Lords Sitting of 22 August 1843

MINUTES.
BILLS. Public.—3a. and passed:—Municipal Corporations; Foreign Jurisdiction; Charitable Loan Societies (Ireland); Chelsea Hospital Out-Pensioners; Exchequer Bills; Consolidated Fund.
Received the Royal Assent.—Stamps; Customs; Cathedral Churches (Wales); Episcopal Functions; Militia Pay; Apprehension of Offenders (France); Apprehension of Offenders (America); Intercourse with China; West India Islands Relief; Holyrood Park; Fisheries; Law of Evidence; Attornies and Solicitors; Mandamus Ap-

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peals; Warrants of Attorney; Hackney and Stage Carriages; Designs Copyright; Coroners Duties; Theatres Regulation; Turnpike Acts Continuance; Coalwhippers; St. Michael's (Limerick) Church; Commissions for taking Affidavits in Scotland and Ireland; Arms (Ireland); Grand Jury Presentments (Ireland); Applotment of Rates (Dublin); Sessions of the Peace (Dublin); Court of Exchequer (Ireland) Offices.
Private.—3a. and passed:—British Iron Company.
Received the Royal Assent.—Belfast and Cavehill Railway; Lagan Navigation; Anderston Improvement and Police; North Esk Reservoir; Glasgow Marine Insurance Company; Bermondsey and Rotherhithe Roads; Gibson's Estate; Earl of Shrewsbury's Estate; Morgan's Divorce.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By the Marquess of Clanricarde, from the Dublin Steam Packet Company, for Inquiry into the Management of Railroad Concerns.—From Kerry, for Relief and Employment to the Poor.—From the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, for Encouraging the Produce of Free Labour.—From Augustus D'Este, to be allowed to enjoy the Rank and Privileges of his late Royal Father the Duke of Sussex.

DEFAMATION AND LIBEL.
Lord Campbellcalled their Lordships' attention to the Libel and Defamation Bill, and to the alterations which had been made in it by the other House of Parliament. This was a different case from that bill affecting the law of Scotland concerning moveables, which had been approved of by all their Lordships, and which had been thrown out in the House of Commons, not because, after discussion, a majority of that House disapproved of it, but because an individual, not a Member of Parliament, did not like it. The rejection of that bill was not respectful to their Lordships. In the case of the libel law, the bill had been discussed in the other House, and alterations made by the majority; but he still maintained his opinion, and could not agree with the majority of the other House. Indeed, he regretted and deplored the alterations which had been made in the measure, by which its unity and consistency were destroyed, and the bill much impaired. The first alteration had been made in the first clause, and he could not pass that by without addressing some remarks to their Lordships. The Commons adhered with pertinacity to the old common law of England, by which no action will lie against spoken words, unless they impute an offence which is indictable, whatever those words may be, or unless they injure a man in his profession; but beyond those two points, however calumnious may be the words, though they may destroy a man's reputation, and make him lose caste, or cause him to be expelled from society for such spoken words, he has no remedy. Those curious distinctions which were now made by the law were approved of by the House of Commons. Their Lord-
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ships might expect him, as he was perhaps casting reflections on others, to give them some proof of these actionable offences. If it were said of a barrister, that he was "a daffy down dilly," that is actionable. If he is said "to be a dunce,"—[The Lord Chancellor: Or a dandy.]—or that he has "no more law in him than a jackanapes," that is actionable. Nay, it was actionable to say that a barrister "has more law in him than the devil," for he must have less law, and not more than that personage. Now, with regard to words imputing indictable offences, it was an actionable offence to say that Mr. A. had held up his hand to Mr. B., for that was held to be an inducement to commit an assault. In Comyn's Digest it was held that to say a man had not repaired a road or a bridge, which he ought to repair, was actionable, because the slander imputed to him an act for which he might be fined as a misdemeanor. For such trifling words as these a man might bring his action, and recover damages under the law of slander; but for words of a most serious nature, which might ruin a man's character, no action could be maintained if they did not ascribe to him conduct inconsistent with the duties of his profession, or impute to him an indictable offence. To call a lawyer a swindler was not actionable. But if a letter containing those words were sent to a single individual, though not shown to another person, an action would lie. If the words were only spoken, it might be proclaimed in the face of the whole county of Middlesex, that a barrister was a swindler, and no action could be brought. If it were said, "a man is a cheat, and I will prove him a cheat; he is a cheat, and stole two bonds from me," no action would lie, because the bonds were considered only a security, and in that state, as a security, they were a chose in action. So, to say of a man "he is a thief, and stole my trees," no action would lie, because they were fixtures on the freehold, and on them a man could not commit a larceny. To say a man "stole corn from my field" is not actionable, because the corn was growing or standing, and therefore no action would lie. To say also that a "man stole iron bars out of my window" is not actionable, because the bars are part of the house, and a man cannot commit larceny with a house. So, to state that a "man stole the shutters" is not action-

