AFFGHAN WAR—VOTE OF THANKS.

HL Deb 20 February 1843 vol 66 cc892-936

The Duke of Wellington moved that the following paragraphs in her Majesty's Speech be read:— Her Majesty is happy to inform you that complete success has attended the recent military operations in Affghanistan. Her Majesty has the greatest satisfaction in recording her high sense of the ability with which these operations have been directed, and of the constancy and valour which have been manifested by the European and native forces, The superiority of her Majesty's arms has been established by decisive victories on the scenes of former disasters, and the complete liberation of her Majesty's subjects who were held in captivity, and for whom her Majesty felt the deepest interest, has been effected. They having been read, the noble Duke proceeded to say, My Lords, I rise, in pursuance of notice I have already given your Lordships, to ask your assent to a motion, the terms of which I had the honour of placing on your Lordships' Table on Thursday last. In calling your Lordships' attention for a short time to the subject of that motion, I beg to state that it is my intention to avoid adverting to any matter not strictly connected with the military preparations of our army in Affghanistan, except so far as to advert to certain historical matters contained in the papers on your Lordships' Table, in relation to antecedent circumstances, in order to elucidate the particular transactions to which it will be my duty to call your Lordships' attention. My Lords, the papers on your Table show—and there can be no doubt on that point—that there existed throughout Affghanistan disturbances in the course of the year 1841, not only to the north and east of the city of Cabul, but likewise to the north and west of Cabul, and not only to the south of Cabul, but at Candahar, and even to the south of Candahar. In short, my Lords, it is impossible to peruse those papers and not to see that the whole country was disturbed, and that it would have been impossible to move troops in small numbers from one part of the country to another, without coming into collision with an enemy, nor without great probability of the troops so employed being cut off. Indeed, there are accounts, in some of those letters, of detachments on their march to Cabul that were cut off and totally massacred; and on one occasion it even became necessary to abandon one of our military posts to the insurgents. In short, the whole country was in a state of insurrection and disturbance. In all parts of the country there were distubances and insurrections, which had totally put an end to all communication between the different parts of the country, except under the protection of large bodies of troops. Under these circumstances the insurrection broke out at the city of Cabul; but, my Lords, before I say a few words on that part of the subject, I wish to remind your Lord ships that only a part of the troops were stationed at Cabul, for the protection of the seat of Government and of the head quarters of the army. A large detachment had moved, under the command of General Sir Robert Sale, to suppress the insurrection in what are called the south eastern provinces. My Lords, before General Sale had made one march he found himself engaged with formidable forces, and was himself wounded. Nevertheless, he continued his operations. Day-after day he was attacked in flank as well as in front, and your Lordships will see by his own despatches how gallant must have been the behaviour of himself, of his officers, and of the troops under his command. The general in command at Cabul found it necessary to recall General Sale and order him to return to Cabul. The general in command found there was every probability of his being pressed in the absence of the force he had sent to suppress the insurrection, and keep open his communication with Hindostan. But General Sale found himself in no situation to obey this order, owing to the number of his wounded and sick, and owing to the total want of means for their conveyance. He found himself in consequence under the necessity of declining to return to Cabul; for he saw that if he had clone so, he must at least have abandoned 500 of his wounded. He continued his operations, however, day after day, in the intention of reaching Jellalabad, and, as I shall presently show to your Lord ships, he established himself at Jellalabad in a short time after he had marched from Cabul. But, my Lords, it must not be supposed that while marching through the country with a considerable force General Sale was able to suppress the insurrection. The insurgents continued to attack the posts occupied by the Shah's troops, and by our troops, throughout the valleys and passes leading from Cabul to Jellalabad; and it is a curious circumstance, that some of those very forces which seized the posts that General Sale and his brave troops were under the necessity of attacking, were placed in that neighbourhood under the direction of some of the Dourine noblemen, to give succour to the Shah's government and tranquillity to the country, and to enable the army to use those valleys as a means of communication. My Lords, I mean to refer to those papers so far only as may be necessary to show the real state of the country at the breaking out of this insurrection, because it will throw some light on the events that followed. General Sale marched about the 14th of October, and on the 3d of November the insurrection broke out at Cabul. The house of Sir Alexander Burnes was attacked, and he himself was murdered. Several other officers were also surprised and murdered, and the stores in the town were seized and plundered. The pay-office was attacked and plundered. From that time forward the insurrectionists were active and the contests were continual. Besides the troops in the cantonments at Cabul, there was a camp on the heights on the opposite side of the river, which was broken up after the insurrection commenced, and part of the troops were sent to the citadel of Bala Hissar. After that detachment had been sent out, the troops which were left behind were barely sufficient to hold that post. The stores destined for the provisions of the troops were outside the cantonments, and the works by which they were defended, being unfinished, rendered their defence difficult and extremely doubtful. The troops in the cantonments were attacked, as it appears, immediately after the affair in the city on the 3d of November, when Sir Alexander Burnes and other European officers were killed. An attempt was made, by the Shah's desire, to get the better of the insurrection, but the troops were beaten back, and obliged to retire on the Bala Hissar. The contest continued between the troops in the cantonments and the insurgents in the city. All communication with the interior of the country was cut off; no forage could be got for the animals attending the army for the conveyance of stores and artillery, and attacks were made, without intermission, day and night, so that the troops were obliged to be continually under arms, day after day, and night after night, and indeed the whole garrison was obliged to be constantly under arms. They could have no relaxation or repose. The commissariat was not placed in cantonment, but was in a dismantled fort at a distance from it, which was immediately under the fire of a strong force, stationed in a place called the King's Gardens, at that time in the possession of the insurgents. It was, therefore, impossible for the army in the cantonment to communicate with the commissariat. Attempts were made to effect a communication, but it was found impossible to succeed in those attempts. The contest continued day after day, for the purpose, if possible, of carrying supplies of food and forage over to the troops in cantonments. As happens always under such circumstances, by degrees the men lost their spirits. They lost those spirits which generally accompany strength of body, they lost their habits of subordination and discipline; indeed, it appears clearly from the papers on the Table that the discipline and subordination of the army were completely gone. The animals belonging to the army were famished, and, upon the whole, never were men in a worse situation than that in which this body was placed in December, little more than a month after the insurrection had broken out, and the attack was made upon the house of Sir Alexander Burns, and he and other officers had been murdered. It was thought proper at that time to open negotiations with those who were understood to be at the head of the insurrection, and to guide the parties opposed to our troops, and (as it then appeared) to their own sovereign. In the course of their negotiations the gentleman who conducted them—the Minister of the British Government to the Shah Soojah—had occasion to have an interview with the person to whom he was treating, and that gentleman was murdered in the most treacherous manner. Notwithstanding this murder, and the circumstances by which it was accompanied—notwithstanding the treachery and breach of engagement which marked it—the negotiation was continued for the evacuation of the cantonment, and for the march of the troops back to Hindustan. My Lords, the disorganization of the army had already commenced; but the discouragement and want of confidence of the troops in their leaders were increased by these negotiations for the surrender of all for which the army had been called on to make such great efforts, and to endure so many miseries, inflicted by the severity of the climate and the want of food. Their discouragement was increased, I say, by these negotiations, which concluded in an agreement that the troops should evacuate the cantonments, and should proceed on their march back into Hindustan at a certain time, and a promise was made by the other party that stores of provisions, and the means of conveyance, would be supplied, to enable the army to make the movement. My Lords, I am sorry to say that when inquiry came to be made into the manner in which the troops were to be marched from the cantonment, they were not in a state of discipline, subordination, and order, to enable them to execute the movements which they were ordered to make. Without discipline or order, without confidence in their officers, I can hardly call them more than a mob with arms in their hands, and in fact they were almost driven out of their cantonment by the mob of Cabul, anxious for plunder. In this state they were followed, hour after hour, day after night, and night after day, in a mass in which no order could be distinguished, armed men mixed with camp followers and women, and fired at from every direction, notwithstanding the engagement made for their protection, having no means for the conveyance of the sick, no provisions, scarcely any clothing to shield them against the inclemency of the weather, and this continued as long as the human frame was capable of enduring such hardships. The whole body became more and more disorganized. The women were left in the hands of the chief who had negotiated for the march of the army, and had engaged to provide for their security and support during the march. After the women and some of the officers had been given up to him; others were taken prisoners; and, in short, my Lords, this distressing march continued till every one belonging to the army had either been killed or taken prisoner, except one, a medical gentleman of the name of Dr. Brydon, who succeeded in reaching Jellalabad. Such, my Lords, is the outline of these distressing events. It is very true, that there is no official account of these transactions; accounts of them have reached the Indian Government in private correspondence, extracts of letters, and other papers of that description, which, however correct may be the statements they contain, cannot be treated as official documents. It is not my wish to impute blame to anybody on account of these misfortunes. Inquiries respecting them have been ordered to be instituted in India; these inquiries were commenced by the late Government, and have been continued by the existing Government. I have not yet heard what is the result of the investigation, but I really believe it will be found that the statement which I have made to your Lordships is as nearly the truth as possible. The officer who commanded the troops, certainly, in the first instance, had not the power to take measures which might have prevented the misfortunes which I have described. He was very ill at the time, and the injuries which he subsequently sustained by a tall from his horse, rendered him incapable of making exertions which were necessary to remedy the evils which arose. I must say, that after the first few days, and more particularly after negotiations were commenced for the surrender of the citadel, which were carried on by the gentlemen at the head of the British military and civil affairs in Cabul, it would have been quite hopeless to expect that our forces could have been able to retain their position in that country. The negotiation aggravated all the evils of their position, and that sooner or later some great effort must have been made to remove our troops out of the country. I must do the Government which existed at the time in India the justice to say, that after the misfortune which befel our army every effort was made to collect troops, and to take measures to ensure the safety of the garrison, which, by its own bravery and good conduct, had established itself at Jellala bad, and likewise to protect and save the other garrisons and troops which were still in the Affghan country. The present Governor-general, I understand, landed in India on the 28th of February, 1842, and it appears that he gave his first orders in respect of these transactions on the 15th of March. Great difficulties were experienced in