for the young prince of Wales—was introduced into the Liturgy not by the command or the authority of the Queen, but by special authority given to the Crown by act of Parliament. In England our blessed Saviour is the spiritual head of the Church, just as much as in Scotland; it is only in respect to jurisdiction that the Sovereign is considered the head of the church. From the most remote times, centuries and centuries before the Reformation, the process of prohibition was just as familiar in England as it is at this moment. At all times, and even in the most palmy days of Popery whenever the ecclesiastical courts exceeded their jurisdiction they were corrected by the civil courts of Westminster-hall. Bracton, the most ancient writer upon the subject, says:— Si judex ecclesiasticus palam ponens in messem alienam aliquid presumpserit contra coronam et dignitatem regiam, pœna debita puniatur; And the form of prohibition is given most distinctly. Even Thomas à Becket was obliged to submit to the law of the land in this respect Thomas à Becket had unlawfully excommunicated a vassal of the Crown. He was obliged to rescind the excommunication and obey the law. By the Constitutions of Clarendon, which he had sworn to obey, it was especially provided that the ecclesiastical courts should not exceed their jurisdiction, and means were pointed out to keep them within it. When we come to the reign of Edward 1st, we find that in the 13th year of the reign of that monarch an act was passed, which says that there shall be no prohibition from the civil courts when the ecclesiastical courts are proceeding for church rates, or for not repairing the church or maintaining the churchyard. But why? Because these were matters that came within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts—matters which it would be improper for the civil courts to interfere with. Then an act passed in the 18th year of the reign of Edward 3rd, which I believe is the shortest in the statute hooks of this country. It is in the form, which then prevailed, of a petition and an answer. What are the words of the petition?— Plures de populo supplicant Domino Regi et Consilio quod assignentur aliqui de curia qui cognoscere possunt et mandent Judicibus Ecclesiasticis, in quibus casibus supersedere debent pro prohibitions, et in quibus procedere, prohibitione non obstante. Very well! Then the problem was to determine in what cases the ecclesiastical courts should be stayed by prohibition, and who was to define the limits of those courts. The answer, as exhibited in the act, was this: — Responsio.—Cancellarius vel Justiciarius habeat inde potestatem. The jurisdiction to determine the extent to which the ecclesiastical courts should be allowed to go was to be exercised by the Lord Chancellor or the Chief Justice of the King's Bench. This course has been uniformly pursued from that time to the present. I have been at some pains to obtain correct information how this matter is treated on the Continent of Europe; and for that purpose I have consulted my friend Mr. James Hope, one of the most learned canonists that ever lived. He has been kind enough to assist me; and we find that the very same system prevails in all Roman Catholic countries, and in all Protestant countries. I will tell your Lordships how the matter stands in Roman Catholic countries—in Austria, Sardinia, and Tuscany. In those countries they will not allow any bull or canon to be published until it has received the authority of the state. So far as regards the power of publication. Then, whenever the ecclesiastical courts exceed their jurisdiction, there is in each of the countries I have named an appeal to the civil courts. This, indeed, is universal. France is, perhaps, the most distinguished country in the world for its jurisprudence. I beg to state to your Lordships one or two authorities from the law of France upon this subject. There is a book of great authority upon these matters by Peter de Marca, Archbishop of Paris, entitled De Concordia Sacerdotii et Imperii, seu de Libertatibus Ecclesise Gallicanæ In this book there is a chapter upon appeals from the ecclesiastical courts, and Peter de Marca lays it down most distinctly, that whenever the ecclesiastical courts exceed their jurisdiction there is an appeal to the Parliaments. I will just read to your Lordships a single passage from this chapter: Si autem Episcopi jurisdictionem sæcularem usurpare contendant, lite per hanc appcllationem ad curias devoluta, ab invasine arcenlnr. Eo jure olira usos esse principes nostros testatum fecirmus. Quernmorem secuti sunt posteri. Hoc jure utuntur Reges in republicâ, Christianâ adversus aucloritatem ecclesiasticum quando de jurisdictione Iæsa controversial oriuntur. Whenever there is any controversy respecting the authority of the ecclesiastical courts, then by this appeal the controversy is to be adjudicated. There is another book, written by a great French authority, to which I beg for a moment to direct your Lordships' attention. It is a work upon the Ecclesiastical Laws of France, written by M. Hericourt. I find in it this passage: — The King being the defender of temporal jurisdiction, the conservator of the holy canons received in the kingdom, and the defender of the liberties of the Gallican church, has confided his authority over these important subjects to the Parliaments. For this reason application is made to them, by way of appeal in case of abuse, when the ecclesiastical judge has encroached on the temporal jurisdiction, and abused the jurisdiction which he exercises under the protection of the king. This ought to be observed in all the Parliaments of the kingdom. I will mention only one other authority, which is to be found in the celebrated declaration of the liberties of the French church. In that declaration your Lordships will find these words: — The courts of Parliament, in case of appeals as from abuse, have right and power to declare null, void, and to revoke the Pope's bulls and excommunications, and to forbid the execution of them, when they are found contrary to sacred decrees, the liberties of the French church, or the prerogative royal. M. Geston, the principal of the University of Paris, lays down precisely the same law with respect to appeal in cases of abuse. He says, Ut si excommunicare velit illos qui Regiis Edictis rationabilibus obedient. Notavit hæc Innocentius et habetur fundimeatum ex infallibili Lege Divinâ et naturali, In Ireland, where the Pope's power prevailed to a very great extent, I can give your Lordships an instance of what occurred in Popish times. In the year 1346, the Archbishop of Cashel and his suffragans opposed the levying throughout his province of a subsidy granted by Parliament, and decreed that every clegyman paying it should be deprived of his benefice, and his tenants making payment should be ipso facto excommunicated; and they farther excommunicated all who had advised or granted it, including the King's commissioner for gathering it in. Now here was the spiritual sentence of excommunication. For any ecclesiastical offence within the cognizance of the church, the civil court could not have interfered, even although the sentence had been unjust. But since the excommunication was not for any ecclesiastical offence, but for obedience to the law, the civil court was entitled to take cognizance of what interfered with the royal prerogative and the majesty of the law, and was bound to protect the subjects of the State from the injustice intended because of the obedience they were disposed to pay to the supreme power. Accordingly, for this offence an information was exhibited in the King's Court against the archbishop, and he was found guilty; and the other confederating bishops were also found guilty on the like information. In Scotland, the practice has been precisely the same. I will give your Lordships an example, which occurred in the reign of James the Fourth of Scotland, in the year 1494. In that year the Bishop of Galloway chose to excommunicate the Sheriff of Wigton under these circumstances: The Sheriff of Wigton had distrained a man's lands and goods for the sum of 40l., awarded against him in the Justice Ayre of Wigton. The Bishop of Galloway led a process of excommunication against the sheriff and his officers for so doing. The exercise of the jurisdiction was exclusively ecclesiastical. Yet for this exercise of his power of excommunication the bishop was called before the Lords of Session. They adjudged That the King's Hienes is greatly injurit in the leading of the said process against his officiaris in the executioun of their office, and therefore referres the convictioun and punising thereof to the King's Hienes, and counsales his good grace to provide for remeid thereintill, that it may be example to utheris in tyme King's officiaris in the executioun of justice. Thus it will be seen that the bishop was presented before the Privy Council was found guilty, and punished. So the law continued down to the time of the Reformation; and at the time of the Reformation was there any desire amongst the Reformers to alter this practice? Was any disposition manifested to say that the civil courts should not interpose where there was a clear excess of jurisdiction on the part of the ecclesiastical courts? I have here the words of Calvin himself. What does he say? Est igitur ecclesiastica potestas non malignà quidem ornanda, sed includenda certis finibus; ne pro hominum libidine huc atque illuc trahatur. Nam, si simpliciter hominibus concedimus, quam sumere ipsis visum fuerit potestatem omnibus in promptu est, quam sit proclivis in tyrannidem lapsus, quaæ procul a Christi Ecclesiâ abesse debet. John Knox, the great founder of the Church of Scotland, entertained precisely the same sentiments. In the confession of faith which was framed by him, or under his auspices, it is thus laid down: Mairover to kings, princes, rulers, and magistrates, we affirme that chieflie and most coming not to mak stop nor impediment to the principallie the conversatioun and purgation of the religion belongs, so that not onlie they are appointed for civil policie, hot also for maintenance of true religioun, and for suppressing of idolatraie and superstitioun whatsoever.…; and therefore wee confess and avow, that sik as resist the supreme power, doing that thing quhilk appertains to his charge, do resist Goddis ordinance, and therefore cannot he guiltles. Furthermore, in a work which Knox published under his own name, he lays down exactly the same view. He says: — It is lawful to God's prophets, and to preachers of Christ Jesus, to appeal from the sentence and judgment of the visible church to the knowledge of the temporal magistrate, who, by God's law, is bound to hear their causes, and to defend them from tyranny. It pertains to the prince, if there arise controversies among the pastors, to compose and agree the same by his authority interposed. Then in the First Book of Discipline I find this passage:— The civil power should command the spiritual to exercise and to do their office according to the word of God. The magistrate neither ought to preach, minister the sacraments, nor execute the censures of the kirk, nor yet prescribe any rule how it should be done, but command the ministers to observe the rule commanded in the word, and punish the trangressors with civil pains. This subject is so very important, that I trust your Lordships will excuse me if I read two or three other passages from the works of the reformers, and founders of the Church of Scotland. One of the most distinguished of them is Rutherfurd, who says:— The Church proceeding in these things that are against common justice in all adjudicatories, no less than in the Church, or to do manifest injustice in the manner of proceeding, leaveth a clear place to the wronged party, by the law of nature, if not to appeal, yet to flee and have recourse to the Christian magistrate, who is Parens Patriœ the father of the common wealth.