Lord Broughamsaid, that in rising to bring under the consideration of their Lordships the important subject of the resolutions which he had laid on the Table last Monday, he thought that he should hardly be justified, certainly was not called upon, to vindicate the course which he had deemed it necessary to take on this occasion. None but a very superficial and ignorant person—none but a person most superficially acquainted, if acquainted at all, with the history of parliamentary proceedings, especially in their Lordships 724 House, could for an instant entertain the shadow of a doubt as to the entire competency and regularity of this proceeding. It was a vain and idle imagination to suppose that the House was precluded by any form of the constitution from exercising its judgment upon whatever financial measures might be introduced into the other House of Parliament. It was a vain and idle imagination to think that the House of Lords had not the same right to consider questions of revenue and taxation as they had to give their decisions on any other matters which affected the interests of their fellow-subjects. It was a right which they had constantly exercised—which they had never abandoned. It was a right from which, when not insisted on, they had voluntarily abstained; but, whether insisted on or abstained from, the right was theirs by the law of the land. This being on all hands allowed, it might, perhaps, be said that in practice they did not interfere with measures of taxation or finance. In general (he would admit) the Lords waited until such measures were embodied in bills and sent up to them from the other House of Parliament; but nevertheless they were habitually called on, in speeches from the Throne, and in messages from the Crown, to take into their consideration grants of money, and that, too, at the very same time, and in the self-same terms, in which similar recommendations were made to the Lower House. Indeed, he never remembered any message sent to one House, recommending grants of money, without the same message being sent to the other at the same time; and as lately as the commencement of the present Session, when they were assembled at the beginning of last month, the Lords and the Commons were, by the speech from the Throne, and in the same words, informed of the deficiency in the revenue, and were asked to take special measures for making that deficiency good. He found that the course he now took of calling their Lordships' attention to matters of finance, while under the consideration of the Commons, was the course pursued in the best of times, and by the best of statesmen; above all, by men who were fully practised in the forms of both Houses of Parliament, as well as eminently conversant with the principles of the constitution. When he mentioned the late Lord Grenville, he named one, who, to his profound political knowledge, and varied acquirements, 725 added the character of being a most diligent student of all our constitutional forms. Having filled the chair of the other House of Parliament for some time before he ceased to be one of its most distinguished Members, he paid the same attention to the forms of this House when he became one of its brightest ornaments. He (Lord Brougham) found him in their Lordships' House, bringing forward questions of finance without feeling the least scruple from the circumstance that the same questions might at the same time be pending in the Commons —not confining himself to what he could then have known of the proceedings of the other House through the "votes," but sometimes acting on his knowledge, otherwise acquired, of what was passing in that House. He remembered that noble Lord thirty years ago—it was in the spring of 1812, when a financial statement had been made by the Minister of the day in the Commons,—Lord Grenville, in his place in the Lords, complained of that statement, as one in which the Minister had deceived himself, and deluded the country; in order to support his charge, he moved for certain accounts, which he made the ground of an elaborate statement; and, as if to preclude for ever any objection on the ground of the Lords interfering on matter of finance, otherwise than by debating bills, and as if he had foreseen the frivolous objections now raised, and was resolved, by anticipation to put them down, with his high authority, he chose for the time of making his statement, the moment when the Household Bill had come up from the other House, and on the discussion of which it might be thought he could have more regularly introduced his observations, but Lord Grenville preferred to found his statement on the papers for which he had moved, rather than on the Household Bill; and before the debate on that bill was brought on, and independent altogether of that bill, he called the attention of the House to his difference with Mr. Perceval, and answered Mr. Perceval's statement. Nor was that the only occasion he took to assert the rights of the Lords to discuss and consider all matters of finance. In office he acted as he had done in opposition. In the early part of the year 1807, when his noble Friend (the Marquess of Lansdowne) near him, was Chancellor of the Exchequer, he brought 726 forward in the Commons an elaborate plan of finance. While it was then under discussion, a noble relation of his brought forward a financial plan of his own in this House, which he offered as a substitute for the one then before the other House and moved that his plan be referred to a committee. Lord Grenville, then Prime Minister, objected to the motion, on the ground that there was no document to go before a committee, the noble Mover's proposition resting in statement merely. He resisted the motion on its merits, he argued on the plan; but as to the regularity or competency of the proceeding, on the ground of its being a matter of finance, or of the subject being then before the Commons, he uttered not one word. If it were at all necessary to add anything to the high authority he had just cited, he would give that of a noble Lord, whose loss at any time would be felt with deep regret, but whose recent loss made the mention of his name the more painful—he alluded to the late Lord Holland, than whom he had never known any one more amiable in all the relations of private life, more to be loved for his virtues, or admired for his acquirements and his capacity, or respected and followed for his devoted patriotism, and his steadfast attachment to the interests of the country. Lord Holland was, moreover, a careful observer of the forms of their Lordships' House, in the knowledge of which no man was more skilled, or more prone to recal those who, for a season, might be disposed to depart from them. He found that noble Lord in the year 1810 moving an address to the Crown to appoint commissioners to consider the management of the tenths and first-fruits which constituted the fund called Queen Anne's Bounty, intended for the improvement of the livings of the poorer clergy; and what was the occasion on which this motion was made? Precisely that on which a question was under consideration in the other House of granting 100,000l. out of the taxes, in aid of Queen Anne's Bounty, and Lord Holland's resolutions affirmed that instead of throwing the burden on the people, it should fall upon the ecclesiastical benefices. On the 11th of May he moved the address and resolutions, and it was not till three weeks after on the 2nd of June, that the grant of 100,000l. was moved by Mr. Perceval in the committeee of supply. The noble Lord had no other ground for his motion 727 than the announcement made in the speech from the Throne at the commencement of the Session—such as that which he had mentioned as having been made at the commencement of the present Session. The motion was resisted solely upon the ground of an act of Parliament, to which Lord Holland had not adverted; but though on that ground Lord Eldon and Lord Grenville opposed the resolution, neither of them said one word as to the House of Lords anticipating a money question about to come on in the other House. He (Lord Brougham) thought he had now said enough to satisfy their Lordships as to the principle of the course he had taken on this occasion, and as to the practice in former times. He would now come to the subject of the resolutions. When he laid them on the Table on a former evening, he had said, with reference to the question of an Income-tax, that ordinarily the measure would not be discussed until it came up from the other House embodied in a bill. If he had objected to this tax on principle, and altogether and at all times—if he had declared an interminable war against it, like that in which he had struggled, and not without success, at a former period— if he saw no sad necessity now any more than he had seen then for resorting to this hateful impost—he might have waited till he had the opportunity of objecting to the bill itself, and declaring his inflexible hostility to it; but that was not the ground on which he went, and he trusted it would not be the ground on which their Lordships would decide. His opinion of an income-tax was the same as before, but he was not prepared to say, that the state of our financial embarrassments might not force us to resort to such a tax, when we found it impossible to adopt any other alternative. He must look to the origin of the present deficit. He was aware that he had been a party to a measure by which freedom had been granted to nearly 1,000,000 of slaves; he was a consenting party to