carrying into execution the measures ordered by the former government for directing troops on the Indus, with a view to the relief of the troops still remaining in the Affghan territory, owing to the want of the means of conveyance for the provisions, ammunition, treasure, and other articles which were to be carried, and without which it would have been useless to attempt to relieve any of the garrisons or troops. These difficulties were to be attributed to many causes, and, among others, to the vast loss of the animals used for the purpose of carrying burthens throughout the war, which had then existed for two or three years, and to the vast slaughter and destruction of the persons who attended upon and drove those animals. It unfortunately happened, also, that the Government had agreed to hire the animals which were to be employed in carrying those things which were necessary for the garrisons and troops in Affghanistan, instead of purchasing them, and hiring persons to take care of and drive them. I have served in India, and I know that a difference of opinion prevails as to which is the best course to pursue, whether to hire the camels or to purchase them; perhaps, in some parts of the country, it may be desirable to take the camels and their drivers on hire, and in others it may be desirable to purchase camels for the use of the state, and to hire persons to drive them. However that may be, it is evident that the error in these transactions was this, that the camels, being taken on hire, were hired to go to Jellalabad, and no farther. The camels were knocked up at Peshawur, or the drivers did not choose to go further, and the consequence was, that there were no means of conveying the ammunition, provisions, and other necessaries beyond Peshawur. No advance of money, no promises, no temptation that could be held out could induce the camel drivers to advance beyond that point, and thus the efforts which had been made to relieve the garrison at Jellalabad were frustrated. General Nott, who had so gallantly taken possession of Candahar, was, in the mean time, doing everything to defend himself and the troops under his command in that position; but it was impossible to get him to move, not alone on account of the military difficulties of the country, which was well defended by the armed inhabitants, and which has, at all times, been the great feature of defence in that territory, but also because, even if the country had been open, he could not stir for want of the means of conveyance for ammunition and stores. Under these circumstances, the Governor-general in council issued an order on the 15th of March, in which he declared what his intentions were with respect to the relief of the garrisons and other operations to be carried on in Affghanistan. The first operation was with respect to the troops collected at Peshawur—collected as fast as they could be collected both by the preceding and the existing Government. The existing Government turned its immediate attention to furnishing those troops with the means of conveyance. It was found that the troops could not move until the end of the month of March, and, in point of fact, our force entered the Khyber Pass on the 6th of April, and arrived in due course of time at Jellalabad, where they formed a junction with General Sale. It is but justice to Major-General Sale to state that he had with great labour and skill fortified his post at Jellalabad, that he made repeated sorties, in which he drove back the enemy, and that on the 6th of April, before he was joined by the reinforcements from Peshawur, he made another successful sortie against the enemy, who had come down with his whole force, with the intention of attacking Jellalabad. General Sale attacked the enemy's camp on the 6th of April, and gained a complete victory, taking possession of all the enemy's cannon and stores. Thus General Sale relieved himself, and General Pollock marching through the Khyber Pass, according to orders, arrived at Jellalabad. This was the first operation that was performed. But though the garrison at Jellalabad was relieved, there were still other garrisons without the means of communicating with Hindostan, or with other posts belonging to the British army, and which were not secure against the evils which had befallen our troops at Cabul. There was a considerable force at Candahar, a sufficient garrison at Ghuznee, another garrison at Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and another at Quetta. Now, the object must have been, at that time, to secure communications with all those posts, for, whatever might be intended in respect to future connection between the British power and the Affghan country, it was indispensable that, at least, the troops then in the country should be placed in safety. For my part, being at that time a Member of her Majesty's Council, that which I felt to be necessary above all things, was to secure communications with all our troops in Affghanistan, and, if possible, to bring off all the garrisons and the prisoners; and, I confess, I thought that if those objects could be accomplished, everything would be done which could be required for the honour and character of the country. The noble Lord at the head of the Government in India continued his efforts to effect these objects. The garrison at Candahar, the force under General Sale at Jellalabad, and the troops under General Pollock, which had joined him there; the garrison at Quetta, and the detachment under General England, were all equally without the means of conveyance for the ammunition and other things essential to the movement of an army. The Governor-general continued his efforts to supply the means of conveyance. If your Lordships will take the trouble to look through the volume of papers, you will see what efforts the Governor-general made to this end; you will perceive that he was in constant correspondence with all manner of persons who could aid and assist him in his object; you will find that he was in constant correspondence with the officers commanding in the Affghan territory, with the view of ascertaining what they wanted, and what progress was made in supplying their wants. Your Lordships will likewise perceive, that the Governor-general was also in correspondence with those officers, in order to ascertain at what period it would be most expedient, with reference to the health and efficiency of the troops, for them to retire from Affghanistan. The Governor-general obtained the officers' opinions on that subject, and as early as the 15th of March, the noble Lord indicated clearly his intention not to embark again in the re-conquest of the country, however desirous he might be to make it felt that the British power had the means of avenging any injury which might be inflicted upon it. I mention that circumstance, not for the purpose of raising any political discussion, but only because it is a fact material to be known in the progress of my narrative. On the 19th of April, the Governor-general having then obtained further information with respect to the wants of the several armies in Affghanistan, and having just received an account of the failure of one detachment, under General England, in an attempt to reach Candahar by the Khojuk Pass; and being sensible of the mischief which must result from the want of communication between the several bodies of troops in Affghanistan and the Government in Hindustan, and with each other, directed that the generals commanding at Candahar, Jellalabad, and elsewhere should turn their attention seriously to the withdrawal of their troops at the period at which it should appear most reasonable to do so, with the least inconvenience to the troops, and in the manner most likely to tend to the preservation of their health and efficiency; for, my Lords, the climate in some districts of that country is such that in winter, troops cannot be exposed to it—in others, rains are likely to impede the progress and injure the health of an army. Under these circumstances, the Governor-general, on the l9th of April, gave directions for the withdrawal of the garrisons from Candahar and Khelat-i-Ghilzie. It appears from the correspondence that the generals commanding those troops were of opinion that it would not be expedient, with reference to the health and efficiency of the troops, even supposing they were supplied with the means of conveyance, to retire until the month of October. The Governor-general then issued instructions to General Nott, the officer in command of the troops at Candahar; which instructions, I must say, are some of the handsomest I have ever seen given by any authority to any officer whatever. I have been employed on many occasions, and have, of course, received various instructions given under circumstances of difficulty; but I must say that I never saw any instructions more handsome and fair towards the individual who was to carry them into execution, than those written by Lord Ellenborough to General Nott. I must also do General Nott the justice to say, that he accepted the instructions most gallantly, and carried them into execution with equal decision and gallantry. I honour him for it. He made no difficulty about the instructions: he took time to consider, as he ought to have done; and, having so taken time to consider, he accepted the instructions, and carried them into execution. The transaction is equally honourable to both parties; and I hope your Lordships will be induced to give your thanks both to the author of the instructions and to the gallant officer who carried them into execution. Under his instructions General Nott, who had been twice engaged with the enemy at Candahar, and defeated him on each occasion, marched out on the 10th of August, and he again defeated the enemy, though greatly superior in force to his own army. The gallant general pursued the enemy to Ghuznee, where they posted themselves on the heights, under the protection of the fire of that fortress. On coming up with the enemy in this position, General Nott attacked and again defeated them. He then attacked the fortifications and citadel of Ghuznee, and obtained possession of them on the 8th of September. In the meantime, the Governor-general was in correspondence with General Pollock in the neighbourhood of Jellalabad. That general had been supplied with means for conveying his provisions, ammunition, and everything he required to enable him to move forward. General Pollock, having sent detachments against some of the chiefs who occupied castles between Jellalabad and the Khyber Pass on the one side, and between Jellalabad and Cabul on the other, was enabled to advance on Cabul. He moved forward, and in that very valley in which, as I have stated to your Lordships, our people had formerly been massacred on retiring from Cabul, he gained a victory over the enemy. He followed up his success, and continued his attacks upon the enemy day after day, until he arrived at Cabul, and hoisted his standard on the Bala Hissar on the 16th of September, where he was joined in a day or two by his brother General Nott, who had marched on Cabul after having, as I before stated, taken and destroyed the fortress of Ghuznee. Thus did our victorious forces unite, in the middle of September, at the spot where our great previous disasters commenced. When I slate to your Lordships that the Governor-general landed in India on the 28th of February; that he gave his first order relative to these transactions on the 15th of March; and that between that day and the 16th of September, the great misfortune which we had suffered was thus remedied—I think I am entitled to ask of your Lordships this: that her Majesty, having expressed her approbation of these services in her gracious Speech at the opening of the Session, your Lordships will support her Majesty in the step which she has taken. I have not stated all. Several of our countrymen and countrywomen were prisoners in the hands of the enemy. Between the 16th and the 26th of September, all those prisoners were safe in the hands of the British generals. Several of the prisoners had been delivered by General Nott at Ghuznee—for there also a capitulation had been made without any cause—without any pressure upon the officers who made it; and they who made it were afterwards cut up and destroyed, and their unfortunate troops carried into captivity and sold into slavery. Thus, in less than six months from the period when the Governor-general landed in India, and issued his first order relative to these transactions, everything was done which the most sanguine mind could have formed an expectation of for remedying the evils and misfortunes which had occurred in the previous December and January. I now conclude by moving— That the thanks of this House be given to the right hon. Lord Ellenborough, Governor-general of the British possessions in the East Indies, for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British empire in India have been applied in the support of the military operations in Affghanistan. That the thanks of this House be given to Major-General Sir George Pollock, G.C.B.; t o Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B.; to Major-General Sir John M'Caskill, K.C.B.; to Major-General Sir Robert Henry Sale, G.C.B.; to Major-General Richard England, and the other officers of the army, both European and native, for the intrepidity, skill, and perseverance, displayed by them in the military operations in Affghanistan, and for their indefatigable zeal and exertions throughout the late campaign. That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the valour and patient perseverance displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, both European and native, employed in Affghanistan, and that the same be signified to them by the commanders of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour.