… Yea, and the Christian King has a coactive power over all men, even pastors, as to cause them do their Christian duties; he hath power to compel Churchmen in assemblies to determine truth, and to use the keys right, and to preach and use the sacraments according as Christ hath commanded in his word, and to punish them when they do otherwise. We deny not but the prince may command the pastor to preach, and the Synod and Presbytery to use the keys of Christ's kingdom, according to the rules of the word; but this is but a civill subjection, though the object be spirituall. Andrew Melville writes to exactly the same effect. I will not trouble your Lordships with any extracts from his works; but I may mention that Bramhall, another eminent divine, who flourished at that time, says:— The Romanists themselves do acknowledge that sovereign princes, by the law of God and nature, not only may, but are in justice obliged to oppose the tyranny of ecclesiastical judges, and to protect and free their subjects from their violence and oppression. Again, in the Westminster Confession of Faith, which is the foundation of the doctrine and discipline of the Church of Scotland, we find these words:— The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the word and sacraments to the power of the keyes of the kingdom of heaven; yet he hath authoritie, and it is his dutie to take order that unitie and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed; and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed. After looking to these authorities, with respect to the Church of Scotland itself— with respect to the opinions and declarations of the founders of that Church—those who are looked up to with so much veneration and respect, it does amaze me to find that now, in the nineteenth century, such a demand should be made as that there shall in no case be an appeal from the Church courts to the civil courts of the land. But, then, we have this strange conundrum, for really it de- serves no better name:—The Scotch ecclesiastical courts say that they are to do whatever they like, to admit whom they please, to depose whom they please, to excommunicate whom they please. But then they say that what they do is not to be binding in the civil courts, and that it is only with regard to the spiritual office, and not with regard to temporalities of the living, that their jurisdiction is to be unbounded. According to this there may be a separation between the benefice and the cure, between the temporalities and the spiritual office, so that you may have in every parish in Scotland one person employed in the spiritual ministration of the benefice, and another person in the enjoyment of the temporalities. But what, according to this doctrine, is to become of a person in the situation of Mr. Young?—because he never can get at his temporalities. It is clear law, that until he is admitted by the presbytery, he has no right to the profits of the benefice. The Church courts say that they will admit whom they please to the spiritual office. Then how is Mr. Young to get the profits of his living? But, suppose that a man is once inducted into a living and is performing the duties of it, is he to be deprived of his spiritual office upon grounds that are not at all of a spiritual character? May the General Assembly pass a law to say, that if any man takes the oath of allegiance he shall be deprived of his spiritual office. But it is not merely the temporalities of the living that are involved in this question. A minister of the Church of Scotland has a status in the Church and a position in society which calls for the performance of duties of a civil as well as of an ecclesiastical nature. The ministers in Scotland are bound to examine schools, to look to the repair of manses and churches, and to perform various other civil duties which are vested in them. How are these duties to be performed when you have a spiritual clergyman and a temporal clergyman in half of the parishes of Scotland? I cannot better characterise this motion than by reading to your Lordships a sentence from the work of Sir Henry Moncrieff, a great ornament of the Church of Scotland, and father of the present Lord Moncrieff, whose family for several generations have displayed great talent and genius. What does Sir Henry Moncrieff say? These are his words:— No greater absurdity can be imagined than that it could ever have been in the contemplation of the law, that a benefice should, in any circumstances, be separated from the pastoral care to which it is attached. Then will your Lordships join with me in saying, that this extravagant demand on the part of the Church of Scotland ought not to be acceded to? I have read a great deal of what has occurred in Scotland upon this subject, and I find that they compare the dispute between the ecclesiastical court and the civil courts of that country to the dispute between the other House of Parliament and the courts of Westminster, at the same time, totally misunderstanding and perverting the question of Parliamentary privilege. Your Lordships will not suppose that I am now going to enter upon that question. I am not going to say whether the courts of Westminster Hall were right, or whether the House of Commons was right; but I am sure that the Church of Scotland is entirely wrong in supposing that there is the slightest analogy between their case and that of the House of Commons. It was never supposed by anybody in England that the House of Commons and the Court of Queen's Bench were co-ordinate courts that might go on in parallel lines, each determining according to its own view of what was right ad infinitum. The struggle between the House and the court was for superiority of jurisdiction. The House of Commons said, that the Court of Queen's Bench had no jurisdiction in the matter in dispute. The Court of Queen's Bench, on the contrary, said that a resolution of the House of Commons was not at all to be regarded; that they (the judges of the Queen's Bench), would look to see what the privilege of Parliament was; that they would not take their notion of what might be Parliamentary privilege from a resolution of the House of Commons. It was throughout a contest for superiority— a contest to know which of the two tribunals was properly vested with the administration of the law upon the matter in dispute. It was not in any respect a question between two co-ordinate courts of coequal jurisdiction, the one not being able to control the other; it was a contest for superiority, neither admitting any equality on the part of the other. The supposed analogy between the case of the Church of Scotland and the case of the House of Commons has greatly misled my countrymen in Scotland. There has been hardly a discussion upon this subject in Scotland, in which this mistaken comparison between the two cases has not been conspicuously put for- ward, und earnestly dwelt upon. This has proceeded from an utter misapprehension of the case of the House of Commons. Then if the demand of the Church of Scotland is one which is unreasonable, which is unprecedented, and which (if conceded) would be mischievous, I think your Lordships will do well to express your opinion that it ought not to be granted; after which I trust it would be abandoned. This total independence and irresponsibility of the Church courts is the great bone of contention—it is upon this that the disruption is to take place—this is the rock upon which the Church of Scotland is to be wrecked; they will give up (as I understand) even the veto—they will give up patronage, but this they will not give up. Now, I humbly apprehend, that upon consideration they will see that this demand is wholly unreasonable; that it is condemned by all men who take the trouble rationally to consider the subject; and that it cannot be granted, because it would only lead to confusion and ruin. There is at all times great danger from encroachments of this nature, emanating from the ecclesiastical power. See how far they have at different periods been carried by the Church of Rome. Originally all questions of marriage were determined by the civil courts; but presently the Church of Rome stepped in, and claimed the jurisdiction, as upon a matter touching the welfare of the soul. The Church said, "We must see whether the parties in the case are living lawfully together, or in a state of fornication." This right of interference once admitted, the Church acquired a jurisdiction to determine what was marriage, and what was not marriage. Thenceforward it was in the ecclesiastical courts that all matters of marriage were determined; they became the judges of divorce, and decided whether for adultery or any other cause a marriage should be dissolved. Then, for the good of the soul of the dead, the priest said he would take care of the property that was left. This gave to the church a jurisdiction over wills and all matters of a testamentary nature; and to this day we go to the ecclesiastical courts for administration or probate of wills. Then the church said, that it was not good for a man's soul that he should malign his neighbour, and consequently suits for defamation were brought before the ecclesiastical courts, and pro salute animæ, they sentenced the offenders to stand in a white sheet before the congregation, or to do some other pe- nance for their misdeeds. These encroachments on the part of the ecclesiastical power were going on so rapidly at the time that the Constitutions of Clarendon, to which I have referred, were framed, that they were actually going to take cognizance of actions of debt. They assumed that every debtor had made a promise to pay; and they said that it was not good for a man's soul that he should break his promise; therefore they allowed the creditor to sue the debtor in the ecclesiastical court. In short, the Church by this means was rapidly taking cognizance of all the civil suits in the kingdom, till, by the Constitutions of Clarendon, they were stopped in their progress. Let their Lordships see also the encroachments made by the Church of Rome as regards the power of excommunication. Originally the church said that it had a right to expel from its communion any persons who violated its rules. Upon this the Pope said that he made no distinction between high and low and that he would excommunicate a sovereign as well as a subject. What was the next step? The Pope absolved from heir allegiance the subjects of an excommunicated sovereign. What followed? The Pope claimed the power of disposing of the crown of the sovereign whom he had excommunicated. In the present day, such encroachments are not to be dreaded; but unless a stand be made in good time, I should be much afraid of the ecclesiastical power taking another direction, and being found extremely odious, and very oppressive, it might assume to itself the right of prying into all the concerns of private life—of interfering in all domestic matters, and so force itself into a position which would have the effect of making the yoke of the Church galling, and its burthen intolerable. I trust, therefore, if your Lordships shall be pleased to concur in the resolutions which I shall have the honour of placing before you, that the expression of your opinion will open the eyes of those who are so deluded—will bring them to their senses —will rouse them from this dream of irresponsible power, and place them in a situation to accept of the boon which your Lordships are ready to confer upon them. I certainly do not expect that those who are