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able, for the same reason. To say that "he stole lead from my House," falls under the same description. To accuse man of "burning a barn," is not actionable, unless it were shown that there was corn in the barn; for unless there was corn in the barn the offence might be only a trespass. So, to state that a man stole Lord A.'s deer is not actionable, because deer are fercœ natureœ, and with them man cannot commit a petty larceny. Neither was it actionable to speak most irreverent words of a parson; that was according to a judgment given, which must be well known to his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, though the same words, if spoken of a lawyer, would b actionable. It might be said of a parson and it was so held by a judge, that he was a "bon, padre and un grand fou." An action was brought on these words but it appeared by the decision of the court they were not actionable, for the court said in its Norman French, that the man had not said anything against the parson, for a "bon parson might be a d—d fool." There were cases of a still more serious description. To say of man that he had forged a warrant was not actionable, for he may hay forged some warrants which it was no indictable to forge, and therefore, to say that he had forged them gave him no ground of action. To say of a person "that he was foresworn," was not actionable though it were said publicly. To say c a person "that he has foresworn himself and I have three witnesses to prove it," was not actionable. To say of any person that "he has been a foresworn man, an I can bring people to prove it," was not actionable, because it was a fundamental principle that a man was not foresworn unless he had taken an oath before court, and where no jurisdiction had administered an oath it was only a more perjury, not an indictable offence, and no action would lie. To say that "he is perjured person and was foresworn in the Bishop of Gloucester's Court," when was not stated that the Bishop of Gloucester's Court had the power to administer an oath, was not actionable. To say to a man, "Thou did suborn witnesses to swear," without showing that perjury was actually committed, though the charge of subornation was complete was not actionable, and he had no remedy. Words also which only denoted suspicion,
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and did not imply a positive charge, were not actionable. To say to a man that "he deserved to be hanged," was only an intimation that he might have committed a capital offence, and those words were not actionable. To say of a woman, "that she had a child and that she or somebody else made away with it," because it was not said that the mother had made away with it, but somebody else, it was not actionable, though the charge was solemnly denied. To say "those are rebels," was not actionable, for peradventure the plaintiff might not have appeared to a subpœna from the Court of Chancery, and a commission of rebellion might have issued against him. There were no words, the most opprobrious, which might not be applied to the chastest matron or the purest maid, and for which she could obtain no remedy either civil or criminal. He would not repeat that common and vulgar word which might be applied to a young woman, of whom it might be also said that she had a bastard, and as long as it was not said that the bastard was chargeable to the parish, that was no offence. If it was said that the bastard was chargeable to the parish, then the person accused of having a bastard might have a remedy. But the worst charges might be made against women: they might be ruined in reputation; they might be removed from society; they might be utterly ruined and had no remedy whatever. He regarded this part of the law as erroneous. It might now be proclaimed at Charing-cross of the man of the highest integrity and courage, of officers of the utmost distinction, who had served their country for a long life—it might be proclaimed of such men at Charing-cross, by the sound of the trumpet, that they were liars, scoundrels, villains, or cowards, and no action would lie. This distinction was peculiar to the law of England; he was sorry it was not removed; their Lordships agreed that it ought to be; but now, however, serious the injury upheld by words, if they were not written, the law gave the injured man no remedy. The Lord Advocate of Scotland, Mr. M'Neil, had been examined before their Lordships' committee, and he had stated that according to the law of Scotland a man might recover damages for spoken slander. He had also stated that a woman slandered might recover by an act of solatium. The Lord advocate added, that he thought