The Earl of Auckland

ventured, with some reluctance, to follow the noble Duke, and, in so doing, he would in the first instance acknowledge the temperate, judicious, and impressive manner in which the noble Duke had brought the subject before their Lordships. It was a subject on which he having been connected with the proceedings, naturally felt most anxious. Whilst he acknowledged that there was nothing in the speech of the noble Duke which seemed to cast blame on him, he was anxious to point out what had been the conduct of the Government of India during the time he had presided over it with regard to this subject. The noble Duke first alluded to the disastrous events of the war. On those events he did not intend to go into any detail. Those engaged in them met with a calamity which came on them most unexpectedly; and he should only say—without at all prejudging the verdict which must become to elsewhere—that they were brave, amiable, and able men. Under what circumstances this disaster was brought upon them, from what cause those assembled at Cabul failed to restore the order which was so fatally disturbed, were matters under inquiry, and upon them he should give no opinion; he should only say, as the head of the Government of India, he was advised that the force then at Cabul was more than sufficient for any emergency that could be looked for, and that he was even pressed to withdraw part of that force. He should not enter into the details of these painful events, but he requested their Lord ships to consider the embarrassing position in which he was when the difficulties consequent upon them were brought to his notice. Three or four months before the intelligence of the outbreak at Cabul reached Calcutta, he had sent his resignation to the Government at home, at a time when tranquillity reigned throughout India When the intelligence of these disasters came he would gladly, if allowed, have remained in India and have grappled with them, but his successor was on the seas, and all he could do was to provide that successor with the best means in his power of overcoming those difficulties. His first measure was to send across the Sutlej, as a reinforcement to Sir R. Sale, such regiments as could best be spared, amounting (he thought) to 7,500 men. When the accounts came of the massacre of Sir W. N'Naghten, and the further difficulties of the army, that force had been increased, and before he resigned the government 3,000 men in addition were on their march to Peshawur, making 10,500 in the whole, with which force General Pollock had been able ultimately to penetrate the Khyber Pass, and to assist in carrying through those great and admirable operations which the noble Duke had so well described. The noble Duke had, without ascribing any blame personally to him, detailed the extent of the difficulties attending the advance of the force, for want of cattle and the means of carriage. He believed he might say, that his attention had been often attracted to this subject, and that not fewer than 6,000 camels had been attached to the force. But as they approached the scene of danger their numbers diminished. Even when camels were purchased drivers could not be hired; and where the camels were our own the drivers deserted, and they deserted also from the hired camels, and it was only by offering high rewards that General Pollock was able to obtain the means of carriage, and then only scantily and insufficiently. The same thing might be said of General Nott's force at Candahar. Almost immediately before the outbreak he had from three to four regiments stationed away from Candahar, in Zemindawur, at Derawut, and at Khelat-i-Ghilzie, all requiring camels from Candahar. The regimental camels, carrying the tents and baggage of the sepoys, were provided by the Government; the commissariat camels were hired from the Affghans. When the outbreak took place, the camel drivers of the country deserted, and the contractors retired. He, however, had lost no time in exerting himself to afford General Nott the means of supply and of support. He took that opportunity of saying that throughout these transactions, to no man in a public office was the public service under greater obligations than to Major Outram; a more distinguished servant of the public did not exist, and one more eminent in a long career. Major Outram exerted himself in collecting camels and stores. From Rajpootana, Joudpore, and other places, 3,000 camels were obtained, and marched on the 10th April from Sukkur to Quetta, and thence to Candahar, and with these camels General Nott was enabled to effect his march, for which he was indebted in a great degree to the zeal and promptitude with which Major Outram had acted. In saying this, he did not wish to detract from the laudable and active endeavours of the present Governor-general; but such had been the exertions of the Government he had succeeded, that nothing on their part had been wanting (as the noble Duke had most handsomely said) which could enable the Government to repair the disasters sustained at Cabul. This was all he thought it necessary to say as to what he had done. If, in the course of the discussion, anything should call for further explanation, he hoped their Lordships would permit him to give it. He now came to the motion of the noble Duke, and he was ready to admit that his noble successor had been active, zealous, and able in supplying the wants of every part of the army. On what may be supposed to be questionable points he said nothing; but by the order of the 4th July, he thought his noble successor became a partner in the expedition from Candahar to Cabul, and in the combined operations, the consequence of which had been the wiping off the stain upon our military honour, which it had received for one moment and in one place, and the conferring an immense benefit upon India. To General Nott, as well as to other officers, he concurred in awarding great praise. The choice given to him was either the safe course of not exposing his army to danger, or that of undertaking one of the most hazardous enterprises, in order to secure a great object. He chose the most dangerous, but the most advantageous and glorious path. He had confidence in his army, and his army had confidence in him, and he succeeded. After what had been said by the noble Duke, it would be superfluous for him to dwell upon the brilliant qualities for command which had been displayed by General Pollock, or upon the undaunted firmness of General Sale and his brave garrison. He had sincerely exulted in their success; and he would conclude by heartily joining with the noble Duke in his admiration of the conduct of the officers and men of these brave armies. He trusted the expression of their Lordship's thanks would be unanimous.

The Marquess of Lansdowne

said, in the few words I think it my duty to address to the House I shall certainly endeavour to imitate the example so properly set by the noble Duke, and so carefully followed by my noble Friend behind me, in abstaining from any topic that can raise political discussion. I am happy in being able to say, that after considering the words of the resolution which has been proposed by the noble Duke, and which, at my request, he was so obliging as to put us in possession of at our last sitting, I do not feel myself in any degree compelled to offer any opposition to it. I feel, my Lords, that worded as that resolution is, it conveys no praise but that in which I can conscientiously concur. Undoubtedly, I am bound to say, that had it embraced a more extended field with respect to the conduct of the present Governor-general, I might have felt it to be my painful duty (and if I could not, some other noble Lord would have done so) to make such comments upon it, as must have disturbed the present unanimity. I do not, I cannot deny to the noble Lord, now Governor-general, the praise of having assisted and promoted by his activity and abilities those movements which have terminated so successfully, and of having employed the means which my noble Friend so justly stated he had left at the disposal of his successor diligently prepared, and calculated in the highest degree to retrieve the honour of our arms—means which, when given effect to, terminated in the successful and decisive measures which your Lordships have heard described. To the resolution, framed as it is, I cannot do otherwise than give my assent. I may be permitted, however, before I sit down, even after the speech of the noble Duke, who has entered into all the details connected with the subject, to add a few words as to the resolution, which, no doubt, will be adopted with the greatest satisfaction, and which will convey the tribute of applause so justly due to the exercise of ability and valour, equal to any that has ever been displayed. I will say I have risen from the perusal of those despatches, which, in the performance of their duty, the Queen's Government has laid before us, with admiration not only of the valour, not only of the perseverance, but of the ability, foresight, judgment, and prudence displayed, not by one, but in various degrees, by three or four generals, who may in future be called eminent commanders in her Majesty's and the Company's services. For, my Lords, let me impress on you—in measuring the amount of gratitude, an expression of which you are called on to adopt—one particular and striking feature in the merits of these commanders. It has often fallen to the lot of the two Houses of Parliament—happily from the character of this country, most frequently in time of war—to express their gratitude for services performed by military men, which have on those occasions, been carefully described. Sometimes, but more rarely, this House has been called on to offer a still stronger expression of gratitude to persons invested, by the nature of their situations, with high office and command, responsible to no other person but their country, not only for their valour, but their discretion; but, my Lords, there is a third class of cases—to one of which your attention has this day been called—which I conceive higher in degree than either of those to which I at first adverted. It has so happened, from the peculiar combination of circumstances to which the noble Duke adverted, that not only one, but every one of these three generals whose names are particularly referred to, have been called on to take on themselves a responsibility, not originally vested in them, but imposed by the force of circumstances, and involving the character, reputation, and feelings of this country, as well as the safety and existence of the army committed to their charge. In no one of these instances has any of these generals shrunk from the responsibility thus imposed on him. Though nominally in a subordinate situation, each has been called to the performance of duties the greatest to which any man can be summoned. I will shortly advert to the peculiar circumstances affecting their situation, and to the distinguished success which attended the efforts of these three great officers. It is unnecessary for me to follow the noble Duke in detailing the situation and services of Sir R. Sale. Independently of the detail which the noble Duke has given, the events at that period are well known, from the constant and anxious interest concerning them taken by the public—an interest inspired not merely by the public services of those engaged in them, but tinged with associations of a chivalrous if not of a romantic nature. There are none, I believe now in this country who attend to passing events that are not familiar with the constancy and courage of Sir R. Sale, in his never-to-be-forgotten defence of Jellalabad—a courage which, in the midst of neighbouring disaster, disappointment, and confusion, showed itself like a lighthouse amidst the storm, and which, in the midst of surrounding darkness, displayed its steady light, keeping alive the honour of the British character, until by unexampled exertions this great general was enabled to encourage the efforts and assist in the furtherance of the plans by which the whole country was recaptured, and the honour of British arms finally completed and effectually re-asserted. My Lords, I say this was no common service, because it was rendered under every circumstance that could impose difficulty, and displayed not only a military fitness for his high command, but a high intelligence when thrown on his own resources. In no one instance, amid the varied changes of fortune and the hazards of war, was his determination for a moment shaken. Similar has been the conduct, in a different situation, of General Pollock. He was left for several months at Peshawur, to prepare for the advance which was finally made. I do not mean now to enter into the circumstances which induced the Governor-general to hesitate for a considerable period as to the permission to General Pollock to advance, as detailed in the despatches on your Table; and in one despatch, not on the Table—one unaccountably not received, though, I can prove from a subsequent despatch that it must have reached the hands of the Governor-general. [Lord Fitzgerald: There is no such despatch in this country.] I am perfectly aware of that; and I allude to these despatches, not for the purpose of condemning the course which the Governor-general took, or of condemning the hesitation which seems to have lasted for two or three months, but for the purpose of doing full justice to the officer who took on himself the resolution to march, and ultimately assisted in ending the war. But General Pollock would not have been able to make that advance, if it had not been for the corresponding advance of General Nott from Candahar to Ghuznee. I heartily join, therefore, in the praise bestowed on the determination evinced by General Nott. During the whole period from April to July he appears to have occupied his mind with an examination of all the difficulties, and the instant he received the despatch giving him the option to which the noble Duke referred, surmounted them all, and without hesitation embraced the more difficult but more gallant course. I implore your Lordships to read his own despatches, because no language could do such honour to his character as that in which he conveys the feelings and views with which he advanced from Candahar to Ghuznee. I say an advance: because, though in the Governor-general's dispatches the word 'retire' is used, he was after a march of three hundred miles, nearly as far from the frontier as before; and his inarch had the practical and moral effect of an advance, particularly as he twice defeated the insurgents in his progress and after the destruction of Ghuznee, contributed to reestablish the honour of the British arms on the very scene of former disasters. Now, my Lords, however desirable it was, and however natural an object it might be, to place the British army on the side of safety and connection with the frontier of India, I do not think that after what has passed that result would have been completely satisfactory if General Pollock and Nott had hesitated, from the moment they had sufficient means in their disposal, to vindicate the superiority of the British arms, and to show that, when effectively conducted, our military power could never be successfully resisted. In having so done, they have left a lesson to their country never to be forgotten, and rendered such a service as well deserves any thanks it is in the power of Parliament to convey. I say again, I advert to the extreme caution of the Governor-general, not for the purpose of casting censure on him, but of doing full justice to those officers who took on themselves the responsibility of advancing, and whilst loaded with cautions (to use the language of Sir Jasper Nicolls) exhibited a determination and confidence in their own resources, which contributed more than anything else to the ultimate triumph of our arms. It is to their spirit which may be traced running through all their despatches that a success so complete is to be ascribed. Therefore I most heartily and sincerely join in the testimony of the military part of this expedition which has been borne by a far higher authority, and I sincerely hope that, by the joint efforts of our generals, any stigma cast on our reputation from whatever cause arising, has been effectually wiped off, and the power and honour of the British arms effectually established. I have nothing more, my Lords, to say, being sensible that, considering the magnitude of the subject, I have treated it. with too great brevity, whilst, recollecting the unanimity of your Lordships, I fear I have trespassed on your patience too far. I humbly but cordially express my concurrence in the praises bestowed by the noble Duke for a series of operations in which I must be permitted to say my noble Friend near me (Lord Auckland) has had an honourable share, and the success of which he had ensured by the full, adequate, and well-considered preparations in which he was engaged up to the last moment of his tenure of office, not a man or a gun having been employed in these brilliant operations that had not been by him provided and by him allotted to this special service.

