Lords Sitting of 13 June 1843

Preamble
MINUTES.] BILLS. Public.—2a. Church of Scotland Benefices.
Private.—1a. Bardney Drainage; Leamington Priors Improvement; Hull Water, Works; M'Culloch's Estate.
2a. Southampton Cemetery; Chalgrove Inclosure; Southampton Docks; Walton-on-the-Hill Rectory; Earl of Gainsborough's Estate; Kentish Town Paving.
Reported. — Birmingham and Gloucester Railway; Edinburgh and Glasgow Union Canal; Saltcoats Harbour; Ballochney Railway.
PETITIONS PRESENTEB. By the Bishop of Ripon, from a number of places, for Church Extension.—By the Earls of Clarendon, Radnor, and Fitzwilliam, from Darlington, Deptford, Sunderland, and a number of other places, for the Total and Immediate Repeal of the Corn-laws.— From Lanark, and Penpont, for Improving the Condition of Parochial Schoolmasters in Scotland. — From Aberystwith, for carrying out Rowland Hill's Plan of Post-office Reform.—From the Commissioners of Lighting and Paving in Ireland, against Repeal.

THE PRINCESS AUGUSTA OF CAMBRIDGE.—THE QUEEN'S MESSAGE.
On the motion of the Duke of Wellington.— Her Majesty's message on Friday was read, [See Anti p. 1289.]
The Duke of Wellington—My Lords, I rise, agreeably to the notice which I gave to your Lordships a few nights since, for the purpose of submitting a proposition in answer to her Majesty's most gracious communication just read. It is impossible that your Lordships or the whole of the country should not feel a lively and deep interest in the subject which Her Most Gracious Majesty has submitted to your consideration. It is impossible, when we call to mind the excellent qualities of her Royal Highness—-her affability—to doubt that she has made a most favourable impression upon the minds of your Lordships. It is impossible that your Lord-

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ships cannot but take a great interest in the happiness and welfare of the illustrious Princess about to be allied to his Royal Highness Frederick Hereditary Grand Duke of Mecklenburgh Strelitz. I rejoice in the auspicious marriage which is about to take place with a Prince for whose qualities every individual who ever had the honour of knowing him must have the greatest respect, on account of the affability and kindness which he invariably manifested to all who approached his Royal Highness. I beg, my Lords, to move in answer to Her Most Gracious Majesty's message an address to thank her Majesty for the most gracious communication which it has pleased her Majesty to make to this House, relating to the intended marriage between her Royal Highness, the Princess Augusta Caroline, eldest daughter of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, and his Royal Highness Prince Frederick, Hereditary Grand Duke of Mecklenburgh Strelitz; that this House feels the most lively interest in any event connected which can contribute to the happiness of the Royal Family, and will concur in the measures which may be proposed for the consideration of the House to make a suitable provision for her Royal Highness on this occasion.
Earl Fortescuetrusted their Lordships would do him the justice to believe, that he did not rise upon that occasion to oppose the motion just submitted to the House by the noble Duke. The contrary, he felt happy in expressing his entire concurrence in the observations which had fallen from the noble Duke. The noble Duke had but given expression to those sentiments of respect and esteem, and if he might use the term good-will, which he felt for the illustrious persons to whom the noble Duke had referred. He wished to take that opportunity however—the only one on which he could with propriety refer to the subject—to call the attention of the House to other parties, connected with the Royal family; parties whose distress associated as it was with a late afflicting event, certainly entitled them to the sympathy and kind consideration of their Lordships and the country. He was bound, in limine, to state that he had had no communication either directly or indirectly with any of the parties interested in this matter. They were all utterly ignorant of the course which he was about to take, the responsibility of
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which for good or for ill rested solely on himself. It was not more than a month back that the noble Duke opposite,— and the right hon. Baronet, the Prime Minister of the country, moved addresses of condolence to her Majesty, on the lamented death of his Royal Highness the Duke of Sussex. Upon that occasion, both the noble Duke in that House and the Prime Minister in the other House of Parliament, expressed in the highest terms their sentiments of respect for the memory of his Royal Highness. The sentiments so expressed were, he believed, shared by all, All concurred in the tribute paid to the high and varied attainments which his Royal Highness had exhibited during life—to the liberal and unostentatious patronage which he had extended to science — to his extensive charity—and to his constant efforts to promote all those objects which he thought calculated to advance the improvement and happiness of his fellow-creatures. The situation of his Royal Highness was different from that of any other member of the Royal family. He was the only member of the Royal family who had never received any income in addition to his Parliamentary grant, and if he had not been misinformed, his Royal Highness up to the age of thirty did not receive that Parliamentary allowance, but was solely, in the receipt of the limited income which he derived from his father, George 3rd. Under these circumstances, he was necessarily a good deal embarrassed, and these embarrassments continued for a considerable period afterwards. In 1831, his Royal Highness married Lady Cecelia Underwood. The circumstances of their marriage were, he (Earl Fortescue) believed, known to his late Majesty William 4th; but for reasons of which he was not aware, it was not thought advisable to make any public declaration of that event. It was his Royal Highness's intention, however, subsequent to the marriage of her present Majesty, to make a public declaration of his marriage, and if no address proceeded from either House of Parliament against it, he (Earl Fortescue) understood, that his Royal Highness would have been entitled to consider his marriage strictly legal. The Duke of Sussex had, however, by the persuasion of his wife, abandoned that determination, in consequence of her Majesty having expressed her wish to that effect, and her intention to confer upon Lady Cecelia Un-

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derwood) the title of Duchess of Inverness. Though the marriage of his Royal Highness was not held valid in law, there could exist no doubt but that it was so in a moral point of view. His Royal Highness, by a former marriage with Lady Augusta Murray, had also two children, whose chief if not their sole income, was the allowance made them by His Royal Highness. He believed, that after the sale of all his Royal Highness's effects, and the payment of his just debts, there would be nothing left for the maintenance of his family, who would not merely be deprived of their present affluence, but even of the comforts common to all who moved in the circles in which they had been accustomed to life. He well knew, that no proposition for a public grant of money could originate in that House, but he trusted that the notice which he had drawn to the subject would excite attention in another place, in which a proposition for some provision for the parties in question could only be made.
The Duke of Wellington:My Lords, the motion which I had the honour to submit to your Lordships affords your Lordships an opportunity of discussing any questions connected with the subject of a provision for the Royal Family. I very much regret that the noble Lord did not give notice of his intention to discuss the question which the noble Lord has brought under the consideration of your Lordships' House. If the noble Lord had given that notice it would have enabled those connected with her Majesty's Government to have spoken with some authority on the subject. The noble Lord has only done justice to myself, and to my right hon. Friend in the House of Commons, in stating that we spoke of the late illustrious Duke with the utmost respect, and that both of us entertained the sincerest admiration of the qualities, the acquirements, and the life of his late Royal Highness. For my part, I always felt the greatest respect for him; I always experienced the utmost affability and kindness from him; I respected his virtues, and I felt how much he was esteemed by the people. My Lords, I had no knowledge whatever, nor, indeed could I acquire any knowledge, respecting his different marriages, or the circumstances to which the noble Earl has adverted. Of course, therefore, I can in no way be prepared to state anything upon those sub-
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jects; and your Lordships will, I am sure, excuse me for not further adverting to them than to repeat my respect for his Royal Highness's memory, and to lament that any friends of his should be left in any state of difficulty. It is obvious that the marriage referred to, though a marriage in a moral point of view, in a legal and political view could be no marriage of a member of the Royal family, and cannot be considered as such in discussing a question of this kind either in this House, or in another place, where, if the matter were discussed at all, it must, of course, be brought under more distinct consideration.
Lord Broughamfelt with the noble Duke, that the observations of the noble Earl, though clearly proceeding from the kindest and best motives that any man's heart could entertain, yet were entirely foreign to the question before the House. The question was one in which he hoped the House would unanimously concur. For his own part, he entirely approved of what had fallen from the noble Duke with respect to it, and he should give his most cordial vote in favour of the motion. With respect to what had fallen from the noble Earl, having had the honour of holding office under hi3 late Majesty King William 4th., and the circumstances referred to having then been brought under his notice, he wished to be understood, that his silence upon this occasion was not to be taken as an assent to the legal doctrine laid down, to his utter astonishment, by his noble Friend. Further than this he would only add, that he had the highest respect for his Royal Highness, and that nothing would give him more satisfaction or greater joy than anything which could conduce to relieve the distress in which it was stated his friends were involved.
The address was agreed to nem. con. and was ordered to be taken up to her Majesty by the Lords with white staves.

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND BENEFICES.
The Earl of Aberdeen:My Lords, I have now to move your Lordships to give a second reading to a bill " to remove doubts respecting the admission of Ministers to benefices in Scotland;'' and if I was desirous of introducing the bill to the House at the earliest moment it was possible to do so, it was because I was most anxious to secure for it the benefit of a fair consideration in its future progress, and because I entertain

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a most sanguine hope that the adoption of this measure will be the means of producing the most beneficial effect to Scotland. My Lords, I thought it probable—nay, certain—that this measure would entirely fail to give satisfaction to either of the extreme parties by which Scotland has been disturbed for several years past. I felt that by the non-intrusion party it would be denounced as Erastian, and treated as a delusion, a mockery, and as utterly worthless; whilst by the opposite party, and those who by a whimsical misnomer are called "violent moderators," I felt that it would be denounced as an unnecessary and an unwarranted interference with the rights of the church. But, my Lords, I look to the great body of the clergy, men who are desirous to remain in the church of their fathers, and to continue with a safe conscience to exercise their holy functions; and I look also to the contentment of the people for whom it is my desire to secure that right which they so highly value, but the exercise of which has lately been called in question, and exposed to such great uncertainty and doubt. My Lords, not long ago a noble and learned Lord opposite styled me in the course of one of his speeches an " eminent non-intrusionist." For my part, I am not disposed to reject the appellation; but the noble and learned Lord will probably be not a little surprised to learn, that, non-intrusionist as I may be, I am, nevertheless, by the leaders of that party as bitterly reviled as he is himself. I can assure the noble Lord that I occupy a prominent place in the non-intrusionists' catalogue of those whom they think their enemies and the persecutors of the church. It is true, however, that upon this point I am perfectly careless. Throughout my life I have always endeavoured to promote the welfare and prosperity of an institution which has bestowed such incalculable blessings on the country, and to which I myself am devotedly attached. I think it, indeed, no small proof of my devotion to that church that I now find myself opposed to my noble and learned Friend on a question relating to the interpretation of the law, and I can assure my noble and learned Friend, notwithstanding my own strong conviction, and notwithstanding the support which that conviction has received from legal friends in Scotland, I certainly should not have placed myself in that position were it not for the nature and character of my cause. My Lords, I have
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already said I would accept the title the noble and learned Lord has given me; but, further than that, I am ready to declare that I consider it a fundamental principle of the Church of Scotland, that no man shall be intruded on a congregation against the will of the people to whom he was appointed. But, although, my Lords, I admit this, and, indeed, I could not do otherwise —for this principle is the principle of every Calvinistic church in Europe,—nevertheless, I do not hesitate to interpret that principle according to the dictates of reason and of common sense. I do not regard it as a point to be construed according to the mere will—the arbitrary and capricious will, of the people, but rather as a matter capable of being explained and judged of. This I believe to be the way in which the principle is interpreted by every church in Europe, and that this is the true interpretation I have no doubt. 1 hold in my hand a book by Sir W. Hamilton, which, though small in bulk, exhibits much learning and research, in which it is proved that this is the principle on which the law is founded. I, in this House, have declared over and over again, that this was the interpretation of Calvin himself—that it was the interpretation of Knox and the fathers of the church, and that it has been the interpretation of the Church of Scotland and of her Assembly; but the author of this work has proved that such was the practice in the Church of Geneva, in the Church of Holland, in the English Church established by the Parliament in 1645, and in the French Calvinistic Church, which, not being the established church, might possibly have been governed by a different principle, and the result of his inquiries and observations he declares to be, that the assertion contrary to that principle is based on as signal and melancholy a perversion of truth as is to be found in the whole series of religious controversies. Having thus defended the principle, I think it is unnecessary to dwell longer upon this point, because, as most noble Lords know, the matter has been finally decided by the judgment of your Lordships" House. It was pronounced by the courts below, and this House subsequently pronounced a decree in confirmation of their judgment, that objection to the presentee without reason assigned was illegal and futile. Such being the case, the question then comes to this—what are the objections which can be admitted and of