most violent upon the subject will counsel their followers to a return to reason and moderation. I am aware of the injurious way in which they have treated and spoken of those who have urged them to adopt the guidance of temper and reason. Sir George Sinclair, who laboured in their cause for years, has incurred much odium and censure for his moderation. I find, also, that Mr. Rutherford, the Member for Leith, and late Lord Advocate of Scotland —a most learned, able, and honourable man, and one who has laboured most assiduously in the cause of the Church, has of late been subjected, for the same reason, to a torrent of abuse and vituperation. If they had followed Mr. Rutherford's advice, they would have escaped the difficulty and the danger of the position in which they now stand. I deeply lament that, after the decision of this House in the cases to which I adverted in an early part of my speech, the church courts of Scotland did not see the propriety of repealing the veto law. Was it not the duty of the members of the established Church of Scotland, if they meant to continue in that Church, to obey the law as laid down by the highest tribunal in the country. But, instead of that, they remain in the Church, and set the law at defiance. They still act upon the veto law, and have not only refused to admit Mr. Young, and other clergymen who have been appointed, to benefices under similar circumstances; but in the case of the Presbytery of Strathbogie, there being a majority of members in favour of obeying the law, the minority, backed by the Church courts, succeeded in deposing all the ministers. Yet these persons continue, as they say, to be members of the Church, as established by law. The Strathbogie ministers did not stand alone in their deposition. Others have been treated in the same way; and the system now is that all ministers who obey the law are to be deposed in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ. A great secession from the Church is threatened. Between 400 and 500 ministers, I think, are about to quit it. They say they will dissolve the tie between the Church and the State. But, my Lords, I say that they have no power to entertain such a question as that, for, by so doing, they would not only be setting the law at defiance; but it would be something approaching to treason and rebellion. The Church is constituted by law, by acts of the legislature, and what right have they, sitting in a Church court, to say that they will dissolve the connection between Church and State? The supposition is quite preposterous, and I hope will receive no countenance from any quarter. Those individuals may withdraw and secede from the Church, as others did about a century ago. I would suggest to them that they have no ground for so doing. What have they to complain of? What injury have they sustained? What is their grievance? Why, there is a disposition to extend the power of the people in respect to the choice of their pastors, and the power of the Church in seeing that the Ministers are suitable to the parishes to which they are presented. If the Court of Session make decisions which are necessary to he appealed against, there is this House as a court of appeal, and I hope this House deserves the confidence of the people as a court of justice. This House has amongst its Members those who are competent to decide in such cases. Of myself and of my humble efforts to assist your Lordships of course I say nothing, but there is my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, who, as a judge, has had no superior— whose great learning and vast abilities cast the brightest lustre upon the Bench, and whose Impartiality and integrity as a judge have never been doubted. Then there is my noble and learned Friend near me (Lord Brougham), who to his varied acquirements adds a familiar knowledge of the law of Scotland as well as the law of England. Then there is my other noble and learned Friend (Lord Cottenham), who had sat on the Woolsack, unexcelled since the days of Hardwicke, he also attends the appeals in this House. Why, then, should the Church of Scotland suppose that the law, as it now exists, would not be faithfully administered? If appeals are brought before us, they will be impartially considered, and justice will be dealt on. What ground is there then—what pretence for seceding from the Church, when the law is purely administered, and when the Legislature, instead of encroaching upon the rights of the Church, are disposed to extend them. There has been a decision in another House of Parliament, by which that House declined to enter upon the question of the state of the Church; but that refusal proceeded from no hostility to the Church. On all sides there was the most marked respect and regard expressed for the establishment, and, I believe the same feeling actuated all parties. As 1 have said, then, the law as it exists will be faithfully administered by your Lordships' House; and if an alteration of the law were to be made, it would be in the direction contended for by the Church of Scotland. I hope, then, that those Gentlemen who think of seceding, will consider the mischief they are about to do. I purposely abstain from making any appeal to their interests, or to their private feelings, for I know that to such considerations they would have no regard, I believe, in their sincerity and seal, but I would entreat them to consider how, by the course they contemplate, they will endanger the establishment to which they belong. I have, indeed, been told, and I was shocked to hear it, that some of them have said they wished the Church to be subverted, and that they have called that establishment to which they have sworn obedience, "a filthy thing." Let them but consider what a frightful state of society must ensue from a perseverance in their wrong-headed and reckless course. Families divided against themselves, feuds and hostilities in every parish. Why a wound would be inflicted upon the very vitals of society, which I cannot even think of without the greatest dismay. Can they who profess to be charitable and Christian pastors voluntarily consent to be the wanton cause of so much mischief? If they deem their purpose to be right, and their consciences are clear, still let them remember that they may have been misled. Let them not suppose it enough that they believe their object virtuous and their intentions good. I think, indeed, that instead of resorting to a measure so little justified by the circumstances, they would better consult the interests of religion, and better observe the precepts of their Divine Master, by continuing in the Church of their fathers—that Church which has conferred, and which I do hope will ever continue to confer, so many blessings on the country. The noble Lord concluded, by moving the resolutions which had been previously laid before the House. See ante, p. 36.

The Earl of Aberdeen

addressed the House as follows:—My Lords, I must request permission of the House to state some reasons why I think your Lordships will do well not to concur in the resolutions submitted to you by the noble and learned Lord who has just sat down. Your Lordships' House, and the other House of Parliament, have always been reluctant to come to abstract decisions upon matters not immediately before them, and to the consideration of which they are not compelled by a paramount necessity. In this case I unfortunately know too well the dissensions by which the Church of Scotland is torn, but that church has not now come before the House by any petition. On the contrary, the noble Lord has informed your Lordships, that he is in possession of a petition addressed to this House, which he has not yet presented. Therefore, we may have that petition to deal with in no long time. If, when this petition shall be presented, you meet this body by a series of resolutions such as this, you would tell them you had already judged their case, and surely they would then have reason to complain of the manner in which they had been treated by your Lordships. If agreeing to these resolutions could in any way tend to remove the differences which exist in Scotland, and to improve the condition in which the Church at present finds itself, I should be willing to abandon as pedantic all considerations of precedent and form, and come at once to these resolutions, or others having such an object in view. But it is because I am persuaded that these resolutions, if agreed to, so far from having such an effect as the noble and learned Lord hopes for, would rather tend to widen that breach which exists, and aggravate the difficulties of the case, that I cannot give my assent to the propositions now before your Lordships. What does the noble and learned Lord expect would be the practical effect of these resolutions, if carried? It cannot surely be by way of information to the Church. The Church must be already perfectly informed of the fact, that in this House there is probably scarcely a single individual who is not prepared to agree in resisting the unreasonable and preposterous claims the Church has put forward. The Church must also see in the other House of Parliament, after a long contest, that an opinion was expressed by men of all parties in that House, and the proposal for a committee to enter into the examination of the question rejected. It therefore cannot be to inform the Church of Scotland, this House, or Parliament, that the noble and learned Lord makes this motion. What then is his practical object? He begins by two resolutions, which are very complimentary to the Church, although not more so than is true, and perfectly just. There is no doubt, my Lords, that we should all be ready to agree, that the Church of Scotland, as by law established, has produced the happiest and best effects upon the morals and religious character of the people of that country. I would even go further than the noble and learned Lord, and I would agree in that opinion which was expressed in the House of Commons, that that particular institution had produced the best effect of any institution that bad ever existed on the face of the earth. This may be true; but there is no reason for the House to come to a resolution to that effect, when it is to be attended by no practical consequence or result. The noble and learned Lord also proposes to resolve— This House is of opinion that the demands of the said Church, contained in the papers laid before this House, should be conceded by the Legislature, as far as the same can be safely conceded consistently with the permanent welfare of the said Church, and the existence of subordination and good government in the country. Now, if that be so—if it be the opinion of this House that these demands must be conceded, ought not the noble Lord to specify what those demands are which ought to be so conceded? Does not the noble and learned Lord leave us in a state of uncertainty and doubt; and does he not also leave the Church in a state of uncertainty and doubt what he means to concede, and what he means to resist? If this resolution mean anything, it commits the House most inconveniently and most dangerously, and the noble and learned Lord is bound to say, what it is he proposes to concede, otherwise he does not deal justly by the House, or by your Lordships. Then, in the same resolution, the noble and learned Lord proposes to declare, that, When any measures for correcting the alleged abuses of patronage in Scotland, and ensuring the appointment and admission of Ministers properly qualified for the parishes in which they are to officiate, this House will favourably entertain the same. That is what the noble and learned Lord proposes that your Lordships shall assent to; but, in the first place, I must observe, that