Lord Fitzgerald

said, the course which the debate had taken, and the tone of the speeches which had been delivered, relieved him from entering on topics of a varied character, which he had thought were likely to be made the subject of discussion. Before he proceeded to any other matters he must be allowed to rejoice at the proceedings of the debate, not because the high authority of the noble Duke would have been sufficient to overrule any opposition which under other circumstances might have been offered to the vote now asked, not because of that speech of the noble Duke, to which their Lord ships had listened with such deep interest, but because their Lordship's approbation was enhanced and increased in the highest degree, on account of the motion now before them having been made by the illustrious Duke who had brought it forward. That circumstance would give to their Lordships' vote, in the eyes of the present Governor-general of India, a priceless value. It would be the same with respect to the Indian army—the same with respect to every European officer, and to every sepoy. By them it would be received as a high and additional distinction that the vote of thanks had been moved by the noble Duke to that army at the head of which he had gained his first brilliant triumphs, and associated his name for ever with their achievements. For these reasons he rejoiced that the noble Duke had been the mover of the vote now before their Lordships; and as he had so nobly and clearly performed his task, it would ill become him to reiterate the praises bestowed by his noble Friend. He must, however, be pardoned for alluding to the speech of the noble Lord, the late Governor-general of India. To that speech he had listened with the deepest interest, and he felt that its tone, its manner, the unruffled style in which the noble Lord had alluded to his own services and exertions, and the liberal spirit in which he had referred to the Governor who had succeeded him, could not fail of exciting similar sensations in the minds of every one who had listened to him. Even had he been prepared for a discussion of a different kind from that which their Lordships were engaged in, he felt that the spirit of the noble Lord's speech would make it almost impossible for the strongest party man to follow in the course alluded to. In the observations of the noble Marquess too, in alluding to the question with respect to the suspense of the orders for advance, the noble Marquess had in a liberal spirit stated that he did not allude to that circumstance as being in the nature of an imputation upon the conduct of the Governor-general, but with the view of proving to the House the merits of the officers and men who had so successfully achieved the late Indian triumphs. He would, therefore, deal unjustly with Lord Ellen borough were he to go into the consideration of points suggested by the speech of the noble Marquess in any other spirit than that which had characterised that speech. But he could show, from the despatches before the House, that the extreme caution which had been imputed to the Governor-general—no, he would not say "imputed," because to one similarly circumstanced with Lord Ellenborough it would be a compliment to show that he had acted with great caution—he could prove that in no part of his operations did he interpose to prevent an advance pressed for and recommended by his generals. Certainly not. Even in the despatch in which that noble Lord directed the withdrawal of the troops, he held out the prospect and expressed the intention of further operations, and in no one of his instructions were there not means indicated and directions given for the infliction of a grand blow—a complete retribution on those whose treachery had caused the destruction of a gallant and unfortunate army. Nay, it was capable of being proved, from the despatches before the House, that at the time when the Governor-general penned the instructions of the 19th of April, which had been already alluded to, two letters bearing date by a curious coincidence, upon the days immediately preceding and subsequent to the 19th of April—that was upon the 18th and 20th of April, and written by Generals Nott and Pollock—not only indicated but pressed upon the attention of the Governor-general their inability to attempt at that time, provided only with such supplies as they could then command, any movement in advance. He could refer their Lord ships, if it were necessary to go into detail upon the subject, to the numbers of despatches proving this. One of them would, at all events, be in the memory of the noble Marquess, who had given so much of his attention to them. He alluded to General Pollock's despatch of the 18th of April, in which he says,— My situation at the present moment is a difficult one, and much as I deprecate any retrograde movement, such a step is by no means improbable, as I have not yet been able to get in supplies in sufficient quantities to warrant my remaining here. He would ask, then, if these instructions of the Governor-general had not been issued to officers impatient, but unable to proceed? General Pollock, in another despatch, referred to the difficulty of keeping the Khyber Pass open. He says that he had communicated with Captain M'Gregor, who had passed through the defile eight times, upon the subject, and that it was his opinion that it would be necessary to have a force of 8,000 men to keep it open. The same circumstance was referred to in the correspondence of General Nott. But really he did not desire, in a case like the present, when such general unanimity prevailed, to allude to any details which might chance to mar that unanimity; but the explanation he had entered into had been drawn from him by the observations of the noble Marquess who had just sat down. The noble Duke had, in a manner so lucid and perfect, brought before their Lordships the military details of the late operations, that to that part of the subject he did not think it would be becoming in him to add one single word; but, connected as he was with India—responsible, as he admitted he was, and claimed to be, in common with his colleagues, for the administration of the government of that country—deeply interested as he felt in its success—interested in all that concerned the noble Lord, the present Governor-general, and in the honour and character of the Indian army—he felt that it would have been unbecoming in him had he hesitated in coming forward, even in a debate characterised by the unanimity of the present discussion, in order to bear his testimony to what he believed to be the valuable services of the noble Lord the present head of the Government in India. He had had many opportunities, from familiarity with the correspondence of that noble Lord, of knowing that no man, not even the noble Lord the late Governor-general, had ever brought to the discharge of his high duties more indefatigable zeal and a loftier order of ability. He not only possessed those great qualities in himself, but he was the means of inspiring into those around him the same desire to perform to the utmost their various duties. He animated all the public functionaries by that spirit of zeal and energy which was conspicuous in himself; and when the noble Earl opposite talked, in the high terms which he had employed, of the services of Major Outram—terms in which he most cordially concurred—he would yet beg to say, that not to that officer alone, but to every one employed by the Governor-general, did the same degree of praise justly belong. Let them look to the commissariat, to be satisfied of the exertions and zeal of the noble Lord, the Governor-general. The whole energies of his mind had been directed to the unfailing supply of the army. The fame of success on that point was all his own. It was the Governor-general who had fitted the soldiers for service, and enabled them to gain the victories they had achieved. With respect to some points connected with this subject, there were two or three observations which, although they did not strictly arise from the speeches which had been delivered, he would yet briefly allude to. He abstained from going into the details of the correspondence before the House, and he earnestly desired to avoid anything which might occasion a difference of opinion with respect to the comparative merits of individuals, because on this subject unanimity was most desirable, not only in the House, but among the people of England; but with respect to certain circumstances preceding the war, he was doubly happy that the noble Duke had, in his enumeration of the late operations, spoken with deep and proper feeling of these unfortunate transactions, and those who had been engaged in them. It was in feeling and commendable terms that the noble Lord opposite had also alluded to the subject, and for his own part he did not think it fit to bring before the House the transactions of men whose conduct was now under a commission of inquiry in India. But circumstances against which they were unprovided had led to many calamities. The gallant and unfortunate officer who commanded on the occasion alluded to was suffering under sickness, indeed he had made preparations for returning home, and when he fell into the hands of the enemy he had been wounded and betrayed. When, therefore, they applauded success, let them not forget to speak tenderly and with feeling of the mishaps of the unfortunate. He thought, however, that he might remark that with respect to these distressing transactions there had been exhibited instances of the greatest personal intrepidity, of devotion under suffering, and manly bearing to the very last, among those who formed a portion of that devoted host. The noble Marquess had followed the example of the noble Duke, and had done justice to the conduct of Sir Robert Sale, and he could safely affirm that these services had not been too highly estimated. The maintenance of Jellalabad was the point on which the whole of the late successes turned, and although he would not go the length of saying that the advance upon Cabul, even if Jellalabad had fallen, would have been unsuccessful, yet certainly in that case the difficulties of that advance would have been so much increased, that it might have become too hazardous for a Government to direct. And when he spoke of those whom the Governor-general had justly described as the "illustrious garrison of Jellalabad," let their Lordships not forget that gallant officer whose name had been mentioned by the noble Duke, and who had fallen in its defence. He alluded to Colonel Dennie. That officer was the life and soul of the garrison, and of the army; and General Sale, in describing his successful resistance, dwelt on the noble conduct of Colonel Dennie in the most affectionate terms which could be used of his brother soldier, and the Governor-general had truly said, in alluding to his death, that "the success of that day would have left nothing to be desired had he survived." He had been principally led to mention this matter by a circumstance which the other day had occurred to him, and to which he could not help for a moment adverting. It had become his duty, within a very few days, in the name of the Governor-general of India, to transmit to the aged mother of Colonel Dennie the medal of honour which, had he survived, he would have been so well entitled to wear. In desiring him to communicate to Lord Ellenborough the expression of the deep feeling with reference to the tribute paid to her gallant son, the letter of Mrs. Dennie stated,— That she received the medal with pleasure and with pride—that she had a right to feel a pride in her son's life, and also in his death Expressions which, he was certain, would find a responsive chord in every breast. There were many points on which he would wish to touch, respecting part of Lord Ellenborough's instructions, which he thought reflected on him the highest honour. Indeed, he thought it impossible to read his first instructions, dated upon the 15th of March, so comprehensive and detailed, glancing at and anticipating all the adverse circumstances which might arise, without being sensible of the high merit of that despatch. There were other points in these instructions, connected with the important subject of the liberation of the prisoners, with respect to which he could have wished to do justice to the Governor-general's motives; but he was desirous to follow the course so generally adopted by their Lordships, and avoid saying anything which could disturb the unanimity so happily exhibited. He would, therefore, in conclusion, merely thank the House for the attention with which they had listened to his remarks.