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which the church can take cognizance? My noble and learned Friend in the judgment he delivered limited the objections taken to any presentee to objections applicable to his life, literature, and doctrine. He gave a technical interpretation to the terms "qualified person'' and " ministerial qualifications." Now I can only say, if such be the admitted and received interpretation, my noble and learned Friend will succeed in disestablishing the whole Church of Scotland. Your Lordships have seen how numerous a body have zealously and sincerely interpreted the right of objection without reason assigned as a scriptural and legal right; but there are other parties in connexion with the church who only a few days ago issued regulations for the adoption of their ministers as diametrically opposed to the dictum of my noble Friend as are the reasons of the other party. Every one of those reasons are equally illegal and inadmissible according to the judgement of your Lordships, and undoubtedly both parties discard that judgement and adhere tenaciously to the views they each adopt. But, my Lords, this question—the interpretation of these terms of "qualified person," and " qualifications of presentation," was not a point argued here nor in the courts below. It was not necessary that it should be argued, for the question simply was, whether the church had the power to divest itself of the right of judging of the qualification, and could delegate to any portion of the people the right to refuse the party presented, without assigning any reason for such refusal? That was the point argued and decided in the courts below—that was the point argued here, and the other question was never argued here, or required to be decided here. My Lords, it is no doubt true that objections to the qualification of the person presented on account of his "life, literature and doctrines," are equally applicable in the Church of Scotland as in that of England, as they must be, indeed, to all persons offering themselves to undertake the holy office. It must be indispensable there as here that there should be morality in life, ability in literature, and orthodoxy in doctrine on the part of the person to be inducted; this is as indispensable in this country as in any other; and I will say further, that, looking at the question in the abstract, it is quite possible that this may embrace all that in the abstract could be possibly required from a person about to assume the functions of
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the ministry. This at any rate is all that is required in England, for although it may be Said that there is a title to be acquired here, yet, as your Lordships know, that is a mere fiction. But the case is different in Scotland. In Scotland there is no vagum minislerium. In Scotland every person is ordained when presented to a particular living, and he must be qualified for that living and the parish to which he is presented when he is ordained. Here there opens a new field of qualification necessary for such a person. In England he docs not know to what parish he may be ordained, or how far he may be fitted for its duties; but in Scotland the presentation is directed to a particular presbytery, who are to judge of his qualifications for the particular place to which he is appointed. And let me for a moment call your Lordships' attention to the form of presentation. It describes and all the forms, I believe, are drawn in the same way—it nominates such a person to be a minister of such a parish or church " all the days of his life," and requires the presbytery to take cognizance of his "life, literature, and doctrine," and, having found him qualified for the ministry " of the said church or parish," to admit and receive him thereto. It is not, therefore, the special qualifications of life, literature, and conversation that are looked to, but the general fitness of the party for the particular church or parish to which he Is to be admitted. Our statutes, in fact, say nothing about the life, literature, and doctrine of the person admitted—nothing whatever; he is to be a qualified person—and qualified for what? Not, as I said before, for the ministry merely, but for the particular parish to which he is presented. That is the qualification which he should possess; and our statutes prescribe no other qualifications further than that the presbytery should try, examine, and, if he be found qualified, admit the presentee to the parish. The statute 5th George 1st, says,
"That the fact of persons being obliged to take certain oaths shall not interfere with the right of the presbytery to try the qualifications of candidates for admission."
It also uses the term " gifts and qualities"—they are to be tried—but in no portion of any of the statutes does it appear that the interpretation of " qualities and qualifications" is to be limited in the manner proposed by noble and learned Lords. My noble and learned Friend has admitted that it is necessary a minister should under-

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stand the language in which he is to preach. That is certainly a very obvious necessity; but this is not what was contemplated by the declaration of insufficiency of literature. I could state a case in which there might be too much learning. In Scotland a man may be presented to a particular parish for which he is not suitable. Suppose a minister were to preach such sermons as the three by Bishop Butler upon human nature, which, in my humble opinion, are full of the most admirable arguments that were ever perhaps produced in a pulpit; if they were delivered to a congregation of East Lothian ploughmen or illiterate persons, the people would naturally say, and of course the presbytery too, that they could not understand a word of what was advanced. Would that be insufficient or sufficient literature, for it would be perfectly unintelligible to that particular congregation? Therefore, a minister being directed to that particular parish, the presbytery would be bound to judge and object that such a minister could not be understood, and if his mind was so metaphysically constituted that he could preach none but such sermons, he would be utterly unsuited for that parish. I say, therefore, that the doctrine of a man being suited to the parish to which he is presented has so invariably been acted upon in Scotland, and so implicitly received by one portion of the church as well as by the other, that I venture to affirm that there is not a minister in the church who would not adhere to and maintain that position. It becomes, therefore, indispensably necessary, now that doubts have been thrown upon such an interpretation as that which I have described, to clear up those doubts by acquiescing in the interpretation which has been invariably given. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will admit such to be the case. I am sure that he is prepared to admit what the effect must be if such be not the case. I am happy to recollect his declaration, which leads me to expect that he will endeavour to tranquillize the minds of those persons who are so deeply interested in the question by subscribing to that interpretation; for, even if it were wrong, I think this is a case in which the rule Communis error facit jus should guide us. Indeed it would be impossible to resist this limited modification of the rights of the Church. The whole principle of the settlement of the ministry in Scotland is composed of the people being entitled to object, and the presbytery to judge. My object is to allow the greatest
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possible latitude of objection on the part of the people, and giving the entire freedom of judgment to the presbytery. [Lord Campbell: " Do you propose to confer a liberum arbitrium."] No; for the terms being vague the right would be inoperative ; but a liberum judicium, if you please, obliging those entrusted with the power to state their objections. But the presbytery is both bound to judge, and to proceed in its judgment upon the principle which the Church has maintained. The point not having been raised in the court below it was not argued; but this much is quite clear, that I believe that not one, or scarcely one, if any, of the judges in their elaborate judgment has said anything of a contrary description, or has given any support to the doctrine laid down by my noble and learned Friend (Lord Brougham) as to the technical and limited extent of qualification. But, 1 am quite sure of this, that a great majority of the judges, by implication, have admitted the reverse of that for which my noble and learned Friend contended; while the very letter which my noble and learned Friend read the other day from Lord Core-house completely contradicts his limited interpretation of the term, for Lord Core-house himself says in that letter:—
" Relevant objections to the presentee may be urged before the Church concerning not only his life, literature, and doctrine, but likewise on some other grounds recognized by the canon law—his inablity to perform the duties of a minister from blindness, deafness, or defective utterance, or from infirmities preventing his visitation of the people, or from his ignorance of the language of the majority of his parishioners, or from necessary and unavoidable connection with secular business to a great extent, and 1 believe some others."
Some others! Now, I believe that in the judgment of Lord Corehouse on the Auchterarder case he also says:—
" Every other known objection, whether of canon law or our own law—and they are nearly identical—to the fitness or idoneity, as it is called by the canonists, or to the eligibility for office would be enough; for example, that, in Scotland, ministers do not understand the Gaelic language, or dialect of that language spoken in the district, or that they have too weak a voice for the size of the church."
Would that be admitted in England? No, because nobody knows to what Church he shall be appointed, and a weak voice is as good as a strong one in a small church But here Lord Corehouse says:—
" No man should be appointed who is too