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such ought to be the law. That was not only the law of Scotland, it was the law of every country of Europe, except England. It was said that if they were to allow of actions being brought on such grounds, it would give rise to a great increase of litigation. But he thought that the check given by the costs would prevent that affliction. As the law stood, if the damages were not above 40 s. the verdict did not carry costs, and as actions of this description were generally brought by pettifogging attornies for the sake of costs, they would not bring them when they ran the risk of being out of pocket. But it should be remembered that there was a clause in the bill allowing the jury, if they thought an action was brought on frivolous grounds, to give a verdict for the defendant, which would carry the costs of both parties. It was said too, that to alter the law might interfere with the liberty of speech. He was as friendly to the liberty of speech as any man, and should be sorry to interfere with that privilege of the people; but it was necessary to give a remedy for the abuse of that liberty. Where a hundred thousand actions might now be brought not one was brought. It was necessary to make the rule of law large in order to provide a remedy for all kinds of injuries; but it was absurd to say that you must not provide a remedy against spoken slander, because you are afraid of vexatious actions. He looked upon the check of costs as sufficient to guard against such actions. His noble and learned Friend (the Lord Chancellor) knew that great freedom of language was tolerated in Westminster-hall. Suppose some person were to say there of a lawyer high in office—of his learned Friend the Attorney-General—that he has no more law than a jackanapes, and suppose that he were to be informed of it, he would not think of bringing an action, he would rest on his character, and only laugh at it as a harmless joke. When he considered the licence of Westminster-hall, the opportunities for bringing actions, and when he knew that actions were not brought, he could not believe that giving a remedy for unwritten as well as written libels would lead to that overwhelming mass of actions which was alleged. Had the first clause of the bill been agreed to, it would have removed an analogy from our law, it would have given men redress when an injury was inflicted and when no injury
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was inflicted no damages could be recovered, without he believed, restricting the liberty of speech, or giving rise to many vexations actions. Another important clause had been rejected—that which allowed the truth to be pleaded in certain cases in civil actions, by which, he thought, the law was made more inconsistent than at present. It took away from the civil action all remedy, if the words were proved to be true. As the law now stands the truth of a libel is an absolute bar against the civil remedy. The veritas convitii, absolved the parties from the crime of defamation. That, too, was peculiar to the law of England. It was not known in the law of Scotland, nor in the law of France, nor he believed in the law of any part of Europe. It was monstrous that it should be so. What right had any man to publish the infirmities of another, or the youthful error which might have been forgotten and atoned for, or some misfortune of his family for which he was not responsible? Egregious wrong might be done in this way, it was manifest, and great pain inflicted on an individual, without any benefit to the public or anybody. Now, if the Commons were of opinion that to publish truth of this nature ought to be punished criminally, being wrong, why should not the individual who suffered, have his remedy by civil action? Where there was a wrong, there was also a remedy, was the maxim of the law of England, and accordingly a clause had been inserted in the bill, enacting that the truth should not be an absolute bar in civil actions, unless the defendant could make out that it was published for the public benefit. That clause had been rejected by the House of Commons; and they left on the bill this strange anomaly, that truth was not to be an absolute bar, but only sub modo, in criminal proceedings; in civil actions, it was to be an absolute bar. The effect would be that injured parties would be driven to indict. He had rather see them obtain damages by civil actions. He regretted and deplored that the Commons had rejected the clause which gave the power to the defendant to a suit to plead that the publication of the truth was for the public good. He was not, at the same time, prepared to say, that the amendment of the Commons should be rejected. He would also refer to another clause which had been altered, that