The Marquess of Clanricarde

did not rise with any purpose of disturbing the general unanimity displayed by their Lord ships upon the present occasion—he would be most unwilling to offer anything which could have the effect of taking away or impairing that spirit of unanimity, especially when the vote before the House was asked by such high authority as that of the noble Duke opposite. Under the present circumstances, however, he felt himself in rather an embarrassing position, and he considered it to be his duty not to give a silent vote, but to touch slightly upon one or two topics connected with the subject before the House, but in doing so he could assure their Lordships that he would introduce nothing that Could be considered as of a political nature. As some parts of the political conduct of Lord Ellenborough would undoubtedly be very soon brought before the notice of the House, he felt that at present it would be improper very particularly to allude to it. He should therefore confine himself to the matter contained in the book upon their Lordships' Table, upon the contents of which they were desired to found their vote. He would for the present say nothing of the phrase of the "extreme caution" of the Governor-general, which had been already used in the discussion; but when the noble Duke opposite had come to that portion of the subject with reference to which that phrase had been applied, that is, to the period at which Lord Ellenborough had assumed the reins of office in India, he had referred to the despatch dated the 15th of March as expressing the views of the noble Lord the Governor-general, on the situation of affairs at that juncture, and the noble Duke had expressed his approbation of that paper, stating that he considered that if the troops and prisoners were safely got out of Afghanistan, that would be for a time all that could be desired or expected. Now he did not find fault with that language, although it was much moderated from the tone of the language held in Parliament upon the impulse of those feelings which were produced by the first news of our reverses; but what he did find fault with was, that the paper under discussion did not make it a distinct condition of the cessation of hostilities that the prisoners should be restored to us; and although an anxious desire was expressed for the restitution of the prisoners, the evacuation of the country and the cessation of hostilities were not stated to depend upon that contingency. He would read the passage he specially alluded to:— To effect the release of the prisoners taken at Cabul, is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honour. That object can, probably, only be accomplished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in, or may come into, our possession; and, with reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question, in the event of Major-General Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabul. The despatch said, "It may become a question!" but he asked whether there were a man in England, when he heard of the situation of the prisoners, who would for one moment consent to allow such a matter to become a question of doubt? The order for the evacuation of Jellalabad and falling back towards the Indus, was given unconditionally, with one exception, namely, the state of the negotiations affecting the prisoners; but, then, General Sale was distinctly ordered not to remain, unless the prisoners were close upon his camp. The Governor-general never seemed to consider, that if these prisoners were to be allowed to remain, that it would be necessary for us ultimately to advance troops into the country. In one of the despatches addressed to Sir Jasper Nicholls, the noble Lord seemed to contemplate the evacuation of Affghanistan as completed. In that despatch it was stated,— It will, however, likewise be for consideration, whether our troops, having been redeemed from the slate of peril in which they have been placed in Affghanistan, and it may still be hoped, not without the infliction of some severe blow upon the Affghan army, it would be justifiable again to push them for no other object than that of revenging our losses, and of reestablishing, in all its original brilliancy, our military character. He did not mean to say that Lord Ellenborough was not anxious for the safety and escape of the prisoners; but the tone of his correspondence did not coincide with the feelings with respect to the prisoners generally entertained in this country. Their Lordships would recollect that when the news of the capture of our countrymen and women reached this country, that Sir Robert Peel declared, amid the cheers of the House of Commons, that, at any cost, our military character must be re-established, and that the prisoners must never be deserted. They would remember, too, that in the imposition of the income-tax it was urged on the feelings of the country that if the prisoners in Affghanistan were not relieved, it would be necessary to despatch an army to their rescue. Now he did insist upon it that the tone of Lord Ellen borough's despatches was not the tone generally prevalent throughout the country. The first object kept in view by the Governor-general was to get the troops withdrawn from Affghanistan, but he could not agree with the statement which had been made that he had mixed himself up with and become responsible for the advance upon Cabul. In his despatches General Nott complained of his movements having been delayed by the Governor-General. In a despatch dated May 21, he thus alluded to the orders of Lord Ellenborough:— Before the receipt of your letter of the 19th of April, I had equipped this force, which, with two additional regiments of infantry, another troop of horse artillery, and the remainder of the Shah's 1st cavalry, I had intended to march in command of for the purpose of throwing supplies into Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and endeavouring to recover the late Ghuznee garrison now in the hands of the enemy, and making a diversion in favour of General Pollock's army. It thus appeared that General Nott distinctly complained that he had been stopped by the orders of the Governor-general. He was released from the order, just referred to by the subsequent order of the 4th of July, received on the 21st of that month, and he immediately began that advance which had led to the brilliant successes they had to rejoice at. He thought that it was quite impossible for any man to read the despatches contained in the book before the House, without being deeply impressed with the merits of the officers and men in general; but although it might be deemed invidious, under such circumstances, to single out particular persons, he could not refrain from specially alluding to the exploits of General Nott. With respect to the paper of July 4, alluded to by the noble Duke, he could not coincide with the character given by the noble Duke to that despatch. The noble Duke had stated that he considered that despatch as being the very handsomest instruction ever addressed to an officer. Now for his part—in his humble comprehensive on—that paper, as he believed, gave permission to Nott to advance, but he really could not see what there was in the order referred to justify the term instruction by which it had been characterised. He should say, that to any person considering that despatch, according to the plain reading of the terms in which it was couched, it would appear to give permission to advance, but instruction to retire. Throughout every line, the disadvantages likely to attend a forward movement were put forward in the strongest way, but not one word of encouragement did the paper breathe to the officer and troops about to undertake the march. That, however, he was told was the great merit of the document, but really he could not see it. Their Lordships were called upon to confer a vote of thanks upon the noble Lord the Governor-general of India; but if they were called upon to thank Lord Ellenborough for anything else than sending supplies to the army, he should say that they were thanking him for successes which had been achieved contrary to his opinions and orders. He might read this despatch wrong; but he could only say that in reading it in a common simple way, he defied any man, if General Nott had failed in his advance, to attribute any blame to Lord Ellenborough: and if no blame could attach to him in case of failure, surely no merit should accrue to him from success. But he had really meant not to have said so much on the subject, and would not have done so, but for the remarks upon his noble Friend, who had stated that the phrase "extreme caution" was the term which could be applied to Lord Ellenborough's conduct. The Governor-general seemed to have adopted the notion that the prisoners were only to be recovered by means of the hostages that might be taken. His instructions to General Pollock were to make incursions for the purpose of making prisoners. The advance to Cabul seemed never to have been contemplated by Lord Ellenborough. It so happened, however, that there were two things which the Governor-general had absolutely prohibited—first, the advance; and then that the prisoners should not be ransomed. He had given strict orders that they should not be ransomed, and yet it so happened that the army did advance, and that the prisoners were ransomed. [The Duke of Wellington: No, no.] The prisoners had agreed to bribe the man, in whose charge they were to allow them to be restored. They agreed to pay a certain sum of money to the man in whose custody they were. That certain sum of money was to be paid. [Lord Fitzgerald: Not by the Government.] Then, if the Government would not pay that sum, the individuals who had agreed to pay their ransom would pay it. That was distinctly stated. General Pollock said that he was extremely sorry to have received such positive orders with respect to the ransom, because there were nineteen men of the 44th in his neighbourhood who could be recovered for twelve hundred rupees. They were worth the money to fight at the time. However, their Lordships would see that the Governor-general was decidedly against the ransom of the prisoners, as it was against the usages of civilized nations to make prisoners of women and children; but they would be at a great disadvantage if they were for strictly adhering to the usages of civilized nations when they were fighting against barbarians—against those who were uncivilized. He thought it must be the most disheartening thing possible to troops engaged in such a service, if they to be told, that so much punctilio would be used, when the question was which was the speediest and the best way of getting them back out of the hands of barbarians. But he wished now to see if, in all the transactions in the late war, the usages of civilized nations had been adhered to. And coming to this, he said it was the only point further with which he should trouble their Lordships. It was a point upon which he considered he could not give unconditional praise to the troops, until he had better information respecting it. What he referred to now was certain transactions said to have taken place upon the retreat of the army. He did not know whether the transactions had actually occurred, which were said to have taken place after the capture of Istalif. He was not much disposed to criticise the conduct of soldiers after a most gallant and desperately contested action—when, too, a town was taken, which was found full of the spoils of their fellow-countrymen; he should say nothing upon that but other transactions were said to have taken place elsewhere which were abhorrent to the practices and usages of civilized nations. He did not mean now to say anything about the taking away of the gates of Somnauth, nor the ornaments of its pillars. It might be that the Governor-general considered them as just and proper trophies. Upon that subject he did not mean to say anything further at present. But he found General Pollock giving an account of the destruction of the bazaar at Cabul previous to the troops evacuating the city, and it might be well said that such must have been the act of barbarians and not of British soldiers—not of the soldiers of those who lived by commerce—of the soldiers of the greatest commercial people in the world. But was it to be said that this should be done by troops that were immediately under the command of the greatest commercial company that ever existed, and that they should destroy a building, which according to the description of General Pollock, was used as the great emporium of central Asia? Was, he asked, the destruction of such a place an act that was in accordance with what ought to be the practice of civilized nations? And then as to the mosque which was destroyed, it appeared that it was repaired and decorated, and fame attached to it, in consequence of the atrocious destruction of our troops. If they considered that it was devoted to such a purpose, it was, perhaps, an excuse for the lower order of men that they had destroyed it, but such an excess he did not think ought to have been sanctioned by persons of high rank and station. They ought rather to have called to mind that monument, of which their Lordships were all aware, erected near Coblentz, and which was intended as a commemoration of a great victory of the French. When the Russian general came to Coblentz in 1813, and saw this memorial, he did not then, flushed with victory, destroy it, but he marked it with the date of his success, and left it thus a commemoration of his own victory, as well as that of his enemies. There would, however, be another opportunity of referring to the political matters connected with this subject. As far, however, as the present vote extended, he would say, conscientiously and sincerely, that he joined in that vote to the Governor-general for applying the resources at his disposal in aid of the operations that had been carried on, but at the same time he must say, that he did not find that the Governor-general was entitled to their commendation for instructing or originating the advance upon Cabol. Thus far, he gave his vote most heartily and conscientiously in favour of the motion.