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feeble to do the duty of a highland parish forty miles in length, or of a lowland parish containing 20,000 inhabitants: all this is idoneity."
What is idoneity? A simple and more familiar word will give its meaning—it is suitableness, fitness. This, of course, he admits is a point for the consideration of the presbytery to which the person is presented as a qualified person for that particular parish. The other judges implied the same thing; none of them that I am aware—none of all those judges—and we have heard enough, not too much of their ability and of their learning, held a contrary opinion. Lord Jeffrey and Lord Moncrieff adjudged that the people were entitled to object, and without assigning any reason. Of course, then, they must all be entitled to object, if they assigned any reason; but even those learned judges —and Lord Corehouse was one who pronounced the judgment below which was affirmed here—all appear to me by implication to admit that for which I contend. My noble friend read a letter from Lord Corehouse some time ago, and with reference to the bill now on your Lordships' Table. It happens that this very morning I received a letter from a noble friend of mine in Scotland—a very influential person, and a great partisan in this question— who applied to me to make the bill upon the Table much more of a non-intrusion character, and to extend its provisions further than, I believe, my noble and learned Friend opposite would a prove, or I should myself approve. But, in the postcript of his letter he says,—
"I was with Lord Corehouse yesterday. He says the bill is exactly what he considers the present law to be, or as nearly so as possible."
Now, that is the opinion of Lord Core-house as applied to the bill on the Table. [Lord Brougham: " It must be Lord Belhaven you mean, from the accuracy of the statements.] No doubt Lord Belhaven may be of that opinion. But, if the noble and learned Lord wishes for another opinion of Lord Corehouse, he shall have it. The bill on the Table is the same as that I produced three years ago; and this is an extract from a letter written to a mutual friend, with reference to my former bill in 1840.—
" I enclose a copy of Lord Aberdeen's bill, which I am glad to find is very different from what it was represented to be. It is declaratory of the law of Scotland as it stands at present,
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and must always remain while patronage exists."
What does the noble and learned Lord say to that? That is the opinion of a man whom we all delight to honour; and all would cheerfully join in paying any tribute of admiration to his learning, and judgment, and talent as a lawyer. If, then, my noble Friend is dissatisfied with Lord Corehouse's opinion on the present bill, I hope he will at least be satisfied with his opinion of the former one. I say, therefore, that by the invariable practice and principles of the Church of Scotland every man is presented, when ordained, to a particular living or parish, and it necessarily opens the ground for special objection to be urged against his admission to that living or parish. I can quote on this part of the question, an extract from Lord Medwin's judgment in the Auchterarder case:—
" Suitableness or meet ness, (said the learned Lord) " for the situation may be among the qualifications of a presentee which the Church may inquire into, besides examining into his life, literature and conversation; but then they must inquire into the matter themselves, it must be the subject of trial by them, for it is to the presbytery that the State, in concurrence with the Church, has intrusted the duty of examination into all the requisite qualifications of ministers."
Is not that conclusive as to the opinion of this learned judge that either matters may be taken into consideration besides objections to the life, literature, and conversation of the minister? It is clear to me that the general tendency of the opinions of the great majority of the judges, and no doubt that of the great body of the profession of the law in Scotland, does not differ upon this subject; and the opinions I am now expressing are decidedly those of the law-officers of the Crown, under whose inspection and supervision the measure has been concocted. Only a few days ago, the present Lord Justice Clerk, in deciding a case affecting a presentee to whom objections had been urged on account of physical defects in the Court of Session, took occasion in pronouncing judgment, more than once, emphatically to declare that it was the duty of the presenter to see that the party was fit and suitable and competent for the particular parish to which he was appointed; and the two other judges, Lords Meadow bank and Medwin, both concurred. This happened two or three weeks ago, and such has been the invariable opinion. Now, if this point had been argued and decided in this House; no man living would more

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implicitly how to the decision of noble Lords than I should; and I really think it is the greatest tribute it is possible to concede to the learning and integrity of the noble and learned personages who have successively occupied the Woolsack, that the people of Scotland should be so universally satisfied, as they are, with your Lordships' appellate jurisdiction, though they bring their causes to be heard by a judge comparatively ignorant of the law he administers—as he must be if it be at all like that we have heard described; and not only comparatively ignorant of that law, but, having a degree of prejudice against it, and a preference to that which is more peculiarly his own. Nevertheless, the people of Scotland are and always have been perfectly satisfied of the justice and wisdom of your Lordships' decisions in all these cases. But then it is a decision—a solemn judgment with which they are thus satisfied, and not with a mere obiter dictum; and I am sure the noble and learned Lord opposite must see the force of the distinction. Nor must your Lordships be surprised if they defer to the opinions of men who have made this law the study of their lives, and who are distinguished by their abilities, until those opinions have been set aside by stronger judgments. If by the law and constitution of this country, we were compelled to appeal from all the Courts of Westminster Hall to those of Paris, I am sure my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack and noble Lords opposite would, most undoubtedly, be disposed to acquiesce in a matter of English law to the Courts of Westminster until they should be set aside by the superior judgment and ability of the Garde des Sceaux. The bill on the Table is the same which I introduced three years ago, and which was read a second time in this House. No doubt it would have passed altogether if I had persevered in pressing it forward; but I abstained from doing so, and I think it right now to say, that the noble Viscount then at the head of her Majesty's Government never pronounced any opinion adverse to that bill. On the contrary, he said in his place that he never had said a word to prevent him from taking possession of the bill if he thought proper, but he opposed it because he thought its introduction at that moment inopportune. Over and over again the noble Viscount declared that he would not give any adverse opinion upon it, though he did not support it. I lament that ex-
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ceedingly. No doubt the noble Viscount did what he thought was right; still, if he had found it possible to give his support to that bill, I believe that the lamentable transactions which have taken place in the Church of Scotland would never have happened. That is my sincere belief; and of those who opposed it in this House so universally—for my noble Friend the noble Marquess, who has left us, and the Church, too, I am sorry to say, was not present during the discussion on that occasion, none voted against that bill on any other ground than because it did too much. I hold in my hand a list of 400 Ministers of the Church and elders, who signed an approbation of that bill. They are all members of the Church at this moment, and most of the ministers are members of the Assembly, including the learned moderator and the most conspicuous members of the Assembly. The declaration in favour of the bill of 1840, signed by these 400 ministers, is to this effect.
"We, the undersigned ministers and elders of the Church of Scotland,"
There are 2,000 elders—
" desirous of making known our opinion of the measure proposed by Lord Aberdeen, as contained in the bill for removing doubts, &c. do declare that in our opinion the measure is, on the whole, perfectly accordant with the principles of our establishment."
The General Assembly, just before they were prorogued, issued regulations for the admission of ministers into benefices, and these regulations, without any concert with me, actually comprise the whole substance of the measure which is on your Lordships' Table, and, therefore, there can be no doubt that they approve and adopt the provisions of this measure. The bill provides, that when a presentee shall be appointed he is to preach in the parish church, notice of which shall be given that, if any one or more male parishioners of full age have any objection of any kind to the person so presented, or any reason against his settlement in that parish, or against his gifts and qualities for the cure of the parish, and which do not infer matter of charge against the presentee, the presbytery must receive such objections and reasons in writing, which shall be without delay fully considered and disposed of by the presbytery, by whom they are to be cognosced and determined on judicially. I know it may be objected by some, and particularly by a noble Friend of mine, who takes a great

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interest in this question, and possessess a great knowledge of the subject, that if the objections of "one or more" were to be admitted, if two persons might be able to defeat the settlement of the presentee, what are the objects sought to be obtained? That fit and properly qualified persons should be appointed to the cure of parishes. But of their fitness the presbytery are to judge. If the principle of election be admitted, it is obvious that for the objections of one or two to prevail against the majority would be an absurdity. But there is nothing of an election, for it is the presbytery who are to judge whether the objections be good or bad, and the objections only bring into action the functions of the presbytery. Even if the objection come not from a parishioner, but from another quarter, the presbytery would be still bound to judge. Collation comprises trial, examination, ordination, and induction; all are comprised in that term, and from whatever quarter an objection may come the presbytery are bound to judge of it. Now if the objection be a good one, what signifies whether it come from one or two, or from 100 to 200? The objection is the same, and the presbytery are to deal with the objection on its own merits, and not in respect to the quarter whence it comes, or the party who put it forth. But I do not deny that numbers are a very important element in some objections, not as to the life, literature, and doctrine of the presentee, because, take the case of a person presented to a large parish and a large church, who had a feeble voice; if one or two parishioners were to come to the presbytery and say, "we cannot hear the preacher," the presbytery might reply, " perhaps you are deaf or do not pay attention." But if half the parish should make the same complaint, numbers would add materially to the weight of such an objection; and so with many others, and all these objections are thus taken out of the limited and technical sense assigned to the term by my noble Friend. So as to an objection, which will not probably be uncommon—namely, that a particular preacher failed to edify; that of itself would be no objection at all if made by one or two persons only, and would deserve no attention; but if it was to be alleged by the great body of the parishioners, consisting of well disposed persons, and was confirmed by the experience and knowledge of the presbytery, it would be an objection which would deserve attention and would always receive it, In
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the next clause, therefore, I have endeavoured to provide that a certain degree of weight should be given to numbers. It provides that the presbytery or church court to which the objections shall be referred to be cognosced, shall be authorized to inquire into the whole circumstances of the parish, and the character and number of the persons by whom the objections and reasons are preferred, and if the presentee shall be found not qualified or not suitable for that particular parish the presbytery or court shall pronounce to that effect, and shall set forth the special grounds upon which the judgment is founded. There is a security against any arbitrary and unjust decision, in the necessity of specifying the grounds on which the judgment is founded, and the finding that the presentee is not qualified for a particular parish. It is true there may be possible cases of capricious adjudication. Why, every court may abuse its powers; but it is to be presumed, that the tribunal will not abandon its duty so far as to render any further protection necessary. The thing is barely possible, but it is not to be presumed; at all events there can be no better security than the control of public opinion and the specification of the grounds of objection, which will be quite sufficient to secure the presentee from any injustice. The real status and condition of the people is to object; that is, their whole concern, and privilege, and right —to make objections, if they have any objections to urge. The duty of the presbytery is to judge; and, therefore, whether the objections are made by many or by few, the functions of the presbytery are the same; and the protection to the presentee is in my opinion sufficient. The next clause provides that, if the presbytery are of opinion that the objections are not truly founded, they shall repel the same, and, subject to appeal, shall proceed to examine and admit the presentee. My Lords, I have thought it right in the following clause, notwithstanding the judgment pronounced by this House and now complied with by the General Assembly, to abolish the veto. I found in my communications with the rev. Gentlemen, that it was a great object, in some form or other, indirectly to establish the veto; and I think that, in order to prevent and obviate all doubt and difficulty and danger, it will be better to introduce this clause, declaring that it shall not be lawful for any presbytery or other ecclesiastical court to reject any presentee upon the ground of any mere dis-