the enormous price which we paid for that act—a price which, however great, was not, in his opinion, too great for that memorable act of justice, humanity, and true policy. He could not but know that one result of that measure was a charge on the revenue of the country to the amount of 700,000l. or 800,000l. per annum; and that this formed part of the sum which the country was now called 728 upon to make good. The revenue was now charged with this amount, as the interest of the 20,000,000l. which we had paid to extinguish slavery in our colonies. He was a party, when out of office, to another great measure, a measure of the late Government, by which the cost of communication by the post was brought into such a moderate compass as to be within the reach of all. By that measure, however, there had been created an addition a deficit in the revenue amounting to between 800,000l. and 1,000,000l. Here ended his responsibility as to the amount of the deficiency in the revenue of the country; but, whatever was the cause of the remaining part of the deficiency, it was not his business then to inquire into it. The course he was taking, in submitting his resolutions to the House, was taken with no party view. Indeed, so far was he from any such intention, that he was anxious to guard against even an expression which could create a personal bias, and he wished to turn away the attention of their Lordships from any and from everything which could create the least party difference. He, therefore, would say not one word upon the measures which had swelled the deficit to its present large amount. That amount was admitted on all hands, and there were other charges to be met for which Parliament was bound to make provision. There was 7,500,000l. deficiency in the course of five years, and 2,500,000l. was the least that could be estimated as the deficiency for the next year, making, in the whole, the sum of 10,000,000l. for which Parliament had to provide. To this let him add, that the aspect of affairs in several (he was sorry he must use the term), in several parts of the East was not calculated to lessen our financial difficulties, but much the reverse. Then let him ask their Lordships, in these circumstances, did not a due care for public credit—did not a regard for the honour and security of the empire, demand that adequate exertions should at length be made by the Government and the Parliament to remedy this most serious evil, and to place the income on a level at least with the expenditure? The opinions of all men who had turned their attention to the subject seemed to unite in coming to this conclusion—that if they did not resort to the mode of making good the deficiency recommended by the Government, they had no other resource on which we could 729 reckon for immediately relieving the pressure. Had they any other resource? He must say, that he could not see any on which to place sure reliance; but certainly there were none which could be available till it was too late. He had heard it vaguely said, that a lessening of the expenditure would make good the deficiency. How, and in what time? It would be absolutely impossible so to lessen the expenditure, consistently with the public service, to anything like the amount of the present deficiency, and within a short time. Well, then, it was suggested that by lowering the duties of customs and excise you would increase the consumption, and thus raise the revenue. All experience was against this resource for any immediate practical effect. Let not noble Lords imagine that he opposed the lowering of the customs and excise, or doubted the wisdom of this course. Quite the contrary. He entertained no doubt that increased revenue would ultimately be the result, the certain consequence of reduction in the duties— that such a relief would immediately remove many of the hardships which now pressed on the consumers, and in the end would increase the revenue as well as augment their comforts; but his opinion was, that such remedies would come too late to remove the present difficulties. They would tell, no doubt, in the course of time; but a much more speedy remedy was now required. Past experience afforded abundant illustration of what he thus stated. When his noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Ripon) was in office, about seventeen years ago, he most wisely made the attempt to get an increased revenue by lowering duties, and in that year the duties on wines were reduced 54 per cent. What became of the consumption? It was very much increased. But what became of the revenue? It fell fully one-third: instead of 2,100,000l. only 1,400,000l. was raised at first. And now, after a lapse of seventeen years, it had not come up to its former amount, but was at the present day still one-fifth less. The same might be said of tobacco. A reduction of the duty took place to the amount of 25 per cent.—from 4s. to 3s. He would not say that the consumption was not increased by this. It was, to a considerable amount, but there was also a considerable deficiency in the revenue, and at the present day it was less by about one-seventh than it had been before the 730 reduction of duties took place, A great reduction had also been made in sugar. The duty was lowered from 27s. to 24s. per cwt., or 11 per cent. The consumption was extended. The comforts of many classes were increased. In fact, the reduction answered admirably for all purposes but those of revenue; the amount of duty received from sugar was still one-twelfth lower than under the old tax. The duty on hemp had been reduced 52 per cent., and the consumption was very little increased, but the revenue from it fell to one-half, and had not since recovered. There were, however, two exceptions to the fact which he had just stated. Those were the articles of coffee and rum: the duties had been reduced on both of these, and the revenue fell off at first, but in the course of three years it increased. The produce of the coffee duties had considerably increased, but three years elapsed before they even regained their former amount. No more, he thought, needed be said to prove that a reduction of duty will not bring an increase of revenue in a short time; and they who contend that a property-tax or income-tax has become necessary, need do no more than refer to the instances he had stated. The failure of the 5 per cent, on excise and customs to raise more than a half per cent., or one-tenth of the expected supply, strongly proved the same position. No doubt, as he had said, in the long run, the customs and excise would recover the loss which the reduction caused, and in some cases would afford increased revenue; but for present supply, to support the credit of the country, to carry on the public service, this remedy of reduced customs and excise would not suffice. Having now stated these grounds why Parliament should resort to the tax on income, it became his duty to show that the Legislature should take every security that, on the one hand, it should be continued only as long as the absolute necessity for it existed, and that, on the other, it should be stripped of all those incidents which had rendered the former measure so intolerable to the people of this country, as far as it is possible to remove them. A very great delusion prevailed in the country—at least amongst that large class, the labouring population, for whom he felt, and ever must feel, the most lively interest—as to the operation of the Income-tax on them. It was a 731 common thing for them, and for those who instructed them, and who should know better, to say that the Income-tax could in no way affect them. There was no greater delusion than this. It required but little argument to show that the labourer was affected by the diminution of the fund out of which he was paid. When capital accumulated, the fund was increased out of which labour is paid: when it became diminished, the fund to pay the labourer decreased in the same proportion. The manner in which the Income-tax was levied, showed its effect on labour. You levy so much on men possessed of income; all that you withdraw from their capital— supposing them tradesmen, farmers, or manufacturers—comes from that accumulation which they had made this year, and would either spend next year in supporting labour, or lend to others who would so employ it. The money which they paid as an Income-tax was no longer an expenditure from which they could derive any direct advantage, for it was taken from them to be applied in another way—to support labour of another kind, which was not productive. If that amount were not taken from this class, it would be an accumulation, which would be laid out in the same or the next year. The classes of mere annuitants not in business, would employ their accumulated capital, if not taken as a tax, in lending it to those who could profitably employ it, or they would themselves spend it in articles of consumption, and other modes of domestic expenditure. That was the case of one class. In another class were the traders, the manufacturers, and the farmers of the country. He would take the first class, annuitants, because they constituted the class to whom the argument applied, perhaps, with the least stringency. Now, he believed that when a tax fell upon that class, the annuitants not in business, the last retrenchment they attempted to make was, in what brought them more prominently before the eyes of mankind—in what went to maintain outward appearance—in those things which went to give a colour and a form to their