there are no complaints of abuses of patronage. On the contrary, for the last twenty or thirty years, it has been admitted that patronage has been exercised almost without any reason whatever for complaint. True, the General Assembly and a large body in the Church object to the existence of patronage altogether, but the exercise of patronage, as it has existed for the last twenty years, has been universally admitted to have been without reproach. Therefore it is an unfair, and I must add, an untrue statement to say, that we are ready to correct abuses the existence of which is not alleged. I for one could not agree to sanction, even by implication, any such assertion, or that the ministers appointed have not been found, proper to edify the congregations to which they have been presented. The fourth resolution is certainly a resolution to the opinion expressed, in which I apprehend not a single Member of your Lordships' House would refuse his assent. But I think it unwise, unnecessary, and injudicious, to move a gratuitous resolution of this description. I am certainly disposed to maintain lay patronage as it exists, being quite agreed with the noble and learned Lord that no other system could be found so advantageous to the Church itself. But I know there is a numerous body in Scotland which, with the General Assembly itself, has declared that patronage is a grievance which ought to be abolished, in which opinion a large portion of the community concur. If that be so, why then declare this to be the resolution of the House when you are not called upon by them, when they have even said, that much as they object to patronage, they yet agreed in the declaration that the abolition of it was not a sine qua non with them, nor one of those grievances which they imperatively desired to have redressed. Why, then, unnecessarily shock the feelings of a large body of persons who do not come to you in a position which makes it necessary for you to give an opinion upon this subject? I know there have been periods in the history of the Church of Scotland in which patronage has been abolished, and though I do not desire to see any such event take place now, I see no necessity, I see no wisdom, in your Lordships committing yourselves absolutely to a declaration of opinion even on that subject. For instance, much as I desire to see patronage preserved, I have no hesitation in saying, I would rather see the abolition of patronage, and the substitution of popular election in the choice of ministers, than I would see the existence of the Veto Act, as enacted by the General Assembly. I conceive it possible that even the abolition of patronage might not be the worst event that could take place in the church of Scotland. But the resolution is wholly unnecessary, it would offend a large body of persons, and there appears to be no reason for it. With respect to the last resolution of the noble and learned Lord, he probably thinks that in consequence of the compliment with which he commenced, he may render his conclusion more palatable to the Church. I think the noble Lord will find himself mistaken; for, in the first place, as re- gards this resolution, the clergy would deny the correctness of his statement relative to the exclusive and supreme jurisdiction. Thus we should have a reply to these resolutions, a denial of the statement of facts, and a controversy would arise. This resolution is also liable to the objection that it refers to many matters which may come before your Lordships in your judicial capacity; for it refers to the law, and implies that the law is not to be altered, but it lays down what the law is; and that pre-judges many cases which may be sent to this House on appeal, and on which you would have to pronounce judgment. Therefore, however, I may agree with the opinion of the noble and learned Lord, I think the resolution would be an objectionable one for this House to pass. Seeing that the practice has been almost uniform to abstain from coming to resolutions of this abstract description without the strongest necessity, looking also to the improbability of these resolutions leading to any practically good result in soothing men's minds in Scotland, and averting the dangers which the noble and learned Lord anticipates—I think your Lordships would act unwisely if you did not refuse to concur in the propositions of the noble and learned Lord. And now, my Lords, with respect to the question of the state of the Church itself, and the other topics adverted to by the noble Lord, suffer me to make a very few observations. My Lords, I have always been one of those who have been disposed to a great extent to advocate that principle which has been called "non intrusion." I believe the people by the law of Scotland have a right to exercise a voice in the settlement of their ministers. I find, by authorities which I cannot controvert, that that is the law, although the precise extent to which that voice should be exercised may be doubtful. It was with a view of removing these doubts, and to fix the law in future on this subject, that three years ago I ventured to introduce a measure to your Lordships, which I had the happiness to see carried beyond its second reading by a large majority of the House, and which I have no doubt would have met, had it been persevered in, with the concurrence of your Lordships. That measure met with no opposition in regard to its provisions, although the time at which it was introduced was objected to by some noble Lords. But all declared that the measure did too much for the Church—that it recognized powers which the Church never did possess, and never ought to possess. The limitation of the rights of patrons in that measure was founded on the principle laid down by Sir H. Moncrieff, in his description of the church of Scotland, that it is the office of the patron to present, of the people to object, and of the presbytery to judge. The object of my measure was to extend as much as possible the power of the people in objecting, to give facility to that power of the people, and to secure the independence of the presbytery in judging of the objection. But, as I before observed, the only objection made in this House to the measure was, that it recognised too great a power in the Church. In Scotland, what was the reception of that measure? I have the happiness to say, that by nearly one half of the parochial clergy of Scotland, the measure was decidedly approved— they signed a written approbation of it; and I believe, that generally throughout the country, it was approved by those who were disposed to take a moderate view of the case, and looked for a practical measure, as the means of restoring the Church to a state of harmony and peace. The dominant party in the Church, however, after some hesitation—for there was hesitation—determined to oppose it, and in consequence of that measure, I was compared to the Regent Morton and the Duke of Lauderdale in oppression of the Church. My measure was called Erastian; I was accused of the sin of Erastianism. You, my Lords, who are Erastians to the very bone, will not think that an accusation very difficult to bear. It is true, I never in my life read a word of the works of Erastus, whether medical or theological, and probably I never shall; but if Erastianism means the setting up of the civil authority above, and so as to interfere with, the spiritual independence of the Church, I am as guiltless of the crime as any of the gentlemen who opposed the measure. But, my Lords, there are many things worse than Erastianism, and I wish nothing better for myself, nor worse for those reverend gentlemen, at the last great day, than that we may all have nothing more heinous to answer for, than the sin of Erastianism. But, my Lords, since that measure, the opinion of her Majesty's Government has been communicated to the Church of Scotland in the letter of my right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for the Home Department. By the statements of that letter, her Majesty's Government are disposed to stand. Those are the opinions which we have expressed, and to which we mean to adhere. But I could not have concurred in the statements of that letter, had I interpreted them as my noble and learned Friend opposite seems to have done. If I had not believed and known, that that letter was written in full conformity with the measure to which I have referred, I could not have concurred in it. But as that letter was intended to be in full conformity with the principles of that measure, I concurred in it. The noble and learned Lord has adverted to an expression in the letter of my right hon. Friend—the word "suitableness"—as applied to the minister of a parish. Now it is a very different thing whether the presentee be "suitable" or "acceptable," and it may happen, that the moat "suitable" may be the least "acceptable." I have now declared, that this letter has reference to the provisions of the measure to which I refer. That measure was proposed by me not as altering the law, but I proposed it to be a declaratory act. It would have been the height of presumption in me to entertain the slightest doubt of what had been declared to be law by the noble and learned Lord opposite, had I not been fortified by authority which I am bound to consider at least equal. The bill to which I refer received the approbation of the late Lord President of the Court of Session, who, for fifty years was himself a member of the General Assembly, also took an active part in all its proceedings, and who was particularly familiar with the law of the Church. He declared, that what was contained in the bill I proposed was consistent with the law of Scotland. I have also the opinion of Lord Core-house to the same effect; and of Lord Core-house it is certainly impossible to speak too highly as regards his profound learning and varied attainments. Your Lord-ships will remember, that there were two judges who were adverse to the claims of the Church, and to the Veto Act, and whose judgments were therefore certainly as little likely to lean towards an extension of the powers of the Church as any others upon the bench. I may, therefore, I think, conclude, my Lords, that the majority of the judges would be found to entertain opinions favourable to that measure. To say that all the objections to the presentee must be founded upon objections to his life, literature, or doctrines, is contrary to the law, practice, and discipline of the Church. I am of the opinion of the learned persons to whom I have alluded. My measure proposed that, at a particular stage of the proceedings, upon the settlement of a minister, if one or more of the parishioners should have any objections of any kind, it might be urged upon the presbytery, by whom they were to be examined, and if found valid, they were to be sustained, and the presentee objected to. That if any large portion of the parishioners should object to the presentee, and if this objection were not in itself valid, but were entertained by so large a proportion of the parish, and were entertained so strongly, as in the opinion of the presbytery to preclude the possibility of his edifying the congregation so as to contribute to their spiritual welfare, they were then at liberty to reject the presentee, recording in every case the grounds of their judgment. And there is the security, the only security, which would exist against the effectual revival of the veto; because, if a presbytery had power to give effect to objections which they did not think in themselves valid, then, of course, unless they recorded the grounds of their judgment, it would enable them to give effect to the veto by capricious and unreasonable objections. Now, there are many objections which are not