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which had been framed to prevent the extortion of money. He now, however, had no right to complain of that alteration, for it had been made according to the view he took. His noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack had introduced amendments altering the clause, as he (Lord Campbell) had proposed it, as he thought much impairing it. His noble and learned Friend's amendment had been struck out, and that clause had been restored pretty nearly as he had framed it. There were no other alterations in the bill which it was necessary for him to advert to. He had stated his objections to some of the alterations; and he should conclude by moving their Lordships to agree to the amendments. There was still much good in the bill. The sixth clause remained, which was a great benefit. He was glad too, that the third clause was left. The maxim, the greater the truth the greater the libel, had been banished for ever from the English law. The truth would be admitted in evidence, and it would be left for the jury to say, whether the publication were for the public good, or were published merely to gratify some wanton malevolence. He trusted their Lordships would agree to these amendments, as at this period of the session they would otherwise throw out the bill, which contained much good, though not all which he wished. He hoped that this instalment might lead to further important improvements of the law of libel, and he should take every opportunity in his power to endeavour to render it one of the most perfect, as it had hitherto been one of the most disgraceful parts of our law.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I am happy that my noble and learned Friend agrees in the amendments made by the Commons in the bill, because if he had not, it would, in all probability, have been lost for the present Session. I agree with my noble and learned Friend in thinking, that this is a most excellent bill, but I do not think that it is so mutilated as my noble and learned Friend, who takes it so much at heart. My noble and learned Friend is not so tolerant as I am; for I believe it will be in the recollection of the House, that the clause which was principally objected to by the House of Commons was suggested by myself—I mean the clause putting the law of spoken slander on the same footing with mitten slander. I allow other persons to enter-
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tain opinions on points of law adverse to my own. My learned and noble Friend has treated the House with a great many absurd cases—with three or four pages of Comyns' Digest; but I can give my noble and learned Friend an instance which I think exceeds in absurdity all the cases which have been mentioned. Sir Thomas Holt was charged with having cloven with a cleaver the head of his cook, so that one half fell on one shoulder, and the other half on the other shoulder. Sir Thomas brought his action for libel; a verdict was obtained, and damages awarded. The defendant moved an arrest of judgment, and the court decided in his favour, though it was stated that one half of the head had fallen on one shoulder and the other half on the other, because there was no averment in the declaration that the man was killed. A greater absurdity than this cannot well be imagined. But with respect to spoken slander and written slander, it was obvious that the latter was done deliberately and maliciously, whilst the former often consisted of words uttered in the heat of passion, and in the presence of a few persons, who soon forgot the charge. But written slander was permanent; and through the means of the press it could be soon circulated through the empire, and therefore on this ground the law had always considered that there was a great distinction between written and oral slander. What the House of Commons intended to say by its amendment was, that the law was perfect respecting spoken slander, but that they did not put both written and spoken slander on the same footing. Now, with regard to the other point mentioned by my noble and learned Friend, the ground on which the House of Commons proceeded was this: truth, for the first time, was to be made a justification of a libel in criminal cases; but then, where the plea of justification was pleaded, an averment must be annexed that the publication was for the public benefit. This was a new experiment—as the law of libel in civil cases worked well, they, perhaps, thought there might be some improvement made as regarded the plea of justification. I apprehend that the House of Commons thought it would be better to try this principle first in criminal cases, and, if it were found to operate well, to apply it afterwards to civil cases. I do not rise to vindicate the House of Commons, for it has a right to express its own

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judgment on this as well as on other subjects. The bill is a good one; and I am most happy that my noble and learned Friend is willing to agree to the amendments made by the Commons, because, if he were not, there would be no chance to pass the measure this session.
Amendments of the Commons agreed to.