circumstances, as servants, equipage, and what is called establishment. But, unfortunately, the first retrenchment they made was, in that which put productive labour in motion—in articles of consumption: so that even this class of the community diminished the fund 732 which they previously used in giving employment to productive labour. Then there was the other class, the persons employed in the trade, manufactures, and agriculture of the country—and with regard to them, he needed scarcely stop to remind their Lordships that, whatever was withdrawn from their fund, was, in fact, withdrawn from that which went directly to give employment to the labouring classes; that every 10l. which this class withdrew from their capital, by so much lessened the fund out of which the labour of the working community was to be paid. Their Lordships would remember that there was an essential difference between a tax upon incomes and a tax upon consumable commodities; inasmuch as the former was unaccompanied by any extension of the support and the stimulus given to labour: whereas the latter, at the same time that it put something into the Treasury, of necessity also put something into the fund out of which the productive labour of the country was rewarded. A tax of 1,000l. upon incomes added nothing to the productive labour of the country, whilst a tax of the same amount collected upon articles paying the duties of excise or customs, of necessity caused an expenditure of 1,000l., or it might be of 2,000l. or 3,000l. more, which went to support the trade, manufacture, and agriculture of England. It was impossible to approach the arguments used, both by those who favoured, and those who opposed an income-tax, without being aware that the greatest mistakes prevailed on both sides; and it was necessary to keep clear of the errors of each of those parties. He should begin by applying himself to the arguments of those who opposed, or seemed to oppose the tax. It was a common thing to hear people say, "Oh, we have no great objection to an income-tax; on the contrary, we think that, under certain restrictions, it is very proper: it has many advantages; and, if properly modified, may be conducive to the national welfare;" but it was invariably found, that the first plan which such reasoners suggested for the modification of the tax, was the application of the impost, not to incomes at all, but simply to property. "We don't," say they, "we don't care what property you tax, but be careful not to touch in- 8 comes. Only tax the land and the funds." But when he came to dissect this propo- 733 sition, when he remembered the grounds on which these persons argued, he found that it was rather the funds than the land that they had in their eye, and that, in point of fact, they had a great disposition to levy a tax exclusively on the fund-holder; and he was sorry to say, that this sort of argument was not confined to those who possessed no property at all. It was, if anything, more strenuously defended by those who rather had lands than funds, and whose enmity, he grieved to say, as well as that of persons who had neither land nor funds, nor property of any kind, was directed against the funds. Men who argued after this fashion, were ignorant—utterly ignorant, not only of all the justice, all the honour of public dealings, but utterly ignorant also how the class was composed on whom they desired to throw the burden of taxation. He remembered, when he was in office with his noble Friend (Lord Ripon) ten years ago, that it became necessary for them to inquire as to the situation of parties in receipt of dividends. They inquired as to the stock warrants, which, as their Lordships were aware, would show the number of separate payments, but much less than the number of individuals interested in the stock. What was the result of the investigation? They found, that there were 280,000 warrants, and many of these embraced hundreds, he might say even thousands of individuals, for they referred to stock, the dividends on which were paid to insurance companies, the Bank of England, dock companies, railway companies, and other public bodies; so that if he said that 300,000 was the number of persons who received dividends, he should probably not exaggerate the number by a single unit. Now, how many out of this number received dividends under 100l. sterling a-year? Why, there were no less than 240,000 who received less than 50l. a-year, and there were only.600 who received above 1,000l. a-year; and the average of the whole 300,000 was an income of less than 100l.: so that a I tax on the fund holders alone, the throwing upon them the burden of an impost which was not thrown upon the rest of the community, would not only be manifestly unjust, foully dishonest, and a robbery of the public creditor, but would be merciless to the poorer classes, and would cast the load upon those who were the least able to bear it. But then, it was 734 said, property should be taxed, and not income. That there was a great difference between the capacity of property and of income to endure such a burden, no one was more ready to admit than himself. The proposition was one he had always asserted, and it would on the present occasion form the groundwork of his principal argument against a measure framed upon the plan of the old property-tax. But to say, that income should escape altogether, and that only capital should be taxed, was one of the greatest absurdities, as well as one of the most unjust propositions possible. Incomes might be named merely professional, to exempt which altogether would be utterly intolerable. There was a party, however, which went much further, and asserted the doctrine of a graduated scale, arguing that the same rate of duty ought not to be levied upon all amounts of income. To these, and to the persons who praise an income-tax as the most equal of all taxes, might alike be applied the observation of Montesquieu, upon the Abbé Dubost's account of the old French monarchy. That his theory had seduced a number of persons, because it took for granted the matter in dispute, allowed plausibilities to be substituted for facts, mistook suppositions for principles, and drew other suppositions as consequences from them. This was precisely the case with those who supported the plan of a graduated scale, on the supposition that under its operation they would arrive at something like justice between the rich, the moderately rich, and the poorer classes. But the same was also the accurate description of that doctrine which represented an income-tax as an equal tax; for it assumed that you can get at all kinds of income with equal ease, and when you have got at them, it supposed that all could equally bear the tax. Certainly never was there a greater mistake than this supposition; but the graduated scale is the worse error of the two. In the first place, had they any right to throw the whole of the taxes on persons with large incomes? Why should they not bear their just proportion —a proportion equal to that of persons in moderate circumstances? The amount paid by the latter class would not be the same; it would be much less, and in what respect less? Why, in respect of the proportion of their lesser incomes to incomes greater in amount. Nothing could 735 be more just and fair than the principle of paying according to such proportion, and it was precisely that sort of justice and fairness which those persons said they sought who argued for the graduated scale. They argued that it would be manifestly unjust that a man of 1,000l. a-year should pay as much as a man of 10,000l. a-year. They desired that each should be taxed according to his means, and so far so good; and if each paid a tenth, or a thirtieth, each would pay according to his means. But this was not enough for them. They went further, and said, that instead of applying a tax of 10 per cent. upon all amounts—(the tax now proposed was 3 per cent., but 10 per cent. was the old income-tax, and he would refer to that sum for the purposes of argument)—they said that, instead of applying 10 per cent. to incomes of all amounts, 10 per cent. ought to be paid by men of 1,000l. a-year, 20 per cent. by those of 2,000l. a-year, 30 per cent. by those of 3,000l. a-year, and so on. That was their proposition, and a strange one it was, for it led at once to a conclusion which utterly and for ever destroyed the basis of justice on which it might at first sight be supposed to rest; for, of course, such a principle would cease to be just unless you could follow out the proposition, and go to the whole extent as far as it would lead you. Now, let them see to what this graduated scale would lead. The rate was to be arranged in proportion to the amount of income; because the reason alleged for varying the rate, was in order to make its rise keep pace with the rise of income. Very well; let them inquire if that was just, but also if that was possible. A man with 1,000l. a-year would pay 10 per cent., he who had 2,000l. a-year would pay 20 per cent., and the man with 5,000l. a-year would pay 50 per cent., there being no possible reason for not making him pay at a higher rate than the man of 2,000l., which would not hold good against making the man of 2,000l. pay at a higher rate than the man of 1,000l. Then was the man of 10,000l. to be excluded from paying in proportion? Why should he? He was the richer man, he was the better able to pay at a higher rate; he was the greater criminal, and the fitter to be punished; he was the more tempting prey, and the rather