1413
sent or dislike expressed by any part of the congregation of the parish in which he is presented, and which dissent or dislike shall not be founded upon objections or reasons to he fully congregation, judged of, and determined in the manner aforesaid by the presbytery or other ecclesiastical court. The appeal, of course, in such cases, can only be to the superior Church courts. In judging of the qualifications of a presentee, the Church alone can decide, and it must be to the superior Church courts exclusively that an appeal can lie, provided only that the presbytery acts within its competency as a judicatory of the Church. This 1 have introduced, not because I think it necessary, because in case of any excess the civil courts are competent to interfere. For instance, suppose the presbytery should reject a presentee because he had accepted the presentation from a patron, that would be no reason for any presbytery to reject a roan; as a presentee can only come before a presbytery by means of a presentation by law, such a rejection would be illegal; and in case of any other excess of power, it would be equally competent to a patron or presentee to bring the question before the Supreme Court. How, it may be asked, should it be done? Nothing can be more easy than for the presentee or patron to bring it by way of declarator as in the Auchterarder case; or of reduction, as in the Strath bogie case; or of interdict, or any other mode. So that although there is an appeal to the Church courts, that does not oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts where the former exceed their powers. The last clause is ninety to quiet the apprehensions of those gentlemen, and secure their right of possession, who are placed in parishes under the Act of Assembly of May 1835, which never was legal. This, there, fore, my Lords, is the bill; and I must say, that if it should be adopted, I believe it will, and I know it will, do much to retain in the Church a very numerous body of ministers who now are in suspense, and who can then continue their functions with safe consciences; and I know, my Lords, that it will prevent the great body of the people from following those ministers who have seceded from the Church- These are objects of paramount importance, which your Lordships, I trust, will secure, by giving effect to this hill. I will now say a few words respecting the secession which has already taken place. My Lords, this is undoubtedly an event of great importance, the consequences of which it is not
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possible at present to foresee; but although we may lament the occurrence, and think that it has proceeded from most erroneous and mistaken views, it is impossible not to do justice to the disinterestedness and purity of motive of those who have seceded. When your Lordships recollect that these men have sacrificed every secular good they possessed, and cast themselves upon the wide world, trusting only to the precarious support of voluntary contributions, abandoning wealth, station, and the respectable position they held in society, I think it is impossible for any one to withhold his sympathy from them, however mistaken they may be In their case we must admit that
"—the light that led astray Was light direct from heaven."
My Lords, I have not an accurate account of the number of ministers who have seceded; I believe about 240 have left— seceded from the Church, being nearly one-fourth of the whole number. I think about 200 unendowed but ordained ministers have also joined them, making altogether 440 or 450 ordained ministers, including parochial and unendowed ministers, being more than one-third of the whole Church of Scotland, certainly a large and alarming proportion. Nevertheless, I do not consider that this secession will be attended with such fatal consequences as some apprehend from it. I trust that the renewed exertion, the increased zeal and devotion of the ministers of the Established Church, which are now doubly necessary, will fill the void. That there will be a diminution of the influence of the presbyterian religion in Scotland I have not the slightest apprehension, for those who have seceded are zealous presbyterians, and those who remain will be incited to exercise their ministerial functions with greater assiduity, and in a still more exemplary manner; so that I do not in the least expect a diminution of the influence of religion on the great body of the people. But this secession brings with it one consolation—namely, that it was inevitable. It is quite impossible for any man to doubt that the cause of the present secession has ceased to be a question of intrusion or non-intrusion. I think the bill on your Lordships' Table will satisfy you that it contains no provision which any reasonable man can object to. But the claim asserted of spiritual independence is one which is utterly inadmissible in any country under any Government which recognizes an Established Church.

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The true spiritual independence of the Church nobody questions; it is recognized by all persons and all tribunals, and no one endeavours to diminish the recognition of that spiritual independence. But they claim to decide what is spiritual and what is civil. The Church admitted that it had no control over civil matters, which it abandoned to the state and the civil authorities; but it claimed to decide for itself what was civil and what was ecclesiastical, which would give to the Church a domination which it is impossible for any state to permit. To show how impracticable it would have been to prevent a secession founded upon such principles, I ask what it was they complained of—why they complained of the judgments of the civil tribunals—the judgments of those whose declarations of the law are pronounced without doubt and universally received without hesitation. They stated that they were unable to remain in the Church were such declarations to be confirmed as the law. Of course, then, to please these gentlemen, it is indispensable that the law should be altered which had been already so much perverted and abused. The sort of preamble which it would be necessary to attach to an act of Parliament to satisfy them, must say, that whereas the seceders declared in their claim of rights that the law courts had in numerous and repeated instances stepped beyond the province allotted them by the constitution, and within which alone their decisions could be held to declare the law, or to have the force of law, deciding not only civil but ecclesiastical and spiritual cases, and that, too, where the cause did not refer to the exercise of the right of patronage—thus invading the jurisdiction and encroaching upon the spiritual privileges of the Church, in defiance of the statutes and laws of the kingdom, be it therefore enacted. This was their official public declaration and protest, and according to it, unless redress should be offered, they could not have continued to remain in the Church. No Legislature could tolerate such pretensions for a single moment. Indeed, rather than sanction such monstrous claims as were set up by this party, I believe and declare that it would be better that the establishment itself should be abolished altogether. But these persons in seceding have declared that they do so upon the principle of the establishment. Now, this appears to be somewhat like a contradiction in terms. They seceded, they said, upon the, establishment
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principle, and some one had said that they did so, as they had resisted upon the passive obedience principle. In truth, they must now become a voluntary Church. The venerable and amiable person who had first presided at their councils very anxiously pressed upon them to adhere to the establishment principle, and to reject the notion of becoming a voluntary Church. I hope, at the same time, that they will retain that charitable and mild tone which pervaded the language and opinions of the remarkable and distinguished person to whom I have referred; but I am afraid, that, like many other voluntary churches, they are destined to display more of bitterness and rancour than those who wish for the peace of the country, and their success, as promulgators of religious truth, will like to see exhibited. Indeed, one leading man among them, their chief legal adviser, has declared that Parliament would never have treated Ireland as it had done Scotland, and he gravely doubted whether it might not be proper to agitate for a repeal of the Scottish union. This is not all, One of their chief ecclesiastical leaders, and one of the most active, able, and influential among them, not, however, the distinguished man to whom I have referred, but another—has declared that it is his deliberate opinion that all communion should be avoided with the members of the Established Church, and that it would be even better not to attend the worship of God at all than to profit by the ministrations of a member of the establishment. And this was the way in which a church was talked of which they had only left twenty-four hours before, and left, too, not on account of any reprehensible doctrine maintained by it—still less on account of anything like persecution, but merely because the gentlemen in question were unable to persuade their brethren to violate the law of the country, and to adopt some strange impracticable notions of independence, incompatible with the maintenance of any establishment whatever. I lament to see these indications of a violent and bitter spirit against the establishment, and I hope that reflection upon the conduct of their leaders may produce some effect upon the deluded men whom they have led into their present situation. At all events, the great object of the Legislature and of the Government ought to be, to tranquillise those who still remain faithful to the principle of an establishment; and to give that satisfaction to the clergy and people which

1417
is anxiously expected by the country. With these observations, my Lords, I move the second reading of this bill.
The Earl of Rosebery and Lord Broughamrose together; the latter gave Way, and the noble Earl said, he felt anxious that his noble and learned Friend would permit him to take that opportunity of addressing the House on the question then under their consideration. As he wished to make a few remarks on the general principle of the bill, be hoped his noble and learned Friend would forgive him for the interruption, as his noble and learned Friend would soon have the power of speaking upon the legal parts of the measure. He had given the subject mature deliberation for the last three years, since this bill had been first proposed, and he cam* to view the matter entirely free from prejudice. He acknowledged, as he had always done, that his noble Friend who had brought forward this bill was peculiarly fitted, from his position and connections, to deal with this subject; and if he bad been so when he introduced his former measure he was much more so now, filling, as be did, a high and important office in the Government: but, while he admitted this, he mast at the same time say, that he was as much disappointed with the present measure, as he had been with that which his noble Friend had introduced three years ago. He objected to the bill as in suited to the emergency it was intended to meet, and as containing many provisions and enactments which must necessarily be so injurious in their operation, that they ought never to be adopted by Parliament. Now, what he understood to be the principle asserted by the Church of Scotland, was, that no minister ought to be forced upon a reluctant congregation in any parish, and that in all ecclesiastical matters the ecclesiastical courts should have the sole power and control. But while he held these principles to he those of the Presbyterian Church, he had never approved of, or vindicated, many of the proceedings of the General Assembly. He had never attempted to defend much of the language which that and other ecclesiastical courts had indulged in; nor had he ever justified or approved of the suspension of the Strathbogie ministers; for whatever might be the abstract right of the Assembly to do that act, he thought, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it was cruel
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and unjust He also considered, that nothing could have been more injudicious or improper than the assembling of the Convocation as it was termed, last year and the resolution they then came to, that patronage in every shape, was an abuse and an abomination. But while be admitted this, he thought there were grounds of complaint on the part of the Church of Scotland which the General Assembly had a right to call upon Parliament to remove. No doubt the event to which his noble Friend had adverted, the secession of one-third of the endowed and un endowed ministers of the Church of Scotland, was a most melancholy one. Having anxiously examined that part of the subject, be must say, that he could see no sufficient reason for that step; though ail must acknowledge, and in some respects admire, the conduct of those who had made such great sacrifices for the principles they conscientiously believed to be just, and in maintaining a course which they thought righteous. But while he admitted that the Assembly had acted in many respects in a way which could not be justified, he considered that their opponents had also acted in a manner that was most impolitic, unjust, and exasperating; It had been the habit of many of those who objected to the proceedings of the Assembly, both in that House and elsewhere, in speaking of the acts of that body, since 1834, to allude to them as the acts of the dominant party, without considering that the Assembly was legally constituted, and, that consequently, their acts were those of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. Again, it had been more than once asserted (most unjustly as he thought), that the Assembly warn grasping at an extent of ecclesiastical power, resembling that of the Church of Rome, but which, recent facts "showed was a most unfounded charge. With regard to the late secession from the Church, he believed, that the state of things which now existed, and which all must lament, would not have arisen, if the opponents of the seceders had not felt secure that that step would not be taken, and it would not have been taken but for the general opinion entertained in Scotland, that Parliament would not interpose or pass any satisfactory measure to allay the differences between the two parties. It was almost