CHARITABLE LOAN SOCIETIES (IRELAND).
On the motion that the Charitable Loan Societies (Ireland) Bill be read a third time,
The Marquess of Clanricardemoved the omission of the clauses 47 to 50, both inclusive, which exempt from the operation of the act those loan societies connected with the Irish reproductive loan funds, whose funds are invested in Ireland. He saw no reason why all these loan societies should not be placed under the superintendence of the board in Ireland.
After a short conversation the amendment was negatived, and the bill was read a third time and passed.

THE EARL OF LUCAN.
The Earl of Glengallsaid, that he had been requested by his noble Friend, the Earl of Lucan, to read a letter, a copy of which he had received from his noble Friend, and which had been sent to the Lord Chancellor, explanatory of the delay which had arisen in bringing this case before Parliament.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, that perhaps it might save time, before the letter was read, if he stated that it was perfectly clear that the delay in bringing this case forward was not attributable to the noble Earl (the Earl of Lucan), but that it had taken place in consequence of communications which had passed between himself and the Lord Chancellor of Ireland on this subject; and the matter was at last postponed until the Chancellor of Ireland came to England, which was not until towards the close of the Session. No blame, however, was attributable for the delay to the noble Earl.

THE POOR-LAW.
Lord Teynhamrose to move, according to notice, for certain returns. In addressing their Lordships on this occasion, he would suggest to her Majesty's Government, whether it would not be wise to sanction a larger extension of out-door relief to the poor than had for
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the last few years been conceded to them, and offer a few reasons why he deemed it wise for her Majesty's Government to call upon their Lordships to grant a select committee to inquire extensively into the operation of the Poor-law. The manner in which the act was now put in operation was not the same as that in which it was at first carried out. During the first few years of its existence there were those who co-operated as guardians most cheerfully, but who withdrew, not owing to any alterations made by Parliament, but in consequence of the manner in which the alterations were carried into execution by the powers at Somerset-house. He sought at the hands of their Lordships and of the Government, that there should be a merciful carrying out of the act, in regard not only to the wants, but to the feelings of the poor, and he would suggest a few reasons why he thought the manner in which the law was now carried out might be moderated, and alterations might be made without detriment to the character of the labourers and to the general condition of the country. He had a right to assume that, in the coming winter, relief would be offered to many or the option of going into the workhouse, on which terms relief would be refused; and with reference to the misery which must be endured if there were not a relaxation of the present system, he implored the Government to ward off such misery by relaxing the present practice. There were many who up to the time of their failure had maintained an unimpeachable character for honesty and integrity. He would set before their Lordships a case:—A man had laboured diligently from morning to night, earning such wages as proved insufficient to support himself and family; his strength decayed, and his inability to earn what was before insufficient compelled him to apply for relief; he was required to throw down his flail and leave his thrashing-floor to go into the union workhouse; the man loves his family and refuses the proffered aid; he is tempted to take some corn for flour, or for a shilling; his dishonesty is discovered, and he is punished; during his punishment his family are obliged to seek refuge in the workhouse, and when he leaves the prison he is obliged to follow them there, bearing a stigma on himself and them. It was to prevent such cases as these that he implored a relaxation of the act. There were general circumstances