personal to the presentee, and which are not at all against his life, literature, or doctrine, but which are very fit to be taken into consideration, and to weigh with the presbytery, even to his rejection—objections. which in themselves may almost appear capricious and unreasonable. I mentioned, on a former occasion in this House, an instance of this class of objections. Take a parish in one of the western islands, where, in former times, the clan of M'Leod had committed some great atrocity, from which day their name was abhorred. That is a circumstance which would render any minister of that name utterly disqualified to edify the people. Now, I say it is clearly no imputation on the life, literature, or doctrine of the man, that his name is M'Leod; but that, under this bill, would have afforded a good objection to his not being settled in that particular parish, because the matter pertains to a subject which has always been considered open to the examination of the Presbytery—the settlement of the presentee in the particular parish. Thus, again, if a person were objected to as unable, from bodily infirmity or weakness of voice to preach so as to be heard by the congregation, that objection, coming from a few, would have no weight; but, coming from the great body of the congregation, might well be considered as rendering him unsuitable for that particular parish. The discretionary power of setting aside or confirming such objections is one which I cannot help thinking is a most salutary power for any church court to possess, and one that might, perhaps, be possessed with advantage in this country. When I say, that it is the right of the patron to present, of the people to object, and of the presbytery to judge, I mean that it is not only their right but their duty; and I think that the Churchy in abandoning their duty of judging, by admitting the dissent of the people without any reason, clearly abandoned a duty which they were bound by statute to perform. Having now gone over the provisions of this measure, I think your Lordships will probably be of opinion, that this bill extended sufficient power both to the people and to the Church. I know it was said, to the Church alone that power was extended. My Lords, I deny that entirely; I say that it gave to the people greater power than they ever possessed and practically exercised at any period of the history of the Church. And that is what I understand that the noble and learned Lord himself is prepared to give; I understand that he is prepared, although he did not describe the measures by which he would propose to meet the demands now made to extend the power of the people to object, and of the presbytery to judge of those objections. I also am desirous of extending to the utmost possible degree the powers of the people in objecting to the presentee; but the part of the people is that of objectors, and not of judges. In any way in which these powers can be secured to them, I shall be perfectly ready to agree; but it is a mistake to suppose that the power of the people to object would be increased, if the objectors were in a majority. Why, is not an objection, if it be a really valid objection, as good, and ought it not to have as much force and authority, if it be urged by two or three, as if it be urged by 300? If it were otherwise, numbers, not truth, would be the rule. I speak now of valid objections of a general kind; I admit that an objection such as I have referred to, against a name, or various other objections which might render a person unsuitable, require, no doubt, a great body of the parish to concur in them before they can be effective; but an objection which is truly and from its own nature valid, is, I apprehend, just as good when urged by a few as when urged by many. I know it is said, and I have heard it urged, that if you allow a presbytery to reject a presentee on the objections of a few persons, you will have corrupt proceeding—you will have objections suggested, in order that the church court may give effect to them. This is to entertain an opinion of the church courts which I am very unwilling—indeed, which I cannot possibly adopt. I say, so long as they record the grounds of their judgment, you have a perfect security in their publicity, to say nothing of the courteousness of the members. The publicity which must attach to such proceedings puts it out of the question that a corrupt connivance can take place. The noble and learned Lord has alluded to one or two modes by which this power, as respects the people and the clergy, may be extended; and he has said, though without explaining his views particularly, that he would prefer the measure to which I have alluded to the veto. He has not described the manner in which he would confirm the powers he is ready to grant. I am perfectly satisfied that the principle of the measure which I laid before your Lordships, though I do not mean to say that no alteration could be admitted in its details, must form the foundation of any measure which may be adopted, if ever this question can be amicably settled. The truth, my Lords, is, that so far as her Majesty's Government is concerned, and I believe I may say the legislature, we are prepared to recognise to the utmost all the rights, privileges, and powers, which the people and the church have ever possessed by law, at any period of its history, in the matter of collation, for I exclude the abolition of patronage, I will not have it understood that we are disposed to entertain the slightest doubt as regards maintaining patronage. The matter of collation is that which brings the people into a share in the proceeding—collation in Scotland differing from collation in England—and gives them their status in the settlement of the minister, and a right of objecting. It is so explained by all the writers on the subject; and this is the ground taken by Sir George M'Kenzie, and the other authorities. So far, then, as regards the settlement of ministers, nothing more, I apprehend, ought to be desired by the Church, or can be desired by any reasonable man. But this, it will appear, is not what they require. I have said, we are ready to agree that the people shall possess all the powers they ever exercised by law at any period of the history of the Church. Take the Revolution settlement. I quite agree with the noble and learned Lord, that the Church would most probably be very unwilling to see the present system of patronage changed for that which was established in 1690, and to have the elders put in the place of the patrons. But take that settlement. According to the Act of 1690, the part taken by the people in the settlement of ministers was this:— The heritors of the parish (being Protestant,) and the elders, are to name and propose the person to the whole congregation, to be either approved or disapproved by them; and if they disapprove, then the disapprovers give in their reasons, to the, effect that the affair may be cognosced upon by the presbytery, under whose judgment and by whose determination the collation and entry of the particular minister is to be held and concluded. The Church might have that arrangement to-morrow. The bill to which I have referred gives them a great deal more than they ever had under the Revolution settlement. Though a majority is not mentioned in the passage I have read, it appears from the import that a majority must be intended, because otherwise it would be impossible to understand what constitutes the whole congregation. It cannot mean that every individual must be included; it must mean, therefore, that the majority was to approve or disapprove; they were to give in their reasons, which were to be cognosced upon by the Presbytery, that is, the Presbytery was to examine them judicially, and then to pronounce their determination. The bill to which I have referred extended greatly the powers both of the people and the Church courts in this respect; but if the settlement of 1690, as far as both these parties concerned be preferred to the existing system, there can be no difficulty whatever in such a system being approved of at the present moment. With this great increase to the powers of objecting, and judging, of course, it is impossible it can be admitted that objections shall be made which are illegal in their nature. Although I should be perfectly willing to agree that the judgment and sentence of the Presbytery could be appealed from to the superior Church courts that it would certainly be right to provide for—yet that could not possibly be understood as admitting of illegal objections being sustained. For instance, supposing, as it might very possibly happen in those parts of the country where patronage is most objected to, that the people might object to a presentee because he had received a presentation from a patron, if a presbytery sustained such an objection as that, I apprehend they would be undoubtedly acting illegally; and, therefore, would be liable to be corrected by the civil tribunals. In every other case where the law was violated, unquestionably an appeal must always lie to those tribunals, which must in every case interpret the law, and apply prompt redress. At one time, we know, a very numerous body in Scotland objected to a minister taking the oath of allegiance. Persons might, then, object to a Minister taking the oath of allegiance to the Queen. If such an objection as that could be sustained, of course it would be quite necessary that the competent tribunals should correct any outrage of that sort, and in every case where objections are illegal in their nature, no doubt recourse must be had to the civil tribunals. My Lords, whether any measure will now avert that disruption of the Church which seems about to take place, is more than I am able to state. I do not pretend to give an opinion; but from all that has appeared in the conduct of the General Assembly and the leaders of the Church, there seems no reason to hope that any measure—even of the most extended con-cession, recognising, as I have said, to the utmost the powers both of the people and the Church to the greatest degree to which they were ever possessed by law at any period—will be sufficient to satisfy the extravagant and unreasonable demands which have been made by the leaders of the Church, in their petitions to her Majesty, and in the claims they have pre- ferred. My Lords, I lament very much to see the spirit in which this secession, if it is to take place, will be accomplished by many of those persons. Very recently a numerous meeting has been held, presided over by the right hon. Gentleman who brought their petition before the other House of Parliament. I believe the noble and learned Lord alluded to the sentiments expressed on that occasion. Those sentiments were certainly not such as we should expect from persons who felt a necessity of leaving the Church, in consequence of their consciences being wounded by the interpretation given to the laws under which the Church is established. We have it announced to us, that if they do leave the Church, a course of agitation will be adopted, that they will not continue in the parishes where they are placed, and minister to such of their flocks as may share their opinions as to the proceedings of the civil courts, but declarations are made, that they will go through the kingdom and preach the Gospel throughout Scotland, as if it were a pagan country in which the Gospel had never been preached before. It is announced that they will force themselves into parishes occupied by men as pious, as learned, as exemplary as themselves; and, in short, that every means will be taken to injure, to destroy, that establishment which they have left. Indeed, one of their leaden makes no secret as to the conduct