to be hunted down; let them, therefore, apply the tax to him as well as to the rest. Then, of 736 course, he would pay 100 per cent., and his whole 10,000l. a-year would go. Observe, there was no escaping from this conclusion. They must not try to get out of it by saying, "Oh, but I did not intend to say that; I never contemplated going on in the same proportion as 1 began." Such arguments as that would be wholly ineffective; for go on in what proportion they might, they would only postpone the evil hour; they would only put off the time, only shift the point at which they must inevitably arrive at last; the point at which the absurdity of their scheme became too glaring to bear the light. Let them take it in this way. Let them suppose that after 10 per cent, had been levied on the first 1,000l., 3 per cent. additional only should be imposed for the next 1,000l., 3 per cent. for the next 1,000l., and so on in proportion. Then the man with 2,000l. a-year would pay 13 per cent., the master of 4,000l. would pay 19 per cent., and he of 8,000l. a-year would pay 21 per cent. more than the man of 1,000l. a-year, or 31 per cent. in all; and so on, until after some postponement of the evil point, you got up to incomes of 30,000l. a-year, when every farthing of that amount would go to pay the taxation; and incomes above 30,000l., as 50,000l. or 100,000l., would have to pay two or three times more than their whole amount. That was the proposition, and let them observe that its great recommendation was said to be its justice—that it would tax all persons according to their means; not making the amount more if the income were greater, or less if it were smaller—that was not objected to; but taxing the larger amount also at a larger rate, for no other reason than because it was a larger amount. Every one must see the absurdity of such a proposition, when it came to be considered. Every one must see that the only pretence on which it could rest was, that the measure of the income should fix the rate to be imposed. If they gave up that principle in its fullest extent they abandoned their argument altogether; and if they said, "We do not carry the principle to the extreme," then he would ask why they stopped short, and did not pursue their theory to its end? There could be only one reason, and that reason was, because they could not carry it to its consequences without exposing its folly—because the whole scheme was easily exposed as a gross and revolting 737 absurdity. Bat he must be permitted to say, that in conducting the argument, he would not allow of any flinching on this subject. When a man laid down a principle, he would insist upon his following it to its consequences, and would not admit of his stopping to pick and choose with regard to it. They might as well allow a man, whose reasoning they had shown to be false, by showing the absurd consequences to which it led, to say, "Oh, I did not mean to arrive at that conclusion. I did not intend to go the length of asserting: that two and two make five." No—very likely you did not; but you said that which by logical deduction from it led to the consequence that two and two are equal to five, and therefore you are proved to have said that which cannot be true. But, let him ask, was the mode of taxation he had spoken of adopted in any other part of their financial system? Did they make people under their own schemes of taxation, pay more because they were richer? The principle, as be understood it, was entirely opposed to this. The system of their taxation was that the people, whether rich or poor, should all pay according to the same rate, not indeed the same amount, but the same rate in proportion to their means. But those who maintained the graduated scale differed in the widest degree from this principle. They meant neither more nor less than that all taxes should be raised from a part of the community, and not from the community at large; whilst it was the principle of the existing taxation I and of every sound financial system, that all classes should bear the burden, each according to his means, each according to his ability. The vast amount, nearer forty than thirty millions, levied on commodities, is all paid by the rich and the poor in the same proportion, the rich paying a much greater amount no doubt, as they ought, but paying at the same rate. All income then, if any is to be taxed, ought to pay the same rate, until you reach so low an income that the tax would fall upon necessaries—until you reach very small incomes; for any tax which would fall upon the poor and labouring classes—a tax upon necessaries, was contrary to every principle both of justice and of sound policy. Perhaps, he hardly had a right, speaking as he did in the presence of their Lordships, to talk of the universality of this principle. When 738 he spoke of it as the result of all experience— as the deduction from all reasoning—that a tax upon the necessaries of life was contrary to every rule of justice, and a gross absurdity; he ought to state that there was one exception, a tax upon a commodity that should be nameless, but with that exception, at least, taxing necessaries was a sin against the first principles both of justice and of sound policy. Now, there being no doubt that the tax was to affect all incomes except the lowest —those who could not pay—and that it must be levied in this way—let us see what the inevitable consequences of such a tax must be, and how deeply interested the community were in resolving to shake themselves loose from it at the earliest possible period, and how much it was the duty of the Government, if possible, to modify the tax so as to vary its weight, not indeed according to the amount of the income, but according to the kind of income. He took the liberty of observing before, that many of those who were enamoured of this tax, formed their predilection upon the supposed fairness of it. They began by assuming that they could tax all income equally. A supposition was next made, and from that supposition an inference was drawn as fanciful and as hypothetical as the other; for they said that, having got a means of obtaining the income of individuals, and having levied a certain fixed rate for all incomes, they had got an equally distributed tax, and that all individuals would pay according to their power, and all classes according to their means and ability. He believed that there was no greater fallacy than this in the world; he believed it was an absolutely fallacious assumption; a fanciful supposition from the beginning to the end, and contrary to all experience; that the experience of all former property-taxes contradicted it; and it was most necessary to keep this fact in view, in order to prevent the continuance of this most hateful tax— hateful to every part of the community at all times—in order to keep the eyes of the community wide open to its nature, that they might not allow it to survive a year, a day, an hour, beyond the necessity in which the Government were placed of imposing it. Now, if he were to be told that he might wait till the measure was framed, and till, being framed and digested, a bill should be passed through the other House of Parliament, 739 and brought up to their Lordships, his answer was this—that it would be too late. Those who were against any such tax at all, and who saw no necessity in the present state of our finances to resort to such an expedient—they might very consistently say, "Wait till the bill comes here." But his (Lord Brougham's) belief was, that the Government was driven to it; that there were no means of avoiding it; that the very existence of the country required the filling up the lamentable deficiency in our revenue; and, let the bill come up to their Lordships in ever so objectionable a shape, they must reject it or accept it as it was; they could not dare to make any alteration in it; they might not vary a single clause, or it would be thrown out by the other House. Now, there was one point to which he wished particularly to call the attention of his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack (Lord Lyndhust). If an income-tax bill came from the other House, and the bill was framed upon any thing like the same model with the former income-tax bill, it would not only contain a great many money clauses, but a great many provisions of another description, not affecting the pecuniary interests, but the most important rights of her Majesty's subjects. The whole machinery of the tax—the establishment of boards—the powers of the commissioners—the right of appeal,—all the judicial or quasi judicial parts of the act—all these were parcel of that measure; and in all the corresponding parts of the present bill, their Lordships would be incapable of introducing any amendment, unless they chose to reject the bill altogether. In fact, their Lordships would be so situated that they could not exercise their judgment upon matters peculiarly suited to their own functions, because these matters were mixed up with that which was exclusively within the cognisance, or in practice was claimed as exclusively within the cognisance, of the other House; and thus their Lordships could not prevent any detail of judicial arrangements from passing just as the Commons had framed it, unless they wholly rejected the bill. And what would be the consequence of doing so? The public service required an immediate supply; however objectionable any clause might be, and however contrary to justice as well as to law—though it might contravene all right and