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which rendered it very needful in the opinion of many that there should be such relaxation, if it could be done without detriment to any parties. He would take the following case:—There was a certain district, under the superintendence of a board of guardians, in which certain wages were paid to able-bodied men, which were barely sufficient to provide food for a man, his wife, and two children. Then what was a man to do who bad five children, where not one of the children could earn a penny? That was a case in which relief might be afforded by giving a little flour, or bread, or money, or by receiving three of the children in the house; but no relief would be granted unless the whole family submitted to the workhouse test. Then with regard to task-work, men working at task-work were not all of the same strength, and could not earn equal wages, or the work was not equally profitable. In cases where men were thrown entirely out of work, not by their own misconduct, but by the necessity of the times, they should not be submitted to the workhouse test. If their Lordships entered into an inquiry into the subject, they would have before them men who had sat at boards of guardians, and were capable of fulfilling their duties with propriety and with kindness, who had devoted themselves to such duties, but who had withdrawn themselves wholly because they would not be parties to the exercise of cruelty towards their fellow-creatures, not from the act itself but engendered by the orders from Somerset-house, and which did not essentially form any part of the act itself. He would remind their Lordships, that one of the reasons assigned for altering the Poor-law was the immense burthen which the maintenance of the poor cast upon the country, and expectations were held out to the country, that the burthen would be far lighter. Let that question be inquired into, and he feared it would turn out, that the expectations of the country would be egregiously disappointed. With respect to local interests, where a man with five children applied for relief and they were all obliged to go into the workhouse, what was the consequence to the union? Why, the family were maintained at an expense immeasurably beyond what it would be if he had been allowed to earn as mach as he could; and if this loss was multiplied by cases in twenty or 100 parishes, it would
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show that no financial wisdom had dictated the rule. If their Lordships took the inhabitants of a workhouse, and considered what they were earning ere they entered it, and what they earned now, they would find that there was an amazing loss of productive industry to the country. These men before they entered the workhouse were immeasurably more producers of food than consumers of it; now they were consumers more than producers. Let their Lordships next consider the expenditure in workhouses. Take any workhouse, and let a committee of those concerned in providing for the expenditure inquire into the amount and into the manner which the accounts are kept, and their Lordships would receive from every such committee wise and valuable suggestions as to the economy of the House. The reports of such committees might be laid before their Lordships. The peculiar circumstances under which out-door relief was granted required attention. There were many persons who once possessed a little cottage and garden, or who had a small pension, and with industry, aided by occasional charity, their gains were adequate to their wants. But if brought to necessity what must they do? Sell their cottage or their pensions, and go into the workhouse. He knew a case of a man who had a pension of 35 l. a year from the Merchant Seamen's Society, and who had been compelled to sell it and go into the workhouse. Sick persons would sometimes, for some reason or other, not live in their own parish, and in such cases they had been refused relief, though in one instance it was only next door. These and other instances ought to be inquired into, and he mentioned them to show their Lordships that there was ground for inquiry. Where men deserted their families, it should be ascertained whether the desertion was with a vicious intention, or whether it were not abonâ fide seeking for employment. He also begged to call their Lordships' attention to the internal regulations of the workhouses. In some cases, where members of a family were inmates of a workhouse, although no private interviews were allowed, frequent opportunities or personal intercourse were afforded. In other eases interviews were only allowed two or three times a-week, and when they were permitted they took place in a crowd, where