1419
impossible to contemplate what had happened without dismay. The majority of their Lordships' House were unacquainted with the strong Presbyterian feeling which prevailed in Scotland on this subject. What would their Lordships say, if, at one blow, one-third of the clergy of this country had seceded from the Church? This, however, was only the commencement of evils of a much more dangerous kind. For how were the vacant churches to be filled? Those from whom they were to draw in order to fill them were more deeply imbued with the feeling which prevailed than the seceders themselves. It was to be feared, that instead of Scotland being what she had been for years past,—a model of moral conduct and peaceable behaviour, every parish would be filled with rival chapels: the seceded Church, preaching against the Established Church: and they would have not Catholic against Protestant, as in Ireland, but a similar state, and all the rancour of feeling and violence produced by difference between religious bodies agreeing together to a certain extent, but differing on some minor points. He thought, as he had said on a former occasion, that the wisest course Parliament could have followed, in order to put an effectual check to those evils, would have been, as soon as the Auchter-arder case was decided by their Lordships affirming the judgment of the Court of Session, that the General Assembly had exceeded its powers, and that the Veto law of 1834 ought never to have been passed—the course would have been for Parliament then to have enacted a qualified veto law, taking away many of the objections to which the veto law of the Assembly was liable, and substituting, instead of a bare majority of the congregation, that a large proportion only should have the power of refusing the presentee, and adding an important provision, which he was sorry to see was altogether omitted from his noble Friend's bill—that if in the course of six months, the presentation should not be effected by the patron, the right to present should devolve to the Crown. The bill of his noble Friend gave a veto, but it was a most dangerous one, for if the bill passed in its present shape, the ecclesiastical courts would have a veto over the whole Church patronage of Scotland. There were many objections, also, to the wording of the bill. It would be difficult to define the difference which
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was intended by the use of the two terms " unsuitable " and " unacceptable " in reference to the right of objecting to the presentee by the congregation and the Presbytery. And again, as the clauses stood, it was doubtful to what extent the Presbytery might go in their objection to the presentee. By this bill, too, power was given to all the parishioners to object; not those in communion with the Church merely, but every parishioner. Thus a Roman Catholic, or an infidel, or any one most hostile to the Church, might make the objection to the presentation, as well as a member of the Church. His noble Friend had termed this a declaratory bill, and had told them that the law was as therein stated, and that it was only necessary in consequence of doubts which had arisen as to whether the law was so or not. His noble Friend had grounded that opinion upon views of his own, entirely differing from the decision given in the Auchterarder case; but he apprehended that the House was bound not only by its decisions, but by the grounds on which those decisions were given. Whilst he respected the opinions of noble Lords who dissented from his, he could not retract his objection to the bill. He thought it would prove subversive of that characteristic control which had been reposed with so much advantage in the body of the congregation when vacancies occurred in the several parishes of Scotland, and which control he considered to be the distinctive privilege and characteristic of the Scotch Church. Having thus stated as shortly as he could the objections he had to the particular form in which the bill had been presented, he repeated that his primary objection to the measure was, that it gave powers to the Church courts such as he thought no ecclesiastical body ought to be intrusted with—that it did not give that control in the appointment of ministers, which was the inherent principle of the Scotch ecclesiastical establishment, and which was the real meaning of the words that " no minister shall be intruded upon a parish." On these grounds he felt it to be his duty to move, as an amendment, that the bill be read a second time that day six months.
Lord Broughamsaid, that he was in hopes, when he very reluctantly yielded to his noble Friend who had just sat down, that his noble Friend would have superseded the necessity of his troubling their

1421
Lordships with any observations at all. His reluctance to yield to his noble Friend had been relieved by the hope that his noble Friend would have argued the question against the noble Earl opposite who had introduced the measure for their Lord-ships' consideration. His noble Friend, however, he Was sorry to say, had not enabled him to maintain that state of quiescence in which he would fain have indulged, and he regretted that he was compelled to give, as his noble Friend had not given, an answer to the able and lucid statement made by the noble Earl opposite in favour of his measure. His noble Friend behind him (the Earl of Roseberry) would forgive him if he immediately followed him, for though both opposed the bill, his noble Friend did not range on the same side of the battle as himself. If the noble Earl opposite gloried in the name of " Non-intrusionist," infinitely more than any was that name deserved by his noble Friend who had just sat down, who avowed a Once that his wish had been to re-enact the veto. He could not have believed it, unless he had heard it from the noble Earl's Own lips, that the noble Earl had been of opinion that no sooner was the Auchterarder case settled, upsetting the veto law, than they should have passed an act confirming or re-enacting that law, certainly, as the noble Earl said, with some modifications. His own opinion of these individuals—these misguided individuals—was, that if their Lordships were to agree with them in ninety-nine points out of a hundred, still disagreeing with them upon the hundredth, they would be as far as ever from an amicable adjustment; that the disappointed seceders would have waged war just as fiercely against them as if they and withheld all their demands; and that the case between them would thus become almost worse than if they had never made an attempt at conciliation; for so he believed it to be, upon a well-known principle in natural philosophy, that theological animosities, like material attraction, increased inversely as the squares of the distance. He was bound to say a Word or two upon the decision of the House, (in which decision he had agreed) upon this question; but, first of all, he must observe, that he must express his acquiescence in the eulogium pronounced by the noble Earl opposite, and concurred in by his noble Friend behind him (the Earl of Rosebery), on the purity of the motives which, generally
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speaking, had prevailed with the seceding portion of the Scotch clergy. He would not say that all those men had acted from the purest and best motives. Amongst them some might have been actuated by an excess of seal, not accompanied by equal charity, and he could not deny that Some of them bad shown a bad spirit in their mode of dealing with their adversaries and had used unchristian expressions such as those referred to by his noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Aberdeen); but he believed, with few exceptions, the bulk of those men, both of the clergy and among the laity who had seceded (and he was happy to say they were not very numerous) had acted and were acting upon the purest and most conscientious motives, and were making great and cruel sacrifices in deference to their opinions. But whilst he believed all this, he could not help casting his regards forward to some future time when the zeal of these leaders might have cooled, and that of their followers still more so, and he calculated the disappointed hopes which would then be rankling, and the universal dissidence which might then prevail throughout the whole religious community of Scotland; for it was in the very nature of all such fragments disrupted from a church establishment like a piece rent from a rock not to hang together, not to unite, but to crumble and separate still wider apart, bereft of all unity or sympathy of purpose. These things would come—the seceders would split and disunite, and then what miserable spectacles must they be prepared to witness ! Conscientious men, deprived of the aid of an establishment, and supported no longer by the zeal and resources of their former followers, would be left upon the wide world, to wear out the remainder of their lives without the means of supporting themselves or their families. A few popular preachers might possibly continue to be supported by their congregations; but he knew enough of the hazards and dangers attendant upon an annual subscription, flowing from personal zeal, to calculate that these exceptions would not be many. Amid all these deplorable results, let him observe, he had no fear of the Presbyterian religion relaxing its hold on the minds of the people of Scotland. He had no fear, either for the Church itself. A great breach undoubtedly had been made in its outworks, but there was no more fear of the downfall of the, Church than of Presbyterianism itself. But now with

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respect to the present measure, to which his noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Aberdeen) had called the attention of their Lordships so ably and so distinctly. The first observation he (Lord Brougham) had to make was, that if unhappily they were to make concessions, they would do so without any security for future peace. His noble Friend opposite himself stated, that this bill would not satisfy the non-intrusionists, and with all his noble Friend's attempts to make peace in the Church, he was just as much the object of bitter and virulent attacks as those who did not go one inch of the way with them. But then, his noble Friend opposite said that this measure would find favour with the Church, and his noble Friend had quoted a passage to show that the Church had itself adopted a measure somewhat of the same kind. No doubt; but did ever any person see any body of men assembled together, and carrying on their proceedings by meetings, by speeches, by votes, by intrigues, by adjournments, and all the incidents attendant upon such matters, when did ever any person see such a body dislike power? On the contrary, did they not covet power, and were they not gratified when power was placed in their hands? But it was said, that this was not a lay, but a spiritual body. When was it that a clerical body had furnished an exception to the rule which showed that all mankind loved power? On the contrary, that which was a feature in the character of the human race at large was peculiarly an eminent feature in the clergy, and the uniform course of clerical men in all countries was rather to love power than ease, peace, and profit, and one of the things they were the readiest to grasp and the slowest to quit hold of, was power connected with their spiritual functions. It was not then to be supposed that such a proposition as this would not find favour with them, when that proposition was the transference of patronage from lay patrons and the Crown to the Church courts, and this without any interference on the part of civil courts. Instead of the Church objecting to this bill, it was most likely that the Church would hail the appearance of it, and it was by no means improbable that it was such a bill as they themselves would have devised, or at least some one very like it, though they would be content to allow the perfect workmanship of the noble Earl to supersede their own, for it was one that
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beyond all others was calculated to gratify the Church party. If his noble Friend could succeed in passing this bill, he was sure it would give great gratification to the Church; but this he said, that if they took away the patronage from the lay patrons, he had much rather have the veto than this bill. He had rather give the patronage to laymen than to priests. His noble Friend had said that 240 persons had already seceded from the Church, and that this measure would prevent others from going away. Now, those who were ready to go must be persons who agreed in opinion with those who had already left the establishment, and therefore, they could not be satisfied with this bill. What was the non-intrusion principle? In a word, it was, that the congregation would have the veto on 'the patron's appointment— that the congregation should have the power of saying, "We won't have this man," without assigning a reason. That was the doctrine, and it was no part of the doctrine, that the Presbytery should have the veto. On the contrary, they contended that it was the people's right, and not the kirk's right, and that neither the Presbytery, nor the Crown, nor the patron, should intrude upon them, and therefore, why should they be pleased with this bill, which professed to take the power entirely out of the hands of the people? His noble Friend opposite had misstated and misunderstood his decision in the Auchterarder case, and that decision had been equally misunderstood by another noble Friend of his (whom he did not now see in his place), but who had comforted the General Assembly by saying, that the highest person in the realm approved of what they had been doing, in setting themselves up—he would not say in rebellion—but against the law of the land. This measure must rest upon the character of this body of men. It proposed to give the power to object to a presentee to every male communicant. Had the females of Scotland no souls? A woman was as good an objectrix—was as good (and he could speak from his little experience) at finding faults as any man, and though a woman might not be the best judge in her own case, she had a right to make an objection. But his noble Friend said, that if the Church courts exceeded their jurisdiction the civil courts would interfere. How could they interfere? By one of the clauses of the bill any objection of any kind might be made, so that the objection

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was in writing, and the Presbytery was to have the final cognizance of it. That was an objection de omnibus rebus; but there was another in which the quibusdam aliis were included, for it went on to say,
" Or any reason to state against his settlement in the parish, or to his gifts or qualities for the cure of the parish."
He defied any man, or woman either, to make a stronger objection than this, that the individual had not sufficient gifts to be settled upon the parish. That included everything. It was impossible to make an enactment more general? The Presbytery, too, were desired, in taking cognizance of the matter, to have regard to the whole circumstances and condition of the parish. Could any jurisdiction be wider than this? They were to have regard to the spiritual welfare and edification of the people, and to the character and number of persons by whom the objection was urged. Therefore, the Presbytery were not only to regard the objection, but also the kind and number of persons by whom it was urged. This was the part of the veto the most objected to. What could exceed this power, and what was it the Church might not do? But then it was said that it was not to be supposed that these Church courts would do anything that was wrong. How long, he asked, was it that they had shown this calmness and forbearance, that they could with such safety calculate as to the future? Since the last election of the last General Assembly they had been in open and avowed resistance to the law. What security, he asked their Lordships, had they that some new schism might not arise—that some new difference might not get up in the Church—that some new act of illegality might not be committed, which might call down upon them some new reproof? He had a great respect for the General Assembly—for it was as much the General Assembly as if there had been no secession from their body—but, with all his respect for them, he could not help saying, that he had no security that there might not be a renewal in some years of those difficulties which had lately occurred; and this made him fearful of investing them with all those frightful powers which the bill proposed to give them. He had no security that there might not again be two or three years of violent opposition to the law. What had occurred justified him in entertaining great suspicion, not of their in-
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tegrity, not of their loyalty, but of their sound discretion when heated by controversy, and above all things upon a subject in which much of religious division was mingled up with political dissension. When men were so heated he knew not the lengths to which they were capable of going, and therefore it was, that he could not approve of an act which proposed to invest them with such powers as were to be given by this bill. The Auchterarder decision could not possibly stand if the present bill was held to declare the law. There was to be a veto, not in the congregation, but in the Presbytery; that was to say, that if any one of the congregation objected, the Church courts were to decide. His noble Friend said, "Give the veto to the Church courts." [The Earl of Aberdeen: " With a reason."] With a reason! Could anything be more puerile? AH that need be urged was, that the person presented did not edify the parish; and, in fact, any objection of any kind might be urged. On these grounds he held, that if the present bill were to be considered as truly declaring the law, their Lordships should not have decided the Auchterarder case as they did; but the bill did not correctly [declare the law, and therefore his opinion remained unchanged, that the Auchterarder case has been properly decided.
The Earl of Haddingtonsaid, that if he understood correctly what had fallen from the noble and learned Lord, their Lordships were to understand, that if the Church had had the power, which the noble and learned Lord thought it did not possess (and for giving the Church which power the noble and learned Lord now complained of the present bill), the decision in the Auchterarder case would have been different from what it was. It was difficult for him to enter into a discussion on such a point with the noble and learned Lord, but he must be permitted to express the extreme astonishment with which he had heard the noble and learned Lord make that statement. The noble and learned Lord said, that if the Church had had the veto, the decision in the Auchterarder case would have been different, and the judgment of the court below would have been reversed; and then he went on to assume, that the present bill gave the veto to the Church. Now, let their Lordships recollect what the veto was. It was a power given to the people to negative the nomination by the patron