all law—however 740 bad it might be, let them alter it at their peril, or amend any one blunder in any one word of the clause, however glaring— at their peril let them touch it. Why? Public credit was at stake, and delay might be fatal to, he did not know how many important interests. Then he did entreat the attention of their Lordships to this subject, and especially that of his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, who must be fully aware of the necessity of some precaution in these respects. Why could not the bill be divided into? Why not make one bill the money bill, and make the other consist of the provisions not within the exclusive privileges real or supposed of the Commons House? It would not be inconsistent with the privileges of that House, and would not be a deviation from its purpose, to frame two bills, and send one up to their Lordships as a money-bill, and the other as a bill with which they could deal. He saw no objection to that course, and he was satisfied that it would be attended with advantage. He wished to speak with all possible respect of the privileges of the other House, but he wished to give some answer to those who said, "See what clauses come up to us from the Commons! See what mistakes are made How could such a clause ever find its way into such a bill?" He was disposed to give the same answer as that given by Lord Liverpool to Lord Grenville, who once observed, from the votes of the other House, that strange absurdities had found their way into bills then in progress through the Commons. Lord Liverpool did not at all object to this interference of Lord Grenville with a measure pending elsewhere; but he gave for answer, that there had been so great a pressure of business in the other House, referring to the inquiry going on into the conduct of the commander-in-chief, in 1809, that the Commons had not been able to mature the measures which they were obliged to send up, from the exigencies of the public service. That was the answer he (Lord Brougham) should give to those who objected to many of the bills which came from the other House of Parliament. It furnished, however, the strongest reasons for this House severely revising those bills, and he had shown how it might have an opportunity of revising those parts of the Income-tax-bill which are not connected with money. But now, with 741 regard to those which were money clauses, and in respect to which no such arrangement could be made—another course was necessary; their Lordships having no means of altering those clauses, were now called on to consider their principle; and he said, it was a very great fallacy to suppose there was any uniformity in the same rate, applying to all incomes, where they were of the same amount but of different descriptions. "You say," continued the noble and learned Lord, "you impose an uniform tax; and you take 3 per cent., or 10 per cent. from the landlord, and the same from the tenant, and you estimate the profits of the tenant; and how do you estimate his net profits? If the framework of this measure is to be like that of the former Income-tax, which yielded, in 1815, a gross sum of 16,500,000l.—if, on the ground of its success, this measure is likely to be framed upon the same principle— see the great inequality of that scheme. The tenant's income was taken at a certain proportion of the rent; it was assumed that the tenant's profits were equal to three-fourths of the rent he paid to his landlord, the Scotch tenant one-half, and the English tenant three-fourths. I assume that you do not mean to raise the Scotch tenant to three quarters, (which you would find it somewhat difficult to do,) but that you will lower the English to one-half, taking the tenant's profits everywhere at one half his rent. But does it follow that a tenant in all cases makes a profit equal to half his rent? Does every tenant who pays a rent of 1,000l. realize a profit of 500l.? Does every tenant who pays a rent of 600l. gain a clear profit of 300.? I will undertake to say it is not so; and indeed wherever land is let low the tenant's gains are the greater. You are in search of profits—you admit you do not intend to tax land, but only the profits arising from the land; but whilst you think you are taxing profit, you are in reality taxing capital. Suppose money laid out in improvements on a farm—that a high rent is obtained from the tenant, and that he gets high profits; if he has improved during his lease, you take his income, not as his real profits, but according to his rent; and so far there may be no harm done. But suppose a party farms his own land, and invests money in improvements, so much this year, which is vested in the land, so much next year, and I will say he stops there; the two 742 years' expenditure comes from his capital, and is invested in improvements. On what speculation? In hopes of reaping a benefit from it at some time to come. Upon this principle he laid out his capital, receiving for the present no profit, no income at all, in order that in some few years the profits from his land should be increased, either by obtaining a greater emolument, if he retained it in his own hands, or, if he let it, by receiving a larger rent. But the tax-gatherer steps in between the outlay and the return, and says, "Oh, this is not invested capital, but income and profits, and I tax it as profits." Now, is that fair? Is that taxing income? No; it is taxing expenditure and capital; you grasp at profits, but you seize capital; you affect to take interest, but you lay hold of principal; you snatch at the fruit to pluck it, but you tear away the branches and wound the stem of the tree; you say you only want to tax income, and you tax expenditure. I take an example from the farmer, but the same principle applies to trade, and perhaps more strongly. Suppose a manufacturer has erected a mill, or an iron master has built furnaces, at a large expense, say 7,000l.; he did this not to sink the money for an annuity; it was capital expended in trade to be returned with a profit. But in what shape returned? In the shape of income, not at 4 or 5 per cent., that was not the rate of interest for which his money was laid out, but to return 10, 15, or 20 per cent., that he might in a few years be able to replace with a profit the capital he had expended; and yet, though this is capital invested, and no return is really made by income, except as to the profits, the whole, capital, profits, and all, is brought within the Income-tax and made to pay, as if it were landed estate or an established trade transmitted from father to son, in which there had been no outlay except the ordinary expense of repairs or of the wear and tear. If these are hard cases with reference to the farmer and the trader, the case is still harder of the life annuitant. You tax the life annuitant as if he were a capitalist, and yet he has no power to alter his investment, or to break in upon his principal, or to provide for a family, or to meet an unforeseen expense, and is compelled to subsist upon a certain annual income. I know that there are great difficulties in dealing with particular cases, from the endless variety of circumstances; 743 but this is only a reason against the tax, and no reason for not making it as bearable as such an impost can by any contrivance be rendered. One man has an estate in fee simple of 5,000l. a year, with power to provide for children, and to deal as he pleases with it; he expends what he pleases, he has the fee simple of the land. Another is only tenant for life, the estate being tied up in strict settlement, without any power beyond his own incumbency to the extent of a shilling; and yet the income-tax of 1815 (the last tax) held both liable to an equal amount of tax, giving no abatement to the mere tenant for life, who was without the power of incumbering the estate one farthing. I cannot help thinking that some more equitable course might be taken in such cases. But if the observation applies to estates for life, as compared with estates in fee simple, how much more powerfully does it apply to another case—that of the professional man? I can conceive nothing more deplorable than the situation of a professional person whose income is reduced by the weight of this tax—a tax to which he cannot, if honest, escape —a tax which no honourable man would endeavour to escape — a tax which it may be utterly impossible for many such persons to pay without reducing them to a state of embarrassment truly painful to contemplate. Having no capital to support them in case of emergency, their whole subsistence, and that of their family, and the chance of a provision for that family, depending upon their personal exertions; where illness, weakness, altered circumstances (without any fault aye or any failure of their own) may concur to overwhelm them; with none of the resources of capitalists, and with no means of borrowing money to help out the diminished income; and exposed to all the hazards which beset professions—I lay on one side, and set off in favour of the trader, and as against the professional man, the chances of a profession—of my own profession, or the medical profession, in which success depends, in a great degree, upon the party's own exertions—I set off in favour of the trader those risks to which he is exposed against those chances which beset the path of the professional man; against the variations in the gale of popular favour, whence the frequent client no longer besieges the door at early dawn, I set off the winds that 744 buffet the trader's vessel; let all these hazards be equal to both classes; but still the lawyer, the physician, the divine, the literary man, have serious risks, and many difficulties of which the capitalist knows nothing. The professional man, to live, must continue in health and strength:— a weakened mind and exhausted spirits; —a debilitated frame, worn out by mental labour;—disease and premature decay suspending his powers and cutting short his life, after reducing him to misery, leave his family to perish,