they will adopt and the hopes they entertain. He says, When we shall leave the establishment, we shall take every step within our power, and use all the influence which remains to us, to bring down the establishment which will then exist. When we leave the establishment, do we not see it made up of men who stand by a system which involves a heinous sin? and shall we not enlist all the energy we can command to bring down the abominable thing? Not that he said this under the influence or impulse of a great public meeting. He had long pondered over the subject in his own mind, and the result was, and it was his conviction, that their reasons for leaving the establishment should also be their reasons for subverting it and pulling it down. If it be impious for us to remain in the Erastian establishment, it therefore follows, as a natural consequence, that we cannot leave it unassailed after we have come out of It. Now, my Lords, proceeded the noble Earl, this does not appear like the wild wailing of a tender conscience, which leaves the Church unwillingly, in order to avoid the reproaches of its own feelings. It is rather the hostile rancour of disappointed ambition: it looks more like baffled ambition than conscientious difficulty. But, my Lords, I cannot think that such feelings will meet with any very extensive sympathy in Scotland. I cannot believe that the people who have been so long attached to the Church, devotedly attached to it as they are, will suddenly become the bitter opponents and irreconcileable foes of the establishment of which they have so long been Members. It is very difficult to say, to what extent those popular Ministers may proceed in misleading the people on this subject. They really make them believe—and some have attempted to make them believe—that it is the object of the Government to attempt to establish Episcopacy, and even Popery, in Scotland. They may make them believe many things as incredible as this; but I think the people will have too much good sense to believe it, without seeing some little more evidence of it. On the contrary, when they see and examine the language held to them by my right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Home Department, and even the sentiments I am expressing at this moment on the part of her Majesty's Government, they must feel that they are not dictated by a spirit of hostility to the Church, or to the extension of the privileges and powers of the people; and they will pause, I trust, before they take the desperate course to which these rev. Gentlemen would excite them. It is difficult, my Lords, to see to what extent the people at present share in the views of these persons. I fear it is greater than we could wish, or than would be thought probable; at the same time I must say, that there are many indications which tend to make me believe that, if it were not for the greatest activity and exertion on the part of the gentleman to whom I have referred, the people themselves would have no great inclination to adopt any such course. I believe that, throughout, this has been a clerical agitation. Notice has been given us by those leaders, at the meeting to which I have referred, of their determination to use the utmost activity, in their journies through the country, and in their efforts, to have what they call a glorious campaign of preaching. This is absolutely necessary to keep the people in the frame of mind which they desire. My Lords, I may mention, as one fact not unimportant with reference to the temper of the people on this question, that, in the course of the last summer, I had the honour of attending her Majesty during her visit to Scotland, together with my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Treasury. We followed in her Majesty's train through different parts of the country, when, naturally, an immense concourse of people was brought together in many places, and your Lordships are aware that when such is the case, among those countless thousands great freedom of expression is used. I was with my right hon. Friend, and although he was generally received with all the regard which his character, his talents, and his position deserve, still I do not deny that we very often heard observations not always of a very complimentary nature. We heard, I believe, cries of "No Corn-law," "no sliding-scale," "free-trade," and many other observations, which were made with that freedom which immense masses of people are so apt to claim. But I assure your Lordships that from the first moment to the very last we never heard a single syllable about intrusion or non-intrusion. I cannot say that those persons might not have entertained those feelings—it is possible they may; but if they had if the heart had been full, I think the mouth would have spoken. I mention this as a fact; but I do not mean to deny that unfortunately a very large class of persons, I fear, are misled to entertain such views as the one of which I have spoken. But if this secession should take place which I am quite confident the passing of the noble and learned Lord's resolutions would do nothing to avert I can only say that neither can hostility, nor the voice of the rational and dispassionate men of the present day, ever affirm with truth that these men were driven forth either by the Government or by the legislature. My Lords, I beg to move that your Lordships do now adjourn.

Lord Brougham

was placed in a situation both embarrassing and painful to himself in consequence of the position which this question occupied among the judicial business of their Lordships, and of the proceedings which had taken place in the courts below, and which were now pending before their Lordships. Feeling him self as it were in the situation of being judicially called upon to interpose his labour is the determination of the question, it was embarrassing for him to address their Lordships, however shortly and generally, on the subject. A sense of this would certainly induce him to imitate the example of his noble and learned Friend near him, then occupying the woolsack (lord Cottenham), in abstaining from entering on a discussion at large of his noble Friend's measure, when it was before the House two years ago. Therefore, he was willing to have been spared the necessity of entering at all into the subject, except for the purpose of reiterating his clear and decided opinion that the members of the Scottish Church, who had taken upon themselves to hold out against the decisions of the Supreme Court in Scotland, and against the decisions of their Lordships' House, were acting, and had been acting, in the grossest and most lamentable manner, and he would add, the most reprehensible violation of their duty, not only as ministers of the gospel, but as good subjects of the realm. With that view he had refused, on the occasion to which he had alluded, to make any new law for them to break, as they were breaking the old laws, to give them any relief of grievances, alleged or pretended, which they said they laboured under, until, in the first instance, if he might use a legal expression upon a legal subject, they should purge themselves of the contempt which they had committed, by submitting themselves heartily and entirely to obey the laws of their country, as declared by their country's tribunals. But, undoubtedly, the course which this debate had taken, and he would say the tenor of the observations which his noble Friend who had spoken last had thought fit to make, seemed to him to leave him no choice on the present occasion, and he must now state what occurred to him on the subject. His noble and learned Friend behind him (lord Cottenham) who felt, no doubt, that his judgment in the Auchterarder case was, though not intentionally, yet in reality, assailed by those observations, would set him right if he differed from him, but he (Lord Brougham) believed they entirely concurred. If he were to allow those observations of his noble Friend to go forth to Scotland, to those in revolt against the law of the country, against the decisions of the supreme court of Scotland, and, above all, against the decisions of their Lordships' House—if without comment, explanation or censure, those remarks were to go forth?— gracious heaven! what would be the consequence? It would be said that the House of Lords, was divided against itself that the law Lords were holding one language and the lay Lords were holding another, and that the authority of the Auchterarder case had been weakened and shaken by a declaration of a minister of the Crown. He knew his noble Friend meant no such thing. He was quite sure of that, because what dropped from his noble Friend at the end of his observations clearly showed that if any man in that House more clearly than another reprobated the conduct of those who were holding out against that decision, it was his noble Friend who had just addressed them in his legislative capacity. If the line were not clearly and broadly drawn between what, by any one Peer, was said and held in his legislative capacity, and what they all, without the least exception, without any shade or difference of opinion—men of all parties, without distinction, lay lords as well as law lords, held to be the law of the land— if the distinction of legislative and judicial matters was not clearly marked out, the judicial decision would inevitably at to be shaken. It was necessary, therefore, first to make that clearly and manifestly appear which no man yet had ever doubted, that there existed not the shadow of a shade of difference of opinion in any quarter of that House with respect to the judgment which had been pronounced on that most important question; that there had been no doubt or hesitation in coming to that opinion, any more than there had been doubt or discrepancy between his noble and learned Friend and himself. With regard to that judgment this remarkable circumstance was to be observed, though his noble and learned Friend and himself had together heard the case argued, for days and days, along with his noble Friend, the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as a former First Lord, for whom they all had the greatest esteem, and who took the greatest interest in Scottish affairs—Lord Minto—yet they had never happened to hold the slightest communication on the subject. They separated at Easter, before the recess, and when they came back, each had separately made up his opinion on the arguments and authorities stated, and the papers before them, and on coming to that House the day before the judgment was pronounced, and comparing notes together, they found that they had arrived at precisely the same conclusion, and that each rested his opinion on the same reasons. This was the decision given judicially in that House, the highest court of justice, affirming the judgment pronounced by the supreme civil tribunals of Scotland, on an appeal made by those parties who, if they had decided in their favour, would have been the very first to hold that the tribunal which did so was worthy of all acceptation; but who, the very moment that judgment was given against them, declared that their Lordships were Erastian judges, whose opinions were not fit to be received, but worthy of all reprobation; and that Scotland, Church and State, men of high degree and low, persons in congregations and out of congregations, were alike bound to support those reverend agitators in their resistance to the law as laid down by their Lordships. That being the undeniable and unanimous opinion of their Lordships, and their Lordships being determined to uphold the law of the country, it became a question of comparatively trifling importance how they should deal with the other part of his noble Friend's speech. His noble