Lord Brougham

My Lords, I should certainly feel disposed to give my silent vote with my hearty concurrence in the motion of my noble Friend, supported as it has been by my noble Friend the late Governor-general, and my other noble Friends who followed him, without doing more, had I not felt that in the present posture of India, in a debate which has, perhaps unexpectedly—I will not say, unnecessarily—arisen, and in the somewhat new phase which the debate has thus assumed, it is incumbent upon me to discharge a duty to the character and conduct of the army in India, and to the memory of those who are unhappily now no more; and although in a good measure this latter duty, this pious office, has been discharged, and eloquently discharged by my noble Friend, and though all your Lordships who have already spoken have discharged in part the same duty toward the present Governor-general, yet I think I may be permitted, without any hypercritical scanning of expressions, such as have fallen from the noble Lords beside me, the two noble Marquesses—without any such criticism, I say, I maybe allowed to express my disappointment that they did not rather, as they were determined to support this motion, follow the cure taken by my noble Friend the lae Governor-general of India, and give that hearty support to these resolutions which they must feel they were giving by their votes, and that they did not make their speeches coincide a little more accurately with the resolution to which they say they are prepared to come, and which they recommended your Lordship to adopt with a unanimity unbroken—un broken as regards the vote, but not so entirely unbroken as regards the speeches by which that vote is supported by one of my noble Friends, though recommended to your Lordships to be unanimously passed by the other. For what is the vote which they are both going conscientiously to give, and which they recommend your Lordships to pass so unanimously, that it would be to them the most grievous of all disappointments if there were a single dissentient? I had occasion to look at the terms of this motion in consequence of their speeches, and I find that it is neither more nor less than a substantive vote of thanks to the right hon. Lord Ellenborough, severed from the generals and officers, and men, who are the subjects of another vote; not lumping him with them or harnessing them together in such wise that they could not make the distinction, and vote against him without blaming all the rest, or that they could not praise them without withholding praise from him. There are several votes, in point of fact, of one of which only does his Lordship form the subject, and what does that say? For what are the thanks of this House to be given to the right hon. Lord Ellenborough by name? "For the ability and judgment," the resolution says—[The Marquess of Lansdowne "Hear, hear."] "with which, the resources of the British empire in India have been applied to the support of the military operations in Affghanistan." Therefore, I conclude, my noble Friends justly believe that whatever may be said of the ability, the judgment at least is referred to and will be praised by this vote; and that judgment cannot be eulogised in this vote truly and justly if the Governor-general showed indiscretion either in advancing when he ought to have stood still, or in standing when he ought to have retreated or in retreating when he ought to have re-married steady or to have advanced forward; or what, perhaps, tests the soundness of judgment more than either advancing when he should go on or withdrawing when he should retire—namely, the not having hesitated when he ought to be firm, the not having faltered when he ought to be steady in his purpose—the not being, in one word, that which seems, perhaps in itself, all that a bad, an infirm judgment can possess—that of being vacillating and irresolute in the decision which he formed. Therefore I have the admission of my noble Friends behind me in praise of my Lord Ellenborough, the Governor-general, for the judgment, as well as ability, of his conduct; I have their distinct approval of his judgment, and the confession that if there is any one quality which he did not show in India, it is vacillation and indetermination, and irresolution, and infirmity of purpose. Now, my Lords, I have said that there is something in the language of my noble Friend, the first noble Marquess who addressed you, which I did not think altogether consistent, deprecating "an extreme caution" in the proceedings of the Governor-general. Could any caution be too great in his position? How did he stand? How fearful to contemplate was the position in which Lord Ellenborough found him self placed the instant that he ascended the chair of the East-Indian Government. I know what his feeling and judgment on that question were. I purposely abstain from any allusion to the origin of the war, in our opinions upon the origin of that war my noble Friend opposite (the Duke of Wellington) and I heartily concur; but, evading all political references, if any man ever went to India with the impression on his mind that the policy—it might be the right and justifiable policy—of his predecessors, here and there, had placed him who was to succeed to the Government of India in a situation of all but unexampled difficulty, and from which to extricate the empire entrusted to his hands must be all but a hopeless task, Lord Ellenborough was that man, and with these feelings often expressed in this place, and a sense of the load imposed upon him, he left this country. Had matters mended on his arrival at Calcutta? Were the reflections which must have haunted him on his voyage, and might have haunted the man of the firmest mind that ever went out to govern that country—were those feelings and alarms diminished when he got to India by the melancholy and most distressing events which had happened between his sailing and arrival, and with the tidings of which he must have been greeted the instant he reached the Bay of Bengal? My Lords, the Cabul disaster—the destruction of one of the largest armies that this country had ever sent to the north—the almost shaking of the Government of the country at home which he was sent to administer in the East—that was the intelligence which leached Lord Ellenborough on his arrival. If he had hesitated for the purpose of reflection and taking counsel, and had wished for further time, no man could have been surprised, or could have blamed him. "Extreme caution!" Indeed! I ask again, in these circumstances and conditions could any caution be deemed extreme? My noble Friend was cautious; he did reflect. Did he hesitate? As my noble Friend, the noble Duke has stated, he arrived on the 28th of February; on the 15th of March he issues his first order. My noble Friend behind me (the Marquess of Clanricarde) will not quarrel with me if I say that this was "an instruction," I suppose. I will read from the despatches of the 15th a passage which my noble Friend omitted to read. He read from the page 168; I shall read from page 167, in which Lord Ellenborough had, within a few days of his arrival in that situation, surrounded by those difficulties, made up his mind to this:— Whatever course we may hereafter take roust rest solely upon military considerations; And this is addressed to the military officer: and I may observe in passing, I entirely concur with my noble Friend, the noble Duke (it is a vanity to say one concurs with him who, as has been said to-night, is the highest of all authorities) as to what instructions a Governor in India ought to give a commanding officer in India, for he led on the army in India—led it on to those triumphs, the first of his great triumphs, and under the orders of a Governor-general not apt to vacillate—a Governor-general whose name will go down to posterity as one of the greatest statesmen who ever adorned and built up the power and glory of the country which had the happiness to produce him; under that great statesman my noble Friend acted in the command of the forces, and he knows in what way a wise and prudent and noble-minded Governor will always show his sense, as well as his justice to the officers serving under him, by giving ample powers, not scrupulously, but liberally and generously, to those whom he employs, and it is to the praise of Lord Ellenborough that such has been his uniform conduct in the whole of these transactions. Acting on this principle, which I know was Lord Wellesley's, to be cautious, to be prudent, to take time, to go even to the "extreme of caution," as my noble Friend says, in choosing his agents, military or civil, as is always proper, and having once made your choice never more to scruple in giving your entire and unstinted and unabated confidence—so did Lord Ellenborough—and then he said,— Whatever course we may hereafter take must rest solely upon military considerations, and have in the first instance regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at Ghuznee, at Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and Candahar, to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary risks, and finally to the re-establishment of our military reputation, by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans, which may make it appear to them, to our Own subjects, and to our own allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities and violate their fate, and that we withdraw ultimately from Afghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that the king we have set up has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed. That was what Lord Ellenborough decided. He resolved on withdrawing ultimately from Afghanistan, but it was not by flying—it was not by a rapid retreat, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position; but because we are satisfied that the thing we have set up, has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed. But then going to the next page, my noble Friend insisted that there was "extreme caution," but my noble Friend, as I conceive, has taken an incorrect view as to the release of the prisoners, for the Governor-general said,— To effect the release of the prisoners taken at Cabul, is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honour. There was here no flying from the country, but having given his opinion, he left the mode of dealing With those matters to the officers whom he trusted. There was no proof of hesitation on his mind; but a; proof that he placed confidence in those to whom he trusted the execution of his orders, and it would be found that Lord Ellenborough had acted in the same way throughout. What does Lord Ellenbo- rough say in the seventh paragraph of his letter to General Pollock on his installation?