Optima quæque dies miseris mortalibus ævi Prima fugit: subeunt morbi, tristisque senectus: Et labor, et duræ rapit inclementia mortis.The noble and learned Lord proceeded to say, that he hoped and trusted some attention would be paid to the peculiar situation of professional men, before the decree went forth that they should be taxed at the same rate to which those who derived profit from the land, the funds, and trade, were about (he must say justly, if unavoidably) to be subjected. If other incomes were subjected to 4 per cent., and those of professions, clergymen, physicians, lawyers, and literary men, were taxed at 2 per cent, he thought the possessors of those higher-taxed incomes would have no reason to complain. But it did not appear necessary to increase the rate on income derived from property; keep it at 3 per cent., and lower the rate to 2 upon professional income, and he thought there would be still enough to supply the deficiency. It was dangerous to speculate upon subjects of finance, but he believed that the probable amount of this tax had been greatly underrated. He believed that the tax would yield a larger sum than had been calculated; and though the more this tax yielded the greater was the abhorrence with which he viewed it, he derived one consolation from considering that the amount would be so much greater; for the more productive it was, the sooner would the hard and cruel necessity of imposing it be at an end. The reason why he thought the amount of the tax had been underrated was, that it had increased very much during the last four or five years of its former existence. In the time of Mr. Pitt, the income tax from 1798 to 1802 averaged 5,500,000l. a-year. [Lord Bexley here observed that it began at 4,400,000l.] Then it never exceeded 5,500,000l. There had been a great change in the frame of the measure when 745 Lord Sidmouth became finance minister, and he thought it impossible to give to that nobleman greater praise than he deserved, for the ability, boldness, and extraordinary vigour of the measures with which he met the financial difficulties of the time when he was called to act. Among other things, he had made the income-tax effectual; in one sense more intolerable, and therefore the more clearly to be suffered only during the war, but in another respect less grievous, because more equally levied and less easily evaded. The principle was to make those pay who had no interest in concealing the income, and leave them to deduct the tax from the owner of the income. Thus the tax was laid on tenants, and their rents might be got at; and they were allowed to charge their landlord; the debtor was made to pay, and to deduct the payment from his creditor, whom he had no interest, probably no inclination to screen. Generally speaking, that was the principle of the act. What was the consequence of this ingenious contrivance of the noble Lord opposite (Lord Bexley) and Lord Sidmouth? The tax soon rose to 10,000,000l.; it had got to 12,500,000l. about 1810, and in the next five years the gross produce rose to 16,500,000l. But he thought the tax would now exceed the estimate from the produce under the three schedules, A, B, and D, including landlords, tenants, trades and professions; for in those schedules their Lordships would find that the amount increased in the seven years from 1807 to 1814 no less than 3,500,000l. Making an allowance for the depreciation of the currency, there was an improvement of 3,000,000l. in seven years, and about 1,500,000. in the last three years. For some years the tax on trades and professions had not increased materially, only 7000l. between 1810 and 1813; but this was owing to the commercial distress; and in 1814, there was an increase of upwards of 400,000l., being very nearly the same in amount as the increase upon the taxes levied on landlords and tenants, and much greater in proportion. Trade had then resumed its activity; and, if they found that there was this constant increase not only in the income tax levied upon land, but also upon trade, it followed of necessity that after the termination of the war there must have been some increase at least going on in the taxable income of the country. Allowing all the 746 improvements in agriculture since the war to go for nothing, allowing that all the new land brought into cultivation could only be set off against the lowering of rents in other parts of England, then you would still have to calculate upon an increase in the taxable income derived from trade, manufactures, and commerce in all its branches, and that increase must of necessity be very considerable. Recollect that during that time 25,000,000l. of war-taxes were given up, and that the increase to which he adverted had taken place while you were raising that large amount of war-taxes. Notwithstanding this enormous capital withdrawn from employment, and notwithstanding the lavish expenditure of the war, the income of the country had gone on increasing. It was, therefore, certain that upon the remission of those taxes there must have been a considerable addition made to the taxable income of the country. For his purpose it was not necessary to show an enormous increase. It was only necessary for him to show such an increase as would relieve tenants from a portion of their share of an Income-tax, the owners of life estates, and the professions, from a portion of their share. It was only necessary for him to show so great an increase of taxable income, as would raise your estimate of the amount to be derived from a 3 per cent. tax, enough to enable you to spare a little the farmer and the professions, whether lawyer, physician, divine, or literary man. He hoped and trusted their Lordship would be of opinion that he had made out a sufficient case, in the first place, to stamp upon their minds, and, if he could prevail upon their Lordships to record upon their journals, the fixed determination that an Income-tax, if by necessity it must now be imposed, should not survive that necessity by the fraction of a year; and in the next place, that any Income-tax to be so imposed, though it could contain no variation of rate as between one amount of income and another, should yet contain a just and reasonable variation of rate as between one kind of income and another. He had not as yet said a word upon that part of an Income-tax which, after all, was at once the most hateful and the most difficult to avoid—he meant its inquisitorial character. As if it were the fate of this tax, in all its operations, to fall most unequally upon different persons and different species of property in differ- 747 ent classes of the community, instead of being recommended, as it was most vainly and thoughtlessly said to be, by its great equality; as if it were the fate of this tax to fall unequally in all its pressure, so in this, the worst part of its pressure, its inquisitorial action, it fell most unequally upon different classes. What was it to the fund holder to let the extent of his income be known, a thing which of necessity must be known to all mankind? What was it to the person in a public office, whose income was as well known as the name of the office itself? Compared with the trader and the professional man, what was it to the landowner? Most men's incomes in the country were pretty well known through their tenants, though their debts were less known; and it might be that the landowner was sufficiently punished by having his incumbrances inquired into. Still, what was it? It was a great inconvenience. But what proved only an inconvenience to him, might be absolute ruin to the trader. It was not a matter of morbid sensibility, of wounded vanity or pride, or what you will, that made the trader averse to have any one prying into his concerns. To him, it might be a matter of life or death to have it known in what circumstances he was placed. The consequence was this, that he was fain sometimes to pay upon a much larger income than he really possessed. He gave in his account sinking his losses, which, if he disclosed, the next year might see his name in the "Gazette." It was said, that these things were told to honourable persons, that they were not made public, that they were brought before a board, and that it was commissioners only to whom they were revealed. But, then, they were commissioners not of the trader's own choosing, and they might be of all the community just the very individuals from whom he would rather conceal the exact state of his affairs. This inquisition, therefore, only added to the horror with which an Income-tax must be regarded— only increased, if it were possible to increase, the repugnance which all men must feel to giving, and embittered, if it were possible to make more bitter the pain, with which every man must give, his consent, as a matter of necessity, to the imposition of such a tax. It also made clearly and undeniably necessary the resolution of the Government—whether 748 the Government resolved or no he cared not—but the resolution of the Parliament and the people