Friend, in enumerating the details of a bill formerly presented by him to that House, had described that bill as merely a declaratory bill, as a bill merely intended to state with more precision the law of the land, as it at present existed. His noble Friend laid it down as the law, that the people and the Presbytery had the right to reject a minister, after the patron had appointed him; that they had a right to reject him, not only because his life was bad—not only because his learning was insufficient—not only because his doctrine was unorthodox—but because he was unfitted and un-suited to that parish. Want of fitness and suitableness was the expression. Now, was that the law of the land? Would an act of Parliament giving to the Presbytery such a power as that, be merely a declaratory act? If that was the law of the land, it was a most marvellous thing that, in the whole history of jurisprudence, centuries should have been allowed to elapse without the occurrence of a single instance that could be cited, in which that power had been claimed and exercised by the Presbytery. [The Earl of Aberdeen; Oh, many.] He could only say, that he spoke in the presence of the judge who had decided on the question, and of the advocate who had pleaded it; and he had not, in the course of those pleadings, heard it maintained that such was the law, though nothing would have been more calculated to prop up the Veto act, than to have shown that it had ever been a constant practice to reject a minister after he had been appointed by a patron, and to reject him, not because he led a bad life, not because there was any thing objectionable or unorthodox in his doctrine, not because his learning was deficient, but because he was not a fit, proper, and suitable person for that particular parish. His noble Friend said, they were all Erastians in that House, but if his noble Friend maintained such principles as those, he ceased to be an Erastian. He was a backslider from Erastianism. He was coming nearer and nearer to positive non-intrusionism. [Hear, hear, from the Earl of Aberdeen]. Oh, his noble Friend accepted that remark, and admitted that he was coming nearer and nearer to the principle of non-intrusion. His noble Friend alarmed him by that admission, and alarmed him still more when he said that he would not only have the law so in Scotland, but that he wished to see the same principle recognised elsewhere too. That he would have his view of the law cross the Tweed and be adopted in England. He must own that there was to him something alarming in the assertion of such a doctrine, particularly when it came from one in the position of his noble Friend. Why, what became of the whole law of patronage? What would remain of the patron's rights; when he first heard of this declaratory bill of his noble Friend, he was abroad, and he was so much alarmed, that he wrote to him by that day's post in hopes that there was some error which might yet be corrected. But it now turned out that it was intended as a deliberate assertion of the existing law. The patron then, had no longer the undoubted right of presenting a minister of pure life, orthodox doctrine, and sufficient literature; the choice of the patron was to be unavailing, if the clerk chosen was not a person who suited the parish! This was quite a new law of patronage. The man who might suit a country congregation might be held to be unsuitable for a town parish. He might be thought deficient in accomplishments as a scholar, not sufficiently attractive as a preacher, not fashionable enough for a city church. Let him go to a rural parish, then, if he will, but let him beware how he intrude himself among a more polished congregation:— Rusticus, abnormis sapiens, crassaque Minerva. Such a law was at all events very different to that laid down by their Lord ships in the Auchterader case. The minister, according to his noble Friend, must be a man enjoying the respect of the people among whom he was to be settled noble Friend ought to be taken into consideration as much as the minister learning, life, and doctrine. Now, was this giving a right of presentation at all to the patron? He utterly denied that it was the law as it now stood. The mere presentation of a minister was held by some to render him unfit and unsuitable. His noble Friend said, that the civil power would interfere to put down such an objection. But how? Not by the bill, which they were told was a declaratory bill. His noble Friend said, that where the majority of a parish were against the man, however suitable he might be for the ministry in all other respects, he was unsuitable for that parish, for, said his noble Friend, he would have a harmonious call or no call at all. It was quite idle to disguise the fact, that this doctrine was neither more nor less than an adoption of the entire principle of the Veto Act. To be sure, his noble Friend said, that the parishioners would have no right to judge and reject, they would only have the right to object; but was not this to take away all security from the exercise of the right of patronage? If the judgment on the Auchterarder case was founded on a correct view of the law, and was a judgment that ought to be maintained, then that law was not the same as that which his noble Friend assumed to be the law of Scotland. If there was only one man in the parish who objected, and he was supported by a majority of the presbytery, although no ground whatever was assigned, his noble Friend would say, under those circumstances, that it would be better the minister should not be forced on the parish, that the patron would do better to choose again, and to go on choosing until he had succeeded in choosing a person agreeable to the parishioners. Such a state of things he (Lord Brougham) would call a mockery of the tight of choosing. After having said this much, he begged their Lordships to remember, that neither on this nor on any former occasion had he ever given an opinion on the legislative part of the question. He had altogether confined his argument to the judicial part of it. He had dealt with his noble Friend's bill only in its character of a declaratory bill. He might be of opinion with his noble and learned Friend behind him, that it was it some alteration should be made in the ecclesiastical law of Scotland. He (Lord Brougham) might adopt the opinion laid evidence on this subject—evidence full of the most profound learning, and full of the most striking candour and wisdom. He (Lord Brougham) might be inclined to adopt the opinion there given, that some more real power than now existed ought to be given to the parishioners of moderating a call. He was certainly not for shutting the door against all conciliation, but one thing was quite clear, and on that point his opinion was fixed and unalterable, namely, that no such steps could be taken till those who had placed themselves in opposition to the law had recognised the error of their ways, till the wrong doers had given up their present course and resolved to act in obedience to the laws. If a mode could be suggested by a legislative measure, of allaying and settling the whole question now in agitation, nevertheless, he (Lord Brougham) would say—do nothing till the law, as it now exists, shall be reverenced and obeyed. He would not himself be a party to any legislative measure, the object of which was to give men new laws to break, till, like good subjects, they had submitted to those laws of their country which were already in force. His noble and learned Friend the Lord Chief Justice he perceived, was not there that evening, and he had deferred to the last moment the observation he was about to make in his noble and learned Friend's name. His noble and learned Friend had been extremely anxious to express his opinion to their Lordships on this great subject. He was authorised, however, to say, that no language was too strong to express his noble and learned Friend's disapproval of the conduct of those parties in Scotland to whom allusion had been made, and his determined opinion that the law must be obeyed before any legislative change could be agreed on by Parliament.

The Earl of Haddington

said, that his noble and learned Friend (Lord Brougham) bad described the speech of his noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as tending to shake the judgment of their Lordships in the Auchterarder case. Yet his noble Friend, (the Earl of Aberdeen) had said, on the contrary, that all the Members of her Majesty's Government had agreed with that judgment. That judgment was deserving of the highest respect. His noble and learned Friend had argued, that the question of suitableness was one that must not be taken into consideration; yet his noble Friend had stated that he was supported in his view of the law by the late president of the Court of Session. He had not any intention of entering into a conflict with his noble and learned Friend on a matter of law; yet be must say, that although the brilliant magination of his noble and learned Friend had conjured up a number of imaginary cases, yet he could easily conceive that there might be descriptions of unsuitableness that ought to be taken into consideration. A man, for instance, might be appointed to a church where he could have no assistance, but would have to discharge the whole of the duty himself. The gentleman appointed to that church might be perfectly qualified, his life might be irreproachable, his doctrine quite orthodox, and his learning highly distinguished; but with all this he might be a man of feeble health, and, if so, would certainly not be suited to such a parish, and no patron would do his duty if he persisted in appointing such a minister to such a parish. Yet, according to his noble and learned Friend's view of the law, the Presbytery would not be entitled to reject that man, however incapable he might be of discharging the duties of a laborious parish. Again, a man with a very feeble voice might be appointed to a parish in which there was not only a numerous congregation, but also a very large church. Such a man would not be able to edify the people; not because his life might not hold out a good example—not that his doctrine might be heterodox—but simply because he could not be heard. He (the Earl of Haddington) thought that should be held to be a sufficient objection. Or, suppose a man appointed to a parish in the Highlands, of which the majority of the inhabitants did not understand English, of what use would the minister be in such a parish, if he was wholly ignorant of the Erse dialect? Whether, therefore, suitableness made part of the law of Scotland as it now stood, he would not undertake to say; but if their Lordships came to legislate on the subject, they would do well to pay all due consideration to the question of suitableness. At all events, what bad been stated in the course of this debate, ought to make those gentlemen who had placed themselves in a state of disobedience to the law, feel how enormous a difficulty they would avoid if they would but determine to put themselves in unison with the laws of their country. Their Lordships would then have a clearer course before them, and peace might be restored to the distracted Church of Scotland. In the meantime, however, their Lordships had lost sight of the resolutions moved by the noble and learned Lord opposite. As to the motives by which the noble and learned Lord was actuated in bringing forward those resolutions, there could be but one feeling among their Lordships, who would all sympathise with the feelings by which the noble and learned Lord was impelled. The noble and learned Lord was the son of a venerable clergyman of the Scottish church, and all his earliest recollections and affections were connected