—this is the Governor-general who cares little for the ransom of the prisoners in the hands of the Affghans:— When every prisoner within the reach of the power of the Cabul government shall have been surrendered, then, and not till then, you may give orders suited to a state of return. Then we are told that we must look to the despatch of the 19th of April. But that despatch was one of a series sent to one of those gallant officers who had received full instructions suited for various emergencies and various events, and accordingly it was not necessary to enter into a subject again and again. He is writing upon another point—on the question of advancing or retreating—and the language he uses is decisive. I maintain that if there were no other papers on the subject except that despatch of the 19th of April, it is absolutely demonstrative of Lord Ellenborough's intentions and instructions to those officers not to retreat, unless in the case of absolute, overruling, overwhelming necessity. It will, however, likewise be for consideration whether our troops having been redeemed from the state of peril in which they had been placed in Affghanistan, and it may still be hoped, not without the infliction of some severe blow upon the Affghan army, it would be justifiable again to push them forward for no other object than that of revenging our losses, and of re-establishing, in all its original brilliancy, our military character. So that, even in that very despatch in which they were told that the Governor-general intended to fly, and not to regain the honour of the British arms, even there he suggests the infliction of some severe blow on the Affghans by taking possession of an advanced post in Affghanistan. My Lords, my noble Friends here in this House, in their comments on Lord Ellenborough's conduct, have adopted as they did on the subject of the American treaty, a language powerfully contrasted with that which their supporters have been accustomed to adopt in relation to Lord Ellenborough in their comments elsewhere and out of doors. My noble Friends here speak smoothly—speak softly—on the subject. One may say of them as was said by an inspired poet of others, "The words of their mouths are soft as butter, having war in their hearts, their words are smoother than oil, yet be they very swords." But those who elsewhere have dealt with the conduct of the Governor-general show or wage the "war that is in their hearts." They brandish "the very swords," be they more or less sharp—more or less trenchant, with which they are by nature endowed, and be the might with which they wield them more or less potent; but omitting the butter and the oil, they endeavour to inflict as severe a wound as the strength of their arm and the sharpness of their weapons will enable them to deal; and, accordingly, my noble Friend the Governor-general here has only been charged with "an extreme caution," and at the same time with an oily sheathing to even that little sting, this tiny weapon is wrapped up in a disavowal of intention to give pain, and of all idea of imputing blame. Elsewhere there has been no such disavowal, but, on the contrary, instead of "extreme caution," I protest that in three long months of uninterrupted abuse and calumny, no phrase has been used more gentle than the "base," "un-English," "reckless," "dastardly," "cowardly," conduct of the Governor-general. ["Hear."] I speak literally; these were the expressions; the last, the foulest and the coarsest of the whole, being the most frequently repeated, being the most congenial to the nature of those who impotent to all other purpose can but just show the rancour that is in them, like superannuated vipers, which still have their bag of venom, but have lost the perforated tooth through which to squirt it. My Lords, it is no light matter for an officer of the exalted rank and station of my noble Friend Lord Ellenborough, for a person sent to the other side of the globe, and commissioned to administer the affairs of a great empire in a most difficult emergency, it is no light matter, that he should be held up to the contempt, and, I will add, to the execration of his countrymen, as was the Governor-general of India during the the last vacation, upon grounds which the production of this book triumphantly shows to be utterly devoid of all pretence of even the shadow of a shade of foundation. If there be any who think that the Governor-general stands impeached upon the ground of having abandoned the prisoners, of having refused to advance, of having withheld authority, or, if you will, of having "withheld instructions" to the army to struggle until the honour of the British arms was restored, and the prisoners were regained—if there be any who still think even after this mass of evidence that this remains still in doubt, they then, I say, ought to take the course to which my noble Friend who last addressed you, had the manliness to advert—they ought to give their notice, to bring forward the question and have it debated, and not to allow a Governor-general in the service of his country to be held up to European and to Indian, to English as well as to the native powers, as a person whose conduct is not above suspicion, though it may be above and beyond the reach of complaint; they ought to bring that subject forward in the open manly fashion adverted to by my noble Friend, and take the sense of the House upon a debate of the question. I know, my Lords, something has been said about a proclamation, and about a despatch, and I agree with those who lament that the Governor-general in one of those despatches suffered himself for a moment to be led away in alluding to the conduct of his predecessor, which remarks I think he ought to have spared. But that is not what they are harping on and carping at out of doors, and elsewhere; it is at the language, the style of one of my noble Friend's proclamations, that they take for the theme of their unceasing cavils. This language was possibly open to observation, but the style of a proclamation or a speech is a matter of trifling importance. I am looking at the acts and deeds of the Governor-general. If the question in dispute were with respect to a speech on this subject were respecting the excellence of a work as a matter of criticism, or if the question of art, it would then be all very well to speak of language; but I am speaking of the conduct of a great public servant. —"Non ego paucis Offendar maculis, quas aut incuria fudit, Aut humana parum cavit natura. I say I have nothing to do with his words, his phrases, his sentences; I look at his public conduct. If his acts are right, if his public conduct is unimpeachable, I give him at once my hearty approval, and acquit him of all these charges. Such are the opinions which I have formed on this subject. I think justice to the service of the Crown makes it my imperative duty after what has passed, to say one word on a subject on which my noble Friend last spoke. I confess I should like a little more explanation relative to a passage in the retreat of our troops, which has filled me and, I believe, all good Englishmen—all friends of civilization and of hu- manity with great grief, I might almost say dismay,—I mean the unnecessary cruelties practised on the retreat. The subject is so painful, that I would willingly avoid it altogether. My noble Friend has done justice to the Governor-general, with respect to those reported atrocities; he is perfectly free from blame regarding them; he has no more to do with them than any of your Lordships, or any of the prisoners themselves at Jellalabad. But now, one word as to Colonel Dennie. I rejoiced to hear the panegyric pronounced upon that gallant and defeated officer by my noble Friend. I have seen also with satisfaction the beautiful and eloquent tribute to his memory contained in the Governor-general's despatch. It is painful to me to add that I greatly lament that a gallant officer, whom I lately saw in this place (Lord Keane)—a noble Baron connected with the early stage of these affairs, felt it his duty, one which must have proved most painful to him, to be pronounced some disapproval of the conduct of that gallant officer. The best proof that could be given by the noble and gallant Baron that the conduct of Colonel Dennie was above all blame, was furnished by the candour of the Officer himself when be selected him to conduct the storming party at Ghuznee, the capture of which was the origin of those great and singular honours which he has won. The noble and gallant Baron must have been confident, that he was an officer deserving in every way, or he would not have appointed him to a command, on the successful conduct of which the very existence of the army depended. But I have another proof besides the noble Lord, the late Commander-in-Chief in Northern India. I have the testimony of my noble Friend the late Governor-general, who in one of the papers now on your Lordships' Table not only pronounces a warm panegyric upon the late Colonel Dennie, but also expresses his high approbation of the selection made of that gallant officer, stating that he was an officer of the most distinguished merit. These circumstances make the melancholy event more deeply to be lamented, which has deprived the country of Colonel Dennie's services, and him the delight of surviving to the period of that victory to which in the early stage of the war he had himself so greatly contributed. I hope what I have now stated, added to the much more powerful expressions used by my noble Friend the noble Duke opposite, may tend to soothe the anguish of the surviving relatives of that lamented officer. As to myself, I had and have no knowledge of him or of his family; and, indeed, I was not even aware of his existence until I saw his name mentioned in the orders of the Governor-general, and was referred to the works of three officers, who had served in the Affghan war, in which his conduct was treated with most honourable mention. I heartily agree in the motion which has to-night been submitted to your Lordships by my noble Friend, the noble Duke opposite. I cordially unite with those who call for unanimity in the approval of that motion, and I can only hope that, in giving expression to these opinions, I have confined myself most strictly to the military operations under consideration. I have given no opinion as to the origin of the war—I give no opinion as to the policy of any part of the Governor-general's conduct—that is not now a question before your Lordships; but, confining my observations to the conduct of the Governor-general of India in connexion with the military operations, I join heartily in the expression of approbation and thanks to the Governor-general—to the officers by whom those operations were conducted; and I offer my thanks to Providence for having vouchsafed to relieve our armies of the great, though temporary, stain that was upon them, our councils of a most grievous embarrassment, and our Indian empire from the peril which at one moment appeared almost greater than the unaided efforts of man could have sufficed to overcome.