1427
without cause assigned—it was a power to say, " We Will not have this man, and we will not tell you why." That was the veto. Did this bill give the Church any such power? If it did, he admitted that it might be matter of consideration, whether it might not as well be given to the people. The great evil of the veto was its excessive unreasonableness; it would have given arbitrary power to the people to reject, without cause assigned. Now, so far from the veto being adopted by the bill, as would seem to be implied by those who opposed it, one of the main principles of the measure was, that reasons should be assigned for any objections which might be Made to any presentee: that those reasons should be heard and decided by the Presbytery, Who, having adjudicated, were to put upon record the grounds of their decisions. The noble and learned Lord who last addressed them, in descanting on the bill, proved by his own showing that reasons for objection must be assigned. The noble and learned Lord said, that if the bill were to be taken to be the law of Scotland before the hearing of the Auchterarder case, the decision would have been different. He must, however, beg leave to differ from that opinion. The principle of the bill not only required general qualifications in the presentee, but also required a peculiar fitness for the particular parish to which he was to be presented. It required this to make certain of the idoneity of the presentee. The function of the presbytery, as contemplated by the bill, was to consider the circumstances in which the parish was placed, with a view to the spiritual welfare of the people, and, in the spirit of the sacred authority committed to them, to act in a judicial capacity between the people and the presentee, and to state on record the grounds for whatever decision they might come to. Care was expressly taken to negative the assumption of the Veto Act. If the objectors expressed merely dislike to a presentee, unless the ground of the objection were expressed, and there was good reason to doubt his qualification, the objection would not be attended to nor would it receive effect. It was perfectly wrong, therefore, to say that the bill of his noble Friend would give effect to the Veto Act. He believed, with his noble and learned Friend, that spiritual pride, which he did not wish to encourage, was very likely to
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be engendered by making the clergymen dependent on the people and obliging them to canvass the people for support. At the same time the Presbytery must have the power to judge. Such a power must be placed somewhere. In England it was placed in the bishops; but to suppose that the Presbytery would act wrongly was to suppose that all the Members would violate their solemn oaths. To the Presbytery it must be left to decide the question as to the doctrine, the literature, and the morals, of the presentee. But all these objections to the bill of his noble Friend should be made in the committee, where his noble Friend would be ready to listen to all reasonable suggestions, and be ready to adopt any means which would provide against the abuses which were apprehended, and listen patiently to any discussion of the clauses of the bill; but to reject the bill at that stage, because the power of the Presbytery was not sufficiently guarded would be the most mistaken, and, he believed, the most mischievous policy which their Lordships could pursue. One advantage of the proposed bill, and it was an advantage which ought not to be lost sight of, was, that it would make the patron circumspect in his presentation. It was always right, and always considered of the greatest advantage, to scrutinise the characters of those to whom the care of souls Was intrusted. It was right that this should be strictly looked into in England, where the clergy had a liturgy, and when there might be a curate, it was still more necessary in a country, or any parish, where the people, having no liturgy, and no curate, were entirely dependent upon the teaching of the incumbeut. The noble and learned Lord had said, that the bill would please nobody but he was of opinion, that it would give satisfaction in Scotland to all parties, except the seceders. Many of the non-intrusionists must feel pleased with a measure which prevented a clergyman from being obtruded on them to whom rational objection could be taken, while at the same time it did not permit arbitrary and untenable objections. It would be impossible, in legislating upon the subject, to throw out of view what had already taken place in Scotland, or to forget the excitement which prevailed in that country; and if at the instigation of the noble and learned Lords opposite, their Lordships should be induced to throw out the bill, and leave no power in the Presbytery to determine the qualification

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of persons presented, the secession would increase to a fearful extent, and he for his own port could conceive no greater misfortune, nor could he imagine any greater aggravation of the existing evils, than to adopt the views urged upon legal grounds by the noble and learned Lords opposite. He would admit, that many of those who seceded from the Church of Scotland had left it from conscientious principles, but he could hare wished, that in doing so they had exhibited somewhat more of the charitable feeling which had been extended to them by the members of the Assembly. When he read in the organ of the seceders and there was little doubt, that that organ was under the influence of the leaders of the party—when he read in that organ the furious and unchristian tirades which had been levelled against those who remained, he could not but feel the deepest regret to find that such language bad been used. That organ stated, that every clergyman of the establishment was to be considered as the one excommunicated man of the parish—that he was not to be joined with in prayer—that he should not be visited, but that he should be put under the ban of the community. Such language under ordinary circumstances would be absurd, but from the ferocity of feeling which it exhibited, it was exceedingly bad, and calculated to create deep disgust. He did not mean to attribute to the body at large of the seceders a Sympathy in such sentiments, but their promulgation was calculated to do as much mischief as if all had shared in them. From the state of excitement in which the Country was placed, he felt convinced, that the only mode of restoring religious peace in Scotland would be by their Lordships affirming the second reading of this bill.
Lord Cottenhamhaving bad, whilst holding the place of his noble Friend Upon the Woolsack, to investigate the whole of the history of the Church of Scotland With respect to the law of patronage, for the purpose of delivering judgment upon the Auchterarder case, felt that if the judgment pronounced in that case was a right one, the present bill was not in accordance with what he conceived to be the existing law of Scotland, and entertaining that view he could not agree to the second reading. The measure now before their Lordships assumed to be a declaratory bill, and not any new law for regulating the presentation of a Minister. What then did this
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declaratory bill declare the law of Scotland to be now, and heretofore to have been? It first declared, that it was competent to the presbytery to refuse the nomination of the presentee "for any reason whatever." Was not that, he would ask, tantamount to vesting them with an absolute power— not to propose, not to elect, but to put a veto on the appointment? Oh, but then it was said, that the presbytery could not veto the appointment without a reason assigned. It was to be remembered, however, that the presbytery were themselves to be the judges of the reasons assigned. It was said, that the reason must be offered and the objection stated by some one of the parishioners; but this was not at all necessary according to the proposed bill. Anybody might suggest a reason, or a reason might be Suggested by the presbytery themselves. It Was impossible to deny this; the result Would be that the presbytery might reject the presentee for any reason, and the patron would, in this way, be deprived of his right of patronage and the presentee of his benefice. That was rather too extravagant a proposition to ask their Lordships to consent to, and he defied any One to show that such would not be the result of the present bill. It gave an absolute power to the presbytery to reject for any reason offered, and, in this respect, was liable to great objection. The noble Earl opposite had referred to some of the grounds upon which the judges of the Court of Session had given the decision in the Auchterarder case, and particularly to the meaning which had been attached by them to the words " qualified person." Lord Med-win adopted the definition given by Balfour, namely, that the presentee must be of sufficient literature, honest life, and good manners, and in looking over the opinions of the other judges he found that those of the majority, consisting of the Lord President, Lords Gillies, Meadowbank, M'Kenzie, the Lord Justice Clerk, and Lords Corehouse and Cunninghame, Were all opposed to the view taken of this point by the noble Earl opposite. But when he came to the opinions of the minority, he found that they Were of opinion that this power existed in the presbytery, and that the-presbytery had a right to delegate this power to the parishioners. The minority of the judges therefore adopted the doctrine of the noble Earl, and one of the minority, Lord Jeffrey, expressed it as his opinion, that not only had the presbytery the large

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power claimed for them, but that the Church had even still larger powers. The right of the patron was founded on the act of Anne, according to which he was hound to present a qualified minister, and the presbytery were obliged to admit such qualified person. That act was the latest act on the subject, and there was no arguing against it. All that They had to do with that act before them, was to inquire what meaning the law of Scotland attached to the words " qualified person." He would refer to the earliest and the latest writers during the last three centuries, and he thought he could show that there could be no doubt of the meaning of those words. From the time when Popery was overturned, to the period when Presbyterianism was established in Scotland, those words had been used and recognised in all the acts of Parliament relating to this question. They were not found in the act of Anne for the first time. The first act on the subject, that of 1567, used the same terms as that of 1711. According to the act of 1567, the patron was to present a qualified person to his—that is, the patron's—understanding; and it provided, that in case the superintendent should refuse admission to such qualified person, the patron might appeal to the General Assembly. By that of 1592 presentations were to be directed to the presbytery, who' were bound and adstricted to receive and admit the "qualified person" presented by the Crown or by lay patrons. He could not, then, suppose that the presbytery were possessed of a power to reject such a presentee for any reason. That act also provided, that when the presbytery refused to admit the presentee, the patron might retain in his own hands the fruits of the benefice. The first Book of Discipline declared that the congregation should be compelled to receive the presentee, provided he were unobjectionable in life, literature, and of honest measures. Balfour defined a qualified person to he a habile person, sufficient in literature, and honest in life and manners. The second Book of Discipline and Bankton, were also in favour of the view which he had taken of what constituted a qualified person. In 1635, a case was decided by the Court of Session, in which the presbytery had refused to admit a presentee against whom no legal objection existed, and in which their conduct in refusing such a presentee was declared to be unlawful, and the patron was ordered to retain the stipend. In this case the presbytery rejected the presentation on
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the ground that the presentee was not suitable, but the court found that it was not a sufficient reason for rejecting him. For any power similar to that which the noble Earl claimed for presbyteries, they must look to the period of the Usurpation. An act of assembly of 1649, declared that where a majority of the congregation did not approve of the minister a new election must take place, but where only a minority dissented, then the presbytery were bound to go to a trial. Upon the Restoration this act and all similar acts, were abolished and patronage restored. By the act of 1690, the heritors and elders were to propose a person to the congregation, and if they disapproved of such person, reasons were to be given in to the presbytery, who were to judge of those reasons and to conclude the matter. This was almost the same mode of proceeding as that proposed in the present bill. If the presbytery were to have the ultimate power of rejecting,, it was immaterial in his opinion whether the reasons came from individuals, or from the congregation at large. The presbytery having the whole power within themselves, might chance to give just as much weight to a bad reason as to a good one. The noble Earl had referred to the opinion of Lord Corehouse in support of his views; but, on turning to the judgment of Lord Corehouse, he found that Lord Corehouse stated that, because the patron had acquiesced in certain limitations, the expediency of which he did not dispute, it did not follow that he was bound to submit to a condition which would be altogether destructive of his right. The act of Anne gave the patron a right to present a qualified person, and all the writers told them, that the meaning of the words " qualified person" was a person qualified in life, literature, and manners. He admitted, that they were not to be tied down literally to these words. The noble Earl comes down to the House and asks you to declare, that such was the law in relation to the Church of Scotland, when the twelve judges who pronounced judgment on this subject declared that it was not the law. The presbytery never had any such power referred to in the bill. They have always been baffled and defeated in their attempts to obtain such power. Ever since the origin of the Church of Scotland, they have not had such a power of declaring the presentee unqualified. The noble Earl came forward with his bill, and wished them to declare that such was the case. It was a strong