of this country, that by one hour after the necessity should have ceased, so odious an impost should no longer be suffered to endure. That it should light upon all classes which could afford to pay it; that the burden should be borne by all ranks which were in a condition to bear it; every one must admit: and it was his unspeakable gratification to have been informed that these sentiments were not his only, or their Lordships', or the sentiments of the people at large, but that the wishes of the people, and their Lordships' wishes, had been nobly and graciously anticipated; and that long before the time arrived, when they had the opportunity of breathing those wishes, a resolution had been taken that the burden which necessity alone could justify the Government in proposing, and Parliament in laying, should be borne by the highest as well as by the humbler classes of the community. It was the fiction—the decorous fiction—of our Constitution, that for the discharge of all painful duties the Crown had responsible advisers; but that every act of grace and favour proceeded from the monarch himself. On this occasion, however, he spoke not the fiction of the Constitution, but the truth of the fact, when he said, that the monarch herself, and not the minister, was to be thanked for this act of grace. He had detained their Lordships, he should, on any other occasion, say, a most unreasonable time, but on one of such moment as the present, and so deeply interesting to the whole community, he could hardly suffer even his respect for their Lordships to betray him into asking their excuse. He gratified no personal feeling, he performed an irksome office. He yielded up, or rather he suspended, his implacable hostility to the policy of an Income-tax, only because he felt it to be required by the pressing necessities of the country. He sought no party favour, for he had stated doctrines on the one hand differing from those of his noble Friends opposite, and on the other hand, doctrines to which his noble Friends near him probably would not accede. He courted no favour out of doors, for he set his face alike against the open robbery of the public creditor, and the disguised confiscation of a graduated scale. He had discharged his duty as a Member of Parliament in 749 the manner and at the season which reflection upon the subject, and an anxious attention to the whole state of the question, taught him to believe were the fittest to meet the exigency of the occasion; and he now closed his remarks with expressing this one additional regret, he must call it, for the tax now seemed to be inevitable, that what ought to have been our resource in war, and ought to have been reserved for a time of war, should unhappily, from dire necessity, be resorted to in a time of peace; although ever since 1816 he had fondly hoped otherwise, with his late Friend Mr. Wilberforce, who upon that occasion gave a sound and a memorable advice.Let this lax," said he, "always be wedded to war, not only that the people may be relieved from such a burden in time of peace, but that the people and that humanity may have less risk of war; when those in whose hands the waging of war, or the keeping of peace may be, are aware, and when the people are aware, of the cost which war must entail upon them.But he might have added, and this doubled the regret with which one saw such a magnificent national resource as this presented for a time of war anticipated and resorted to in time of peace—he might have added, that the bare knowledge by the rest of the world that we had this splendid resource upon which to retreat, that we might levy, as we did before, by war-taxes, upwards of 20,000,000l. in one year, to support the necessities of the war—he might have added, that the bare knowledge of that fact incalculably increased, and to a certain degree, notwithstanding our now having recourse to it partially, it must still increase the weight, the power, and the influence of this country in all its negotiations and all its proceedings—an influence which it might possess, which it ought to possess, and which he hoped it ever would possess, as long as the moderation, and justice, the conciliatory and peaceful spirit in which its immense power was wielded should entitle it to the possession, but not one instant longer; as long as it acted in that spirit, as long as its power was wielded with a firm hand, but directed by a just and conciliatory spirit, its influence would never be grudged by any, because its conduct would be respected by all. The noble and learned Lord then moved a series of resolutions; for which, see ante 508.
§ The Earl of Riponwas not at all surprised 750 that his noble and learned Friend had felt it to be his duty to bring under the consideration of their Lordships in the manner he had done the very important question which they might hereafter have to consider under circumstances much more favourable to its consideration than the present. He recollected the course taken by his noble and learned Friend in the year 1816, when he succeeded in inducing the House of Commons of that day to prevent the continuance of the Income-tax after the cessation of the war; and although, speaking of that transaction in a mere financial point of view, he might retain the belief, that the success of his noble and learned Friend's efforts, to a certain degree at least, contributed to aggravate the difficulties of the financial position of the country in subsequent years, yet he could not say, that his noble and learned Friend was not justified in the course he had taken. He quite agreed with his noble Friend, as to the necessity of reserving that which he had truly described as a splendid resource for times of imminent and pressing necessity, which must be held to transcend all other considerations. He gave his noble and learned Friend full credit for the motives which induced him to come forward on the present occasion as the advocate of a measure which he so well appreciated, the character of which he so powerfully described, and which his noble and learned Friend now felt to be indispensably necessary for the support of the interests, if not of the independence, of the country. There were many things stated by his noble Friend in the course of his powerful, clear, argumentative, and eloquent speech, which he thought it was impossible for any man to dissent from. No one could deny the self evident truth of the first proposition contained in the noble Lord's resolutions, or the general truth of the second. There were three points in them which, as abstract truths, were quite undeniable, as were also many of the arguments by which his noble and learned Friend supported them; but he must confess, that he could not reconcile to his mind the adoption of these resolutions in the state in which the question then stood in their Lordships' House. He could not agree in thinking, that, it was either convenient, judicious, practical, or safe for that House, upon the first information, that a question, was likely to be brought forward in the other House of Parliament, immediately to proceed to record a deliberate set of resolu- 751 tions, which, if adopted, and ultimately turned out to be inconsistent with the bill which the House of Commons might send up, would place their Lordships in the extraordinary, he was going to say ridiculous predicament, of either being compelled to reject the bill because it was not founded upon the principle they had solemnly recorded, or else to retreat from their own solemnly recorded opinion, and accept the bill without the conditions which they had previously decided ought to belong to it. It appeared to him impossible, that the business between the two Houses of Parliament could be safely transacted in this way. His noble Friend laid it down as a principle, which he did not dispute, that they had always claimed the right, and had never abandoned that claim, of dealing with their taxation-bills by alteration as well as rejection; but then years and years had elapsed since they had thought it judicious or practically consistent with the transaction of business between the two Houses of Parliament rigidly to enforce that right, and so deal with those bills. Would they not then be doing the same thing, only in a different manner, if they determined, that a bill upon a particular subject should be founded upon certain principles? Would they not be saying to the House of Commons, "Now mind, we don't profess the intention of altering your bill; we claim the right of doing so, but we know you deny that right: we don't mean to have a collision on the point, but mind, we tell you beforehand, that your bill must contain certain propositions, and be founded upon certain principles, or we cannot receive it." That would be an exceedingly awkward and inconvenient mode of discussing a question of this kind. His noble Friend had referred to certain cases, and first, that of Lord Grenville, than whom no one certainly better understood all the constitutional bearings of the proceedings in both Houses of Parliament. The first case referred to, in which Lord Grenville was concerned, related to a bill for the purpose of regulating the Household. He did not remember all the circumstances to which the noble and learned Lord had referred, but he understood the noble and learned Lord to say, that when that bill (which the noble and learned Lord said was in some sense a money bill) came up from the Commons, Lord Grenville took the course of moving for a committee of their Lordships' House upon it.