The Marquess of Lansdowne

The noble and learned Lord who has just sat down has dwelt upon one expression of mine upon which to found a most unworthy charge against me, of supporting the motion before your Lordships by my vote, while I have done not so by my speech. Being conscious that I did not utter one word in that speech which would be inconsistent with the vote it is my intention to give. I trust to the recollection of the House to show that my noble and learned Friend has most grossly, though not intentionally, misrepresented me. It was not necessary for me to make this explanation after the speech of the noble Lord the President of the Board of Control, who adverted to the same expression as used by me, because that noble Lord, with a candour which my noble and learned Friend did not think it necessary to imitate, at the same time that he adverted to it, referred also to the particular qualification with which that expression was used. In stating my reasons for supporting a motion expressive of approbation of the ability and judgment with which the Governor-general of India had applied the resources of the country to the operations of her Majesty's army, I adverted to the fact that the vote was not one thanking the Governor-general for "the direction" of those operations. That expression is not to be found in the motion—it is omitted from the vote, and the observations of my noble and learned Friend have made it necessary for me to call the attention of your Lordships to that subject. After stating my reasons for approving the exertions of the noble Lord the Governor-general of India, I observed that I attributed greater merit to the commanders of the army in consequence of the extreme caution which the Governor-general had exhibited, adding that I did not condemn that caution, but on the contrary, I thought great caution was, under the circumstances commendable. My noble and learned Friend seems not to have heard all that fell from me, but what I did say was merely for the purpose of exhibiting to your Lordships the responsibility thrown by that extent of caution upon those gallant officers, and the increased merit of those officers for taking that responsibility upon themselves. Now, I stated that from a passage in the book which is before me now, but which I did not read to your Lordships. It is a document in which the Governor-general, in the exercise of that caution which I repeat I do not condemn, writing to Major-general Nott, directs him on no account to undertake any operations of a hazardous nature against Ghuznee or Cabul, thereby putting upon General Nott whether or not he would venture upon those operations. Now, I beg to ask, was not that extreme, though possibly justifiable caution on the part of the Governor-general—does it not increase the merit of General Nott, that though cautioned again and again, no less than five times in one page of the book before your Lordships, he did not hesitate to engage in that perilous march of 300 miles—that he did not hesitate to take the responsibility of destroying Ghuznee and of advancing to Cabul, where General Pollock met him, that gallant officer also advancing on his own responsibility? Now, I say to my noble and learned Friend, that unless he is prepared to refuse to these two gallant officers the merit of so advancing upon their own responsibilty, he cannot blame me for pointing out the circumstance to your Lordships that this responsibility had been thrown upon them—not once, but two or three times—by the Governor-general—a responsibility which, I say, was justly and fortunately thrown upon them in consequence of the courage, zeal, and intrepidity which they exhibited. So much for explanation. I will not follow my noble and learned Friend into the contests of newspapers, of which I know nothing, nor will I enter into a discussion with him upon the American treaty, which is a subject not now before the House. "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof;" and your Lordships shall not hear me speak on all subjects when only one question is under consideration.

Lord Brougham

said, he certainly did not hear his noble Friend accompany his use of the words "extreme caution" with the observations he had just offered in explanation to the House. His noble Friend had made, as was to be expected from him, an excellent and candid explanation, with which he entirely concurred. It turned out that his noble Friend's reason for using the words "extreme caution" was not to throw any kind of blame upon the Governor-general; it was not "to hint a fault and hesitate dislike;" it was not "to damn with faint praise;" but his noble Friend had, it seemed, used the expression—not in odium of the Governor-general, but praise of the officers by whom the military operations were conducted. In short, his noble Friend's only reason for making use of the words "extreme caution" was not for the purpose of throwing anything like doubt upon the conduct of Lord Ellenborough, but to express more strongly his commendation of the gallant officers. It was a convenient rule, however, which it was well to practice, that when you wished to bestow praise upon any person, it should be conveyed in express terms, and not at the expense of imputing, however indirectly, blame to another. That "comparisons were odious" was a common rule of prudence and good sense. If his mind had not been preoccupied by the constant attacks upon his noble and absent Friend, he should doubtless have comprehended the whole of the noble Marquess's remarks, but when he heard the words "extreme caution," it was impossible for him to disunite them from the attacks in which the words "base, das- tardly, and cowardly," had been so lavishly used. He, however, was not sorry that he had misunderstood his noble Friend, as it had led to an explanation which others like himself, might require.

Lord Fitzgerald and Vesey

was understood to say, with reference to the terms of the present motion, they were the same as had been adopted by this and the other House of Parliament on the occasion of thanks being voted to the late Governor-general.

The Bishop of Salisbury

said, it was not his intention to say one word to detract from those great and glorious successes which had been followed by that most blessed of all things—a glorious peace, or to prevent the authors of those successes from receiving the unanimous thanks of their Lordships' House. He could not have said a single word on the present occasion, but for some expressions which had fallen from the noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord Brougham), rather in the heat of an animated defence of an absent Friend, than that they were the result of the noble and learned Lord's cool and deliberate judgment. He should not now go into the subject matter to which the noble Lord had alluded, as his only object in rising was to guard himself and their Lordships, and in justice to those Christian feelings which he was sure pervaded all their breasts, from being supposed to assent to the terms in which the noble and learned Lord had thought fit to speak of a proclamation which was not now before the House. Certainly, he differed widely from the terms and manner in which the noble and learned Lord had spoken of that proclamation; he, however, would not speak of it now as he thought it deserved, inasmuch as the question now before their Lordships was confined to the expression of thanks to the Governor-general and the army. Thus much it would not, he hoped, be thought unbecoming him to say,—that if ever that proclamation should become the subject of discussion in this House, he was sure it would be deemed by their Lordships generally, as it was already elsewhere, a most unhappy accompaniment to these successes.

The Bishop of Chichester

briefly expressed his entire concurrence in the observations which had fallen from the right rev. Prelate.

Lord Brougham

said, that in vindication of his noble and absent Friend against the attack of the two right rev, Prelates, and in reply to the great clamour, he ought to say clatter, which had been made about the proclamation in question, he must observe, that his noble Friend the Governor-general, than whom there was no more pious and sincere Christian, never dreamed of showing any preference of any heathen religion, for Hindoo over Mahometan, or for the Juggernaut, or any other heathen idols. The proclamation was a political matter merely, and though he had, at first, been led away by the clamour which had been raised about the proclamation, he could say, that if the right rev. Prelates should think it right or becoming their station to bring the matter before the House, he would demonstrate to the satisfaction of every calm and dispassionate inquirer that the words did not and could not bear the construction which had been put upon them. He had lately read by accident this document; the other he had only seen at second hand.

The Earl of Minto

said, the extension which in the course of this discussion had been given to the proposed vote of thanks compelled him to address to the House a few words in explanation of the grounds on which he should be induced to refrain from offering any opposition to that vote. He understood the vote to express their Lordships' sense of the talent, ability, and judgment with which the Governor-general had applied the resources of the Indian empire in aid of the military operations in that country: and he did not understand that it was intended to be implied that those operations had been originated, directed, or conducted by Lord Ellenborough. On looking at the mass of papers before the House, he found that if the wishes of that noble Lord hud been carried into effect, the House would not now have been called upon to vote any thanks either to the Governor-general or to the army, because it was quite clear, if it had been possible to execute the orders he gave, every man would have been withdrawn from Affghanistan before any attempt had been made to recover the honour of the British arms or the prisoners in that country. He denied also that the terms of the present motion were precisely the same as those used on the occasion of the thanks voted by Parliament to his noble Friend Lord Auckland, for on that vote the words "under his direction" appeared. What he principally rose to do, however, was to guard himself from being supposed to participate in that more extensive construction of the vote which had been suggested in the course of this discussion. There was, he confessed, another difficulty which weighed considerably on his mind in considering the case. He thought this proposition unprecedented. The thanks of Parliament were one of the greatest honours that could be conferred upon a public servant, and in this case he felt it was lowering the character of the votes hitherto given, and that it was somewhat a prostitution of that honour. It was unprecedented, because he was not aware that thanks had ever before been given to any Governor-general of India, except for services of which he was either the originator or the conductor. Such had been the case in the instance of the Marquess Wellesley—such had been the case in the instance of his noble Friend behind him and such, also, had been the case in the instance of the conquest of the island of Java. The utmost latitude, therefore, that he could consent to give to the motion was to join in the expression of the satisfaction felt in the talent, ability, and judgment with which the Governor-general had applied the resources of the Indian empire to the military operations in that country.

The resolutions were then put seriatim from the Woolsack, and declared to be carried nemine dissentiente.

It was then resolved, that the said resolutions be transmitted by the Lord Chancellor to the Governor-general of India and that his Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several officers referred to therein.

The House adjourned at 20 minutes past 9 o'clock.