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measure which called upon their Lordships to say that they had been in the wrong, and that the judges had also been in the wrong. The noble Earl's bill was not introduced for the purpose of reversing this judgment of the law of the case. No; that was not his intention. He did not thinks, if their Lordships paid attention to the bill, that they could support it. The course adopted by the noble Earl was quite unnecessary. What was intrusion? It was forcing a minister upon a parish which objected to his appointment; whether that person so forced was appointed by the presbytery or the patron, it was intrusion. It was the same in either case. He had no doubt that the power of objection on the part of the parishioners to the nomination of certain ministers, operated very advantageously to the interests of the Church establishment. It operated against the introduction of erroneous opinions into the Church. No great change could take place without coming to the knowledge of the laity as well as the Church. Should the party nominated entertain what might be considered unsound opinions, such persons could be objected to, and, of course, would not be appointed. The law had worked well in Scotland. No church had better performed its various important duties than the Church of Scotland for the long period of 300 years. He would admit with the noble Earl, that the powers referred to in the bill never were possessed by the people of Scotland. They had been struggling for it, but had never attained it. Such had been the case from the period of the usurpation. What then did the noble Earl propose to alter? Great excitement had no doubt prevailed in Scotland on the subject. Both the Church and the people had been most anxious for a change. He would ask how would the bill of the noble Earl allay that excitement? The Church of Scotland objected to the power possessed by certain parties of forcing ministers on parishes who were objectionable to the majority; and they came to Parliament and asked for relief. And what was proposed? They intended to take the patronage away from the lay patrons, and transfer it to the Church itself. That was the measure of relief. He would tell the noble Earl that what he contemplated doing by his bill, the Church of Scotland had been struggling for since 1789. In that year, the General Assembly proposed the adoption of a scheme similar to that of the noble Earl. What the noble Lord proposed to be was not
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asked for by any body. The noble Earl who last addressed the House stated, that a great portion of the General Assembly did not wish to have any such power given to them. In 1840, the noble Earl brought forward a similar plan. The General Assembly rejected it altogether. The majority of the General Assembly disapproved of it. If a great portion of the General Assembly objected to the measure, why was it proposed? What purpose had the noble Earl in view in submitting such a bill for the adoption of the House? The noble Earl stated, that there were a number of ministers now in the Church of Scotland who wished to secede, and the object of his measure was to stop, to catch these disaffected persons, to keep them in the Church. But if such was the object of the noble Earl, why did he not bring forward such a measure before? Why did he permit the secession to take place? They who had left the Church, could not by the noble Earl's bill be brought back into the establishment again. Therefore, as far as those ministers were concerned, the noble Earl's bill would be perfectly useless. When the Veto Act passed, it contained a provision to the effect, that in certain cases if the Veto Act should not be complied with, the appointment should be transferred to the presbytery. He thought that after the decision of that House, the General Assembly would not be disposed to retain that provision of the Veto Act. He considered that those who had left the Church were entitled to the approbation of their Lordships for the sincerity which they had manifested. He would direct the attention of the noble Earl to the acts of the General Assembly. The General Assembly, it was evident, did not consider an Act of Parliament binding upon them. They looked upon acts of Parliament in a light different to that of other persons. They thought that the General Assembly possessed powers co-ordinate and co-extensive with Parliament itself. Such was not only the case with regard to patronage. The General Assembly treated acts of Parliament generally with great contempt. When the Veto Act passed, the General Assembled considered that they had such authority, and they also thought that they possessed the power to pass any other law in opposition to any act of Parliament. He would ask the noble Earl, as a Minister of the Crown, whether he would consent to part with all the patronage of the Crown in regard to the Church of Scotland. The

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noble Earl was clearly interfering with the patronage of the Crown, as well as with the patronages of all the lay patrons of Scotland. He trusted that their Lordships would resist so strong a measure as that proposed by the noble Earl, and give it their determined opposition.
The Lord Chancellorwas desirous of addressing a few words to their Lordships on the subject of the bill under the consideration of the House. He trusted that their Lordships would consent to allow the bill to be read a second time. After having paid much attention to that subject, and to the present condition of Scotland, it was his opinion, that in order to allay the excitement and irritation which existed in that country, the bill which his noble Friend had introduced would be extremely useful. Noble Lords who might object to some of the details of the measure would have an opportunity afforded them of doing so when the bill went into committee. He felt quite convinced, that when the bill was so discussed, most of the objections which had been urged to the measure would be removed. The objections which had been urged against the bill had been advanced on the assumption that the objections which were raised to the appointment of a particular person would be made the basis of the decision of the court. He admitted that any person might make an objection to the presentee. The whole of the argument of the noble Lord arose out of the clause which related to the objections which might be urged to the presentee. It had been said in course of the debate how absurd it was to give the parties the power of making such an objection. How absurd that such objection should afterwards be made the ground of the decision of the court, or that the decision should be in conformity with the objection. There was nothing more foreign from the intention of the bill than that. He admitted that objections of any kind might be made to a presentee; but when they came to the consideration of those objections, he affirmed that the presbytery could decide on none that did not affect his personal character, or that did not go to impugn his ministerial qualifications in respect of the particular parish to which he was presented. No objection, in fact, was available, unless it was an objection to the presentee's " gifts and qualities," either generally, or else with reference to a particular parish; and if the noble and learned Lord would refer to the appeal clause, he would
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find, that the objections must be repelled, unless they were to such effect. The question was, then, was this bill any alteration of the law of Scotland? He contended, that with these limitations and restrictions, it most decidedly was not, and the whole of the argument of the noble and learned Lord, which went to prove the converse, was, in fact, founded on a false construction of the different clauses of the enactment. That noble and learned Lord said the qualification was with a view to instruction. Now, the noble and learned Lord could not show a single Act of Parliament which had so defined it, and he was obliged to go back to authorities anterior to the Reformation, when the whole frame of the system was swept away. He had not had the advantage of attending the Auchterarder case, and therefore it was with much deference he referred to that part of the subject; but it was unnecessary for him to go into it, because, as the noble Earl had well said, at an earlier period of the evening, the question was not in any way a question as to the definition of a qualification. The people refused to take a Minister on trial, and the question simply was, were they right or wrong? The question of qualification could only have come in incidentally. He did not say that noble and learned Lords were wrong in their interpretation of it, but he did say that the House had formed no judgment on the point. But if not from the House of Lords, from what tribunal were they to draw their decision upon this question? Now, he unhesitatingly said, that they would do well upon such a matter as this, to look to the opinion of the judges on the spot, who had given the case their consideration, and who had pronounced a decision. And the noble and learned Lord would no doubt be astonished to find, that in contradistinction to all he had asserted, most, if not all, the Scottish judges, were opposed to his views. Let him take the late Lord President. He had it from the best authority, that the late Lord President had declared the former bill of his noble and learned Friend—[The Earl of Aberdeen: No, no, not learned.] Learned, at least, I am sure, I may say, upon this subject. He said he had it from the best authority, that the late Lord President had declared the former bill to be in entire conformity with the law of Scotland, to correspond with it, as he said he believed, in principle, and to be, in fact, only an enunciation of the established laws of that

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country. Then what said Lord Corehouse? Why, be would only refer to the papers on the Table to show his opinion, or, if it were necessary to go further, he might quote his judgment delivered in the Auchterarder case, upon which he distinctly laid it down that the jurisdiction was not confined to the consideration of the life, literature, and manners of the presentee, And let him take some of Lord Corehouse's illustrations. Among other things, he remembered that he said:—
" One man may have a weak voice, and may be incompetent to preside over a large parish, although he may be a most competent and able minister."
Again,
" Another person (he said) may be a man of refined manners, who would not be at all adapted for the ploughmen of East Lothian, 'whilst another might be a man of rough manners, anything but adapted to the refined audiences of Glasgow and of Edinburgh."
Then the noble and learned Lord had referred to the opinion of the Dean of Faculty. Now, that was surely a most unfortunate and extraordinary reference; for he had seen letters from that functionary stating what were his opinions on the subject; and those opinions were entirely conformable to the principle of the noble Earl's bill. Then, Lord Medwin; that was another extraordinary reference, showing how grossly the noble and learned Lord had been misled. Then, another learned judge. There was a ease only lately decided on which he had given his opinion it was the case of a Shetland parish, consisting of islands, and of a part of the mainland intersected by bogs. The qualifications of the presentee for that parish had been objected to, and the case had come before the superior courts. The Lord Justice Clerk had decided, that the Presbytery had a right to judge whether the minister was fit and suitable for that parish. Now, when he found these authorities all ranged on one side, and when he found only one judge opposed to them— Lord Cunninghame, a judge of great learning and ability—he admitted, when, he said, he found all these great authorities, with one solitary exception, on one side, he must say, that he was satisfied that the learned judges of Scotland were of opinion that the presbyteries had even more extensive powers than was generally supposed—that they had the power, not only of deciding on the " life, literature, and doctrine " of the presentee, but that
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they also had a right to decide on his suitableness for the particular parish to which he was presented. But it was said, that this was the chief objection to the bill, that the measure went to give an extraordinary power to the presbyteries—the power of deciding without appeal. That he (the Lord Chancellor) most positively denied, and further, he would declare that the assertion was made on an entirely false construction of the bill. The House would in one moment see that this was the case when he stated, that under the clauses the presbyteries were limited to the consideration of objections respecting the ministerial gifts and qualities of the presentee, that they were obliged to state in writing any objections to him entertained upon any other grounds, and that at any time the civil courts could interfere and arrest an excess of authority. This was the main objection to the bill, and he trusted that after his explanation, which their Lordships could in a moment understand, that objection would entirely vanish. For his part, he founded his judgment upon this bill on the impression that it was no innovation on the established law—that it was not in contradiction of any decision of that House, and that, therefore, there was good foundation for legislating in a matter of this kind. If the bill was only attended with a small part of the advantage those best informed taught him to expect from it, there would be sufficient to induce him to implore their Lordships to give it a second reading. With respect to its details, he admitted that the wording of the measure was somewhat loose, too general, and too comprehensive, Those errors must and should be corrected, but the principle of the measure being good, he felt it a duty at once to call upon their Lordships to read the bill a second time that evening.
Lord Campbellobserved, that the noble Lord on the woolsack appeared to have received some sudden illumination with respect to this subject- On a former occasion he bad expressed his entire and decided approbation of the judgment in the Auchterarder case, and not only of the judgment, but of the reasons upon which it was founded. Those reasons were, that the Church was in reality possessed of no such power as the noble and learned Lord now found it bad owned and exercised from time immemorial, and that if it had such power it might have enacted the veto law, which if so enacted would not have been beyond, but within, the powers