with that Church, to whose well-being he was anxiously desirous of contributing by every means in his power. Now, at the eleventh hour, the noble and learned Lord came forward to endeavour to avert one of the greatest evils that could befall that Church; but if he might be permitted to say so, the noble and learned Lord would not by these resolutions gain the object he had in view. He understood the object of the noble and learned Lord in bringing forward his resolutions was to make some concessions to the Church of Scotland. But what would be the value of that concession? When the noble and learned Lord came to explain his views, he told the House, that he disapproved of the bill introduced some years ago by his noble Friend near him (Lord Aberdeen). The noble and learned Lord said, he thought that that bill went too far —that it gave too much power to the Church. Now, it must be in the recollection of their Lordships that that very bill was rejected with disdain by the Scotch Church. The noble and learned Lord refused to go as far as that bill went, and proposed to give the gentlemen who rejected that measure, a modified proposition, compounded of somewhat less power to them, and somewhat less power to the people; but if the former measure were not considered satisfactory, surely the noble and learned Lord's more limited proposition was likely to be still less so. It was evident, that the object which the noble and learned Lord had in view, would not be gained, if the House were to agree to his resolutions—that object being to stop the coming evil of secession from the Church. God knew, that could he assist in averting that enormous evil, by sacrificing opinions and prejudices, without the abandonment of principle, he would gladly do so; but he did not feel himself called upon to agree to resolutions, which he was satisfied would not have the slightest effect in that respect. In all that the resolutions expressed respecting patronage he entirely concurred. Patronage ought to be upheld, and he agreed with the noble and learned Lord in thinking, that much of the decorum, and of the well-working of the Church, depended upon the system of patronage. He attached great importance to lay patronage, but much more to the patronage of the Crown, exercised, as it was with respect to a Church which, by its constitution, had no ecclesiastical connection with the State. Still the difficulties of the case would not be removed by throwing those opinions in the teeth of the advocates of the claims put forward in behalf of the Church. It would be better to leave them to reflect upon what had recently taken place with reference to this question, The letter of Sir James Graham showed what was the animus of the Government; and the discussion which had lately taken place in the House of Commons, as well as that which was now going on in their Lordships' House, showed what was the animus of the Legislature with respect to the Church of Scotland. He was most anxious, three or four years ago, for the success of the bill brought forward by his noble Friend (Lord Aberdeen). If that bill had been adopted, he believed it would have had the effect of stopping all the mischiefs which be saw were coming, and which no man who knew Scotland as he did, could fail to foresee. A crisis had now arrived; but he hoped in God, that before the fatal moment of secession came, many of the reverend gentlemen In Scotland would reflect on the infinite mischief they were doing, not merely to the Established Church, but to the cause of religion, peace and morality. He hoped that if those gentlemen had come to a rash and hasty resolution without being aware of what they were about, they would yet see that they might, with a safe conscience, draw back. From all that be had lately heard, he was inclined to believe that many of them would not persevere in the fatal resolution they had adopted; and as to the people themselves, the pains which had been taken by leaders to agitate them by going from house to house to stir them up to secession, showed that the people had no natural desire for anything of the kind. He did not know what success those unworthy efforts had been attended with; but he feared that in some parts it had been considerable. Still, he hoped that, from the known attachment of the people of Scotland to the Church of their forefathers, the secession would, after all, not be as great as some gentlemen in their zeal were apt to imagine, or as those who were friendly to the institutions of their country, were led to fear.

Lord Cottenham

said, that if the law were as it was stated to be by the noble Earl opposite (Lord Aberdeen), and in the letter of Sir J. Graham, there bad been in this case, as had happened in many other great contest;, very little to quarrel about. If the Church had the right to decide on the question of the suitableness of the presentee, where was the use of the Veto-act? The noble Earl had quoted the opinions of high authorities in support of his view of the case, but before it was possible to decide what weight might or ought to be attached to those opinions, it would be necessary to know every particular of the case which had been laid before the persons who pronounced them. It was a singular circumstance, that two of the individuals to whom the noble Lord referred were in the majority on the Auchterarder case. The noble Earl said, that there had been many instances of such interference as that which the Church of Scotland claimed the right of exercising; but it mattered not how numerous those instances might be, unless there had also been a decision in favour of the Church. Doubtless there had been much interference on the part of the Church, for it was notorious that the Church had al- ways been engaged in contests with the civil courts on the subject of patronage. How was the right of patronage defined? The Presbytery was bound to admit a qualified person. But the noble Earl might, however, say, that although qualified, the presentee might not be suitable. But the meaning of the phrase, "qualified person" was strictly defined. It was defined to be a person qualified in literature, life, and manners. If, therefore, the Presbytery should find a presentee to be qualified in literature, life, and manners, they had no right, according to the law of Scotland, to reject him for any other reason. They were bound by act of Parliament to admit any presentee who was qualified in these three particulars, and if they should not do so they would fail in their duty. Their Lordships had the assistance of the most able counsel in the Auchterarder case, and not one of them ventured to suggest that the Presbytery possessed the power of rejecting a presentee, provided he were qualified in respect of literature, life, and manners. It would, indeed, be most strange that if the law of Scotland were such as the noble Earl represented it to be, it should have remained a secret, and never have been acted on. [The Earl of Aberdeen: It had fallen into desuetude.] It must, indeed, have long since fallen into desuetude, for no trace of it was to be found in any record. The noble Earl had introduced a declaratory act to make it law, which he at the time opposed. He objected to that measure because it destroyed patronage; and the state of the law, as described in Sir J. Graham's letter, if it really existed, would have the same effect. If the Presbytery were to be allowed to entertain the question of suitableness upon any other ground than the three defined points, the exercise of patronage would be a mere mockery. If a single person in a parish objected to a presentee, the Presbytery might declare him unsuitable, and that they might continue to do as often as the patron should present. What, in such a state of things, would become of the property and privileges of the patrons? It was obvious that a right exercised at the will of another was worthless. In his opinion it was important that patronage should not be transferred to the Church. The exercise of patronage by laymen, as it took place in this country, worked beneficially for the Church and the community. There were some circumstances connected with it which might, at first sight, appear to be absurd or improper, such as making livings a matter of bargain and sale; but, upon the whole, the exercise of patronage by laymen, checked by the control of the Church, was productive of great advantage both to the community and the Church itself, and he should be sorry to see it transferred to the Church either in this country or in Scotland. His only reason for rising on the present occasion was to state what the law was, and he could not help thinking that it was very unfortunate that any question should have been raised as to the existing law. No person who would take the trouble to read the Auchterarder case could have any doubt as to what the law was. Whatever the opinion of Scotch lawyers might be, he was certain that every lawyer in that House would admit that the law was correctly laid down in the Auchterarder case.

The Lord Chancellor

wished to say a few words with reference to the decision in the Auchterarder case, and in the course of what he had to say he would neither allude to the bill formerly introduced by his noble Friend, nor to the resolutions now under the consideration of the House. He agreed with his noble and learned Friend who had last addressed the House in thinking that it would be productive of the most serious consequences if any doubt should happen to be entertained in Scotland as to the unanimity of their Lordships with respect to the decision in the Auchterarder case. He was not present when the case was argued for the first time before their Lordships, but when it came for the second time before the House he had the honour of presiding at the hearing of it. Everybody acquainted with the subject, knew that the said case was connected with and arose out of the first. It, therefore, became his duty before the judgment was pronounced in the second case to consult all the papers and all the arguments which had been adduced in the first. He paid every attention to the subject, he consulted all the judgments of the judges in the courts of law, and the opinion he arrived at was—he spoke with deference to some of the judges of Scotland—that it was perfectly impossible, consistently with every legal principle, to come to any other decision than that which was pronounced in the first Auchterarder case. He had felt it his duty to the country, and to Scotland is particular, to state his opinion with respect to the Auchterarder case, in order that it might not be supposed for a moment that amongst the law lords, at least in that House, there existed the slightest difference of opinion, not merely with respect to the decision in that case, but with respect to the arguments on which it was founded. He trusted that their Lordships would excuse him for having said thus ranch; but he was anxious that no doubt should be entertained, in consequence of anything which had been thrown out of the validity of the decision in the Auchterarder case.

Lord Campbell,

in reply, expressed his entire concurrence in the view taken by his three noble and learned Friends as to the law of Scotland upon the point in dispute. He was disposed to hope that the discussion which had taken place would have a salutary effect. Though an adverse opinion had been expressed as to the expediency of adopting his resolutions, no one had dissented from the opinions contained in them, and it might, therefore, be presumed, that their Lordships unanimously concurred in them. He hoped that the leaders of the Church party would not be so presumptuous and arrogant as to resist the unanimous opinion of Parliament.

House adjourned.