Lord BroughamNo; it was before the bill came up, that Lord Grenville addressed the House. Mr. Perceval had made a financial statement in the other House, and then Lord Grenville addressed their Lordships' House, but it was upon papers, and in a manner wholly unconnected with the bill, although it did happen, that that bill came up on the very same day.
§ The Earl of RiponAt all events, the House did not adopt Lord Grenville's proposition, because they saw its inconvenience, and the fact only went to show, that under peculiar circumstances, and to a certain extent, Lord Grenville thought it possible for the House to take a particular course.
§ The Earl of RiponSo much the stronger case, then, was there against the noble and learned Lord, who had moved resolutions, by which resolutions, if adopted, that House would be bound hereafter. The other case adduced by the noble and learned Lord with reference to Lord Grenville was one with which he was not familiar, and therefore, he would offer no remark upon it. But the noble and learned Lord had alluded to a case in which he had referred to a noble Friend of his now no more (Lord Holland), as to whose public spirit, and those other qualities which the noble and learned Lord had ascribed to him, no man would be more ready than himself to bear testimony. It appeared, that in that case the Commons had entertained a measure for the purpose of paying out of the consolidated fund 100,000l. for a certain purpose connected with the Church; he believed for the increase of small livings. What did Lord Holland do on that occasion? He did not call upon the House to record a deliberate opinion, which would have been improper; but he asked for a committee to inquire whether out of the revenues of the Church itself, might not be found the means of doing what was required. That appeared to him to be no interference whatever, directly or indirectly, with the privileges of the Commons; for there was nothing in the appointment of a committee, or in what might have followed from it, to pledge their Lordships' House to adopt on that occasion a course different from that of the other House; non constat, that they would hare objected to that aid out of the public 753 revenue which the Commons were then disposed to give. Therefore, that case did not bear out the noble and learned Lord on the present occasion. He felt himself absolved from the necessity of entering at length into the topics on which the noble and learned Lord had enlarged with so much talent and ability, although he might be disposed individually to agree in many of his remarks; and, entirely concurring as he did in the noble and learned Lord's declaration, that the proposed tax was a resource to which Parliament ought not to have recourse, except under the pressure of dire necessity, still, unless the noble and learned Lord thought he had reason to believe (and the noble and learned Lord had not indicated any such belief) that there existed a design on the part of the Government to entrap Parliament into the passing of this act on the plea of absolute necessity, and for a limited period only (so limited, indeed, as to render it necessary for Parliament to consider it at a very early period)—unless the noble and learned Lord thought them mean and shabby enough so to trick Parliament in order to get the measure passed, and then afterwards to continue it as a permanent tax—unless this was the case, and there were grounds for it which the noble and learned Lord did not even suggest, he did not see why, as a preliminary step, their Lordships should be called upon to declare by resolution their opposition to it. He was quite sure, however, that the noble and learned Lord did not think they deserved to labour under any such imputation. Under these circumstances, it appeared to him, that there could be no occasion for adopting these resolutions. There was one point, however, on which the noble and learned Lord had laid great stress, which he did not mean to discuss, but to which he must refer, because none of the resolutions of the noble and learned Lord touched it; he alluded to the subject of the mode in which the Income-tax was to be levied—the machinery by which such income was to be ascertained. The noble and learned Lord had laid great stress upon that branch of the subject, and had described in glowing language the severity and hardship, and injury that would be caused if the inquisitorial mode of inquiry were carried on. Yet, although the noble and learned Lord had dwelt quite as impressively upon that case as upon the cases of the tenant at will, of persons holding life interests, and 754 of those in trades and professions, there was no resolution affecting it. But if the objections of the noble and learned Lord on that head were well founded, and if a bill should come up containing clauses regarded on that ground as objectionable, their Lordships would still, if they could not consent to those clauses, have no alternative but to reject the bill. Therefore it appeared to him that the resolutions of the noble and learned Lord did not go far enough to secure the attainment of his own object. Looking, however, at the relative position in which the two Houses stood, it could not but be regarded as an extraordinary course, that their Lordships' House should in the first instance lay down certain principles, so that if a bill came up from the other House that did not accord with those principles they could have no alternative but to reject it. That ground alone, in his mind, sufficiently showed that they ought not to agree to these resolutions, and he should therefore take the opportunity before he closed of moving the previous question. Before he did so, however, there were two observations of the noble and learned Lord in which he desired to express his full and entire concurrence. The first was in relation to one of the resolutions—one which, for the reasons that had been stated by him, he conceived could not now be put. He alluded to the third resolution, which referred to the call which the nation had on the highest personage in the country to share in the general pressure of taxation. The noble and learned Lord had, with more eloquence than he could command, alluded to the feeling, the delicacy, the promptitude with which that illustrious personage had expressed, through her Minister, her readiness to concur with her people in bearing any burden which the necessities of the State might require. But though he was not able so eloquently to express his feelings, he felt as strongly on the subject as the noble Lord did, and he did not think there was a man, woman, or child in the country who would not share in the gratification which that announcement had produced. The other observation of the noble and learned Lord to which he desired to refer, was that relating to the feeling which other nations of the world might entertain as to the power and resources of this country. Though it might be true, that those nations would necessarily become impressed with the vast resources which this tax would give 755 to the Government in time of war, he could not but think that that very circumstance of our being prepared by a sense of necessity, in time of peace, for a limited time, and for a particular purpose, to impose such a tax, which the people were prepared to submit to as a great effort to re-store the finances, he thought that this very circumstance would more than anything tend to show the world the power and resources of this country, and induce those nations not to swerve from that course of friendliness and conciliation with regard to this country which the noble and learned Lord had described, and which he believed it was the disposition of all foreign powers to continue to pursue in conducting the affairs of the world. The noble Earl concluded by moving the previous question.
Lord Broughamexplained, that he had omitted any resolution with reference to the inquisitorial nature of the proposed tax, because he was not to know that the bill would contain clauses of that nature, but at the same time he had felt that the very nature of an Income-tax rendered some such machinery necessary. If there should be such clauses in the bill, when it came up they could be considered without the difficulties which would attend the money clauses.
Previous question put, and it was agreed nem. con. that Lord Brougham's resolutions should not be put.
§ Adjourned.