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of the Church; but the noble Lord on the Woolsack, after the powerful and convincing speech of his noble Friend (Lord Cottenham), had felt it necessary to summon up his courage, and come to the rescue of the noble Earl by declaring his opinion that this bill was properly a declaratory bill, and that the Church of Scotland had from time immemorial enjoyed all that he now declared she had a right to. He never remembered an instance in which in the ardour of debate the expedient had so entirely prevailed over the just, and he could not but express his amazement at the noble Lord's singular change of opinion. With respect to the measure itself, he found himself under the necessity of voting against the amendment, in order that he might not at once reject the bill. He was of opinion that the time was come when it would be desirable and expedient to legislate upon this question. Hitherto he thought the Government had taken a wise and judicious course in refraining from introducing any act of legislation, for certainly such legislation could scarcely have been effectual, and might have proved very dangerous. Now, however, the Church of Scotland had assumed such a different aspect, that he could not but think it right that some legislative measure should be adopted. It was necessary, he thought, for the credit of the Church as she now existed to give some confidence to her communicants—to sustain the reputation of her establishment, and to do this by some measure of legislation. But to this bill, in its present shape, although he should support it in this stage, he certainly could not assent; and unless it was materially altered he must decidedly oppose it on a future occasion. With respect to one point connected with it, he could not but express the most unfeigned surprise. He was astonished that the noble Earl— whose honest intention no one could doubt—should, without a single useful object that he could discover, persist in making this a declaratory instead of an enacting bill. Good God why should it be declaratory? The noble Earl was powerful enough in that House, and the Government to which he belonged had surely sufficient influence in the other, to have this measure passed in any way they might propose. Last Session, when the Irish Marriages Bill was introduced, he had begged and prayed that it might be a de-
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claratory bill, but the noble Lord on the Woolsack had insisted that it should be an enacting measure. Why should there be a distinction with regard to this bill? If the noble Lord looked to the Church and to the good of the people of Scotland, he could not but find that all his purposes would be answered by making the bill an enacting bill. As a declaratory bill, in fact, it should have his strenuous opposition, for he did not believe that it was, or could be made, declaratory of what was the law of Scotland respecting presentations as it now existed. This bill, as it at present stood, assumed that the Church possessed a certain power. If so, how, let him ask, had that power been acquired? It could only have been acquired by act of Parliament; and would the noble Earl tell them, if he could, by what Act of Parliament that power had been conferred? It was a power, they must remember, which had not belonged to the Church of Rome, or to any other church; and how, he should like to know, did it come to the Church of Scotland? The fact was that there was no statute giving such power, and there was only one which gave the power of examining presentees respecting qualifications.
The Lord Chancellor: The words are these,—
" And if the court shall be of opinion that the objections and reasons stated are not duly founded in any objections personal to the presentee, in regard to his ministerial gifts and qualities, whether in general or in reference to that particular parish, the court shall repel the same."
Lord Campbell; There must be some error. Because if any person is presented who, in the opinion of the Presbytery, has anything that renders him unfit, they may reject him. The patronage of the Church was completely transferred from the patrons to the church; and how did the system work? The patron presented a clerk, and any one might make an objection. A man might be objected to for having fair hair or dark hair. Yes, even such things as those might be cognosced, and thereupon the Presbytery had only to say, " We repel the presentation." A presentee might be objected to on the ground that his name was M'Leod. The noble Earl had admitted that any objection might be made. The noble Earl was getting diplomatic, and shook his head. But the objection to a name might be

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made under the bill, and the Presbytery if they chose to give it effect, would be fully justified in doing so. By the two Acts of Parliament applicable to the subject it was enacted, that the lay patron should present and the presbytery admit. But would not the presentee be disqualified if it were proved that his name was M'Donald or M'Leod? Was this bill then a declaratory measure? The noble Earl said this bill did not alter the law of the land. But it would be difficult to show that, and to reconcile the differences between the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack and the noble Earl. Indeed, they could not reconcile their differences without one or both of them making some sacrifice. He objected then to the bill, because it was a declaratory bill; and, secondly, because it transferred all the powers of patronage to the Church, giving it a power which no church ought to possess, a power that would be abused, a power which held out temptations to abuses, and a power for which there was no example and no parallel. Where was the necessity for this measure? It would do no good to those who had left the church, for they had left it never to return; nor would it be any boon, if the noble Earl's description of it were correct, to those who remained in the Church. If the bill were carried on he should most undoubtedly propose that the word " declare" be struck out; and if amendments were not introduced so as to give civil courts cognizance of the grounds of objection, he should oppose the further progress and third reading of the bill, because it seemed to him to be advisable that the civil courts should have cognizance of the grounds of objection, as in England. The civil courts ought to be allowed to see that the objections were spiritual and canonical; without that the Church would be tyrannical, The noble Earl seemed to wish that the whole establishment of the Church should be subverted, than the claims of the other party should be admitted. He thought it would be better the Church should be subverted than invested with powers that would prove injurious to that establishment and most mischievous to the public. With regard to the clauses touching the veto law, he thought they would be wholly harmless, for the bill said that no objection should be acted upon without a reason. What did that mean? He might say he did not like
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the qualifications of a presentee, and there would be a reason as well as an objection. He should vote for the second reading of the bill, as he found that his noble and learned Friend meant to introduce an amendment to strike out the word " declare" and he hoped his noble and learned Friend would introduce a clause expressly limiting the power of the presbytery to spiritual and canonical grounds of objection. Then, if his noble and learned Friend would do so, the bill would be a very different one, and he should not oppose it; but in its present shape he certainly should on a subsequent stage offer it his firm opposition.
The Earl of Aberdeen,in reply, explained that in Scotland ordination took place at the time of induction, which was not the case in England. With regard to the veto, he apprehended that was a dissent without a reason. If objections were made, and reasons assigned, then the presbytery must judge of them, so that they might pronounce upon the fitness of the presentee for the particular parish. If they repelled the same improperly, undoubtedly it would admit of action in a civil court, upon an application from the patron or presentee. He did not presume to oppose the noble and learned Lord upon points of law; all he could say was, that the bill had been submitted to the proper authorities, and that it was revised by the Lord President, and therefore he must still presume to think that it was consistent with the present law of Scotland. The noble and learned Lord had said that those in the Church did not desire it, and he was at a loss to understand what boon it would be. If any of them had expressed indifference to the bill, it was because they believed that they possessed all the powers which it professed to give them. He was prepared for the opposition of those who might think it an unwarrantable interference with the powers they believed they possessed. But to show the noble and learned Lord how similar their powers were, he would just read an extract from the " Regulations for the Admission of Ministers;"—
" If the objections stated affect the moral character of the doctrine of the presentee, so that if they were established he would be deprived of his licence, or of his situation in the Church, the objectors shall proceed by libel, and the Presbytery shall take the steps usual in such cases. If the objections relate merely to the insufficiency or unfitness of die presented

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for the particular charge to which he has been appointed, the objectors shall not be required to become libellers, but shall simply deliver in writing the specific grounds for objecting to the settlement, and shall have full liberty to substantiate the same; and the presentee shall have opportunity of being fully heard in reference to all objections that may be slated against him. The Presbytery shall then consider these grounds, and if it shall appear that the opposition originates in causeless prejudices, no adequate reason having been adduced for it, they shall proceed to the settlement of the presentee, according to the rules of the Church; but if the Presbytery shall be satisfied that the projector or objectors have established that the presentee is not fitted usefully and efficiently to discharge the pastoral duties in that parish, then they shall find that he is not qualified, and shall intimate the same to the patron, that he may forthwith present another person, it being always in the power of the different parties to appeal from the sentence pronounced by the Presbytery if they shall see cause."
It was quite clear that the term " qualification" must be defined rather by the practice of the Church than by technicalities; and according to the " regulations" it would comprise all objections which would render a man unfitted and unsuitable for a particular parish. Although the noble and learned Lord thought the bill would transfer the patronage to the Church, he thought the reverse, and he had received no thanks for it from the violent party in the Church. He had no objection, however, to make the bill as perfect as possible, with the assistance of the noble and learned Lord, and other noble Members of that House, so that it might have the effect of tranquillizing the Church. His object was to frame the established Church of Scotland in obedience to the law, and to satisfy the people that their right to object would be admitted. What the people desired was full liberty to state whatever they thought proper, with the conviction that their objections would be fully weighed and examined. If they were, in addition to the monstrous doctrines which the seceders had separated upon, to add to the inducement to secession that the people were to be confined to object merely to life, literature, and morals, they would disestablish the whole Church of Scotland. If they refused to admit that which every individual of the Scotch Church maintained to be indispensable, they would really disestablish the Church. It was, therefore, with this serious conviction on his mind
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that he was anxious that this bill should proceed. He should be happy to receive any suggestions from the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack with all the respect which was due to them.
The Earl of Mintocould not vote for the second reading without stating that the only ground on which he could allow the bill to pass through this stage without a negative was the hope held out by the noble Earl on the other side of the House, and by the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack, that the bill in a future stage would be rendered less objectionable than now.
Bill read a second time.
The House adjourned at twenty minutes past eleven o'clock.