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—as a poor man who had written to him on the subject expressed himself—they were thrown together like sheep in a pen, and there was little opportunity for domestic intercourse. It would be found that, in many of the unions, it was a rare occurrence for husbands and wives to see one another's faces. He might also mention another circumstance of great importance—the system of classification. It was undoubtedly most desirable that the strong, the hale, and the robust, should be separated from the weak, the aged, and the infirm; that the pure should not be allowed to associate with the impure; and that persons of good character should not be compelled to mix with bad characters. This was a matter of great importance, especially with regard to children and young persons who might be inmates of workhouses. There were many other topics connected with this subject into which he conceived it was most desirable that a full and careful inquiry should be instituted. One of these was, the operation of what was commonly called the bastardy clause of the Poor-law Act. He thought also that an inquiry ought to be instituted into the proceedings of the Poor-law Commissioners,—not only as to what had been done by their authority, but as to what had been left undone; and that some provision should be made to meet cases in which parishes annexed to unions might consider that their junction with such unions would prove disadvantageous to them, and might wish to avoid the connexion. These were the points to which he had considered it his duty to call their Lordships' attention; and he begged to thank them for the patience with which they had listened to him. He must confess he did not on the whole regret that the proposed amendments in the existing Poor-law had not been brought forward during the present Session; because he was convinced that the knowledge now possessed, as well by their Lordships as by Members of the other House, as to the working of the Poor-law, would not enable them to adopt efficient and satisfactory amendments. Indeed, he believed that object would not be accomplished until a full and searching inquiry had been instituted on the subject before Parliamentary committees. The noble Lord then moved for
"A return from the several parishes in England and Wales, for the year ending the 30th
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of June, 1843, and for the four preceding years, of the number of persons charged with absconding and leaving their wives or children chargeable to the parish, distinguishing such as absconded from within the workhouse from such as absconded from without; and also, a return of the number of such persons, during the same period, as have been apprehended, and of such as are known to have been re-united to their families without being previously apprehended."
Earl Stanhopesaid, he had not intended to make any observations on this subject, with respect to which he had frequently expressed his sentiments, had not the opinions he had long entertained been confirmed and strengthened by the impressive address of his noble Friend. He had not, during the last and the present Sessions of Parliament, addressed their Lordships on this important topic so frequently as he had done during previous Sessions; and he had abstained from doing so, because he entertained the expectation that a bill for the amendment of the Poor-law would have been brought forward in the other House of Parliament. He would, on this occasion, trespass on their Lordships' attention for a very few moments. He begged to suggest to his noble Friend that it was utterly useless to move for returns on this subject, because they had no security for the production of those returns. He had, during the last Session of Parliament, moved for the production of certain returns respecting the operation of the Poor-law, but they had not been laid on the Table; and about four years ago he had also moved for returns which had never been produced. He did not mention these circumstances because he was desirous of insisting upon the production of the returns to which he alluded, but because he considered that their Lordships ought to determine whether they would permit their authority to be defied and disregarded in this manner by the Poor-law Commissioners. Was it expected that, he should go to Somerset-house and make a representation to the commissioners, requesting them to furnish him with the papers he required? He would state at once that he did not recognize any legal or constitutional power as being possessed by those dictators; and he would hold no communication with them. He was somewhat surprised that, after the convincing and powerful manner in which his noble

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Friend had exposed the extreme cruelty, oppression, and injustice of the existing law, he should content himself with asking merely, as he had himself expressed it, for a more merciful administration of that law. For his own part, he objected not only to the cruelty and injustice of this law, but he objected to its principle. It was a piece of despotic legislation, which our ancestors would not have endured for a moment, and which ought no to be allowed to exist in any country He was aware that it was competent to the Poor-law Commissioners, in the exercise of those extensive powers with which they were invested, to allow some relaxations of the existing law; but such relaxations had frequently been demander of them, and in many cases ineffectually. He demanded, on behalf of the oppressed and injured poor of this country, the full and entire repeal of this obnoxious and cruel law. He had no fear but that such a result would ultimately, and at no remote period, be attained; for the force of the people would be directed to the accomplishment of this object, and if it was not conceded by Parliament it would be achieved by them.
Lord Wharncliffedid not object to the production of the papers for which his noble Friend had moved. He regretted that the noble Earl had indulged in one of his usual tirades against the Poor-law Commissioners. The noble Earl intimated that, if the repeal of this law was not conceded by the Government, it would be accomplished by force. [Earl Stanhope: By moral force.] He had understood the noble Earl to refer to physical force. He regretted that the returns for which the noble Earl stated he moved last Session had not been produced; and if the noble Earl had said one single word on the subject to any member of her Majesty's Government—without applying to those whom he had termed "dictators"—the returns he required should at once have been laid on the Table.
Earl Stanhope, in explanation, said, he had used the word "force" in allusion to moral, not to physical, force—to that moral resistance which, if properly applied and directed, no Government could withstand.
Motion agreed to.
Their Lordships adjourned at half-past seven o'clock.